Appendix — Lau v. United States

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Po RE Gt SERENE IES, Ei a

87-18 if Buna Cut,

NO.

OLERK

JAN 27 1986

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JI

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

MICHAEL ALAN LAU and

BRUCE TAYLOR,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

FIRST CIRCUIT

ROBERT AUGUSTUS HARPER

131 North Gadsden Street

Post Office Box 10132

Tallahassee, FL 32302-0132

(904) 224-5900

Counsel for Petitioners

a re

—_— = ra SP ee

Description Page

I. Portions of the Record Necessary to 1

Show Proper and Timely Raising of

Federal Questions

II. Opinions —~f the Lower Court 5

A. United States Court of Appeals 5

for the First Circuit -

Opinion 09-15-87

B. United States Court of Appeals 27

for the First Circuit - Order

on Rehearing 10-29-87

C. United States Court of Appeals 29

for the First Circuit -

Judgments/Mandates 11-09-87

III. Judgments Sought to be Reviewed 37

A. United States District Court af

for the District of Puerto Rico

(Lau)

B. United States District Court 40

for the District of Puerto Rico

(Taylor)

a.

I. RECORD SHOWING PROPER AND TIMELY RAISING OF

FEDERAL QUESTIONS :

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *

vs * Criminal Case

MICHAEL, ALAN LAU and * No. 85-321 (PG)

BRUCE TAYLOR .

FIFTH DAY OF JURY TRIAL

The above-captioned case came to be heard

before the HONORABLE JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ, United

States District Court Judge, sitting at San Juan,

Puerto Rico, on December 16, 1985 at 9:00 a.m.

FERNANDO ALTAMIRANO, Official Court Reporter

P. O. Box 383, San Juan, P.R. 00902

722-2003, 722-1553

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Are the parties ready?

MR. BAZAN: The government is ready, Your

Honor.

MR. CAMPER: We are ready.

[Counsel for Lau]

MR. TAYLOR: We are ready, Your Honor.

[Counsel for Taylor!

THE COURT: Bring the jury in.

MR. BAZAN: Your Honor, before the jury is

brought in I want to inform that the government

intends to present evidence of prior Similar acts.

If counsel for defendants have any objection

to it, or any objection at all, I think it should

be discussed right now before the jury comes in.

MR. TAYLOR: It is our position that at

this point in time it certainly is questionable as

to whether or not 404(b) will come in, in light of

the evidence that is being presented today, and I

think the appropriate procedure would be a

proffer, either through the witness, what evidence

he's expected to introduce, so that this Court can

.

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jury. I think that would be the most safe course.

THE COURT: Mr. Camper?

MR. CAMPER: Same motion, Your Honor.

a ,

II. OPINIONS OF THE LOWER COURT:

A.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

No. 86-1255

No. 86-2008

Appellee,

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Defendant, Ay

No. 86-1256 UNITED

No. 86-2002

OR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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UDASTY 1dg

Before

Breyer and Selya, Circuit Judges ,

and Re,* Judge.

William L. Camper for appellant Michael Alan Lau.

Clyde M. Taylor, Jr. for appellant Bruce Taylor.

Antonio R. Bazan, Assistant United States

Attorney, with whom Daniel F. Lopez Romo,

United States Attorney, was on brief for

appellee.

*hief Judge of the United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

—

BREYER, Circuit Judge. The appellants,

Michael Lau and Bruce Taylor, appeal their

convictions for importing and possessing cocaine

and for conspiring to do so. 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), 846, 942(a). They claim that there was

insufficient evidence for conviction; they make

several claims relating to a DEA informant's

testimony about their participation in an earlier

cocaine smuggling scheme; and they ask for a new

trial because they say the government withheld

exculpatory evidence. We do not believe their

arguments are legally sufficient, and we affirm

their convictions.

I

Appellants' first claim is that there was

insufficient evidence for conviction. A reading

of the record, with inferences appropriately drawn

in the government's favor, see United States v.

Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1984); United

States v. Patterson, 644 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir.

1981), indicates the following basic series of

events:

i In the morning of August 9, 1985,

appellant Michael Lau, president of St. Maartin

Helicopter Service, landed his helicopter in St.

Croix, Virgin Islands. He falsely told a United

States customs officer that he was traveling on to

San Juan, Puerto Rico, with only one passenger and

that the senior inspector of U.S. customs in St.

