Opposition Brief — Connecticut v. Federal Communications Commission
Supreme Court brief1988
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No. 87-671
In the Supreme Court of the
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
Depariment of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
DIANE S. KILLORY
General Counsel
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG
Associate General Counsel
GREGORY M, CHRISTOPHER
Counsel
Federal Communications Commissiain
Washington, D.C. 20554
QUESTION PRESENTED
Congress provided in 1984 that local authorities may
“regulate rates for the provision of basic cable [television]
service [only] in circumstances in which a cable system is
not subject to effective competition” and directed the
Federal Communications Commission to “define the cir-
cumstances in which a cable system is not subject to effec-
tive competition.” 47 U.S.C. (Supp. IID) 543(b)(1) and
(2)(A). The question presented is whether the Commission
permissibly concluded that “effective competition” exists
when three broadcast television signals can be received
“off the air” in a community.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
City of New York v. FCC, cert. granted, No. 87-339 (Nov.
eee rs aes had eke et weds tans 11
Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C.
SETS eg 5
Statutes and regulation:
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 47 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 521 e¢
OO aa SRE PE ae Pe
BERT el |” Be
5 G2ne), 47 U.S.C. upp. i) 54a) .............-
§ 623(b)(1), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 543(b)(1) ......
§ 623(b)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. IID) 543(b)(2)(A) . .
§ 623(b)(3), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 543(b)(3) .. 2... -. 3
§ 623(h), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 543(h) .. 2.2.22... 3
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.
Miscellaneous:
H.R. Rep. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) .......... 8
Kwoka, The Effect of Market Share Distribution on
Industry Performance, 61 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 101
eee Nie pile eas chiaW Acad sot 5 8 6 10
(111)
Jn the Supreme Court of the Onited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
No. 87-671
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
A115-A185) is reported at 823 F.2d 1554. The orders of
the Federal Communications Commission (Pet. App.
Al1-A95, A96-A114) are reported at 50 Fed. Reg. 18637
and 51 Fed. Reg. 21770.
b
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered. on
July 17, 1987. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
on October 15, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. Most cable television operators provide “basic” and
“premium” services. Basic service, which all subscribers
receive, usually includes retransmission of local broadcast
(1)
2
signals and | satellite programming such as the Cable News
Network. PPremium service, for which subscribers pay ad-
ditional feees if they desire it, typically includes channels
such as Hopme Box Office. See Pet. App. A131 n.3. Prior
‘to 1984, thhe Federal Communications Commission had
concluded t that local authorities could regulate the rates
charged forr basic cable service, but could not regulate the
rates chargeed for premium services. /d. at A131.
In 1984, « Congress enacted the Cable Communications
Policy Act, , Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 47 U.S.C.
(Supp. III) ) 521 e¢ seg. Section 623(a) of the Act provides
that local aauthorities “may * * * regulate the rates for the
provision opf cable service * * * only to the extent provided
under this s section.” 47 U.S.C. (Supp. Ill) 543(a). Section
623 does noot authorize the regulation of rates for premium —
service; Copngress’s decision not to permit regulation of
premium service rates “appears to have been made based,
at least in ppart, on a belief that alternative video delivery
systems [suuch as video cassette recorders and direct
satellite recception] provided sufficient existing or potential
competitionn to nonbasic services that rate controls would
be counterrproductive.” Pet. App. A44-A45. Section
623(b)(1) pprovides that local authorities may “regulate
rates for thhe provision of basic cable service in circum-
stances in wwhich a cable system is not subject to effective
competitionn.” 47 U.S.C. (Supp. Il) 543(b)(1). Thus,
under the AAct only basic service is subject to rate regula-
tion, and i it is subject to such regulation only in the
absence of f “effective competition.”
Congressss directed the Commission to promulgate
regulations s that “define the circumstances in which a cable
system is naot subject to effective competition.” 47 U.S.C.
(Supp. III) ) 543(b)(2)(A). It provided that the Commission
was to adoppt such regulations within 180 days (47 U.S.C.
(Supp. IID) 543(b)(1)) and further provided that “[t}he
3
Commission shall periodically review such regulations”
and amend them “to the extent the Commission deter-
mines necessary” (47 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 543(b)(3)). In ad-
dition, Congress directed the Commission to submit “a
report regarding rate regulation of cable services” by 1990.
