Opposition Brief — Connecticut v. Federal Communications Commission

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No. 87-671

In the Supreme Court of the

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

Depariment of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

DIANE S. KILLORY

General Counsel

DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG

Associate General Counsel

GREGORY M, CHRISTOPHER

Counsel

Federal Communications Commissiain

Washington, D.C. 20554

QUESTION PRESENTED

Congress provided in 1984 that local authorities may

“regulate rates for the provision of basic cable [television]

service [only] in circumstances in which a cable system is

not subject to effective competition” and directed the

Federal Communications Commission to “define the cir-

cumstances in which a cable system is not subject to effec-

tive competition.” 47 U.S.C. (Supp. IID) 543(b)(1) and

(2)(A). The question presented is whether the Commission

permissibly concluded that “effective competition” exists

when three broadcast television signals can be received

“off the air” in a community.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

City of New York v. FCC, cert. granted, No. 87-339 (Nov.

eee rs aes had eke et weds tans 11

Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C.

SETS eg 5

Statutes and regulation:

Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 47 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 521 e¢

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BERT el |” Be

5 G2ne), 47 U.S.C. upp. i) 54a) .............-

§ 623(b)(1), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 543(b)(1) ......

§ 623(b)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. IID) 543(b)(2)(A) . .

§ 623(b)(3), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 543(b)(3) .. 2... -. 3

§ 623(h), 47 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 543(h) .. 2.2.22... 3

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Miscellaneous:

H.R. Rep. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) .......... 8

Kwoka, The Effect of Market Share Distribution on

Industry Performance, 61 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 101

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(111)

Jn the Supreme Court of the Onited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-671

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

A115-A185) is reported at 823 F.2d 1554. The orders of

the Federal Communications Commission (Pet. App.

Al1-A95, A96-A114) are reported at 50 Fed. Reg. 18637

and 51 Fed. Reg. 21770.

b

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered. on

July 17, 1987. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed

on October 15, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Most cable television operators provide “basic” and

“premium” services. Basic service, which all subscribers

receive, usually includes retransmission of local broadcast

(1)

2

signals and | satellite programming such as the Cable News

Network. PPremium service, for which subscribers pay ad-

ditional feees if they desire it, typically includes channels

such as Hopme Box Office. See Pet. App. A131 n.3. Prior

‘to 1984, thhe Federal Communications Commission had

concluded t that local authorities could regulate the rates

charged forr basic cable service, but could not regulate the

rates chargeed for premium services. /d. at A131.

In 1984, « Congress enacted the Cable Communications

Policy Act, , Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 47 U.S.C.

(Supp. III) ) 521 e¢ seg. Section 623(a) of the Act provides

that local aauthorities “may * * * regulate the rates for the

provision opf cable service * * * only to the extent provided

under this s section.” 47 U.S.C. (Supp. Ill) 543(a). Section

623 does noot authorize the regulation of rates for premium —

service; Copngress’s decision not to permit regulation of

premium service rates “appears to have been made based,

at least in ppart, on a belief that alternative video delivery

systems [suuch as video cassette recorders and direct

satellite recception] provided sufficient existing or potential

competitionn to nonbasic services that rate controls would

be counterrproductive.” Pet. App. A44-A45. Section

623(b)(1) pprovides that local authorities may “regulate

rates for thhe provision of basic cable service in circum-

stances in wwhich a cable system is not subject to effective

competitionn.” 47 U.S.C. (Supp. Il) 543(b)(1). Thus,

under the AAct only basic service is subject to rate regula-

tion, and i it is subject to such regulation only in the

absence of f “effective competition.”

Congressss directed the Commission to promulgate

regulations s that “define the circumstances in which a cable

system is naot subject to effective competition.” 47 U.S.C.

(Supp. III) ) 543(b)(2)(A). It provided that the Commission

was to adoppt such regulations within 180 days (47 U.S.C.

(Supp. IID) 543(b)(1)) and further provided that “[t}he

3

Commission shall periodically review such regulations”

and amend them “to the extent the Commission deter-

mines necessary” (47 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 543(b)(3)). In ad-

dition, Congress directed the Commission to submit “a

report regarding rate regulation of cable services” by 1990.

