Opposition Brief — Connecticut v. Federal Communications Commission

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, INC.

IN OPPOSITION

BRENDA L. Fox

MICHAEL S. SCHOOLER *

1724 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 775-3664

Counsel for National Cable

* Counsel of Record Television Association, Inc.

February 22, 1988

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Was the Federal Communications Commission’s deter-

mination that the availability of three over-the-air broad-

cast signals constitutes “effective competition” for pur-

poses of Section 623 of the Cable Communications Policy

Act of 1984 arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion

or otherwise not in accordance with law?

(i)

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Air Transport Association of America v. CAB,

792 F.2a:219 (D.C. Cec 1068) a 16

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ....................... 9

FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582

CTU seis Re a oe LOI oe Ca 16

National Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commission-

ers v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1224 (1985) ..........0222.... 16

United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Commis-

sion, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978)...................... 16

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND REPORTS:

Amendment to the Commission’s Rules to Imple-

ment the Provisions of the Cable Communica-

tions Policy Act of 1984, 52 Fed. Reg. 37461

CO Ei, SIE oie eeoreeaee 8

Implementation of Cable Communications Policy

Act of 1984, 52 Fed. Reg. 36801 (Oct. 1, 1987)... 8

STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, codified at 47 U.S.C. .

§ 521 et seq.

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Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47

U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS: Page

H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 66

I ian cack lek rh clash 6, 10, 12

130 Cong. Rec. H10436 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)... 2,3

MISCELLANEOUS:

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-671

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, INC.

IN OPPOSITION

The National Cable Television Association, Inc.

(“NCTA”) respectfully submits this brief in opposition

to the Petition for 2 Writ of Certiorari filed jointly by

the State of Connecticut, the City of New York, the Na-

tional League of Cities, and the American Civil Liberties

Union (“Petitioners”). NCTA is the principal trade

association of the cable television industry in the United

States, representing the owners and operators of cable

systems serving over 80 percent of the nation’s approxi-

2

mately 43 million cable subscribers.* NCTA was an

intervenor in the proceedings below and is, therefore, a

respondent in this proceeding.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the Federal Communications Com-

mission’s implementation of one provision of the Cable

Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the “Act’”’).’ That

law amended the Communications Act of 1934 to estab-

lish, for the first time, a comprehensive federal statutory

framework for the regulation of cable television. Em-

bodying a compromise between the cable television indus-

try and state and local governments, the Act generally

codified the authority of such governments to require

cable operators to obtain franchises before providing serv-

ice—authority that had been unclear and was increas-

ingly being “challenged at the FCC and in the courts.” ”

At the same time, the Act imposed limits on the require-

ments and conditions that may be imposed by franchis-

ing authorities, thereby eliminating many of the burdens

and excesses of regulation that had hampered the effi-

cient growth and development of cable in the increas-

ingly competitive marketplace of video and entertain-

ment services.

As Representative Wirth, the chairman of the House

Telecommunications Subcommittee and the bili’s prin-

cipal sponsor in the House of Representatives, explained,

“(t]he legislation protects local authority over cable tele-

vision in several important respects.”* For example, in

* NCTA has no parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliates.

1 Public Law 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (Oct. 30, 1984), codified at,

47 U.S.C. $521 et seq.

2130 Cong. Rec. H10436 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (remarks of

Rep. Wirth).

3 Jd.

3

addition to requiring cable operators to obtain franchises,

the Act permits cities to impose annual franchise fees of

up to five percent of the cable operator’s gross revenues ;*

to enforce franchise requirements for facilities and equip-

ment and for “broad categories of video programming,”

though not for specific program services;* and to require

cable operators to provide public, educational and gov-

ernmental access channels and facilities.*®

But the legislation also “contains several provisions to

provide the industry with the certainty and stability it

needs to make large financial investments to construct

and operate cable systems.” ’ In particular, Section 623

of the Act prohibits the regulation of rates for cable

service except in certain, limited circumstances. Al-

though it was understood that the Cable Act would

generally deregulate rates after a two-year transition

period,* Section 623 allows continued regulation of basic

cable service “in circumstances in which a cable system

is not subject to effective competition.”*® The Act di-

* Act, § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 542.

5 Id., § 624, 47 U.S.C. § 544.

® Id., § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531.

