Appendix — Connecticut v. Federal Communications Commission
Supreme Court brief1988
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8 4 FILED
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OCT 15 67
Ne. SP. HF. SPANIOL, JR,
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
os
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, CITY OF NEW YORK, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
CITIES, and AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
Petitioners,
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Joseph |. Lieberman, Michael Botein
Attorney General Robert T. Perry*
William B. Gundling, Michael I. Meyerson
Assistant Attorney General Media Law Clinic
Carl J. Schuman, . New York Law School
Assistant Attorney General
30 Trinity Street 57 Worth Street
es 5 Se ' New York, New York 10013
Hartford, Connecticut 06106 (212) 431-2160
(203) 566-4990
October 15, 1987 * Counsel of Record for Petitioners
(Additional Counsel on Inside Cover)
:
nV
i%
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Steven R. Shapiro
C. Edwin Baker
American Civil Liberties Union
132 West 43rd Street
New York, New York 10036
(212) 944-9800
CITY OF NEW YORK
Norman M. Sinel
Paul S. Ryerson
Robert Alan Garrett
Patrick J. Grant
Barbara J. Delaney
Arnold & Porter
1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 872-6700 .
Stephen Kramer
Assistant Corporation Counsel
City of New York
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007
(212) 566-3929
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
Cynthia Pols
General Counsel
Office of Federal Relations
National League of Cities
1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 626-3020
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TO THE JOINT APPENDIX
\
\
Orders and Opinions Below PAGE
Report and Order in MM Docket No. 84-1296, 50 Fed.
Reg. 18,637 (1985) (released April 19, 1985)......... ]
Memorandum Opinion and Order in MM Docket No.
84-1296, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,770 (1986) (released June 5,
Ce hia re ane gt para yore are See yn se npr Senge are 96
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, decided July 17, 1987, in
American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1554
a ae PCO ale bi ads wk cake dew awa nee ke 115
Relevant Statute
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (relevant
| ERE eee Pat, Serr ee ee meray ys 186
Al
Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554
MM Docket No. 84-1296
MM—FCC 85-179—35670
7
In the Matter of
Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commission’s Rules
to Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984
-*
REPORT AND ORDER
(Proceeding Terminated)
Adopted: April 11, 1985 Released: April 19, 1985
By the Commission:
Commissioner Rivera not participating.
7
INTRODUCTION
1. By this action, the Commission amends its rules to
implement certain provisions of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984. This action establishes rules and regula-
tions for cable systems in the areas of ownership, channel
usage, franchise requirements and pole attachments. In addi-
tion, it establishes regulations and guidelines governing the
regulation of basic cable service rates by franchising authori-
ties.
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BACKGROUND
2. On October 30, 1984, the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984 (Cable Act) was signed into law.' This legislation
amends the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, by
-adding a new Title VI, entitled “Cable Communications.”* The
intent of the Cable Act is to establish a national policy that
encourages the growth and development of cable television
services and assures that cable systems are responsive to the
needs and interests of the local communities they serve.’
3. On December 4, 1984, the Commission adopted a Notice
of Proposed Rule Making (Notice) in the above-captioned
proceeding.* In this Notice, the Commission proposed to
amend its rules to implement certain provisions of the Cable
Act.° In particular, the Notice proposed, inter alia: 1) defini-
tions for the terms cable operator, cable service, and cable
system; 2) procedures whereby an aggrieved party may petition
the Commission for a ruling or file a complaint concerning
commercial channel access; 3) rule changes regarding common
carrier ownership of cable systems in their rural service areas;
4) criteria for determining whether a cable system is subject to
effective competition; 5) standards for regulation of basic
l Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 1
et seq., 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
2 The Cable Act also amends certain other provisions of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, as amended. For example, the Cable Act also amends
Section 224(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, by adding a
new paragraph (c)(3). -
3 See House Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. Rep. No.
934, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984) (hereinafter House Report).
4 See Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Docket No. 84-1296,
49 FR 48765 (1984).
5 The Commission also recentiy initiated a separate rule making
proceeding regarding the equal employment opportunity provisions of the
Cable Act. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Docket No. 85-61,
FCC 85-102, adopted March 1, 1985.
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cable service rates by a franchising authority in those instances
where a cable system is not subject to effective competition;
and 6) modification of our rules concerning state regulation of
pole attachments to reflect new language contained in the
Cable Act.
4. One hundred and forty (140) parties filed comments and
sixty-three (63) parties filed replies in response to the Notice. A
list of all parties is contained in Appendix A. The Commission
was required by the Cable Act to complete this rule making
within 180 days of enactment.
DISCUSSION
Section 602—Definitions
5. Section 602 of the Cable Act defines a number of funda-
mental terms. In the Notice, we proposed to amend our rules
to adopt the definitions of cable operator, cable service, and
cable system contained in the Cable Act. In proposing these
changes, we noted that there are differences between the new
definitions and the definitions presently in our rules and that
these differences may affect the manner in which we currently
regulate certain segments of the cable industry. Comments were
sought on the proposed definitions of these terms. Each of
these terms is discussed below.
6. Cable Operator. The term “cable operator” is defined in
paragraph (4) of Section 602 of the Cable Act as follows:
. any person or group of persons (A) who provides
cable service over a cable system and directly or through
one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such
cable system, or (B) who otherwise ccetrols or is responsi-
ble for, through any arrangement, the management and
operation of such a cable system.
The term “affiliate” when used in relation to any person,
means another person who owns or controls, is owned or
controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with,
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such person.° A “significant interest” for the purposes of this
definition means a cognizable interest as provided in the
Commission’s rules for attributing interests in broadcast, cable
television and newspaper properties.’
7. Several parties submitted comments on the proposed
cable operator definition. Comments filed by the law firm of
Hogan & Hartson on behalf of various cable operators and
state cable associations (Hogan & Hartson) state that the
proposed definition, if read broadly, could include not only the
local entity providing cable service to the community but also
entities associated with the cable entity. This could include
companies with management contracts to run the cable system,
even if those companies have no ownership interests, and any
person with a “cognizable interest” in the cable system, even if
those persons do not participate in the management of the
system. Hogan & Hartson suggests that the Commission
“should clarify the definition by limiting it to a single cable
operator per cable system.” Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI)
believes that the Commission should clarify the use of the term
“affiliate” to indicate that it is not being used in its common
communications sense but rather is used to describe a purely
legal relationship. In this regard, TCI believes that the Com-
mission’s present rules are more reflective of congressional
intent.
8. The New York Telephone Company and the New England
Telephone and Telegraph Company (NYNEX), while support-
ing the Commission’s proposal, believes that more specificity is
needed. NYNEX is concerned that the definition may give rise
to uncertainty concerning the ability of the telephone compa-
nies to construct, sell or lease a cable system. NYNEX requests
that the definition be amended to specify that “controls or is
responsible for” pertains to provision of cable services, not
6 See Section 602(1) of the Cable Act.
7 See 47 CFR §§ 73.3555, 73.3615 and 76.501. See also House Report
at 41.
AS
facilities. Similar views are expressed by Pacific Bell and
Nevada Bell (Pacific) in its comments and by the Ameritech
Operating Companies (Ameritech) in its reply comments. Both
Pacific and Ameritech propose that language be added to the
proposed definition to affect this change.* BellSouth Corpora-
tion (BellSouth), on behalf of its operating telephone compa-
nies, supports the Commission’s proposed adoption of the
language contained in Section 602(4) of the Cable Act. Simi-
larly, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Southwestern
Bell) supports the definition but suggests the Commission add
language to clarify the meaning of “significant interest.” The
Communications Workers of America (CWA), in its comments,
suggests that the definition be amended to include either “cable
television system operator or cable operator” to ensure consist-
ency with the statute.
9. After review of the comments and replies, we believe that
our original proposal is generally appropriate. However, in
order to ensure completeness and consistency with the statute,
we will also amend our rules to include definitions of the
terms: affiliate; person; and significant interest. With regard to
limiting the definition to include only a single cable operator
per cable system, we feel that the definition of a cable operator
is intentionally broad and that a cable system may have more
than one operator. According to the definition, any person
who “provides cable service” and “owns a significant interest”
in a cable system either directly or through a subsidiary or
affiliated company would be a cable operator. In addition,
anyone who controls or is responsible for the “management
and operation” of a cable system would also come under the
definition of a cable operator and may also be subject to
8 Pacific proposes that the definition be amended to state that it “does
not include a person or group of persons who provides cable distribution
facilities for channel service to cable systems.” Ameritech proposes the
adoption of the language suggested by Pacific or the following language:
This definition shall not include a person or groups of persons who
lease or manage local distribution systems for the delivery of cable
services by third parties.
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sanctions for violations of the provisions of the Cable Act.” On
the other hand, mere ownership of facilities used by a cable
system would not be sufficient to qualify an entity as a cable
operator. Accordingly, telephone companies that merely con-
Struct or lease cable system facilities are not cable operators
under the Cable Act.
10. Cable Service. Section 602(5) of the Cable Act defines
the term “cable service” as follows:
(A) The one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video
programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B)
subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the
selection of such video programming or other program-
ming service.
The Commission’s rules do not contain a definition of cable
service or the terms “video programming” or “other program-
ming service” which are included in this definition.'® In the
Notice, we proposed to include only the definition of the term
cable service in our rules.
11. Most parties commenting on this matter favor the addi-
tion of the definition of cable service to the Commission’s
rules.'' Several parties, however, comment that the proposed
9 However, we will generally proceed against the franchisee who is a
matter of record with us.
10 The terms “video programming” and “other programming service”
are defined in Sections 602(11) and 602(16), respectively, of the Cable Act as
follows:
the term “video programming” means programming provided by, or
generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a televi-
sion broadcast station;
the term “other programming service” means information that a cable
operator makes available to all subscribers generally.
11 These parties include Ameritech, Anchorage Telephone Utility, Bell-
South, CWA, the City of New York (NYC), the Department of Justice
(DOJ), GTE Services Corp.(GTE), the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), NYNEX, Pacific, Southwestern Bell
and the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (Connecticut
PUC).
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definition of cable service is incomplete and potentially confus-
ing without also defining the terms “video programming” and
“other program services” contained in the Cable Act. A
number of parties suggest that the definition of cable service is
meant to delineate the boundary between such services and
services for which common carrier regulation could potentially
be imposed." In this regard, Southwestern Bell suggests a more
precise definition of cable service in order to differentiate more
clearly between cable services and telephone common carrier
services. Several telephone interests, such as BellSouth and
GTE, believe that our rules should state that the provision of
non-video programming by a telephone company is a permissi-
ble activity under the Cable Act.
12. DOJ requests that the Commission clarify the definition
of the term video programming contained in the Cable Act.
DOJ recommends that the Commission indicate that program-
ming “comparable” to that provided by a television broadcast
station includes satellite-delivered, advertiser-supported pro-
gramming networks such as ESPN, commercial-free TV pro-
gramming such as HBO, and pay-per-view services which are
not generally provided by broadcast television stations.
13. The National Cable Television Association, Inc. and the
Community Antenna Television Association (NCTA/CATA),
on the other hand, suggest that the Commission need not
define the term cable service in the rules, because the term does
not generally appear elsewhere in the Commission’s rules and
inclusion of the term is inappropriate given the unresolved
12 For example, Anchorage Telephone Utility states in its reply com-
ments that Congress included the definition of cable service “to differentiate
between cable services exempted from common carrier regulation and all
other non-cable communications services which can be provided over a cable
system. Anchorage also states that Congress intended that cable operators
should not be allowed to function as telecommunications common carriers.