47 U.S.C. (Supp. IIL) 543(h).

2. The Commission promptly instituted the rulemak-

ing proceeding that is the subject of petitioners’ com-

plaints. After receiving comments from more than 140

parties (Pet. App. A134), the Commission concluded that

“a cable system will be considered to face effective com-

petition whenever the franchise market receives three or

more unduplicated broadcast signals” (id. at A47 (foot-

note omitted)). ~

Before reaching that conclusion, the Commission first

considered whether it should adopt standards for deter-

mining when an entire “cable system” (including both

basic and premium service) is subject to effective competi-

tion or whether it should limit its inquiry to establishing

standards for determining whether basic cable service is

subject to effective competition. The Commission con-

cluded that since “rate regulation authority is limited to

regulation of basic cable service,” it should limit its

analysis to the “question of effective competition to basic

cable service.” Pet. App. A43. The Commission disagreed

with the concern of some commenters that “cable systems

may have market power in the provision of nonbasic serv-

ice and that this power could be extended to their provi-

sion of basic service,” concluding that its review of the

antitrust literature convinced it that there is no merit to

such a “tying arrangement” argument. /d. at A44 n.63.

The Commission further determined that “a standard

for defining effective competition based on the availability

of off-the-air broadcast signals in the cable system’s com-

munity is appropriate.” Pet. App. A43. It thus concluded

4

that the question whether effective competition exists

should be answered by determining the number of televi-

sion stations that can be received in a community without

the use of cable and rejected suggestions that it should

consider other factors, such as the “penetration rate” of

cable service. Noting that a number of commenters had

proposed that a cable operator should be subject to rate

regulation if 70% of households in the community have

subscribed, on the theory that such a high penetration rate

shows a lack of effective competition (id. at A49), the

Commission stated that “a penetration criterion would

penalize cable operators who have attained substantial

subscriber penetration by providing low-priced popular

cable offerings and services” (id. at A51).

The Commission next concluded that “three broadcast

signals are the minimum number of signals needed” to en-

sure that there is effective competition to basic cable serv-

ice. Pet. App. A45. The Commission determined that the

presence of three broadcast stations would be “sufficient

to allow viewers adequate and significant programming

choices” and to ensure that basic cable service “does not

become a source of market power for the cable operator.”

Ibid. \n rejecting the suggestion that the existence of two

broadcast stations would be sufficient, the Commission

noted that its review of viewing data showed that “in two

Signal markets the viewership share of [cable] program-

ming could be as iarge or larger than the off-air viewership

of the typical local station in such a market” (/bid.)—thus

indicating a potential for market power in such com-

munities. The Commission also rejected suggestions that

more than three broadcast signals should be required. It

noted that “[iJn three signal markets, the cable Viewership

of such basic programming was in general less than the

off-air viewership of a single local signal” and less than

one-third of the market, and concluded that a “viewership

5

share of 33% or less is a reasonable indication of lack of

market power” (id. at A45-A46 & n.65).

Finally, the Commission considered when a broadcast

television signal would be presumed to be available off the

air for purposes of its three-signal “effective competition”

standard. lt concluded that a signal would be deemed

available when it placed a predicted “Grade B contour” —a

measurement of the approximate extent of coverage of a

television signal indicating that 50% of the locations at the

edge of the contour can expect to receive a good quality

picture 90% of the time (Clarksburg Publishing Co. v.

FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 515-516 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see

Pet. App. A135 n.8)—over any portion of the cable com-

munity or was “significantly viewed” (see 47 C.F.R.

76.5(k); Pet. App. A136 n.9) in the cable community. Pet.

App. ASO. The Commission noted that, under that stand-

ard, some cable systems will be determined to face effec-

tive competition “when in fact reception of three or more

signals may not always be possible in the franchise area,”

but concluded that “administrative convenience” war-

ranted the use of the signal availability standard it

selected. Jd. at A49-ASO.

3. The court of appeals upheld the Commission’s

three-signal rule but invalidated its signal availability

standard. Pet. App. Al15-A185. The court noted that

Congress has granted the Commission broad discretion in

defining effective competition and had offered “no

guidance on, what factors the Commission should con-

sider, or what weight it should assign to those factors.” /d.

at Al43. With respect to its decision to define effective

competition as the presence of three broadcast signals, the

court concluded that “the Commission carefully con-

sidered proposed alternatives, explained the reasons

underlying its decision, and reached a rational

conclusion.” /bid. Therefore, “applying familiar principles

6

of judicial review” (id. at A142 (footnote omitted)), the

court held “that the FCC’s rate regulation rules are af-

firmed in all respects except to the extent specifically

delineated” (id. at A143).

