Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In re Exxon Corp.

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B7* 1296

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,

AND TENNECO RESINS, INC.,

Petitioners.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

DANIEL M. GRIBBON JOHN J. CARLIN, JR.

E. EDWARD BRUCE Counsel of Record

BRUCE N. KUHLIK 30 Vreeland Road

COVINGTON & BURLING P.O. Box 751

1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Florham Park, New Jersey 07932

P.O. Box 7566 (201) 377-3350

Washington, D.C. 20044

(202) 662-6000

Attorneys for Petitioners

February 1988

9

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Supreme Court of New Jersey violated

this Court’s mandate in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S.

355 (1986), by denying petitioners a refund of state

taxes, which this Court had held were expressly pre-

empted by a federal statute, on the grounds that (1) the

statute preempted only expenditures and not, as this

Court had held, the exaction of taxes; (2) preemption

became effective almost three years later than the date

established by Congress; (3) policies of a subsequent

Congress disfavored preemption; and (4) principles of

equity warranted denial of petitioners’ claim.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The petitioners are named in the caption.*

The following respondents were defendants-respondents

in the court below: Robert Hunt, Administrator of New

Jersey Spill Compensation Fund; Clifford A. Goldman,

Treasurer of the State of New Jersey; Sidney Glaser,

Director of the Division of Taxation; Jerry F. English,

Commissioner of Environmental Protection; and the State

of New Jersey.

The following respondents are those Justices of the

Supreme Court of New Jersey who participated in the

decision below: Robert L. Clifford, Alan B. Handler,

Stewart G. Pollock, and Gary S. Stein. Additional re-

spondents are Judges Michael P. King and Sylvia B.

Pressler of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate

Division, who sat by special designation.

* Tenneco Resins, Inc., was formerly Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. Pur-

suant to Rule 28.1, all parent companies, subsidiaries (except

wholly owned) and affiliates of petitioners are listed in the appendix

at pages 64a-80a.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EE SRE a 1

GE ne 1

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ............ 2

ERE ESE SE Oe a a eae 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 7

Teen ns enmaceneimnsunst 16

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A (Opinion of the Supreme Court of

ae at el et ln la

APPENDIX B (Recommendations of the Tax

Court of New Jersey) _...... COMI At ae 27a

APPENDIX C (Remand Order of the Supreme

Court of New Jersey) _........ celica lied ca 6la

APPENDIX D (Mandate of the Supreme Court

oe eee ee 62a

APPENDIX E (Affiliates and Subsidiaries) 64a

(iii)

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464

Shei SE seediradininsdceachenintaeeintladeiaaeehs aiastecalabiessnbeakacc

Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976)...

Deen Vv. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1958) .....................

Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) ............

Gaines V. Rugg, 148 U.S. 228 (1898) -...0000000 0.

General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493 (1978)...

Greene V. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964) _.......

Potts, In re, 166 U.S. 263 (1897) ...............22..001.00.....

Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488

GERRI LA OFA SA oS LOAN DICE

TVA Vv. Hill, 487 U.S. 158 (1978) ............................

United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 (1962) _..........

United States v. United States District Court, 334

ere I CI ach atic eee tee caaeaics etait ccna

Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 434 U.S. 425

fa ERISIS INGA el tole Mrantne Son ee teeth 1 bees a

Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90 (1967)

Constitution and Statutes:

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation, and Liability Act of 1980:

§ 114(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) 2...

§ 152(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9652 (a) ....

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

RSE Net Se Rr ne ee eS

Se a I an

Pa Se A BS peeeeenenmer nae

New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act,

NJ. Stat. $§ 58:10-23.11 ef seq. ...........................

rere rs

Miscellaneous:

2 Library of Congress, S. Committee on The En-

vironment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d

Sess., A Legislative History of [CERCLA]

eR | rae El tals Ae

[1 N.J.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) { 34-180.75 (1981)..

passi

a)

be

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11

15

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No.

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,

AND TENNECO RESINS, INC.,

Petitioners.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

Exxon Corporation, The BF Goodrich Company, Union

Carbide Corporation, Monsanto Company, and Tenneco

Resins, Inc., petition for a writ of mandamus directing

the Supreme Court of New Jersey to comply with the

mandate issued by this Court in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,

475 U.S. 355 (1986).

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey

(App., infra, la-26a) is not yet reported. The recom-

mendation of the Tax Court of New Jersey (App., infra,

27a-60a) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1651(a).

2

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 114(c) of the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c), provided:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may

be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of

which is to pay compensation for claims for any

costs of response or damages or claims which may

be compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in

this section shall preclude any State from using

general revenues for such a fund, or from imposing

a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance

in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of

hazardous substance response equipment or other

preparations for the response to a release of haz-

ardous substances which affects such State.

STATEMENT

This petition arises out of a suit brought by petition-

ers in 1981 in the Tax Court of New Jersey seeking a

declaratory judgment and a refund of taxes imposed

under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control

Act (Spill Act), N.J. Stat. §§ 58:10-23.11, et seg. Peti-

tioners complained that the taxes which created a Spill

Fund under the Act were preempted by Section 114(c)

of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c). The Tax Court ruled

against petitioners, holding that CERCLA did not pre-

empt a state tax used to create funds to pay for hazard-

ous waste cleanup eligible for CERCLA compensation,

but instead merely prevented taxes for funds to pay

cleanup expenses that were actually paid by the “Super-

fund” established by CERCLA. Its decision was affirmed

both by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court and

the Supreme Court of New Jersey."

197 NJ. 526, 481 A.2d 271 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 15a-36a);

190 N.J. Super. 131 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 37a-46a): 4 NJ. Tax

294 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 47a-78a).

3

This Court reversed the New Jersey courts’ construc-

tion of CERCLA. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355

(1986). Recognizing that “[tjhis is an express pre-

emption case,” this Court agreed with petitioners that

“the New Jersey courts have violated the plain meaning

of the statute.” Jd. at 362, 370. Taxation is forbidden,

the Court concluded, to support “state funds that covered

Superfund-eligible expenses,” whether or not those ex-

penses were actually paid by Superfund. /d. at 375.

The Court found that two types of claims eligible for

compensation under the Spill Act—governmental cleanup

of hazardous waste sites and reimbursement of third

parties for cleanup costs—were also compensable under

CERCLA. Accordingly, it ruled that the New Jersey

tax was preempted to the extent its purpose was to pay

for these expenses, rejecting the dissent’s invitation to

uphold the entire tax on the basis of the Spill Fund’s other

non-preempted purposes. Jd. The Court specifically re-

jected New Jersey’s argument that its tax was lawful be-

cause the expenditures actually made from the Spill Fund

were not directed toward CERCLA-eligible purposes:

New Jersey argues, finally, that after the enactment

of CERCLA, * * * all Spill Fund expenditures * * *

[have been] for nonpre-empted purposes. To the ex-

tent that the Spill Act permits taxation to support

pre-empted expenditures, however, tt cannot stand.

475 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added) .*

2 The Court held that these purposes “are within the scope of

CERCLA, except to the extent that they are intended to provide

the 10% state share of remedial costs.” 475 U.S. at 375-76.

3 The state’s argument also was erroneous as a factual matter.

At the time of this Court’s decision, only a de minimis proportion

of Spill Fund expenditures had been devoted to non-preempted

purposes. See Appellants’ opening brief in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,

No. 84-978, at 22-23 n.24, 25 n.26. This pattern continued following

this Court’s decision—the record before the Tax Court on remand

showed that 89% of the $49.5 million spent by New Jersey on

4

Thus making it clear that the appropriate inquiry was

the purpose of the tax, not the nature of the subsequent

expenditures, this Court held that at least a portion of

the New Jersey tax was preempted. It remanded the case

for a determination whether any portion of the tax could

be saved: the lower court was directed to consider

“whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-empted provi-

sions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted

provisions.” 475 U.S. at 376; see App., infra, 62a-63a.

On remand from this Court, the New Jersey Supreme

Court sent the matter back to the Tax Court to develop

a record and to make recommended findings. App., infra,

61a. The Tax Court thereupon embraced the very prem-

ise which this Court had rejected—that “it was not the

collection of the Spill Act tax that the [United States

Supreme] Court found to be improper but rather certain

expenditures made from the fund.” Jd. at 39a. The Tax

Court therefore ruled that petitioners would be entitled to

a refund only if the State had expended monies from the

Spill Fund for CERCLA purposes. Moreover, even

though Section 114(c) was made effective on CERCLA’s

December 11, 1980 enactment, the Tax Court held that

cleanup was devoted to sites eligible for Superfund compensation.

See Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judg-

ment, Schedule IV.

* Attributing language to this Court that is nowhere to be found

in Exron Vv. Hunt, the Tax Court further stated:

The United States Supreme Court * * * held that, “the State

was entitled to collect taxes,” * * * but that, “the State was not

permitted to spend that money for any of the types of projects

which EPA intended to finance,” with superfund. Quite simply

put, it was the nature of certain expenditures and not the tax

collected to fund all the expenditures * * * that the Court found

to be objectionable.

App., infra, 49a (emphasis and quotation marks in original). See

also id. at 58a (“the harm which plaintiffs * * * allegedly suffered

is the improper expenditure of legal tax monies”).

5

state expenditures were preempted only if made after the

June 16, 1982 promulgation of the National Contingency

Plan (NCP) or, where applicable, the September 8, 1983

promulgation of the National Priority List (NPL). Id.

at 59a.

Finally, the Tax Court held that “the [State] Legis-

lature should be permitted a reasonable period of time

to reimburse the spill fund for the amount of pre

empted expenditures made.” App., infra, 56a. Such re-

imbursement, the Tax Court concluded, “will make the

plaintiffs whole because the constitutional infirmity and

plaintiffs’ financial harm resulted from the improper

expenditure of spill fund revenues and not the collection

of the tax per se.” Id. at 56a-57a (emphasis in original).

The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the “thought-

ful and practical” (App., infra, 20a) recommendations

of the Tax Court. Thus, it too held that Section 114(c)

of CERCLA preempted only expenditures from the Spill

Fund and not the collection of taxes. App., infra, Ta-12a,

20a, 25a-26a.° The court therefore did not determine

whether there were any portions of the tax sustained

by non-preempted purposes that could be severed from

those that this Court had held were preempted. Instead,

focusing on expenditures instead of taxes, the state Su-

preme Court concluded that the provisions of the Spill

Act allowing “preempted” expenditures could be severed

from those that allowed other expenditures. Id. at 7a-12a.

The New Jersey Supreme Court also held, like the

Tax Court, that preemption did not begin on the effec-

tive date of Section 114(c), but instead on the dates

related to publication of the NCP and NPL. /d. at 1lda-

5 For example, the Court stated that the “tax rate” was one of

the “non-preempted portions of the Spill Act.” App., infra, 8a.

See also id. at 20a (discussing “pre-empted expenditures”).

6

16a.° It thereby delayed preemption for approximately

three out of the five years that CERCLA initially was in

effect, bringing about the very “overtaxation” of indus-

try that this Court concluded Congress intended to pro-

hibit through Section 114(c). 475 U.S. at 372.

Invoking its purported equitable discretion, the state

Supreme Court said that it would treat a tax refund to

petitioners as a “remedy of last resort.” App., infra,

at 25a. Thus, the court held that no refund would be

made if the Legislature “reimburse[s] the Spill Fund

for the amount of expenditures found to be pre-empted.” 7

Id. at 25a. This followed from the Court’s view that it

is the Spill Fund—rather than petitioners—that the

remedy should “make * * * whole.” Jd. at 26a. Once the

Legislature reimburses the Fund by transferring reve-

nues from other accounts, the Fund will be “whole” and

petitioners will be denied any refunds.*

In reaching this result, the Court relied on neither an

analysis of CERCLA nor this Court’s opinion in Exxon

v. Hunt. Instead, it stated that it was “obligated to

consider” the repeal of Section 114(c), effective Octo-

ber 17, 1986, in the Superfund Amendments and Reau-

thorization Act of 1986 (SARA), App., infra, 20a, and

8 Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that even expendi-

tures made by New Jersey after promulgation of the NCP and NPL

were not preempted so long as the decision to commit the funds

was made prior to promulgation of the NCP or NPL. 7d. at 19a.

*The Tax Court had recommended that if, following reimburse-

ment by the Legislature, the amount in the Spill Fund exceeds the

$36 million cap established in the state statute, the excess amount

should be refunded to petitioners. Apn., infra, 60a. The New

Jersey Supreme Court held that, in view of the repeal of the cap,

no refund should be made following reimbursement. Jd. at 26a;

see also id. at 10a-1lla & n.2.

8’ The Court again remanded the case to the Tax Court for a

hearing on the amount of “preempted” expenditures made from

the Spill Fund that the Legislature will be invited to reimburse.

ee

:

7

it crafted a remedy which “best implements the intent

of Congress in adopting SARA,” when it prospectively

repealed preemption under CERCLA. 7d. at 25a. On

this reasoning, the state Supreme Court allows New

Jersey to retain all of the millions of dollars extracted

from petitioners pursuant to a statute that this Court

has held is, in substantial measure, expressly preempted

by act of Congress.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

From its inception, the focus of this litigation has been

on whether Section 114(c) of CERCLA entitled petition-

ers to a refund of the taxes that they paid to sustain the

New Jersey Spill Fund. The state courts initially denied

such relief to petitioners by ignoring the plain meaning

of Section 114(c), as well as this Court’s opinion in

Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7

(1983). This Court reversed. The state courts have now

ignored the rationale and mandate of this Court’s deci-

sion and have again denied petitioners relief. Mandamus

is warranted in order to bring the state courts into con-

formity with the mandate issued by this Court.

1. This Court has long held that “a clear case is

shown for issuing a writ of mandamus” where the lower

court’s decision on remand is “based upon a misunder-

standing of the mandate, and in practical, though unin-

tentional, disobedience of the command thereof that fur-

ther proceedings be had in conformity with the opinion

of this court.” Jn re Potts, 166 U.S. 2638, 268 (1897).

Similarly, the Court stated in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend

Corp., 484 U.S. 425, 428 (1978) (per curiam), that if

a party “is of the view that the [court] to which the

case was remanded is failing to carry out the judgment

of this Court, its remedy is * * * to file a writ [of]

mandamus.” See also, e.g., General Atomic Co. v. Felter,

436 U.S. 493 (1978) (per curiam); Will v. United

8

States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1967); United States Vv.

Haley, 371 U.S. 18 (1962).

The rule applies to state courts that have departed

from this Court’s mandate, just as it does to the lower

federal courts. In Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57, 58

(1958) (per curiam), for example, the Court granted a

motion for leave to file a mandamus petition to direct

the Supreme Court of Texas “to conform its decision to

[this Court’s] mandate.” See also General Atomic Co.

v. Felter, supra; Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976)

(per curiam) .®

2. The New Jersey Supreme Court has clearly and

substantially departed from the mandate of this Court.

The state court erred by holding that (1) only actual

expenditures from the Spill Fund, and not the tax, were

preempted by Section 114(c) of CERCLA; (2) preemp-

tion was effected not on December 11, 1980, as Congress

specifically provided, but only by subsequent federal reg-

ulatory action taken in 1982 and 1983; (3) the scope of

preemption, and any relief to petitioners, should be ex-

tremely narrow because SARA subsequently repealed

Section 114(c); and (4) the court had equitable discre-

® It also is settled that mandamus is appropriate in these circum-

stances, even though an appeal or writ of certiorari might also

be available:

A litigant who * * * has obtained [a] judgment in this Court

after a lengthy process of litigation, involving several layers of

courts, should not be required to go through that entire process

again to obtain execution of the judgment of this Court.

General Atomic Co. Vv. Felter, supra, 436 U.S. at 497; accord United

States v. United States District Court, 334 U.S. 258, 264 (1948);

United States v. Haley, supra, 371 U.S. at 20; Gaines v. Rugg, 148

U.S. 228, 243 (1893) (“although it might have been admissible to

raise the question by a new appeal * * *, we do not consider that

such remedy would have been, or would be, fully adequate, or that

a writ of mandamus is now improper’).

9

tion to regard a tax refund as a “remedy of last resort”

and to devise a remedy that protects the Spill Fund

rather than petitioners. The cumulative effect of these

errors is to deny petitioners the substantial relief to

which they are entitled under this Court’s decision and

to permit New Jersey “to flout federal law” in precisely

the manner disapproved by this Court. 475 U.S. at 376.

a. The premise of the decision below was that Section

114(c), as interpreted by this Court, preempted only cer-

tain expenditures from the Spill Fund and not the im-

position of the tax. See, e.g., App., infra, 25a-26a; pages

4, 5, supra. That premise is flatly contrary to the plain

language of both Section 114(c) and this Court’s deci-

sion. Section 114(c) prohibits a state from requiring a

person “to contribute to any fund” that has certain pur-

poses; once New Jersey established a fund having those

purposes, its administrators’ spending decisions could not

avoid preemption.