Croix had said it was all right to "pre-clear'" the

flight, that is, to grant U.S. customs clearance

in St. Croix instead of San Juan. The customs

officer then pre-cleared Lau without inspecting

the helicopter. (Tr. 259, 262-63, 266-68)

ae Later that day, Lau landed _. his

helicopter in San Juan. Lau, an elderly man, and

another man in a wheelchair all got off the

helicopter. (Tr. 196) Lau and the elderly man

unloaded several suitcases from the helicopter and

"left them between two vehicles."" (Tr. 336-37)

The elderly man and the man in the wheelchair then

approached appellant Taylor, a partner in Lau's

helicopter company, who was’ standing nearby

awaiting the helicc cer's landing. (Tr. 339)

Bee

3. Gus Maestrales, a charter jet pilot whom

Lau had hired to fly his passengers from San Juan

to Orlando, asked Taylor, the elderly man, and the

man in the wheelchair if they had any luggage

except the few bags they were carrying. They

said, '[N]o, we've got more bags over there," and

pointed to six suitcases "over by a _ vehicle."

Maestrales' co-pilot complained that the six suit-

cases "weigh[ed] a ton."" (Tr. 194-96)

4, Maestrales, who was perhaps especially

cautious because authorities had found $5 million

aboard his jet the previous March (Tr. 216-17),

thought the bags were suspiciously heavy and asked

about their contents. Taylor said, ''We don't have

anything in there." (Tr. 198) Later, when

Maestrales insisted on being shown the contents of

the bags, Taylor said they belonged to a man who

had not come on the helicopter. He added, "[T]Jhey

are not mine. We don't want you to take them,

just leave the bags."' (Tr. 202) Maestrales found

a customs official, who watched as Maestrales

opened one of the bags. Inside was cocaine. (Tr.

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of cocaine. (Tr. aac)

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however, Taylor and the man in the wheelchair had

disappeared. (Tr. 277, 416) Two witnesses said

they saw Taylor pushing the man in the wheelchair

quickly toward the street. (Tr. 341, 354) One of

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them found he wheelchair abandoned index in

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refueled Lau ne licopte! iftey ne bag were

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presence tnere wa i! intortunat ! lence

he jury apparent li ! ided that the presi

the uitcase wa , " ly P ty. } ths

acts testimony we discuss below -- are more than

"sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'' United States

v. Guerrero-Guerrero, 776 F.2d 1071, 1073 (1st

Cir. 1985) (noting that our system looks to jurors

"to come up with answers that reflect’ the

common-sense view of the community"), cert. denied

sub nom. Mosquera v. United States, 106 S.Ct. 1233

(1986). .

II

The major issues on appeal concern = an

additional piece of evidence. The government

presented the testimony of Thomas Aiello, who said

that about two and one-half years before the

events described above, in January 1983, he had

worked with appellants in a cocaine smuggling

venture. Aiello said that he and Taylor and

others had met a plane that Lau had flown into

Broxton, Georgia. He helped unload from the plane

a number of boxes that proved to contain 50 to 60

"football shapes"' of cocaine. (Tr. 902-05,

908-10 )

Appellants make three separate claims in

relation to this evidence. First, they say that

Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) bars’ this

evidence of a prior bad act because it is relevant

only to show appellants' bad character. Second,

they say the trial judge should have excluded the

evidence because the government offered insuffi-

cient proof that appellants were the men Aiello

saw in Georgia. Third, they say they had insuffi-

cient notice of Aiello's testimony. We consider

each claim in turn.

A

Since Aiello's testimony amounts to evidence

of a prior bad act, it "is not admissible to prove

the character of a person in order to show action

in conformity therewith. It may, however, be

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.'' Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The trial court

must consider whether the evidence has any

"special'' purpose other than to_- show. the

~ 123 «=

defendant's bad character or his propensity to

commit the crime. Then it must weigh any such

probative value against the prejudicial risk that

the jury will convict the defendant simply in

order to punish him for his past crime or will

assume that a past criminal is a bad person likely

to strike again. See United States v. Moccia, 681

F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982). The law commits this

balancing process in the first instance to the

trial court, which is more directly familiar than

a court of appeals with the need for the evidence

and its likely effect on the jury. See United

States v. Rivera Rodriguez, 808 F.2d 886, 888 (1st

Cir. 1986); United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207,

212-13 (1st Cir. 1978).

