Appendix — Griffin v. Dugger

Supreme Court brief1988

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Suprerve Court, 1.8.

FILED

R? Spal | JAN 2B 1988

JOUER TOPANGA,

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octosper TERM, 1987

Peners L. Grirrin, et al.,

Petitioners,

¥+

Ricuarp L. Dvucacer, et al.,

Respondents.

eel

ee

APPENDIX OF OPINIONS AND STATUTES TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

——--

Ha

Jutius LeVonne CHAMBERS

Ronautp L. E.uis

CHARLES STEPHEN RaLstoNn

Crype EK. Murpuy*

99 Hudson Street

16th Floor

New York, New York 10013

(212) 219-1900

Harry L. Witte

JERRY G. TRayNHAM

PATTERSON AND TRAYNHAM

1213 Thomasville Road

Post Office Box 4289

Tallahassee, Florida 32315

(904) 224-9181

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

Table of Contents

Page

Decision of the United States

Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit,

August 7, 1987 . «© «© «© «© «© « @ « la

Order of the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Florida,

Tallahassee Division,

So PS 9) ) a a ||

Order of the United States

District—Court for the

Northern District of Florida,

Tallahassee Division,

eee oe ee 8 4 ck st tke 6

Memorandum Opinion of the United

States District Court for the

Northern District of Florida,

Tallahassee Division,

ee SS a eee

42 U.8.C. § 2000e-5 (b) . ° + - . 189a

- la -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Northern District of Florida

No. 85-3831

Decided: August 7, 1987

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.

DEJERINETT,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Vv.

RICHARD L. DUGGER, etc., et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Before TJOFLAT and HATCHETT, Circuit

Judges, and EATON*, Senior District

Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

I.

In April 1971, Peners L. Griffin

became the first black road Prison

Officer at the Tallahassee Road Prison,

operated by the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDOC or Department). Be-

—

ginning in 1973, Griffin frequently

sought promotion to higher-grade correc-

tional officer poaktions, as well as

various other positions. On each occa-

sion, the FDOC turned him down.

In December 1974, Griffin’s super-

visor fired him for disciplinary reasons.

The next day, the Regional Superintendent

reinstated Griffin because the supervisor

had not followed proper termination

procedures. In early 1975, the FDOC

again terminated Griffin’s employment,

without notice, for disciplinary reasons.

He appealed the termination to the State

of Florida Career Service Commission.

The Commission found no just cause for

Griffin’s discharge and ordered the FDOC

to reinstate him with back pay. The

Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed

the Commission’s decision, and the FDOC

reinstated Griffin to his position.

“ Sa

Soon after Griffin’s reinstatement,

he filed a complaint with the FDOC’s

Equal Employment Opportunity Program

Office, charging that his two dismissals

were racially discriminatory. An inves-

tigator in that office wrote Griffin a

month later and informed him of his

conclusion that racial discrimination had

not been a factor in the dismissals.

Within a day or two of having received

that letter, Griffin filed a complaint

with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC), detailing the events

leading up to his allegedly discrimina-

tory dis-charges. A notation at the

beginning of Griffin’s complaint,

probably made by an EEOC’ counselor,

describes Griffin’s alle-gations of

racial discrimination as also _ encom-

passing "[{s)Jincerity of recruiting,

hiring, and promoting of minority groups

» 40

within the Florida’s Division of Adult

Corrections. Specific attention within

the Community Service Program."

Griffin asked the EEOC for a right-

to-sue letter and received one in July

1979. On October 15, 1979, Griffin

brought this action in the district court

against Louis L. Wainwright, as Secretary

of the FDOC, the FDOC, and the State of

Florida. Griffin alleged that the FDOC

had denied him several promotions because

of his race. He also alleged that the

FDOC impermissibly considered race in all

of its promotion decisions, as well as in

its hiring and job assignment decisions.

In hiring correctional officers, accord-

ing to Griffin, the Department’ used

written entry-level examinations having a

detrimental impact upon blacks.1

1 The district court found the

following facts concerning the FDOC’s

written entry-level examination: "Every

- @ «

Griffin sued “individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,"

pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federai

Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking de-

claratory and injunctive relief and money

damages under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to

2000e-17 (1976) (current version of 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)), 42

U.S.C. § 1981 (1976),2 and 42 U.S.C. §

person seeking a position as a correc-

tional officer is required to take a

written examination. The Department of

Administration developed the correctional

Officer I entry level test which consists

of seventy-five questions. An applicant

must receive a score of at least thirty-

eight for employment consideration."

2 §1981. Equal rights under the

law

All persons within the jurisdiction

of the United States shall have the same

right in every State and Territory to

make and enforce contracts, to sue, be

parties, give evidence, and to the full

and equal benefit of all laws and pro-

ceedings for the security of persons and

property as is enjoyed by white citizens,

and shall be subject to like punishment,

pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and

- 6a -

1983 (1976).2 The class identified in

his complaint was composed “of all past,

present and potential black American

exactions for every kind, and to no other.

3 § 1983. Civil action for

‘vati - right

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custon,

or usage, of a State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of

Congress applicable exclusively to the

District of Columbia shall be considered

to be a statute of the District of

Columbia.

Griffin’s complaint stated that his

action was brought "pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, to redress the deprivation of the

Plaintiff GRIFFIN’s property interests in

his employment, without due process of

law." We assume that Griffin’s section

1983 claim also encompassed the theory

that the FDOC’s conduct amounted to in-

vidious discrimination in the violation

of the fourteenth amendment’s equal

protection clause.

- Ja-

citizens and residents who have been, are

or may be employees of the Defendants or

applicants for employment."4

On June 17, 1980, Griffin obtained

leave of court to amend his complaint to

add Henry L. Dejerinett as a party-

plaintiff and class representative.

Dejerinett, who is black, had applied for

an FDOC clerical position but was not

4 The claims described in the

text were presented in count I of

Griffin’s complaint, which contained two

counts. Count II, which is not pertinent

to this appeal, alleged that Griffin was

denied due process and equal protection

of the law when the FDOC terminated his

employment in 1975; Griffin alleged that

the FDOC(a) failed to give him notice of

the reason for his discharge and an op-

portunity to be heard before terminating

his employment and (b) discharged him

because of his race. Count II further

alleged that because Chapter 110 of the

Florida Statutes, which governs’ state

employment, did not require the Depart-

ment to give him notice, a hearing, or

back pay, Chapter 110 was unconstitutional.

» Ge =

hired.° On March 10, 1981, based on a

stipulation between the parties® and

without a hearing, the district court

preliminarily certified the case as a

class action with Griffin and Dejerinett

° Dejerinett subsequently filed a

timely charge of racial discrimination

against the FDOC with the Florida

Commission on Human Relations, a deferral

agency for the EEOC. He requested and

received a right-to-sue letter from the

EEOC in April 1980.

6 The parties stipulated, among

other things, that

[t]he allegations of race discrimi-

nation in the ... Complaint involve

questions of law and fact which,

under current law in the United

States Court of Appeals, Fifth

Circuit, are common to the class,

including statistical evidence,

evidence concerning the employment

system of the State of Florida

Department of Corrections, and the

common legal principles applied to

claims of race discrimination. The

parties maintain their right to

brief these issues on appeal, if

any.

The parties also "reserve({d) the right to

move to decertify or limit the class, or

to establish subclasses, at any time

during the pendency of this litigation."

- Qa -

representing the class of "all past,

present, and potential black employees of

the State of Florida Department of

Corrections."

On June 25, 1982, the defendants

filed a Notice Regarding the Adequacy of

the Preliminary Class Certified," which

called to the court’s attention a Supreme

Court decision rendered eleven days pre-

viously. That decision, Genera] Tel. Co.

v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364,

72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), announced the

appropriate standards courts should apply

when determining class action certifica-

tions in the context of a Title VII suit,

reversing a former Fifth Circuit decision

permitting "across-the-board" class ac-

tions that had been binding precedent in

the new Eleventh Circuit.’ On July 8,

7 In Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc), this court adopted as binding

- 10a -

1982, the defendants moved the court, in

light of Falcon, to vacate its order

certifying the class.

To avoid the risk that the district

court might vacate its order certifying

the class, Griffin and Dejerinett took

steps to obtain an additional named

plaintiff to represent those in the class

who had applied for the position of cor-

rectional officer, failed the written

entry-level examination, and not been

hired. Accordingly, on July 8, 1982,

Alvin Smith, joined by Griffin and

Dejerinett, moved the court to intervene

as an additional named plaintiff and

class representative. In 1980 and 1981,

Smith, who is black, applied for the same

entry-level position that Griffin held.

The FpDOoc did not hire Smith, because he

precedent all decisions of the former

Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

October 1, 1981.

- 11a -

did not have a high school diploma or a

general equivalency diploma (GED), a

prerequisite for employment as a correc-

tional officer. Smith later obtained a

GED, but when he reapplied with the FDOC

in July 1981, he failed the written

entry-level correctional officer

examination and was again denied the

job.8

On July 28, 1982, the district court

denied the defendants’ motion to decer-

tify the class and permitted Smith to

intervene? because

8 Smith never filed a _ timely

charge of racial discrimination with the

EEOC.

9 In its dispositive order, the

district court did not address’ the

intervenor’s complaint, which was filed

with Griffin, Dejerinett, and Smith’s

joint motion for leave to allow Smith to

intervene. Apparently, the court treated

the intervenor’s complaint as an amend-

ment to Griffin and Dejerinett’s conm-

plaint because it ordered that the

“action shall continue to be certified as

a class with PENERS L. GRIFFIN, HENRY L.

- g28a =

Smith, [as] an unsuccessful

applicant, certainly has an

interest in this suit which

seeks to challenge defendants’

employment practices, including

hiring. Unless he is permitted

to intervene, his interest may

not be adequately represented

by the named parties. Mr.

Smith eases this court’s con-

cern that the class’ claim

against the [FDOC]’s objective

criteria was not fairly and

adequately protected by the

named plaintiffs. Alvin Smith

is a proper representative for

potential black employees.

DEJERINETT, and ALVIN SMITH as_ named

plaintiffs representing a class of all

past, present, and potential black em-

ployees of the State of Florida Depart-

ment of corrections."

- 13a -

As to the defendants’ contention that

Smith could not be a class representative

because he had not timely filed an EEOC

complaint, the district court found that

the charges of discrimination Griffin had

filed with the EEOC included "the hiring

Claim in addition to promotion, job

Classification, discipline, and termina-

tion claims." The court thus reasoned

that the Fifth Circuit’s single-filing

rule excused Smith from having failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. See

Qatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d

496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968))"[O)nce an

aggrieved person raises a particular is-

sue with the EEOC which he has standing

to raise, he may bring an action for

himself and the class of persons similar-

ly situated....").

On July 30, 1982, the district

court entered partial summary judgment

- 248 -

for the plaintiffs, including Griffin and

Dejerinett, on the liability issue as to

the written entry-level examination. 1°

The court found that the FDOC examination

"has a disparate impact upon class men-

bers which has not been justified wy

business necessity." The plaintiffs had

sought summary judgment on two other

issues -- the class hiring and promotion

claims -- but the court denied summary

judgment on those issues because they

presented material issues of fact.

A trial was held over the five-week

period beginning August 17 and ending

September 17, 1982. The court entered

judgment on August 25, 1983, disposing of

the following issues in favor of the

defendants: whether the FDOC’s policies

and practices discriminated against past,

10 The district court said it

would consider the issue cf relief at

trial.

-15a -

present, and potential black employees;

whether the FDOC’s hiring practices as to

Henry L. Dejerinett were racially

discriminatory. The court entered judg-

ment for the plaintiffs on the liability

issue concerning the correctional officer

examination, on which it had previously

granted summary judgment for the plain-

tiffs.11 The issue of relief for the

Class of black persons who took and

failed the correctional officer written

examination is still pending. The

parties agreed that notice should be

sala to the affected members of the

class and to seek interlocutory appeal of

the district court’s decision permitting

11 The district court did not

render judgment on Griffin’s federal due

process and equal protection claims or on

his pendent state law claim for malicious

prosecution (which was first raised in

count III of Griffin’s first amended

complaint). Those claims are still

pending in the district court.

- 4624 -

Griffin, Dejerinett, and Smith to serve

as named plaintffs for a class that

included applicants with testing claims.

We granted this appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

Because we conclude that the district

court’s incorrectly applied the dictates

of Falcon, we vacate the district court’s

order certifying the class.

II.

As with any private class action,

the legitimacy of a private Title ViI

suit brought on behalf of a class depends

upor the satisfaction of two distinct

prerequisites. First, there must be an

individual plaintiff with a cognizabie

claim, that is, an individual who has

constitutional standing to raise chai

claim (or claims) and who has satisfied

the procedural requirements of Title

- 178 <=

vir.12 Second, the requirements of Rule

23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure must be fulfilled; in other words,

the individual plaintiff must be quali-

fied to represent the members of the

class in accordance with the _ four

prerequisites of Rule 23(a),+3 and the

12 This circuit has held that the

conditions precedent to filing a Title

VII suit are not jurisdictional, but

rather are akin to a statute of limita-

tions. A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy

the conditions precedent does not, stand-

ing alone, deprive federal district

courts of subject matter jurisdiction.

Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678

F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless,

"a plaintiff must generally allege in his

complaint that ’all conditions precedent

to the institution of the lawsuit have

been fulfilled.’" Id. at 1010 (quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c)).

13 Rule 23(a) provides as- follows:

(a) Prerequisites to a Class

Action. One or more members of a class

may sue or be sued as representative par-

ties on behalf of all only if (1) the

class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable, (2) there are

questions of law or fact common to the

class, (3) the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the

- 18a -

action must be one of the three types

Rule 23(b) identifies.14 We emphasize

claims or defenses of the class, and (4)

the representative parties will fairly

and adequately protect the interests of

the class.

14 Rule 23(b) provides as

follows:

(b) Class Actions Maintainable.

An action may be maintained as a class

action if the prerequisites of subdi-

vision (a) are satisfied, and in addi-

tion:

(1) the prosecution of separate

actions by or against individual members

of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adju-

dications with respect to individual

members of the class which would es-

tablish incompatible standards of conduct

for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to

individual members of the class which

would as a practical matter be disposi-

tive of the interests of the other mem-

bers not parties to the adjudications or

substantially impair or impede their

ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the

class has acted or refused to act on

grounds generally applicable to the

class, thereby making appropriate final

injunctive relief or corresponding de-

Claratory relief with respect to the

class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the

questions of law or fact common to the

- 19a -

that any analysis of class certification

must begin with the issue of standing and

the procedural requirements of Title VII.

Thus, the threshold question is whether

the named plaintiffs have individual

standing, in the constitutional sense, to

raise certain issues. See Brown v.

Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th Cir. Unit

A July 1981)("This constitutional thres-

hold must be met before any consideration

of the typicality of claims or common-

members of the class predominate over any

questions affecting only individual men-

bers, and that a class action is superior

to other available methods for the fair

and efficient adjudication of the con-

troversy. The matters pertinent to the

findings include: (A) the interest of

members of the class in individually

controlling the prosecution or defense of

separate actions; (B) the extent and

nature of any litigation concerning the

controversy already commenced by or

against members of the class; (C) the

desirability or undesirability of con-

centrating the litigation of the claims

in the particular forum; (D) the diffi-

culties likely to be encountered in the

management of a class action.

- 20a -

ality of issues required for procedural

reasons by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23"). Only after

the court determines the issues for which

the named plaintiffs have standing should

it address the question whether the named

plaintiffs have representative capacity,

as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the

rights of others. See generally 2A.

Larson & L. Larson, Employment discrimi-

nation §§ 49.50-.51 (1986 & Supp. Nov.

1986).

A.

Under elementary principles of

standing, a plaintiff must allege and

show that he personally suffered injury.