Similarly, Southwestern Bell proposes that the Commission adopt Sections
3(b) and 621(d)(2} of the Cable Act concerning jurisdiction of the FCC and
the states with respect to cable service to ensure clear delineation between the
regulatory treatment of cable operators offering cable services and those
offering common carrier services.
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preemption issues related to two-way services provided by
cable systems. NCTA/CATA maintains that such inclusion
might suggest that the Commission had decided that any
services “other than those meeting the Cable Act’s definition
of ‘cable service’ could be regulated as common carrier services
‘ .” In its reply comments, NCTA/CATA states that the
term cable service is intended to distinguish between those
services “that cannot, by statute, be regulated on a common
carrier basis from those whose regulatory status is yet to be
determined by the Commission.” Inclusion of the definition, it
States, could be viewed as resolving the issue of preemption of
state regulation of two-way services provided by cable systems.
14. We stated in the Notice that the legislative history
indicated that the intent of Congress in defining cable service is
to mark the boundary between the cable services that the
legislation specifically exempts from common carrier regula-
tion under Section 621(c) of the Cable Act and all other non-
cable communications services which cable systems could
provide. We proposed to resolve only those issues raised in the
Cable Act and, therefore, not to address the issue of the
regulatory treatment of non-cable communications services
offered over cable systems.'* Consistent with our proposal,
therefore, we will avoid ruling at this time on the manner of
regulatory treatment of non-cable services. We emphasize that
our adoption of the term “cable service” in our rules in no way
represents any decision as to the regulatory treatment of non-
cable services.
13 This issue is currently under consideration before the Commission in
Cox Cable Communications, Inc. (CCB-DFD-83-1), which concerns preemp-
tion of state regulation of Cox’s institutional cable service in Omaha,
Nebraska. The House Report states that the Committee “does not intend to
resolve or even address the issue of the state or Federal treatment of non-
cable communications services offered over cable systems. . . .” See House
Report at 60. It also states that nothing in the Cable Act “shal! be construed
to affect existing regulatory authority with respect to non-cable communica-
tions services provided over a cable system.” See House Report at 41.
a
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15. We believe that inclusion of the term “cable service” in
our rules is necessary and consistent with the intent of Con-
gress. The term issued extensively not only throughout the
Cable Act but also in the rules we are adopting today. We
believe that adoption of the term precisely as stated in the
Cable Act is a necessary part of our implementation process.
We believe that the legislative history and intent provides
sufficient guidance regarding the definition of cable service.
Such service includes programming services that make non-
video information generally available to all subscribers and do
not include subscriber-specific information. Cable services in-
clude, for example, pay-per-view video programming, teletext,
one-way transmission of computer software, and on-line air-
line guides or catalog services that do not allow direct customer
purchases. Two-way services that allow subscribers to manipu-
late or otherwise electronically process information or data
would not be classified as cable services.'* Examples of such
non-cable services include at-home shopping and banking ser-
vices, data processing, video conferencing, and all voice com-
munications."
16. We are aiso amending our rules at this time to include
definitions of the terms “video programming” and “other
programming service” as they afe stated in the Cable Act.
These terms are contained within the definition of the term
“cable service” and we believe that their incorporation in the
rules will reduce potential confusion which may arise from
their absence. Further, with respect to the definition of video
programming, we conclude that this definition is sufficiently
expansive to include such video programming as that provided
by ESPN, HBO, and other satellite-delivered cable network
programming.
14 With respect to data processing services or use of data bases, we
believe that the distinction between cable and non-cable services occurs with
regard to where the data processing takes place. For example, downloading
of data to a home computer that then is used to manipulate or process the
information would still be considered a cable service.
IS See House Report at 41-44,
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17. Cable System. The Notice also solicited comment on the
definition of the term “cable system” contained in the Cable
Act. The Cable Act defines a cable system as:
. . a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission
paths and associated signal generation, reception, and
control equipment that is designed to provide cable ser-
vice which includes video programming and which is
provided to multiple subscribers within a community
Furthermore, the definition of cable system in the Cable Act
specifically excludes inter alia: 1) facilities that only retransmit
the signals of television broadcast stations; and 2) facilities that
serve Only subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings
under common ownership, control, or management, unless
such facilities use public rights-of-way.
18. In the Notice, the Commission recognized several differ-
ences between this definition and the existing definition of a
cable system in the Commission’s rules. For example, the
Commission’s rules define a cable system as a facility that
distributes the signals of broadcast stations.'’ The Cable Act
redefines a cable system as a facility that provides video
programming and it specifically excludes facilities that only
retransmit broadcast signals.'* In this regard, we requested
comment on whether or not to include satellite-received
“superstations” within the meaning of television broadcast
Signals; our initial position was that such facilities not be
included within the meaning of television broadcast signals for
this purpose.
16 = Section 602(6) of the Cable Act.
17 The existing definition of a cable system is contained in Section
76.5(a) of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR § 76.5(a).
18 ~—s- The staff estimates that about ten to tweive percent of all cable
facilities, serving less than two percent of all subscribers, carry only broad-
cast signals.
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19. A second difference is that cable systems with fewer
than 50 subscribers are presently exempted from our rules.
Under the Cable Act, such systems are no longer exempted. A
third difference is that the Cable Act includes facilities, such as
satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, that serve
subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings under
common ownership, control or management, if such facilities
use public rights-of-way. The Commission’s rules exclude all
facilities that serve multiple unit dwellings under common
ownership, control or management.
20. In proposing to adopt the definition of a cable system
contained in the Cable Act, we noted that a number of
regulatory concerns remain for facilities which previously qual-
ified as cable systems but would no longer come under the
definition and sought comment on what, if any, other princi-
ples should be applied to such facilities. We indicated that
existing federal preemption policies such as those relating to
franchise fee limits, technical standards, mandatory signal
carriage, sports blackout, and network nonduplication rules
would no longer be applicable to these systems. In addition,
such facilities would no longer be eligible to be licensees in the
Cable Television Relay Service (CARS). We raised the question
of whether existing licensees should be “grandfathered” or
whether the CARS eligibility rules should be amended.
21. In general, most commenters support adoption of the
proposed definition of a cable system contained in the Cable
Act. Some concern, however, was raised by a number of
broadcast interests and others about the impact the Cable Act
definition of a cable system may have on the Commission’s
signal carriage rules.'? For example, the National Broadcasting
Company, Inc. (NBC) and the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting (CPB) argue that the definition of a cable system
should not exempt cable facilities that retransmit exclusively
broadcast signals. CPB indicates that at a minimum if the
19 The carriage rules cited by the commenters include sports blackout,
technical standards, network nonduplication protection and the mandatory
carriage Or must-carry rules.
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Commission adopts the Cable Act definition it must amend its
signal carriage rules to include facilities that retransmit exclu-
sively broadcast signals. Similarly, the Association of Indepen-
dent Television Stations, Inc. (INTV), in its reply comments,
States that the Commission should retain its current definition
of a cable system at least for the purposes of its “must-carry”
rules. Other parties, such as NCTA/CATA, also indicate that
the Commission should conduct a further inquiry to determine
the extent to which systems not covered by the Cable Act or the
rules should be subject to signal carriage rules, technical
requirements and other regulations similar to those applied to
cable systems.
22. DOJ, in its comments, states that the Commission’s
must-carry rules would not, as a practical matter, need to be
applied to “classic” cable systems (i.e., systems that retransmit
only broadcast signals) since these systems will generally re-
spond to demand for retransmission of those signals desired by
consumers. In its reply comments, DOJ indicates that the
Commission does retain authority over these systems and
suggests that the Commission could seek further comment on
whether such systems should remain subject to the “array of
Signal carriage regulations” historically applied to cable televi-
sion systems.
23. With regard to the retransmission of “superstations,”
the majority of commenters on this issue support the Commis-
sion’s proposal in this matter.*? They believe that satellite-
received superstations should not be included within the
meaning of television broadcast signals contained in the excep-
tion to the definition of a cable television system. The com-
menters generally agree that such television broadcast signals
be limited to only those signals received in a conventional
manner. In this regard, DOJ states that the Commission has
discretion in this matter but suggests that a reasonable way to
deal with this problem is to include such systems as cable
systems.
20 See, e.g., comments of Pennsylvania Cable Television Association
(PCTA), NYC, and DOJ.
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24. Most commenters object to our proposal to include
SMATYV systems serving multiple unit dwellings not under
common ownership, control or management as cable systems
only if they use public rights-of-way. Some SMATYV, cable and
municipal interests submit that the Cable Act is not intended to
alter the present status of non-commonly owned multiple unit
dwellings. Austin Satellite Television, Inc. et a/., for example,
states that the Commission proposal to include such facilities
in the exemption would require “otherwise legitimate cable
systems” to utilize public rights-of-way in order to be consid-
ered cable systems. The City of St. Louis, NYC, the Municipal
Coalition and the National League of Cities (NLC) agree and
state that the Cable Act imposes new regulations on SMATVs
that use public rights-of-way and serve commonly owned,
controlled or managed multiple unit dwellings.
25. Another issue which some commenters address is the
interpretation of the phrase “use of public rights-of-way.”
Private Cable Systems, Inc. and Direct Satellite Communica-
tions, Inc. suggest that the definition of the term should
remain a local responsibility and that the revised definition
should not automatically subject SMATV systems to federal
cable regulation.”’ In its reply, NTIA, on the other hand,
declares that Congress did intend to include systems which
make incidental use of public rights-of-way in the cable system
definition. Furthermore, NCTA/CATA, TCI, the National
Association of State Cable Agencies (NASCA), and the City of
Austin state that, regardless of their status under the Cable
Act, SMATVs should be subject to the same regulatory obliga-
tions as cable systems.
26. Several commenters were concerned with the impact of
the definition on small cable systems and SMATV operations.
The Microwave Communications Products Division of the
Hughes Aircraft Company (Hughes) states that this new defini-
21 Direct Satellite notes, for example, that it is not unusual for a
commonly-owned group of multi-unit dwellings to be situated on both sides
of a public street or for a developer to dedicate streets to a local municipality
following construction.
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tion will render many older and smaller cable systems ineligible
for CARS licenses. Hughes believes that such systems should
continue to be eligible for CARS licenses. Hughes does not
believe that grandfathering these existing small systems is the
appropriate solution. Hughes proposes that the CARS eligibil-
ity rules be amended to incorporate the existing Commission
definition of “cable system.”
27. After reviewing the record, we believe that adoption of
the definition of a cable system contained in the Cable Act is
appropriate. We concur with DOJ, which states in its com-
ments, that the Commission cannot define cable systems to
include systems that retransmit only broadcast signals given the
clear language to the contrary in the Cable Act. Accordingly,
facilities that merely retransmit broadcast signals will not be
considered cable systems for purposes of the Cable Act or the
Commission’s rules to the extent indicated herein. With respect
to the status of “superstations,” we believe that such signals
which emanate well beyond the local viewing area should not
be considered broadcast television signals for the limited pur-
pose of the broadcast-only exclusion contained in the defini-
tion of a cable system. To do otherwise would preclude from
regulation many systems which the Congress clearly intended
to include within the scope of the Cable Act’s definition of a
cable system. On the other hand, we agree with the commen-
ters that this proceeding is not the appropriate place to decide
the status of signal carriage requirements for such rebroadcast
only facilities. Accordingly, at this time, facilities now subject
to signal carriage rules will continue to remain subject to those
same requirements. Facilities constructed after the effective
date of these rules and not meeting the definition of a cable
system contained in the Cable Act, however, will no longer be
subject to any signal carriage requirements. With regard to the
exclusion of facilities serving multiple unit dwellings, we will
include as cable systems only such facilities that use public
rights-of-way. Further, with respect to CARS eligibility, we.
believe that CARS facilities should be limited to only those
systems which qualify as cable systems under the revised
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definition.” We will, however, grandfather existing systems
which hold CARS licenses as of the effective date of this
action. As a final matter, we emphasize that any regulations
which are inconsistent with the policy of the statute or place a
burden on interstate communications will continue to be re-
garded as in conflict with federal regulatory policy.”