Appellants say that the Broxton incident's

probative value depended upon an impermissible

inference, namely that, because appellants

smuggled drugs before, they would likely do so

again. In our view, however, the jury might have

made use of the evidence without drawing this

inference. For one thing, the jury had to decide

=. =

which of three persons aboard the helicopter (Lau,

the old man, and/or the man in the wheelchair)

likely smuggled the cocaine. The jury might have

noted similarities between the August 9 incident

and the Broxton incident. These included (1) the

presence of a large amount of cocaine; (2) Lau's

acting as pilot; and (3) Taylor's being present to

receive the cocaine. In addition, although there

is no evidence in the transcript about the shape

of the cocaine packets seized in San Juan, samples

of those packets were before the jury, and the

prosecutor implied in closing argument that they,

like the packets Aiello saw in Georgia, were foot-

ball shaped. (Tr. 633) These similarities might

have helped the jury to infer that the persons who

smuggled cocaine into San Juan were the same as

those who smuggled cocaine into Broxton. :

For another thing (and more importantly), the

the jury had to conclude that Lau and Taylor were

not the innocent dupes of a calculating smuggler

who hired them, without their knowledge, to ferry

him and his drug shipment into the States and who

aw th

then, somehow, convinced Lau to lie to a St. Croix

customs officer. The fact that Lau and Taylor

were knowledgeable about cocaine, that’ they

probably knew first hand what it weighed and had

some sense of how it was smuggled, suggests that

Lau (like Maestrales) might have become suspicious

(if he in fact were innocent) after he was asked

to take several heavy suitcases on his helicopter

and to make false statements to the “St. Croix

customs officer. A "knowledgeable" Lau's apparent

lack of suspicion makes an innocent explanation of

his actions (and hence of his partner Taylor's

actions) less plausible. Similarly, Lau's and

Taylor's prior contact with cocaine suggests that

they knev hat Maestrales was concerned about from

the time he first voiced his suspicions; and this

fact, in turn, makes a totally naive explanation

of Lau's and Taylor's subsequent actions less

plausible. To refute such innocent or naive

explanations of the appellants' behavior does not

automatically prove appellants' guilt, but it

es i ae

helps draw tighter the circumstantial net

convicting them.

We need not decide whether either of these

two sets of inferences, standing alone, would

justify the admission of this prior bad act

evidence. Cf. United States v. Pisari, 636 F.2d

855, 858-59 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that evidence

of prior bad acts, if admitted solely to prove

identity, must show "distinctive" similarities

with the offense at bar). Together, however, we

believe they have sufficient probative value to

bring the probity-versus-prejudice balance within

the scope of the district court's lawful powers.

B

Appellants argue that the trial judge should

have excluded evidence of the Broxton incident for

a different reason, namely that the government did

not adequately show that they were participants in

the earlier smuggling event. Ot course, if Aiello

misidentified Lau and Taylor, then his evidence

has no probative value at all.

a!

Before admitting Aiello's testimony, the

district court held a hearing focusing upon

identification outside of the jury's presence.

The appellants raised the question of identifi-

cation again before the jury. After reviewing the

transcripts of both proceedings, we believe that

the identification, legally speaking, was suffi-

ciently certain to support admission of the

evidence.

Several factors weigh in favor of a correct

identification. First, Aiello twice confidently

identified Lau and Taylor in open court, both

before the judge and before the jury. (Tr. 444,

501, 505) Second, Aiello had adequate opportunity

to observe Lau and Taylor at the time of the

Broxton incident. Before the plane landed at

Broxton, he had met Lau (to give hima check), and

he had gone with Taylor to inspect the landing

strip. After the plane landed, he was with them

for several hours. (Tr. 500-07) Cf. Manson Vv.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (holding

identification reliable where witness had two to

oe iZ2«

three minutes to observe defendant); Sinmons v.

United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968) (five

minutes); Judd v. Vose, 813 F.2d 494, 499 (lst

Cir. 1987) (three to five minutes): United States

v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 609 (ist Cir.) (one

minute), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).

Third, some corroboration exists in the facts that

Lau has a licence to fly the type of plane used at

Broxton (Tr. 583), that ‘Taylor was nearby in

Alabama at the time (Tr. 602, 607), and that

Aiello consistently used the appellants' correct

first names from the time that he first described

the Broxton incident to drug enforcement agents.