565 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. ("To meet the

requirement for standing under Article

III, a plaintiff must establish either

that the asserted injury was in fact the

consequence of the defendant’s action or

-21ia-

that the prospective relief will remove

the harm.") (citation omitted), cert

denied, 439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 118, 58

L.Ed.2ad 131 (1978); urston v ekle,

531 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The

threshold case-or-controversy inquiry is

whether there existed a named plaintiff

with standing to raise the issue before

the court."), vacated on other grounds,

438 U.S. 901, 98 S.Ct. 3118, 57 L.Ed.2d

1144 (1978). If he cannot show personal

injury, then no article III case or

controversy exists, and a federal court

is powerless to hear his grievance. This

individual injury requirement is not met

by alleging "that injury has been suf-

fered by other, unidentified members of

the class to which [the plaintiff] be-

long{s} and which [he] purport[s]} to

represent." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

490, 502, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2207, 45 L.Ed.2d

a TI” Se CIE I aN TRE OT rma put

- 22a -

343 (1975); see also Minority Police

Officers Assoc. v. City of South Bend,

721 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Feel-

ings of solidarity do not confer standing

to sue."). Thus, a plaintiff cannot

include class action allegations in a

complaint and expect to be relieved of

personally meeting the requirements of

constitutional standing, "even if the

persons described in the class definition

would have standing themselves to sue."

Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th

Cir. Unit A July 1981); see also Vuyanich

v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195,

1200 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S.

1073, 105 $§.Ct. 367, $3 U.84.24 507

(1984). A named plaintiff in a class

action who cannot establish the requisite

case or controversy between himself and

the defendants simply cannot seek relief

for anyone -- not for himself, and not

- 23a -

for any other member of the class.

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494,

94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).

Moreover, it is not enough that a named

plaintiff can establish a case or con-

troversy between himself and the defen-

dant by virtue of having standing as to

just one of many claims he wishes to

assert. Rather, each claim must be

analyzed separately, and a claim cannot

be asserted on behalf of a class unless

at least one named plaintiff has suffered

the injury that gives rise to that claim.

This relationship between standing and

the class action has been discussed in

some detail by the Supreme Court:

It is not enough that the

conduct of which the plaintiff

complains will injury someone.

The complaining party must also

show that he is within the

- 24a -

class of persons who has been

subject to injurious conduct of

one kind possess by virtue of

that injury the necessary stake

in litigating conduct of

another kind, although similar,

to which he has not been sub-

ject.

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999, 102

S.Ct. a27vii, 2783, 73 L.Ed.2d 534

(1982) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v.

Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67, 92 S.Ct.

1965, 1968-69, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972)).

In the case before us, the named

praintiff who initiated the action,

Peners L. Griffin,1° could, and did,

allege injury as a result of the FDOC’s

15 Our analysis of the standing

and Rule 23 issues presented by this case

focuses first on Peners L. Griffin as a

sole named plaintiff. We then examine

whether the addition of Henry L. Dejeri-

nett and Alvin Smith as named plaintiffs

affected the class certification.

- 25a -

discipline and promotion practices: he

claimed that on specific occasions the

FDOC illegally disciplined him and did

not promote him, because of his race.1l®

Griffin had standing to assert discipline

and promotion claims. Because he had al-

ready met the educational and testing

requirements of a road prison correc-

tional officer and had been hired for

that position, however, he suffered no

injury as a result of the FDOC’s use of

the written entry-level examination. See

Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565

F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir.)"{Named p]lain-

tiffs ... possessed tenth grade educa-

16 Griffin satisfied the proce-

dural requirements of Title VII, such as

filing an EEOC complaint against his

employer within 180 days of the alleged

discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(c) (1976), and receiving statutory

notice of the right to sue his employer,

see 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(f) (1). See

generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(detailing

conditions precedent to a Title VII

action).

- 26a -

tions and therefore lacked [constitution-

al} standing" to challenge tenth grade

educational requirement), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 118, 58 L.Ed.2d

131 (1978). Griffin thus lacked consti-

tutional standing to assert a testing

Claim.17

17 Griffin’s complaint alleged that

the FDOC had implemented policies and

practices of discrimination, including

"maintaining a racially biased working

environment" and "failing or refusing to

recruit, hire,and assign blacks on the

same basis as whites." Nothing in the

complaint, in the district court’s

certification orders, or in the record on

appeal alleged or established a causal

iink between the FDOC’s allegedly dis-

criminatory testing policy and its al-

legedly discriminatory work environment

or its allegedly discriminatory promotion

and discipline practices. Nor is there

an allegation or showing in the record

that Griffin (or Dejerinett, who was a

clerk employed by the FDOC) suffered any

specific harm resulting from the alleged-

ly discriminatory work environment. Thus

Griffin (and Dejerinett) did not estab-

lish standing to challenge the FDOC’s

testing practices. Cf. Gray v. Greyhound

Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 173-75 (D.C. Cir.

1976), cited with approval in Meritor

Savings Bank v. Vinson, __—iU.S. P

, 106 &.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 4

- 2m -

Accordingly, we hold that the

district court erred when it permitted

Griffin to raise the testing claim on

(1986).

Assuming, for the sake of argument,

that Griffin (or Dejerinett) had estab-

lished standing to assert a testing

claim, we nevertheless believe that under

General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147

102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982),

the court should not have presumptively

held that Griffin satisfied the require-

ments of Rule 23(a) so as to allow him to

represent a class of applicants with

testing claims. Griffin’s complaint

provided “an insufficient basis for

concluding that the adjudication of his

Claim of [a racially discriminatory

environment] would require the decision

of any common question concerning the

failure of [the FDOC] to hire more [black

correctional officers}]." See Falcon, 457

U.S. at i538, i02 &.Ct. at 2371. The

record does not identify any questions of

law or fact that were common to Griffin’s

claim of a racially biased working

environment and the claims of those who

failed the written entry-level correc-

tional officer examination and were not

hired. Thus, even if Griffin had

standing to litigate his right to a work

environment untainted by racial

discrimination, he could not, on that

basis, represent those with testing

claims, because he did not satisfy the

requirements of Rule 23(a).

- 26a =

behalf of himself and on behalf of

others. We hold in the alternative that

even if Griffin somehow had constitution-

al standing to assert the testing claim,

he did not, in light of General Tel. Co.

Vv. Falicon, 457 U.S. 147, i602 &.€e. 2364,

72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), have representa-

tive capacity to assert the testing claim

on behalf of those who took the FDOC’s

written entry-level examination, failed

it, and were not hireda.18 In other

words, Griffin did not meet the pre-

requisites of Rule 23(a). We now turn to

a discussion of Rule 23(a) and the

Supreme Court’s interpretation of it in

Falcon.

18 In Falcon, the Supreme Court

granted certiorari for the express

purpose of discussing the contours of

Rule 23(a). Falcon, 457 U.s. at 155, 102

S.Ct. at 2369. The Court did not ques-

tion, in its opinion, whether the named

plaintiff had constitutional standing.

» 346 -

policies and practices. See e.g., Gibson

V2 Loca ] 4 Q Int ’ ] Longshoremen , s g

Warehousemen’s Union, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th

Cir. 1976); Senter v. General Motors

Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 870, 97 S.Ct. 182, 50

L.Ed.2d 150 (1976): Rich v. Martin

Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir.

1975); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518

F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Reed v. Arling-

ton Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854, 94 S.Ct. 153,

38 L.Ed.2d 103 (1973).129

19 Although widely accepted, the

across-the-board theory was not univer-

sally endorsed. See, e€.9., Taylor v.

Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 270-

71 (10th Cir. 1975); Kinsey v. Legg,

Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91 (D.D.C. 1973),

rev’d sub nom on other grounds, 557 F.2d

830 (D.C. Cir. 1977); White v. Gates

Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo.

1971); Gresham _v. Ford Motor Co., 53

F.R.D. 105 (N.D. Ga. 1970)3 Hyatt v.

United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D.

Conn. 1970). Moreover, one of the

members of the Fifth Circuit panel that

first announced the across-the-board

- 32a =

The Supreme Court repudiated that

liberal reading of the class action, and

the reasoning underlying it, in General

Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102

S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).29 In

approach, Judge Godbold, cautioned in a

specially concurring opinion that the

approach announced in the majority’s

opinion was not a replacement for precise

pleadings that allow district courts to

determine whether the requirements of

Rule 23(a) have been satisfied. See

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,

417 F.2d 1122, 1125-27 (5th Cir. 1969)

(Godbold, J., specially concurring).

Judge Godbold also observed that "an

over-broad framing of the class" may be

unfair and harmful to the absent class

members: "what of the catastrophic

consequences if the plaintiff loses and

carries the [over-broad] class down with

him, or proves only such limited facts

that no practice or policy can be found,

leaving him afloat but sinking the

class?" id. at 1126. Thirteen years

later, the Supreme Court favorably dis-

cussed Judge Godbold’s opinion when it

rejected the across-the board approach.

See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.

147, 160-61, 102 &.Ct. 2364, 2372, 72

L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).

20 Even before Falcon, the across-

the-board approach was placed in doubt by

the Supreme Court. In East Texas Motor

Freight Sys. . Vv. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.

- 33a -

allegations quite similar to those made

in Griffin’s initial complaint, the named

plaintiff in Falcon claimed that his en-

ployer had denied him promotions because

he was a Mexican-American. He also al-

leged class claims on behalf of all

Mexican-American employees of the company

who had not been promoted, and all

Mexican-American applicants who had not

395, 405-06, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1898, 52

L.Ed.2d 453 (1977), the Court reversed a

broad class certification:

We are not unaware that suits

alleging racial or ethnic dis-

crimination are often by their

very nature class suits, in-

volving classwide wrongs. Com-

mon questions of law or fact

are typically present. But

careful attention to the re-

quirements of Fed. Rule Civ.

Proc. 23 remains nonetheless

indispensable. The mere fact

that a complaint alleges racial

or ethnic discrimination does

not in itself ensure that the

party who has brought the law-

suit will be an adequate repre-

sentative of those who may have

been the real victims of that

discrimination.

- 348 -

been hired. Without holding an eviden-

tiary hearing, the district court certi-

fied a class consisting of those employ-

ees and applicants at one of the com-

pany’s facilities. After a trial, the

district court found that the employer

had not discriminated against the named

plaintiff in hiring, but did discriminate

against him in its promotion practices.

As to the class claims, the court reached

the converse conclusion, finding no dis-

crimination in promotion practices, but

finding the hiring practices unlawfully

discriminatory. On appeal, the Fifth

Circuit, using the across-the-board

approach, upheld the class certification:

[The across-the-board rule)

permits an employee complaining

of one employment practice to

represent another complaining

of another practice, if the

- 35a -

plaintiff and the members of

the class suffer from essen-

tially the same injury. In

this case, all of the claims

are based on discrimination

because of national origin.

Falcon v. General Tel, Co., 626 F.2d 369,

375 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Supreme Court, on certiorari,

began its analysis of the case by

reiterating that Title VII does not

relieve a private party plaintiff seeking

to represent others from meeting the

requirements of the class action rule:

“An individual litigant seeking to

maintain a class action under Title VII

must meet ‘the prerequisites of numer-

21 In contrast, under Title VII,

the EEOC may seek relief for groups of

employees or applicants without having to

comply with the requirements of Rule 23.

General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,

100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).

- 36a -

osity, commonality, typicality, and

adequacy of representation’ specified in

Rule 23(a). These requirements effec-

tively limit the class claims to those

fairly encompassed by the named plain-

tiff’s claims.’" General Tel. Co.. v.

Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct.

2364, 2369-70, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) (ci-

tations omitted). Although the Court

recognized "that racial discrimination is

by definition class discrimination," it

said that the mere allegation of racial

discrimination cannot answer the ques-

tions posed by Rule 23(a) or define the

class that may be certified:

Conceptually, there is a wide

gap between (a) an individual’s

claim that he has been denied a

promotion on discriminatory

grounds, and his otherwise

unsupported allegation tnat the

- 37a -

company has a policy of dis-

crimination, and (b) the exist-

ence of a class of persons who

have suffered the same injury

as that individual, such that

the individual’s claim and the

class claims will share common

questions of law or fact and

that the individual’s claim

will be typical of the class

claims.

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157, 102 S.Ct. at

2370 (footnote omitted). Thus, evidence

that an employee was denied a promotion

because of illegal considerations of race

will not necessarily justify the addi-

tional inference, for example, that the

employer has adopted a general policy of

racial discrimination that is reflected

in the employer’s other employment prac-

tices, such as hiring and testing. See

- 38a -

Falcon, 457 U.&. at i188, i102 S.Ct. at

2371. The presumption that general class

claims are fairly encompassed within the

personal claims of a named plaintiff can,

at best, be characterized as tenuous.

ia. The Falcon Court held that "actual,

not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a)

[is] indispensable." Falcon, 457 U.S. at

160, 102 S.Ct. at 2372. This means that

a private Title VII class action "may

only be certified if the trial court is

satisfied, after a rigorous analysis,

that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have

been satisfied." Falcon, 457 U.S. at

161, 102 &.Ct. at 2372.

The district court’s error in Falcon

can be traced to the named plaintiff’s

complaint, which "provided an insuffi-

cient basis for concluding that’ the

adjudication of his claim of discrimina-

tion in promotion would require the

- 39a -

decision of a common question concerning

the failure of petitioner to hire more

Mexican-Americans." Id. at 158, 102

6.ct. eat 2371. Without the benefit of

sufficiently specific pleadings or of a

hearing that probed beyond the pleadings

to answer the required certification

questions, see jd. at 160, 102 S.Ct. at

2372, the district court could do nothing

but presume that the named plaintiff’s

individual promotion claim was typical of

other claims that Mexican-American em-

ployees and applicants might raise. Id.

at 158-59, 102 S.Ct. at 2371. In short,

a district court must have some way of

identifying the questions of law or fact

that are common to claims of the named

plaintiff and of the class members he

seeks to represent. l[d.

The Supreme Court has thus repu-

diated the across-the board theory of

- 40a -

Title VII class actions.22 No longer

will one allegation of specific dis-

criminatory treatment be sufficient to

sustain a company-wide class action. 23

No longer will an employee complaining of

racial discrimination, for example, in

one employment practice necessarily be

permitted to represent other employees

complaining of racial discrimination in

22 "Although Falcon does not

eliminate broad-based class actions per

se, it will be a rare situation indeed

that will permit the combining of hiring,

promotion, and discharge claims in the

same class." 2 A. Larson & L. Larson,

Emp] Discriminat) § _49.52(c) (2:

(1986).

23° In Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159, 102

S.Ct. 2371 (footnote omitted), the Court

stated as follows:

"If one allegation of specific

discriminatory treatment were

sufficient to support an

across-the-board attack, every

Title VII case would be a

potential company-wide class

action. We find nothing in the

statute to indicate that Con-

gress intended to authorize

such a wholesale expansion of

class-action litigation.

- 418 -

other practices. District courts must

not presume that a named plaintiff has

satisfied the typicality and commonality

requirements of Rule 23(a). In practical

terms, this means that, as a general

rule, incumbent employees cannot rep-

resent a class that includes applicants

and that even a general policy of

discrimination will not justify a class

of both applicants and employees. See

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158-59 & n.15, 102

S.Ct. at 2371 & n.15.

In footnote fifteen of Falcon, the

Supreme Court identified exceptions to

that general rule. For example, an em-

ployee who alleges that he was a victim

of a specific discriminatory employment

practice may properly represent ap-

plicants when the employer used a biased

testing procedure to evaluate both

applicants and incumbent employees: "a

- 426 =

class action on behalf of every applicant

or employee who might have been prej-

udiced by the test clearly would satisfy

the commonality and typicality require-

ments of Rule 23(a)." Falcon, 457 U.S.

at 159, nmeiS, 102 6.Ce. at 83713 nS. in

addition, a general policy of discrimina-

tion could justify a class of both

applicants and employees "if the dis-

crimination manifested itself in hiring

and promotion practices in the _ same

general fashion, such as through entirely

subjective decisionmaking processes."

Id.

The situations the Supreme Court

identified in footnote fifteen can be

thought of as exceptions to the general

rule that applicants and incumbent

employees cannot share the same class.

We emphasize, however, that those

situations are exceptions not because

- 43a -

racial discrimination is by definition

class discrimination, a necessarily valid

proposition underlying the across-the-

board rule, Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157, 102

8.ct.. at 2370, But neneune the commonal-

ity and typicality requirements of Rule

23(a) can be satisfied. 24 If, after a

rigorous analysis, a district court is

satisfied that in a case similar to those

situations described in footnote fifteen

the Rule 23(a) requirements have been

met, then it should not hesitate to

24 See I H. Newberg, Newberg On

Class Actions § 3.17 (2d ed. 1985):

In the final analysis,

through its rulings and

examples, Falcon instructs that

the Rule 23(a) typicality

requirement can be _ satisfied

only by a showing of a

sufficient interrelationship

between the claims of the

representative and those of the

class, so that an adjudication

of the individual claims will

necessarily involve the

decision of common questions

affecting the class.