Indeed, this Court rejected the precise argument that

the state court accepted on remand. New Jersey argued

before this Court that no refund was required because

“all Spill Fund expenditures” have been “for nonpre-

empted purposes.” 475 U.S. at 376.°° This Court dis-

agreed: “To the extent that the Spill Act permits taxa-

tion to support pre-empted expenditures, however, it can-

not stand.” Jd. Thus, the actual expenditures made from

the Spill Fund are irrelevant; the sole question is the

purpose for which the tax was imposed, not the manner

in which the revenues were later expended.

Further emphasizing that Section 114(c) preempts

taxes creating certain kinds of funds, not subsequent

spending decisions, this Court held that

[Section 114(c)] is meant to forbid the States to

impose taxes to finance certain types of funds. The

10 See page 3 & note 3, supra.

10

issue in this case is whether the New Jersey Spill

Fund is, in whole or in part, the type of fund that

§ 114(c) pre-empts.

475 U.S. at 361; see also, e.g., id. at 362 (question is

whether Section 114(c) “forbids state taxation of the

type the Spill Act imposes”).

Accordingly, this Court reversed the state court “[tlo

the extent that the New Jersey Supreme Court held that

the Spill Act could constitutionally impose a tax to sup-

port expenditures” for purposes covered by CERCLA.

Id. at 376. On remand, the state court was directed to

consider only “whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-

empted provisions of the statute are severable from the

pre-empted provisions,” not whether certain expenditures

could be severed. Jd. The New Jersey court did not fol-

low this mandate when it upheld the entire tax based

solely upon its inquiry regarding expenditures from the

Spill Fund.”

b. On December 11, 1980, when CERCLA was en-

acted, it was clear that two types of claims would ulti-

mately be compensable under the statute—government

cleanup of hazardous waste sites and reimbursement to

third parties for cleanup costs. It was also clear that

further regulatory action by the United States, such as

publication of the NCP and NPL, as well as collection of

the new federal tax, would be necessary before the fed-

11Tf this Court concludes, contrary to our position (pages 13-15,

infra), that the state court, despite its obduracy, should be given

another opportunity to examine the severability issue, it should be

instructed that part of the tax may be upheld only if (1) it can

reliably be determined that the New Jersey Legislature imposed

part of the tax with the sole intent of funding the non-CERCLA

purposes of the Spill Act; and (2) under New Jersey law, a court

can establish a tax rate to fund solely the non-CERCLA purposes

of the Spill Act. If these criteria are met, petitioners would be

entitled to a refund proportionate to the difference between the

court-established rate and the statutory tax rate.

Blea n -

11

eral government could actually begin to make payments

for such cleanup expenses. Congress did not, however,

defer the effectiveness of Section 114(c)’s preemption of

state taxes; collection of such taxes was immediately pre-

empted. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(a).% Ignoring the effective

date of Section 114(c), the New Jersey courts, on re-

mand, ruled that preemption did not “commence” until

either the July 16, 1982 promulgation of the NCP or the

September 9, 1983 publication of the NPL because those

documents specified the sites for which federal monies

could actually be obtained. App., infra, 15a-18a; see also

id. at 59a. The result of this substantial delay in effect-

ing preemption is inconsistent with two principles recog-

nized in Exxon v. Hunt.

First, it subjects petitioners to the double taxation

that Section 114(c) was intended to prevent. See 475

U.S. at 372 (“the decision to enact a pre-emption provi-

sion resulted in part from Congress’ concern about the

potentially adverse effects of overtaxation on the com-

petitiveness of the American petrochemical industry”)

(footnote omitted). Second, in dating preemption only

from the promulgation of the NCP and NPL because

they clarified the sites eligible for federal compensation,

the lower court has resurrected the very construction of

CERCLA, as preempting only funds for claims likely to

be paid by Superfund, which this Court disapproved in

Exxon Vv. Hunt. See 475 U.S. at 372 (specifically reject-

ing New Jersey’s argument that it could tax petitioners

to pay for its Spill Fund when “the availability of

12 Prior versions of the bills that preceded the enactment of

CERCLA had made the preemption of Section 114(c) effective

180 days after enactment. 2 Library of Congress, S. Committee on

The Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legis-

lative History of [CERCLA] at 732 (Comm. Print 1983) (H.R.

85); 3 id. at 59 (S. 1341). Congress’ elimination of the 180-day

delay in effecting preemption confirms its intent that preemption

was to take effect immediately.

12

Superfund money is sufficiently low, as a practical mat-

ter, that” it was clear such monies would not be ex-

pended at certain New Jersey sites).

e. The state court further erred by relying on the

subsequent repeal of Section 114(c) in SARA to deny

relief to petitioners. In its own words, the state court

felt “constrained to fashion a remedy * * * that least

offends the congressional purpose in repealing pre-emp-

tion.” Id. at 24a; see also id. at 20a-25a.

Again, the state court’s reasoning is contrary to Exxon

v. Hunt. This Court recognized when it rendered deci-

sion that CERLA had already expired and that reau-

thorization legislation was under consideration in Con-

gress, but it concluded that these developments were

irrelevant:

Of course, [petitioners’] claims for a refund of taxes

paid through September 30, 1985 are unaffected by

the expiration of CERCLA or by any changes in the

law after that date.

475 U.S. at 362 n.6 (emphasis added); see generally,

e.g., Greene V. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964).

The state court ignored this unambiguous directive by

relying on the policies that underlay SARA to limit the

relief to which petitioners were entitled under CERCLA.

d. The state court further departed from the mandate

by invoking its own purported “equitable powers” to

“make the Spill Fund whole” and to treat a tax refund

to petitioners as “a remedy of last resort.” App., infra,

24a, 25a. Nothing in this Court’s mandate authorized

the state court to exercise equitable discretion to limit

relief to petitioners. The only question open on remand

was the issue of severability, 7.e., whether petitioners

were entitled to a total refund or whether some portion

of the tax imposed on them could be severed and saved.

475 U.S. at 376-377. The state court erred in going

beyond the mandate. See, e.g., Sibbald v. United States,

fae al A Oe

Kee ech

13

37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488, 492 (1838) (the court below “is

bound by the decree [of this Court] * * * [and cannot]

give any other or further relief; * * * [nJjor intermeddle

with it, further than to settle so much as has been re-

manded”’).

Even apart from the terms of the remand, the state

court invoked equitable discretion that it did not possess.

Once a clear-cut statutory command has been violated,

courts do not have equitable discretion to develop a rem-

edy fitting their own conception of the public interest.

See TVA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158, 193-195 (1978). Section

114(c) was such a command—it prohibited the states

from imposing certain types of taxes. This Court deter-

mined that the Spill Act imposed, at least in part, a

prohibited tax. The state court was required to enforce

the federal statute that preempted the state tax. It could

not resort to its own conceptions of public policy or equity

to deny the refund to which petitioners were entitled

under CERCLA.

3. If the New Jersey Supreme Court had applied this

Court’s holding that the exaction of the tax—not the

actual expenditures from the fund—was preempted, it

would necessarily follow that the single tax was not sever-

able and that the entire tax must therefore fall. Because

a single tax sustained the Spill Fund, petitioners argued

below that the New Jersey judiciary could not establish

a new tax rate by eliminating only a portion of the tax.

See N.J. Const. Art. IV, § 6, para. 1. The Tax Court

agreed:

(T]he Spill Act contains a single tax that cannot

be apportioned between its preempted and _ non-

preempted purposes.

* * * *

[H]ad the [United States Supreme Court] found

that it was the ‘collection of the tax that was im-

proper, this Court should direct repayment of the

14

taxes to the taxpayers in the same proportion as the

taxes were paid.

App., infra, 47a, 56a (emphasis in original). It was, of

course, precisely the collection of the tax that this Court

had found to be preempted under Section 114(c). Ac-

cordingly, under the Tax Court’s reasoning, petitioners

are entitled to a refund of the entire amount of the tax

wrongfully collected from them.

The state Supreme Court recognized the correctness

of the Tax Court’s analysis. It noted, for example, that

“a single tax rate was struck by the Legislature” to fund

all of the purposes of the statute. App., infra, 8a. The

state Supreme Court avoided the necessary conclusion

that the entire tax must fall only by its erroneous inter-

pretation of this Court’s mandate in the respects set forth

above, particularly by holding that Section 114(c) pre-

empted only expenditures and not imposition:of the tax

itself.

The state courts’ refusal to refund to petitioners any

part of the preempted tax “flout{s] federal law” in pre-

cisely the manner that this Court refused to countenance

in its decision. 475 U.S. at 376. As this Court con-

cluded, the New Jersey tax cannot be upheld “in its en-

tirety” merely because “valid provisions” were included

“within [a] clearly invalid statute[].” Jd. Notwith-

standing this Court’s directive, the state courts have up-

held the entire Spill Tax, without inquiring into its pur-

poses, solely on the basis that certain expenditures from

the Fund were for non-CERCLA purposes.

The unwillingness of the New Jersey courts to conform

to federal law mirrors a similar recalcitrance on the

part- of the state’s administrative officials. New Jersey’s

position at the time that CERCLA was enacted was that

the state would ignore the preemptive effect of Section

114(¢c) and persist in collecting the tax until “a final

Lncaran ad Ae He ei Se ANAS * ta wi

15

determination by the courts is to contrary.” Of the

fifty states, New Jersey was the only one that con-

tinued to collect a tax of this nature during the period

of preemption.‘* As a result, the balance in the Spill

Fund increased tenfold, from $3 million in 1981 to $30

million in 1985.%° There is no justification for permitting

the state to continue to “violate[] the plain meaning

of the statute” (475 U.S. at 370) by retaining taxes

that could not legally be collected under Section 114(c).

The New Jersey courts have twice contravened federal

law by denying petitioners a refund of illegally imposed

taxes. On remand from this Court, they failed to identify

any means of severing part of the tax in a manner con-

sistent with this Court’s mandate, and they clearly indi-

cated that such a severance is not permissible. Under

these circumstances, there would be no point to another

remand. This Court should instead direct the lower court

that petitioners are to be refunded the taxes that they

paid under the Spill Act during the period that Section

114(c) was in effect.

18 [1 N.J.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) { 34-180.75 (1981).

14 See Appellants’ reply brief in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, No. 84-978,

at 18-19.

15 See Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, Exhibit B, p. 7 and Exhibit H, p. 7.

16

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of mandamus should be

granted. The Supreme Court of New Jersey should be

instructed that petitioners are entitled to a refund of

taxes paid under the Spill Act during the period that Sec-

tion 114(c) was in effect.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL M. GRIBBON JOHN J. CARLIN, JR.

E. EDWARD BRUCE Counsel of Record

BRucE N. KUHLIK 30 Vreeland Road

COVINGTON & BURLING P.O. Box 751

1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Florham Park, New Jersey 07932

P.O. Box 7566 (201) 377-3350

Washington, D.C. 20044 =

(202) 662-6000

Attorneys for Petitioners

February 1988

APPENDICES

la

APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

September Term 1986

A-158

EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY, UNION

CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY and TEN-

NECO CHEMICALS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

V.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR ‘OF NEW JERSEY SPILL

COMPENSATION FUND; CLIFFORD A. GOLDMAN, TREAS-

URER OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SIDNEY GLASER,

DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION, and THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY, UNION

CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY and TEN-

NECO CHEMICALS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

V.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR OF NEW JERSEY SPILL

COMPENSATION FUND; CLIFFORD A. GOLDMAN, TREAS-

URER OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SIDNEY GLASER,

DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION; JERRY F.

ENGLISH, COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-

TION ; and THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

Argued February 17, 1987—Decided December 2, 1987

2a

On remand from the Supreme Court of the United

States, whose opinion is reported at 475 U.S. ——, 106

S.Ct. 1103, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986).

John J. Carlin, Jr., argued the cause for appellants

(Mr. Carlin, attorney; Mr. Carlin and Donald J. Fay,

on the brief).

Mary R. Hamill, Deputy Attorney General, argued the

cause for respondents (W. Cary Edwards, Attorney Gen-

eral of New Jersey, attorney; Deborah T. Poritz, Assist-

ant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Hamill and Nancy

B. Stiles, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J.

This case is before us for the second time. Initially,

we affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division up-

holding the Tax Court’s determination that the tax im-

posed by the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control

Act, L.1976, c. 141 (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 58:

10-23.11 to -23.24, -23.34) (Spill Act), was not pre-

empted by the federal government’s adoption of the Com-

prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675)

(CERCLA). Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526 (1984).

The United States Supreme Court, affirming in part

and reversing in part, concluded that the tax levied by the

Spill Act was imposed for certain purposes that were

pre-empted by CERCLA, as well as for other purposes not

pre-empted by CERCLA. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S.

355, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). Accordingly, the Supreme

Court remanded the matter to this Court to determine

“the state law question whether, or to what extent, the

non pre-empted provisions of the statute are severable

from the pre-empted provisions,” id. at , 89 L.Ed.2d

at 382, “and for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this opinion.” Jd. at , 89 L.Ed.2d at 383.

ee re ey

3a

We then remanded the matter to the Tax Court to

develop a record and to make recommended findings,

otherwise retaining jurisdiction. N.J. —— (1986).

Pursuant to our order, the Tax Court has submitted the

following recommended findings:

1. The decision of the United States Supreme

Court should not be applied prospectively but should

be retroactive to July 16, 1982 with respect to ex-

penditures made on preempted removal purposes and

to September 8, 1983 as to preempted remedial ex-

penses.

2. The non-preempted purposes of the Spill Act

are severable from the purposes found to be pre-

empted by the United States Supreme Court.

3. Plaintiffs’ claims for refunds should not be de-

feated by reason of their failure to comply with the

procedural requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:49-14.

4. Following an accounting, (and plenary hearing

if necessary) to determine the amount of monies paid

for material purchased and services rendered for

preempted removal purposes on or after July 16,

1982 and for preempted remedial purposes on or

after September 8, 1983 to March 10, 1986, (date

of the United States Supreme Court decision), the

Legislature should be permitted a reasonable period

of time to reimburse the fund for the preempted

amounts expended.

(a) If, following such reimbursement, the amount

of the fund exceeds the cap established by the Legis-

lature, such excess should be paid to plaintiffs.

(b) Should the required reimbursement not be

made, the amount of preempted expenditures should

be refunded to plaintiffs.

(ec) Such refunds should be made in proportion to

the tax paid by each plaintiff to the total tax col-

lected.

4a

5. Defendants should not be enjoined from enforc-

ing payment of the spill fund tax by plaintiffs.

[—— NJ. Tax ; (Tax Ct. 1986) slip

op. at 38, 39).]

We now modify and, as modified, adopt the recommended

findings of the Tax Court.

I

The procedural history and facts pertinent to the pre-

emption issue are set forth in the prior opinions of this

Court and the United States Supreme Court. They need

be restated here only to the extent necessary to frame

the unique issue that confronts us in respect of the

Supreme Court’s remand.

The purpose of the Spill Act, enacted in 1977, was to

finance prevention and cleanup of oil spills and hazardous

substance discharges because of their adverse effects on

the state’s environment and economy. N.J.S.A. 58:10-

23.1la. The Act levied an excise tax on major chemical

and petroleum facilities within the state, and the proceeds

of the tax have been deposited into a permanent fund

(Spill Fund) to implement the legislative goals. N.J.S.A.

58:10-23.11h. The Spill Fund may be expended primarily

to clean up discharges of hazardous substances, to com-

pensate third parties from economic losses resulting from

such discharges, and for research and administrative

costs. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.1lo. Tax collections during Spill

Fund fiscal years from 1978 through 1985 averaged

slightly Jess than 10 million dollars annually.

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, providing for the

establishment over a five-year period of a 1.6 billion

dollar trust fund, commonly known as Superfund. 87.5%

of Superfund was raised primarily by federal excise

taxes on petroleum and chemicals,’ and the balance by

1 The federal excise tax on petroleum is currently at the rate of

0.79 cent a barrel and on chemicals at rates ranging from 0.22 cent

5a

appropriations from general revenues. Superfund’s re-

sources may be expended for two primary purposes: the

first, “governmental response,” encompasses both “re-

movals” of released hazardous substances in the nature

of a “short term” cleanup, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), and

“remedial action,” to achieve a “permanent remedy” for

released hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24).

Secondly, Superfund may pay claims, consisting either

of reimbursement to private parties for hazardous sub-

stance cleanup costs consistent with the national con-

tingency plan, or reimbursement to the federal or a

state government to compensate for damages to natural

resources. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9611(a) (2)-(3). Unlike Spill

Fund, Superfund resources cannot be used to clean up

oil spills or to_ compensate third parties for economic

losses caused by hazardous substance discharges.

The pre-emption issue that was resolved by the Su-

preme Court’s decision concerned the proper interpreta-

tion of §114(c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9614(c).

That section, since repealed in its entirety by § 14(a)

of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1652 (codified

at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9614(c) ), provided as follows:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may

be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose

of which is to pay compensation for claims for any

costs of response or damages or claims which may

be compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in

-this section shall preclude any State from using

general revenues for such a fund, or from imposing

to $4.87 per ton. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4611. Under the Spill Act, as

originally enacted, the basic tax rate was .01 cent per barrel on

petroleum products, and on non-petroleum products the greater of

.01 cent per barrel or .4% of fair market value. L. 1976, c. 141, § 9.

