Opposition Brief — Koons Ford of Annapolis, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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FILED |

MAR 23 1988

No. 87-1305 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

paint |

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

KOONS FORD OF ANNAPOLIS, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER

General Counsel

JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR

Deputy General Counsel

ROBERT E. ALLEN

Associate General Counsel

NORTON J. COME

Deputy Associate General Counsel

LINDA SHER

Assistant General Counsel

National Labor Relations Board

Washington, D.C. 20570

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the court of

appeals properly enforced the bargaining order issued by

the National Labor Relations Board without requiring the

Board to reopen the record so that petitioner could adduce

evidence of post-hearing employee turnover and changes

in ownership and management.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765 (Sth Cir. 1978) .....

Chromalloy Mining & Minerals v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120

i er es eae e eaca st wee Waa. W0.

Granite City Journal, 262 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1982) ........

NLRB vy. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1965) ...

NLRB v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 717 F.2d 141

ee a a as Sol wy" kino ee a wb 8

NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160 (3d

a a eles aay a dl avhew ele 49 Owed

NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) .......

NLRB vy. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, 696 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.

ALY adh Vg ee ge oh ee a

Piggly Wiggly, Tuscaloosa Div. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 1537

ee aa ae u add bs okie os vee oe

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) .............

Statute:

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. (& Supp. III)

151 ef seq.:

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(III)

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-1305

KOONS FORD OF ANNAPOLIS, INC., PETITIONER

¥.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

“ IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-A6)

is reported at 833 F.2d 310 (Table). The decision and order

of the National Labor Relations Board, including the find-

ings and recommendations of the administrative law judge

(Pet. App. A30-A45, A46-A133), are reported at 282

N.L.R.B. No. 88.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

October 28, 1987. A timely petition for rehearing was

denied on December 11, 1987 (Pet. App. A136). The peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on February 4, 1988.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

(1)

STATEMENT |

1. In November 1982, District 65, United Automobile, |

Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of |

America (the Union), began an organizational campaign

among petitioner’s service department employees (Pet.

App. A58). By mid-December 1982, the Union had ob-

tained authorization cards from at least 38 of the 66 unit

employees (id. at A39). On petition by the Union, the Na-

tional Labor Relations Board scheduled a representation

election for January 12, 1983 (id. at A118).

Petitioner’s officials, however, learned of the Union’s

organizational drive and, as a consequence, On approx-

imately 26 occasions between mid-November 1982 and

January 12, 1983, “either threatened employees with plant

closure, discharge, and layoff, more onerous working con-

ditions and stricter work rules leading to the discharge of

employees, and loss of privileges and benetits; inter-

rogated employees concerning their union sympathies and

the organization campaign; or unlawfully solicited

employees to campaign against the Union” (Pet. App.

A34-A35; see also id. at A72-A95). Specifically,

petitioner’s President, John Koons Jr., announced to an

employee whom he was interrogating about the Union that

“he didn’t need the dealership and he would close it down

and (urn it into an apartment building or an office

building” (id. at A35, A76); moreover, he told several

other employees that he did not need the dealership and

“could close the doors and move to Florida and that lite

would go on without Koons Ford” (id. at A35, A75-A76).

Petitioner’s Service Department Manager, Ned Tomar-

chio, in turn told an employee that President Koons could

easily close down the dealership and warned two

mechanics that unionization would mean that employees

could be fired or otherwise disciplined for arriving late to

———

3

work, for making unsatisfactory repairs, or for requesting

additional time to complete a job (id. at A35-A36,

A85-A88). Likewise, petitioner’s Make-Ready Manager,

Irv Sherbert, warned two mechanic’s helpers that

employees would receive more severe discipline if the

Union was selected as their collective bargaining represen-

tative, with the result that employees could be fired for a

single misstep (id. at A36, A80); he also told the two least

senior employees in his department that they would be laid

off in the event of unionization (id. at A36, A78). Tomar-

chino, Sherbert, and General Manager Ronald Hendrick

similarly threatened small groups of employees that valued

employee privileges would be taken away if the employees

elected to unionize (id. at A36, A83, A89-A90, A91-A95).

Finally, on January 6, 1983, just six days before the

representation election, petitioner increased the wages of

its body-shop employees — by granting their long-standing

demand that their compensation formula be returned to

the system that had been in effect prior to April 1982 —and

gave pay increases, averaging between 25 and 60 cents per

hour, to 15 used car, parts, and make-ready department

employees (id. at A36-A37, A97-A103, A107-A118).