- 44a -

certify the class. We caution, however,

that although district courts should give

real meaning to Falcon’s footnote fif-

teen, that footnote should not be used to

defeat the general dictates of Falcon.

The footnote was not meant to sanction

broad class actions that otherwise do not

conform to Rule 23(a).

Cc.

We begin our analysis of whether the

requirements of Rule 23(a) have been

fulfilled in the case before us by

examining Griffin’s complaint.?°> The

complaint, which was filed in October

1979, almost three years before Falcon

was decided, included allegations that

the defendants discriminated on the basis

25 Our analysis takes into account

that the district court had considerable

discretion in deciding to certify the

class. See e.g., Walker v. Jim Dandy

Co., 747 F.2@ 1366, “S068 ~“feace Cir.

1984); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700

F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1983).

- 45a -

of race with their written entry-level

examinations and in their hiring,

assignment, discipline, and promotion

decisions. Griffin’s action was brought

"on behalf of all past, present and

potential black American citizens and

residents who have been, are or may be

employees of the Defendants or applicants

for employment." As to Rule 23(a)’s

numerosity requirement the complaint

contains the allegation that the persons

in the class "are too numerous to join in

this action."26 The only reference to

26 In his second amended com-

plaint, Griffin made the following

numerosity allegation:

The precise total number of

persons in the class is unknown

to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs

allege, on information and be-

lief, that there are more than

1,000 persons in this class.

There are many other unknown

class members. They are too

numerous to join a named Plain-

tiffs and such joinder is

impractical.

- 464 =

Griffin’s ability to represent that class

was this statement: "The Plaintiff can

fairly and adequately represent’ the

class." The complaint’s only reference

to Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement

was this statement: "The conclusory ques-

tions of whether there is a_ general

pattern and practice of discrimination by

Defendants and the question of whether

certain practices constitute illegal job

discrimination are common mixed questions

of fact and law to the class as a whole."

The complaint made no allegation whatso-

ever that Griffin could meet Rule 23(a)’s

additional requirement of typicality.?2?

Without an evidentiary hearing, the

district court preliminarily certified

27 The first reference to Rule

23(a)’s typicality requirement was in

Griffin’s second amended complaint, in

which he alleged that "the claim of the

Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of

another class members."

- 47a -

the "class of all past, present, and

potential black employees" of the FDOC,

finding that the requirements of Rule

23(a) had been met. The court’s cer-

tification ruling was based solely on a

stipulation of the parties that under the

law of the Fifth Circuit, the named

plaintiffs met the commonality require-

ment of Rule 23(a).28 the parties fur-

ther stipulated that "[t])he claims of the

named plaintiffs are, under current law

in the United States of Appeals, Fifth

Circuit, similar to those of other

members of the proposed class."29 The

parties made no relevant factual stipula-

tions.

Soon after the Supreme Court decided

Falcon, the defendants moved the district

28 See supra note 6.

29 The defendants reserved the

right to move the district court to

decertify the class. See supra note 6.

- 48a -

court to vacate the order certifving the

Class. The parties filed memorandum of

law, arguing the applicability of Falcon.

On the basis of the memoranda, and with

no hearing, the district court issued an

order denying the defendants’ motion.

The court’s analysis began with the

recognition that "[tjhe Falcon decision

mandates that this court carefully

examine the requirements of Rule

23(a)."30 As to the commonality

requirement, the district court found the

following:

Plaintiffs have alleged a com-

mon practice and pattern of

30 As to the first requirement of

Rule 23(a) -- "the class is so numerous

that joinder of all members is imprac-

ticable" -- the district court found

that "[(tjhe number of black persons

employed by the [FDOC] in February 1981

was 1,346.... This number alone, without

inquiry as to the number of past and

potential black employees, clearly

indicates that the class members are too

numerous to join."

- 49a -

racial discrimination which

affects defendants’ hiring,

promotion, job classification,

disciplinary, and termination

decisions. This general dis-

criminatory policy commonly

injures all members of the

class of past, present, and

potential black employees of

the Department. Plaintiffs

maintain that they will utilize

similar statistical data, simi-

lar historical background, and

the same or similar witnesses

to support their allegations of

Class-wide discrimination.

This court is satisfied that

the commonality requirement of

Rule 23 is met.

The district court found the

typicality prerequisite satisfied, but

EE

- $0a -

only because Henry L. Dejerinett, a black

male who was not hired for a clerical

position, had been added as a party-

plaintiff and as a class representative.

Even so, the court was concerned that

Griffin and Dejerinett could not ade-

quately represent those with objective

testing claims:

Plaintiff Griffin certainly can

adequately protect the inter-

ests of black employees who

have claims of discrimination

in promotions, job classifica-

tion, discipline, and termina-

tions. Plaintiff Dejerinett’s

claim is somewhat interrelated

with the class claims of a dis-

criminatory hiring police.

Plaintiffs allege that blacks

are not hired in sufficient

number because of facially

- Sila -

neutral objective criteria,

ji.e., a high school education

requirement and the _ [FDOC}

test, which have a disparate

impact on black applicants and

of a subjective barrier which

causes the almost exclusively

white decisionmakers to dis-

criminate against black ap-

plicants. The class claim

against discriminatory subjec-

tive hiring decisions is fairly

encompassed in Dejerinett’s

claim. This court, however, is

concerned that the class claim

against the Department’s ob-

jective screening criteria

which have a disparate impact

upon class members, especially

the [FDOC] test, is not fairly

and adequately protected by any

itil

- 52a -

of the named plaintiffs.

In that same order, the district

court permitted Alvin Smith to intervene

as a party plaintiff. Smith was an

unsuccessful black applicant for a

correctional officer position who had

failed the written entry-level correc-

tional officer examination. The court

wrote the following in its order: "Mr.

Smith eases this court’s concern that the

class claim against the Department’s

objective criteria was not fairly and

adequately protected by the named plain-

tiffs. Alvin Smith is a proper represen-

tative for potential black employees."

As to Griffin’s capacity to rep-

resent the "class of all past, present,

and potential black employees" of the

FDOC, we hold that, in light of Falcon,

Griffin’s complaint provided an insuffi-

cient basis by which the district court

- 53a -

could have concluded that Griffin’s

"“claim({s] of discrimination in promotion

{and discipline] would require the

: decision of any common question concern-

, ing the failure of [the defendants] to

hire more [blacks]." Falcon, 457 U.S. at

is8, 102 8.Ct. eat 2371. In our view,

Griffin satisfied neither the commonality

nor the typicality requirements of Rule

23(a).31

The district court found the

commonality requirement satisfied because

31 As the Supreme Court noted in

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13, 102 S.Ct.

at 2370 n.i3,

{tjhe commonality and typical-

ity requirements of Rule 23(a)

tend to merge. Both serve as

guideposts for determining

whether under the particular

circumstances maintenance of a

class action is economical and

whether the named plaintiff’s

claim and the class claims are

so interrelated that the inter-

ests of the class members will

be fairly and adequately pro-

tected in their absence.

- 54a -

the "general discriminatory policy"

Griffin alleged “commonly injures all

members of the class" and that in order

"to support their allegations of class-

wide discrimination," Griffin would

utilize "similar statistical data,

Similar historical background, and the

same or similar witnesses." As to the

typicality requirement, the district

court found it satisfied because

"(pjlaintiffs allege that blacks are not

hired in sufficient number because of

facially neutral objective criteria,

pe a high school education require-

ment and the [FDOC] test, which have a

disparate impact on black applicants and

of a subjective barrier which causes the

almost exclusively white decisionmakers

to discriminate against black appli-

cants."

- $5a -

To us, the district court failed to

appreciate the significance of Falcon.

The district court did not engage in the

kind of "rigorous analysis" that we

believe the Falcon court contemplated.

See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S.Ct. at

2372.

Griffin’s initial complaint, relying

on the then-valid across-the-board rule,

made no factual showing to satisfy the

Rule 23(a) requirements. Additionally,

the two amended complaints, which

included Dejerinett and Smith as named

plaintiffs, offered no facts to satisfy

the Rule 23(a) requirements. Moreover,

the named plaintiffs’ "Memorandum in

Opposition to Motion to Vacate Order

Certifying Class" offered little more

than conclusory statements that the named

plaintiffs satisfied the Rule 23(a)

criteria. See Nelson v. United States

- 36a -

Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 680 (11th Cir.

1983) ("(Named plaintiff] was ... obli-

gated to show, in at least a preliminary

fashion, the required commonality between

her claims and those of the putative

class.") (citations omitted). Although

the plaintiffs asserted that "(w]hether a

person impacted by one employment prac-

tice may represent other persons impacted

‘in the same manner’ by another practice

need not be reached in this case," they

nonetheless tried to take refuge in

Falcon’s footnote fifteen, which states

that a class of both applicants and

employees could be justified "if the

discrimination manifested itself in

hiring and promotion practices in the

same general fashion." Falcon, 457 U.S.

at i159 n.35,; i002 8.¢e. a 2371 n.1i5.

This is the closest the named plaintiffs

came to helping the district court con-

- 57a -

duct a rigorous Rule 23 inquiry. In

fact, the plaintiffs, although aware of

Falcon, continued to rely on the defunct

across-the-board rule by citing a former

Fifth Circuit case?2 that, in light of

32 In support of its typicality

argument, the plaintiffs’ memorandum of

law cited Herbert v. Monsanto Co., 576

F.2d 77, 88 (5th Cir.), vacated and

dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 580

F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam):

Appellee contends that because

appellant’s claim concerns only

the trucking activities of the

company and other claimants are

from different departments,

appellant’s claim is neither

factually nor legally typical.

We recognize, however, that the

typicality requirement is not

so rigid as to comprehend only

Similar fact situations. 4

Class actions were limited to

factual typicality, class

actions under Title VII would

be impossible because, except

in rare cases, the facts would

not be identical. It would be

a better test for typicality to

consider whether the types of

facts or evidence were typical

of the class. For example, if

all claims, although of dif-

ferent job classifications,

depended upon statistical

eal

- 58a -

Falcon, was no longer good law.

The district court’s commonality

analysis amounts to nothing more than a

presumption that racial discrimination as

manifested in various employment prac-

tices raises a common question of law or

fact. See Wheeler v. City of Columbus,

703 F.2d 853, 855 (5th Cir. 1983) (per

curiam) ("Discrimination in its broadest

sense is the only question alleged that

is common to [the named plaintiff] and

the class she sought to create and

represent. Under Falcon this is not

evidence, and the statistics

evidenced a policy of discrim-

ination, typicality would be

satisfied.

In light of Falcon, "general statistical

evidence of underrepresentation in the

workforce will undoubtedly not suffice to

justify a single class covering different

types of discrimination such as in

hiring promotion, and discharge." 2 A.

Larson & lL. Larson, Employment Dis-

crimination § 49.52(c)(2) (1986) (inter-

preting footnote 15 of Falcon, 457 U.s.

at 159, i02 @.€es Ot Bera-

- 59a -

enough."). The district court’s typical-

ity analysis, which presumably is based

on Falcon’s footnote fifteen, is flawed.

As we have already discussed, in that

footnote the Falcon Court identified

exceptions to the general rule that

employees cannot represent a class that

includes applicants, even though the

employer’s discrimination is manifested

in various employment practices. One

situation that may justify a class of

both applicants and employees is when the

discrimination that is manifested in

various practices is effected "in the

same general fashion, such as_ through

entirely subjective decisionmaking

processes." Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159

n.15, 102 S.Ct. at 2371 n.15. The named

plaintiffs’ assertions notwithstanding,

the pleadings demonstrated that any

general policy of discrimination that the

- 60a -

FDOC may have had did not manifest itself

in the same general fashion.

When the Supreme Court used the term

"Same general fashion," it gave an

example: "entirely subjective decision-

making processes." Significant proof

that an employer makes both discrimina-

tory hiring and promotion decisions using

an entirely subjective decisionmaking

process for each employment practice is a

manifestation of a general policy of

discrimination operating in "the same

general fashion." By qualifying "subjec-

tive decisionmaking processes" with

"entirely," the Court implied that an

employer’s general policy of discrimina-

tion manifested, for example, by an

objective hiring practice and by a

subjective promotion practice would not

be discrimination operating in "the same

general fashion" sufficient to justify a

ad

- 6la -

class of both applicants and employees.

The FDOC’s decisionmaking process

for hiring correctional officers is

objective: applicants must hold a high

school diploma or a general equivalency

diploma and must pass the written cor-

rectional officer examination. In

contrast, the FDOC’s decisionmaking

process for promoting correctional

officers, and other employees, is sub-

jective: applicants for promotion need

not hold advanced degrees or pass any

additional examinations; correctional

officers are promoted on the basis of

their performance as viewed by their

superiors. The case before us is not one

that implicates ahaeiata footnote fif-

teen.

We therefore hold that Griffin, an

incumbent correctional officer complain-

ing of a subjective decisionmaking pro-

- 62a -

cess, could not represent a class that

included those who may have been victims

of a discriminatory objective decision-

making process, such as applicants for

the position of correctional officer who

took the written entry-level examination

and failed it. See e.g., Walker v. Jim

Dandy Co., 747 F.2d 136, 1365 (11th Cir.

1984) ("Following Falcon ... we hold that

[plaintiffs’] complaint provided an in-

sufficient basis for concluding that the

adjudication of [their] claim of dis-

crimination in hiring supervisory

employees would require the resolution of

common questions of law and fact concern-

ing [the employer’s} discriminatory

practices in recruitment, job assignment,

718 F.2d 1381, 1387 (Sth Cir. 1983)

("Under Falcon, plaintiff cannot serve as

- 63a -

class representative with respect to

hiring, promotion, or any other employ-

ment practices excepting discriminatory

discharge because she does not possess

the same interest and did not suffer the

same injury as the other members of the

class."); Taylor v. Block, 35 Fed.R.

Serv.2d (Callagham) 546 (D.D.C. Oct. 15,

1982) (plaintiffs who alleged they suf-

fered only promotion discrimination could

not represent across-the-board class

Claiming hiring, assignment, and training

discrimination). In other words,

Griffin, who could assert discipline and

promotion claims under Title VII, did not

have representative capacity, within the

meaning of Rule 23(a), to assert testing

claims on behalf of others.?? We now

33 Because Griffin satisfied

neither the commonalty nor the typicality

requirements of Rule 23(a), we need not

address whether he could have been an

adequate representative of the class.

- 64a -

examine whether the addition of Henry L.

Dejerinett and Alvin Smith as _ named

plaintiffs affected the class certifica-

tion question.

Iitl.

Eight months after filing his

complaint in district court, Griffin

sought leave to amend his complaint to

add Henry L. Dejerinett as a party-

plaintiff and as a class representative.

In November 1978, Dejerinett applied for

an FDOC clerical position, entitled

"Property Manager III." Dejerinett was

not required, as part of the application

process, to produce an educational degree

or to take the written entry-level exami-

nation required of correctional officer

applicants. He was required, however, to

have an interview. Dejerinett was not

hired; instead, the FDOC hired a white

See Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(a) (4)-

- 65a -

male. A month later, Dejerinett filed a

charge of racial discrimination against

the FDOC with the Florida Commission on

Human Relations, a deferral agency for

the EEOC. He requested and received a

right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in

April 1980. The district court, with no

written analysis of standing or Rule 23,

granted Griffin leave to amend his comn-

plaint and add Dejerinett as a named

plaintiff.

Dejerinett had standing to assert a

subjective hiring claim.34 He applied

34 There is some indication in the

record that the Florida Department of

Administration, on the basis of testing,

training, and experience, rated Dejeri-

nett as well-qualified for the clerk

position. We cannot tell from the record

whether any testing done by the Depart-

ment of Administration measured health,

physical ability, or intelligence. In

any event, because the rating took

experience and training into account,

there was a substantial subjective

component to the rating. We also note

that because Dejerinett received a well-

qualified rating (which presumably was a

- 66a -

for a clerical position, requiring no

correctional officer examination or

educational degrees, and was not hired.