As amended by L. 1986, c. 143, § 2, the tax rate is .0125 cent per

barrel on petroleum products, and on nonpetroleum products the

greater of .0125 cent per barrel or 1% of fair market value.

N.J.S.A. 58 :10-23.11h.

6a

a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance

in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of

hazardous substance response equipment or other

preparations for the response to a release of hazard-

ous substances which affects such State.

The New Jersey Attorney General’s contention was

that the pre-emption language should be construed to

prohibit only payments to a fund to be used for purposes

that are actually compensated by Superfund. The Su-

preme Couri rejected that construction and concluded

that § 114(c) pre-empted “any fund intended, in whole

or in part, to pay for the same types of expenses that

may be paid by Superfund,” 475 U.S. at ——, 89 L.Ed.2d

at 379, whether or not Superfund actually paid such

expenses.

With respect to the parameters of pre-emption the

Court’s opinion implicitly acknowledged that CERCLA

itself does not set forth criteria for determining which

removal and remedial expenses and which natural re-

source claims “may be compensated” by Superfund. Ac-

cordingly, since such criteria are set forth in the National

Contingency Plan (NCP) required by CERCLA to be

revised to reflect its provisions, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(8)

(B), the Court held that “the NCP provides the ap-

propriate measure of whether a given expenditure con-

stitutes ‘costs of response or damages or claims which

may be compensated’ by Superfund.” 475 U.S. at

89 L.Ed.2d at 382.

The Court conceded that CERCLA did not pre-empt

expenditures authorized by the Spill Act for the follow-

ing purposes: to compensate third parties for damage

resulting from hazardous substance discharges; to pay

personnel and equipment costs; to administer the fund

itself; and to conduct research. Jd. at ——, 89 L.Ed.2d

at 382. In addition, the Court specifically excluded the

required State contribution to the cost of remedial ac-

,

inch sdneniaa cl

Whence ute id apa See. Btiahe me

nd

Ta

tions, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c) (3) (C), from those costs

that “may be compensated” by Superfund.

The Court concluded that the Spill Act was pre-empted

by §114(c) of CERCLA to the extent that the Act

authorized expenditures, beyond the mandatory state

share, “for remedial costs for sites on the National Pri-

ority List, or for removal costs that are eligible for

Superfund compensation under the terms of the NCP.”

475 U.S. at ——, 89 L.Ed.2d at 382.

II

Recommendations of the Tax Court

No testimony was elicited in the course of the remand

proceedings before the Tax Court. As a result, the record

on remand consists solely of affidavits and exhibits sub-

mitted by the parties in support of various motions filed

with the Court.

(a) Severability

We are in full accord with the Tax Court’s conclusion

that the purposes of the Spill Act held to be pre-empted

may be severed from the remainder of the statute with-

out impairing its validity.

The critical standard for determining issues of sever-

ability is the presumed intent of the Legislature. ‘That

intent must be determined on the basis of whether the

objectionable feature of the statute can be excised with-

out substantial impairment of the principal objects of

the statute.” Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills,

60 N.J. 342, 345 (1972); accord New Jersey Chapter,

Am. Inst. of Planners v. New Jersey State Bd. of Prof.

Planners, 48 N.J. 581, 593, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 8, 19

L.Ed.2d 8 (1967); Lane Distributors, Inc. v. Tilton, 7

N.J. 349, 369-70 (1951); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Con-

struction § 44.03 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1986) at 483. As we

explained in State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516 (1958),

8a

{[A]n unconstitutional provision in a statute does

not affect the validity of a separate article or clause

of the enactment, if otherwise valid, unless the two

are so intimately connected and mutually dependent

as reasonably to sustain the hypothesis that the Leg-

islature would not have adopted the one without the

other. Where the principal object of the statute is

constitutional, and the objectionable provision can

be excised without substantial impairment of the gen-

eral purpose, the statute is operative except insofar

as it may contravene fundamental law. [Jd. at 528.]

In this unusual setting, the inquiry is whether the

Legislature would have intended the nonpre-empted por-

tions of the Spill Act, including the tax rate, to remain

in effect notwithstanding the determination that signifi-

cant statutory purposes were pre-empted by CERCLA

for a limited period. (See discussion as to the period of

pre-emption, infra at (slip op. at 14-23)). Plain-

tiffs argued in the Tax Court and before us that sever-

ability is inappropriate where, as here, a single tax rate

was struck by the Legislature to fund both pre-empted

and nonpre-empted purposes. We are not persuaded,

however, that the valid purposes of a taxing statute are

not severable from the invalid ones simply because all

of the statutory objectives are financed by the same tax.

Rather, the entire statutory scheme must be analyzed in

order to ascertain the probable intent of the Legisla-

ture as to severability. The guiding principle was suc-

cinctly stated by Judge Gibbons in Chamber of Commerce

v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 1985): “This

[severability] is largely a question of whether the statute

will continue to make sense after the challenged portion

is excised.”

We observe initially that the Spill Act contains a

standard severability clause. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.liw.

However, the inclusion or exclusion of such a clause does

9a

not ordinarily resolve the issue. See State v. Lanza,

supra, 27 N.J. at 527.

We also note the Legislature’s comprehensive objectives

in passing the Spill Act:

The Legislature finds and declares that the dis-

charge of petroleum products and other hazardous

substances within or outside the jurisdiction of this

State constitutes a threat to the economy and en-

vironment of this State. The Legislature intends by

the passage of this act to exercise the powers of this

State to control the transfer and storage of hazard-

ous substances and to provide liability for damage

sustained within this State as a result of any dis-

charge of said substances, by requiring the prompt

containment and removal of such pollution and sub-

stances, and to provide a fund for swift and ade-

quate compensation to resort businesses and other

persons damaged by such discharge. [N.J.S.A.

58 :10-23.11a. ]

To implement these wide-ranging goals, the Act au-

thorizes the Department of Environmental Protection

(DEP) to clean up hazardous discharges either by using

the resources of the Spill Fund or by directing the dis-

charger to perform the work at its own expense.

N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f. The fund also can be used to re-

imburse innocent third parties for cleanup and removal

costs incurred by them, and to pay direct and indirect

damages sustained because of hazardous substance dis-

charges. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g. The Act imposes joint

and several liability on dischargers of hazardous sub-

stances, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and re-

moval costs, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g, and authorizes the .

imposition of treble damages on a discharger who fails to

comply with a directive to clean up a hazardous-sub-

stance discharge. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f-a. The Spill

Fund’s authorized uses were summarized in the Supreme

Court’s opinion:

10a

As we have explained above, the Spill Fund may be

used for six purposes: (1) to finance governmental

cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) to reimburse

third parties for cleanup costs; (3) to compensate

third parties for damage resulting from hazardous

substance discharges; (4) to pay personnel and

equipment costs; (5) to administer the fund itself;

and (6) to conduct research. [475 U.S. at ——, 89

L.Ed.2d at 382.]

It is also significant that the Legislature, when it

adopted the Spill Act, knew that federal funding for

hazardous waste cleanup was possible and that such fund-

ing might warrant modification of the authorized pur-

poses of the Spill Act. Section 27 of the Act provides:

If the United States Congress enacts legislation

providing compensation for the discharge of petro-

leum and hazardous products, the commissioner shall

determine to what degree that legislation provides

the needed protection for our citizens, businesses and

environment and shall make the appropriate recom-

mendations to the Legislature for amendments to

this act. [L. 1976, c.141, § 27 (codified at N.J.S.A.

58 :10-23.11z) .]

Also pertinent to the question of severability is the

provision in the Spill Act as originally enacted, L.1976,

c.141, §9, suspending the collection of taxes whenever

the Spill Fund attains certain prescribed levels.* Al-

2In its original form, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h provided, in part:

b. * * * In each fiscal year following any year in which the

balance of the fund equals or exceeds $50,000,000.00, no tax

shall be levied unless (1) the current balance in the fund is less

than $40,000,000.00 or (2) pending claims against the fund

exceed 50% of the existing balance of the fund. The pro-

visions of the foregoing notwithstanding, should claims paid

from or pending against the fund not exceed $5,000,000.00

within 3 years after the tax is first levied, the tax shall be

$0.01 per barrel transferred or 0.4% of the fair market value

lla

though these tax-suspension provisions of the Act were

repealed as of February 1, 1987, L.1986, c.143, § 2 (codi-

fied at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h-b), they were in effect dur-

ing the entire period of pre-emption. Accordingly, the

Spill Act had a self-correcting mechanism that would

suspend tax collections when existing funds were ade-

quate to discharge the statutory objectives. These pro-

visions appear to reflect the Legislature’s assumption

that if the demands on the Spill Fund were less expan-

sive than originally contemplated, the impact of the pre-

scribed tax rate on the oil and chemical industry would

be alleviated by the tax-suspension provisions built into

the Act. Although undoubtedly not adopted in anticipa-

tion of a holding that certain statutory objectives were

pre-empted by CERCLA, the presence of the tax-suspen-

sion mechanism persuasively suggests that the tax-rate

provisions of the Act are not inconsistent with a deter-

mination that the nonpre-empted purposes of the Spill

Act are severable from the pre-empted purposes during

the limited period of pre-emption.

We are also informed by the uncontroverted affidavit

| of Michael E. Catania, Deputy Commissioner of the

DEP, filed with the Tax Court in support of the State’s

motion seeking severability and prospective application

of the Supreme Court’s decision, that the Spill Fund will

require approximately 340 million dollars during the five

fiscal years beginning with 1987 to pay for “nonpre-

empted” type expenditures. Of this amount, 200 million

dollars is projected as the cleanup cost for sites ineligible

of the product, as the case may be, until the balance in the fund

equals or exceeds $36,000,000.00, and thereafter shall not be

levied unless: (1) the current balance in the fund is less than

$30,000,000.00 or (2) pending claims against the fund exceed

50% of the existing balance of the fund. In the event of either

such occurrence and upon certification thereof by the State

Treasurer, the director shall within 10 days of the date of such

certification relevy the excise tax, which shall take effect on the

first day of the month following such relevy. * * *

bee

12a

for Superfund reimbursement and 140 million dollars as

the anticipated State share of cleanup costs at Superfund-

eligible sites. The affidavit also identified anticipated in-

creases in administrative costs and in the cost of reim-

bursement of third-party claims. The affidavit states that

the projected needs of the Spill Fund for nonpre-empted

purposes are substantially higher than the anticipated

revenue from the then current tax rate.

As forecast by the Catania affidavit, the Legislature

has recently recognized the enhanced needs of the Spill

Fund by increasing the tax rate, and broadening the tax

base by redefining “major facility” to include a greater

number of oil and chemical companies. L. 1986, c. 143,

§2 (codified at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h). The Legisla-

ture’s commitment of additional resources to the Spill

Fund, after the Supreme Court’s pre-emption decision,

demonstrates plainly that the Legislature’s assumption

in 1986 was that the Spill Act remained in effect, not-

withstanding the Court’s conclusion that a portion of the

act’s objectives had been pre-empted for a limited period.*

Accordingly, we are convinced on the basis of the

overall structure of the Spill Act, its comprehensive pur-

pose to facilitate the statewide cleanup of hazardous-

substance discharges, and the continuing commitment of

the Legislature to provide adequate resources for the

Spill Fund that severability of the nonpre-empted pro-

vision of the Spill Fund, during the limited period of

pre-emption, is manifestly consistent with the legislative

intent. The Spill Act “makes sense,” Chamber of Com-

merce v. Hughey, supra, 774 F.2d at 597, with or without

the pre-empted purposes.

*L. 1986, c. 143 was enacted after Congress adopted the Super-

fund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986, which repealed

the pre-emption provision in CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9614(c).

Nevertheless, it is self-evident that the Legislature assumed that the

Supreme Court’s decision did not invalidate the Spill Act in its

entirety.

th 13a

(b) Period and Scope of Pre-emption

The conclusion that the pre-empted purposes of the

Spill Act are severable from the nonpre-empted provisions

requires that we determine the period and scope of pre-

emption and, based on that determination, the appro-

priate relief. The positions of the parties conflict sharply.

The State argues that the Supreme Court’s decision

should be given only prospective application, with the

result that the period of pre-emption would begin on

March 10, 1986 (the date of the Court’s decision), and

would end on October 17, 1986, the effective date of

SARA. If its position on prospectivity is rejected, the

State supports the Tax Court’s determination that prom-

ulgation of the NCP and the NPL mark the commence-

ment period for pre-emption of removal and remedial ac-

tions respectively, but the State argues that the pre-

emption period should end on September 30, 1985, the

date on which CERCLA’s taxing authority expired.

Plaintiff’s position is that the effective date of the

Supreme Court’s holding that the Spill Act was partially

pre-empted by CERCLA must be December 11, 1980, the

date of CERCLA’s enactment. Plaintiffs point to section

302(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9652(a), which states

that “unless otherwise provided, all provisions of

[CERCLA] shall be effective on December 11, 1980.”

Moreover, plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s

references to the NCP and NPL were intended solely to

provide a frame of reference for determining whether

the Spill Act established a fund that was devoted to pre-

empted purposes, but were not intended to imply that

the effective date of pre-emption depended on promulga-

tion of the NCP and NPL. Plaintiffs further contend

that on CERCLA’s enactment New Jersey had “adequate

guidance” to know what sites would be eligible for

Superfund reimbursement and “could have amended the

Spill Act so as not to violate Section 114(c).”

l4a

We are in full accord with the Tax Court’s conclusion

that the Supreme Court’s decision in this case should not

be restricted to prospective application. Although the

Supreme Court’s opinion is silent on the issue of retro-

spective application, the remand to this Court to deter-

mine severability and “for further proceedings” carries

with it the implicit direction that we determine the re-

lief appropriate to the holding that the Spill Act is par-

tially pre-empted. If the Court conceived that its deci-

sion might apply only prospectively, which would signifi-

cantly affect the remedy we must fashion, it is reasonable

to assume that the opinion would at least have adverted

to that possibility. See Lemon v. Kurzman, 411 U.S. 192,

198, 199, 30 L.Ed.2d 151, 160 (1973) (Lemon II) (hold-

ing that there are no absolute principles available to

determine whether a given constitutional ruling should

be applied retroactively and that equitable principles and

the totality of. circumstances should guide such deter-

minations) ; accord Coons v. American Honda Motor Co.,

Inc., 96 N.J. 419 (1984) (Coons II).

Moreover, we agree with the Tax Court that an indis-

pensable prerequisite to prospectivity is not present in

this case, since the Supreme Court’s opinion did not

“establish a new principle of law, either by overruling

clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied

* * * or by deciding an issue of first impression whose

resolution was not clearly foreshadowed * * *.” Chevron

Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106, 30 L.£d.2d 296, 306

(1971) (citations omitted). Here, the Supreme Court

relied upon a settled legal principle—the preeminence of

federal legislation under the supremacy clause, article

VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution—and ap-

plied it by construing section 114(c) of CERCLA as pre-

empting certain provisions of the Spill Act. No “clear

past precedent” was overruled nor could the question of

statutory interpretation fairly be considered an “issue of

first impression whose resolution was not clearly fore-

15a

Sse cee Ged Sali

shadowed,” as that phrase was used in Chevron. The

purpose of the Chevron test is the avoidance of prejudice

arising from judicial decisions that interested parties

. could not fairly have anticipated. In this case the issue

of statutory interpretation was susceptible to either of

two resolutions, one advanced by the State and the other

advanced by plaintiffs. The Court’s holding that

CERCLA partially pre-empted the Spill Act was not suf-

ficiently unpredictable to satisfy this aspect of the Chev-

ron criteria. Accordingly, we conclude that an exclusively

prospective application of the Court’s decision is inappro-

propriate under these circumstances.

_

We also agree with the Tax Court’s conclusion that

the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) promul-

gation of the NCP and the NPL marked the critical

dates on which pre-emption of remedial and removal ex-

penditures, respectively, shall be deemed to have com-

menced. The NCP sets forth detailed criteria for deter-

mining whether removal actions may be financed by

. Superfund, imposes limits on the cost and duration of

most removal actions, and prescribes the conditions under

which such limits may be exceeded. 40 C.F.R. § 300.65

(b) (2) and (8) (1987). In addition, the NCP limits

Superfund-financed remedial actions to sites listed on the

NPL, 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a) (1987), which was initially

promulgated in September. 1983 and thereafter amended

and supplemented to include additional sites.

Plaintiffs, arguing that CERCLA’s effective date of

December 11, 1980, is necessarily the date of pre-emption,

contend that New Jersey could have anticipated the im-

pact of the NCP and NLP. Plaintiffs assert that two of

New Jersey’s worst sites had qualified prior to May 1981

for an unspecified amount of funding under the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251-1376; the implication is

that qualification of such sites for Superfund reimburse-

ment was therefore inevitable. Plaintiffs also observe

that four New Jersey sites had qualified in 1981 to

nlite ill

l6a

receive money from Superfund for study and design

work, and that a substantial number of New Jersey sites

received high rankings on a list of EPA Region II sites

designated as “candidates” for remedial funding under

Superfund.