The Union lost the January 12, 1983 election, with 27

employees voting in its favor, and 39 employees voting

against it (Pet. App. A47). It then filed unfair labor prac-

tice charges and objections to the election with the Board,

contending that petitioner’s pre-election misconduct had

precluded a fair election (id. at A47-A48). In response to

these charges, the General Counsel issued a complaint

against petitioner (id. at A48).

2. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ)

held that, by engaging in the aforementioned acts, peti-

tioner had violated Sections 8(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(5) of the

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (a)(3)

4

and (a)(5) (Pet. App. A46-A130). As a remedy, the ALJ |

recommended: (a) that petitioner be ordered to cease and

desist from the aforementioned acts; (b) that the results of |

the January 12, 1983 election be set aside; and (c) that peti-

tioner be ordered to recognize and bargain with the Union

as the representative of the service department employees

(id. at A126-A130).

In recommending that a bargaining order issue, the ALJ

noted both that “[t}he applicable standard is set forth in

the landmark case of N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Com-

pany, 395 U.S. 575, 613-615 (1969),” and that, under this

standard, a bargaining order may issue where a union has

at One point enjoyed majority support and the employer’s

unfair labor practices have rendered the possibility of con-

ducting a fair rerun election too slight (Pet. App. A121,

A122). The ALJ then found that petitioner “ha[d] engaged

in a pattern of unremedied unfair labor practices which ef-

fectively destroyed the conditions [necessary] for a free

and fair election, that those conditions probably cannot

and will not be restored at any time in the foreseeable

future, and that therefore a bargaining order is warranted,

based on the Union’s majority status as of November 23

and 24” (id. at A123). The ALJ explained (id. at

A123-A124 (footnotes omitted)):

The present case presents an almost textbook example

of the ‘fist inside the velvet glove.’ N.L.R.B. v. Ex-

change Parts, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). [Petitioner]

through its supervisory personnel repeatedly ham-

mered home the theme that unionization would per se

result in the loss of a wide range of privileges and

benefits which were important to the employees, e.g.,

job security, employer assistance, access tO manage-

ment, hobby night, working on cars outside the job,

parts discount, opportunity for schooling advance-

we

ment, drinking beer after work, and the annual

Christmas party. These threats for all practical pur-

poses nullified [petitioner’s] belated assertion that it

would bargain in good faith. Moreover the employees

were well aware that retention of some of these

privileges and benefits were dependent on employer

good will or other subjective or variable factors

within [petitioner’s} control, e.g., the extent to which

the service manager might grant more time to a

: mechanic on a flat rate job. Therefore, it is unlikely

that the posting of a Board notice (and that essentially

is all that a conventional Board order could provide in

this case) would offer much assurance to the

employees. * * * Most serious, however, were the pay

increases granted shortly before the election. In these

cases, * * * [e]ssentially all the Board can do is to tell

the employer not to do it again. * * * The impact of

such actions, coupled with [petitioner’s] unlawful

threats, cannot easily be forgotten. * * *

The ALJ added (id. at A125) that “neither the passage of

time nor employee turnover is likely to result in conditions

which would allow uncoerced employee choice in a free

and fair election,” noting that (id. at Al25-A126):

[Petitioner] presented evidence that as of the close of

the hearing (October 18, 1983), 24 of the 66

employees in the unit as of January 10 were no longer

employed by [petitioner], and one was no longer in

the unit. The evidence indicates that there is substan-

tial turnover among [petitioner’s] younger, unskilled

employees, e.g., porters, helpers and make-ready

employees. However the evidence also indicates that

there is much greater stability at higher levels of pro-

gression, particularly among the line mechanics and

those on commission. * * * These employees included

6

the principal union adherents and employees who

were direct targets of [petitioner’s}] unfair labor prac-

Hom. * **

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that “it will be a long

time before the 1982-83 election campaign is forgotten at

the Company and before the effects of the Company’s

unlawful conduct can be dissipated” (id. at A126).

3. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and

adopted, with minor modifications not material here, his

recommended order (Pet. App. A30-A45). The Board

noted that “[b]oth the courts and the Board have long

recognized that threats of job loss (i.e., plant closure,

discharge, and layoff) because of union activity are among

the most flagrant interference with Section 7 rights and are

more likely to destroy election conditions for a lengthier

period of time than other unfair labor practices” (id. at

A37-A38) (footnote omitted)). It then determined that

“the natural and likely result of the threats found here was

to reinforce the employees’ fear that they would lose

employment if they persisted in their union activity,” par-

ticularly since “these violations were commited by Koons,

the [petitioner’s] top official, and two department

managers of the unit employees” (id. at A38). The Board

described the wage increases awarded to 24 unit employees

six days before the election as “an equally serious viola-

tion” (ibid.), noting that “such conduct must, of necessity,

have a strong coercive effect on the employees’ freedom of

choice, serving as it does to eliminate, by unlawful means

and tactics, the very reason for a union’s existence” (/d. at

A38-A39 (footnote omitted)), and that “[w]age increases

in particular have a potential long-lasting effect, since the

Board’s traditional remedies do not require [petitioner] to

withdraw the benefits from the employees” (id. at A39

(footnote omitted)). Finally, the Board found that peti-

tioner’s “careful orchestration and general campaign to

>

destroy employee support for the Union” resulted in a

“clear dissipation of union support during the period of

[petitioner’s] most egregious violations” (ibid.) and that

“the inhibitive effects of these unfair labor practices are

likely to persist despite a substantial level of turnover and

concomitant passage of time” (id. at A40).

In this latter regard, the Board noted that “a substantial

portion of the turnover occurred among [petitioner’s]

younger less skilled employees, while many of the older

more skilled employees, who were the direct targets of

many of the threats, are still employed” (Pet. App. A460).

Moreover, “[iJn light of the extensive and repetitive nature

of the violations, in particular the threats engaged in at

general department meetings,” the Board was unwilling to

“assume that other employees were unaffected” (id. at

A41). It concluded that “[t]he continued presence of these

employees creates a potential that the inhibitive effect of

the unfair labor practices remain, preventing the possibili-

ty of a fair election” (/bid.). Finally, it refused to reopen

the record so that petitioner might adduce evidence of

post-hearing turnover in employees and changes in owner-

ship and management, including the transfer of ownership

and the presidency to Joseph Koons, finding that “the

evidence sought to be adduced would not require a dif-

ferent result” (id. at A40 n.18).

4. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the court of

appeals enforced the Board’s order (Pet. App. Al-A6). It

noted petitioner’s contention that the Board had erred by

failing to reopen the record in this case to receive peti-

tioner’s evidence concerning employee turnover and

changes in ownership and management (id. at A4). It

similarly noted the Board’s contention that it was “not re-

quired to reopen the record to consider post-hearing

evidence of changed circumstances” and that, in any

8

event, it “actually did consider this evidence” (id. at A5

(emphasis in original)). But the court concluded (ibid.)

that it did not have to resolve these issues. It noted that “a

bargaining order is in the nature of an equitable remedy”

(ibid.); that an employer who “continues to act with dis-

dain or disregard for this country’s labor laws * * *

presents the most cogent possible evidence that there could

not be a free and fair second election” (idid.); and that

“fo}nly if the employer has clean hands can there be any

reason to look at changed circumstances and determine

whether they should affect the enforcement of the

bargaining order” (id. at AS-A6). It then concluded that

petitioner did not have such clean hands, noting that “un-

fair labor practices charges had been filed against [peti-

tioner] after the Board issued its order in this proceeding,”

that “[t]hese charges were disposed of by a settlement

stipulation providing for the entry of a Board Order and a

Court Judgment enforcing that order,” and that, while

“the settlement stipulation * * * did not” include an ad-

mission that petitioner had violated the statute, it did in-

clude “an extensive order requiring compliance with the

Act and providing for full and immediate reinstatement,

and for any loss of earnings or other benefits suffered by

reason of the discharging of three specific complainants in

the proceeding” (id. at A6).' Having “reviewed in this

' The court was referring to the unfair labor practice charges

underlying the complaint that the General Counsel filed against peti-

tioner on March §, 1987. This complaint, which is attached as an ap-

pendix to this brief, alleged that, on August 5, 1985, petitioner held a

meeting at which its then-president, Joseph Koons: (a) promised to

provide employees with raises and a pension plan if they abandoned

their support for the Union; (b) solicited employees to persuade other

employees to abandon their support for the Union; (c) informed

employees that it would be futile to support the Union; (d) informed

employees that petitioner would not bargain with the Union;

9

appeal the record in the other proceeding between the par-

ties,” the court was certain that “[petitioner] [could not]

meet the ‘clean hands’ requirement” (ibid.). Accordingly,

it held that “{ijt would be * * * a waste of judicial time to

remand this cause to the Board to consider the ‘clean

hands’ issue” (ibid.).