Because Dejerinett never took the

correctional officer examination, and

never applied for that position, he

suffered no injury as a result of that

test. He thus’ lacked constitutional

standing to assert a testing or a hiring

claim arising out of the FDOC’s correc-

tional officer application process.

Accordingly, we hold that the

district court erred when it permitted

Dejerinett to raise the testing claim on

behalf of himself and on behalf of

others. We hold in the alternative that

even if Dejerinett somehow had constitu-

tional standing to assert the testing

reason he was granted an interview), he

did not allege that the Department of

Administration’s rating process illegally

discriminated against black applicants.

- 67a -

claim, he did not, in light of General

Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102

S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), have

representative capacity to assert the

testing claim on behalf of those who took

the FDOC’s written entry-level examina-

tion, failed it, and were not hired.3°

In other words, Dejerinett did not meet

the prerequisites of Rule 23(a).

‘The district court, in effect,

presumed the similarity of hiring claims

of those denied clerical positions to

hiring claims of those denied correc-

tional officer positions. In our view,

applicants who were subjectively denied

clerical positions cannot sufficiently

identify with other applicants who failed

an objective written examination and, on

that basis, were not hired for the

higher-ranking position of correctional

35 See supra note 18.

- 68a -

officer. See Walker v. Jim Dandy Co.,

747 F.2d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The

{[district]) court [correctly] reasoned

that because [the plaintiffs] were appli-

cants for supervisory positions, they did

not sufficiently identify with other

applicants for lower level labor jobs or

employees complaining of disparate job

assignments or pay.") The district court

abused its discretion when, in light of

Falcon, it continued to permit Dejerinett

to represent those members of the class

who took and failed the written entry-

level correctional officer examination.

B.

Intervenor Alvin Smith twice applied

for the entry-level correctional officer

position held by Griffin. Smith was

first denied the job because he did not

have a high school diploma or a general

equivalency diploma (GED), both require-

- 69a -

ments for the job. Later he obtained a

GED, but he then failed the written cor-

rectional officer examination. Conse-

quently, he was denied the position a

second time.

Smith had constitutional standing to

assert a testing claim under Title VII.

He could, and did, allege injury as a

result of the FDOC’s testing requirement:

he took and failed the written examina-

tion required of entry-level correctional

officers. Although Smith may very well

have had representative capacity, under

Rule 23(a), to assert testing claims on

behalf of other black applicants who

failed the same test and were consequent-

ly not hired, we need not address that

point. Smith did not file a timely

charge of racial discrimination with the

EEOC, a precondition to a Title VII suit.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982); Jackson

- 74a =

Vv. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d

992, 1010-11 (11th Cir. 1982); See also

supra note 12. Furthermore, as we dis-

cuss below, Smith could not avail himself

of the single-filing rule. For these

reasons, we hold that the district court

erred when it allowed Smith to intervene

as a class representative.

In Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,

398 F.2d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 1968),

our predecessor circuit held that it is

not necessary for each person with the

same grievance to file an EEOC charge as

a prerequisite to class membership. Nor

is it necessary that an intervenor bring

a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite

to serving as a class representative.

Id. As long as at least one named

plaintiff timely filed an EEOC charge,

the precondition to a Title VII action is

met for all other named plaintiffs and

- 718 <-

class members. Ia.36

This rule, which has become known as

the "single-filing rule," contains two

essential requirements: "First, at least

one plaintiff must have timely filed an

EEOC complaint that is not otherwise

defective.... Second, the individual

Claims of the filing and non-filing

plaintiffs must have arisen out of

Similar discriminatory treatment in the

same time frame." Jackson, 678 F.2d at

1011-12. In the case before us, the

36 The QOatis reasoning was

extended to intervention in non-class

suits in Wheeler v. American Home Prods.

Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 897-98 (5th Cir.

1977) (similarly situated intervenors who

had not filed EEOC charges nevertheless

could assert back pay claims if one or

more of original plaintiffs had filed

timely charges).

The Oatis rationale was further

extended in wfo Vv. it States

Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 663, 665-66 (5th

Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), which held that

every original plaintiff in a multi-

plaintiff, non-class action suit need not

file charges with the EEOC.

- 12a =

first requirement was met: Griffin, one

of the named plaintiffs, timely filed an

adequate EEOC complaint, as far as it

detailed his promotion and discipline

claims. The second requirement, however,

was not satisfied. Smith, a non-filing

plaintiff, had an objective testing claim

while Griffin, on the other hand, had

sub} ive motio dad discipline

claims.

We hold that Griffin and Smith were

not sufficiently similarly situated.

That is, employee Griffin’s claims and

applicant ‘smith’s claims did not arise

out of similar discriminatory treatment.

Griffin alleged that the FDOC’s subjec-

tive promotion and discipline practices

were illegally discriminatory. Smith |

alleged that the FDOC’s objective cor-

rectional officer examination illegally

discriminated against black applicants.

- 73a =

The FDOC’s promotion and discipline

practices were not manifested in similar

fashion to its hiring and testing prac-

tices. See Ezell_v. Mobile Housing Bd.,

709 F.2d 1376, 1381 (11th Cir. 1983) (non-

filing incumbent plaintiff’s discrimina-

tory examination claim was not suffi-

ciently similar to filing plaintffs’

discriminatory discharge and broad-based,

on-going campaign of discrimination

claims to invoke single-filing rule to

excuse filing requirement) ; on ev

Employment Sec. Comm’n, 671 F.2d 835, 838

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862,

103 S.Ct. 138, 74 L.Ed.2d 117. (1982) (be-

cause non-charging plaintiff’s hiring

Claim was not "substantially identical"

to incumbent employee’s claims of

discriminatory treatment, single-filing

rule did not apply). Although both

employment practices could have _ been

- 74a -

racially discriminatory, that alone is

not enough to implicate the second

requirement of the single-filing rule.

Otherwise, "intervention [could] boot-

strap the court’s jurisdiction to

encompass claims regarding practices

broader that the ... claims properly

assertable by the named plaintffs."

Vuyanish v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 723

P.2G4 1195, 1201 (Sth Cir.) (former

employees who sought to intervene in

class action but who did not file timely

charges with EEOC could only proceed

within periphery of issues that named

plaintffs could assert), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1073, 105 8.Cée. S67, 83

L.Ed.2ad 507 91984); see also Wakeen v.

Hoffman House, Inc., 724 F.2d 1238, 1246

(7th Cir. 1983)("[{A] class member who

does not meet the procedural prerequi-

sites for waging a Title VII suit may not

- 7 =

use the guise of a moticn to intervene to

take over as the sole class representa-

tive for someone who initiates but is not

legitimately able to continue a class

action.").

We also note that merely because a

notation at the beginning of Griffin’s

EEOC complaint stated that Griffin’s

charge also encompassed "[s]Jincerity of

recruiting, hiring, and promoting of

minority groups within the Florida’s

Division of Adult Corrections," Smith’s

status as a class representative was not

saved. As the pleadings make clear,

Griffin never had constitutional standing

to raise a testing or a hiring claim, a

fundamental requirement underlying the

Single-filing rule: “once an aggrieved

person raises a particular issue with the

EEOC which he has standing to raise, he

may bring an action for himself and the

- 76a -

class of persons similarly situated."

Qatis, 398 F.2d at 498.37 smith cannot

point to Griffin’s EEOC charge, which

arguably contained a testing claim

brought on behalf of others, to excuse

his failure to have filed his own testing

charge with the EEOC when Griffin did not

have standing to raise the testing issue.

We cannot permit the single-filing rule

to be used to circumvent the constitu-

tional requirement of standing.

37s By "standing," the Oatis court

meant "the issues as to which (the

employee] is aggrieved," Oatis, 398 F.2d

at 499, citing Title VII’s enforcement

provision that requires the EEOC to

investigate the charges of a person

Claiming to be aggrieved, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5 (a). By “standing,” the Oatis

court also meant, even if implicitly,

personal injury, that is, constitutional

standing. See id., at 498-99; see also,

Vuyanish v. Nat’l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195,

1200-01 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Oatis’

single-filing rule as implicating

constitutional standing cert. denied, 469

U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 567, 83 L.Ed.2d 507

(1984).

- 77a -

Iv.

In sum, based on standing principles

and on the dictates of Falcon, we hold

that the district court erred when it

certified the class with the named

plaintiffs as representatives. None of

the named plaintiffs -- Griffin, Dejeri-

nett, or Smith -- should have been al-

lowed to represent the class of black

correctional officer applicants with

testing claims. The district court’s

order certifying the class is therefore

VACATED.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent. The majority holds that

Smith did not meet the second element of

the single-filing rule. That rule

states, "the individual claims of the

filing and non-filing plaintiffs must

have arisen out of similar discriminatory

treatment in the same time frame."

- 78a -

Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1011-12 (emphasis

added). One of Griffin’s claims in his

EEOC complaint was that the FbDOCcC dis-

criminated against black job applicants.

Non-filing intervenor Smith’s claim arose

"out of similar discriminatory treat-

ment," because he alleges that the FDOC

discriminated against him and other

applicants through administration of a

test with a discriminatory impact on

blacks. The majority ignores the fact

that Griffin raised the claim of dis-

crimination against black applicants in

his EEOC complaint.

The majority erroneously assumes

that if Griffin lacks standing to raise

the hiring claim in federal court, then

his raising of that claim before the EEOC

is somehow ineffective for purposes of

the single-filing rule. The majority’s

reasoning is based upon its failure to

- 79a -

differentiate between the policy under-

lying the standing requirement in federal

court and the policy underlying the

single filing rule in an EEOC action.

The policy underlying the _ standing

requirement is to ensure that a party

litigating an issue has a concrete stake

in the outcome of the case, and is

therefore motivated to vigorously

litigate the issues. The policy underly-

ing the EEOC filing requirement is to

ensure "that the settlement of grievances

be first attempted through the office of

the EEOC...." Ezel]_v. Mobile Housing

Board, 709 F.2d 1376, 1381 (11th Cir.

1983); Otis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,

398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968). The

purpose underlying the EEOC filing

requirement is therefore to promote the

resolution of Title VII claims out of

court. The EEOC proceeding is not

- 80a -

designed as a way-station on the road to

the federal courthouse.

By asserting a hiring grievance in

his EEOC complaint, Griffin ensured "that

the settlement of [hiring] grievances

(would) be first attempted through the

office of the EEOC." Ezell, 709 F.2d at

1381. The fact that Griffin may not have

had standing in federal district court to

raise the hiring issue is irrelevant to

the fact that his EEOC complaint gave the

EEOC an opportunity to settle the hiring

grievance before that grievance was sued

upon in federal district court. Since

Smith’s claim in federal district court

of discriminatory hiring practices is

identical to the claim of discriminatory

hiring practices asserted in Griffin’s

complaint before the EEOC, involving the

single filing rule will not frustrate the

purpose of the EEOC filing requirement:

= 396

to give the EEOC a chance to resolve

Title VII claims before they go to court.

The fact that Griffin may not have had

standing to raise the hiring claim in

court is irrelevant to the issue of

whether the EEOC has had a chance to

resolve that claim before it is taken to

court, whether by Griffin, Smith, or

anyone else.

In short, the majority has grafted

the constitutional standing requirement

for parties litigating in federal

district court onto the filing require-

ments for persons alleging Title VII

claims before the EEOC. Such a require-

ment does not, and never has, existed.

The majority, however, misinterprets

Fifth Circuit dicta to reach just that

conclusion. That dicta says, "Once an

aggrieved person raises a particular

issue with the EEOC which he has standing

- 82a -

to raise, he may bring an action for

himself and the class of persons similar-

ly situated." Oatis, 398 F.2d at 498.

The majority fails to mention that the

sole issue in the Oatis case was whether

a Title VII class action could include in

the class persons who had not previously

filed charges with the EEOC. The court

held that the class could include such

persons. The Oatis court gave its rea-

soning for this holding in the sentence

immediately preceding the language relied

upon by the majority in this case. That

sentence states, "If it is impossible to

reach a settlement with one discriminat-

ee, what reason would there be to assume

the next one would be successful."

Oatis, 398 F.2d at 498. In short, the

court in Oatis was not faced with the

question of whether an EEOC complainant

could effectively file claims with the

- 83a -

EEOC even though the complainant would

not have standing to assert the claim in

federal district court. The majority’s

application of constitutional standing

requirements to the EEOC complainant puts

the EEOC in the nonsensical position of

having to anticipate how the federal

district court will rule on the con-

plainant’s standing to litigate various

Claims if the EEOC does not resolve then.

Such a rule will result in the EEOC

narrowing its resolution of claims to

those which it anticipates the conm-

plainant will have standing to sue upon

in federal district court, regardless of

the apparent existence of the alleged

discrimination with respect to other

employees or job applicants. Such a

situation would hardly further’ the

purpose of the EEOC filing requirement:

to resolve Title VII claims out of court.

- 84a -

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) says:

Whenever a charge is filed by

or on behalf of a person claim-

ing to be aggrieved, or by a

member of the Commission,

alleging that an employer ...

has engaged in an_e unlawful

employment practice, the

Commission shall serve a notice

of the charge ... and shall

make an investigation thereof.

This provision requires the Commission

to investigate all charges which a person

"Claims" to be aggrieved of. In no way

does the provision suggest that the

Commission is limited to the investiga-

tion of claims which the complainant will

have standing to bring in a federal

court. Any suggestion in Oatis of such a

requirement is dicta that is in conflict

with the intent of the statute that the

- 85a -

EEOC resolve "claimed" discrimination out

of court. Smith should therefore be

allowed to proceed in federal district

court as a class representative for the

class of applicants who failed the

objective test.

- $64 °

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 79-1016

Decided: March 12, 1981

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.

DEJERINETT, both individually

and on behalf of others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

Pr

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS

On the basis of the record in this

case and the attached stipulation of the

parties, which is hereby incorporated in

this order as the findings of this court,

the court finds that this action should

be certified as a class action with the

above-named plaintiffs representing a

class of all past, -present, and potential

- $7a -

black employees of the State of Florida

Department of Corrections.

The court finds that the require-

ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(2) have been satisfied and that

plaintiffs have met the requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). A

decision on class certification is con-

ditional and subject to modification at

any time prior to a decision on the

merits. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c) (1); Jones

v, Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1098 (5th Cir.

1975).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED

i Plaintiffs’ motion to certify

the class (Document 16) is GRANTED and

the court hereby certifies this case as

an action on behalf of the following

class: all past, present, and potential

black employees of the State of Florida

- $94 «

Department of Corrections.

2. The class certification hearing

schedule,d to take place on April 2, 1981

is hereby cancelled.

DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of

March, 1981.

s/s William Stafford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* oa =

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 791016

Decided:

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.

DEJERINETT, etc.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, etc., et al.,

Defendants.

STIPULATION

The Plaintiffs and Defendants, by

and through their undersigned counsel,

for the purpose of permitting the Court

to determine preliminarily whether this

action shall be maintained as a class

action and for no other purpose, stipu-

late and agree as follows:

- 90a -

i. The number of persons in the

proposed class of all past, Present and

potential black employees of the state of

Florida Department of Corrections is

greater than 1,000.

2. The allegations of race dis-

crimination in the Second Amended

Complaint involve questions of law and

fact which, under current law in the

United Stares Court of Appeals, Fifth

Circuit, are common to the class,

including statistical evidence, evidence

concerning the employment system of the

State of Florida Department of Correc-

tions, and the common legal principles

applied to claims of race discrimination.

The parties maintain their right to brief

these issues on appeal, if any.

3. Plaintiffs’ counsel are com-

petent to prosecute this action as a

class action. The named plaintiffs are

- 91a -

willing and able to prosecute this action

on behalf of the class. The parties

reserve the right to present evidence and

argument, at trial or at the hearing of

any motion filed pursuant to paragraph

"7" of this Stipulation, concerning the

allegation that the Plaintiff Griffin

withdrew his first charge of discrimina-

tion.