47 U.S.C. (Supp. IIL) 543(h).
2. The Commission promptly instituted the rulemak-
ing proceeding that is the subject of petitioners’ com-
plaints. After receiving comments from more than 140
parties (Pet. App. A134), the Commission concluded that
“a cable system will be considered to face effective com-
petition whenever the franchise market receives three or
more unduplicated broadcast signals” (id. at A47 (foot-
note omitted)). ~
Before reaching that conclusion, the Commission first
considered whether it should adopt standards for deter-
mining when an entire “cable system” (including both
basic and premium service) is subject to effective competi-
tion or whether it should limit its inquiry to establishing
standards for determining whether basic cable service is
subject to effective competition. The Commission con-
cluded that since “rate regulation authority is limited to
regulation of basic cable service,” it should limit its
analysis to the “question of effective competition to basic
cable service.” Pet. App. A43. The Commission disagreed
with the concern of some commenters that “cable systems
may have market power in the provision of nonbasic serv-
ice and that this power could be extended to their provi-
sion of basic service,” concluding that its review of the
antitrust literature convinced it that there is no merit to
such a “tying arrangement” argument. /d. at A44 n.63.
The Commission further determined that “a standard
for defining effective competition based on the availability
of off-the-air broadcast signals in the cable system’s com-
munity is appropriate.” Pet. App. A43. It thus concluded
4
that the question whether effective competition exists
should be answered by determining the number of televi-
sion stations that can be received in a community without
the use of cable and rejected suggestions that it should
consider other factors, such as the “penetration rate” of
cable service. Noting that a number of commenters had
proposed that a cable operator should be subject to rate
regulation if 70% of households in the community have
subscribed, on the theory that such a high penetration rate
shows a lack of effective competition (id. at A49), the
Commission stated that “a penetration criterion would
penalize cable operators who have attained substantial
subscriber penetration by providing low-priced popular
cable offerings and services” (id. at A51).
The Commission next concluded that “three broadcast
signals are the minimum number of signals needed” to en-
sure that there is effective competition to basic cable serv-
ice. Pet. App. A45. The Commission determined that the
presence of three broadcast stations would be “sufficient
to allow viewers adequate and significant programming
choices” and to ensure that basic cable service “does not
become a source of market power for the cable operator.”
Ibid. \n rejecting the suggestion that the existence of two
broadcast stations would be sufficient, the Commission
noted that its review of viewing data showed that “in two
Signal markets the viewership share of [cable] program-
ming could be as iarge or larger than the off-air viewership
of the typical local station in such a market” (/bid.)—thus
indicating a potential for market power in such com-
munities. The Commission also rejected suggestions that
more than three broadcast signals should be required. It
noted that “[iJn three signal markets, the cable Viewership
of such basic programming was in general less than the
off-air viewership of a single local signal” and less than
one-third of the market, and concluded that a “viewership
5
share of 33% or less is a reasonable indication of lack of
market power” (id. at A45-A46 & n.65).
Finally, the Commission considered when a broadcast
television signal would be presumed to be available off the
air for purposes of its three-signal “effective competition”
standard. lt concluded that a signal would be deemed
available when it placed a predicted “Grade B contour” —a
measurement of the approximate extent of coverage of a
television signal indicating that 50% of the locations at the
edge of the contour can expect to receive a good quality
picture 90% of the time (Clarksburg Publishing Co. v.
FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 515-516 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see
Pet. App. A135 n.8)—over any portion of the cable com-
munity or was “significantly viewed” (see 47 C.F.R.
76.5(k); Pet. App. A136 n.9) in the cable community. Pet.
App. ASO. The Commission noted that, under that stand-
ard, some cable systems will be determined to face effec-
tive competition “when in fact reception of three or more
signals may not always be possible in the franchise area,”
but concluded that “administrative convenience” war-
ranted the use of the signal availability standard it
selected. Jd. at A49-ASO.
3. The court of appeals upheld the Commission’s
three-signal rule but invalidated its signal availability
standard. Pet. App. Al15-A185. The court noted that
Congress has granted the Commission broad discretion in
defining effective competition and had offered “no
guidance on, what factors the Commission should con-
sider, or what weight it should assign to those factors.” /d.
at Al43. With respect to its decision to define effective
competition as the presence of three broadcast signals, the
court concluded that “the Commission carefully con-
sidered proposed alternatives, explained the reasons
underlying its decision, and reached a rational
conclusion.” /bid. Therefore, “applying familiar principles
6
of judicial review” (id. at A142 (footnote omitted)), the
court held “that the FCC’s rate regulation rules are af-
firmed in all respects except to the extent specifically
delineated” (id. at A143).
