Opposition Brief — Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Kiser
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| | Suprentie Court, ti,
_ FILBD
FEB 18 1988
>) JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR
\? CLERK
No. 87-1175
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
V.
ANNIE C. KISER,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
(Appeal No. 87-1023).
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
VALERIE ANSEL KARPMAN
BAILEY AND KARPMAN
240 Stockton Street, 8th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108
(415) 391-3400
Counsel for Respondent
February 18, 1988
BOWNME OF GAN FRANCISCO, INC. * 190 NINTH ST. + S.F.. CA 94103 + (415) 864-2300
BEST AVAILABLE COPY.
QUESTION PRESENTED
The sole question actually presented is this: Whether the Court
of Appeals properly determined that the district court erred in
dismissing the action without considering plaintiffs motions to
amend her complaint to remedy an incomplete statement of
diversity jurisdiction.
The questions asserted by petitioner are part of the “games-
manship” and lack of “candor with our courts” noted by the
Court of Appeals (831 F.2d 423, 429). The court below did not
sanction any federal Doe practice. On the contrary, the Court of
Appeals authorized respondent to seek leave to amend her com-
plaint as to the Doe defendants, reversed the dismissal order and
remanded with directions to grant Kiser’s motion to amend her
complaint to allege petitioner’s state of incorporation as Ohio.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS AND AUTHORITIES......
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Initial Dismissal Notwithstanding Deferral ......
Stipulation and Order Vacating Dismissal .......
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Renewal of Application of Leave to Amend .....
Denial of Reconsideraciton and Leave to Amend. .
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT............
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I.
THE SOLE ISSUE IS THAT OF REFUSAL TO CON-
SIDER LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT ..
II.
REFUSAL TO CONSIDER LEAVE TO AMEND WAS
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION .........0..5......
III.
THERE IS NO CONFLICT WITH THE BRYANT
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iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1987) 7,8
Comey v. Gipson, 355 US. 41 (1957) ................ 3
Foman v. Davis, 371 US, 176 (1962) ................. pe f
Kiser v. General Electric, 831 F.2d 423 (3rd Cir. 1987)
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Rules and Statutes
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No. 87-1175
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
V.
ANNIE C. KISER,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
(Appeal No. 87-1023)
RESPONDENT?’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
The respondent Annie C. Kiser, individually and as Adminis-
tratrix of the Estate of Everett W. Kiser, submits that the petition
for writ of certiorari should be denied for the reasons set forth
below.
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the district court was based on diversity of
citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The first amended complaint
(Appendix 26a, cited as “App.”) alleged that: Plaintiff Kiser is a
citizen of North Carolina and was appointed administratrix of her
husband’s estate in North Carolina. Defendant General Electric
(since dismissed) is a corporation with its principal place of
business in Connecticut. Defendant Parker-Hannifin (petitioner)
2
and defendant Eaton (since dismissed) are each corporations
with their principal places of business in Ohio.
The one omission was the failure to state the places of incorpo-
ration of the defendants, although it was alleged that none was
incorporated in North Carolina. App. 160a. Petitioner Parker-
Hannifin is the sole remaining defendant and, as noted in the
opinion below (831 F.2d 423, 428), petitioner is incorporated in
Ohio.
Through the inadvertent use of routine California practice,* the
first amended complaint added “DOES 1-5” in the caption. App.
26a. The fictitious defendants were not otherwise mentioned
except to state that they were not incorporated in and did not have
their principal place of business in North Carolina. App. 27a. As
noted in the opinion below (831 F.2d at 426), the Doe defendant
issue was not raised in the district court until after dismissal of the
action. App. 154a. The dismissal did not mention any Doe issue.
App. 124a-128a. Nor did the district court mention that issue in
denying reconsideration. App. 172a-176a. The Court of Appeals
initially granted Kiser’s request to dismiss the Doe defendants.
The opinion was then modified to simply allow respondent to seek
that relief in the district court. (831 F.2d at 426, fn. 6.)
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
inasmuch as the district court dismissed the complaint as to the
sole remaining defendant and also refused to consider plaintiff's
applications for leave to amend.
The Supreme Court may review the judgment by writ of
certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1254. The only issue, however, is whether
the Court of Appeals properly held that the district court should
not have dismissed the action without allowing, or even consider-
ing, leave to amend the complaint.
* Petitioner’s assertions (Petn. 7) about problems, defenses, immuni-
ties, naming the wrong defendant and frivolousness reflect the “games-
manship” decried by the court below; they are not based on the record.