In response, the affidavit of defendant Robert E. Hunt,

Administrator of Spill Fund from 1978 to 1986, described

the difficulty experienced by DEP officials in 1981 and

1982 because “the scope of the federal program had not

been defined and Superfund financing decisions appeared

to be made by EPA on a case by case basis.” According

to Hunt, “there was virtually no money available from

Superfund at this time and no real guidance from

USEPA as to what activities would eventually be funded.”

We need not resolve the conflict whether DEP, from

the date of CERCLA’s enactment, knew or should have

known those hazardous waste sites that would be the in-

evitable beneficiaries of Superfund’s resources. Suffice it

to say that the manner in which Superfund was adminis-

tered at that time leave us highly skeptical that its opera-

tional parameters could readily have been forecast by any-

one outside the EPA. A typical account of Superfund’s

operations during this period is contained in a House Re-

port, accompanying a predecessor bill to the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986:

The resources given to EPA were simply inade-

quate to fulfill the promises that were made to clean

up abandoned hazardous wastes in this country. With

political pressure on EPA to treat every site dis-

covered as a high priority, EPA was virtually guar-

anteed to fail from the moment CERCLA passed in

1980.

To compound the problem the first administrator

of the Superfund program undermined the intent of

the program. Under the initial leadership of Assist-

ant Administrator Lavelle, the program was vic-

17a

timized by gross mismanagement and policies which

limited expenditures for site cleanups, in part in an

effort to dissuade Congress from extending the fund-

ing for the program beyond its scheduled expiration

date of October 1, 1985. [H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th

Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1 at 55 (1985) reprinted in 1986

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2835. ]

In any event, we are satisfied that the Supreme Court’s

reference to the NCP, supplemented by the NPL, as pro-

viding “criteria that determine what expenses, at which

sites, will be eligible for Superfund money” was intended

to demonstrate that the pre-emption period did not com-

mence before these guidelines were promulgated. The

Court explained that

{hjaving decided that “may be compensated” should

be given its ordinary meaning, we must define the

category of expenses that may be compensated by

Superfund. Fortunately, CERCLA itself furnishes

an appropriate test. Section 105(8) (B) of CERCLA,

42 USC §9605(8)(B) requires the President to

revise the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to re-

fleet CERCLA’s provisions. As part of that revision,

the President must create and revise annually a list

of sites most in need of federal efforts, now known as

the National Priorities List. The NCP currently

specifies that removal, or immediate cleanup, will be

financed by Superfund only in emergency situations,

see 40 CFR § 300.65 (1985). Remedial action will be

financed only for sites on the National Priorities

List, id., § 300.68(a). Finally, the Environmental

Protection Agency, pursuant to the NCP, has pro-

posed criteria for the use of Superfund money for

natural resource claims. See 50 Fed. Reg. 9593

(1985). The NCP, therefore, provides criteria that

determine what expenses, at which sites, will be

eligible for Superfund money. We therefore conclude

that the NCP provides the appropriate measure of

18a

whether a given expenditure constitutes “costs of

response or damages or claims which may be com-

pensated” by Superfund. [475 U.S. at ——, 89 L.Ed.

2d at 381-82 (footnote omitted) .]

We find the clear thrust of the Supreme Court’s opin-

ion to be that although CERCLA established the principle

of pre-emption, the scope of pre-emption is a regulatory

rather than statutory determination. Accordingly, until

the NCP was first promulgated by EPA on July 16, 1982,

47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1982), and then revised on Septem-

ber 8, 1983, to include the first NPL, 48 Fed. Reg.

40,669 (1983), no agency guidelines existed to determine

those remedial or removal actions that would be eligible

for Superfund reimbursement, and for which funding by

the Spill Fund was thereby pre-empted.

We reject the State’s assertion that pre-emption should

cease as of September 30, 1985, the date on which taxing

authorization under CERCLA expired. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9653

(repealed by Pub. L. 99-499 §571(b), 100 Stat. 1761

(1986)). From that date until enactment of SARA on

October 17, 1986, CERCLA was funded by emergency

appropriations. We can discern no clear congressional

intention to terminate pre-emption for the brief period

during which CERCLA was financed temporarily by ap-

propriations from general revenues rather than by excise

taxes on petroleum and chemicals. Accordingly, we hold

that the period of pre-emption ended on October 27, 1986,

the effective date of SARA, which repealed the pre-

emption language in § 114(c) of CERCLA.

Our conclusions concerning the scope and period of pre-

emption will require that this matter be remanded once

again to the Tax Court. The purpose of the remand will

be to permit the parties to establish a record upon which

the Tax Court can determine the amount of Spill Fund

expenditures that was pre-empted by CERCLA. In that

connection, the State points out that establishing the be-

ginning and end of the pre-emption period does not

Bes ohh ris a a ie see Ge

19a

necessarily determine whether a particular expense in-

curred or paid by Spill Fund during the pre-emption

period should be treated as a “pre-empted” expense. The

State contends that work authorized, commenced, or com-

pleted before the pre-emption period began, but paid for

during the pre-emption period, should not be deemed pre-

empted.

We are generally in accord with the State’s position.

If expenses to remove or remediate hazardous waste that

are paid by Spill Fund before pre-emption began are not

inconsistent with CERCLA, it should follow that expenses

committed before but paid after the effective date of pre-

emption should not be treated as pre-empted. The princi-

ple is that the Spill Funds’ expenditures should not be

deemed pre-empted by CERCLA unless the essential de-

cision to commit the funds was made after promulgation

of the NCP* or NPL,° as the case may be. We leave to

the Tax Court on remand the task of determining pre-

cisely those expenditures that were permissible and those

that were pre-empted.

Remedy

Preliminarily, we note our full accord with the Tax

Court’s conclusion that any technical noncompliance by

* As noted, the effective date of pre-emption of removal actions

that meet the criteria of the NCP is July 16, 1982. We note the

State’s reference, in its Exceptions to the Recommendations of the

Tax Court, to objections communicated to EPA concerning the

vagueness of the criteria for authorization of removal actions and

the EPA’s response to the effect that the criteria are adequate.

It is self-evident that expenditures by the Spill Act for removal

actions that EPA determined to be unauthorized by the NCP cri-

teria are not pre-empted. In cases where EPA has not determined

eligibility of a removal action pursuant to the NCP criteria, the

Tax Court on remand must make that evaluation in order to deter-

mine if the expenditure was pre-empted.

5 The effective date of pre-emption of remedial actions for sites

on the NPL is the date of promulgation of the NPL, or any amend-

ment or supplement thereof, on which such site is first listed.

20a

plaintiffs with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 59:49-14 does

not affect plaintiffs’ right to relief. —— N.J. Tax at ——

(slip op. at 28).

The remedy recommended by Judge Evers is thoughtful

and practical. Essentially, the Tax Court proposed that

an accounting or hearing be conducted to determine the

amount of the pre-empted expenditures by the Spill Fund.

The Legislature would then be accorded a reasonable time

period to reimburse the Spill Fund for the entire pre-

empted amount, using any source of funds other than the

tax imposed by the Spill Act. If the Legislature does not

reimburse the Spill Fund within the designated period,

the Tax Court proposed that plaintiffs receive a refund

of so much of the pre-empted expenditures as bears the

same proportion to the total pre-empted expenditures as

the Spill Act taxes paid by plaintiffs bears to the total

amount of Spill Act taxes collected. In addition, the Tax

Court recommended that if the Legislature reimbursed

the Spill Fund and the reimbursement caused the amount

of the Fund to exceed the statutory cap originally im-

posed by the Spill Act, see supra at —— (slip op. at 12),

the entire excess over the cap would be paid to plaintiffs.

In considering the appropriateness of the Tax Court’s

recommendations as to remedy, we accept plaintiff’s

premise that ordinarily a taxpayer that pays a tax found

to be invalid is entitled to a refund. Mayor of Jersey

City v. Riker, 38 N.J.L. 225, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1876) ; accord

In Re Fees of State Bd. of Dentistry, 84 N.J. 582,. 587

(1980) ; Milmar Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 36

N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1955). In this litigation,

however, we must address a tax that has been invali-

dated only in part, and for a limited period. Further-

more, in framing the appropriate relief we are obliged to

consider the context in which repeal of the limited pre-

emption of the Spill Act occurred.

The background and need for the Superfund Amend-

ments and Reauthorization Act, which appropriated $9

2la

billion in additional funding to clean up hazardous waste

sites, is summarized in the report of the House of Repre-

sentatives Science and Technology Committee referred to

above, see supra at —— (slip op. at 19), that accom-

panied H.R. 2817, a predecessor to the bill ultimately

enacted by Congress:

The Superfund program to clean up abandoned

hazardous waste sites is one of the Nation’s most

important environmental programs designed to pro-

tect human health and the environment. It is also

the most beleaguered program the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) administers. If enacted,

H.R. 2817 would give EPA the flexibility to revital-

ize the Superfund program, ensure cleanup of aban-

doned hazardous chemicals, and protect human

health and the environment.

Superfund was passed in 1980 to address what

many believed was a relatively limited problem. The

EPA was instructed to find 400 hazardous waste

sites. Most believed that cleaning up a site was rela-

tively inexpensive and involved removing containers

or scraping a few inches of soil off the ground. The

| Agency was given $1.6 billion to administer the

cleanup of the 400 sites.

vo

VD ital

Today, five years later, our understanding of the

problem posed by abandoned hazardous chemicals is

entirely different. The Office of Technology Asess-

ment now estimates there may be as many as 10,000

Superfund sites across the Nation, or an average of

23 sites per Congressional district. These sites range

from industrial plants to river beds to city dumps

: where smal! businesses and households have disposed

of solvents, paints and cleaning fluids. We now un-

derstand -that a cleanup frequently goes far beyond

i simple removal of barrels. It often involves years of

j pumping contaminated water from aquifers. The

22a

total cost of completing the Superfund program is

estimated to be as much as $100 billion. The total

time will be decades.

* * *

The current reauthorization, coming when it does,

forces Congress to face a very fundamental policy

question: how to ensure in the future that there are

adequate resources, and to see that past, thoroughly

repudiated, mismanagement problems are behind us.

H.R. 2817 has been written with the underlying

belief that Congress should focus on ways to ensure

rapid and thorough cleanup of abandoned hazardous

wastes rather than on past mistakes. It is clear from

the accumulating data on waste sites that EPA will

never have adequate monies or manpower to address

the problem itself. As a result, an underlying prin-

ciple of H.R. 2817 is that Congress must facilitate

cleanups of hazardous substances by the responsible

parties while assuring a strong EPA oversight role

with a set of tough legal enforcement standards.

Equally important is the role of the communities

around Superfund sites. It is here that we can

ensure that cleanups and post-cleanup maintenance

of the sites are carried out in compliance with the

cleanup agreements for the sites. [H.R. Rep. No.

253, supra, at 54.]

In this connection, the repeal of section 114(c), the

pre-emption provision of CERCLA, was explained by the

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works in

its report on §.51, another predecessor to SARA:

Clarification of section 114(c) appears desirable be-

cause of the litigation that has arisen from the origi-

nal language in the statute. The litigation has been

focused on the right of States to tax those substances

which are taxed under the Federal Superfund law.

To date, all decisions in State courts (including

23a

recent State Supreme Court rulings) have found that

the Federal Superfund law does not preempt the

rights of the States to raise taxes from these sub-

stances or through other special taxes. This litiga-

tion could continue for years. Any cloud of uncer-

; tainty over the legitimacy of these taxes should be

removed at the earliest possible time.

It is widely recognized that States must develop

their own taxes to meet their responsibilities for the

State share of the cleanup costs at Superfund sites.

In addition, States have responsibilities for managing

and cleaning up hazardous materials not covered by

the Federal program. Clarification of section 114(c)

will allow the State to move forward and develop

the tax mechanisms necessary for meeting the grow-

ing funding needs for response to hazardous sub-

i stance releases and participation in the Superfund

; program, as well as for maintaining effective State

hazardous waste programs.

Si telnet

iiss Silat Ii tend nha Sah Siar igs ee

The primary effect of the amendment will be to

remove a potential barrier to the creation of State

superfund programs. The amendment may result in

an increase in the number and pace of hazardous

i substance response actions undertaken or partially

; funded by States, since States will be able to raise

‘ funds to assist such hazardous substance response.

[S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. at 59, 60

(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 2835 (emphasis added). ]

In the course of Senate debate on 8.51, Senator Lauten-

berg of New Jersey offered this explanation for the pro-

posed repeal of section 114(c):

Mr. President, S. 51 clearly addresses an issue that

: has hindered State efforts to set up their own super-

: funds. Because of a suit filed in New Jersey, which

questioned the right of a State to tax the same

sources taxed by the Federal Superfund, State Super-

24a

fund programs have had a cloud over them. This has

certainly been the case in New Jersey, where the

State was extremely reluctant to spend funds out of

our spillfund without this litigation being settled.

S. 51 strikes the so-called preemption language in

existing law which created this legal ambiguity. Ap-

proval of the bill will end years of litigation and free

States to conduct aggressive cleanup programs with

their own funds. [116 Cong. Rec. $11,581 (daily ed.

Sept. 17, 1985 at $11581.]

Subsequently, in the debate on the conference report

of SARA, Senator Lautenberg stated that the repeal of

section 114(c) would

{o]verturn the Supreme Court’s Exxon versus Hunt

decision, which preempted State taxing authority for

State spill funds, such as New Jersey’s. This provi-

sion is critical to New Jersey’s plans for complement-

ing the Federal Superfund Program with a State

supported cleanup program. [135 Cong. Rec. $14,912

(daily ed. Oct 3, 1986) .]

These excerpts from the legislative history of SARA

reflect Congress’s recognition not only of the enormity

of the hazardous waste cleanup problem but also of the

importance of State and local cooperation to assist the

federal government in this complex and difficult under-

taking. It is obvious that the repeal of section 114(c)

was intended to encourage and facilitate State participa-

tion in the long-term cleanup effort.

Under these circumstances, we are constrained to

fashion a remedy for the collection of Spill Act taxes

during the pre-emption period that least offends the con-

gressional purpose in repealing pre-emption. On another

recent occasion involving an invalid tax statute, we used

our equitable powers to construct a remedy consistent

with the attendant circumstances. See Salorio v. Glaser,

93 N.J. 447, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 78 L.Ed.2d 682

25a

(1983) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of the

Emergency Transfer Tax on New York residents who

commuted to work in New Jersey, but restricting deci-

sion to prospective application). As we observed in

Salorio, “Equitable remedies * * * ‘are a special blend

of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is work-

able,’ ” id. at 464 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon

II), supra, 411 U.S. at 200, 36 L.E£d.2d at 161).

Accordingly, we conclude that under these unique cir-

cumstances the appropriate remedy in this matter is that

which best implements the intent of Congress in adopting

SARA and the intent of the Legislature in adopting and

amending the Spill Act. The uncontradicted record be-

fore us indicates that the Spill Fund’s needs are likely to

exceed its resources for some time. The Legislature has

only recently increased both the tax rate and the tax base

in order to augment the Spill Fund’s revenues. Congress

has evidenced its intention to encourage an enhanced

State role in hazardous waste cleanup.

In this setting, a partial tax refund to plaintiffs should

be a remedy of last resort. Instead, we adopt that part

of the Tax Court’s recommendation that conditions the

payment of a pro-rata refund upon the Legislature’s fail-

ure to reimburse the Spill Fund for the amount of ex-

penditures found to be pre-empted. In our view, reim-

bursement of the Spill Fund from non-Spill Act revenues

vindicates the Spill Fund’s payment cf pre-empted ex-

penses in a manner most consistent with the objectives of

Congress and the Legislature. We conclude that a period

of six months from the final determination of the amount

of pre-empted expenditures, from which no appeal is

pending or can be taken, is sufficient for the Legislature

to take action to reimburse the fund. In this connection,

we hold that reimbursement of the Spill Fund must be

for the entire amount of pre-empted expenditures, and

reject the State’s contention that pro-rata reimbursement

proportionate to the plaintiffs’ share of Spill Act taxes

26a

is sufficient. The thrust of this remedy is to make the

Spill Fund whole.

In the event the Legislature does not appropriate funds

sufficient to reimburse the Spill Fund for the full amount

of pre-empted expenditures within such six-month period,

the Fund shall refund to the plaintiffs, pro rata, so much

of the pre-empted expenditures as bears the same pro-

portion to the total pre-empted expenditures as the Spill

Act taxes paid by plaintiffs bears to the total amount of

Spill Act taxes collected. In view of the repeal of the cap

provisions of the Spill Act as originally enacted, the Tax

Court’s recommendation in paragraph 4(a) of its Sum-

mary is no longer appropriate. —— N.J. Tax at ——

(slip op. at 39).

For the reasons stated, the recommendations of the

Tax Court, as modified by this opinion, are adopted. The

matter is remanded to the Tax Court for further pro-

ceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain

jurisdiction.

Justices Clifford, Handler and Pollock and Judges

Pressler and King join in this opinion. Chief Justice

Wilentz and Justices O’Hern and Garibaldi did not par-

ticipate.