Sections 611 and 612—Use of Cable Channels
28. Sections 611 and 612 of the Cable Act concern the use of
cable channels. Section 611 specifies that a franchising author-
ity may establish requirements to designate channels for pub-
lic, educational or governmental (PEG) use. In addition,
Section 611 prohibits the cable operator from exercising any
editorial control over the PEG channels. Section 612 estab-
lishes those conditions under which a cable operator must
designate channels for commercial use by persons unaffiliated
with the cable operator. The term “commercial use” is defined
in Section 612(b)(5)(B) as the provision of video programming,
whether or not for profit. Cable systems with fewer than 36
activated channels are not required to designate any channel
capacity for commercial use. Cable systems with 36 or more
activated channels must designate a certain percentage of their
capacity for commercial use.”
22 It should be noted, however, that such cable facilities may be eligible
for microwave systems above 18 GHz in the private radio services and can
also lease channel capacity from common carriers.
23 See, for example, Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 FCC 2d
1223 (1983), recon. denied FCC 84-206 (May 14, 1984), aff’d sub nom. New
York State Commission Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
24 Systems with 36 to 54 activated channels must designate 10 percent
for commercial use and systems with 55 or more must designate 15 percent.
Except for systems with more than 100 channels, must-carry channels and
channels which cannot be used due to technical and safety requirements
(e.g., aeronautical channels) are subtracted from the system’s total capacity
for the purposes of determining the percentage of designated commercial
channels. In addition, any fractional amount of a channel is rounded up to
the next whole number of channels.
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29. Section 612 also provides a right of action for any
person aggrieved by the failure or refusal of a cable operator to
make commercial channel capacity available. The first avenue
of relief is the federal court system. However, Section 612 also
provides that parties may petition the Commission for relief
upon a showing that a cable operator or a multiple system
operator (MSO) has repeatedly violated this section.** The
Commission is also authorized to establish any additional rule
or order, including a rate schedule, if it finds that there is a
pattern or practice of abuse.
30. Commercial Channel Access Disputes. In order to im-
plement the provision of the Cable Act concerning commercial
channel access disputes, we proposed in the Notice to follow
the administrative procedures set forth in Section 76.7 of the
Commission’s rules. Section 76.7 provides procedures for peti-
tions for special relief whereby an aggrieved party may petition
the Commission for a ruling or file a complaint. We requested
comment on this approach as well as other remedial procedures
such as the show cause procedures contained in Section 76.9 of
the Commission’s rules.
31. Most parties commenting on this matter favor the use of
the special relief procedures proposed in the Notice. For
example, cable parties and other interests generally endorse the
use of the special relief procedures contained in Section 76.7 of
our rules for adjudication of commercial channel access dis-
putes. Several commenters suggest, however, that specific lan-
guage be added to the proposed rule to indicate that three prior
adjudications are required before the special relief procedures
may be invoked.
25 Three or more adjudicated violations would generally constitute a
pattern or practice of abuse with respect to a single cable operator. However,
three adjudications on three different cable systems all controlled by an MSO
may not necessarily constitute such a pattern. Nevertheless, to the extent that
a few violations which might otherwise appear to be isolated are found to be
the result of corporate headquarter decisions, directives or actions, these
actions may be grounds for a Commission finding that an MSO has engaged
in a pattern of abuse. See House Report at 53-54.
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Al7
32. The Cable Television Access Coalition (Access Coali-
tion) and Connecticut PUC contend that the burden of proof
in these matters should be on the cable operator and not the
petitioner. For this reason, they propose that a show cause
procedure be used. NYC, in its comments, suggests that an
aggrieved party should be able to choose any course of action,
e.g., special relief, show cause or forfeiture proceeding.
33. Some commenters express concern over what constitutes
commercial leased access in terms of rate discrimination. The
Access Coalition claims the “Commission should emphasize
that rate structures . . . must fall within a reasonable scope
”
34. After reviewing the comments and replies, we conclude
that the administrative procedures proposed in the Notice are
the most appropriate means of adjudicating commercial chan-
nel access disputes. The special relief procedures afford the
Commission significant flexibility in conducting a proceeding
and in determining an appropriate remedy. While such special
relief procedures do place the burden of proof on the peti-
tioner, we believe that this burden is not unreasonable and is
consistent with the prior adjudication standard set forth in the
Cable Act.” Therefore, we are amending our rules to include a
new rule section on commercial channel access as proposed in
the Notice. This new rule section wil! specify that the special
relief provisions contained in Section 76.7 shall be used in the
case of commercial channel access disputes. We will also
specify in this rule section that three prior adjudications are
necessary before the Commission will entertain petitions re-
garding commercial channel access. This action in no way
limits the sanction provisions, such as show cause orders and
forfeitures, which the Commission may take in response to
commercial channel access disputes.
26 There must be three or more adjudicated violations before an
aggrieved party may petition the Commission. Furthermore, the special relief
process may also protect MSOs from frivolous complaints of violating this
section.
Al8
35. With respect to the issue of establishing rules to ensure
reasonable rates for commercial leased access, Section 612(f)
of the Cable Act states that “there shall be a presumption that
the price, terms, and conditions for use of [commercial]
channel capacity . . . are reasonable and in good faith unless
shown by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” We,
therefore, do not believe that additional rules or regulations
are appropriate or necessary and will not modify our rules at
this time to include language specific to “reasonable” rates for
commercial leased access. This action does not prevent parties
from filing commercial access dispute petitions that have met
the prior adjudication standard based upon unreasonable
rates, terms and conditions.
36. Other Issues. A number of other issues were raised by
the commenters regarding the requirements of Sections 611
and 612 of the Cable Act. The law firm of Farrow,
Schildhause, Wilson & Rains (Farrow) raises a number of
constitutional questions regarding access channels. Farrow
suggests that the forced opening of a cable system to PEG and
commercial access may be the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation or an improper restric-
tion on the First Amendment rights of cable operators. Farrow
Suggests that the Commission consider raising these constitu-
tional questions and staying access obligations while this ques-
tion is being litigated. Farrow also proposes that the
Commission allow special rélief petitions against franchising
authorities to permit an operator to test the constitutionality of
Section 612(h) of the Cable Act. This subsection allows a
franchising authority to prohibit a local cable system from
carrying leased channel programming that local authorities
consider obscene.
37. With respect to the constitutional questions raised by
Farrow concerning channel access, similar access matters have
been before the courts and have been found to be constitu-
Al9
tional.*’ Further, the Commission is charged with implement-
ing the Cable Act in a timely fashion. We do not believe that
grant of a stay of all channel access obligations, until all
constitutional questions regarding the Cable Act are resolved,
is appropriate here.
38. Western Communications, Inc. (WCI) and Gill Indus-
tries, in their comments, request clarification of the commer-
cial channel access requirement. They are concerned that a
cable operator could be required to permit commercial channel
lessees access to the computer systems and associated hardware
used by the cable operator.” They state that making such
access mandatory would not be “reasonable” under Section
612(c)(1) of the Cable Act.” We concur with the commenters
on this issue. We find no basis either in the legislative history or
in the Cable Act that would require cable operators to afford
mandatory access to control systems by third party commercial
channel lessees. However, to the extent that a cable system
deliberately configures itself technically to preclude commer-
cial access, such action would likely be viewed as a direct
attempt to thwart Congressional intent and could result in
sanctions being imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction.
27 See, e.g., Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F.
Supp. 976 (D.R.1. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-1800 (Ist Cir. Oct. 27,
1983) (state agency jurisdiction question certified to R. I. Supreme Ct.,
A.2d (R. I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1985), and returned to Ist Cir. for
constitutional questions).
28 In addressable cable systems, each converter/descrambler is nor-
mally controlled by a central computer which uses an integrated program to
authorize program choices, automatically generate billing information, and
produce reports and accounts for the cable system.
29 This section of the Cable Act states that the cable operator may
establish rates, terms or conditions for commercial use that are sufficient to
ensure that such use will not adversely affect the operation of the cable
system.
A20
39. As a final matter, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. (Cap Cities)
and Hogan & Hartson request clarification concerning the
definition of activated channels. Cap Cities contends that the
language of the Cable Act is ambiguous. Hogan & Hartson, in
its comments, requests clarification on the use of aeronautical
channels and channels that have been designated for commer-
cial uses prior to the effective date of the statute. Specifically, it
believes that the Commission should declare that channel
availablity will be judged by the aeronautical rules under which
the cable operator elects to operate and that commercial use
which commenced prior to December 29, 1984, may still be
deemed commercial use for Section 612 purposes.
40. Section 612(b)(S)(A) of the Cable Act defines activated
channels as “those channels engineered at the headend of the
cable system for the provision of services generally available to
residential subscribers of the cable system, regardless of
whether such services actually are provided, including any
channel designated for public, educational, or governmental
use.” We do not believe that it is necessary at this time to
define “activated channel” in our rules. We believe that the
intent of the statute is clear. For purposes of compliance with
the access requirements of the statute, we will consider “acti-
vated channels” to include all channels used for the provision
of video and other programming services generally available to
subscribers, i.e., any channel used to provide cable service to
subscribers. In addition, those channels not carrying any pro-
gramming but capable of delivering cable service to subscribers
without additional engineering modification of the system will
be considered activated for the purposes of access channel
allocation.”
30 For example, channels that are currently set aside for future expan-
sion of services on the cable system would be counted as “activated
channels” whether or not new subscriber equipment would be necessary to
receive such services. (It should be noted that there is no requirement that the
cable operator provide any such new subscriber equipment necessary to
receive channels designated for commercial use.) Additional system capacity
that would require new equipment to be installed throughout the cable
A21
41. With respect to the questions of aeronautical and prior
commercial use, we agree with the commenters on both issues.
In determining the base of channels to which the commercial
channel percentage requirement is applied, it is up to the cable
system to declare under which aeronautical rules it chooses to
operate. Commercial use applicants cannot force cable opera-
tors to alter the aeronautical channel system under which they
operate in order to affect channel capacity. As for prior
commercial uses, we see no reason that a channel designated
for commercial use before the effective date of the statute
cannot continue to be used for the purposes of satisfying this
requirement.
Section 613—Ownership Restrictions
42. Section 613 of the Cable Act establishes restrictions on
the ownership and operation of cable television systems by
local television broadcasters and local telephone companies.
43. Cable/Broadcast Station Restrictions. Section 613(a)
of the Cable Act prohibits the ownership of a cable system by a
television broadcast licensee whose predicted Grade B contour
covers any portion of the cable community. This provision is
the same in substance as Section 76.501(a)(2) of the Commis-
sion’s rules. Accordingly, we did not propose any change to
this rule in the Notice.
44. Several commenters, such as WCI and TCI, agree that
Section 613(a) of the Cable Act and Section 76.501(a)(2) of the
Commission’s rules are equivalent and that no changes should
be made to our rules. NYC recommends the adoption of the
specific language of the Cable Act. The NLC believes that
there is no need to retain this rule since it duplicates the statute.
Marsh Media Ltd. (Marsh) believes that any television/cable
crossownership rules are unconstitutional and that the Com-
system would not be considered activated channels for the purpose of
determining commercial channel requirements. In this regard, the mere
absence of a cabie headend processor would not, in and of itself, be an
indication of lack of system capacity.