4. The claims of the named

plaintiffs are, under current law in the

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth

Circuit, similar to those of other

members of the proposed class. The

parties maintain their right to brief

these issues on appeal, if any. The

Defendants believe that the employment

record of the Plaintiff Griffin is not

typical, but recognize that this issue

relates to the merits of the claim rather

than to the existence of the claim. The

- 92a -

Defendants further believe that the

claims of the Plaintiff Dejerinett are

typical only of claims concerning

employment at the Central Office of the

Department of Corrections.

S. The Defendants reserve all

defenses alleged in their amended answer

to the second amended complaint, except

their response, stated in their Eleventh

Defense, *o paragraphs numbered "8", "9",

"10", and "11" of the second amended

complaint. A response to those para-

graphs may be reasserted if the Defen-

dants move pursuant to paragraph "7" of

this Stipulation.

6. The parties do not agree as to

the appropriate dates which begin the

periods of potential liability in this

action and reserve the right to present

evidence and argument on this issue.

- 938 -

7. In the event that this action is

preliminarily certified by the court as a

class action, the parties reserve the

right to move to decertify or limit the

class, or to establish sub-classes, at

any time during the pendency of this

litigation.

8. The parties recognize that this

Stipulation may be used by the court as a

basis upon which to enter an order

preliminarily certifying this action as a

class action. The parties reserve the

right to present evidence and argument

concerning the appropriateness, vel non,

and scope of the class at trial.

9. This Stipulation and the

proposed class pertain only to the claims

of employment discrimination and not to

the other claims alleged in the second

amended complaint.

- 94a -

MITCHELL D. FRANKS

Assistant Attorney General

Department of Legal Affairs

The Capitol, Suite 1501

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 488-1573

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS

s/s RRY L. WITTE

HARRY L. WITTE

Attorney at Law

1215 Thomasville Road

- Post Office Box 4289

Tallahassee, Florida 32303

(904) 244-9184

PATTERSON G. TRAYNHAM

Patterson & Traynham

Attorneys at Law

1215 Thomasville Road

Post Office Box 4289

Tallahassee, Florida 32303

(904) 224-9181

s/s (e) N

BRIAN E. NORTON

Attorney at Law

117 S. Martin Luther King

Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 224-8701

PAUL A. LEHRMAN

Attorney at Law

103 N. Gadsden Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

(904) 224-8687

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

- 95a -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 791016

Decided: July 30, 1982

PENERS L. GRIFFIN, et al., etc.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, et al., etc.,

Defendants.

ORDER

The above-styled cause is a civil

rights suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981 and 2000e alleging discriminatory

employment practices based on race. This

court, by order dated March 10, 1981

(Document 84) and on the basis of a

stipulation filed by the parties,

certified this action as a class action

with Peners L. Griffin and Henry lL.

- 96a -

Dejerinett representing a class of all

past, present, and potential black

employees of the State of Florida

Department of Corrections. The parties

have litigated this action as an across-

-the-board discrimination claim with

discovery covering the realm of employ-

ment practices including hiring, promo-

tions, job classification, discipline,

and terminations. On June 14, 1982, the

United States Supreme Court rendered a

decision faulting the Fifth Circuit’s

quasi-automatic across-the-board rule

stressing the fact that all the require-

ments of Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure must be satisfied for the

maintenance of a class action. General

leph ° outhwest v.

Falcon, slip op. No. 81-574 (U.S. June

14, 1982). Relying on Falcon, defendants

filed a motion to vacate the order

- 97a -

certifying class (Document 143) to which

plaintffs responded in Document 146.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to

intervene (Document 141) requesting this

court to enter an order permitting

Alvin Smith to intervene as a named

plaintiff to represent the class of

applicants who defendants have denied

employment on the basis of a facially

objective selection procedure which

allegedly has a disparate impact upon

black applicants. Defendants responded

to this motion in Document 145.

Peners L. Griffin is a black

employee of the Florida Department of

Corrections. Plaintiff Griffin unsuc-

cessfully applied for several promotions

within the Department. Document 58,

Defendants’ Admissions 21-25, 30-32. He

also alleges that he had been terminated

twice for discriminatory reasons. but

- 98a -

eventually was reinstated. Document 54,

Second Amended Complaint q 14. Griffin

filed a charge of discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

on February 22, 1975, and received a

Notice of Right-to-Sue letter. Document

58, Defendants’ Admission 20.

Henry lL. Dejerinett, a black,

unsuccessfully applied for the position

of Property Manager III within the

Department. Document 58, Defendants’

Admissions 33 & 34. Defendant Dejerinett

alleges that he was not hired because of

defendants’ impermissible racial con-

siderations. Document 54, Second Amended

Complaint 415. He filed a charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission. Document 57,

Attachment.

Defendants assert that plaintiffs

Griffin and Dejerinett cannot adequately

- 99a -

represent the class as_ preliminarily

certified. Defendants posture that, at

best, Griffin can adequately represent

employees seeking promotion within the

correctional officer lines within any

region he applied for promotion and

Dejerinett can adequately represent

applicants seeking employment’ for

clerical/office positions within region

I. Defendants further claim that neither

Griffin nor Dejerinett can represent a

sub-class of applicants rejected for

employment because they failed to receive

a passing score on the FDOA exam given to

all applicants for correctional officer

jobs. Finally, defendants urge this

court to inquire into plaintiffs’ ability

to bear the costs of this suit.

The Falcon decision mandates that

this court carefully examine the require-

ments of Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of

- 100a -

Civil Procedure. No. 81-574, slip op. at

9. The first requirement is that "the

class is no numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable." Federal

R.Civ.P. 23(a) (1). The number of black

persons employed by the Department in

February 1981 was 1,346. Document 82,

Defendants’ Admission 62. This number

alone, without inquiry as to the number

of past and potential black employees,

clearly indicates that the class members

are too numerous to join.

The second requirement is that

"there are questions of law or fact

common to the class." Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(a) (2). Plaintiffs have alleged a

common practice and pattern of racial

discrimination which affects defendants’

hiring promotion, job classification,

disciplinary, and termination decisions.

This general discriminatory policy

- 101a -

commonly injures all members of the class

of past, present, and potential black

employees of the Department. Plaintiffs

maintain that they will utilize similar

statistical data, similar historical

background and the same or similar

witnesses to support their allegations of

Cclass-wide discrimination. This court is

satisfied that the commonality require-

ment of Rule 23 is met.

The third prerequisite for maintain-

ing a class action is that "the claims or

Gefenses of the representative parties

are typical of the claims or defenses of

the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). This

court must inquire "whether the named

plaintift’s claim and the class claims

are so interrelated that the interests of

the class members will be fairly and

adequately protected in their absence."

Falcon, slip op. at 10 n.3. Plaintiff

- 4028.

Griffin certainly can adequately protect

the interests of black employees who have

claims of discrimination in promotions,

job classifications, discipline, and

terminations. Plaintiff Dejerinett’s

claim is somewhat interrelated with the

class claims of a discriminatory hiring

policy. Plaintiffs allege that blacks

are not hired in sufficient number

because of facially neutral objective

criteria, i.e., a high school education

requirement and the FDOA test, which have

a disparate impact on black applicants

and of a subjective barrier which causes

the almost exclusively white decision-

makers to discriminate against black

applicants. The class claim against

discriminatory subjective hiring deci-

sions is fairly encompassed in Dejeri-

nett’s claim. This court, however, is

concerned that the class claim against

- 103a -

the Department’s objective screening

criteria which have a disparate impact

upon class members, especially the FDOA

test, is not fairly and adequately

protected by any of the named plaintiffs.

The fourth requirement is that "the

representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the

class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) (4). This

court notes that plaintiffs and plain-

tiffs’ counsel have efficiently litigated

this complex action for three years, and

trial will commence in three weeks. This

demonstrates that plaintiffs are adequate

representatives of the class. The court,

however must also inquire whether there

is a conflict of interest between the

named plaintiffs and the class they seek

to represent. See Falcon, slip op. at 10

n. 13, This court is mindful of the

possible conflict of interest for

- 104a -

Plaintiff Griffin to represent applicants

who were denied employment and who, if

granted relief, might compete with him

for promotions. The United States

Supreme Court held that "[u]nder Rule 23,

the same plaintiff could not represent

these classes [of applicants]}." General

e ° west v.

446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980). This court is

of the view that if an _ unsuccessful

applicants for a correctional officer

position becomes a class representative,

that applicant can adequately represent

potential black employees. The prejudice

which may result from the conflict

between Griffin and the class of poten-

tial employees is far outweighed by the

prejudice which would result if ap-

plicants could not be members of the

Class certified in this action. As is

- 105a -

discussed more fully below, this suit has

been litigated for years as a class which

included applicants. See, e.g., Docu-

ments 54, 108, and 120. Extensive

discovery has taken place on the hiring

issue. See, e.g., Documents 37, 38, and

43. It would be greatly prejudicial, at

this late date, to exclude potential

employees from the class.

This suit is a class action for

injunctive or declaratory relief under

Rule 23(b)(2;, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Defendants’ contention that

the class cannot encompass all the

regions in the state because employment

decisions are made independently at each

regional level is not well-taken.

Plaintiff Griffin has applied for

promotion in four out of the five regions

in the state. The propriety of defen-

dants’ behavior will be determined in a

SS

- 106a -

single action, and if plaintiffs

prevail, this court can fashion an

adequate remedy.

Plaintiffs strenuously maintain the

position that Griffin can adequately

represent the class; however, in the

alternative, plaintiffs have filed a

motion to intervene on behalf of Alvin

Smith. Mr. Smith applied for employment

as a Correctional Officer I. Initially,

Mr. Smith was denied employment because

he had not completed high school. After

obtaining his GED, he was again denied

employment because he failed the written

examination required of Correctional

Officer I applicants.

Plaintiffs did not specify in their

motion whether this was intervention of

right, Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), or permissive

intervention, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). The

foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates

- 107a -

that plaintiff may intervene as a matter

of right.

Alvin Smith, an unsuccessful

applicant, certainly has an interest in

this suit which seeks to challenge

defendants’ employment practices,

including hiring. Unless he is permitted

to intervene, his interest may not be

adequately represented by the named

parties. Mr. Smith eases this court’s

concern that the class claim against the

Department’s objective criteria was

fairly and adequately protected by the

named plaintiffs. Alvin Smith is a

proper representative for potential black

employees.

This court is of the view that this

motion was timely filed. Falcon, which

altered this circuit’s position on

across-the-board discrimination claims,

was decided cn June 14, 1982. Plaintiffs

- 108a -

filed their motion to intervene on July

8, 1982, as a result of Falcon. This

court finds that defendants will not

suffer prejudice if Smith is allowed to

intervene. Defendants have _ been on

notice since the institution of this

action that they must defend against

hiring claims. The parties have con-

ducted discovery regarding the hiring

issue, and have vigorously litigated this

claim as evidenced by the motion for

partial summary judgment (Document 108).

Defendants further contend that

Smith cannot be a class representative

because he did not timely file an EEOC

complaint. This circuit adopted the

single filing rule whereby "once an

aggrieved person raises a particular

issue with the EEOC which he has standing

to raise, he may bring an action for

himself and the class of persons similar-

- 109a -

ly situated...." S W ~

bach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.

19680. An examination of Griffin’s

charges of discrimination (Document 148

Exhibits A & C) reveals that Griffin

raised the hiring claim in addition to

promotion, job classification, dis-

cipline, and termination claims.

Griffin’s charge, therefore, exhausted

administrative remedies for the whole

class and for all the claims.

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to vacate

order certifying class is DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to intervene

is GRANTED.

3. This action shall continue to be

certified as a class with PENERS UL.

GRIFFIN, HENRY L. DEJERINETT, and ALVIN

SMITH as named plaintiffs representing a

class of all past, present, and potential

- 110a -

black employees of the State of Florida

Department of Corrections.

DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of

July, 1982.

WILLIAM STAFFORD

Chief Judge

= 35084 -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 79-1016

Decided: August 25, 1983

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.

DEJERINETT,

Plaintiffs,

and

ALVIN SMITH,

Intervenor,

all individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated,

Vv.

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, individually

and in his official capacity as

Secretary of the Department of

Corrections of Florida; THE sTATE

OF FLORIDA? THE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, and any predecessor or

successor agency; and RAYMOND W.

GEARY, individually and in his official

capacity as attorney for the Department

ef Corrections of Florida,

Defendants.

This is a civil rights class action

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

1983 and 2000e alleging discriminatory

employment practices based on race.

Pederal jurisdiction is found in 28

U.S.C. § 1343. This action also involves

individual claims of the named plaintiff

Peners L. Griffin which are stated in

Counts II and III of the second amended

complaint. The issue of liability for

the class claims was tried before the

court without a jury from August 17,

1982, to September 17, 1982, following

which the parties submitted extensive

post-trial memoranda. From the pre-trial

stipulation, the exhibits, admissions of

the parties, and all testimony, and after

considering the legal arguments’ made

before, during, and after trial, the

court now makes its findings of fact and

* 3338 =

conclusions of law as required by Rule

52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. HISTORY OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Peners L. Griffin, a black

male, became employed with defendant

Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC)

or its predecessor agency in April 1971.

Plaintiff Griffin was the first black

person hired as a Road Prison Officer at

the Tallahassee Road Prison operated by

defendant FDOC. Since January 1973,

plaintiff Griffin has applied for several

promotions, but has never been selected

Griffin received at least satisfactory

employee evaluations from his date of

hiring until sometime in 1974 when Wayne

Scott, a white male, became Chief

Correctional Counselor in Tallahassee.

Scott fired Griffin in 1974; however,

Regional Superintendent Hicks, a white

- 114a -

male, reinstated Griffin because FDOC

failed to follow proper termination

procedures. In early 1975 Griffin again

was terminated, and he filed a Career

Service appeal. The Career Service

Commission found no "good cause" for

Griffin’s dismissal and ordered his

reinstatement with back pay. On or about

February 22, 1975, Griffin also filed a

charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (the

EEOC) in which he alleged discrimination

by the FDOC against blacks in discipline,

hiring, promotions, and other employment

practices. Defendants contend and

plaintiffs deny that Griffin withdrew his

1975 charge; however, this issue was

never raised at trial. Griffin requested

a right-to-sue letter and received it on

about July 23, 1979. Griffin filed this

suit as a class action on October 15,

- - 1154 -

1979.

Griffin has been disciplined several

times, and he has filed at least one

other charge of discrimination with the

EEOC against the FDOC. He requested and

received a right-to-sue letter on this

later charge on or about April 10, 1980.

Henry L. Dejerinett, a black male,

applied for the FDOC position of Property

Manager III in November 1978 Plaintiff

Dejerinett was not hired; Kenneth Hayes,

a white male, was selected. Dejerinett

filed a charge of discrimination against

the FDOC and received a right-to-sue

letter on or about April 2, 1980.

On June 17, 1980, plaintiff Griffin

sought leave of court to amend his

complaint to add Henry L. Dejerinett as a

named plaintiff. This court granted the

motion by order dated November 25, 1980

(Document 53). Plaintiffs filed a second

- 1168 -

amended complaint (Document 54) = on

December 15, 1980.

Based on the parties’ stipulation,

this court, by order dated March 10, 1981

(Document 84), certified the action as

a class action with Peners L. Griffin and

Henry L. Dejerinett representing a class

of all past, present, and potential black

employees of the FDOC. On July 8, 1982,

defendants filed a motion to vacate the

order certifying the class and plaintiffs

moved for an order permitting Alvin Smith

to intervene.

Alvin Smith, a black male, was

denied employment as a Correctional

Officer I because he had not earned a

high school diploma or a general educa-

tion degree (GED). Smith obtained a GED

but failed the written correctional

officer examination in July 1981. He,

therefore, was denied employmenc.

- $478 =

This court allowed Smith to inter-

vene to represent potential black

employees. The court also reviewed the

class certification in light of the

recent case of General Telephone Company

of the Southwest v. Falcon, 72 L.Ed.2d

740 (1982). By order dated July 28, 1982

(Document 150), the court continued to

certify this action as a class action

with Peners L. Griffin, Henry L. Dejeri-

nett, and Alvin Smith as named plaintiffs

and intervenor representing a class of

all past, present, and potential black

employees of the FDOC.