27a

APPENDIX B

TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY

September Term 1984

A-66

EXXON CORPORATION, et als,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

vs

ROBERT HUNT, et als,

Defendants-Respondents.

On Remand from Supreme Court of New Jersey

RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO REMAND

JOHN F. EVERS, J.T.C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The United States Supreme Court in this matter,

(reported at 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986)) interpreted § 114

(ce) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9601, et seg. as preempting contributions to any state

fund that is intended to pay for the same types of ex-

penses that may be paid by the Fund (superfund) estab-

lished under CERCLA. The Supreme Court reversed the

decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court to the extent

that it held that the New Jersey Spill Compensation and

Control Act (Spill Act), N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 et seq.,

could constitutionally impose a tax on plaintiffs to sup-

28a

port expenditures which are eligible for superfund financ-

ing. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the New

Jersey Supreme Court to the extent that it held that the

Spill Act could constitutionally impose a tax to support

expenditures that are not eligible for superfund financ-

ing.

The purposes of the Spill Act which were found to be

non-preempted by the Supreme Court because they are

clearly beyond the scope of CERCLA and, therefore, not

‘covered by § 114(c), 42 U.S.C. 9614(c), include: (1) to

compensate third parties for damages resulting from

hazardous substance discharges; (2) to pay personnel

and equipment costs; (3) to administer the New Jersey

spill fund; and (4) to conduct research. The purposes of

the Spill Act which the Supreme Court found to be pre-

empted by §114(c) because they fall within the scope

of CERCLA are (1) the financing of governmental clean-

up of hazardous waste sites, including remedial costs for

sites on the National Priority List (NPL) and removal

costs that are eligible for superfund compensation under

the terms of the National Contingency Plan (NCP); and

(2) the reimbursement of third parties for cleanup costs,

except to the extent that these two categories of expend-

itures are intended to provide the 10% state share of

remedial costs. The Supreme Court held that, to the ex-

tent the Spill Act permits taxation to support preempted

expenditures, it cannot stand, and remanded the case to

the New Jersey Supreme Court which remand, in per-

tinent part, stated: j

We leave to the New Jersey Supreme Court the

state law question whether, or to what extent, the

nonpre-empted provisions of the statute are sever-

able from the pre-empted provisions. . . .

. . . [T]he case is remanded for further proceed-

ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 106 S. Ct.

1116-1117.

29a

I. ISSUES (AND PROBLEMS) PRESENTED DUE

TO THE NATURE OF THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT REMAND.

While that part of the Supreme Court remand which

leaves to the New Jersey Supreme Court the state law

question whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted

provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-

empted provisions is clear, the language concerning fur-

ther proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion is un-

clear and, it is submitted, its intent can only be ascer-

tained through an analysis of the Court’s reasoning as

expressed in its opinion. Such question arises not only

as a legal proposition but out of practical considerations

as well.

A cursory reading of the remand suggests that the

Court must focus, at least initially and perhaps exclu-

sively, on the severability issue. Following a resolution

of that question however, the question arises—what now?

Unlike the language employed in Exxon Corp. v. Eager-

ton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983), (also authored by Justice

Marshall and specifically referred to by the Justice in

the instant remand), where, after concluding that a por-

tion of an Alabama tax (on oil and gas extracted from

Alabama wells) was preempted, the high court said:

Since the severability of the pass-through prohibi-

tion from the remainder of the 1979 amendments is

a matter of state law, we remand to the Supreme

Court of Alabama for that court to determine

whether the partial invalidity of the pass-through

prohibition entitles appellants to a refund of some

or all of the taxes paid under protest. [at 197]

here the Court made no reference to the question of re-

funds whatsoever. The reasons suggested for the absence

of such refund language in the instant maiter are dis-

cussed infra, but in any event it appears that the New

Jersey Supreme Court, as well as the parties, assumed

30a

that the real question presented on remand dealt with

refunds—and then not “if” but rather “how much”.

(Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in its re

mand, directed_the Tax Court to make such calculations) .’

In an apparent attempt to formulate a method of de-

termining the exact amounts of spill fund monies which

were devoted to preempted purposes and thence a deter-

mination of the exact refunds due each plaintiff, the

parties embarked on a course of considerable “informal”

discovery. (See appendix in support of plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment). It soon became apparent (to

the parties and this Court) that such an undertaking,

if pursued to a conclusion, would be staggering in terms

of time and money. For example, Robert Hunt, (who

from January 1978 until January 1986 was the Chief

Executive of the spill fund), stated, “It would be ex-

tremely difficult, if possible at all, to determine which

expenditures were for work completed or contracted for

before April, 1981 but paid after that date,”*? and

“Numerous other examples can be given for sites where

significant amounts of spill fund monies were spent for

cleanup at a site which was eventually put on the NPL.”

(National Priority List). (Hunt affid. July 16, 1986, p.

6).8

1 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, also recognized the absence of

any direction as to payment of refunds. He said:

But since the Court concludes that the Spill Act is “pre-

empted in part,” ante, at 1; accord, id., at 19, it must gon-

front the difficult question of relief. In keeping with its “par-

tial preemption” analysis, the Court should advise the New

Jersey courts how they should calculate the partial refund of

taxes to which appellants are presumably entitled on remand.

106 S.Ct. 1120. [emphasis supplied]

2 While CERCLA was effective in Decembe 1980, superfund tax

was not collected until April 1981.

3 Although Congress directed that the superfund program be

implemented through a revised NCP to be adopted by June 1981,

3la

Additionally, concerning the problems associated with

extensive discovery, David Mack, (prior to his appoint-

ment as Acting Administrator of spill fund in February

1986, Mr. Mack was a regulatory officer of the New Jer-

sey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) ),

whose responsibilities included the monitoring of the spill

fund’s activities and who was also involved in New Jer-

sey’s hazardous waste cleanup program since 1980, which

involvement included negotiating contracts and agree-

ments under the superfund program between DEP and

United States Environmental Agency (EPA), stated:

This information, (a list of expenditures at sites

on the NPL from December 1980 [effective date of

CERCLA] to the present), was provided [to plain-

tiffs], but it should be noted that the costs listed in-

clude expenditures contracted for and paid prior to

listing on the NPL; expenditures contracted for

prior to listing on NPL but paid after listing; ad-

ministrative charges billed directly to the project

account; costs later reimbursed by EPA for advanced

funding; costs EPA declared to be ineligible for

funding; and costs which may be credited in the

future against the State’s mandated 10% share. Our

records reveal the date on which invoices are paid,

but not the date on which the work was contracted

for or actually performed... .

To discover the date of performance, however,

every invoice would have to be examined. Such an

undertaking is staggering in terms of time and re-

sources when 99 New Jersey sites—the number cur-

the EPA did not meet this deadline and the NCP, revised pursuant

to CERCLA, was not published until July 16, 1982. Once published

the NCP limited superfund expenditures for remedial (long-term

cleanup) actions to sites on the NPL which was to be a compilation

of the worst sites nationwide. However, EPA did not officially

promulgate the NPL until September 8, 1983, more than a year

after the NCP was promulgated.

32a

rently on the NPL—are involved. At least 1,800- in-

voices would have to be scrutinized. Indeed, the spill

fund would have to hire either a contractor or new

staff to perform this lengthy task. Additionally,

these invoices would have to be scrutinized to deter-

mine whether non-preempted costs such as adminis-

trative costs had been included. [Mack affid. July 15,

1986, pp. 5 & 6]

Under the circumstances it was agreed that certain

legal issues, (arising primarily from the imprecise direc-

tions of the United States Supreme Court), should first

be addressed; the thought being that a decision on those

questions would possibly decrease the time and expense,

and perhaps completely avoid the need, of such a detailed

accounting. Accordingly extensive briefs were submitted

concerning the issues of prospectivity vis-a-vis retroactiv-

ity, (of the Supreme Court decision) ; severability; extent

of refunds, if any; and the applicability (and compliance

with, if applicable) of N.J.S.A. 54:14-14, (State Tax

Uniform Procedure Law) .*

II. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT DECISION BE APPLIED PROSPEC-

TIVELY?

As indicated in the Statement of the Case the United

States Supreme Court remanded this matter for the pur-

pose of determining, “whether, or to what extent, the

non-preempted provisions of the statute are severable

from the preempted provisions.” 106 S. Ct. at 1116. To

carry out the Court’s mandate, the first question to be

addressed is whether its order to determine severability

of the preempted portions of the Spill Act is to have

4 Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against enforcement of the

spill tax taxing provisions until the New Jersey Supreme Court

resolves the remand from the United States Supreme Court in

the instant matter.

Oral argument was waived pursuant to R. 1:6-2.

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33a

retroactive or prospective effect. The answer to that ques-

tion turns on whether the decision itself is to be applied

retroactively or prospectively. It is determined that the

decision is to have prospective effect only if it follows that

severability of the Spill Act for the period prior to March

10, 1986, the date of the United States Supreme Court

decision, is not an issue because the Act will be treated

as valid up to that date. Such decision will also deter-

mine whether plaintiffs are entitled to refunds for

amounts paid for preempted purposes prior to March 10,

1986. If it is to be applied prospectively it follows that

there can be no refunds for amounts paid prior to that

date even though the spill fund used tax monies for pre-

empted purposes. Defendants’ position is that the deci-

sion must be given prospective effect and consequently

severability is an issue only from March 10, 1986 and

further that plaintiffs are not entitled to refunds for any

tax paid prior thereto.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ motion for prospec-

tive effect ignores the limited scope of the remand by the

United States Supreme Court, which according to plain-

tiffs, was confined strictly to the question of severability.

Because the Spill Act was not devoted exclusively to pur-

poses preempted by §114(c) of CERCLA, according to

plaintiffs it was necessary for the United States Supreme

Court to remand this matter, “for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.” 106 S. Ct. at 1117.

Plaintiffs further contend that the high court was quite

explicit as to the scope that would be open on remand:

State legislation is invalid ‘to the extent that it

actually conflicts with federal law,’ Pacific Gas &

Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Commission, 461

U.S. 190, 204 . . . (1983), and such a conflict has

been demonstrated in this case. We leave to the New

Jersey Supreme Court the Statelaw question

whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted pro-

visions of the statute are severable from the pre-

34a

empted provisions. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462

U.S. 176, 196-97 (1983).

Id. at 1116.

Thus, they assert that the only issue on remand is the

state-law question as to the possible severability of the

non-preempted provisions of the Spill Act. Defendants’

argument that plaintiffs should be denied refunds of all

taxes paid prior to the United States Supreme Court

decision does not fall within the scope of the remand,

according to plaintiffs. Thus it is argued that to hold

that the decision should be applied only prospectively

would result in a complete nullification of the Court’s

decision.

I disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that prospectivity

is a non-issue. As noted earlier I do not find the remand

language of the United States Supreme Court to be as

“crystal clear” as suggested by plaintiffs. Secondly, al-

though the courts initially espoused the common law doc-

trine that an invalidated statute must be deemed a nullity

from the moment of its adoption (“. .. in legal con-

templation as inoperative as though it had never been

passed,” Norton v. Shelton County, 118 U.S. 425, 442

(1886) ), the rigidity of the rule and the impractical and

harsh results which it compelled in invalidating all past

transactions made in reliance upon a purportedly legiti-

mate statute led the Supreme Court in Chicot Co. Drain-

age Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940),

to reason that the “broad statements” of absolute retro-

spective invalidity espoused in Norton were unjustified.

Subsequent to Chicot Co. Drainage, supra, two United

States Supreme Court cases conclusively silenced the Nor-

ton doctrine of invariable and total retroactivity. In the

first, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the

Court held that its earlier decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna

Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969) should be

applied prospectively only. In Rodrigue the Court had

35a

held that state law would be incorporated into federal

law and applied in actions for personal injuries on fixed

structures located on the Outer Continental Shelf. The

plaintiff in Chevron had filed suit prior to the Court’s

decision in Rodrigue and had relied on the longer statute

of limitations under admirality law which at that time

was held to be applicable in actions brought under the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In holding that

Rodrigue would be applied prospectively with the result

that the plaintiff’s action was not time barred, the Court

set up a three-part test to determine whether a particular

decision should be applied prospectively or retrospectively.

First, in order to be applied prospectively, the decision

“must establish a new principle of law either by over-

ruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have

relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression

whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed... .”

404 U.S. at 106. Secondly, a determination must be made

whether the purpose and effect of the new rule will be

furthered or retarded by its retrospective application.

Id. at 107. Third, the Court should weigh “the equity

imposed by retroactive application” and should avoid |

retroactivity where to do so “could produce substantial

inequitable results. . . .” Ibid.

To preclude retroactivity, defendants must satisfy all

three parts of the Chevron Oil test. EEOC v. MTC Gear

Corp., 595 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D.C. Ill. 1984). An exam-

ination of the facts here leads to the conclusion that,

while parts two and three of the Chevron test may be

satisfied, the first part is not.

In ruling that its earlier decision in Rodrigue was to

have prospective application the Chevron Court said:

Rodrigue was not only a case of first impression

in this Court under the Lands Act, but it also effec-

tively overruled a long line of decisions by the Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that ad-

36a

mirality law, including the doctrine of laches, applies

through the Lands Act. See, e. g., Pure Oil Co. v.

Snipes, 293 F. 2d 60; Movable Offshore Co. v. Ousley,

345 F. 2d 870; Loffland Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386

F. 2d 540. When the respondent was injured, for

the next two years until he instituted his lawsuit,

and for the ensuing year of pretrial proceedings,

these Court of Appeals decisions represented the law

governing his case. It cannot be assumed that he did

or could foresee that this consistent interpretation of

the Lands Act would be overturned. The most he

could do was to rely on the law as it then was.

[404 U.S. 107]

While acknowledging that § 114(c) of CERCLA was “not

a model of legislative draftsmanship,” 106 S. Ct. at 1109,

the Supreme Court decided the case based on the well

established principles of express preemption as applied

to the language of the statute. It held that it, (§ 114(c))

was meant to forbid the States from imposing taxes to

finance certain types of expenditures. This case is there-

fore significantly different from Rodrigue which over-

ruled a long line of decisions.

Furthermore, the situation here also significantly dif-

fers from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)

(Lemon II) where the Court held that its earlier in-

validation of a Pennsylvania statute (Lemon v. Kurtz-

man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I)), should be ap-

plied prospectively. The Pennsylvania statute had _ per-

mitted the State to reimburse private sectarian schools

for certain educational services. A divided Court struck

down the Pennsylvania statute under the establishment

clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs then

sought to enjoin the State from reimbursing the schools

for the current school year although the schools had al-

ready performed the services for which they were to

obtain reimbursement. The Court refused to enjoin the

reimbursement. Nor does the instant matter present a

a /

37a

Solario type situation, (Solorio v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447

1983), where the Court held that its decision invalidat-

ing the emergency transportation tax (ETT) under the

Privileges and Immunities Clause would be applied

prospectively.

In Lemon II and Solario the state expenditures were

held to be invalid under general provisions of the federal

Constitution, which necessarily must await a definitive

court ruling before their contours are established. See

Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 108. Here, by contrast, Congress

commanded in December 1980 that, “no person may be

required to contribute to any fund the purpose of which

is to pay compensation for claims ... which may be

compensated under CERCLA.” 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c).

The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the

preemptive language of § 114(c) which was based on the

Federal Supremacy clause, did not “establish a new prin-

ciple of law either by overruling clear past precedent on

which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an

issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly

foreshadowed. .. .” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, supra,

at 106. :

Additionally it appears that defendant’s “reliance”

argument is questionable. The legislative history of

CERCLA §114(c) reveals that the defendants were

aware of the statute’s probable preemptive effect on the

spill fund. Jerry English, (former DEP Commissioner),

observed that the predecessor to § 114(c) would have the

effect of “ ‘swiss-cheese preemption’, because it would

_ shoot holes in State laws to the extent incidents or dam-

ages are compensable under the federal law. ...” The

Environmental Law Institute, Superfund; A Legislative

History 534 (1983). (Supplemental appendix to plain-

tiffs’ brief in opposition to defendants’ motion for sum-

mary judgment and in support of plaintiffs’ motion for

an injunction). Of note also are the statements of Rob-

38a

ert Hunt. “Upon the adoption of the Superfund Act in

December 1980, I became concerned about the impact of

the preemption language on the spending alternatives of

the spill fund”, (Hunt affid., p. 2), and again, “. . . we

in New Jersey felt that we had to be prepared to use

the spill fund to address pressing State priorities even

if we were risking the possibility of some conflict in

regard to the preemption language contained in the

Superfund Act.” (Hunt affid., p. 4).

As earlier noted both Lemon II and Salorio involved

the invalidation of State laws on constitutional grounds.

In such cases, courts are entitled to shape their decrees

in accordance with traditional equitable principles un-

constrained by legislative directives. This case, however,

involves an explicit statement of policy by the Congress

on a matter indisputably within its authority that gives

courts no such discretion to withhold relief to persons

protected by the statute. Congress, in § 152 of CERCLA

expressly stated that § 114(c) would become effective on

passage, (in contrast with the predecessor version in H.R.