7 Remarks of Rep. Wirth, supra, 130 Cong. Rec. at 10436.

8 Rep. Wirth, for example, stated that the Act “[d]Jeregulates the

rates charged for basic cable service in 2 years, allowing the mar-

ketplace to dictate the price for cable programming and serv-

MBisak

*“The term ‘basic cable service’ means any service tier which

includes the retransmission of local television broadcast signals.”

Act, § 602(2), 47 U.S.C. §522(2). Cable operators typically offer

a wide range of programming services, such as distant broad-

cast signals and nonbroadcast satellite-delivered networks, in addi-

tion to the retransmission of local signals. Some of these services

may be provided along with local broadcast signals as a separately

priced package or “tier.” Others may be offered together in a

separately available tier that does not include local broadcast signals.

Still others, such as premium movie channels, may be offered alone

4

rected the Federal Communications Commission, within

180 days of the law’s enactment, to promulgate rules de-

fining “effective competition” for this purpose and estab-

lishing standards for basic rate regulation in the absence

of effective competition. It is the definition adopted by

the Commission, which the court below affirmed, that is

at issue in this case.

Completing its rulemaking proceeding within the time

period mandated by Congress, the Commission concluded

that ‘‘a cable system will be considered to face effective

competition whenever the franchise market receives three

or more unduplicated broadcast signals.” In adopting

this definition of “effective competition,” the Commission

rejected proposals of some commenting parties to require

the availability of a larger (or smaller) number of broad-

cast signals. It also rejected proposals to require, in ad-

dition to broadcast signals, the availability of -non-

broadcast alternatives to cable, such as multichannel

multipoint distribution systems and direct broadcast

satellite-services,"' that might provide an array of non-

broadcast program services comparable to those that are

often provided along with local and distant broadcast

stations as part of the cable operator’s basic service. And

it rejected proposals of the Department of Justice and

others that would, as described by Petitioners, “apply

antitrust market analysis to the ‘effective competition’

issue.” 7”

on a per-channel basis. Under the Act, only the basic tier rate may

ever be regulated, and it may only be regulated in the absence of

“effective competition.” Act, § 623(b), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b).

10 Report and Order, {100 (Appendix to Petition for Writ of

Certiorari at Al7). (Hereinafter, the Appendix will be cited as

“Pet. App. at ——.”)

11 See Comments of National League of Cities at 45 (Jan. 28,

1985).

12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari (“‘Petition’”’) at 18.

5

The Commission acknowledged these proposals but ex-

plained why, in its view, “the existence of three or more

off-the-air broadcast signals in the cable market provides

viewers with adequate programming choices and presents

an effective constraint on the market power of a cable

system in the provision of basic service.” ** With respect

to the requisite number of broadcast signals, the only

empirical evidence submitted by commenting parties—

an economic analysis of cable rates in unregulated mar-

kets submitted by NCTA— indicated that, while the avail-

ability of the first, second and third broadcast signal in

a community each has an incremental competitive effect

on the price of basic cable service, additional signals

have no further effect on basic rates.* A three-signal

threshold was also indicated by a study, conducted by the

Commission’s staff, of Arbitron viewership data in mar-

kets with two, three, four and five available broadcast

signals. That study showed that viewership of basic

cable programming other than locally available broadcast

stations was sufficiently high to indicate possible market

power in markets with fewer than three available broad-

cast signals, but not in markets with three or more sig-

nals.“ Absent any empirical evidence indicating that

broadcast signals beyond the third would have any sig-

nificant effect on basic cable rates, the Commission deter-

mined that its definition of effective competition should

require no more than three such signals.

With respect to its decision to define effective competi-

tion solely in terms of availability of local broadcast sig-

nals and not to require the availability of nonbroadcast

alternatives to cable, the Commission acknowledged “that

13 Report and Order, § 100 (Pet. App. at A46).

14 See, Comments of the National Cable Television Association

and Community Antenna Television Association, Appendix A (Jan.

28, 1985).

15 Report and Order, { 99 (Pet. App. at A46-47).

6

many cable systems provide a number of services in ad-

dition to the retransmission of off-the-air signals” ** as

part of their basic service. But “[flor these additional

basic services to be a source of market power, it must

first be shown that a significant demand exists for these

services and that such demand is relatively inelastic.” **

The Commission found no evidence in the record of any

such significant or inelastic demand for access channels

or satellite program services provided as part of basic

cable service; indeed, it found evidence to the contrary.”

For this reason, the Commission rejected the notion “that

a cable system gains significant market advantage by the

provision of this additional programming in those mar-

kets where there are sufficient (7.e., three or more) off-

the-air broadcast signals.”