On July 30, 1982, this court entered

an order (Document 157) granting partial

summary judgment for plaintiffs and

finding that ‘the correctional officer

written examination utilized by defen-

dants in screening applicants’ for

correctional officer positions had a

- 118a -

disparate impact upon class members which

had not been justified by business

necessity. This court denied summary

judgment on the hiring and promotion

claims because the court found plain-

tiffs’ statistics used to support their

claims were flawed.

Phase I, the liability for class

claims, commenced on September 17, 1982.

Phase I, part 1, consisted mostly of

witnesses who were experts in the fields

of economics and statistics. Phase I,

part 2, was anecdotal evidence.

II. CLASS REEVALUATION

The court has a continuing duty to

reevaluate class status throughout the

litigation. Vuyanich v. Republic

National Bank of Dallas, 505 F.Supp. 224,

233 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see also Cooper v.

(e) allas, 482 F.

Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d,

- 119a -

648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981). Although

defendants have not filed a post-trial

motion to decertify the class, they argue

that plaintiff Griffin voluntarily

withdrew his 1975 charge of discrimina-

tion and that there is no proof that the

charge was an “across-the-board” claim.

Defendants first raised the issue of

whether Griffin withdrew the 1975 charge

in a motion to dismiss the first amended

complaint (Document 17). This court held

that "the factual dispute regarding

plaintiff’s waiver of rights conferred by

Title VII is an issue for trial "

Document 53.

This issue was next mentioned in the

pre-trial stipulation under the heading

"Admitted Facts Requiring No Proof." It

states:

The Plaintiff, Peners L.

Griffin, filed a charge of

Discrimination, pursuant to

Title VII, on or about February

- 120a -

22, 1975. A true copy of that

charge has been filed in this

action as Exhibit "A" To a

Stipulation (Document 148) and

is properly in evidence A

Notice of Right-to-Sue was duly

issued by the Department of

Justice regarding that charge,

and this action was’ timely

filed under Title VII.

Defendants assert and Plain-

tiffs deny that Griffin

withdrew the charge

Document 166, p.1l.

This issue was not litigated at trial

and, in fact, was not raised until

defendants’ response and objections to

plaintiffs’ proposed findings and

conclusions (Document 215).

This court is of the view that

plaintiffs have both pleaded and proved

that Griffin filed a charge of dis-

crimination on or about February 22,

1975, and that he received a right-to-sue

letter. As the pre-trial stipulation

notes, the charge and letter are properly

in evidence. Defendants have failed to

- 1218 -

prove the defense that Griffin voluntar-

ily withdrew the 1975 charge. The class,

therefore, may rely on Griffin’s 1975

charge, because the Fifth Circuit adopted

the single filing rule whereby “once an

aggrieved person raises a particular

issue with the EEOC which he has standing

to raise, he may bring an action for

himself and the class of persons similar-

ly situated. .. ."™ Oatis v. Crown

Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th

Cir. 1968). |

Defendants have also argued that

there is only "the naked assertions of

Griffin and his attorneys ... that the

destroyed charge was an ‘’across-the-

-board’ claim." Document 215, 62>

This statement is inaccurate. The 1975

charge is in evidence (Document 148,

Exhibit A). A review of that charge

Clearly indicates that Griffin set forth

- 4248 -

an across-the-board claim challenging the

FDOC’s practices in hiring, discipline,

and promotions of blacks.

Griffin has alleged that these

discriminatory practices are the result

of a subjective decision-making process

which has its roots in pre-Act procedures

and continues until the present. Because

plaintiffs attempted to prove that this

discrimination pervades a pattern of

events and is not isolated incidents, the

charge could have been filed at any time.

See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,

567 F.2d 429, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1976);

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

Company, 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3rd Cir.

1975); Cooper v. University of Texas at

Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. Tex.

1979). Defendants’ liability commences

March 24, 1972, the date which Title VII

became applicable to the FDOC. The only

« 12348 -

employees barred from the class are those

who left the employ of the FDOC more

than 300 days before the filing of

Griffin’s 1975 charge. See Laffey, 567

F.2d at 472-74; Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 246;

Cooper, 482 F. Supp. at 190.

Defendants failed to present any

evidence at trial which altered this

court’s findings that plaintiffs met the

requirements for class certification set

forth in Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (Document 150). This court

now reaffirms its decision that this

action shall be certified as a class

action with Peners L. Griffin, Henry L.

Dejerinett, and Alvin Smith as_ named

plaintiffs and intervenor representing a

class of all past, present, and potential

black employees of the FDOC.

- 124a -

III. THE DEFENDANTS

Plaintiffs have sued Louie UL.

Wainwright, individually and in his

official capacity as Secretary of the

Department of Corrections of Florida.

Defendant Wainwright is the chief

executive officer of the FDOC.

Plaintiffs have also sued the State

of Florida and the Department of Correc-

tions. This court orally ruled that when

referring to the State of Florida in this

case, it shall mean the Florida Depart-

ment of Corrections. Defendant FDOC is

an executive department of the State of

Florida and is an employee within the

meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e(b).

Plaintiffs sued Raymond W. Geary,

individually and in his official capacity

as attorney for the FbDOC. Defendant

Geary was employed as general counsel for

- 125a -

the FDOC during pertinent times enconm-

passed in this litigation.

IV. THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS

The Department of Corrections has

"Supervisory and protective care,

custody, and control of the inmates,

buildings, grounds, property, and all

other matters" pertaining to the state

correctional system. yaa. Stat. §

945.025 (1981). In 1981, over half of

the FDOC work force, 4451 out of 8594

jobs, was in EEO Category No. 4, Protec-

tive Services. The following positions

with the FDOC are protective service

jobs:

Correctional Counselor Chief I

Correctional Counselor Chief II

Correctional Officer Chief I

Correctional Officer Chief II

Correctional Officer Chief III

Correctional Officer I

Correctional Officer II

Correctional Officer III

Correctional Security Coordinator

Correctional Security Shift

- 1268 =

Supervisor I

Correctional Security Shift

Supervisor II

Fire Chief

Firefighter II

Prison Inspector and Investigation

Supervisor

Prison Inspector and Investigator

There are statutory qualifications

for the correctional Officer position.

The Florida Statutes required:

After July 1, 1974, any

person employed as a correc-

tional officer shall:

(1) Have reached the age of

majority.

(2) Be a citizen of the

United States.

(3) Be a high’ school

graduate or its equivalent" as

the term may be determined by

the council.

(4) Have his fingerprints

on file with the council or

agency designated by the

council.

(5) Have passed an

examination by a_ licensed

physician based on specifica-

tions established by the

council.

(6) Have a good moral

character as determined by

investigation under procedures

established by the council.

» lz7a =

Fla. Stat. $ 944.584 (1975). These

requirements have changed slightly.

Since July 1, 1980, one must be age

nineteen and after July 1, 1981, meet the

additional requirement of not having been

convicted of a felony or misdemeanor

involving moral turpitude. Fla. Stat. §

943.13 (1981).

An applicant seeking a position as a

correctional officer was required to pass

a written examination consisting of

seventy-five questions to be considered

for employment. Any applicant who failed

to score at least thirty-eight on the

test was automatically excluded from

consideration. The FDOC ceased using a

written examination in August, 1982,

immediately after this court found that

it had a disparate impact.

- 148984 =

V. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

A. Hiring

When there iS a vacancy for a

correctional officer, the FDOC issues a

vacancy announcement. Applicants file

applications which are reviewed by the

personnel officer at the institution

where there is a vacancy. The applica-

tions are screened for the minimal

requirements such as age and education.

Then the applications are reviewed by a

committee which usually consists of a

chief correctional officer, a lieu-

tenant, and sometimes a personnel manager

at the location. The committee inter-

views applicants who are deemed to be

qualified and prior to August, 1982,

those who had passed the written examina-

tion. The interview normally consists of

questions about an applicant’s prior work

history, interest in the field, and

- 129a -

questions designed to determine an

applicant’s potential effectiveness as a

correctional officer. The committee

makes a recommendation to the institu-

tion’s superintendent who has the hiring

authority.

The hiring process for clerical

employees is similar to the procedure

used for correctional officers. Usually

a clerical vacancy is advertised locally

and the personnel office screens’ the

applications. The supervisor or depart-

ment head further screens the applica-

tions and after interviewing the ap-

plicants, makes a recommendation through

the personnel manager to the superinten-

dent who is the hiring authority.

B. Promotions

When there iS a vacancy for a

position above a Correctional Officer I

position, a vacancy announcement is

- 130a -

published. The applications are reviewed

by the personnel office, which forwards

applications of those who meet’ the

training and experience requirements set

forth in the class specifications to the

chief correctional officer. A committee

interviews the qualified applicants and

makes a recommendation through the

personnel officer to the superintendent

Generally the criteria considered in

promotional decisions are:

(1) seniority;

(2) training;

(3) education;

(4) time -on the job (actual

experience gained in the position sought,

such as in an “acting" capacity) ;

(5) job stability;

(6) professional development;

(7) performance evaluation;

(8) recommendations from peers

and superiors;

(9) demonstrated leadership;

and

(10) administrative experience.

C. Performance Evaluations

An employee’s supervisor completes

an employee service rating or evaluation.

- 1318 =

The employee is rated unsatisfactory,

conditional, satisfactory, above satis-

factory, or outstanding in the following

areas:

appearance;

attendance;

cooperation;

dependability;

health;

initiative;

knowledge of job;

quality of work;

quantity of work; and

safety.

RR RN RRR ON

OU ON AO UP WD bP

ee eee eee ees aes tas ee

The evaluation is routed through the

next higher level supervisor and then to

the institution’s personnel manager for

final review and filing.

VI. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

A. Theoretical Approaches

The two theories which may be

applied to a particular set of facts to

show discrimination are disparate impact

and disparate treatment. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters vv. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).

- 132a -

Liability for claims of disparate impact

arise when a facially neutral employment

practice imposes a harsher result on one

group than another and cannot be jus-

tified by business necessity. A dis-

parate impact plaintiff need not show

intentional discrimination. Griggs v.

u Ow , 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

Disparate treatment is a type of

discrimination where the employer treats

some people less favorably than others

because of their race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin. The standards

for evaluating classwide disparate

treatment claims are found in Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters Vv.

United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and

Hazlewood School District v. United

States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The

plaintiff has the burden of proving a

prima facie case that defendant inten-

- 133a -

tionally discriminated against a pro-

tected class as its regular practice.

Plaintiff may prove the prima facie case

solely by statistics. Discriminatory

intent or motive may be inferred by the

statistics alone if the statistical

disparity is great. Payne _v. Travenol

Laboratories Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 817 (5th

Cir. 1982) (citing Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-

ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1971)).

A plaintiff, however, may enhance his

case by presenting evidence of the

employer’s history of discrimination or

anecdotal testimony as to individual

cases of discrimination. Payne, 673 F.2d

at 817.

Once plaintiff has proved his prima

facie case, defendant must rebut this

showing by demonstrating that plaintiff’s

proof is either inaccurate or insig-

- 134a -

nificant. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.

If the employer fails to rebut plain-

tiff’s case, there is a violation of

Title VII. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.

The Teamsters’ pattern of proof is

appropriate for the §§ 1981 and 1983

claims as well as the Title VII claims.

Payne, 673 F.2d at 818.

B. Plaintiffs’ Statistical Case

Plaintiffs have primarily relied on

statistics to prove their claims of

discrimination. Dr. David W. Rasmussen,

Professor of Economics at Florida State

University, Tallahassee, Florida,

testified for plaintiffs at trial. Dr.

Rasmussen defined his task as determining

in an analytical way if the FDOC has been

drawing from the labor pool in a racially

random way. Dr. Rasmussen used the 1970

census and the Department of Administra-

tion’s register summaries to construct a

- 135a -

series of availability labor pools. He

then tested his proxy availability pool

of blacks against incumbents for statis-

tical significance using the approxima-

tion to the binomial distribution test

approved by the United States Supreme

Court in Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.

482 (1977). Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-1

amended. Dr. Rasmussen’s benchmarks for

his state workforce analyses ranged by

-23 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-1 amended,

Table 9) to .38 (Id., Table 2). This

court will examine Tables 9 and 2 in

detail.

- 14368 =

TABLE 9

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER I

STATE WORKFORCE ANALYSIS

Geographic

Actual 38 Adjusted

Year Total Black Bench-

mark?3

1972 1066 55 -23

38 Incumbents from DOC documents

entitled:

6/30/72 Division of Correc-

tions, incumbents by job class (Plain-

tiffs’ Exhibit A-3).

FY 74-75 DOR Job Classification

Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-4).

6/30/77 DOR Job Classification

Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-5).

1978-1981 Minority and Female

Staffing Report (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits

A-6, 7, 8, 9), New hires from Plaintiffs’

Exhibit A-11.

39 Includes Service workers ex-

Clusive of private household, Farmers,

all Laborers and all Operatives, earning

less than $6000 in 1969, and having

completed 12 to 15 years of education.

Sources: 1970 Census of the Population,

Table 175 and 176.

This benchmark includes occupa-

tional groups throughout the State, ex-

Clusive of Bay, Duval, Escambia, Frank-

lin, Gulf, Hamilton, Holmes, Jefferson,

Madison, Nassau, OKaloosa, Santa Rosa,

Taylor, Walton, Washington, St. Jonns,

Leon and Wakulia counties.

FY

1974-75

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

NEW HIRES

FY 77-78

Year

1972

FY

1974-75

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

NEW HIRES

FY 77-78

1648

2518

3119

3232

3488

3415

1570

631

237

Expected

Numberr of

Black

245

379.

579.

-18

04

14

o3f

.36

~24

-45

-10

023

-23

023

Ys

ona

-23

.23

Number of

Std. Dev.

13.

84

~ 36

~S1

91

ey

~41

-28

~44

- 138a =

In Table 9 Dr. Rasmussen reached a

-23 benchmark which reflects’ four

factors: geography, occupation, income,

and education. This proxy labor pool

excludes people living in eighteen

counties which are not adjacent to

counties with major. prisons. Dr.

Rasmussen assumed that people would not

commute from these eighteen counties to

work at a prison as a_e correctional

officer. The 23 benchmark includes only

people from the 1970 census who listed

their occupations as farmers, laborers,

operatives, or service workers exclusive

of private household. Dr. Rasmussen

hypothesized that correctional officer

applicants would most likely come from

those occupational groups. The benchmark

was also adjusted for income to include

those groups whose median income was less

than $6000. in 1969. In 1970 the

starting salary for a correctional

officer was approximately $5600. Dr.

Rasmussen assumed that persons in

occupational groups earning more than an

annual salary of $6000 would be unwilling

to apply for a position as correctional

officer and receive a lower salary. ‘The

last adjustment to the benchmark was for

education Dr. Rasmussen included only

those persons with twelve to fifteen

years education because a high school

diploma or a general education degree is

a statutory requirement for correctional

officers.

After considering these four

factors, Dr. Rasmussen calculated the

appropriate benchmark at .23 which means

that black? comprised 23% of his proxy

labor pool. Dr. Rasmussen theorized that

if the FDOC drew from the labor pooi ina

racially random way, then 23% of its new

- 4404 =

hires should be black.

Table 9 was the incumbent workforce

because data on new hires is’ limited.

When Dr. Rasmussen tested his’ proxy

availability pool of blacks against

incumbents, he found statistically

Significant underrepresentation of blacks

in defendants’ workforce.

- 14238 =

TABLE 2

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER I

STATE WORKFORCE ANALYSIS

Income

Adjusted

Actual 49 Benchmark

Year Tot Black Maitleesos

Only4t

1972 1066 55 -38

FY

1974-75 1648 202 38

1977 2518 336 -38

1978 3119 461 -38

1979 3232 523 -38

40 Incumbents from DOC documents

entitled:

6/30/72 Division of Correc-

tions, incumbents by job class (Plain-

tiffs’ Exhibit A-3).

FY 74-75 DOR Job Classification

Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-4).

6/30/77 DOR Job Classification

Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-5).

1978-1981 Minority and Female

Staffing Report (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits

A-6, 7, 8, 9).

41 Includes Service workers ex-

clusive of private household, all

laborers, all operatives and farmers,

earning less than $6000 in 1969.

Sources: 1970 Census of the Population,

Table 175.

1980 3488 618 -38

1981 3415 631 .38

Expected

Number of Number of

Year Black Std. Dev.