(Tr. 468)

Several other factors, however, weigh against

a correct identification. First, Aiello, in

statements made soon after Broxton, incorrectly

said that Lau and Taylor were about 5'8" and 5'9"

tall (in fact they are about 5'1l1" and 6'4'"); and

he may have incorrectly said that Lau was clean

shaven (he usually wears a beard and mustache ).

Ci? 432, 455-56, 915-16, 980 ) Second,

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considerable time elapsed between the Broxton

incident and the time that Aiello positively

identified photographs of Taylor (more than one

year) and Lau (more than two years). (Tr. 471-72,

474) But see United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d

at 28 (five-year lapse between incident and

identification does not necessarily render identi-

fication unreliable). Third, Aiello saw _ the

defendants in court a few days before he identi-

fied them to the judge. (Tr. 456-58)

In addition to these sets of factors (pro an

con), Aiello correctly identified defendants from

a photo album that a DEA agent showed him sometime

before the present time took place (i.e., before

August 9, 1985). Several aspects of the photo

identification process suggest that these identi-

fications may have been accurate. (Tr. 470-86)

For one thing, the DEA agent altogether showed

Aiello between 23 and 41 photographs of several

different people, some of whom Aiello identified

as Broxton participants and others of whom he did

not. Moreover, Since Aiello picked out the

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correct photos before August 9, 1985, the DEA

could not have impermissibly encouraged him to

identify Lau and Taylor with an eye _ towards

prosecuting the present crime. Further, the DEA

placed Lau's and Taylor's photos in the book only

after having connected Lau and Taylor with a

different person whom Aiello had _ positively

identified from the beginning. (Tr. 469-70) On

the other hand, the DEA agent had shown Aiello

roughly the same display of photos (except for

those of Lau and Taylor) at least once (and

perhaps several times) before the agent placed

Lau's and Taylor's photos in the book; thus, the

other photos among which Lau's and Taylor's

appeared were not new to Aiello. Moreover, the

DEA agent placed not one but three pictures of Lau

in the book at the time that Aiello identified

him, thus, at least arguably, further increasing

the risk of a false identification.

On balance, we think the pre-August 9 photo

identifications sufficient to eliminate’ any

negative implication which appellants’ might

- 20 -

otherwise draw from Aiello's having seen the

defendants in court a few days before he identi-

fied them. Apart from that, we do not think it

can be used to Significantly strengthen the

in-court identification; the procedure is too

seriously flawed. See Sinmons v. United States,

390 ~=CUS Sj at 383-84 (police should avoid

emphasizing picture of suspect in photographic

identification); United States v. Eatherton, 519

F.2d at 608 (police should avoid repeatedly

showing same picture to witness). But neither was

the photo identification procedure so open to DEA

"suggestion'' as to undercut the reliability of the

later in-court identification. After all, Aiello

had no problem stating that he did not recognize

many of the other persons whose photographs the

DEA agent showed him under the same procedure.

Leaving the photo identification to one side,

the in-court identification, in our view, is

sufficiently reliable (despite the inconsistency

about defendants' heights) as to permit the

district court to allow the jury to hear Aiello's

a 5 |

testimony. See Sinmons v. United

at 384 (given opportunity to cross-examine

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yhotographic identification procedure

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a very substantial 1ikelihood irreparable

misidentification"'); Judd v. Vose 813 F.2d at

498-99: Gullick v. Perrin, 669 F.2d 1] 0-6 (1st

probative (as set out in Part ILiA, supra, that

the dist rict court po: sessed the lega] power

admit it. Although the appellants argue that the

identification evidence wa not "clear !

convincing," see United States v. Mascio, 774 F.2d

oo. anaes Cron Cir 1985); United States v.

McDaniel, 773 F.2d 242, 247 (8th Cir. 1955), we

note tha this circuit has not la lown a

separate mechanical evidentiary test for "past bad

act'"' identification Rather, the strength of the

evidence linking defendants to a past bad t is

but one consideration that the district court must

take into account when weighing its "probative

value" against its "prejudicial risk.'"' See United

States v. Rivera Rodriguez, 808 F.2d at 888;

United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d at 63. Without

expressing a view about whether the evidence here

is or is not "clear and convincing,'' we conclude,

on balance, that its probative value is sufficient

to bring the question of admissibility within the

scope of the trial court's lawful decisionmaking

authority.