85 which had a 180 day delay in its preemption provi-

sion). Thus it is clear that under Chevron, and § 114(c),

the courts are not permitted to contradict the legislative

command based on their conceptions of equity or public

policy. In TVA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158, 193-95 (1978),

the Court refused to exercise any equitable discretion to

deny relief to plaintiffs once it determined that the stat-

ute had been violated and that Congress had left no room

for equity courts to carve out exceptions to its clear com-

mands. Jd. Accord Badaracco v. Comm’r., 464 U.S. 386,

398 (1984).

The finding that the United States Supreme Court’s

decision should be applied retroactively and not prospec-

tively gives rise to the next question which will now be

addressed.

ee Se ee | oY lS

—

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Pie bran Sain tot et

39a

Ill. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION BE

RETROACTIVELY APPLIED?

The answer to this question is found by scrutinizing

the Supreme Court decision itself. We know that § 114

(c) states:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may

be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of

which is to pay compensation for claims for any

costs of response or damages or claims which may be

compensated under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C.

§ 9614(c).

We know that the high court, based on § 114(c), found

that in some areas there was an overlap in the superfund-

spillfund purposes. We also know that those purposes

were identified as (1) the financing of governmental

cleanup of hazardous waste sites, including remedial

costs for sites on the NPL and removal costs that are

eligible for superfund compensation under the terms of

NCP; and (2) the reimbursement of third parties for

cleanup costs, except to the extent that these two cate

gories of expenditures are intended to provide the state

share of remedial costs. We further know that it was

not the collection of the Spill Act tax that the Court

found to be improper but rather certain expenditures

made from the fund.

Our remaining task is to determine whether the

“purpose” of the Spill Fund is ta pay costs that we

have found to fall within the scope of pre-emption.

Those parts of the statute that permit Spill Fund

expenditures beyond this state share for remedial

costs for sites on the National Priority List, or for

removal costs that are eligible for Superfund com-

pensation under the terms of the NCP, are pre

empted by § 114(c). 106 S. Ct. 1116 [emphasis sup-

plied]

40a

What we do not know, and what neither the United

States Supreme Court nor the Congress knew, because at

the time of enactment of CERCLA and its § 114(c) they

could not know, were the specific sites within the scope

of the preempted purposes. New Jersey knew what it did

but the United States did not know what it (the Federal

Government) would do or where.

The Court found that two of the six purposes of spill

fund were preempted.

As we have explained above, the Spill Fund may

be used for six purposes: (1) to finance govern-

mental cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) to

reimburse third parties for cleanup costs; (3) to

compensate third parties for damage resulting from

hazardous substance discharges; (4) to pay person-

nel and equipment costs; (5) to administer the fund

itself; and (6) to conduct research. Of these the

latter four are clearly beyond the scope of CERCLA,

and are therefore not covered by § 114(c). The first

two are within the scope of CERCLA, except to the

extent that they are intended to provide the 10%

state share of remedial costs. 106 S. Ct. 1116

Obviously, in recognition that such conclusion was ab-

stract and without more would not provide a resolution

to the conflict, the Court found a yardstick with which

to measure those expenditures which may be compensated

by superfund. Without an appropriate measure those

expenditures found in the above-noted two categories

would be preempted notwithstanding that, at least some

of them, could never be paid from superfund. The Court

said:

Having decided that “may be compensated” should

be given its ordinary meaning, we must define the

category of expenses that may be compensated by

Superfund. Fortunately, CERCLA itself furnishes

an appropriate test. Section 105(8) (B) of CERCLA,

4la

42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B), requires the President to

revise the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to

reflect CERCLA’s provisions. As part of that revi-

sion, the President must create and revise annually

a list of sites most in need of federal efforts, now

known as the National Priorities List. The NCP

currently specifies that removal, or immediate clean-

up, will be financed by Superfund only in emergency

situations, see 40 CRF § 300.65 (1985). Remedial

action will be financed only for sites on the National

priorities List, id. § 300.68(a). Finally, the En-

vironmental Protection Agency, pursuant to the

NCP, has proposed criteria for the use of Superfund

money for natural resource claims. See 50 Fed. Reg.

993 (1985). The NCP, therefore, provides criteria

that determine what expenses, at which sites, will be

eligible for Superfund money. We therefore conclude

that the NCP provides the appropriate measure of

whether a given expenditure contitutes “costs of

response or damages or claims which may be com-

pensated” by Superfund. 106 S. Ct. 1115 [emphasis

supplied] °

Close scrutiny of the foregoing language discloses how-

ever that the NCP only specifies that removal, or immedi-

ate cleanup expenses, will be paid only in emergency

cases. As to remedial (long term) activities superfund

may pay those expenses only in connection with the sites

appearing on the NPL. Therefore, while the NCP serves

as a measure for preempted emergency (immediate)

cleanup expenses, it can only be in conjunction with the

NLP that it can likewise serve in connection with re-

medial (long term) preempted expenditures.

5 Curiously the Court used the word “will” (be financed) (be

eligible) in deciding the class of expenditures which “may” be

compensated. See Exxon v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526, 534 (1984) where

Justice Clifford, quoting from the Tax Court opinion (4 N.J.Tazx

294, 307 (Tax Ct. 1982) ), stated, “(t]he seemingly simple, but often

misused and misapplied word ‘may’ is anything but unambiguous.”

42a

It cannot be doubted that the Supreme Court was

aware that the NCP and NPL were not effective on the

date CERCLA was enacted, when the Court declared the

NCP and NPL to be the guidelines of preempted expendi-

tures. Had the Supreme Court believed that expendi-

tures made before the adoption of the NPL and NCP

were subject to the preemption provision, it is reasonably

assumed that it would have provided a second guide for

expenditures preempted during the initial period follow-

ing the adoption of CERCLA. Since no mention was

made of that time period, it is obvious that the Court did

not believe that any spill fund expenditures were pre-

empted until after the superfund program was in place

and ready to operate pursuant to the promulgated NCP

and NPL.

That conclusion is reenforced by reference to 42 U.S.C.

§ 9611 which defines the types of removal actions which

will be financed by superfund. Subsection (a) (2) states

that superfund may be used for:

Payment of any claim for necessary response costs

incurred by any other person as a result of carrying

out the national contingency plan established under

section 1321(c) of Title 33 and amended by section

9605 of this title: Provided, however, that such costs

must be approved under said plan and certified by

the responsible Federal official. . . . [42 U.S.C.

§ 9611(a) (2).] [emphasis supplied]

Without the NCP this section provides no guidance what-

soever. Prior to publication of the NCP and NPL, only

to the extent that superfund money was actually com-

mitted to New Jersey projects did the State have reason

to know that spill fund expenditures were preempted. In

those instances, according to defendants, no spill fund

monies were spent.

Further scrutiny of the above Supreme Court language

reveals that, in its reference to the use of NCP as an

appropriate measure, it recognized that the NCP speaks

43a

to the future, not to the past. Thus reason and logic

dictate that in defining the immediate cleanup purposes

which are preempted it could only be from the date of

promulgation of the NCP that the expenditures would be

preempted. Similarly it was only upon the promulgation

of the NPL that expenditures in the prohibited remedial

category are prohibited. Any other interpretation would

render unintelligible the Court’s reference to “what ex-

penses, at which sites, will be eligible for superfund

money.” 106 S. Ct. at 1115.

The revised NCP was promulgated July 16, 1982 (42

Fed. Reg. 31180) although the first NPL was not prom-

ulgated (as part of the NCP) until September 8, 1983.°

Accordingly, if spill fund is found to be severable and if

plaintiffs are entitled to refunds, the refunds will be cal-

culated from those dates.

In arriving at this conclusion I have not overlooked

plaintiffs’ claim that from the enactment of CERCLA,

New Jersey had sufficient guidance to know what sites

would be eligible for superfund and could have amended

the Spill Tax to reflect such “would-be eligibility.” 7

The following provision was included in the Federal Register

concerning those dates:

Under Section 305 of CERCLA, this revised Plan cannot take

effect until Congress has had at least sixty “calendar days of

continuous session” from the date of promulgation in which to

review the Plan. Since the actual length of this review period

is affected by congressional action, EPA will publish a notice

in the Federal Register at the end of the review period announc-

ing the effective date of the Plan.

Notwithstanding this provision and the absence of any publica-

tion in the Federal Register, defendants accept these dates as the

cates of final adoption of the NCP and NPL.

7™See Appendix in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment and particularly the following exhibits which, according

to plaintiffs, prove that:

1. Chemical Control and Goose Farm had already qualified for

funding under § 311 of the Clean Water Act (Ex. E and M) leaving

no doubt that they would be included on the NPL.

[Continued]

44a

At the outset it must be noted that plaintiffs’ conclu-

sions are based on information furnished by defendants.

Furthermore it should be remembered that CERCLA was

not even signed into law until December 1980. Clearly

no expenditures prior to that date could be considered

preempted. Beyond that, taxing authority for CERCLA

was not effective until April 1981. Preemption could not

have been contemplated before that date. Moreover plain-

tiffs use figures from the Spill Fund Annual Report for

1982 and 1983 which included all expenditures made at

sites from the inception of the spill fund in 1977 until

June 30, 1983. Again, these figures include expenditures

7 [Continued]

2. The NPL itself was to be compiled on the basis of the Fed-

eral Hazard Ranking System (HRS). Seventy-two sites were sub-

mitted as candidates initially by New Jersey. (Ex. Q, p. 2).

3. Pursuant to the HRS, in February 1981, four sites in New

Jersey; Bridgeport, Burnt Fly Bog, Kin-Buc and Lipari Landfill

were selected for funding by superfund for remedial site study

and design. (Ex. N).

4. The Abandoned Site Cleanup Report issued by the DEP on

May 1, 1981 (Ex. M) disclosed that as of that date, application

for superfund money was pending on Chemical Control and Goose

Farm, and that superfund awards had already been made on Burnt

Fly Bog, Bridgeport Rental, Kin-Buc and the Lipari Landfill.

5. In July 1981, EPA listed its rating scores (Ex. O) for com-

pilation of the Interim Priority List. New Jersey had 16 sites

which received high rankings. In addition to the six above men-

tioned sites, they included Price Landfill, Pijack Farm, Spence

Farm, Lone Pine Landfill, Motel Dennis, Williams Property, Upper

Freehold, Krysowaty Farm, King of Prussia and Bog Creek Farm

(Ex. O).

6. In October 1981, EPA issued the Interim Priority List of 115

of the Nation’s worst sites. Of this number, eleven sites were

from New Jersey. (Ex. P).

7. In December 1982, EPA released its NPL; of the 418 haz-

ardous waste sites listed, 65 were from New Jersey. (Ex. Q, p. 2).

8. Since that time, the NPL has been amended so that currently

99 sites from New Jersey are on the NPL. (Ex. I, Att. II).

45a

made before CERCLA was enacted as well as for non-

preempted purposes at the sites. Furthermore, it is

irrelevant that spill fund expenditures were made for

NPL sites as there is no limitation of the use of any or

all of spill fund monies at NPL sites for non-preempted

purposes.

As to plaintiffs’ claim that certain projects “without

question” constitute removal actions within the meaning

of CERCLA, it appears that plaintiffs’ erroneously relied

on the statute, rather than the NCP for description of a

removal action and further ignored 40 C.F.R. 300.65

which establishes criteria for removal actions and limits

the amount of time or money that can be spent on a

removal action. In pertinent part 40 C.F.R. 300.65(a)

(3) states:

Removal actions, other than those authorized under

Section 104(b) of CERCLA, shall be terminated

after $1 million has been obligated for the action or

six months have elapsed, unless the lead agency de-

termines that (certain factors exist at the site).

It further appears that plaintiffs have not thoroughly

analyzed nor utilized all of the information supplied on

which they rely. By way of example, it appears that the

figures recited for the projects targeted by plaintiffs do

not necessarily represent what plaintiffs imply. Exhibit

L was provided to plaintiffs with a cover memo addressed

to a Deputy Attorney General which cautioned against

misuse of the figures provided. The figures represent the

total amounts spent at any site which has ever been in-

cluded on the NPL including money spent prior to De-

cember 1980 (effective date of CERCLA) and certainly

prior to the adoption of the revised NCP, as well as

money spent after CERCLA’s taxing authority expired.’

® CERCLA was a temporary experiment; the authorization to col-

lect the tax and to appropriate general revenues expired on Sep-

tember 30, 1985. On April 1, 1986 Congress appropriated a “one-

46a

It also includes amounts which were later reimbursed by

the Capital Fund (general revenue account) if the project

was later found to have been an emergency type removal

action which was not carried out in accordance with the

NCP. Plaintiffs cannot claim any impropriety for pre-

empted expenditures which have been reimbursed to the

spill fund.

IV. SEVERABILITY: ARE THE PREEMPTED PRO-

VISIONS OF THE SPILL ACT SEVERABLE?

It is axiomatic that the non-preempted provisions of a

statute can escape invalidity only to the extent they can

be severed from the preempted provisions. It is recog-

nized that the doctrine of severability must be applied

with caution for, in the enforcement of valid portions of

a statute which contains invalid portions also, there is a

danger of judicial usurpation of the legislative power.

Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 1 NW.

545, 556 (1949). Accordingly, the party seeking sever-

ance must establish that (1) the Legislature clearly

manifested its intention that it would not have enacted

the valid provisions independently of the invalid provi-

sions and (2) the valid and invalid provisions are not

so intimately connected with and dependent upon each

other so as to make the statute one composite whole. See

Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills, 60 N.J. 342,

345-46 (1972); Lane Distrib. Inc. v. Tilton, 7 N.J. 349,

369-70 (1951).

Admittedly funding for the cleanup and removal of

hazardous substances eligible for Superfund financing

was within the purpose of the New Jersey Spill Tax.

Equally as clear is that funding for those purposes found

to be not preempted was also included. The problem, as

shot” infusion of $150,000,000 which was available for obligations

only until May 31, 1986. P.L. 99-270. On October 17, 1986 new

Superfund legislation was adopted which provides for an appro-

priation of $9,000,000,000.

47a

presented by plaintiffs, is that all purposes are funded

by a single tax. According to plaintiffs the tax rate and

the expenditures it supports constitute an integral whole,

intimately connected and interdependent rendering it im-

possible for the court to sever the non-preempted items of

spill fund since severance would require the establish-

ment of a new tax rate. Citing the N.J. Const. Art. VI,

§ 6, par. 1 (1947), which states that the taxing power is

vested exclusively in the Legislature, plaintiffs argue

that, as a matter of constitutional law, the New Jersey

judiciary is prohibited from recomputing a tax rate for

the spill fund to reflect expenditures for non-preempted

purposes. Since the spill fund has only one tax rate

which is invalid and incapable of judicial recomputation,

the entire taxing scheme is invalid, according to plain-

tiffs.

To the extent that the Spill Act contains a single tax

that cannot be apportioned between its preempted and

non-preempted purposes, plaintiffs are correct. To the

extent that the fact of a single tax rate renders the act

incapable of severability, plaintiffs’ argument misses tne

point.

As the Supreme Court noted, the issue of whether an

invalid portion of a state statute is severable from the

remainder of the statute is an issue of state law. This

Supreme Court has consistently applied the long estab-

lished “principle of separability” noting that “the essen-

tial inquiry is whether the lawmaking body designed that

the enactment should stand or fall as a unitary whole.”

State v. Lanze, 27 N.J. 516, 527 (1958). The inclusion

of a severability clause in the statute, as is included in

the Spill Act, will not necessarily resolve the issue com-

pletely. Such a clause will reverse the presumption that

an act is only intended to “operate as an entirety... .”

Id. at 528. However, the court must also determine

~ whether the required severance would have been within

the Legislature’s intention or whether the Legislature

48a

would have concluded that “the particular provision is so

interwoven with the invalid clauses so that it cannot

stand alone.” Jd. at 527. The court must be able to say

with assurance that “the Legislature would have intended

the remainder of the statute to stand alone”; Affiliated

Distillers Brand Corp. v. Sills, swpra and would have en-

acted the statute without the offending clause. Affiliated

Distillers Brand Corp. v. Sills, supra.

This test can be met “where the principle object of the

statute is constitutional, and the objectionable provision

can be excised without substantial impairment of the

general purpose. .. .” State v. Lanza, supra, at 528.

There must be no conflict between the purpose for which

the Legislature originally enacted the statute and the

statute as it remains with the offending portions excised.

N.J. Chapt., Am. J. P. N.J. State Bd. of Prof. Planners,

48 N.J. 581, 593 (1967).

Finally, as earlier noted, when excising the invalid pro-

visions, the courts must be cautious not to “usurp the

legislative function of lawmaking.” Affiliated Distillers

Brand Corp. v. Sills, supra, at 346.

The Legislature adopted the Spill Act to protect the

citizens and the environment of the State from harm re-

sulting from discharge of petroleum and other hazardous

substances. The Legislature specifically declared that it

intended;

.. . [b]y the passage of this Act to exercise the

powers of this State to-control the transfer and

storage of hazardous substances and to provide lia-

bility for damage sustained within this State as a

result of any discharge of said substances, by requir-

ing the prompt containment and removal of such

pollution and substances, and to provide a fund for

swift and adequate compensation to resort businesses

and other- persons damaged by such discharge.