A22
mission should refrain from enforcing these statutory provi-
sions.
45. We believe that our current rule is appropriate and
should be maintained. As the rule is currently worded, it has
the same effect as Section 613(a) of the Cable Act. Therefore,
we believe there is no need to substitute the language of the
Statute, as NYC suggests. We believe that our rules should
contain the substance of the significant provisions of the Cable
Act. Accordingly, we will not adopt the NLC’s suggestion to
eliminate this rule.
46. Cable/Telephone Company Restrictions. Section
613(b) of the Cable Act establishes regulations pertaining to
cable system ownership by a common carrier within its tele-
phone service area. Section 613(b)(1) makes it unlawful for a
common carrier to provide video programming to subscribers
in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly
through an affiliate. Under Section 613(b)(2), a common -
carrier is prohibited from providing pole or conduit space, or
channels of communications, to any entity that it owns or
controls, if these facilities are to be used for the provision of
video programming directly to subscribers. These provisions of
the Cable Act are similar to the cable/telephone company
ownership prohibitions contained in Sections 63.54 and 63.55
of the Commission’s rules. In the Notice we proposed only to
replace the term “cable television service” with “the provision
of video programming” language contained in the Cable Act.
47. Many commenters agree with our proposal to amend
Part 63 of our rules by substituting “the provision of video
programming” for “cable television service.” BellSouth states
that this amendment would permit telephone companies to
provide other programming services, which was the intention
of the Cable Act. The joint comments of 105 cable operators
(Cable Operators) favor this proposal but add that the Com-
mission should explicitly state that all non-textual video serv-
ices including pay cable and pay-per-view are within the
definition of video programming.
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A23
48. Several commenters believe that clarifications may be
needed if the language of the statute replaces the wording of
our rules. For example, NTIA states that the Commission
should ensure that such an amendment will not prevent tele-
phone companies from continuing to offer broadband video
transport services under tariff. Centel Communications Com-
pany (Centel) believes that we should make it clear that this
change in terminology has no effect on our decision to permit
affiliates of telephone companies to have blanket Section 214
authorization when they propose to offer cable service outside
their telephone service area.”'
49. A few commenters believe that we should not change
“cable television service” to “the provision of video program-
ming.” The Joint Cable Operators, Florida Cable Television
Association and Cox Cable Communications, Inc. (Cox) state
that the intent of Section 613(b) is to codify current Commis-
sion rules and, therefore, we should retais) these rules as
presently written. NYNEX sees no need for this change.
However, if the rules are amended as proposed, they believe
that the definition of “video programming” should also be
adopted.
50. Several commenters address other issues not specifically
mentioned in the Notice. The NLC believes that those rules of
Part 63 that duplicate the Cable Act should be deleted. The
U.S. Telephone Association (USTA) suggests replacing the
term “telephone common carrier” with “common carrier.”
GTE believes the more appropriate term is “any common
carrier . . . im its service area,” as used in Section 613(b),
because these rules are meant to apply only to traditional
exchange telephone companies. Centel states that Note (1)(a)
of Section 63.54 of our rules is ambiguous and should be
modified to allow voluntary cooperation between telephone
31 Report and Order, Docket 84-28, 49 FR 21333 (1984).
A24
and cable companies.’ Telephone and Data Systems Inc. and
TDS Cable Communications Company (TDS) comments that
Note 1, as currently written, makes it difficult to ascertain
what type of “relationship” is permissible without a case-by-
case clarification.
51. Farrow believes that telephone companies proposing to
offer only broadcast signals on cable systems should not be
exempt from the cross-ownership restrictions. It states that
Section 613(b)(1) seems to make this clear when the section
provides that telephone companies may not sell video program-
ming. However, Farrow indicates that problems may arise since
Section 602(6) changes the definition of a cable system to
exempt systems carrying only broadcast signals. GTE disagrees
and states that pure retransmission systems should be exempt.
52. Several cellular radio operators, such as the Cellular
Telecommunications Division of Telocator Network of Amer-
ica, Inc. (Cellular), state that the application of crossownership
restrictions to non-wireline common carriers is not justified by
the policies and purposes of Section 613 and would not be in
the public interest. Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. comments that the
basis of the crossownership restrictions relates to the unique
monopoly position held by local landline telephone exchange
carriers in their telephone service areas. Non-wireline cellular
operators will not have a monopoly. Further, cable operators
are not dependent on non-wireline carriers for pole attach-
ments or transmission capacity. Therefore, non-wireline carri-
ers have no incentive for abuse, like landline carriers, and
should not be affected by these restrictions. GTE, in its reply
comments, believes that there is no reason to include wireline
cellular operators, if non-wireline common carriers are ex-
empted.
32 Note (1)(a) of Section 63.54 states:
As used above, the terms “control” and “affiliate” bar any financial or
business relationship whatsoever by contract or otherwise, directly or
indirectly between the carrier and the customer, except only the carrier-
user relationship. -
A25
53. We will substitute the language of the Cable Act, “provi-
sion of video programming,” for the term “cable television
service” in Part 63 of our rules. We believe that this change is
sufficient to make the substance of our rules conform to the
statute. The Cable Act is quite clear that its intention is to
restrict only the direct provision of video programming to
subscribers by common carriers in the same areas as they
provide telephone service.” In this regard, we believe that the
provisions of Section 613(b)(1) aiso apply to telephone compa-
nies proposing to offer only broadcast signals on their cable
systems. While such cable systems may be exempt from other
provisions of the Cable Act, it is clear that these cable systems
provide video programming directly to subscribers. Therefore,
without a waiver from the Commission, ownership of such a
system by a common carrier within its telephone service area
would be prohibited.
54. Finally, we will not apply the telephone company/cable
crossownership restriction to non-wireline cellular operators
and other radio common carriers.** Cellular operators provide
telephone service to their subscribers using radio communica-
tions and do not have telephone service areas in the traditional
sense. We have not applied these restrictions to non-wireline
common carriers in the past and nothing in the Cable Act or its
legislative history indicates that we should change this policy.
55. Attribution of Ownership. In the Notice, we requested
comment on the issue of attribution for the purpose of defin-
ing ownership and control as it relates to cable system owner-
ship by a common carrier. While the legislative history
specifically states that the Commission’s attribution rules apply
33 The Cable Act defines “video programming” as that which is
comparable to the programming provided by a television broadcast station in
Section 602(16). We interpret this to include broadcast stations, supersta-
tions, satellite delivered cable networks and pay cable whether the subscriber
fee is on a per channel or per program basis.
34 For similar reasons, these crossownership restrictions will not apply
to wireline cellular operators in areas in which they operate cellular systems
but do not provide wireline telephone service.
A26
for broadcast station-cable system crossownership, it is silent
on the issue of common carriers. We note that the current
Commission attribution standards differ for common carriers
and broadcast stations.
56. DOJ and numerous cable interests recommend that we
retain the current attribution rules. NCTA/CATA states that
we should not modify the attribution limits without specific
direction from Congress, as the cabie and common carrier
rules differ fundamentally in origin and purpose. TCI believes
that the attribution standards should not be relaxed since
common cafriers are not subject to multiple ownership rules
and there is the potential for extensive passive ownership.
Hogan & Hartson, in its reply comment, states that relaxation
of the attribution rules would subvert the independence of the
cable industry.
57. A few commenters suggest changes to the attribution
rules at this time. Several of these parties favor adoption of the
same standards for common carriers as for broadcasters and
cable operators. Among them, the American Council of Life
Insurance (ACLI) believes that the purpose of Section 613 is to
develop a uniform approach to ownership restrictions. If
Congress had intended a different standard for common carri-
ers, it would have said so in the legislative history, in their
view. Further, ACLI states that the current low standard
unduly inhibits the availability of investment capital. BellSouth
proposes to amend the attribution rules to permit the owner-
ship of telephone companies and cable systems as long as the
common parent company’s ownership in the cable system is
limited to no more than SO percent of the entire ownership of
the cable system.
58. We do not believe that it is appropriate to modify the
attribution rules in this proceeding. First, the commenters have
not submitted sufficient evidence to indicate the necessity of
such an action at this time. Second, there is nothing in the
Cable Act or legislative history that indicates that Congress
believed this change would be desirable. Specifically, the House
A27
Report states that it is “the intent of section 613(b) to codify
current FCC rules concerning the provision of video program-
ming over cable systems by common carriers.”*° Accordingly,
we will at this time maintain the current attribution limits for
common carriers with regard to restrictions on cable owner-
ship.
-59. Rural Crossownership Exemption. Section 613(b)(3) of
the Cable Act exempts telephone common carriers from the
ban on cable system ownership in rural areas as defined by the
Commission. Under this subsection of the Cable Act, tele-
phone companies will be able to own cable systems that serve
rural areas without applying to the Commission for waivers.
The House Report indicates that the intent of Section 613(b)(3)
of the Cable Act is to eliminate all legal and administrative
barriers preventing a common carrier from providing rural
cable television service.*° According to the House Report, the
Commission’s role is to define “rural area” and to certify that
a service area meets this definition. The Notice made no
specific proposal for this certification procedure.”
60. The Commission’s rules currently permit telephone
company ownership of a cable system in rural areas, as defined
in Section 63.58, when “no cable television system is under
construction or in existence within the proposed cable televi-
sion service area.” In other cases, the telephone company must
apply for a waiver. In the Notice, we proposed to expand the
exemption from the waiver process by deleting the phrase “if
no cable television system is under construction or in existence
within the proposed cable television service area” from our
rules. The Commission’s definition of rural area is based on
35. See House Report at 56.
36 See House Report at 56-57.
37 Currently, a telephone company that proposes to offer cable service
and qualifies for an exemption from Section 63.58 of our rules files for
Section 214 authority by submitting the information described in Section
63.01 of our rules and certifies that the service area is rural and that it has
applied for a franchise.
A28
population criteria using U.S. Department of Commerce, Bu-
reau of the Census, definitions and statistics. We proposed no
changes to this definition in the Notice.
61. Several telephone company interests and NTIA agree
with our proposal to simply delete the qualifying phrase from
Section 63.58 of our rules. These parties believe that such an
action is sufficient to make our rules consistent with the Cable
Act.
62. Many cable interests argue that the deletion of the
qualification for exemption is not justified by the legislative
history or intent of the Cable Act.** They state that Section
613(b) of the Cable Act was amended after the House Report
that the Commission relied on was written. They quote later
House comments that the “policy of subsection 613(b) is that
telephone companies should not provide video programming
directly to subscribers in their telephone service areas.” As
viewed by cable operators such as the Mid-America Cable
Television Association, this statement indicates an absolute ban
on the provision of cable service by telephone companies in
their service areas including rural areas. Further, these compa-
nies argue that the Commission exemption for rural areas was
designed only “to allow them [telephone companies] to own
cable systems where cable service would otherwise be denied to
local residents.”*’ Therefore, they state there are no grounds
for eliminating the qualifying statement from our rules.
63. The Community Antenna Television Association
(CATA) comments that the Commission has previously recog-
nized the importance of independent cable service wherever
possible as a matter of public policy and in the interest of fair
competition. They believe that the qualification limiting tele-
phone company ownership to those areas where independent
cable service is impractical is an integral part of the definition
of rural area. Thus, it should not be eliminated. Further, this
limitation is justified by a “demonstrated pattern of abuse by
38 = Cong. Rec., October 1, 1984, at H10438.
39 —- Cong. Rec., October 1, 1984, at H10436.