Finally, in opting for a standard based on available

broadcast signals rather than the multi-pronged anti-

trust market analysis urged by the Department of Jus-

tice, the Commission did not dispute the utility and valid-

ity of antitrust-style analysis in accurately assessing

market power on a case-by-case basis. But, as the Com-

mission noted in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Con-

gress specifically intended that the Commission define

effective competition in terms of “readily applicable cri-

teria” and that “[r]jegulations should specify objective

criteria to avoid the need for an independent examina-

tion of the status of competition on a community-by-

community basis.” * The Commission concluded that its

16 Report and Order, §. 100 (Pet. App. at A46).

17 Jd., n.68.

18 Jd,

19 Jd., { 100 (Pet. App. at A47).

20 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 48765, 48770

(Dec. 14, 1984), quoting Report of the Committee on Energy and

Commerce, H.R. Rep. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1984)

(“House Report”).

7

standard based on availability of broadcast signals pro-

vided “a reasonable benchmark for determining effective

competition with basic cable services” and best met “the

congressional intent of an administratively manageable

standard for the Commission, franchising authorities and

cable operators.” **

None of the Petitioners sought reconsideration by the

Commission of its “effective competition” standard. In-

stead, they went directly to the court of appeals, where

they “launch[ed] a broad assault on virtually every ar-

gument cited by the FCC in support of its rules, and

every component of the rules themselves.”* The court

determined, however, that the Commission had acted

reasonably both in defining “effective competition” solely

in terms of the availability of a certain number of broad-

cast signals and in selecting three as the appropriate

number. The court found that the Commission had “con-

sidered the alternatives suggested by the commenters

and offered cogent reasons for adopting a three-signal

availability standard.” *

The court of appeals also found, however, that, while

defining effective competition to exist where three broad-

cast stations are available was wholly reasonable, the

Commission had acted arbitrarily in determining when a

broadcast station should be deemed “available.” Under

the Commission’s rules, a station would be considered

available if it placed a signal of Grade B strength over

“any portion” of the cable community. The court held

that if a signal was to be deemed available as an effec-

tive competitor to cable service, “it was incumbent upon

the FCC to craft the standard more carefully, to ensure

21 Report and Order, { 98 (Pet. App. at A45).

22 American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1563

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Pet. App. at Al41).

23 Jd. at 1564 (Pet. App. at Al44).

8

that a signal is at least theoretically available over the

entire cable community or at least some significant por-

tion of the cable community.” ** The court also rejected

two minor aspects of the standards adopted by the Com-

mission governing rate regulation in those communities

where, because fewer than three broadcast stations are

available, rate regulation remains permissible.” But

apart from these exceptions, the court held “that the

FCC’s rate regulation rules are affirmed in all re-

spects.” *6

ARGUMENT

This case raises no unusual, unresolved or extraordi-

nary issues that warrant review by this Court. In deter-

mining that the Commission acted reasonably in imple-

menting its statutory mandate, the court below applied

well-established principles of administrative law and

statutory construction. Although Petitioners seek to por-

tray the Commission’s decision as arbitrary and incon-

sistent with the Act and the court’s decision as erroneous,

their real complaint is that they would like more regu-

latory authority over rates than the Act gave them. To

the extent that there has been a “nationwide impact” on

the “traditional cable rate regulation powers” of state

and local governments, as alleged by Petitioners,*’ such

impact is directly attributable to the Act—which was

specifically intended to prohibit rate regulation except in

24 Jd. at 1572 (Pet. App. at A160-61). The Commission is cur-

rently conducting a rulemaking proceeding to amend its definition

of signal availability. See Implementation of Cable Communications

Policy Act of 1984, 52 Fed. Reg. 36801 (Oct. 1, 1987).

25 823 F.2d at 1565-71 (Pet. App. at A145-158). The Commission

has already amended its standards in accordance with the court’s

decision. See Amendment to the Commission’s Rules to Implement

the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 52

Fed. Reg. 37461 (Oct. 7, 1987).

26 823 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. App. at A143).

27 Petition at 15.

9

limited circumstances—and not to any novel or arbi-

trary substantive or procedural approaches taken by the

Commission or by the court below.