3
STATUTES INVOLVED
The only statute involved is 28 U.S.C. § 1653, providing that:
“Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon
terms, in the trial and appellate courts.” Denial of leave to amend
without “any apparent or declared reason” is not an exercise of
discretion. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Also relevant is Rule 15, Fed.R.Civ.Proc., mandating that leave
to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice requires.”
The federal rules thus reject “the approach that pleading is a
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to
the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading
is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley v. Gibson,
355 US. 41, 48 (1957).
.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The record is correctly stated in the opinion below (831 F.2d at
424-426) and is briefly summarized from that opinion:
A. xhe Action.
This action was brought by the parents of Tony W. Kiser,
deceased, to recover damages for his allegedly wrongful death.
The initial complaint, filed December 5, 1985, alleged that the
decedent, while on active duty as a fireman in the United States
Navy, was killed on February 23, 1984, aboard the U.S.S. Guam,
which was then stationed in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast
of Lebanon. He died from injuries ailegedly caused by the failure
and malfunction of certain component parts of a hatch that
allegedly had been manufactured by the defendants, sold to the
Navy and installed on the Guam.
B. Motions to Dismiss.
The initial complaint inadequately alleged the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. On February 6, 1986, then-defendant Eaton Corpora-
tion moved to dismiss the action for that reason. Petitioner
Parker-Hannifin joined in that motion.
C. Deferral of Motions.
On February 12, 1986, the district court held a telephone
conference with counsel during which counsel for respondent
Kiser was informed that, pending further notice from the court,
the pending motions of Eaton and petitioner require no immedi-
ate response.
D. Initial Dismissal Notwithstanding Deferral.
On February 19th respondent filed an amended complaint
alleging that petitioner was not a North Carolina corporation but
failing to specifically allege that petitioner was incorporated in
Ohio. The amended complaint inadvertently added Does 1-5.
Petitioner filed its answer on March 27, 1986. Notwithstanding
the court’s direction that respondent could defer any response to
the pending motions, the district court thereafter granted the
motions to dismiss of Eaton and petitioner for insufficient juris-
dictional allegations.
E. Stipulation and Order Vacating Dismissal.
By letter of June 24, 1986, respondent’s counsel asked the
district court to vacate its dismissal order, referring to the court’s
February 12th directive deferring consideration of the motions to
dismiss. Another telephone conference with counsel and the court
resulted in an order vacating the dismissal order of June 9th and a
stipulation to dismiss Eaton and then-defendant General Electric.
The stipulation and order further provided (in paragraph 3)
that respondent and petitioner shall have thirty (30) days in
which to attempt to resolve the claim that diversity jurisdiction is
proper; and in the event they failed to agree, “Parker-Hannifin
Corporation may move the Court upon the end of the said thirty
(30) day period for reinstatement of the Order dismissing the
Complaint as to Parker-Hannifin Corporation for lack of diversity
jurisdiction and/or lack of properly pleading the existence of
diversity jurisdiction.”
—
F. Renewal of Motion.
Respondent’s counsel then attempted to obtain consent to
amending the complaint to allege that petitioner’s state of incor-
poration is Ohio. On August 28, 1986, petitioner moved to
reinstate the June 9th dismissal order. Respondent filed opposi-
tion to this motion and requested leave to amend her complaint.
G. Second Dismissal.
On September 23, 1986, the district court granted petitioner’s
motion on the basis of paragraph 3 of the stipulation. As noted in
the opinion below (831 F.2d at 426), the court did not mention
and, thus, apparently did not consider, respondent’s then pending
request for leave to amend her complaint.
H. Renewal of Application for Leave to Amend.
On October 8, 1986, respondent moved for reconsideration of
the second dismissal order and again moved for leave to amend
her complaint. This motion was accompanied by a proposed
second amended complaint stating that petitioner is an Ohio
corporation. [As the opinion notes (831 F.2d at 429, fn. 7),
petitioner's counsel professed ignorance of this fact even at the
oral argument in the Court of Appeals.] Petitioner opposed this
motion, asserting for the first time that the Doe defendants
destroyed diversity of citizenship.
I. Denial of Reconsideration and Leave to Amend.
On December 11, 1986, the district court denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration and affirmed the second dismissal
order, basing its ruling on a misreading of the stipulation as
mandating dismissal absent a stipulation for leave to amend. The
final dismissal order did not mention respondent’s renewed mo-
tion for leave to amend her complaint.