(e) solicited employees to decertify the Union as their collective-

bargaining representative; and (f) offered to assist employees to decer-

tify the Union (App., (fra, Sa-6a). The complaint also alleged that, at

the same meeting, Joseph Koons threatened employees with discharge

if they engaged in union activities, and that other supervisory person-

nel threatened employees with discharge because of their union activi-

ty during the period January 15 through January 21, 1986 (id. at 6a).

Finally, the complaint alleged that the discharges on March 30, 1986

of three employees—Ricky Kubert, Fred Pierson, and Joseph

Smith — were due, inter alia, to their activities on behalf of the Union,

including testifying in the unfair labor practice proceedings in the in-

stant case (id. at 4a-Sa).

The complaint was settled by a stipulation in which petitioner

agreed to the entry of a Board order requiring it: (a) to cease and desist

from engaging in the conduct alleged to have occurred at the August

5, 1985 meeting held by Joseph Koons; (b) to cease and desist from

discharging or otherwise disciplining or discriminating against its

employees because of their protected activity or because “they have

filed charges or given testimony under [the Act]”; and (c) to offer

reinstatement and certain sums of backpay to the three discharged

employees (Pet. App. All). The settlement stipulation contained a

non-admission clause stating that “by entering [into] this Stipulation,

[petitioner] does not admit it violated the [Act]” (id. at A13). Finally,

the settlement provided that petitioner was waiving all defenses to the

entry of a judgment by the appropriate court of appeals enforcing the

Board’s order (ibid.).

The Board approved this settlement on May 28, 1987, and entered

the agreed-upon order (Pet. App. A1l9-A27). The court of appeals

then enforced the Board’s order on August 6, 1987 (id. at A28-A29).

10

ARGUMENT

The court below reached the correct result in this case.

Its decision does not conflict with any decision of this

Court or of any other court of appeals. Accordingly

review by this Court is not warranted.

1. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,

613-614 (1969), the Court approved issuance by the Board

of bargaining orders in both “exceptional” cases marked

by “outrageous” and “pervasive” unfair labor practices

and also “in less extraordinary cases marked by less per-

vasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency

to undermine majority strength and impede the election

processes.” A bargaining order may therefore issue “where

there is a showing that at one point the union had a ma-

jority” and “the Board finds that the possibility of erasing

the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election

(or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though

present, is slight and that employee sentiment once ex-

pressed through cards would, on balance, be better pro-

tected by a bargaining order * * *” (id. at 614-615). In this

case, the Board found that petitioner’s unfair labor prac-

tices had dissipated a card majority and that the effects of

the unfair labor practices could not be erased by tradi-

tional remedies (so that a fair election could be held). Ac-

cordingly, it is clear that a bargaining order would or-

dinarily be justified. See, e.g., NLRB v. Air Products &

Chemicals, Inc., 717 F.2d 141, 144-147 (4th Cir. 1983);

Piggly Wiggly, Tuscaloosa Div. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 1537,

1540-1543 (11th Cir. 1983); Chromalloy Mining &

Minerals v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1130 (Sth Cir. 1980);

NLRB vy. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160,

167-169 (3d Cir. 1977).

2. Inthe court below, petitioner contended (Pet. Br.

15-28) that a bargaining order was not justified because

1]

of post-hearing turnover in employees and changes in

management and ownership and that the Board had erred

in issuing the bargaining order without reopening the

record so that petitioner could adduce evidence of these

post-hearing events. But, as the Board noted (Pet. Anp.

A40 n.18), “the evidence sought to be adduced would not

require a different result.” “[A] substantial portion of the

turnover occurred among [petitioner’s] younger less skilled

employees, while many of the older more skilled

employees, who were the direct targets of many of the

threats, are still employed”; “[t]he continued presence of

these [and other] employees create[d] a potential that the

inhibitive effect of the unfair labor practices [would] re-

main, preventing the possibility of a fair election” (id. at

A41 (footnote omitted)). Moreover, the only significant

change in management and ownership occurred when

Joseph Koons succeeded his brother, John Koons, Jr., as

the dealership’s owner and president, and Joseph Koons

did not disavow the prior coercive acts of petitioner’s of-

ficials or communicate to the employees in the bargaining

unit that he had taken steps to assure that their rights

would be respected in the future. See C.A. App. 77-79,

82-85, 117-140. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the

Board to conclude that, notwithstanding the alleged post-

hearing events, a fair election was not possible and a

bargaining order should still issue. See NLRB v. Keystone

Pretzel Bakery, 696 F.2d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 1982); Bandag,

Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 772 (Sth Cir. 1978); NLRB v.

Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 1965); Granite

City Journal, 262 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1158 (1982).

3. The court below rested its judgment, however, on

the alternative ground that petitioner did not have “clean

hands” warranting reopening the record to take evidence

of post-hearing events, because in fact unfair labor prac-

tice charges based on alleged post-hearing events had been

12

filed against petitioner and settled by an order approved

by the Board and enforced by the court. Even though the

results below can stand on the grounds discussed by the

Board, petitioner contends (Pet. 8-17) that this Court’s

review is warranted, because in relying on the settlement

stipulation the court of appeals violated the established

principle that a settlement agreement with a “nonadmis-

sion clause” may not be used to “impute guilt” to a party

entering into that settlement. But the court below did not

use the settlement agreement to “impute guilt” to peti-

tioner. It merely concluded that the existence of a settle-

ment, and the unfair labor practice charges underlying it,

made it appropriate not to require a new evidentiary hear-

ing to enable petitioner to show that post-hearing events

had made a fair election possible. That conclusion was

eminently sensible: the settlement did not insulate the

post-hearing events from any possible consideration in

connection with determining the appropriateness of a

bargaining order. Petitioner argued below (Pet. Br. 26, 27)

that a fair election could be held because “[t]he record

does not reflect that [petitioner] has committed an[y] un-

fair labor practices since the accession of Joseph Koons”

and is “devoid of any evidence tending to reveal any anti-

union animus on the part of [petitioner’s] current manage-

ment.” The court of appeals was not obliged to take that

claim at face value when the settlement was a matter of

record and the court knew that at any reopened hearing

the claim of no “evidence * * * of anti-union animus”

would be swiftly dashed.

4. Petitioner aiso suggests (Pet. 9, 18-20) that the deci-

sion below violates the principle of administrative law

enunciated by this Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318

U.S. 80, 87 (1943), to wit, that the validity of agency ac-

tion ordinarily must be judged solely by the grounds in-

voked by the agency. But the court here was not affirming

13

an exercise of agency discretion on grounds other than

those that supporting the actual exercise of that discretion.

It merely concluded that it was “obvious,” on the basis of

information it had before it, that further proceedings

would be “a waste of judicial time” (Pet. App. A6). At

worst, it might be said that the court gave excessive weight

to the existence of post-hearing charges in concluding that

a reopened hearing would be futile. That judgment, highly

specific to this case, does not warrant this Court’s review

in this case, where the Board’s conclusion was amply

justified by the reasons it itself gave, and where the court

of appeals’ opinion is unpublished.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER

General Counsel

JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR.

Deputy General Counsel

ROBERT E. ALLEN

Associate General Counsel

NORTON J. COME

Deputy Associate General Counsel

LINDA SHER

Assistant General Counsel

National Labor Relations Board

MARCH 1988

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APPENDIX

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD

REGION 5

Cases 5-CA-17683, S5-CA-17917, 5-CA-17933

KOONS FORD OF ANNAPOLIS, INC.

and

District 65, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA

AMENDED ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES,

AMENDED COMPLAINT, THIRD CONSOLIDATED

COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Upon a charge filed on December 11, 1985, in Case

5-CA-17683, by District 65, United Automobile,

Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of

America, herein called the Union, and upon a charge filed

on January 21, 1986, amended on February 12, 1986, in

Case 5-CA-17770, by the Union, an Order Consolidating

Cases, Amended Complaint, Consolidated Complaint and

Notice of Hearing issued on March 28, 1986, against

Koons Ford of Annapolis, Inc., herein called Respondent;

and upon a charge filed on March 17, 1986, amended on

May 5, 1986, in Case 5-CA-17917, by the Union, and upon

a charge filed on March 21, 1986, amended on May S5,

1986, in Case 5-CA-17933, by the Union, an Order Con-

solidating Cases, Amended Consolidated Complaint, Sec-

ond Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing

issued on May 23, 1986, against Respondent; and upon an

(1a)