As evidence of the impact of rate deregulation or of

changed conditions in the video marketplace becomes

available, the Commission is required by the Act to “peri-

odically review” ** its rules and, in any event, must pre-

pare a report for Congress on rate d@tegulation and “the

effect of competition in the marketplace” before October

30, 1990.” Moreover, Congress is closely monitoring the

effects of its deregulatory mandate.*” If implementation

of the Act leads to results that Congress either did not

intend or does not desire, it can and will make its views

known to the Commission and amend the Act. But Peti-

tioners present no basis whatever for concluding that, in

light of the statute, the legislative history and the rule-

making record, the Commission’s rules are in any respect

arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with

law.

I

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals ignored

and therefore “sanction[ed] a significant departure

from” *' this Court’s edict that, in construing statutes,

courts and agencies “must give effect to the unambigu-

ously expressed intent of Congress.” ** The court of ap-

peals was, however, well aware of that principle and, in

fact, relied specifically upon it in invalidating one of the

Commission’s standards governing rate regulation in the

28 Act, § 623(b) (3), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (8).

29 Td., § 623(h), 47 U.S.C. §543(h).

© The House Telecommunications Subcommittee intends to hold

oversight hearings on the implementation of the Act in March

1988. See Broadcasting, Feb. 15, 1988, p. 18.

31 Petition at 15.

82 Jd. at 16, quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).

10

absence of effective competition But it upheld the

Commission’s approach to defining effective competition

because, contrary to Petitioners’ faulty reading of the

Act, that approach was in no way inconsistent with the

explicit legislative intent.

Petitioners complain, first, that while the Act di-

rects the Commission to “define the circumstances in

which a cable system is not subject to effective competi-

tion,” the Commission erroneously interpreted its task as

defining the circumstances in which a cable system’s basic

service is not subject to effective competition. The Com-

mission’s approach was, in fact, not only reasonable on

its face but wholly consistent with the “expressed intent

of Congress.”

Thus, Congress specifically intended “that this rule-

making focus solely on whether there is effective com-

petition sufficient to warrant the regulation of rates for

basic cable service.” ** This follows from the fact that

the only rates that can be regulated under the Act, even

in the absence of effective competition, are rates for

basic service. In its comments in the rulemaking proceed-

ing, the Department of Justice explained why it would,

therefore, be irrational to define effective competition, for

purposes of the Act’s rate regulation provisions, in terms

ef anything other than basic service:

It would make little sense . . . to regulate the price

of basic cable service if all of a cable system’s mar-

ket power was derived from and could be exercised

in the provision of services that are expressly ex-

cluded from rate regulation under the Act.®

Second, Petitioners contend that, even if it was correct

to focus on effective competition for basic cable service,

83 See 823 F.2d at 1565-70.

34 House Report, supra, at 66 ( emphasis added).

35 Comments of the United States Department of Justice at 24

(Jan. 28, 1985).

11

the Commission erroneously viewed basic cable service as

only that portion of the basic tier that includes local

broadcast signals and “excluded all non-broadcast pro-

gramming (except access channels)” ** that might also

be provided on the same tier. In so doing, the Commis-

sion, according to Petitioners, ignored the unambiguous

statutory definition of “basic cable service,” which en-

compasses the entire “tier which includes . . . local tele-

vision broadcast signals.” **

The Commission, however, did no such thing. Having

observed, in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, that

“ijn essence, basic cable service is the provision of lo-

cally viewed broadcast signals” *"—because, “as a matter

of definition,’ *® basic service always includes local

broadcast signals but may or may not include various

nonbroadeast services—the Commission nevertheless se-

lected a standard that was intended to reflect the num-

ber of available local broadcast signals necessary to pro-

vide effective competition to the entire basic service pack-

age. Thus, the Commission recognized that “many cable

systems provide a number of services in addition to the

retransmission of off-the-air signals” * on their basic

service tiers. But it specifically concluded that cable sys-

tems would not gain “significant market advantage by

the provision of this additional programming in those

markets where there are sufficient (7.e., three or more)

off-the-air broadcast signals.” *!

36 Petition at 16.

87 Act, § 602, 47 U.S.C. § 522.

38 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra, 49 Fed. Reg. at 48770.