The court concluded that the Commission’s determina-
tion of when a broadcast signal would be deemed available
was faulty because of the “enormous margin of error
created by its decision to ‘count’ every signal that covers
‘any portion of the cable community.’ ” /d. at A161 (cita-
tion omitted; emphasis in original). The court could not
determine “why the ‘any portion’ standard was selected
over a more refined geographical qualification, such as ‘a
significant portion of the cable community,’ ” or “ ‘over
75 percent of the cable community.’ ” /d. at A162 (citation
omitted). On remand, the Commission has proposed to re-
quire that each of the three signals available in a communi-
ty place a Grade B contour over at least 75% of the cable
community. 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5888 (Sept. 28, 1987).
ARGUMENI
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the Com-
mission did not err in promulgating its three-signal rule for
determining when effective competition exists, and its
decision does not conflict with any decision of this Court
or another court of appeals. In addition, two other factors
make review inappropriate here. First, most of the peti-
tioners are participating in the remand proceeding con-
cerning the standards to be applied in determining whether
a signal is available in a community and the outcome of
that proceeding could affect the practical importance of
the question presented. Therefore, review is unwarranted
al this time, especially since petitioners will be free to raise
the issues presented in this petition, together with any
claims arising out of the remand proceeding, after the
completion of that proceeding. Second, pursuant to Con-
gress’s directive, the Commission is monitoring the effect
of its three-signal rule particularly closely so that amend-
ments can be made, if needed, and in order to report to
Congress by 1990 on the effects of rate régulation of cable
services. In these circumstances, review by this Court al
this time is unwarranted.
1. Petitioners primarily argue (Pet. 15-18) that, in
determining that “effective competition” exists when three
broadcast television signals are available in a community,
the Commission departed from the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. There is no merit to that argu-
ment.
As an initial matter, as the court of appeals concluded
(Pet. App. A143), rather than defining “effective competi-
tion” itself, Congress granted the Commission “broad
discretion” to define it and provided “no guidance on what
factors the Commission should consider, or what weight it
should assign to those factors.” Section 623(b)(2)(A) sim-
ply directs the Commission to “define the circumstances in
which a cable system is not subject to effective competi-
tion” (47 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 543(b)(2)(A)), to “periodically
review such regulations” and amend them “to the extent
the Commission determines necessary” (47 U.S.C. (Supp.
111) 543(b)(3)), and to “submit to the Congress a report
regarding rate regulation of cable services” by 1990 (47
U.S.C. (Supp. III) 543(h)). Thus, the only intent that is
unambiguously expressed in the statutory language is
Congress’s intent that the Commission should _ have
considerable discretion in determining when effective
competition exists. The legislative history confirms that
conclusion. The House Report —which was “specifically
adopted by both the House and the Senate as their ex-
planations of the Act” (Pet. App. A153 n.33)—states that
“(t]he Committee wishes to stress that it intends to give
wwe
8
the Commission flexibility in promulgating these regula-
tions.” H.R. Rep. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1984).
In these circumstances, there is no basis for petitioners’
argument (Pet. 16) that the Commission departed from
Congress’s clear instruction that it define effective com-
petition with respect to a “cable system” rather than “basic
cable service.” Congress gave no such instruction. Hence,
as the Commission concluded (Pet. App. A43-A45), it
plainly had discretion not to consider the effect of
premium service when Congress has barred rate regulation
of such service.
Nor does petitioners’ citation of the House Report (Pet.
17) support its conclusion that Congress directed the Com-
mission to promulgate an effective competition rule based
on factors in addition to the number of broadcast televi- —
sion signals available over the air in a community, such as
the penetration rate. The House Report stated that the
Commission “may find it relevant to consider factors in
addition to the number of over-the-air broadcast stations
in a market, such as the penetration rate.” H.R. Rep.
98-934, supra, at 66. Accordingly, it was plainly within the
scope of the discretion granted to the Commission to use
factors such as the penetration rate or not to do so.
Finally, with respect to the merits of the three-signal
rule, petitioners contend (Pet. 17) that the fact that Con-
gress did not enact the Senate bill providing that effective
competition exists when four broadcast television signals
can be received over the air in a community shows that it
did not intend the Commission to adopt its three-signal
rule. That is a non sequitur. Congress decided that, rather
than initially attempting to define effective competition
itself, it would direct the Commission to do so (and to
report to Congress on the subject by 1990). The fact that,
after studying the issue, the Commission has decided, at
ot lb Doraiai mm:
9
least initially, on a standard that is similar to what the
Senate proposed is not evidence that it has erred.'