C

Appellants also claim that despite their

timely request that the government disclose its

intention to offer 404(b) evidence, the government

failed to notify them of Aiello's testimony until

December 3, 1985, six days before trial, and that

even then the government misspelled Aiello's name.

On the day of trial, the district court refused

appellants' request for a continuance of 30 days

or of 7 days in order to respond to the evidence,

but it granted a one-day continuance over a long

weekend. A court of appeals will not find that

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these conversations, Taylor said he suspected that

someone was using the plane to transport drugs,

that he strongly opposed any drug daling, and that

he had told the FBI that the plane had _ been

stolen.

Appellants say that the government's failure

to produce these tapes violated the disclosure

rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

alternatively, they request a new trial based on

the discovery of this new evidence, see Fed. R.

Crim. P. 33. ‘To show a Brady violation, however,

appellants must demonstrate that the allegedly

suppressed evidence was "favorable'' to them and

‘material’ to guilt. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.5.

at 87. Similarly, discovery of new evidence

merits a new trial only if the evidence is

material and might have had some impact on the

outcome of the trial. See In re United States,

565 F.2d 173, 176-77 (1st Cir. 1977). We do not

think that the tapes in question meet these

standards. For one thing, appellants have not

explained how they could have admitted the tapes

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into evidence. They amount to hearsay in respect

to the truth of Taylor's statements. Fed. R.

Evid. 801, 802. They could not be offered to

impeach, since no trial witness speaks on the

tapes. And, they could not be offered to prove

Taylor's character, since the rules allow such

proof only by reputation or opinion testimony.

Fed. R. Evid. 405(a). For another think, and in

any event, we do not see how the evidence of

Taylor's professed attitude toward drugs in April

1982 (as it appeared on these tapes) could have

swayed the jury's determination of events in

January 1983, much less August 1985.

For these reasons, the judgment of the

district court is

Affirmed.

B.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Nov. O2,

No. 86-1255 UNITED STATES,

No. 86-2008

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ALAN LAU,

Defendant, Appellant.

No. 86-1256 UNITED STATES,

No. 86-2002

Appellee,

v.

BRUCE TAYLOR,

Defendant, Appellant.

ee ee EE

1987

Before

CAMPBELL, Chief Judge

COFFIN, BOWNES, BREYER, TORRUELLA and SELYA,

Circuit Judges

and RE,* Judge.

ORDER OF COURT

Entered: October 29, 1987

The panel of judges that rendered the

decision in these cases having voted to deny the

petitions for rehearing and the suggestions, for

the holding of a rehearing en banc having been

carefully considered by the judges of the Court in

regular active service and a majority of said

judges not having voted to order that the appeals

be heard or reheard by the Court en banc,

It is ordered that both petitions for

rehearing and both suggestions for rehearing en

banc be hereby denied.

By the Court:

/S/ Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk

*Chief Judge of the United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

[cc: Messrs. Camper, Taylor and Bazan]

—-

MANDATE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 86-2008 UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

MICHAEL ALAN LAU,

Defendant, Appellant.

JUDGMENT

Entered: September 15, 1987

This cause coming on to be heard on appeal]

from the United States District Court for the

District of Puerto Rico, and was argued by

counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, It is now here

—

ordered adjudged and decreed as_ follows: The

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

By the Court:

Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk.

Certified and Issued

as informal mandate under

F.R.A.P. 41 on NOV 9 1987

FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO

Clerk

By: /S/ Richard W. Gordon

Chief Deputy Clerk

[cc: Messrs. Camper, Bazan and Taylor]

sceaTrr are

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ordered adjudged and decreed as_ follows: The

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

By the Court:

Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk.

Certified and Issued

as informal mandate under

F.R.A.P. 41 on NOV 9 1987

FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO

Clerk

By: /S/ Richard W. Gordon

Chief Deputy Clerk

[cc: Messrs. Camper, Bazan and Taylor]

MANDATE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 86-1255 UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ALAN LAU,

Defendant, Appellant.

JUDGMENT

Entered: September 15, 1987

This cause coming on to be heard on appeal

from the United States District Court tor the

District of Puerto Rico, and was argued by

counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, It is now here

- 33 -

ordered adjudged and decreed as follows: The

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

By the Court:

Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk.

Certified and Issued

as informal mandate under

F.R.A.P. 41 on NOV 9 1987

FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO

Clerk

By: /S/ Richard W. Gordon

Chief Deputy Clerk

[cc: Messrs. Camper, Bazan and Taylor]

MANDATE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 86-1256 UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

BRUCE TAYLOR,

Defendant, Appellant.