39 Td.

40 Report and Order, {| 100 (Pet. App. at A46).

41 Jd. (Pet. App. at A47). By implication, the Commission deter-

mined that cable systems might be able to exercise market power

from the provision of services other than local broadcast signals

in markets with fewer than three such signals. If, as Petitioners

12

Finally, Petitioners contend that Congress unambigu-

ously directed the Commission not to define effective

competition solely in terms of a specific number of broad-

east signals. But, as the court of appeals recognized,

that is not what the Act or the legislative history ac-

tually says. Petitioners point to no provision of the Act

imposing such a directive, and their attempt to read such

a requirement into the legislative history was correctly

rejected by the court of appeals. The legislative history

suggests, first, that the Commission, in fashioning a stand-

ard, “should consider the number and nature of [cable]

services provided, compared with the nature and number

of services available from alternative sources and, if so,

at what price,” and, second, that it “may find it relevant

to consider factors in addition to the number of over-

the-air broadcast stations in a market... .”* Thus,

as the court of appeals concluded, “[{t]he FCC’s mandate

was to ‘consider’ various alternatives, including, it seems,

one in which effective competition would be measured

solely in terms of the availability of broadcast signals.” *

If the Commission had determined that broadcast

signals alone were not sufficient to constrain market

power in the provision of basic cable.service but never-

theless selected a standard based solely on the availability

of broadcast signals, Petitioners’ challenge might have

been persuasive. But having considered the alternatives

and determined that three broadcast signals were gen-

suggest, the Commission was only concerned with whether there

was effective competition for the local broadcast component of basic

service, it would necessarily have concluded that there was always

effective competition. Even where there are only one or two avail-

able local broadcast stations, the availability of those signals to

viewers over-the-air free of charge obviously constitutes effective

competition to the provision of those same signals by a cable system.

42 House Report, supra, at 66.

43 823 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. App. at Al44).

13

erally sufficient to provide effective competition to basic

cable service, the Commission was not constrained (and

it would have been irrational) to require in its standard

the additional availability of other nonbroadcast pro-

gramming sources.“

II

Petitioners contend that, in failing to adopt a defini-

tion of effective competition that embodies “antitrust

market analysis,” the Commission violated “the. ac-

cepted and usual doctrine that requires agencies to con-

sider all relevant factors and explain departures from

longstanding policies.” ** They confuse the Commission’s

refusal to adopt the antitrust approach urged by the De-

partment of Justice with a failure to consider it. More-

over, the fact that the Commission uses marke analysis

in regulating telephone common carrier services and fa-

cilities pursuant to Title II of the Communications Act

of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seg. does not make its re-

jection of such an approach in implementing a wholly different

statutory task a “departure from longstanding policies.”

In its Report and Order, the Commission specifically

acknowledged that the Department of Justice had pro-

44 Petitioners also argue that, because Congress ultimately re-

jected a provision in the version of the cable bill initially passed by

the Senate, which deregulated rates whenever there were four avail-

able broadcast signals, and instead gave the Commission the respon-

sibility of determining what constituted effective competition, Con-

gress clearly did not intend that the Commission ultimately adopt

a standard based solely on broadcast signals. See Petition at 17-18.

This is a wholly unpersuasive argument. In rejecting the Senate-

passed provision, Congress cannot even be viewed as having pre-

cluded the ultimate adoption by the Commission of a similar four-

signal standard. What Congress decided was not that effective

competition could not be defined solely in terms of broadeast signals

but that it should be defined by the Commission on the basis of a

rulemaking record rather than by legislative fiat.

45 Petition at 18.

14

posed! that effective competition be defined to require “a

mininmum of five broadcast signals” ** and that “other

eriterfia be considered in addition to the signal comple-

ment.’ “7 And the Commission also explained why it

adopteed a different approach.“ The Commission sought

a starndard that would, as Congress desired, be “readily

appliccable” and “avoid the need for an independent ex-

aminaation of the status of competition on a community-

by-conmmunity basis.” ** As the National Telecommuni-

eationns and Information Administration (NTIA) had

pointeed out to the Commission, the multifaceted, anti-

trust-ttype approach proposed by the Justice Department

“woylid create an administrative nightmare, something

whicho Congress specifically sought to avoid.” ®

46 pgeport and Order, { 95 (Pet. App. at A42).

47 yqd., n.59.

48 Tyhe reason why the Commission “went so far as to dismiss, as

based upon ‘supposition and intuition,’” the Justice Department’s

five-siggnal proposal, Petition at 18, is that the Department had

itself sStated that “it appears intuitively that five broadcast stations

are neecessary,” but that “the precise number of stations could be

determnined with more accuracy if reliable empirical evidence were

availabble—and could be more or less than we suggest.” Department

of Jusstice Comments at 37 (emphasis added). Studies by NCTA

and thane Commission’s staff supplied empirical evidence that showed

that a t three-signal standard was more appropriate.