2a

Order issued March 2, 1987, by the Administrative Law

Judge, severing Case 5-CA-17770 from the Order Con-

solidating Cases, Amended Consolidated Complaint, Sec-

ond Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing dated

May 23, 1986, and granting leave to amend the complaint

in Cases 5-CA-17683, 5-CA-17917 and 5-CA-17933: the

General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board,

herein called the Board, on behalf of the Board, by the

undersigned, pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National

Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et

seq., herein called the Act, and Section 102.15 and 102.17

of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as

amended, hereby issues this Amended Order Con-

solidating Cases, Amended Complaint, Third Con-

solidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing, and alleges as

follows:

1. (a) The charge in Case 5-CA-17683 was filed by the

Union on December 11, 1985, and a copy thereof was

served by certified mail on Respondent on the same date.

(b) The original charge in Case 5-CA-17917 was

filed by the Union on March 17, 1986, and a copy thereof

was served by certified mail on Respondent on March 18,

1986.

(c) The first amended charge in Case 5-CA-17917

was filed by the Union on May 5, 1986, and a copy thereof

was served by certified mail on Respondent on May 8,

1986. 7

(d) The original charge in Case 5-CA-17933 was

filed by the Union on March 21, 1986, and a copy thereof

was served by certified mail on Respondent on March 24,

1986.

(e) The first amended charge in Case 5-CA-17933

was filed by the Union on May 5, 1986, and a copy thereof

was served by certified mail on Respondent on May 8,

1986.

3a

2. (a) At all times material herein, Respondent, a

Maryland corporation with an office and place of business

in Annapolis, Maryland, herein called Respondent’s facili-

ty, has been engaged in the retail sale and service of

automobiles.

(b) During the preceding twelve months, a repre-

sentative period, Respondent, in the course and conduct

of its business operations described above in paragraph

2(a), derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000.

(c) During the period of time described above in

paragraph 2(b), Respondent, in the course and conduct of

its business operations described above in paragraph 2(a),

purchased and received at its facility goods and materials

valued in excess of $5,000 directly from points located out-

side the State of Maryland.

(d) Respondent is now, and has been at all times

material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within

the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.

3. The Union is now, and has been at all times material

herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section

2(5) of the Act.

4. At all times material herein, the following named

persons have occupied the positions set forth opposite

their respective names, and are now, and have been, super-

visors of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11)

of the Act, and agents of Respondent within the meaning

of Section 2(13) of the Act:

Arthur W. Dawson —Shop Foreman

Ronald L. Hendrick — General Manager

Joseph R. Koons —President

John L. Moore — Service Manager

Henry D. Sparrow —General Parts and Service

Director

4a

5. In or around February 1986, Respondent’s

employee, Joseph Smith, contacted the Maryland Occupa-

tional Safety and Health Administration (M.O.S.H.A.)

regarding alleged safety problems at Respondent’s facility,

and on or about March 5 and March 19, 1986, Respond-

ent’s employees, Joseph Smith, Fred Pierson and Ricky

Kubert, participated in a M.O.S.H.A. investigation and

inspection at Respondent’s facility.

6. On or about the dates listed below, Respondent,

acting through Henry D. Sparrow, issued letters of warn-

ing to the employees named below:

Ricky Kubert —February 19, 1986, March 14,

1986, and March 20, 1986

Fred Pierson — March 14, 1986 and March 20,

1986

Joseph Smith —February 12, 1986, March 14,

1986, and March 20, 1986

7. On or about March 20, 1986, Respondent terminated

its employees Ricky Kubert, Fred Pierson and Joseph

Smith.

8. Respondent engaged in the conduct described above

in paragraphs 6 and 7 because the employees named

therein joined, supported or assisted the Union, and in

order to discourage employees from engaging in such ac-

tivities Or other concerted activities for the purpose of col-

lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

9. Respondent engaged in the conduct described above

in paragraphs 6 and 7 because the employees named

therein gave testimony to the Board in Cases 5-CA-15050,

5-RC-11899, 5-CA-17683 and 5-CA-17917.