A29
telephone companies which results when these companies are
unfettered in their dealings with cable systems,” according to
CATA.”
64. With regard to the definition of rural areas as it is now
written, several telephone interests agree with our proposal to
continue to define rural areas in terms of population. A few
cable commenters, Southwestern Bell and DOJ state that this
definition should be modified. Southwestern Bell believes that
a broader definition is needed to bring cable service as rapidly
as possible to rural areas, as Congress intended. However, they
make no specific suggestion on how this should be accom-
plished. DOJ and others state that the definition could be
improved by basing it upon a population density stanaard.
DOJ states that the definition should be “crafted to further the
policy objective of prohibiting telephone-cable crossownership
except in those markets where an unaffiliated cable system
would not be economically feasible.” Further, DOJ notes that
population density has traditionally been a yardstick used by
the cable industry to determine potential viability of cable
systems. Among the other commenters, Mid-America recom-
mends that the definition include a density standard of less
than 10 households per route mile.
65. A further concern of commenters is the process that a
telephone company will be required to use to certify that the
proposed cable service area is rural. Commenters representing
telephone interests assert that the application procedures for
certification pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 63.01 of the Commis-
sion’s rules are too burdensome and should be modified or
eliminated. Clarks Telephone Company ef ai. states that a
simple certification that the area is rural should be substituted
for the 214 application. TDS believes that all that is required
for certification is a map showing the boundaries of the area to
40 The CWA disagrees with this position. It states that the most
practical means for_providing cable service in rural areas is to have telephone
companies offer it. These operations would be conducted with the necessary
safeguards of all line-of-business operations.
A30
be served and a statement that it meets the Commission’s
definition of a rural area. Eagle Telecommunications, Inc./
Colorado, among others, proposes that telephone companies
certify that their service area is rural in conjunction with their
cable operator registration statement.*!
66. The cable operators that commented on this issue be-
lieve that nothing in the Cable Act or the legislative history
exempts telephone companies serving rural areas from the
requirements of Section 214. TCI, for example, asserts that
telephone companies should demonstrate that the proposed
service area is rural in their Section 214 applications. In
addition, TCI states that telephone companies should also be
required to project that the likely future population growth in
the area (TCI suggests this be done for perhaps five years) will
not remove the area from the rural category. Further, TCI
believes any rural exemption request should be put on public
notice and formal notification should be given to local cable
operators. In its reply, Hogan & Hartson argues that the
elimination of the requirements of Section 214 is contrary to
the instructions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.”
67. It is clear from the statute and the comments of the
Congress that Section 613(b)(3) is intended to permit telephone
company ownership of cable systems in their rural service areas
without any qualifications. The amendments made to Section
613 after the House Report was written have no effect on
subsection (b)(3). The legislative comments referred to by the
objecting cable interests were addressing a general policy.
Congress has stated that cable systems in rural areas are
exceptions to this policy. The proposed legislation in the House
4) For example, this position was generally supported by the National
Telephone Cooperative Association, TDS and BellSouth.
42 National Cable Television Association, Inc. v FCC, 747 F.2d 1503
(D.C. Cir. 1984). In that decision, the Court required the Commission to
consider whether “allowing a local phone company to provide cable services
will reduce the public convenience and necessity by allowing the local phone
company to engage in anti-competitive practices... .”
A31
Report includes this subsection exactly as it was adopted.”
While the Commission’s previous policy was to limit telephone
company ownership of cable systems without the grant of a
waiver to those areas where there would not be independent
cable ownership, the provisions of the Cable Act require that
we modify this policy. Accordingly, the exemption qualification
will now be eliminated from our rules.
68. The Cable Act and legislative history state that the
Commission is responsible for defining “rural area.” There is
no indication that Congress disapproves of the Commission’s
current definition. From our experience, these criteria gener-
ally define areas that are indeed rural, and are unlikely to be
served by independent cable systems. Accordingly, we will not
modify the existing definition of rural areas, as given in -
Section 63.58. For cable systems that qualify under our defini-
tion of rural, we will adopt an abbreviated process for granting
Section 214 authority. In doing so, we will eliminate the burden
of submitting the detailed information required by Section
63.01 of our rules. Instead, we will adopt a new Section 63.09
which will require submission of basic information on the
system providing video programming and certification that the
proposed service area is rural under one of the definitions
contained in Section 63.58 of our rules. The Part 63 applica-
tions will be put on public notice and the public will be given
an opportunity to file objections. We believe that this proce-
dure will meet the requirement that we certify that a proposed
cable system will serve a rural area without burdening either
the telephone company or the Commission. We note that the
Cable Act does not specifically address the issue of Section 214
authority and the certification process. However, the legislative
history emphasizes the need to expedite the provision of cable
service to rural areas. We believe that this simple process
43 See House Report at 6, 104. This subsection is quite clear and
simple. It states that “[t]his subsection shall not apply to any common carrier
to the extent such carrier provides telephone exchange service in any rural
area (as defined by the Commission).” (Emphasis added.)
a
A32
minimizes the administrative burden and is an important
means to accomplish this goal. Finally, we do not agree with
those commenters that suggest that a telephone company
should be required to project the future population growth of
the rural area it proposed to serve. We believe that such a
requirement is not in keeping with the intent of this section of
the Cable Act to foster the provision of cable service and that
estimates of population growth would be highly speculative at
best.
69. Waivers. Section 613(b)(4) of the Cable Act permits
the Commission to waive these crossownership restrictions in
those circumstances where a waiver is justified in accordance
with Section 63.56 of its rules. TCI comments that a telephone
company asking a waiver should have the burden of demon-
strating that it is unlikely that independent cable service would
otherwise be provided in the foreseeable future. NYNEX states
that the Commission should take steps to prevent the situation
whereby once a telephone company demonstrates an interest in
filing for a waiver, an independent cable company states its
intent to construct a cable system, thereby precluding the
telephone company. Viacom International Inc. (Viacom) com-
ments that the Commission should ascertain whether a tele-
phone company is subject to line-of-business restrictions by the
AT&T consent decree, before a waiver is granted. If so, we
should ascertain whether DOJ approval is likely.
70. We note these comments. However, we believe that our
current waiver rules and procedures balance the concerns of all
parties. We also note that the Cable Act specifically states that
“waivers shall be made in accordance with Section 63.56. . .
(as in effect on September 20, 1984).” Accordingly, we will
make no changes to Section 63.56 of our rules at this time.
71. Other Matters. Section 613(c) of the Cable Act gives
the Commission the authority to enact rules relating to local
crossownership between cable systems and other media of mass
communications.” Given this authority, we stated in the Notice
44 Section 613(g) of the Cable Act defines “media of mass communica-
tions” as it is defined earlier in Section 309(i)(3)(c)(i) of the Communications
A33
that we believed that this was an appropriate time to consider
whether the cable crossownership restrictions should apply to
other competing media of mass communications, such as
~ MDS.
72. The cable interests commenting on this issue generally
believe that it is unnecessary to apply cable crossownership
restrictions to additional mass media, especially MDS. For
example, Cap Cities states that cable and MDS typically serve
different classes of subscribers with different services and that
the situations where they are head-to-head competitors are the
exception, rather than the rule. Viacom believes that we should
not adopt cable ownership restrictions for these other compet-
ing media, unless there is evidence that such restrictions are
necessary. DOJ comments that restrictions of this nature would
be premature, since there is no indication of concentration of
ownership of these other video technologies.
73. Other commenters on this issue believe either that there
is a definite need for additional ownership restrictions or there
may be such a need. The NLC recommends the initiation of a
separate rule making proceeding to consider the possibility of
new rules. The Connecticut PUC urges adoption of cross-
ownership restrictions for all other media, including print, at
this time.** TRAC/H. Geller/D.Lampert (Geller) in reply com-
ments, states that crossownership should be prohibited be-
tween a cable operator and either an MDS licensee or a
customer-programmer of MDS. While MDS has had difficulty
competing with cable, MMDS will be the main competitor to
Act of 1934, as amended. Media of mass communications are defined as:
television, radio, cable television, multipoint distribution service,
direct broadcast satellite service and other services, the licensed facili-
ties of which may be substantially devoted toward providing program-
ming or other information services within the editorial control of the
licensee.
45 TCI also comments that the Commission should not repeal its ban
on network ownership of cable systems.
A34
cable, according to Geller. Southwestern Bell states that equity
requires crossownership bans for all competing media. The
Anchorage Telephone Utility concurs with this opinion in its
reply comments. It believes that:
If the FCC imposes cross ownership restrictions on local
broadcasters and telephone companies on the theory that
it will prevent establishment of media monopolies, it must
either apply the same restrictions to other competing
media or eliminate the restrictions for all competing
media.
74. We do not believe that additional ownership regulations
are appropriate at this time. We are not aware of any concen-
tration of ownership of the alternative video delivery systems,
especially by cable operators. Further, there is no evidence that
there is likely to be a problem in the foreseeable future. We
again note that we have the authority to establish additional
rules. If we deem such restrictions necessary, we will institute
the appropriate rule making proceeding to consider the estab-
lishment of additional ownership restrictions.
75. Section 613(e) enables a state or franchising authority to
own a cable television system as long as editorial control is
exercised through a separate entity in order to preclude undue
government control of programming. In the Notice we stated
that we did not believe that this provision of the Cable Act has
any impact on our rules. Accordingly, no proposal wss made
and we will take no further action relating to this section.”
76. Section 613(f) of the Cable Act grandfathers any combi-
nation of interests held on July 1, 1984, to the extent such
interests were not inconsistent with applicable Federal or state
law or regulations on that date. In the Notice, we indicated
that we believe this provision is consistent with our rules.
46 ~The Connecticut PUC seeks a clarification as to whether a coopera-
tive of municipalities may hold an interest in a cable system. We do not
believe that this type of ownership would be in conflict with the Cable Act as
long as editorial control is exercised through an entity separate from the
franchising authority.
eth. lees
A35
Accordingly, we proposed no changes. Nothing in the com-
ments has convinced us otherwise.”
Section 621 and 622—Franchise Requirements and Fees
77. Sections 621 and 622 of the Cable Act concern franchis-
ing requirements and fees. Under Section 621, franchising
authorities are authorized to grant one or more franchises
within their jurisdiction.“’ This section also sets forth certain
conditions regarding the construction of cable systems and the
use of public rights-of-way. In addition, Section 621 requires
that franchise authorities assure that no class of potential
residential cable subscribers is denied service due to income
class. Finally, this section of the Cable Act gives the Commis-
sion authority to require the filing of informational tariffs for
intrastate, non-cable communications services. Section 622 of
the Cable Act limits the franchise fee paid by the cable
operator to the franchising authority to no more than five
percent of gross revenue.
78. Use of Public Rights-of-Way. In the Notice, we indi-
cated that Section 621 delineates certain conditions regarding
the construction of cable systems over public rights-of-way. We
stated that cable system construction is authorized over public
rights-of-way and through easements designated for compati-
47 Marsh was the only party to address this issue. In its comments and
reply comments, Marsh contends that we should change the grandfathering
date of July 1, 1970, of Section 76.501 of our rules to the July 1, 1984, date
of the Cable Act. Also, for the purposes of grandfathering the Commission
should recognize executory, as well as cognizable interests. These arguments
are the same as those made by Marsh in a petition for reconsideration in
Docket 20423. That proceeding will resolve the question of the extent that
Marsh's own cross-interest is grandfathered. Marsh appears to be the only
cable/broadcast entity that might be affected by a change in our rules.
Accordingly, we do not believe these issues need be addressed here and will,
therefore, give them full and appropriate treatment in the separate proceed-
ing.