1972 405.08 22.09

FY

1974-75 626.24 21.53

1977 956.84 25.48

1978 1185.22 26.72

1979 1228.16 25.55

1980 1325.44 24.68

1981 1297.70 23.50

- 14434 -

In Table 2, Dr. Rasmussen reached a

-38 benchmark which reflects’ three

factors: occupation, income, and gender.

Dr. Rasmussen made the same assumptions

concerning occupation and income as he

did for Table 9. He also counted only

males in this benchmark because he

assumed most correctional officers were

men. Considering these factors, Dr.

Rasmussen’s proxy population consisted of

38% blacks. When Dr. Rasmussen tested

his availability pool of blacks against

incumbents, he found an even greater

underrepresentation of blacks as correc-

tional officers in the FDOC’s workforce.

Dr. Rasmussen also constructed a

benchmark using data from defendants’

register summaries. The Department of

Administration maintains a register of

persons who have completed applications

for state employment and have stated a

- 144a -

class of positions or classes of posi-

tions of employment for which they = are

eligible and have an interest in apply-

ing. The register covers a four-year

period beginning approximately October 8,

1977, and ending approximately October 8,

1981.

The Department of Administration

processes all applications of applicants

who are required to pass an examination.

During the period covered by this report,

the Department of Administration ad-

ministered the Correctional Officer I

examination only to those persons who

were interested in becoming eligible for

Correctional Officer I positions and met

the age and education requirements. Data

concerning applicants who fail the

examination are purged from the register

at the end of six months.

- 143484 -

Data concerning applicants’ are

deleted from the register upon specific

request of the applicant, upon the

expiration of a four-year period, or upon

the expiration of a six-month period for

applicants who failed the written

examination. Information concerning an

applicant remains on the register even

though the applicant may have been hired,

promoted, or otherwise become unavailable

for employment in a class of positions.

This register is the data base for

the statewide register summary. Plain-

tiffs’ Exhibit No. A-1. The data

contained in the statewide register

summary is a report of the race and

gender characteristics of all applicants

who provided race and gender information.

Only half of the applicants, however,

provided this information.

- 146a -

The race and gender identifications

of those persons are reported by class

code number for each class of positions

for which such persons requested that

their eligibility be determined. Those

persons who have applied for more than

one class and for whom race and gender

are available are reported in each class

for which they have applied. Within each

class, such persons are reported only

once.

The register is also the data base

for the county register summary. Plain-

tiffs’ Exhibit No. A-2. This report con-

tains race and gender information but

also indicated one or more counties where

the applicant was willing to work. Only

30% of the applicants provided this

information. Those applicants who

expressed a willingness to work in more

than one county are reported in this

- 1478 -

report in each such county in each class

of positions for which they have applied;

therefore, there would be multiple

counting of those applicants.

- 148a -

TABLE 10

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER I

STATE WORKFORCE ANALYSIS

Register

Actual4#2 State

Year Total Black Benchmark‘?

1972 1066 55 a >

FY

1974-75 1648 202 oaa

1977 2518 336 saa

1978 3119 461 soa

1979 3232 523 ssa

1980 3488 618 oad

1981 3415 631 saa

42 Incumbents from DOC documents

entitled:

6/30/72 Division of Correc-

tions, incumbents by job class (Plain-

tiffs’ Exhibit A-3).

FY 74-75 DOR Job Classification

Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-4).

6/30/77 DOR Job Classification

Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-5).

1978-1981 Minority and Female

Staffing Report (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits

A-6, 7, 8, 9).

43 The benchmark is derived from

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-2, and is the

proportion of black eligibles among all

eligibles.

- 149a -

Expected

Numberr of Number of

Year Black Std. Dev.

1972 330.46 18.24

FY

1974-75 510.88 16.45

1977 780.58 19.16

1978 966.89 19.59

1979 1001.92 Aecaa

1980 1081.28 16.96

1981 1058.65 15.82

- 412908 -

Dr. Rasmussen’s register state

benchmark was ai. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit

No. 2 shows that 31% of the applicants

who sought eligibility for a Correctional

Officer I position and who provided race

and gender information and specified a

county were black.

In Table 10 of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit

No. D-1 amended, Dr. Rasmussen tested his

proxy applicant pool of 31% blacks

against incumbent data. He found

statistically significant underrepresen-

tation of blacks in the Correctional

Officer I position in defendants’

workforce.

Approximately 10% of defendants’

workforce is comprised of clerical

workers. Dr. Rasmussen prepared tables

on the clerical position using both the

1970 census and the register summaries.

- 15la -

TABLE i

ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY CLERICAL CLASSES

USING REGISTER BENCHMARK*“4

JOB TITLE TOTAL4>

LACK46

1978

Clerk Typist II 204 34

Secretary II aa3 18

1979

Clerk Typist II 168 33

Secretary II 208 18

1980

Clerk Typist II 295 79

Secretary 11 217 25

1981

Clerk Typist II 316 92

Secrerary II 215 23

44 Clerk typist II and secretaries

II comprise between 38%-56% of the

clerical workforce during all periods

between 1972-1981, and 41% to 56% between

1978-1981.

45 Number of total and black in-

cumbents is taken from DOC Minority and

Female Staffing Reports 1978-1981.

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibits A-6, 7, 8, 9).

46 Number of total and black in-

cumbents is taken from DOC Minority and

Female staffing reports 1978-1981.

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibits A-6, 7, 8, 9).

JOB TIBLE

Clerk Typist

Secretary II

Clerk Typist

Secretary II

Clerk Typist

Secretary 11

Clerk Typist

Secrerary II

- 152a -

REGISTER

BENCHMARK®/?

1978

—

.29

1979

oa

.29

1980

7). .<32

.29

1981

TT isa

.29

NO.OF

EXP BLK DEVS.

65.28 4.69

61.77 6.61

53.76 3.43

60.32 6.47

94.40 1.92

62.93 5.67

101.12 1.10

62.35 5.91

47 Number of total and black in-

cumbents is taken from DOC Minority and

Female Staffing Reports 1978-1981.

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibits A-6,

+; 3, hi

- 41538 -

Using the statewide register

summary, Dr. Rasmussen calculated the

benchmark for the Clerk Typist II and

Secretary II positions as .32 and .29

respectively. He compared this with

incumbent data and found gross statisti-

cal disparities except for the Clerk

Typist II position beginning in i980.

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-2, Table 1.

Dr. Alan A. Parrow, Director of

Research at Hoffmann Research Associates,

Inc. in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, also

testified at trial as an expert for

plaintiffs. Dr. Parrow analyzed gross

hiring data which were set forth in the

pre-trial stipulation (Document 166 %%

F(10)-(12)).

Total White Black

FY 1974-75

Applications 3967 3092 861

Hires 1579 1300 268

FY 1976-77

Applications 10,643 8389 1972

Hires 3ei2 2660 445

- 154a -

FY 1977-78

Applications 9517 7312 1963

Hires 2405 1957 ata

These data represent hiring for all

positions with the FDOC and all ap-

plicants whether eligible or ineligible.

Using the chi-square method, Dr. Parrow

found that blacks were hired less

frequently than whites and the results

were statistically significant. See

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-10.

Dr. Parrow also testified about

discrimination in promotions. Plain-

tiffs’ Exhibit No. D-6 summarizes the

correctional officer line of progression

for each year when data were available.

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit D-6 demonstrates that

blacks decrease in representation as one

moves from lower level positions to

higher level positions. Dr. Parrow used

the Wilcox on two-sample test to deter-

mine whether the result was statistical-

- 1398 =

ly significant. In each case Dr. Parrow

found statistical significance exceeding

two standard deviations.

- 195964 =

FY

Involuntary Terminations*

Voluntary Terminations*

Dismissals

Suspensions

Written Reprimands

Oral Reprimands

FY

Involuntary Terminations*

Voluntary Terminations*

Dismissals*

Suspensions

Demotions

Written Reprimands

Oral Reprimands

FY

Involuntary Terminations*

Voluntary Terminations*

Dismissals*

Suspensions*

Demotions

Written Reprimands*48

Oral Reprimands*

48% The Black and White columns do

not add up to the total.

Information for Dade

Institution is unknown and not included.

49 Information for Dade, Desota, and

Avon Park correctional Institutions

unknown and is not included.

Total

57

480

89

25

104

181

Total

198

1889

199

>a

21

246

462

Total

115

1626

165

101

a7

230

333

Correctional

- 1578 -

FY White Black

Involuntary Terminations* 44 12

Voluntary Terminations* 415 64

Dismissals 52 37

Suspensions 16 9

Written Reprimands 81 23

Oral Reprimands 141 40

FY White Black

Total

Involuntary Terminations* 138 58

Voluntary Terminations* 1609 239

Dismissals* 140 57

Suspensions 36 16

Demotions ai 0

Written Reprimands 177 69

Oral Reprimands 385 77

FY Total Black

Involuntary Terminations* 74 37

Voluntary Terminations* 1345 245

Dismissals* 109 51

Suspensions* 74 26

Demotions 34 3

Written Reprimands*°?°® 180 49

Oral Reprimands*°1l 261 69

50% The Black and White columns do

not add up to the total.

Information for Dade Corectional

Institution is unknown and not included.

51 Information for Dade, Desota, and

Avon Park Correctional Institutions is

unknown and is not included.

- 156a -

Dr. Parrow also analyzed the FDOC’s

imposition of discipline from the data

contained in the pre-trial stipulation

(Document 166 44 F(10)-(12)).

Dr. Parrow used the chi-square

statistical tool to analyze the data.

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-9. He found

that the level of statistical sig-

nificance exceeded two to three standard

deviations. Dr. Parrow testified that

blacks received proportionately harsher

discipline than whites and that’ the

probability of chance occurrence of these

results was less than one in ten thou-

sand.

Cc. Defendants’ Challenges’ to

Plaintiffs’ Statistics

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’

benchmarks derived from the 1970 census

are seriously flawed. Defendants’ labor

economics expert, Charles T. Haworth,

Professor of Economics at Florida State

- 1598 -

University, Tallahassee, Florida,

testified at trial that plaintiffs’

inclusion in the benchmark of only

service workers, laborers, operatives,

and farmers excluded many potential

applicants. Dr. Haworth found that most

correctional officer applications came

from clericals. Although Dr. Rasmussen

stated that he excluded clericals because

mostly females were clericals, Dr.

Haworth testified that in 1970, 2470 of

the clericals were male. Dr. Haworth

also thought it was erroneous to exclude

all of the managerial and administrative

category. That category is a broad one

and would include, for example, a

nineteen year old managing a_e small

convenience store. Instead of excluding

the entire category, Dr. Haworth would

use a money criteria to eliminate those

in the managerial and administrative

- 160a -

category earning over a certain annual

Salary. Dr. Haworth expressed a similar

concern with plaintiffs’ exclusion of the

sales category. He again would include

some in the sales category and eliminate

highly paid salespersons. Dr. Haworth

took issue with the fact that plaintiffs’

benchmarks did not consider those leaving

the military because several applicants

and employees had prior military ex-

perience. A major flaw in plaintiffs’

benchmarks, Dr. Haworth testified, was

that unemployed applicants were not

considered. In summary, Dr. Haworth

stated that a more appropriate benchmark

would include laborers, operatives,

farmers, service workers exclusive of

private household workers, clericals,

part sales, and part managers’ and

administrators with those leaving

military service and the unemployed

- 16l1a -

factored into the benchmark.

Although Dr. Haworth did not compute

such a benchmark, he offered evidence to

prove that the benchmark would be a lower

percentage of blacks than plaintiffs’

benchmarks. Defendants’ Exhibit No. 7-N,

Table 3A. The groups excluded by Dr.

Rasmussen that Dr. Haworth would include

all have a lower percentage of blacks

(2.8 - 5.9%) than the percentage of

blacks in the labor force (14.9%) or the

proportionate share of blacks represented

in plaintiffs’ benchmarks (23 - 38%).

Additionally, to test the validity of

plaintiffs’ assumptions concerning the

exclusion of some occupational groups,

Dr. Haworth reviewed a sample of applica-

tions for the period 1979-81. See

Defendants’ Exhibit No. 7-J. He found

that approximately 1/3 of the applicants

came from groups that Dr. Rasmussen

- 162a -

excluded from his benchmark.

Dr. Haworth also disagreed with Dr.

Rasmussen’s removal of all persons in

each category in which the median income

of the category was more than $6000. Dr.

Haworth points out that this procedure

may exclude as many as 50% of the persons

in that category who are in fact earning

less than the median income. Dr. Haworth

also sampled applications, Defendants’

Exhibit No. 7-E, and testified that

persons with incomes above what correc-

tional officers earn did apply for

correctional officer positions. On

cross-examination, however, Dr. Haworth

reviewed the underlying data for the

sample, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit Nos. I-600-6-

03, and found that only two of twenty-six

earned higher salaries.

Dr. Haworth also took exception to

plaintiffs’ exclusion of some occupation-

- 4638 =

al categories that are primarily composed

of females. Dr. Haworth reasoned that it

would be more appropriate to weight the

benchmark as to the relative proportion

of females to males within these census

categories than to totally exclude the

groups.

Dr. Haworth testified that, in his

opinion, the register summaries’ should

not be used because they are unreliable.

His first criticism is that the statewide

summary and the county summary only

represent 50% and 30% respectively of

persons on the register. Dr. Haworth

stated that the sample is not random

because some people chose not to desig-

nate their race. He hypothesized that it

would be likely for white persons not to

state their race when the employer has an

affirmative action plan. Dr. Haworth

also stated that the summaries’ count

- 164a -

incidences of eligibility not people.

Furthermore, persons who have failed the

written examination and are thereby

ineligible nevertheless remain on the

register. Defendants conclude that the

Summaries overrepresent black eligibil-

ity.

Dr. Haworth opined that a major flaw

in Dr. Rasmussen’s tables was that he

compared his benchmarks with incumbent

data instead of actual hiring data.

Defendants admit that actual hiring data

are sparse. The record does~ show,

however, that 15.2% of the new hires for

correctional officers in fiscal year

1977-78 were black. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit

No. A-1l. Twenty percent of persons

hired as correctional officers in 1979

were black. Defendants’ Exhibit No.

11-c. Plaintiffs’ incumbent data,

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-1 amended, show

- 165a -

only 16.2% blacks. In 1980, 24.5% of the

correctional officers hired were black.

Defendants’ Exhibit No. 11-D. Plain-

FEey hy incumbent data, Plaintiffs’

Exhibit No. D-1 amended, show only 17.7%

blacks. Defendants’ workforce in 1972

was 5% black. This rate has increased to

over 18% in 1982.

The incumbent data, therefore,

understate the rate that blacks have been

hired.

Dr. Haworth testified that Dr.

Parrow’s calculations with the gross

statistics had little value. The

analysis of the gross hiring statistics

was weak because the raw data did not

account for whether the applicants were

qualified. The statistics were for the

entire FDOC workforce and included a wide

variety of occupations including doctors

and other professionals where the black

- 166a -

availability rate is low.

Dr. Haworth also discounted the

significance of the disciplinary action

analysis. Dr. Haworth testified that it

is proper to compare what should have

happened with what actually happened.

The gross statistics did not account for

the type of offense or frequency of

disciplinary problems with the employee.

Dr. Haworth also testified that Dr.

Parrow’s analysis on _ promotions had

little value because it failed to

consider the fact that fewer blacks than

whites are eligible for promotions

because of insufficient time on the job

or comparable experience.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. STATISTICAL CASE

Plaintiffs have used both disparate

impact and disparate treatment theories

for their case with the primary thrust

- 167a -

directed toward the disparate impact of

subjective decisionmaking. Defendants

argue that except for the challenge to

the written examination and high school

diploma or equivalent requirement, the

claims are disparate treatment claims.

Plaintiffs do not assert that the FDOC

applied distinct, facially neutral

standards to its Steele promotion, and

disciplinary decisions. Plaintiffs, to

the contrary, contend that the lack of

objective criteria permits defendants to

subjectively discriminate against blacks.

Generally this subjective discrimination

is analyzed under the disparate treatment

theory. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories,

aa eee wsaea 798, 816-17 (5th Cir.

1982); contra: Rowe v. Cleveland Pneuma-

tic Company, 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982).

