Opposition Brief — Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Kiser

Supreme Court brief1988

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

| | Suprentie Court, ti,

_ FILBD

FEB 18 1988

>) JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR

\? CLERK

No. 87-1175

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

V.

ANNIE C. KISER,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

(Appeal No. 87-1023).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

VALERIE ANSEL KARPMAN

BAILEY AND KARPMAN

240 Stockton Street, 8th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94108

(415) 391-3400

Counsel for Respondent

February 18, 1988

BOWNME OF GAN FRANCISCO, INC. * 190 NINTH ST. + S.F.. CA 94103 + (415) 864-2300

BEST AVAILABLE COPY.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The sole question actually presented is this: Whether the Court

of Appeals properly determined that the district court erred in

dismissing the action without considering plaintiffs motions to

amend her complaint to remedy an incomplete statement of

diversity jurisdiction.

The questions asserted by petitioner are part of the “games-

manship” and lack of “candor with our courts” noted by the

Court of Appeals (831 F.2d 423, 429). The court below did not

sanction any federal Doe practice. On the contrary, the Court of

Appeals authorized respondent to seek leave to amend her com-

plaint as to the Doe defendants, reversed the dismissal order and

remanded with directions to grant Kiser’s motion to amend her

complaint to allege petitioner’s state of incorporation as Ohio.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 ig 88 (| pe ne are

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND AUTHORITIES......

i a sina ian 46 04 34s ARMRO ERS CONS EA KS ON

SEN MEW WEEE x Soo snc cc dsoac dace cencaws

UPR RMIPOUPOe GOO BE CARE ooo. cei cccascsscaces

a a ke wad ate a kes ae ee ek

NT ne wus

ne ackaeeeas

Initial Dismissal Notwithstanding Deferral ......

Stipulation and Order Vacating Dismissal .......

PI I i oh id rn ein

I oon se ge es ey se

Renewal of Application of Leave to Amend .....

Denial of Reconsideraciton and Leave to Amend. .

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT............

“rAMMOODD>

I.

THE SOLE ISSUE IS THAT OF REFUSAL TO CON-

SIDER LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT ..

II.

REFUSAL TO CONSIDER LEAVE TO AMEND WAS

AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION .........0..5......

III.

THERE IS NO CONFLICT WITH THE BRYANT

IE sk nan kan waned kas Gey hewie Chahine eats

ON Aaa. & hh W W w Ww

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1987) 7,8

Comey v. Gipson, 355 US. 41 (1957) ................ 3

Foman v. Davis, 371 US, 176 (1962) ................. pe f

Kiser v. General Electric, 831 F.2d 423 (3rd Cir. 1987)

Se UU ait eee aie gins bap ks a cde cone aes te

Rules and Statutes

oe are as on Wis vie we vg as acess: 2

Ne ee av aN neem eu eces 2

a pe aN ee eas ee dense

eis vad da wdve kbs eek ne’ 3,7

Se ee ec ee eke vale ckscceseaves 7

No. 87-1175

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

V.

ANNIE C. KISER,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

(Appeal No. 87-1023)

RESPONDENT?’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The respondent Annie C. Kiser, individually and as Adminis-

tratrix of the Estate of Everett W. Kiser, submits that the petition

for writ of certiorari should be denied for the reasons set forth

below.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the district court was based on diversity of

citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The first amended complaint

(Appendix 26a, cited as “App.”) alleged that: Plaintiff Kiser is a

citizen of North Carolina and was appointed administratrix of her

husband’s estate in North Carolina. Defendant General Electric

(since dismissed) is a corporation with its principal place of

business in Connecticut. Defendant Parker-Hannifin (petitioner)

2

and defendant Eaton (since dismissed) are each corporations

with their principal places of business in Ohio.

The one omission was the failure to state the places of incorpo-

ration of the defendants, although it was alleged that none was

incorporated in North Carolina. App. 160a. Petitioner Parker-

Hannifin is the sole remaining defendant and, as noted in the

opinion below (831 F.2d 423, 428), petitioner is incorporated in

Ohio.

Through the inadvertent use of routine California practice,* the

first amended complaint added “DOES 1-5” in the caption. App.

26a. The fictitious defendants were not otherwise mentioned

except to state that they were not incorporated in and did not have

their principal place of business in North Carolina. App. 27a. As

noted in the opinion below (831 F.2d at 426), the Doe defendant

issue was not raised in the district court until after dismissal of the

action. App. 154a. The dismissal did not mention any Doe issue.

App. 124a-128a. Nor did the district court mention that issue in

denying reconsideration. App. 172a-176a. The Court of Appeals

initially granted Kiser’s request to dismiss the Doe defendants.

The opinion was then modified to simply allow respondent to seek

that relief in the district court. (831 F.2d at 426, fn. 6.)

The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

inasmuch as the district court dismissed the complaint as to the

sole remaining defendant and also refused to consider plaintiff's

applications for leave to amend.