48 Recently, the courts have questioned a franchising authority’s right
to grant an exclusive franchise. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City
of Los Angeles et al., No. 84-5541, slip op. (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1985).
A36
ble uses. The Notice also stated that a property owner that has
already granted or is obligated to grant an easement for
utilities cannot deny cable access. However, the cable franchi-
see must ensure the safety and appearance of the property
accessed through the easement and must bear the costs of the
installation, operation or removal of the equipment.
79. Several commenters requested clarification of this lan-
guage. Pacific believes that differences between the terms
“designated for compatible uses” used in the Notice and
“dedicated for compatible uses” used in the Cable Act may
result in future misinterpretations of this section. A few com-
menters (e.g., Oxford Development Corp. and Direct Satellite
Communications, Inc.) claim that the statutory language
should not be construed to mean that franchised cable opera-
tors have “mandatory access” rights. Other commenters sug-
gest that the Commission should codify rules to define the
Cable Act’s easement requirements and obligations and the
circumstances of liability under Section 621(a)(2) of the Cable
Act.
80. We agree with the commenters on the use of the term
“dedicated.” Our use of the phrase “designated for compatible
uses” in the Notice was not intended to be any more or less
encompassing than the phrase “dedicated for compatible uses”
used in the Cable Act.*” With respect to the access issue, the
House Report states that “[a]ny private arrangements which
seek to restrict a cable system’s use of such easements or rights
of way which have been granted to other utilities are in
violation of this section and not enforceable.” Based on the
legislative history and clear language of the statute, we find
that a cable system does have the right to access through an
easement as long as the other conditions of this section are
met. Furthermore, we believe that the language and provisions
49 Examples of such uses include easements dedicated for electric, gas
or other utility transmission. See House Report at 59.
50 See House Report at 59.
owas
A37
of these sections of the Cable Act are generally self-
explanatory and that they need not be codified by our rules.*!
81. “Redlining’-Prohibition. In the Notice, we stated that
Section 621 requires that a franchising authority assure that no
class of potential residential cable subscribers be denied cable
service due to income status (This practice of denying service to
lower income areas is commonly called “redlining.”). We stated
that the franchising authority must require that all areas of the
franchised area be wired. However, we indicated that the
franchising authority could award separate franchises within
its jurisdiction.
82. Many cable interests claim that the Commission has
misinterpreted this section of the Cable Act. These commenters
assert that the Notice indicates that all areas of the franchise
area must be wired when in fact this is not the case. NCTA/
CATA, in its comments, indicates that the intent of this section
is to prevent “redlining” and does not require wiring of those
homes that are too remote to wire economically. We agree that
the intent of this section was to prevent the exclusion of cable
service based on income and that this section does not mandate
that the franchising authority require the complete wiring of
the franchise area in those circumstances where such an exclu-
sion is not based on the income status of the residents of the
unwired area.
83. Informational Tariffs. Section 621(d)(1) authorizes the
Commission to collect informational tariffs for intra-state,
non-cable services offered by a cable system that would be
subject to regulation by the FCC if provided on a common
carrier basis. In the Notice, we suggested that the Commission
did not need the information at this time but retains the right
to collect this information in the future.
5] In this regard, we believe that any disputes which may occur as a
result of the provisions of this section are best settled at the local level
utilizing the remedies available therein.
A38
84. Several telephone company interests state that we should
collect this information in order to monitor the state of the
industry. Southwestern Bell is concerned that without filing
tariffs, telephone companies may not find out about such
services that may be common carrier in nature. DOJ claims we
should require tariffs because the beneficial data they would
yield outweighs the marginal cost associated with their use.
Pacific, however, suggests we should not require tariffs to be
filed and that this requirement is best left to the states. NCTA/
CATA, in its reply comments, states that there is no basis for
requiring tariffs. It indicates that such a tariff requirement
would be unduly burdensome and unnecessary.
85. We continue to believe that the filing of informational
tariffs at this time is unnecessary. We have recently taken
action to reduce tariffing requirements for non-dominant com-
mon carriers and we see no reason to impose such a new
requirement on cable systems.*’ We believe that we can effec-
tively monitor this situation through trade publications and
other materials. Therefore, we will not require that informa-
tional tariffs be filed, but we do reaffirm our authority to
require them in the future should such action be deemed
necessary.
86. Franchise Fees. Section 622 of the Cable Act specifies
that the franchise fee paid by the cable operator to the
franchising authority be no more than five percent of gross
revenue. This section also prohibits the Commission or any
other Federal agency from regulating the amount of the fran-
chise fee or the use of the funds derived from the franchise fee.
87. In the Notice, we proposed to delete Section 76.31 of
our rules concerning franchise standards. This rule limits the
franchise fee to three percent of gross revenue with a five
percent fee obtainable upon a showing of reasonableness. This
rule also contains suggested, but not mandatory, procedures
§2 See Fourth Report and Order, CC Docket 79-252, 48 FR §2452
(November 18, 1983). See also Fifth Report and Order, CC Docket 79-252,
49 FR 34824 (September 4, 1983).
oe |
A39
for the local franchising process.*’ These provisions are gener-
ally dealt with in Section 621 and other sections of the Cable
Act.
88. In general, comments from individual cities and the
NLC support deletion of the Commission’s franchise fee rules.
These parties also contend that Section 622(i) of the Cable Act
specifically precludes the Commission from establishing any
regulations that deal with the resolution of disputes between
franchising authorities and cable operators. Several commen-
ters suggest that the franchise rules and standards should be
retained in some form. The Town of Islip, N.Y., supports
retaining Section 76.31’s recommended procedures for all new
franchises and would have the Commission supervise negotia-
tion of renewal between the operator and franchising authority.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recommends
retaining the timely wiring standard found in Section 76.31.
89. NCTA/CATA, in its comments, suggests rewording Sec-
tion 76.31 to specify that the franchise fee may not exceed five
percent. NCTA/CATA also indicates that the Commission
should define what is and is not to be included in the fee. In
addition, NCTA/CATA suggests that the Commission specify
relief procedures for cable operators seeking enforcement and
interpretation of the provisions. A number of other cable
interests support deleting the existing rule, but request that the
Commission retain and assert its jurisdiction over any disputes
that may occur regarding franchise fees. Hogan & Hartson, in
its reply comments, states that the “Commission should exer-
cise its jurisdiction to regulate franchise fees . . . to prevent
the balkanization that will result if such disputes are left to the
courts.” Hogan & Hartson also states that the Commission
53 For example, these recommendations include that: 1) the franchi-
see’s qualifications and construction arrangements should be approved by
the franchising authority as part of a full public proceeding affording due
process; 2) initial and renewal franchises should not exceed 15 years; and, 3)
construction should be significant within the first year of certification and be
completed under a reasonable timetable; etc.
A40
should rule that Section 76.31 of the rules was in effect until
December 29, 1984, the effective date of the Cable Act. Miami
Cablevision echoes this position and further states that the
Commission’s rules (76.31) should be applied in full force to
those fee controversies pending with the Commission on
December 29, 1984.
90. After examining the record, we believe our initial pro-
posal to eliminate Section 76.31 of the rules concerning fran-
chise requirements and fees is the appropriate course of action.
Section 622(i) of the Cable Act clearly states that “[a]ny
Federal agency may not regulate the amount of the franchise
fees paid by a cable operator, or regulate the use of funds
derived from such fees, except as provided in this section.” We
believe that this provision renders our rules invalid with respect
to setting franchise fee limits.** Section 622 of the Cable Act
spells out quite clearly the terms of the franchise fee and how it
is defined and administered. Therefore, there is no need for us
to further define these matters.*° We believe that any disputes
involving the franchise fee are best resolved through the
courts. Accordingly, we are deleting Section 76.31 of the rules,
entitled “Franchise standards.” In addition, we are also delet-
ing Section 76.30 concerning applicability of Section 76.31.°°
54 In this regard, the House Report states:
Subsection 622(i) prohibits any agency of the United States, including
the FCC, from regulating the amount of the franchise fee or the use to
which funds collected through the fee will be put. The current FCC
regulations which restrict the use of franchise fee revenues to cable-
related uses and permit franchise fees of 5 percent only if a waiver is
granted by the FCC are invalid by the terms of this legislation. See
House Report at 65.
55 As far as reinstating petitions that were pending prior to December
29, 1984, we decline to return them to active status. The Commission no
longer has regulatory interest in adjudicating petitions that have been
rendered moot by the Cable Act.
56 Section 76.30 states the’ the existing franchise fee rule is applicable
only to systems with 1000 or more subscribers.
A4l
Section 623—Regulation of Rates
91. Section 623 of the Cable Act specifies the manner in
which subscriber rates for cable services may be regulated. In
particular, the regulation of basic cable service is permitted by
a franchising authority whenever a cable system is not subject
to effective competition.*’ The Cable Act specifically charges
the Commission with the responsibility of defining effective
competition and establishing standards for rate regulation. In
addition, the Cable Act requires that the Commission submit a
report to Congress within six years on the effect of competition
in the marketplace as it relates to rate regulation of cable :
systems.
Definition of Effective Competition
92. In the Notice, we recognized the desirability of defining
“effective competition” in a manner that can be easily inter-
preted and readily applied by a franchising authority within its
community or communities. On the other hand, we noted that
the definition chosen should also permit the correct identifica-
tion of those situations where a cable system may have signifi-
cant market power. The Notice also reviewed the actions taken
by several states in deregulating cable television service.
93. In the Notice, we sought comment on what constitutes
effective competition and what kinds of signals or services
compete with basic cable service. We also requested comment
on defining effective competition in terms of the availability of
off-the-air signals in the cable system’s community. In this
regard, we indicated that if such a signal complement criterion
were chosen, one approach would be to define effective compe-
tition in a given market as the presence of four unduplicated
broadcast signals, including the programming of the three
57 Section 623(g) of the Cable Act grandfathers for two years any
existing state law which provides for any limitation or preemption of
regulation by local franchising authorities. This regulation applies to cable
systems franchised after the effective date of these rules, and to all cable
systems after December 29, 1986. The Cable Act grandfathers certain
franchise rate obligations during the two intervening years.
i eieeaeeeeeenadteaainiiil
A42
major networks. We also suggested that in determining
whether a signal was available in a franchise area the predicted
Grade B contour might be a more appropriate criterion than
one based on either a specific mileage zone (e.g., 35 miles) or
the Commission’s must-carry rules. Finally, comments were
requested on whether a penetration level criterion should be
included in the definition of effective competition.
94. Most of the parties filing comments or reply comments
in this proceeding addressed the issues raised in this section of
the Notice. :
95. Signal Complement Criteria. Although little consensus
can be found among the commenting parties, they generally
suggest defining effective competition based on some form of
signal complement criterion. Well over half of the commenters
feel that the proposed requirement of four off-the-air broad-
cast signals is too strict. Cox, NTIA and Time Inc., for
example, suggest a three signal criterion. NCTA/CATA, Hogan
& Hartson, and comments submitted by the law firm of
Fleischman and Walsh, P.-C. on behalf of various cable televi-
sion interests (VCTI), in comments representative of most
cable interests, argue for a two signal criterion.’ Other com-
menters argue that the four broadcast signal criterion sug-
gested in the Notice is insufficient to ensure effective
competition. DOJ and the Telecommunications Research and
Action Center (TRAC) assert that a minimum of five broad-
cast signals is necessary in order for there to be effective
competition with cable service.’ The National Federation of
Local Cable Programmers suggests seven signals. The NLC
58 Both Cox and VCTI also argue that foreign broadcast station signals
(e.g., Canadian and Mexican) represent effective competition in some cable
markets and should be counted for this purpose. Section 76.5(b) of our rules
defines television broadcast station to include any “station liceased by a
foreign government,” and accordingly any such stations will be included.