[N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 (a) ]

49a

From this introductory section alone, it is clear that

the Legislature had numerous concerns which it intended

to address through this act: the desire to minimize the

chances for discharges of hazardous substances; the need

for prompt action to remedy real or potential discharges;

and the concern that individuals and businesses not be

unfairly harmed by such discharges. The tax imposed

by the Act is credited to the spill fund which is author-

ized to finance spill response and waste site cleanups,

certain damages claims resulting from hazardous dis-

charges, personnel and equipment costs of the DEP as-

sociated with enforcement of the Act, the administration

of the spill fund and research concerning pollution and

cleanup techniques, including ocean pollutions. N.J.S.A.

58:10-23.11(0). Thus, a primary object of the Spill Act,

(and CERCLA) was to create a funding mechanism to

finance as broad a response to the problem of actual and

potential hazardous substance discharges in New Jersey

as reasonably feasible.

The United States Supreme Court recognized the im-

portance of the problem addressed by both the Spill Act

and CERCLA and accordingly held that, “the State was

entitled to collect taxes,” to address the great risk to the

public presented by discharges of hazardous substances,

but that, “the State was not permitted to spend that

money for any of the types of projects which EPA in-

tended to finance,” with superfund. Quite simply put, it

was the nature of certain expenditures and not the tax

collected to fund all the expenditures made and to be

made from the fund in furtherance of the overall pur-

poses of the Spill Act that the Court found to be objec-

tionable. In their argument that the single unapportion-

able tax required by the Act renders it non-severable,

plaintiffs overlook that important distinction drawn by

the Court. While the tax cannot be apportioned, the pre-

empted and non-preempted purposes and the expendi-

tures made in furtherance thereof, are identifiable.

50a

This Supreme Court found in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54

N.J. 194 (1969) that when a statute would be uncon-

stitutional if applied to one set of facts, the courts should

not stumble over, “mechanical terms, (but rather) the

sounder course is to consider what is involved and decide

from the sense of the situation whether the Legislature

would want the statute to succumb.” Jd. at 202. There

should be no doubt here, after reviewing the purposes of

the statute and the intent of the Legislature, in light of

the Supreme Court’s findings, that as much of the Spill

Act as is possible to survive, should survive.

In State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462 (1974) the Court

was faced with invalidating the State’s obscenity statute

or reading in to it several conditions which the United

States Supreme Court had recently held must be a part

of a constitutional obscenity statute. The Court decided

to “judicially salvage” the statute, reading in the neces-

sary conditions, even though to do so the Court would

have to make some legislative policy decisions and even

though the Legislature would have to completely rewrite

the statute in the near future. Id. at 472-473. In this

instance, the Spill Act will not necessarily need to be

rewritten and the Court will not have to make any legis-

lative policy decisions. The Court will only have to hold

that the Act must be read in conjunction with § 114(c)

of CERCLA.

This matter is not dissimilar to U.S.A. Chamber of

Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131 (1982) where The Na-

tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was found to pre-

empt the State’s “Strikebreakers Act” to the extent that

its provisions applied to employers and employees within

the NLRA. Finding that the “legislature would likely

want the statute to remain to the extent that it may...

(and finding) no impediment to such judicial surgery as

will bring the statute within the [Federal] Constitution,”

the Court read the necessary restrictions into the statue.

|

5la

Id. at 154 citing State v. Zito, 54 N.J. 206, 218 (1969).

The same surgical procedures should be performed on the

Spill Act.

In view of the foregoing it is submitted that the Court

will not be usurping any legislative prerogative by delet-

ing the preempted purposes from the Spill Act. This

reduced definition of the scope of the fund’s authoriza-

tion will not diminish the importance of the remaining

portions of the statute. More importantly, the remain-

ing purposes are in no way dependent on the excised por-

tions. This Court suggests therefore that the authoriza-

tion in the Spill Act for expenditures, beyond the State’s

share, for remedial costs for sites on the NPL and for

removal costs that are eligible for superfund compensa-

tion under the terms of the NCP, should be severed.

Having found that the preempted/non-preempted pro-

visions of the Spill Act may be severed, the question of

refunds will now be addressed.

V. HAVE PLAINTIFFS COMPLIED WITH ALL JU-

RISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS SO AS TO

ENTITLE THEM TO CLAIM REFUNDS OF

SPILL ACT TAXES?

N.J.S.A. 54:49-14 of the State Tax Uniform Procedure

Law, provides:

Any taxpayer, at any time within two years after

the payment of any original or additional tax as-

sessed against him, unless a shorter limit is fixed by

the law imposing the tax, may file with the commis-

sioner a claim under oath. for refund, in such form

as the commissioner may prescribe, stating the

grounds therefore, but no claim for refund shall be

required or permitted to be filed with respect to a

tax paid, after protest has been filed with the com-

missioner or after proceedings on appeal have been

52a

commenced as provided in this subtitle, until such

protest or appeal has been finally determined.

As it pertains to this issue the procedural history of

this matter is as follows. On August 10, 1981, plaintiffs

filed a complaint in the Tax Court seeking to have the

Spill Tax declared unconstitutional and to obtain a re-

fund for all taxes which were being paid. On April 23,

1982 the Tax Court granted the State’s motion for sum-

mary judgment and dismissed all counts of plaintiffs’

complaint which related to the constitutionality of the

Spill Act. This decision was affirmed by the Appellate

Division and by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The

United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded to

the New Jersey Supreme Court which in turn remanded

the matter to the Tax Court.

In early 1983, during the pendency of these lawsuits,

plaintiffs filed claims for refund with the New Jersey

Division of Taxation, which were denied by the Director

of the Division. Each plaintiff filed a timely appeal in

the Tax Court from denial of the claim for refund. No

subsequent refund claims appear to have been filed.

Since plaintiffs’ 1983 refund claims cover only the pe-

riods stated in the claims, defendants contend that there

are subsequent periods for which no refund claims were

filed and which are now barred by the two-year statute

of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 54:49-14.

In a letter to the presiding judge of the Tax Court

dated June 2, 1983, defendants presented the parties’

joint request to place each of the appeals filed in 1983

on the inactive list pending the final disposition of the

Tax Court decision. The issues raised were identical to

those presented in the refund appeals, i.e. whether the

Spill Act was preempted by CERCLA. These cases were

placed on the inactive list where they still remain. Plain-

tiffs also claim that during an April 1986 conference

with the presiding judge of the Tax Court, defendants

-

EE

53a

represented that plaintiffs had complied with all proce-

dural requirements and that that was not an issue.°

In their brief in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for

injunctive relief, dated September 8, 1986, defendants

for the first time formally asserted that plaintiffs had

failed to comply with all of the procedural requirements

concerning their refund claims." In a letter to plaintiffs’

counsel dated September 10, 1986, the Division of Taxa-

tion notified plaintiffs concerning the alleged procedural

deficiencies in the claims for refund and denied all re-

fund claims.

Essentially plaintiffs claim that the refund statute

language permits the filing of a single set of claims cov-

ering all subsequent periods. Plaintiffs argue that the

phrase in N.J.S.A. 54:49-14, “but no claim for refund

shall be required or permitted to be filed with respect

to a tax paid, after protest has been filed with the Com-

missioner or after proceedings on appeal have been com-

menced as provided in this subtitle, until such protest or

appeal has been finally determined,” means that once a

claim for refund is filed for a given two-year period, no

other claims are required or permitted until the matter

in controversy in the first refund claim is finally re-

solved.

Plaintiffs’ interpretation overlooks the fact that each

taxable period is viewed as separate and distinct from

all other periods for purposes of compliance with juris-

dictional requirements in tax matters. Jurisdiction to re-

® Defendants neither admit nor deny making such representa-

tion but claim that such a statement during an informal, off-the-

record conference, cannot be binding.

The Court notes that in their April 1986 non-binding statements

regarding legal issues, no reference was made to plaintiffs’ alleged

failure to abide by the requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:49-14.

10TIn an earlier brief defendants alluded to the possible existence

of such procedural defects.

54a

view one taxable year is not determinative of jurisdiction

over other years. See Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 109 N.J.

Super. 22, 25 (App. Div. 1980), aff’d. o.b., 57 N.J. 199

(1970), app. dism’d. 402 U.S. 902 (1971); Fairmount

Cemetery Ass’n. v. Newark, 3 N.J.Tax 370, 374 (Tax

Court 1981). Construing the refund statute as plaintiffs

would have it would completely subvert the principle that

in tax matters jurisdictional requirements, specifically

statutes of limitations, must be met for each taxable

period.

Notwithstanding that conclusion I nevertheless find

that plaintiffs are entitled to seek refunds, (from the

NCP and NPL dates set forth in Point III). Although

couched in terms of a “tax” refund, in view of the United

States Supreme Court’s finding that it was not the im-

position and collection of the Spill Tax, but rather the

expenditure of some of the monies on preempted pur-

poses, that was improper, plaintiffs actually seek a re-

turn of those improperly spent funds. As such, N.J.S.A.

54:49-14 does not apply. Defendants Go not disagree

with the Supreme Court’s finding. Defendants cannot

have it both ways. They cannot adopt the “no tax” argu-

ment when it suits their needs in support of their posi-

tion regarding prospectivity and severability, and adopt

a “yes tax” position in an attempt to defeat plaintiffs’

claims for refunds.

Secondly, notwithstanding defendants’ claims that had

they known the United States Supreme Court’s decision

regarding preemption beforehand, they would have de-

voted the preempted funds to non-preempted purposes,

the fact is, as noted earlier, that some monies were ex-

pended on preempted purposes. But for those expendi-

tures, it clearly appears that, with the continued pay-

11In spite of thise finding it was deemed wise to include the

foregoing discussion concerning the interpretation of the require-

ments of N.J.S.A. 54:49-14 in the event the Supreme Court dis-

agrees with this finding and concludes that the statute does apply.

55a

ments of the tax by plaintiffs, the statutory cap,

(N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h(b)) would have been reached

and the subsequent payments would never have been

made. Under those circumstances defendants should not

be permitted to take refuge behind the procedural re-

quirements of N.J.S.A. 54:49-14.

Lastly, if ever there was a situation where fundamen-

tal fairness should allow a party to at least pursue a re-

fund claim, this is it.

VI. IN WHAT MANNER SHALL PLAINTIFFS BE

REFUNDED THOSE SUMS EXPENDED ON

PREEMPTED PURPOSES?

Initially, defendants argue that plaintiffs are entitled

to no refund because they cannot prove that they would

have been assessed less tax, or no tax at all, but for the

preempted provisions of the Spil! Act; that is, they can-

not show that all of the taxes would not have been spent

for non-preempted purposes if the Supreme Court’s de-

cision had been available earlier. Thus plaintiffs cannot

show that they suffered any harm from the constitutional

defects in the Spill Act. Defendants argue that the

hazardous substance discharge problem in New Jersey is

of sufficient scope to justify expenditure of all Spill Tax

revenues collected to date. That some of those monies

may have been spent for preempted purposes can be

viewed as an historical accident resulting from the

State’s reasonable reliance on its interpretation of the

law. Had the law been clear, according to defendants,

there is no doubt that all of the Spill Tax revenues would

have been used for non-preempted purposes. Accordingly

defendants contend that plaintiffs have suffered no spe-

cific financial harm and are entitled to no financial rem-

edy. In sum, defendants claim that the equities favor

them since the plaintiffs would have paid the full amount

of taxes even if preempted spending had not been made.

They claim ti.at if they had known that preemption would

56a

have been ultimately declared, they would have spent the

money on other things. The simple answer, as previ-

ously noted, is that they did not do this. Preemption has

been declared; taxpayers’ money was spent for preempted

purposes; and those taxpayers are presumably entitled to

a measure of relief.

As previously noted § 114(c) of CERCLA states that

a special tax cannot be collected for certain uses; it does

not preclude the collection of the tax for ve!i. uses nor

does it prohibit general revenues or other monies from

being spent for preempted uses. Accordingly had the

high court found that it was the collection of the tax

that was improper, this Court should direct repayment of

the taxes to the taxpayers in the same proportion as the

taxes were paid. However it was the expenditure for

preempted purposes that was found to be improper. If

that preempted spending had not occurred, (it did) and

if those monies were spent on non-preempted purposes,

(they were not), as earlier noted, it appears that the

amount of money paid into spill fund would have ex-

ceeded the $35,000,000 cap set by the Legislature and the

tax would have been suspended on its own accord.

N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h(b).

Because it was the expenditure for preempted purposes

that was improper, the court should allow defendants the

opportunity to compute the amount of those expenditures

paid for work performed and material purchased after

promulgation of the NCP (July 16, 1982) and the NPL

(September 8, 1983). Such task, as noted earlier, will

be difficult. Possibly a hearing may have to be conducted

to determine the amount in question. Thereafter the

Legislature should be permitted a reasonable period of

time to reimburse the spill fund for the amount of pre-

empted expenditures made.’* Reimbursement will make

12 As previously noted general revenues may be devoted to pre-

empted uses. Similarly the State is free to recover these expendi-

se

57a

plaintiffs whole because the constitutional infirmity and

plaintiffs’ financial harm resulted from the improper ex-

penditure of spill fund revenues and not the collection

of the tax per se. Reimbursement cures the improper

depletion of the fund because all of these monies col-

lected will again be in the fund for future commitment

to proper uses. Plaintiffs will not have suffered any eco-

nomic harm once the spill fund has been reimbursed and

thus will be entitled to no refund.

Failure to make timely reimbursement should entitle

plaintiffs to a refund of the improperly expended

amounts. Any excess in the fund resulting from such re-

imbursement should also be refunded. In either event

the refund to the individual plaintiffs should be in pro-

portion to the tax each paid to the total tax collected.

VII. SHOULD PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ENJOIN

DEFENDANTS FROM ENFORCING COLLEC-

TION OF THE SPILL TAX BE GRANTED?

In their original complaints to the Tax Court, plaintiffs

sought, inter alia, an injunction restraining defendants

from attempting to enforce the collection of taxes under

the Spill Act. The United States Supreme Court has

ruled on the merits of the case and declared that to the

extent the Spill Act permits taxation to support pre-

empted expenditures it cannot stand. Accordingly plain-

tiffs argue that to continue to impose the Spill Tax at

the rate established to support the cleanup of all hazard-

ous waste sites, including preempted superfund sites, is

in clear violation of § 114(c) and the mandate issued by

the Supreme Court. Citing Keuper v. Wilson, 111 NJ.

Super. 502, 505-06 (Ch. Div. 1970), plaintiffs argue that

where there has been a prior adjudication that the State

tures from the responsible parties. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(c). Pos-

sibly any balance of the $100,000,000 bond issue for hazardous

waste cleanup, P.L. 1981, c. 175, may be used to replenish the fund.

58a

has violated plaintiffs’ rights, the acts of State officials

in contravention of such adjudication should be enjoined.

The fundamental error in plaintiffs’ position, both as

expressed in their request for injunctive relief and in

this remand proceeding generally, is that the United

States Supreme Court, contrary to plaintiffs’ belief, did

not strike down the spill fund tax per se but only to the

extent that tax monies were expended for preempted

purposes. Thus, if plaintiffs’ tax monies are being spent

for non-preempted purposes, which defendants allege is,

and has been the case, since the date of the Supreme

Court’s opinion, plaintiffs have no cause to complain and

must continue to pay the tax. While plaintiffs are free

to disagree with this view, their recourse is not injunc-

tive relief.

Furthermore plaintiffs are adequately protected against

any irreparable harm. Irreparable harm sufficient to en-

title an applicant to either temporary or permanent in-

junctive relief is a harm that cannot be adequately re-

dressed by monetary damages. Crowe v. DeGioia, 90

N.J. 126, 132-3 (1982) (stating standard to obtain tem-

porary injunction); Board of Ed. of Union Beach v.

N.J. Ed. Ass’n., 96 N.J.Super. 371 (Ch. Div. 1967),

aff’d. 53 N.J. 29 (1968) (stating standard for permanent

injunctive relief). Since the harm which plaintiffs will

have allegedly suffered is the improper expenditure of

legal tax monies, that harm can be redressed by repaying

such monies in the form of refunds or reimbursement

to the fund as the case may be. Plaintiffs’ harm is thus

purely pecuniary and not irreparable.

Moreover, for an applicant to obtain either temporary

or permanent injunctive relief, the court must be at least

somewhat persuaded of the correctness of the applicant’s

claim. Until a determination is made as to the monies

expended for work and materials after the NCP and

NPL triggering dates, the Court is not persuaded in

favor of either party’s chance of success.

59a

Finally, when the relative hardships to the parties are

considered, it is apparent that plaintiffs do not meet the

test. Plaintiffs are clearly able to pay current spill fund

tax assessments. On the other hand, the State needs

plaintiffs’ spill fund tax monies to fully fund its vast

cleanup operations which have not been preempted by

CERCLA (see Catania Affid. par. 2 to 5). Moreover,

should plaintiffs prevail the State will abide by that final

judicial decision, and a permanent injunction will be

unnecessary.

o

An injunction should not issue.