49 }{douse Report, supra, at 66.

50 Reeply Comments of NTIA 5 (Feb. 11, 1985). What the Justice

Depart'tment specifically proposed was that effective competition be

presunmed to exist if any two of the following criteria were satisfied :

First, ‘ “at least five unduplicated broadcast stations, including affili-

ates oof the three networks, can be received adequately by con-

sumers’s in the cable system’s franchise area.” Second, “the total

numbeer of channels on the basic tier, excluding local access, teletext

and sirimilar channels, is less than three times the number of broad-

cast stitations that can be received adequately in the cable system’s

franchhise area .... For the purpose of applying this criteria, the

numbeer of channels on the basic tier should be reduced by the num-

ber off substitute channels actually provided in the market by al-

eee

15

Ultimately, the Commission concluded that three broad-

cast signals would generally be sufficient to constrain

basic cable rates. And, in rejecting alternative stand-

ards that might require consideration of additional mar-

ketplace factors, the Commission explained that the

three-signal standard “meets the congressional intent of

an administratively manageable standard for the Com-

mission, franchising authorities and cable operators.” *'

Ill

Finally, Petitioners complain that the Commission

should not have been permitted by the court of appeals

to have relied upon a study conducted by its staff in the

course of the rulemaking proceeding because the study

was “virtually unavailable for public comment” ® until

the Commission issued its Report and Order. In fact,

the Commission dealt with its internal study in a man-

ner wholly consistent with sound administrative proce-

dure and precedent.

There is no legal doctrine that prevents an agency

from using its own resources to supplement or confirm

the evidence in a rulemaking record by conducting a

study in the course of the proceeding. If, in such cir-

cumstances, “[t]he staff studies were placed in the pub-

ternative delivery systems at a price comparable to that charged for

basic service.” Third, “[n]o more than 20 percent of the cable

system’s subscribers subscribe only to the basic tier as of the date

of the Act.” Department of Justice Comments, supra, at 36-41.

Senator Goldwater, the Cable Act’s principal sponsor in the Sen-

ate, specifically urged the Commission to reject this “convoluted”

standard because it was a “complicated and theoretical antitrust

approach to what Congress intended to be simple and practical rule-

making.” Letter of Sen. Goldwater to Chairman Mark S. Fowler

(Mar. 26, 1985).

51 Report and Order, { 98 (Pet. App. at A45).

52 Petition at 20.

16

lie docket at the close of the rulemaking,’™ and, by

petitioning for reconsideration, interested parties even-

tually had ample opportunity to address the staff

study,” ** the courts have held that there is no proce-

dural deficiency.” Indeed, this Court has held that, even

where a study was not disclosed until after reconsidera-

tion was denied, this “procedural lapse” was not a “suffi-

cient ground for reopening the proceedings before the

Commission.” *

In the present case, the Commission could not control

its timetable. It could not wait to issue a Notice of Pro-

posed Rulemaking until it had conducted its own internal

studies and analyses, and it could not postpone issuing

a rule until all parties had an opportunity to comment

on those studies and analyses. The Act required that the

Commission promulgate rules and make them effective

within 180 days. In these circumstances, the Commis-

sion was required, at most, only to disclose its reliance

on these studies in its final decision and to place the stu-

dies in the public record at the close of the rulemaking

proceeding—which is precisely what the Commission

did.* Petitioners had ample opportunity to challenge the

53 Air Transport Ass'n of America v. CAB, 732 F.2d 219, 224

(D.C. Cir. 1984).

54 National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC,

737 F.2d 1095, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1224

(1985).

55 See also United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584

F.2d 519, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

56 FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 591 n.22 (1981).

57 The internal staff study was placed in the record on May 1,

1985—one day before the Commission’s Report and Order appeared

in the Federal Register. See emorandum of Bruce Franca, Policy

Analysis Branch, to Joyce Butler, Dockets Branch (May 1, 1985).

Interested parties have 30 days after a Commission decision appears

in the Federal Register in which to seek reconsideration. See 47

U.S.C. § 405.

SS ae

17

validity and relevance of the staff study—and of the

NCTA study—in petitions for reconsideration, but they

simply chose not to do so.

CONCLUEiC™

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition presents no is-

sues that warrant review by this Court and should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted,

BRENDA L. Fox

MICHAEL S. SCHOOLER *

1724 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 775-3664

Counsel for National Cable

Television Association, Inc.

* Counsel of Record

February 22, 1988

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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