JUDGMENT

Entered: September 15, 1987

This cause coming on to be heard on appeal

from the United States District Court for the

District of Puerto Rico, and was argued by

counsel.

—. “es

Upon consideration whereof, It is now here

ordered adjudged and decreed as follows: The

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

By the Court:

Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk.

Certified and Issued

as informal mandate under

F.R.A.P. 41 on NOV 9 1987

FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO

Clerk

By: /S/ Richard W. Gordon

Chief Deputy Clerk

a

III. JUDGMENTS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED:

A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.

DEFENDANT MICHAEL ALAN LAU

Docket No. Cr. 85-321-01 (PG)

JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

In the presence of the attorney for the

government the defendant appeared in

person on this date March 07, 1986

X WITH COUNSEL William Camper and

Carlos Lopez de Azua

There being a verdict of X GUILTY.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of

the offense(s) of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine, a Sch. II

Narcotic Drug Controlled Substance, in

violation of Title 21 USC § 846, 952(a),

841(a)(1) as charged in Count One; aid and

=

abet to

import cocaine, a Sch. Narcotic, in

violation of Title 18 USC § 2 and Title 21

USC § 952(a) as charged in Count Two of the

indictment; and aid and_e abet in the

possession with intent t

» distribute cocaine,

a Sch. II Narcotic, in violation of Title 18

USC § 2 and Title 21 USC § 841(a) as charged

in Count Three of the indictment.

The Court asked whether defendant had

anything to say why judgment should not be

announced. Because no sufficient cause to

the contrary was shown or appeared to the

Court the Court adjudged

the defendant guilty

as charged and convicted and ordered that The

defendant is hereby committed to the custody

of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment

of twenty (20) in

years

the sum of $20,000; for

(20) years in Count Two

$20,000; and for a

y

i

tor a period

Count One and fined

a period of twenty

and tined the sum of

tf fifteen (15)

years in Count Three and fined the sum of

$20,000. Only the imprisonment terms imposed

in Counts One and Two are to be served con-

currently with each other. The term of

imprisonment imposed in Count Three is to be

served consecutively to the terms of

imprisonment imposed in Counts One and Two.

The defendant is ordered to_ stand

committed until the fines are paid or he is

otherwise discharged by due course of law.

Credit towards the sentence is to be

given for any time spent in jail in relation

to this case.

Juan M. Perez-—Gimenez March 7, 1986

B.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.

DEFENDANT BRUCE TAYLOR

Docket No. Cr. 85-321-02 (PG)

JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

In the presence of the attorney for the

government the defendant appeared in

person on this date March 07, 1986

X WITH COUNSEL Clyde Taylor and

Fernando Carlo Gorbea

There being a verdict of X GUILTY.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of

the offense(s) of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine, a Sch. II

Narcotic Drug Controlled Substance, in

violation of Title 21 USC § 846, 952(a),

841(a)(1) as charged in Count One; aid and

abet to import cocaine, a Sch. Narcotic, in

a

iieetiaill

violation of Title 18 USC § 2 and Title 21

USC § 952(a) as charged in Count Two of the

indictment; and aid and abet in the

possession with intent to distribute cocaine,

a Sch. II Narcotic, in violation of Title 18

USC § 2 and Title 21 USC § 841(a) as charged

in Count Three of the indictment.

The Court asked whether’ defendant had

anything to say why judgment should not be

announced. Because no sufficient cause to

the contrary was shown or appeared to the

Court the Court adjudged the defendant guilty

as charged and convicted and ordered that The -

defendant is hereby conmitted to the custody

of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period

of fifteen years (15) in Count One and fined

the sum of $20,000; for a period of fifteen

(15) years in Count Two; and for a period of

twenty (20) years in Count Three and fined

the sum of $20,000. Only the terms of

=

n ft 2 — a eee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee) ee

imprisonment imposed in Counts One and Two

are to be served concurrently with each

other. The term of imprisonment imposed in

Count Three is to be served consecutively to

the terms of imprisonment imposed in Counts

One and Two.

The defendant is ordered to stand

committed until the fines are paid or he is

otherwise discharged by due course of law.

Credit towards the sentence is to be

given for any time spent in jail in relation

to this case.

/S/ Juan M. Perez—Gimenez March 7, 1986

ee