SUMMARY ° :

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s remand, the under-

signed submits the following recommendations.

1. The decision of the United States Supreme Court

should not be applied prospectively but should be retroac-

tive to July 16, 1982 with respect to expenditures made

on preempted removal purposes and to September 8, 1983

as to preempted remedial expenses.

2. The non-preempted purposes of the Spill Act are

severable from the purposes found to be preempted by

the United States Supreme Court.

3. Plaintiffs’ claims for refunds should not be de-

feated by reason of their failure to comply with the pro-

cedural requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:49-14.

4. Following an accounting, (and plenary hearing if

necessary) to determine the amount of monies paid for

material purchased and services rendered for preempted

removal purposes on or after July 16, 1982 and for pre-

. empted remedial purposes on or after September 8, 1983

to March 10, 1986, (date of the United States Supreme

Court decision), the Legislature should be permitted a

reasonable period of time to reimburse the fund for the

preempted amounts expended.

60a

(a) If, following such reimbursement, the amount of

the fund exceeds the cap established by the Legislature,

such excess should be paid to plaintiffs.

(b) Should the required reimbursement not be made,

the amount of preempted expenditures should be refunded

to plaintiffs.

(c) Such refunds should be made in proportion to the

tax paid by each plaintiff to the total tax collected. "

5. Defendants should not be enjoined from enforcing

payment of the spill fund tax by plaintiffs.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John F. Evers

JOHN F. EvERrS, J.T.C.

/cef

Oct. 24, 1986

6la

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

September Term 1984

A-66

EXXON CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

Vv.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR OF

NEW JERSEY SPILL COMPENSATION FUND, et al.,

Defendants-Respondents.

[Filed Apr. 3, 1986]

ORDER

This matter having been remanded to this Court by the

Supreme Court of the United States for further proceed-

ings consistent with its mandate, and good cause appear-

ing;

It is ORDERED that this matter is hereby remanded

to the Tax Court to develop a record and make such

recommended findings and calculations as may be deter-

mined to be necessary to implement the mandate of the

Supreme Court; and it is further

ORDERED that report of the Tax Court shall be filed

with the Clerk of this Court within 60 days of the filing

date this Order.

Jurisdiction over this matter is otherwise retained.

WITNESS, the Honorable Robert L. Clifford, Presid-

ing Justice, at Trenton, this lst day of April, 1986.

/s/ Stephen W. Townsend

Clerk of the Supreme Court

62a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ss:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To the Honorable the Justices

of the Supreme Court of

New Jersey,

GREETINGS:

WHEREAS, lately in the Supreme Court of New

Jersey, there came before you a cause between Exxon

Corporation, The BF Goodrich Company, Union Carbide

Corporation, Monsanto Company and Tenneco Chemicals,

Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Robert Hunt, Adminis-

trator of New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund; Clifford

| A. Goldman, Treasurer of the State of New Jersey; Sid-

ney Glaser, Director of the Division of Taxation, Jerry

F,. English, Commissioner of Environmental Protection,

and the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents,

No. 21,567, wherein the judgment of the said Supreme

Court was duly entered on the nineteenth day of Septem-

ber, 1984, as appears by an inspection of the transcript

of the record from the said Supreme Court which was

brought into the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES as provided by Act of Congress.

AND WHEREAS, in the 1985 Term, the said cause

came on to be heard before the SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES on the said transcript of record

and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it was ordered

and adjudged on March 10, 1986, by this Court that the

judgment of the above court in this cause is affirmed in

part and reversed in part, with one-half of the total costs

to be taxed against the appellees therein, and that this

cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of New Jersey

iii

63a

for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion

of this Court.

IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED that the appellants,

Exxon Corporation, et al., recover from Robert Hunt,

Administrator of New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund,

et al. One Thousand Five Dollars and Thirty-four Cents

($1,005.34) for their costs herein expended.

NOW, THEREFORE, THE CAUSE IS REMANDED

to you in order that such proceedings may be had in the

said cause, in conformity with the judgment of this

Court above stated, as accord with right and justice, and

the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

Witness the Honorable WARREN E. BURGER, Chief

Justice of the United States, the 9th day of April in

the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and

eighty-six.

Costs of Exxon Corporation, et al.

Printing of record: $1,710.68

Clerk’s costs: 300.00

TOTAL: $2,010.68

/s/ Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr.

JOSEPH F’. SPANIOL, JR.

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the

United States

No. 84-978

Exxon Corporation, et al.

V.

Robert Hunt, Administrator of New Jersey Spill

Compensation Fund, et al.

64a

APPENDIX E

EXXON CORPORATION

Affiliates and Subsidiaries

(Not Wholly-Owned)*

Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited

Ace Polymer Co., Ltd.

Aditivos Orinoco, C. A.

Adria-Wien Pipeline Gesellschaft mit beschrankter

Haftung

Aircraft Fuel Supply B. V.

Aishin Sekiyu K. K.

Alberta Products Pipe Line Ltd.

Al-Jubail Petrochemical Company

Altona Petrochemical Company Limited

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company

Andian National Corporation, Limited

Arabian American Oil Company

Aramco Overseas Company

Aramco Services Company

Asakawa Sekiyu K. K.

Asociacion Civil “Academy La Castellana”

Atlas Supply Company

Atlas Supply Company of Canada Limited

Australian Synthetic Rubber Company Limited

Aviation Services Saudi Arabia Limited

Awaji Gas Nenryo Kabushiki Kaisha

Azuma Sekiyu K. K.

BEB Erdgas und Erdo! GmbH, Hannover

BT Asia Securities Limited

B.W.O.C., Inc.

Bangkok Aviation Fuel Services Limited

Banshu Ekika Gas K. K.

Bayerische Erdgasleitung G.m.b.H.

Beaverhill Resources Limited

Bel-Air Entreposage S. A.

* Does not include companies with less than 5% Exxon Ownership.

65a

BRIGITTA Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover

Bryan Woodbine Gathering Inc.

Byron Creek Collieries (1983) Limited

Carlew Ine.

Carnduff Gas Limited

Cary Chemicals Inc.

Castle Peak Power Company Limited

Champlain Oil Products Limited

Changi Airport Fuel Hydrant Installation Pte. Ltd.

Chuo Sekiyu Hanbai K. K.

Commercial Polymers Pty. Ltd.

Compagnie d’Etancheite Africaine en Cote d’Ivorie S. A.

Compania Minera Disputada de Las Condes S. A.

Comptoir Auxiliaire du Petrole

Comptoir Oxonnaxien des Combustibles (C.0.C.)

Computer Centrum Groningen B.V.

DFTG Deutsche Flussigerdgas Terminal GmbH

Daihatsu Sekiyu K. K.

Daiichi Kouyu K. K.

Demulsificantes Del Orinoco, C. A.

Depot Petrolier du Gresivaudan

Depots de Petrole Cotiers

Depots Petrolier de la Corse

Deudan-Holding GmbH

Deutsche Erdgas Transport G.m.b.H.

Deutsche Transalpine Oelleitung G.m.b.H.

Devon Estates Limited

Dixie Pipeline Company

Dukhan Service Company

ES F Limited

Eagle Kenso K. K.

East Japan Oil Development Company, Limited

East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company

Eastcoast Spill Response Inc.

Eiko Sekiyu K.K.

Elwerath Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover

Elwerath Erdol und Erdgas AG

Emirates Chemicals Company

66a

Emori Sekiyu K.K.

Emsland-Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.

Energie Marketing Service GmbH (EMS)

Entrepot Petrolier de l’Aveyron (E.P.A.)

Entrepot Petrolier de Mulhouse (E.P.M.)

Erdgas-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Escuela Las Morochas, C. A.

Esso Chemical Alberta Limited

Esso Energie G.I.E.

Esso Exploration and Production Angola Inc.

Esso Malaysia Berhad

Esso of Canada Limited

Esso Resources Canada Limited

Esso Societe Anonyme Francaise

Esso Standard Tunisie S. A.

Etablissements Cloarec

Exact Reisebyra A/S

Exxon Chemical Pakistan Limited

489061 Ontario Inc.

F. T. Giken Kabushiki Kaisha

Federated Pipe Lines Ltd.

Ferngas Nordbayern G.m.b.H.

Ferngas Salzgitter GmbH

Forjas de Colombia, S. A.

Fuji Kogyo K.K.

Gasunie Engineering B.V.

General Bussan K.K.

General Highway K.K.

General Petrochemical Industries Limited

General Sekiyu K.K.

General Sekiyu Okinawa Hanbai K.K.

General Sekiyu Overseas Ltd.

General Shipping Co. Ltd.

General Unyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Geobutane-Lavera

Gewerkschaft Brassert Erdol und Erdgas GmbH

Gewerkschaft Elwerath & Co. GmbH..

Gewerkschaft Erdol-Raffinerie Deurag-Nerag

Gewerkschaft Gute Hoffnung Erdgas und Erdol GmbH

67a

Gewerkschaft Kuchenberg Erdgas under Erdol GmbH

Goroku Sekiyu K.K.

Grande Ecaille Land Company, Inc.

Groupement Immobilier Petrolier

Groupement Petrolier Aviation

Groupement Petrolier de la Cote D’Azur

Groupement Petrolier de Nantes

Groupement Petrolier du Finistere G.I.E.

Groupement pour |’Etude d’un Pipeline

Bordeaux Toulouse

Hannoversche Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.

Hanshin Kyowa Sekiyu K.K.

Hayakawa Sekiyu K.K.

Heinrich Schneider Spedition GmbH

Hiroshima General Gas Juten Kabushiki Kaisha

Hoei Sekiyu K.K.

Hokushin Bussan K.K.

Hokuyu Sekiyu K. K.

Home Energy Company Ltd.

Home Oil Company Limited

Houston Regional Monitoring Corporation

Hydranten-Betriebsgesellischaft*

Hydrierwerke Poelitz Aktiengesellschaft

Imperial Oil Limited

Imperial Pipe Line Company, Limited, The

Inada Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha

Industry Promotion Enterprises Limited

Interprovincial Pipe Line (Alberta) Ltd.

Interprovincial Pipe Line Limited

Interprovincial Pipe Line (NW) Ltd.

Iranian Oil Participants Limited

Iranian Oil Services (Holdings) Limited

Iranian Oil Services Limited

Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited

Iraq Petroleum Pensions, Limited

Japan Butyl Company Limited

Japan Coal Liquefaction Development Company, Ltd.

Jersey Nuclear-Avco Isotopes, Inc.

68a

K.K. Aizu General

K.K. Daimaru

K.K. General Sekiyu Hanbaisho

K.K. Genetech

K.K. Heian Sekiyu

K.K. Kanagawa Sekiyu Shokai

K.K. Kyoei Shosha

K.K. Kyowa Sekiyu Service

K.K. Marugo Izumasa Shoten

K.K. Nippatsu

K.K. Standard Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho

K.K. Toresen

K.K. Uwano Sekiyu Shokai

K/S Statfjord Transport A/S & Co.

Kabushiki Kaisha Sankyo Plastics

Kai Tak Refuellers Company Limited

Kanto Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai K.K.

Karlsruhe-Stuttgart Rohrleitung Gesellschaft mbH

Kawasaki Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Keiyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited

Kibo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Kimura Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Kinwa Sekiyu K.K.

Kobe Port Service Kabushiki Kaisha

Kobe Standard Sekiyu K. K.

Kowa Sekiyu K.K.

Kowloon Electricity Supply Company Limited

Kygnus Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha

Kygnus Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha

Kygnus Marketing Service K.K.

Kygnus Sekiyu K. K.

Kyushu Eagle K.K.

LPL Investments, Inc.

Lakehead Pipe Line Company, Inc.

LEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur luzernisches Erdol

Les Docks des Petroles d’Ambes

Long Beach Oil Development Company

Maasvlakte Olie Terminal N.V.

69a

Maasvlakte Coal Terminal B.V.

Magota Sekiyu K.K.

Mainline Pipelines Limited

Maple Leaf Petroleum Limited

Maquinas de Coser y Bordar Sigma, S. A.

Marugo Gas K.K.

MEGAL FINCO

MEGAL GmbH

Meiji Sekiyu K.K.

MESBIC Financial Corporation of Houston

Metro Fuel Co. Ltd.

Mikawa Bussan K.K.

Minerals Limited

Mittelrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft

mit beschrankter Haftung

Montreal Pipe Line Limited/Les Pipe-Lines

Montreal Limitee

Mytex Polymers Incorporated

NAM—K 7 B.V.

NAM—K 14 B.V.

NAM—K 15 B.V.

NAM/CLOMS—K 8/K 11 B.V.

NAM/CLOMS—L 13 B.V.

N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie

NPC Services, Inc.

Nakabayashi Sekiyu K.K.

Nansei Oil Terminal K.K.

Nansei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Native Venture Capital Co. Ltd.

Near East Development Corporation

Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B. V.

Neptune Bulk Terminals (Canada) Ltd.

Nichimo Oil (Bermuda) Co., Ltd.

Nichimo Sekiyu Seisei Kabushiki Kaisha

Nikko Sangyo K.K.

Nippon Unicar K.K.

Nisku Products Pipe Line Company Limited

Nissei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

70a

Norddeutsche Erdgas-Aufbereitungs G.m.b.H.

Norddeutsche Mineraloelwerke Stettin G.m.b.H.

Norddeutsche Oelleitungs-gesellschaft m.b.H.

Nordrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft

mit beschrankter Haftung

Nord-West Oelleitung G.m.b.H.

Northward Developments Ltd.

Northwest Company, Limited

Nottingham Gas Limited

107580 Canada Ine.

139675 Canada Limited

151742 Canada Inc.

158585 Canada Limited

159129 Canada Ince.

Office Prive d’Assurances et de Courtages

Offishore Medical Support Limited

Oil Field Chemicals Company “Saudi Arabia) Ltd.

Oil Service Company of Iran (Private Company)

Oil Spill Response Limited

Oil Transport Company (Saudi Arabia) Limited

Oldenburgische Erdol Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Osaka Ashyu Nenryou K.K.

Osaka Propane Gas Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Osaka Sekiyu Gas Yuso K. K.

P.A.C. S.A.R.L. (Pinson Allegret-Causse )

P. T. Stanvac Indonesia

Pars Investment Corporation

Peninsula Electric Power Company Limited

Petroleum Refineries (Australia) Proprietary Limited

Petroleum Services (Middle East) Limited

Petrosvibri S.A.

Pinpoint Retail Systems Inc.

Pipe Line Services, Inc.

Piantation Pipe Line Company

Polder-Seehafen-Harburg GmbH

Portland Pipe Line Corporation

Primaer Oel GmbH

Progas A/S \

\

Tila

Raffinerie du Midi S.A.R.L.

Rainbow Pipe Line Company, Ltd.

Redwater Water Disposal Company Limited

Refineria Petrolera Acajutla, S. A.

Rheingas Erdgasleitungs-Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Rochevert Inc.

Rotterdam Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Belgie)

Rotterdam-Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Nederland) N.V.

Ruhrgas Aktiengesellschaft

S.A. du Pipeline a Produits Petroliers sur

Territoire Genevois (SAPPRO)

S.A.R.L. Viain

SEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur schweizerisches Erdol

S.0.P.—Societa Oleodotti Padani S. p. A.

Saitama Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Sakurajima Futo K.K.

Sanko Oil Kabushiki Kaisha

Sanyo Sekiyu K.K.

Saraco 8. A.

Saudi Arabian Lube Additives Company Limited

Schubert KG

Scurry-Rainbow Oil Limited

Seibu Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Seismic Industries A/S

Senpoku Oil Service K.K.

SERAM Societa per Azioni

Servacar Ltd.

Shehtah Drilling Limited

Shimoka Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Shimoyama Sekiyu K.K.

Shin-Nihon Yukagaku Kogyo K. K.

Shinohara Oil K.K.

Shizuoka Kanesho Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Smiley Gas Conservation Limited

Sociedad Anonima “Escuela Campo Alegre”

Sociedad de Inversiones de Aviacion

Sociedad Nacional de Oleoductos Ltda.

Societa Italiana per l’Oleodotto Transalpino S.p.A.

72a

Societa per Azioni Raffineria Padana

Olii Minerali-SARPOM

Societe Anonyme de la Raffinerie des Antilles

Societe Anonyme des Hydrocarbures

Societe Anonyme “Produits Lubrifiants de

Madagascar”—PROLUMA S.A.

Societe Belge de Transport par Pipeline

Societe Civile de Mustapha Algerie

Societe Civile de Participation pour la

Destruction des Dechets Industriels (SOCDI)

Societe Civile Immobiliere ‘“Courcelles-Etoile”

Societe Civile Immobiliere de la Croix au Chene

Societe Civile Immobiliere du 195 Avenue de Neuilly

Societe Civile Immobiliere Khariessa

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Kleber-Etoile”

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Les Casseaux-Bougainville”

Societe de la Raffinerie d’ Alger

Societe de la Raffinerie de-borraine-

Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation

Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation

Daker-Yoff, S. A.

Societe de Promotion et de Financement Touristique

(CARTHAGO)

Societe d’Entreposage de San-Pedro

Societe des Pipe-Lines de Strasbourg ”

So

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