The Supreme Court may review the judgment by writ of

certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1254. The only issue, however, is whether

the Court of Appeals properly held that the district court should

not have dismissed the action without allowing, or even consider-

ing, leave to amend the complaint.

* Petitioner’s assertions (Petn. 7) about problems, defenses, immuni-

ties, naming the wrong defendant and frivolousness reflect the “games-

manship” decried by the court below; they are not based on the record.

3

STATUTES INVOLVED

The only statute involved is 28 U.S.C. § 1653, providing that:

“Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon

terms, in the trial and appellate courts.” Denial of leave to amend

without “any apparent or declared reason” is not an exercise of

discretion. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Also relevant is Rule 15, Fed.R.Civ.Proc., mandating that leave

to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice requires.”

The federal rules thus reject “the approach that pleading is a

game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to

the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading

is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley v. Gibson,

355 US. 41, 48 (1957).

.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The record is correctly stated in the opinion below (831 F.2d at

424-426) and is briefly summarized from that opinion:

A. xhe Action.

This action was brought by the parents of Tony W. Kiser,

deceased, to recover damages for his allegedly wrongful death.

The initial complaint, filed December 5, 1985, alleged that the

decedent, while on active duty as a fireman in the United States

Navy, was killed on February 23, 1984, aboard the U.S.S. Guam,

which was then stationed in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast

of Lebanon. He died from injuries ailegedly caused by the failure

and malfunction of certain component parts of a hatch that

allegedly had been manufactured by the defendants, sold to the

Navy and installed on the Guam.

B. Motions to Dismiss.

The initial complaint inadequately alleged the basis of diversity

jurisdiction. On February 6, 1986, then-defendant Eaton Corpora-

tion moved to dismiss the action for that reason. Petitioner

Parker-Hannifin joined in that motion.

C. Deferral of Motions.

On February 12, 1986, the district court held a telephone

conference with counsel during which counsel for respondent

Kiser was informed that, pending further notice from the court,

the pending motions of Eaton and petitioner require no immedi-

ate response.

D. Initial Dismissal Notwithstanding Deferral.

On February 19th respondent filed an amended complaint

alleging that petitioner was not a North Carolina corporation but

failing to specifically allege that petitioner was incorporated in

Ohio. The amended complaint inadvertently added Does 1-5.

Petitioner filed its answer on March 27, 1986. Notwithstanding

the court’s direction that respondent could defer any response to

the pending motions, the district court thereafter granted the

motions to dismiss of Eaton and petitioner for insufficient juris-

dictional allegations.

E. Stipulation and Order Vacating Dismissal.

By letter of June 24, 1986, respondent’s counsel asked the

district court to vacate its dismissal order, referring to the court’s

February 12th directive deferring consideration of the motions to

dismiss. Another telephone conference with counsel and the court

resulted in an order vacating the dismissal order of June 9th and a

stipulation to dismiss Eaton and then-defendant General Electric.

The stipulation and order further provided (in paragraph 3)

that respondent and petitioner shall have thirty (30) days in

which to attempt to resolve the claim that diversity jurisdiction is

proper; and in the event they failed to agree, “Parker-Hannifin

Corporation may move the Court upon the end of the said thirty

(30) day period for reinstatement of the Order dismissing the

Complaint as to Parker-Hannifin Corporation for lack of diversity

jurisdiction and/or lack of properly pleading the existence of

diversity jurisdiction.”

—

F. Renewal of Motion.

Respondent’s counsel then attempted to obtain consent to

amending the complaint to allege that petitioner’s state of incor-

poration is Ohio. On August 28, 1986, petitioner moved to

reinstate the June 9th dismissal order. Respondent filed opposi-

tion to this motion and requested leave to amend her complaint.

G. Second Dismissal.

On September 23, 1986, the district court granted petitioner’s

motion on the basis of paragraph 3 of the stipulation. As noted in

the opinion below (831 F.2d at 426), the court did not mention

and, thus, apparently did not consider, respondent’s then pending

request for leave to amend her complaint.

H. Renewal of Application for Leave to Amend.

On October 8, 1986, respondent moved for reconsideration of

the second dismissal order and again moved for leave to amend

her complaint. This motion was accompanied by a proposed

second amended complaint stating that petitioner is an Ohio

corporation. [As the opinion notes (831 F.2d at 429, fn. 7),

petitioner's counsel professed ignorance of this fact even at the

oral argument in the Court of Appeals.] Petitioner opposed this

motion, asserting for the first time that the Doe defendants

destroyed diversity of citizenship.

I. Denial of Reconsideration and Leave to Amend.

On December 11, 1986, the district court denied respondent’s

motion for reconsideration and affirmed the second dismissal

order, basing its ruling on a misreading of the stipulation as

mandating dismissal absent a stipulation for leave to amend. The

final dismissal order did not mention respondent’s renewed mo-

tion for leave to amend her complaint.