The court concluded that the Commission’s determina-

tion of when a broadcast signal would be deemed available

was faulty because of the “enormous margin of error

created by its decision to ‘count’ every signal that covers

‘any portion of the cable community.’ ” /d. at A161 (cita-

tion omitted; emphasis in original). The court could not

determine “why the ‘any portion’ standard was selected

over a more refined geographical qualification, such as ‘a

significant portion of the cable community,’ ” or “ ‘over

75 percent of the cable community.’ ” /d. at A162 (citation

omitted). On remand, the Commission has proposed to re-

quire that each of the three signals available in a communi-

ty place a Grade B contour over at least 75% of the cable

community. 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5888 (Sept. 28, 1987).

ARGUMENI

The court of appeals correctly concluded that the Com-

mission did not err in promulgating its three-signal rule for

determining when effective competition exists, and its

decision does not conflict with any decision of this Court

or another court of appeals. In addition, two other factors

make review inappropriate here. First, most of the peti-

tioners are participating in the remand proceeding con-

cerning the standards to be applied in determining whether

a signal is available in a community and the outcome of

that proceeding could affect the practical importance of

the question presented. Therefore, review is unwarranted

al this time, especially since petitioners will be free to raise

the issues presented in this petition, together with any

claims arising out of the remand proceeding, after the

completion of that proceeding. Second, pursuant to Con-

gress’s directive, the Commission is monitoring the effect

of its three-signal rule particularly closely so that amend-

ments can be made, if needed, and in order to report to

Congress by 1990 on the effects of rate régulation of cable

services. In these circumstances, review by this Court al

this time is unwarranted.

1. Petitioners primarily argue (Pet. 15-18) that, in

determining that “effective competition” exists when three

broadcast television signals are available in a community,

the Commission departed from the unambiguously ex-

pressed intent of Congress. There is no merit to that argu-

ment.

As an initial matter, as the court of appeals concluded

(Pet. App. A143), rather than defining “effective competi-

tion” itself, Congress granted the Commission “broad

discretion” to define it and provided “no guidance on what

factors the Commission should consider, or what weight it

should assign to those factors.” Section 623(b)(2)(A) sim-

ply directs the Commission to “define the circumstances in

which a cable system is not subject to effective competi-

tion” (47 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 543(b)(2)(A)), to “periodically

review such regulations” and amend them “to the extent

the Commission determines necessary” (47 U.S.C. (Supp.

111) 543(b)(3)), and to “submit to the Congress a report

regarding rate regulation of cable services” by 1990 (47

U.S.C. (Supp. III) 543(h)). Thus, the only intent that is

unambiguously expressed in the statutory language is

Congress’s intent that the Commission should _ have

considerable discretion in determining when effective

competition exists. The legislative history confirms that

conclusion. The House Report —which was “specifically

adopted by both the House and the Senate as their ex-

planations of the Act” (Pet. App. A153 n.33)—states that

“(t]he Committee wishes to stress that it intends to give

wwe

8

the Commission flexibility in promulgating these regula-

tions.” H.R. Rep. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1984).

In these circumstances, there is no basis for petitioners’

argument (Pet. 16) that the Commission departed from

Congress’s clear instruction that it define effective com-

petition with respect to a “cable system” rather than “basic

cable service.” Congress gave no such instruction. Hence,

as the Commission concluded (Pet. App. A43-A45), it

plainly had discretion not to consider the effect of

premium service when Congress has barred rate regulation

of such service.

Nor does petitioners’ citation of the House Report (Pet.

17) support its conclusion that Congress directed the Com-

mission to promulgate an effective competition rule based

on factors in addition to the number of broadcast televi- —

sion signals available over the air in a community, such as

the penetration rate. The House Report stated that the

Commission “may find it relevant to consider factors in

addition to the number of over-the-air broadcast stations

in a market, such as the penetration rate.” H.R. Rep.

98-934, supra, at 66. Accordingly, it was plainly within the

scope of the discretion granted to the Commission to use

factors such as the penetration rate or not to do so.

Finally, with respect to the merits of the three-signal

rule, petitioners contend (Pet. 17) that the fact that Con-

gress did not enact the Senate bill providing that effective

competition exists when four broadcast television signals

can be received over the air in a community shows that it

did not intend the Commission to adopt its three-signal

rule. That is a non sequitur. Congress decided that, rather

than initially attempting to define effective competition

itself, it would direct the Commission to do so (and to

report to Congress on the subject by 1990). The fact that,

after studying the issue, the Commission has decided, at

ot lb Doraiai mm:

9

least initially, on a standard that is similar to what the

Senate proposed is not evidence that it has erred.'