6
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I
THE SOLE ISSUE IS THAT OF REFUSAL TO CONSIDER
LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
The “gamesmanship” deplored by the Court of Appeals (831
F.2d at 429) is carried to extremes in the petition. There is no
issue about the propriety of Doe pleadings in federal courts.
Respondent does not claim, and the court below did not hold, that
Doe pleadings are permissible. All these contentions about federal
practice and Doe allegations (Petn. pp. 9-11) are sham.
Only two questions were presented to and decided by the court
below. One question was “whether the district court erred when it
failed to consider Kiser’s motions for leave to amend her com-
plaint prior to addressing Parker-Hannifin’s motions to dismiss.”
831 F.2d at 426. The decision was that the court’s “outright
refusal to grant Kiser leave to amend” was “without justification”
and “is a clear abuse of discretion and is inconsistent with the
spirit of the Federal rules, see Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, especially
where the motion for leave to amend the complaint is accompa-
nied by an amended complaint that may properly be relied upon
for relief.” 831 F.2d at 428.
The second question was “whether the district court properly
dismissed Kiser’s complaint.” 831 F.2d at 428. The Court of
Appeals concluded “that the district court erred as a matter of
law when it granted Parker-Hannifin’s second motion to reinstate
the June 9th dismissal order and denied Kiser’s motion to
reconsider.” 831 F.2d at 428.
The court below did not suggest that there is any basis in the
federal rules, or otherwise, for Doe practice or pleadings. On the
contrary, the court authorized respondent to seek leave to amend
to dismiss the Doe defendants. The opinion below also noted the
view of Judge Becker that Doe defendants should be “dismissable
as a matter of course in federal diversity litigation.” 831 F.2d at
426, fn. 6.
The assertion that the district court “gave the plaintiffs several
opportunities to amend their complaint” (Petn. p. 13) is another
“gamesmanship” gambit. Respondent was given no opportunity
7
to amend. Having once amended, respondent could not amend
again without leave of court and the district court refused to even
consider respondent’s applications. 831 F.2d at 427.
REFUSAL TO CONSIDER LEAVE TO AMEND WAS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The court below properly applied the federal rules
(Fed.R.Civ.Proc., Rule 15) and the federal statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1653) in holding that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to
even consider respondent’s motions for leave to amend her com-
plaint to remedy the minor flaws therein. As noted in Foman vy.
Davis, supra, 371 U.S. 178, 182:
“... but outright refusal to grant the leave without any
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of
discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.”
The question is not one of subject matter jurisdiction. Petn.
p. 11. The question, rather, is one of amending the complaint to
allege the true jurisdictional facts. The statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1653) expressly authorizes such amendments.
THERE IS NO CONFLICT WITH THE BRYANT
DECISION
There is no conflict in the circuits, and particularly no conflict
with the decision in Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080 (9th
Cir. 1987), concerning federal Doe practice. The opinion below
does not sanction any such practice. On the contrary, the Court of
Appeals initially dismissed the Doe defendants at the request of
respondent and thereafter modified the opinion to allow respon-
dent to seek that relief in the district court.
Bryant simply held that removal of a state court action was
premature because the complaint contained Doe defendants as
parties. 832 F.2d at 1084. There the defendant sought to invoke
federal diversity jurisdiction notwithstanding that plaintiff did not
seek dismissal of the Does. In contrast, federal jurisdiction was
here invoked by the plaintiff and, having added Doe defendants
through routine California practice, the plaintiff sought to retain
federal jurisdiction by voluntary dismissal of the Does. Bryant
expressly recognizes that federal jurisdiction would exist upon
such dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that “the 30-day time
limit for removal contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 will not com-
mence until all Doe defendants are either named, unequivocally
abandoned by the plaintiff, or dismissed by the state court.” 832
F.2d at 1083.
The Doe defendants in this case were inadvertently added and
have been “unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff.” There is,
thus, no conflict with Bryant.
CONCLUSION
There is no reason for granting certiorari to review the simple
question of whether the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to even consider respondent’s requests for leave to amend
the complaint to cure minor flaws in the jurisdictional allegations.
No other question is presented. The Court of Appeals did not
purport to sanction any federal Doe practice. There is no conflict
between the circuits. As Bryant itself recognizes, federal diversity
jurisdiction, if otherwise present, will attach when the Doe de-
fendants are “unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff.” The Doe
defendants were inadvertently added and have been “unequivo-
cally abandoned.” The petition should therefore be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
VALERIE ANSEL KARPMAN
BAILEY AND KARPMAN
240 Stockton Street, 8th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108
(415) 391-3400
Counsel of Record and
Counsel for Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.