6

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I

THE SOLE ISSUE IS THAT OF REFUSAL TO CONSIDER

LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

The “gamesmanship” deplored by the Court of Appeals (831

F.2d at 429) is carried to extremes in the petition. There is no

issue about the propriety of Doe pleadings in federal courts.

Respondent does not claim, and the court below did not hold, that

Doe pleadings are permissible. All these contentions about federal

practice and Doe allegations (Petn. pp. 9-11) are sham.

Only two questions were presented to and decided by the court

below. One question was “whether the district court erred when it

failed to consider Kiser’s motions for leave to amend her com-

plaint prior to addressing Parker-Hannifin’s motions to dismiss.”

831 F.2d at 426. The decision was that the court’s “outright

refusal to grant Kiser leave to amend” was “without justification”

and “is a clear abuse of discretion and is inconsistent with the

spirit of the Federal rules, see Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, especially

where the motion for leave to amend the complaint is accompa-

nied by an amended complaint that may properly be relied upon

for relief.” 831 F.2d at 428.

The second question was “whether the district court properly

dismissed Kiser’s complaint.” 831 F.2d at 428. The Court of

Appeals concluded “that the district court erred as a matter of

law when it granted Parker-Hannifin’s second motion to reinstate

the June 9th dismissal order and denied Kiser’s motion to

reconsider.” 831 F.2d at 428.

The court below did not suggest that there is any basis in the

federal rules, or otherwise, for Doe practice or pleadings. On the

contrary, the court authorized respondent to seek leave to amend

to dismiss the Doe defendants. The opinion below also noted the

view of Judge Becker that Doe defendants should be “dismissable

as a matter of course in federal diversity litigation.” 831 F.2d at

426, fn. 6.

The assertion that the district court “gave the plaintiffs several

opportunities to amend their complaint” (Petn. p. 13) is another

“gamesmanship” gambit. Respondent was given no opportunity

7

to amend. Having once amended, respondent could not amend

again without leave of court and the district court refused to even

consider respondent’s applications. 831 F.2d at 427.

REFUSAL TO CONSIDER LEAVE TO AMEND WAS AN

ABUSE OF DISCRETION

The court below properly applied the federal rules

(Fed.R.Civ.Proc., Rule 15) and the federal statute (28 U.S.C.

§ 1653) in holding that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to

even consider respondent’s motions for leave to amend her com-

plaint to remedy the minor flaws therein. As noted in Foman vy.

Davis, supra, 371 U.S. 178, 182:

“... but outright refusal to grant the leave without any

justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of

discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsis-

tent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.”

The question is not one of subject matter jurisdiction. Petn.

p. 11. The question, rather, is one of amending the complaint to

allege the true jurisdictional facts. The statute (28 U.S.C.

§ 1653) expressly authorizes such amendments.

THERE IS NO CONFLICT WITH THE BRYANT

DECISION

There is no conflict in the circuits, and particularly no conflict

with the decision in Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080 (9th

Cir. 1987), concerning federal Doe practice. The opinion below

does not sanction any such practice. On the contrary, the Court of

Appeals initially dismissed the Doe defendants at the request of

respondent and thereafter modified the opinion to allow respon-

dent to seek that relief in the district court.

Bryant simply held that removal of a state court action was

premature because the complaint contained Doe defendants as

parties. 832 F.2d at 1084. There the defendant sought to invoke

federal diversity jurisdiction notwithstanding that plaintiff did not

seek dismissal of the Does. In contrast, federal jurisdiction was

here invoked by the plaintiff and, having added Doe defendants

through routine California practice, the plaintiff sought to retain

federal jurisdiction by voluntary dismissal of the Does. Bryant

expressly recognizes that federal jurisdiction would exist upon

such dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that “the 30-day time

limit for removal contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 will not com-

mence until all Doe defendants are either named, unequivocally

abandoned by the plaintiff, or dismissed by the state court.” 832

F.2d at 1083.

The Doe defendants in this case were inadvertently added and

have been “unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff.” There is,

thus, no conflict with Bryant.

CONCLUSION

There is no reason for granting certiorari to review the simple

question of whether the district court abused its discretion in

refusing to even consider respondent’s requests for leave to amend

the complaint to cure minor flaws in the jurisdictional allegations.

No other question is presented. The Court of Appeals did not

purport to sanction any federal Doe practice. There is no conflict

between the circuits. As Bryant itself recognizes, federal diversity

jurisdiction, if otherwise present, will attach when the Doe de-

fendants are “unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff.” The Doe

defendants were inadvertently added and have been “unequivo-

cally abandoned.” The petition should therefore be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

VALERIE ANSEL KARPMAN

BAILEY AND KARPMAN

240 Stockton Street, 8th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94108

(415) 391-3400

Counsel of Record and

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Opposition Brief — Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Kiser · 485 U.S. 906 | Frix