This court finds, however, that plain-

tiffs’ statistical evidence is unper-

- 1684 -

suasive undér either theory.

This court is of the view that

because plaintiffs’ statistics are so

flawed, plaintiffs have railed to

establish a prima facie case. The court

agrees with Dr. Haworth’s attack on the

1970 census benchmarks. The major flaw

is the exclusion of many occupational

groups from which defendants’ showed

several correctional officers were

previously employed. This factor, in

addition to the others mentioned by Dr.

Haworth, casts grave doubt upon the

credibility and reliability of plain-

tiffs’ census benchmarks.

This court also finds that plain-

tiffs’ register summary benchmarks are

similarly unreliable. The register

summaries, as Dr. Haworth pointed out,

are non-random samples which contain

information about both eligible and

- 1694 -

ineligible persons.

Finally, the court takes issue with

the fact that Dr. Rasmussen’s’ tables

compare these suspect benchmarks with

incumbent data. This practice produces

misleading results, especially when the

employer has made rapid strides as the

FDOoC has in going from 5% to over 18%

blacks in the workforce in ten years.

This court is of the view that Dr.

Haworth also successfully discredited Dr.

Parrow’s statistics. The analyses of the

gross data for hiring, discipline, and

promotions failed to account for many

variables, such as: whether the applicant

was eligible, the type of behavior being

disciplined, or the qualifications of the

employee seeking a _ promotion. The

analyses of the raw data are deficient

for failing to recognize that several

factors op=rate simultaneously to

- 1708 <

influence decisions of hiring, dis-

cipline, and _ promotions. Thus, "the

findings of statistically significant

disparities derived therefrom will not

permit an inference of discrimination."

Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment

Service, 699 F.2d 760, 770 (5th Cir.

1983).

Plaintiffs have argued that defen-

dants had the burden of disproving

plaintiffs’ statistics with affirmative

evidence, such as complete studies of

their own. Defendants did attempt to put

forth some of their own statistical

studies, but the thrust of defendants’

attack was to discredit plaintiffs’

statistical evidence as unreliable. This

court is of the view that defendants

sufficiently proved that plaintiffs’

statistics had little probative value

Plaintiffs, therefore, never established

- 2738 -

a prima facie case. See Equal Employment

issio v. Datapoint

Corporation, 570 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.

1978); Cooper v. University of Texas at

Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187 (N.D. Tex.

1979), aff’d, 648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir.

1981); and Dickerson v. United States

Co ion, 472 F. Supp. 1304

(E.D. pa. 1978).

II ANECDOTAL TESTIMONY

Plaintiffs sought to bolster their

discrimination claims Through anecdotal

testimony. Plaintiffs called approxim-

ately twenty witnesses who testified to

individual acts of discrimination

primarily in promotions, discipline, and

job assignments. This court is of the

view that plaintiffs still have failed to

prove a prima facie case.

Some of plaintiffs’ witnesses

testified that they were denied promo-

- i172a -

tions based on their race. Defendants,

however, rebutted most of the testimony

by demonstrating the following nondis-

criminatory reasons for the failure to

promote employee ineligible for position

sought (Whitfield Jenkins and Wilmatene

Edwards) and employee’s disciplinary

record (Lester Kinsler and Zondra

Harris). Other witnesses testified that

they were discriminatively disciplined.

Again, defendants advanced nondis-

criminatory reasons such as failure to

assist (William Turpin), taking money

from an inmate (Walter Gray), and breach

of security (William McCullough).

Testimony regarding discriminatory

job assignments came from primarily eight

witnesses representing three institutions

(Florida State Prison: Larry Sullivan,

William Turpin, and Mark Bevins; Glades

Correctional Institution: Gwen Joseph,

- 1738 =

Virgilee Graham, and Bobby Ray Hall;

Apalachee Correctional Institution: Sam

Jones and Kenneth Gibson). Defendants

failed to adequately rebut the testimony

on job assignment claims. Plaintiffs,

however, presented no statistics on this

issue and although the testimony was

convincing, statements from eight people

about three institutions is not suffi-

cient to prove a claim of classwide

discrimination against the FDOC.

IIIT INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS OF NAMED PLAIN-

TIFFS

A. Peners L. Griffin

Plaintiff Peners L. Griffin has

filed an individual claim against the

FDOC alleging discriminatory employment

practices. Griffin has complained that

he has not received a promotion during

his eleven years of employment with the

FDOC. In 1973 Griffin applied for a

promotion as a Correctional Counselor II

- 174a -

at the Tallahassee Community Correctional

Center. He did not receive this promo-

tion; however, evidence was not presented

about the person who was promoted. In

1974 plaintiff Griffin again applied for

a promotion as a Correctional Counselor

ee David Arthur, a white male, was

selected. Mr. Arthur was an ex-offender

and the FDOC had an affirmative action

policy for ex-offenders in 1974.

Plaintiff Griffin has unsuccessfully

applied for several other promotions.

Richard Roberts, a black male, was a

Chief Correctional Counselor at Talla-

hassee Community Center. He testified

that on several occasions he had con-

sidered Griffin for promotion oppor-

tunities but had not recommended him

because of Griffin’s general uncoopera-

tive attitude and poor employment record.

- 175a -

John Holland, a white Chief Correc-

tional Counselor at Tallahassee Community

Correctional Center, has supervisory

duties over plaintiff Griffin. Mr.

Holland testified that he would not

recommend Griffin for promotion because

he considers Griffin to be an unreliable,

uncooperative, and hostile employee.

Analyzing plaintiff Griffin’s

promotion claims under a variant form of

the standard set forth in McDonnell

s Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), this court finds that Griffin

cannot prevail. The burden of proof is

that plaintiff must show (1) that he

belongs to a racial minority; (2) that he

applied and was qualified for the

promotion he sought; (3) that, despite

his qualifications, he was rejected; and

(4) that the employer selected an

individual from a nonprotected class.

- 176a -

Then the burden shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-

tory reason for the employee’s rejection.

Plaintiff thereafter has an opportunity

to show that the employer’s stated reason

for the employee’s rejection was in fact

a pretext McDonnell, 411 U.S. at

802-04.

Plaintiff Griffin has shown that he

belongs to a racial minority. His second

amended complaint lists twelve promotions

for which he applied and the court has

detected at least one other~position in

his personnel file (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit

No. I-50 (Grif)). Although Griffin was

not always qualified for the position

(e.g. Inmate Classification Specialist in

September 1974), he has proved that he

was qualified for some of the positions

[Correctional Counselor II). This court

has no knowledge whether Griffin was

- 4774 =

qualified for the other positions, but

for the sake of this analysis will assume

that he was qualified. Despite Griffin’s

qualifications, _he has never been

promoted. Griffin has proved that the

FDOC selected a person in a non-protected

class in some but not all of the cases.

For instance, Griffin applied for a

Correctional Counselor II position in

January 1973, but plaintiff did not prove

that the FDOC selected an individual ina

non-protected class. Plaintiff did prove

that in January 1974, he again applied

for a Correctional Counselor II position

and David Arthur, a white male, was

selected With the above assumptions in

mind, this court finds that Griffin did

prove a prima facie case.

Defendants did prove that in January

1974, they selected an ex-offender as

Correctional Counselor II in keeping with

- 21768 =

their affirmative action policy for

ex-offenders. Plaintiff never demon-

strated that this reason was pretextual.

Griffin unsuccessfully applied for

approximately ten promotions after

December 17, 1974. Defendants advanced

the reason that Griffin was not promoted

because of his poor work record and

attitude. This court finds that this

reason is not ae pretext. Although

Griffin had been a satisfactory employee,

his job performance was poor beginning in

November 1974. His unsatisfactory record

is evidenced by his performance evalua-

tion dated December 17, 1974 (Plaintiffs’

Exhibit No. I-50 [Grif)). This court has

reviewed Griffin’s personnel file

excerpts and concludes that defendants

have articulated a leyitimate, nondis-

criminatory reason for their failure to

promote Griffin and plaintiffs have not

- 179a -

shown that the stated reason is merely a

pretext.

Griffin also advances a claim of

discriminatory or retaliatory discipline.

On or about December 17, 1974, Wayne

Scott, Chief Correctional Counselor at

the Tallahassee Center, fired plaintiff

Griffin. The following day plaintiff

discussed this matter with Wayne Scott,

Jerry Hicks, the Assistant Superinten-

dent, and Robert Martin, the Personnel

Manager. Assistant Superintendent Hicks

reinstated plaintiff because the FDOC’s

termination procedures were not followed.

By letter dated January 27, 1975,

plaintiff Griffin was informed that he

was dismissed effective at the close of

business on January 24, 1975. The letter

stated seven reasons for his termination:

(1) disobedience of order not to leave

the Tallahassee Center to search for a

- 180a -

resident; (2) failure to comply with

instruction to clean the Tallahassee

Center; (3) inability to complete a

routine form for approval for community

release and furlough; (4) unauthorized

personal use of official state vehicle;

(5) refusal to participate in a discipli-

nary committee hearing; (6) use of a

vehicle entrusted to a resident; and (7)

insubordinate and deceitful behavior.

Plaintiff successfully appealed his 1975

termination to -the Career Service

Commission which found that the FDOC

failed to offer competent, substantial

evidence to support Griffin’s dismissal.

Plaintiff Griffin was reinstated with

back pay.

On January 24, 1975, the Equal

Employment Opportunity Program Office

received a complaint from Griffin which

detailed both his December 1974 and

- 18l1la -

January 1975 dismissals. Donald M.

Finley, a black male, investigated the

complaint and found that discrimination

was not a factor in Griffin’s termina-

tion. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. I-50

(Grif), letter dated February 20, 1975,

from Donald M. Finley. An Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Program ffice inves-

tigative report was issued on or about

April 14, 1975. In part, the report

states: "The above statistics tend to

reflect that disciplinary actions have

not been based upon race, but more

likely, upon violations of regula-

tions.... [T}he Equal Employment

Opportunity Office finds no reasonable

cause to believe that [Griffin] was

discriminated against by [the FDOC]

because of his race." This court finds

that plaintiff’s terminations were not

racially discriminatory.

- 1828 =

Griffin has been disciplined several

times since his’ reinstatement. For

instance, Griffin received a written

reprimand for failing to pay for meal

tickets. Griffin alleges that his white

co-workers were not similarly dis-

ciplined. John Holland, Chief Correc-

tional Counselor at the Tallahassee

Center, testified that four whites and

two blacks failed to pay for meal

tickets. Each of the six individuals was

placed on probation for six months, at

which time the letters of reprimand would

be pulled from their files. Griffin and

Chalecki, a white officer, again violated

the meal ticket policy and their repri-

mands remained in their respective files.

Griffin often complained to his

superiors that he would be disciplined

when white officers would not be dis-

ciplined. Holland testified that he

- 183a -

asked Griffin for the names of these

other people, but Griffin has never

provided this information. Plaintiff has

not proven that he was treated different-

ly because of his race.

B. Henry Dejerinett

In 1978, Henry Dejerinett applied

for a position with the FDOC as a

Property Manager III. The Department of

Administration evaluated him, and

Dejerinett received a score of 100 VP.

James Vickers, a white male, interviewed

Dejerinett. Kenneth Hayes, a white male,

was selected. Mr. Vickers testified that

he thought Mr. Hayes was more qualified

than plaintiff Dejerinett because Mr-

Hayes had experience in lease management,

control, maintenance, and management of

motor vehicles, and records management.

Mr. Dejerinett testified that he did have

experience in the areas of lease manage-

- 184a -

ment and records management but Mr.

Vickers never asked him about it during

the interview. Dejerinett did not assert

that he was prevented from discussing his

prior experience or in any manner given

an unfair interview.

In 1980, Dejerinett applied again

for a Property Manager III position with

the FDOC. James Vickers and two other

white supervisory employees interviewed

Dejerinett. Gloria Thomas, a_ white

female, was selected., however, Mr.

Vickers ranked Dejerinett higher than the

other two panel members.

Plaintiff has proven that he is a

member of a protected class and that he

applied and was qualified for the

position. White persons were selected

for the vacancies. This court finds that

James Vickers did not select Dejerinett

because he sincerely believed Kenneth

- 2185a -

Hayes to be the best qualified applicant.

Mr. Vicker’s reason was legitimate and

nondiscriminatory. At the worst, Mr.

Vickers may be faulted for not being the

best interviewer, but not for hiring ina

racially discriminatory way.

Defendants have also articulated and

proven a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for not hiring Dejerinett for the

1980 vacancy. James Vickers believed

that Gloria Thomas, who had prior

experience as a business manager at a

state-operated facility for delinquent

females, was more qualified than plain-

tiff Dejerinett. Dejerinett’s individual

Claim for failure to hire must therefore

fail.

- 186a -

PENDING MATTERS

I. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR EQUIVALENT

REQUIREMENT

Plaintiffs have challenged the

statutory requirement that a correctional

officer must be a high school graduate

or its equivalent. See Fla. Stat. §

943.13 (1981). This issue was not tried

during the trial. Instead, the parties

took depositions (Documents 200-209) and

then briefed the issue (Document 210, pp.

114-18; Document 211, pp. 28-53; and

Document 21, pp. 16-25). The court has

the issue of the validity of the high

school diploma or equivalent requirement

under advisement and will enter a

separate order on this issue at a later

date.

II. RELIEF

Plaintiffs have prevailed on one

issue. This court granted summary

- 187a -

judgment and found that the correctional

officer written examination utilized by

defendants in screening applicants for

correctional officer positions had a

disparate impact upon class members which

had not been justified by business

necessity (Document 157). The parties,

through their counsel, have represented

to the court that they will make a good

faith effort to settle any issue of

relief.

III GRIFFIN’S INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff Griffin has filed two

pendent claims alleging lack of due

process and malicious prosecution.

(Second Amended Complaint, Counts II and

III). The parties shall confer and then

file a status report informing the court

when the remainder of this case will be

ready for trial.

- 188a -

An order to give effect to this

opinion will be entered this date.

s/s August 25,1983 s/s William Stafford

WILLIAM STAFFORD

CHIEF JUDGE

- 189a -

§ 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions

Power of Commission to prevent

unlawful employment practices

(b) Whenever a charge is filed by

or on behalf of a person claiming to be

aggrieved, or by a member of the Commis-

sion, alleging that an employer, employ-

ment agency, labor organization, or joint

labor-management committee controlling

apprenticeship or other training or

retraining, including on-the-job training

programs, has engaged in an unlawful

employment practice, the Commission shall

serve a notice of the charge (including

the date, place and circumstances of the

alleged unlawful employment practice) on

such employer, employment agency, labor

organization, or joint labor-management

committee (hereinafter referred to as the

"respondent") within ten days, and shall

make an investigation thereof. Charles

————————————E

- 190a -

shall be in writing under oath or

affirmation and shall contain such

information and be in such form as the

Commission requires. Charges shall not

be made public by the Commission. If the

Commission determines after such inves-

tigation that there is not reasonable

cause to believe that the charge is true,

it shall dismiss the charge and promptly

notify the person claiming to be ag-

grieved and the respondent of its action.

In determining whether reasonable cause

exists, the Commission shall accord

substantial weight to final findings and

orders made by State or local authorities

in proceedings commenced under State of

local law pursuant to the requirements of

subsections (c) and (dad) of this section.

If the Commission determines after such

investigation that there is reasonable

cause to believe that the charge is true,

- 19l1la -

the Commission shall endeavor to elim-

inate any such alleged unlawful employ-

ment practice by informal methods of

conference, conciliation, and persuasion.

Nothing said or done during and as a part

of such informal endeavors may be made

public by the Commission, its officers or

employees, or used as evidence in a

subsequent proceeding without the written

consent of the persons concerned. Any

person who makes public information in

violation of this ‘subsection shall be

fined not :nore than $1,000 or imprisoned

for not-more than one year, or both. The

Commission shall make its determination

on reasonable cause as promptly as

possible and, so far as practicable, not

later than one hundred and twenty days

from the filing of the charge or, where

applicable under subsection (c) or (da) of

this section, from the date upon which

- 192a -

the commission is authorized to take

action with respect to the’ charge.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Appendix — Griffin v. Dugger · 486 U.S. 1005 | Frix