59 DOJ also suggests that other criteria be considered in addition to the
signal complement.
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A43
proposes requiring a total of ten signals including five alterna-
tive delivery channels.”
96. Several of the parties suggesting additional (more than
four) signals also indicate that the statute requires that the
Commission define the circumstances in which a “cable sys-
tem” is not subject to effective competition. These parties state
that a standard based on alternatives to “basic cable service”
only, as suggested in the Notice, is not appropriate given the
statutory language. This view was expressed by NLC and the
City of New York, among others. DOJ and a number of other
parties believe that the Commission was correct in limiting the
question of effective competition to basic cable service. These
parties note that franchise rate regulation authority is limited
to regulation of basic cable service.
97. Several parties in their reply comments criticize the
Department of Justice’s proposals for an effective competition
standard based on five signals. They state that DOJ provides
little justification other than supposition and intuition. On the
other hand, an empirical study by NCTA/CATA was cited by
many as providing factual support for a standard based on
fewer than three signals.
98. After full consideration of the record on this issue, we
continue to believe that a standard for defining effective
competition based on the availability of off-the-air broadcast
signals in the cable system’s community is appropriate. In
adopting this definition, we do not mean to minimize the
importance of the various alternative sources of video pro-
gramming such as multipoint distribution services, direct satel-
60 In addition to NLC, a number of commenters (irrespective of their
views on the number of signals) support the inclusion of various alternative
delivery systems in our effective competition standard. See, e.g., comments
filed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, VCTI, TRAC, and the U.S.
Catholic Conference. Other parties argue that the programming provided on
these systems (STV, MDS, MMDS, and DBS) is most substitutable with that
provided on the pay cable channels and therefore should not be included.
A44
lite reception, and video cassette recorders.°' Such services are
significant providers of video programming services and do, in
fact, offer competition to cable services.” Congress has al-
ready made the decision that nonbasic services should not be
subject to such regulation at either the federal or local levels.~’
This decision appears to have been made based, at least in
61 —_— In this regard, we note that the Cable Act amends Section 705 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to permit the reception by
individuals of any satellite cable programming for private viewing. This
action significantly increases the programming options available to all
viewers. We also note that the Commission has proposed preemption of
certain restrictive local zoning regulation of satellite receive-only antennas.
See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CC Docket No. 85-87, FCC 85-144,
adopted March 28, 1985S.
62 See Report and Order in Docket No. 83-670, 49 FR 33588 (August
23, 1984); Report and Order in Docket No. 19142, 96 FCC 2d 634 (1984);
Report and Order in Docket No. 83-1009, 49 FR 31877 (August 8, 1984) and
Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 83-1009, 50 FR 46666
(February 1, 1985).
63 Some commenters express concern that cable systems may have
market power in the provision of nonbasic service and that this power could
be extended to their provision of basic service. Therefore, these commenters
contend, rate regulation of basic service should be permitted whenever there
is a lack of competition in noabasic service. We believe the commenters’
argument is based upon a concern about the marketing practice of cable
operators whereby consumers can subscribe to a pay tier only if they a/so
subscribe to the basic tier. This marketing practice, often called a “tying
arrangement,” is addressed in the antitrust literature. We believe that the
commenters’ argument is incorrect. This is so because a cable operator has
the ability to charge a price for nonbasic service that is the most profitable.
He, therefore, has no incentive to raise basic service rates in order to earn
increased profits. Thus, we believe that the manner in which cable operators
market basic and nonbasic services represent an efficient business practice
and is not a threat to the competitive provision of basic service. “The law’s
theory of tying arrangements is merely another example of the discredited
transfer-of-power theory, and perhaps no other variety of that theory has
been so thoroughly and repeatedly demolished in the legal and economic
theory.” See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 1978, p. 372. Accord-
ingly, we see little point in determining whether a cable system may have
market power in the provision of a service that a franchising authority is
prohibited statutorily from regulating.
A45
2
:
‘
2
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part, on a belief that alternative video delivery systems pro-
vided sufficient existing or potential competition to nonbasic
services that rate controls would be counterproductive. How-
ever, the Cable Act requires the Commission to look at compe-
tition for the limited purpose of determining in what situations
rate regulation of basic cable service may take place. For the
most part, programming provided by basic cable service in-
cludes local, over-the-air signals and other services. Therefore,
we believe that a standard based on the reception of terrestrial
television signals is appropriate and provides a reasonable
benchmark for determining effective competition with basic
cable service. Furthermore, we feel that this standard meets the
congressional intent of an administratively manageable stan-
dard for the Commission, franchising authorities and cable
operators.
99. Number of Signals Required. The number of over-
the-air broadcast signals required to provide effective competi-
tion to basic cable service must be sufficient to allow viewers
adequate and significant programming choices. Further, the
number of signals should ensure that the basic tier offering
does not become a source of market power for the cable
operator. Based on the record in this proceeding, we believe
that three broadcast signals are the minimum number of
signals needed to meet these objectives. A limited statistical
sampling of two, three, four and five signal markets using
Arbitron viewing data provides further evidence to support this
conclusion.” In comparing the cable viewership of the pro-
gramming which is most likely to be included in the basic tier
with the off-air local broadcast viewership, we found that in
two signal markets the viewership share of such programming
could be as large or larger than the off-air viewership of the
typical local station in such a market. This could potentially be
a source of market power for the cable operator. In three signal
markets, the cable viewership of such basic programming was
in general less than the off-air viewership of a single local
64 See Arbitron 1/982 County Coverage Surveys, Cable-Controlled.
A46
signal. In the worst case, the impact of the provision of basic
service programming would be comparable to adding one more
competitor to a (three competitor) market. Further support for
the reasonableness of an effective competition standard of
three signals can be found in the economic literature. In an
empirical study of American industry, Kwoka demonstrated
that the presence of a third competitor of sizable market share
may be sufficient to guarantee competition in a given indus-
try.” For the case at hand, involving at least three broadcast
signals and a cable system, there will generally be not just a
third but a fourth competitor of sizable market share. Accord-
ingly, we feel that the programming of basic cable service is not
likely to be a significant source of market power in these
circumstances and that retaining the four signal standard
proposed in the Notice could subject a number of cable
systems to unnecessary rate regulation.
100. Therefore, after careful consideration of the arguments
presented as to the appropriate number of broadcast signals
required for effective competition with basic cable service, we
have decided to relax the effective competition standard pro-
posed in the Notice. We now conclude that the existence of
three or more off-the-air broadcast signals in the cable market
provides viewers with adequate programming choices and
presents an effective constraint on the market power of a cable
system in the provision of basic service. We recognize that
many cable systems provide a number of services in addition to
the retransmission of off-the-air signals. For example, a cable
system may typically provide additional broadcast signals,
access channels, and certain satellite delivered programming on
65 Viewership of basic cable services (excluding must-carry signals)
ranged from three quarters to approximately equal to the off-the-air viewer-
ship of the typical local signal, which in this sample was about 33%. We feel
that a market or viewership share of 33% or less is a reasonable indication of
lack of market power. See U.S. v. Aluminum Co of America et al., 148 F. 2d
416, 424 (1975).
66 See John E. Kwoka, “The Effect of Market Share Distribution on
Industry Performance,” Review of Economics & Statistics, Vol. LX1, No. 1,
February 1979, pp. 101-109.
——— = wee
A47
its basic cable tier.” Nevertheless, we do not believe that a
cable system gains significant market advantage by the provi-
sion of this additional programming in those markets where
there are sufficient (/.e., three or more) off-the-air broadcast
signals. Accordingly, a cable system will be considered to face
effective competition whenever the franchise market receives
three or more unduplicated broadcast signals.”
101. Program Content of Signals. in the Notice, we pro-
posed that the programming of three major networks be
included as part of the signal complement requirement. A
number of commenters support this network programming
requirement. For example, DOJ, NLC, the Department of
Defense, and TRAC concur with this position. These parties
believe that a cable system could conceivably gain market
power by importing a signal which provides network program-
ming not receivable off-the-air in the franchise area. Several
commenters, NCTA/CATA, VCTI, NTIA, Heritage Commun-
ications, Inc., Hogan & Hartson, and California Cable Tele-
vision Association (CCTA), among others, oppose any
67 Exampies of satellite delivered programming or cable networks are
the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network and Cable News
Network.
68 The existence of market power depends on both the ievel of demand
for a particular product and the elasticity of that demand. For these
additional basic services to be a source of market power, it must first be
shown that a significant demand exists for these services and that such
demand is relatively inelastic. None of the commenters were able to present
any evidence to support either of these contentions. In fact, several of these
same commenters readily concede that no market power is obtained from the
provision of some of these additional services, such as the public access
channels. In this regard, it should also be noted that most satellite services
presently provided on cable systems either are not rated or have very small
viewing shares according to the national rating services.
69 Furthermore, we also agree with those commenters that state that it
was the intent of the Cable Act to significantly deregulate the provision ot
cable service. We believe that a requirement of five or more signals would not
have the effect that Congress clearly intended.
A48
programming content requirement.” In its comments, VCTI
argues that past Commission policies (e.g., spectrum alloca-
tion, must-carry rules, etc.) have not been based upon some
“entitlement” of viewers to the programming of the three
major networks. In addition, VCTI points out that indepen-
dent and noncommercial programming have become increas-
ingly popular and that the presence of either in a market may
contribute more to programing diversity than the offering of a
third network affiliate.
102. After weighing the arguments presented on both sides
of the issue, we conclude that a programming content require-
ment based on major network programming should not be
included in the Commission’s standard for effective competi-
tion.’' We continue to have significant First Amendment con-
cerns with any requirement based on the programming content
of broadcasters. We also note that such a requirement would
not be consistent with our past efforts to foster alternative
program sources. For these reasons, we will not adopt such a
requirement.
103. Signal Availability Standard. The Notice indicated
that if a broadcast signal standard is chosen, a method must
also be developed for determining when a signal is available in
a given franchise area. A number of approaches were suggested
in the Notice including counting all signals within a specific
mileage zone (i.e., the 35-mile zone) and a standard based on
the Commission’s must-carry rules.” In the Notice, we sug-
gested a standard based on counting stations that placed a
0 CCTA also argues that duplicated signals should be counted. It notes
that programming duplication is not an issue in either television license
renewal or must-carry requirements.
71 It should be noted, however, that in the vast majority of markets
with three or more unduplicated signals, the programming of the three major
networks is provided
759
- Must-carry signals include ail television stations within a 35-mile
zone, certain Grade B contour signals and signals that have attained signifi-
cantly viewed status within the cable community. See Sections 76.54, 76.55,
76.57, 76.59 and 76.61 of the Commission’s rules
eS it aA a Sh Sat NE A Mig Ell este Atlin
2 Ae AO Ne cme BL atl
A49
predicted Grade B signal contour over the cable community.
Comment was also requested on whether a penetration level
should be included in our definition of effective competition.
104. Most cable interests and certain other parties suggest
counting a signal if it meets any of the must-carry require-
ments. For example, NCTA/CATA, VCTI, TCI, Cap Cities
and CCTA, argue that a signal should be counted if it satisfied
any one of a number of criteria, such as Grade B, significantly
viewed, 35-mile, or must-carry. NTIA, Hogan & Hartson and
Time, Inc., support the Grade B contour criteria proposed in
the Notice. They indicate that the Grade B proposal is the most
cost-efficient and easiest to administer alternative.