2. Petitioners’ procedural arguments (Pet. 18-20) are
also without merit and, in any event, involve nothing more
than the application of settled legal principles to the facts
of this case and accordingly do not warrant this Court’s at-
tention. First, petitioners contend (id. at 18-19) that the
Commission did not set forth a principled antitrust market
analysis in promulgating its effective competition standard
and should have explained why it did not do so. That ap-
pears to be little more than another way of saying that
petitioners do not agree with the Commission’s conclu-
sions. In any event, the Commission did fully consider the
likely effects on competition of its three-signal rule (see
' Petitioners note (see Pet. 10) that the Commission’s three-signal
rule differs from that proposed by the Antitrust Division of the
Department-of Justice. The Antitrust Division did not disagree with
the Commission’s conclusions that “effective competition” should be
defined with respect to basic cable service rather than basic and
premium service and that a penetration rate of 70% or more did not
necessarily show that there was no effective competition in a com-
munity. However, the Division proposed a definition providing that
effective competition exists when two of the following conditions are
met: (1) five unduplicated broadcast signals, including all three major
networks, are available in the community; (2) the total number of
channels provided as part of basic service (excluding certain channels
that have limited viewership) is less than three times the number of
signals available over the air; and (3) no more than 20% of the cable
system’s subscribers subscribed to basic service only (/.e., did not
receive any premium service) on the date the Act was enacted. C.A.
App. 156-161. The fact that the Commission did not incorporate re-
quirements like those suggested by the Division in its effective com-
petition rule (at least, not yet) does not show that it abused its broad
discretion under the Act. And, of course, Congress remains tree to
consider whether it wishes to prescribe other standards by statute.
10
Pet. App. A42-A47). Petitioners may also be suggesting
that the Commission should have bolstered its conclusions
with quantitative analysis. However, as the court of ap-
peals concluded (id. at Al44 (footnote omitted)), the
Commission conceded “[w]ith admirable candor * * * that
its decision to define ‘effective competition’ in terms of the
availability of three broadcast signals was not an exercise
in ‘scientific precision.’ Rather, the Commission made a
predictive judgment based on the evidence it had ac-
cumulated in the relatively short time frame within which
Congress directed the agency to complete its rulemaking.”
And, while the Commission’s rule cannot be shown by
Statistical analysis of evidence in the record necessarily to
be the best possible rule, petitioners have presented no em-
pirical data proving that a different rule better determines
when effective competition exists.
Finally, petitioners err in contending (Pet. 20) that the
Commission erroneously relied upon three studies—the
“NCTA/CATA study,” a study by Commission staff, and
the “Kwoka study”—without addressing significant
criticisms of the methodology employed in those studies.
The Commission did not rely on the NCTA/CATA study,
but merely noted (Pet. App. A43) that it had been cited by
many commenters as providing support for a standard
based on fewer than two signals, a standard the Commis-
sion rejected. Similarly, the Kwoka study (Kwoka, The Ef-
fect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Perfor-
mance, 61 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 101 (1979)) supported a
two-signal rule; while the Commission noted that it pro-
vided “[fJurther support” for its conclusion that a three-
signal rule would not result in monopolistic practices by
cable operators (Pet. App. A46), the Commission plainly
did not base its decision on that study. Rather, as the court
of appeals noted (id. at A144), the Commission’s decision
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11
was a predictive judgment based on conflicting informa-
tion that it had accumulated in order to promulgate a rule
in the time allotted by Congress. The Commission’s inter-
nal study was similarly cited as “further evidence” support-
ing the Commission’s decision (id. at A45) rather than as
primary evidence. And, contrary to petitioners’ complaint
that it was “virtually unavailable” (Pet. 11, 20), the bulk of
the study was provided to petitioners and placed in the
public rule-making record within two weeks of the Com-
mission’s decision (see C.A. App. 541-553). In any event,
the question whether in this basically interim proceeding —
whose conclusions are subject to further consideration by
the Commission and by Congress itself, in light of ex-
perience—the Commission impermissibly relied on the
three studies petitioners cite plainly does not warrant this
Court’s attention. ?
2 While City of New York v. FCC, cert. granted, No. 87-339 (Nov.
30, 1987), also involves interpretation of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, the question presented there is whether the Com-
mission permissibly preempted the states from adopting regulations
governing the technical quality of cable broadcasts that exceed federal
guidelines. No question concerning “effective competition” is
presented and the case involves a proceeding before the Commission
entirely separate from the proceeding resulting in the Commission’s
three-signal rule. Accordingly, there is no reason to hold this case for
City of New York.
12
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
DIANE S. KILLORY
General Counsel
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG
Associate General Counsel
GREGORY M. CHRISTOPHER
Counsel
Federal Communications Comésission
FEBRUARY 1988
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988— 202-037/60313
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