10. Respondent issued the warnings of March 14 and

March 20, 1986, described above in paragraph 6, and

engaged in the conduct described above in paragraph 7,

because the employees named therein engaged in the

Sa

activity described above in paragraph 5, and in order to

discourage employees from engaging in such activities or

other concerted activities for the purpose of collective

bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

11. At or around noon on or about August 5, 1985,

Respondent, acting though Joseph Koons in the upstairs

conference room at Respondent’s facility:

(a) promised employees raises and a pension plan if

they abandoned support for the Union as their collective-

bargaining representative;

(b) solicited employees to persuade other em-

ployees to abandon support for the Union as their

collective-bargaining representative;

(c) informed employees that it would be futile to

support the Union as their collective-bargaining represen-

tative;

(d) informed employees that it would not bargain

with the Union as their collective-bargaining represen-

tative; .

(e) solicited employees to decertify the Union as

their collective-bargaining representative;

(f) offered to assist employees to decertify the

Union as their collective-bargaining representative. _

12. At or around 4:30 p.m. on or about August 5, 1985,

Respondent, acting through Joseph Koons in the upstairs

conference room at its facility, threatened employees with

discharge if they engaged in protected concerted activities.

13. In or around the period between January 15 and

January 21, 1986, the exact date being presently unknown

to the undersigned, Respondent, acting through Arthur

Dawson and Henry D. Sparrow, at its facility, threatened

employees with discharge because of their activities in sup-

port of the Union by telling employees that Respondent

wanted to get rid of all the troublemakers in the shop.

Ce ee eT ne ge pe ee Te Os Fea alee Be eT eT

PS agi Dig ae tN Me: eee PER nh | GE ee at ee On

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6a

14. By the acts and conduct described above in

paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13, and by each of said

acts, Respondent has interfered with, restrained and

coerced, and is interfering with, restraining and coercing,

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-

tion 7 of the Act, and Respondent thereby has been engag-

ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section

8(a)(1) of the Act.

15. By the acts and conduct described above in

paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, and by each of said acts, Respond-

ent has discriminated, and is discriminating, in regard to

the hire or tenure or terms or conditions of employment of

its employees, thereby discouraging membership in a labor

organization, and Respondent thereby has been engaging

in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section

8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

16. By the acts and conduct described above in

paragraphs 6, 7 and 9, and by each of said acts, Respond-

ent has discriminated, and is discriminating, against

employees for giving testimony under the Act, and

Respondent thereby has been engaging in unfair labor

practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of

the Act.

17. The unfair labor practices of Respondent described

above affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)

aid (7) of the Act.

VISITORIAL CLAUSE

WHEREFORE, as part of the remedy for the unfair

labor practices alleged above in paragraphs 6 through 16,

the General Counsel seeks an order providing that Re-

spondent:

Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing,

within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps

Ta

have been taken to comply therewith. For the purpose

of determining or securing compliance with this

Order, the Board, or any of its duly authorized

representatives, may obtain discovery from Respond-

ent, its officers, agents, successors or assigns, or any

other person having knowledge concerning any com-

pliance matter, in the manner provided by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Such discovery shall be con-

ducted under the supervision of the United States

Court of Appeals enforcing this Order and may be

had upon any matter reasonably related to com-

pliance with this Order, as enforced by the Court.

The General Counsel further prays for such other relief

as may be just and proper to remedy the unfair labor prac-

tices herein alleged.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on a date to be deter-

mined, a hearing will be conducted in the Hearing Room,

4th Floor, Room 4200, Candler Building, 109 Market

Place, Baltimore, Maryland, before a duly designated ad-

ministrative law judge of the National Labor Relations

Board on the allegations set forth in the above amended

consolidated complaint, at which time and place you will

have the right to appear in person, or otherwise, and give

testimony. ~-

You are further notified that, pursuant to Sections

102.20 and 102.21 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,

Series 8, as amended, Respondent shall file with the under-

signed, acting in this matter as an agent of the National

Labor Relations Board, an original and four (4) copies of

an answer to said amended consolidated complaint within

fourteen (14) days from the service thereof, and that,

unless Respondent does so, all of the allegations in the

amended consolidated complaint shall be deemed to be ad-

mitted to be true and shall be so found by the Board. You

8a

are also notified that, pursuant to said Rules and Regula-

tions, Respondent shall serve a copy of its answer on each

of the parties.

Form NLRB-4668, Statement of Standard Procedures

in Formal Hearings Held Before the National Labor Rela-

tions Board in Unfair Labor Practices Cases, is attached.

Dated at Baltimore, Maryland this Sth day of March

1987.

(SEAL)

/s/ Louis J. D’Amico

Louis J. D’Amico, Regional Director

National Labor Relations Board,

Region 5

Candler Building, 4th Floor

109 Market Place

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

Attachment

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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