2. Petitioners’ procedural arguments (Pet. 18-20) are

also without merit and, in any event, involve nothing more

than the application of settled legal principles to the facts

of this case and accordingly do not warrant this Court’s at-

tention. First, petitioners contend (id. at 18-19) that the

Commission did not set forth a principled antitrust market

analysis in promulgating its effective competition standard

and should have explained why it did not do so. That ap-

pears to be little more than another way of saying that

petitioners do not agree with the Commission’s conclu-

sions. In any event, the Commission did fully consider the

likely effects on competition of its three-signal rule (see

' Petitioners note (see Pet. 10) that the Commission’s three-signal

rule differs from that proposed by the Antitrust Division of the

Department-of Justice. The Antitrust Division did not disagree with

the Commission’s conclusions that “effective competition” should be

defined with respect to basic cable service rather than basic and

premium service and that a penetration rate of 70% or more did not

necessarily show that there was no effective competition in a com-

munity. However, the Division proposed a definition providing that

effective competition exists when two of the following conditions are

met: (1) five unduplicated broadcast signals, including all three major

networks, are available in the community; (2) the total number of

channels provided as part of basic service (excluding certain channels

that have limited viewership) is less than three times the number of

signals available over the air; and (3) no more than 20% of the cable

system’s subscribers subscribed to basic service only (/.e., did not

receive any premium service) on the date the Act was enacted. C.A.

App. 156-161. The fact that the Commission did not incorporate re-

quirements like those suggested by the Division in its effective com-

petition rule (at least, not yet) does not show that it abused its broad

discretion under the Act. And, of course, Congress remains tree to

consider whether it wishes to prescribe other standards by statute.

10

Pet. App. A42-A47). Petitioners may also be suggesting

that the Commission should have bolstered its conclusions

with quantitative analysis. However, as the court of ap-

peals concluded (id. at Al44 (footnote omitted)), the

Commission conceded “[w]ith admirable candor * * * that

its decision to define ‘effective competition’ in terms of the

availability of three broadcast signals was not an exercise

in ‘scientific precision.’ Rather, the Commission made a

predictive judgment based on the evidence it had ac-

cumulated in the relatively short time frame within which

Congress directed the agency to complete its rulemaking.”

And, while the Commission’s rule cannot be shown by

Statistical analysis of evidence in the record necessarily to

be the best possible rule, petitioners have presented no em-

pirical data proving that a different rule better determines

when effective competition exists.

Finally, petitioners err in contending (Pet. 20) that the

Commission erroneously relied upon three studies—the

“NCTA/CATA study,” a study by Commission staff, and

the “Kwoka study”—without addressing significant

criticisms of the methodology employed in those studies.

The Commission did not rely on the NCTA/CATA study,

but merely noted (Pet. App. A43) that it had been cited by

many commenters as providing support for a standard

based on fewer than two signals, a standard the Commis-

sion rejected. Similarly, the Kwoka study (Kwoka, The Ef-

fect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Perfor-

mance, 61 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 101 (1979)) supported a

two-signal rule; while the Commission noted that it pro-

vided “[fJurther support” for its conclusion that a three-

signal rule would not result in monopolistic practices by

cable operators (Pet. App. A46), the Commission plainly

did not base its decision on that study. Rather, as the court

of appeals noted (id. at A144), the Commission’s decision

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11

was a predictive judgment based on conflicting informa-

tion that it had accumulated in order to promulgate a rule

in the time allotted by Congress. The Commission’s inter-

nal study was similarly cited as “further evidence” support-

ing the Commission’s decision (id. at A45) rather than as

primary evidence. And, contrary to petitioners’ complaint

that it was “virtually unavailable” (Pet. 11, 20), the bulk of

the study was provided to petitioners and placed in the

public rule-making record within two weeks of the Com-

mission’s decision (see C.A. App. 541-553). In any event,

the question whether in this basically interim proceeding —

whose conclusions are subject to further consideration by

the Commission and by Congress itself, in light of ex-

perience—the Commission impermissibly relied on the

three studies petitioners cite plainly does not warrant this

Court’s attention. ?

2 While City of New York v. FCC, cert. granted, No. 87-339 (Nov.

30, 1987), also involves interpretation of the Cable Communications

Policy Act of 1984, the question presented there is whether the Com-

mission permissibly preempted the states from adopting regulations

governing the technical quality of cable broadcasts that exceed federal

guidelines. No question concerning “effective competition” is

presented and the case involves a proceeding before the Commission

entirely separate from the proceeding resulting in the Commission’s

three-signal rule. Accordingly, there is no reason to hold this case for

City of New York.

12

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

DIANE S. KILLORY

General Counsel

DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG

Associate General Counsel

GREGORY M. CHRISTOPHER

Counsel

Federal Communications Comésission

FEBRUARY 1988

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988— 202-037/60313

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