105. The majority of the parties associated with the local
franchise process and a number of other commenters support a
stricter standard for counting signals. NLC and TRAC argue
that the 35-mile zone criterion should be used. ACLU and the
Cable Television Information Center support using the Grade
A city contour. Several commenters, for example, the National
Association of Towns and Townships, the Vermont Depart-
ment of Public Service, DOJ and the Department of Defense
argue for a standard based on “actual” as opposed to predicted
reception. In addition, a requirement that cable penetration be
less than 70% was supported by several of these parties
including the NLC and TRAC.” These commenters cite pene-
tration as a good indicator of the dependence of viewers on
cable service for adequate reception of local broadcast signals.
106. The choice of an appropriate signal reception criterion
is a difficult one. The use of any of the above alternatives will
result in some cable systems being judged to have effective
competition when in fact reception of three or more signals
may not always be possible in the franchise area. On the other
hand, some cable systems will be judged, whatever the alterna-
73 Several states have such a penetration requirement for statewide
deregulation of cable systems. DOJ proposes a variation based on the
maximum penetration level of basic service. Specifically, it suggests basic-
only subscribers must be less than 20% of all subscribers for there to be
effective competition.
ASO
tive chosen, to not face effective competition when in fact the
majority of homes in the franchise area are receiving more
than three broadcast signals. Since no compelling arguments
were given to the contrary, we believe that weight should be
given to the administrative convenience of irmplementing a
signal availability test.
107. Furthermore, given the intent and purposes of the
Cable Act, we feel that in developing a standard for the
purposes of rate regulation, it is more appropriate to favor a
presumption that competition does in fact exist rather than to
assume that consumers will make no efforts to seek out
alternatives to basic cable service. Clearly, in this regard, there
is considerable evidence viewers do take significant measures,
such as improved antennas, use of rotors and amplifiers, to
receive broadcast signals they deem desirable even if those
viewers are in areas with fringe or marginal reception. Accord-
ingly, at this time, a signal will be counted for purposes of
effective competition if it places a predicted Grade B contour
over any portion of the cable community or is significantly
viewed within the cable community. * However, in order to
ensure that franchise authorities are permitted to rate regulate
in those areas where there is not effective competition, fran-
chise authorities may submit showings and engineering studies
74 We believe that “significantly viewed in the cable community” will
give a more accurate analysis of those signals that are available in the cable
community and eliminate any problems this standard may have within
hyphenated communities. In addition, a number of parties submitted com-
ments on the issue Of availability of broadcast signals from television
translators. For example, VCTI, Cox, and Hogan & Hartson present argu-
ments for the inclusion of such signals in the determination of effective
competition. We agree that broadcast signals of translator stations should be
considered. However, in view of the varying power and the relatively small
geographic service area of translator stations, we believe that it is inappro-
priate to count translators on an equal basis with broadcast stations.
Accordingly, signals of translator stations shall be counted only if such
stations are located within the cable community; provided, however, that
translators used to retransmit a station already providing a Grade B contour
or significantly viewed within the cable community may not be considered
for this purpose.
AS1
to indicate that such signals are in fact not available anywhere
within the cable community. Such studies shall include field
strength measurements made in accordance with Section
73.686 of the Commission’s rules.
108. With regard to any additional criterion based on cable
penetration figures, we are unconvinced that such statistics are
reliable indicators of broadcast reception problems. We believe
that cable subscriber penetration is determined by a number of
factors other than the availability of off-the-air signal recep-
tion. More specifically, price, quality of service, income and
area viewing tastes will all have a significant impact on the
demand for cable service and the resulting subscriber penetra-
tion of cable service within a particular area. We find that the
adoption of a penetration standard would be arbitrary and
unjustifiable for the thousands of cable communities that not
only have varying television reception, but also include viewing
households with divergent incomes and tastes. We are also
sympathetic to commenters’ arguments that a penetration
criterion would penalize cable operators who have attained
substantial subscriber penetration by providing low-priced
popular cable offerings and services. In this regard, we believe
that a penetration standard could create a disincentive for
cable operators to upgrade the quality and level of the services
they now provide. Accordingly, we conclude that adoption of a
cable penetration criterion as part of the effective competition
standard would not be in the public interest.
109. Several commenters express concern that some cable
systems maybe susceptible to disruption in their long term
plans due to the nature of our definition of effective competi-
tion. For example, a system operating in a market within three
Grade B contours could become subject to rate regulation if
one of the broadcast stations should go dark (even temporar-
ily), reduce its power, or directionalize its signal. In this regard,
Cox, in its comments, proposes that once a market satisfies the
criteria for effective competition, it cannot be reclassified.
While we are sympathetic to a cable operator’s desire for
regulatory certainty, we believe that this solution would be
A5S2
contrary to the intent of the statute and would ignore those
situations where effective competition might be removed. Ac-
cordingly, in those situations where a cable system has been
found previously to be subject to effective competition but
subsequently was found to not be subject to effective competi-
tion due to changed circumstances in the cable system commu-
nity, the cable system shall be exempt from rate regulation for
a period of at least one year. We believe that this one year
period will allow a cable operator sufficient time to make the
transition from an unregulated to a regulated entity.
Standards for Rate Regulation
110. Section 623 of the Cable Act also requires that the
Commission establish standards for the regulation of basic
cable rates by a franchising authority. In the Notice, we noted
that this involves not only specifying what services can be
regulated but also in what manner. Thus, we must define
“basic cable service” for the purpose of rate regulation and
establish the standards for such rate regulation. These issues
are discussed in turn.
111. Definition of Basic Cable Service. Section 602 of the
Cable Act defines basic cable service as “any service tier which
includes the transmission of local television broadcast signals.”
The House Report encourages the Commission “to fashion a
definition of basic cable service most appropriate to achieve
the purpose of the regulations consistent with the provisions of
Title VI.” In this context, we stated in the Notice that it was
appropriate to include “significantly viewed” as weil as local
signals. Accordingly, we proposed defining basic cable service
as “any service tier(s) which include(s) the retransmission of
must-carry television broadcast signals as defined in Sections
76.55 to 76.61 of the rules.”
112. There is considerable disagreement among the parties
with respect to the Commission’s discretion to develop a
definition of basic cable service for the purposes of rate
regulation different from that contained in Section 602 of the
PPE SE as
AS3
Cable Act. NCTA/CATA states that the Cable Act generally
reflects Congressional endorsement of the Commission’s pro-
hibition on regulation of rates for optional services and there-
fore gives the Commission discretion to alter the definition of
basic cable service in developing standards for rate regulation.
In this regard, it quotes extensively from the House Report:
The Committee wishes to stress that it intends to give the
Commission flexibility in promulgating these regulations.
The definition in Sec. 602 of basic cable service is in-
tended primarily for use in determining the extent of
regulation that will be permitted during the. . . transi-
tion period. The regulations of the Commission under this
subsection serve a different purpese—defining the cir-
cumstances and extent of regulation that may occur be-
yond the transition period.
NCTA/CATA does not, however, support the Commission’s
proposed definition. It states that the definition in the statute
as well as our proposed modification would permit regulation
of multiple tiers of basic service where a cable system offers a
lowest-priced basic tier that includes retransmission of local
broadcast signals and also offers another tier at a single, higher
price that includes everything on the lowest-priced tier plus
additional services. NCTA/CATA states that while the statute
permits this practice during the two-year transition period as
the result of a political compromise, the Commission’s pre-
emption policies and the Cable Act’s endorsement of the
Commission’s prohibition on regulation of rates for optional
services requires that the Commission prevent such rate regula-
tion from continuing beyond the transition period. Thus,
NCTA/CATA recommends that the Commission make clear
that basic cable service includes no more than the lowest priced
tier of service that includes all local broadcast signals. In
addition, NCTA/CATA urges the Commission to affirm that
basic cable service includes only the retransmission of local
broadcast signals and that any ancillary services provided
along with basic service should not be deemed “basic service.”
Thus, NCTA/CATA asserts, regulated cable systems would be
AS54
free to remove or retier any of these other services. Such a
statement, NCTA/CATA asserts, would simply reaffirm the
Commission’s fundamental policy in this area,” and nothing in
the Cable Act requires the Commission to set aside its previous
decisions. ”®
113. NTIA states that the Commission “clearly has the
power, and probably a mandate to adopt a definition of ‘basic
cable service’ different than the one contained in Section 602(2)
in order to further effectuate the purposes of the Cable Act.”
NTIA proposes that the Commission adopt a definition of
basic cable service which is based on the retransmission of
unaltered broadcast television signals rather than one based on
must-carry signals, as proposed in the Notice. NTIA states that
this alternative definition would ensure that franchising au-
thorities whose cable systems are outside of all television
markets (i.e., areas where there are no signals which cable
operators are required to carry under the must-carry rules)
have the authority to rate regulate the basic service of these
cable systems if they are not subject to effective competition.
NTIA states that this proposal more fully carries out the intent
of the statute. ;
75. See Community Cable TV, Inc. (hereinafter Community), 95 FCC
2d 1204 (1983) and Community Cable TV, Inc., (Reconsideration), 56 RR 2d
735 (1984).
76 The individual cable interests that filed are in general agreement with
NCTA/CATA’s proposed definition of basic cable service, giving equal
support to the concept that basic cable service should include either (1) must-
carry signals only; or (2) the lowest-priced tier which contains the must-carry
signals. In addition, they state that cable operators must retain the freedom
to retier ancillary services out of “basic service” granted them by the
Commission’s decision in Community. These parties include PCTA, TCI,
Cap Cities, VCTI, New Jersey Cable Television Association, Time (reply
comments), CCTA, Cox, Cable Operators and Hogan & Hartson. We also
note that several parties urge that the PEG channels be included in the
definition of basic service. These parties include TCI, the City of Boston, the
U.S. Catholic Conference, and the New York Citizens’ Committee - for
Responsible Media.
AS55
114. The Department of Justice believes that the Cable Act
sanctions the Commission’s decision to preempt state and local
rate regulation of all but basic cable television service. How-
ever, it states that it is not clear whether the Commission has
discretion under the Cable Act to define basic cable service. It
states that the Cable Act does not authorize the Commission to
define basic cable service either generally or for purposes of
Section 623. “While the legislative history does suggest that the
Commission may ‘fashion a definition of basic cable services
most appropriate to achieve the purpose’ of its ‘effective
competition’ criteria, . . . it seems apparent that the Commis-
sion could not define ‘basic cable service’ inconsistently with
the Act, e.g., limited to the must-carry channels.” DOJ be-
lieves, however, that the Commission’s proposed definition of
basic cable service that interprets local television broadcast
signals as the must-carry signals is a proper interpretation of
the statute, supported by the legislative history.
115. NLC states, in its reply comments, that the Commis-
sion’s responsibilities under Section 623(b) of the Cable Act
should be construed in the context of the plain language of the
Cable Act and the purpose of the section to allow for rate
regulation in communities when the cable system is not subject
to effective competition. NLC agrees with DOJ that the Com-
mission has little discretion to fundamentally alter the defini-
tion of basic service contained in the Cable Act. In this regard,
NLC states that Congress considered and ultimately rejected
both definitions of basic service proposed by the various cable
parties (i.e., must-carry signals and the lowest priced tier which
includes the must-carry signals). NLC states that the definition
of basic service contained in the Cable Act is intended to
establish regulatory certainty and stability where conflicting
court decisions created confusion with respect to the proper
definition of basic service. NLC believes that the definition
contained in the statute establishes the necessary distinction
between basic and nonbasic services.
116. After careful consideration of the full record in this
proceeding including the statute, the legislative history and the
comments, we conclude that the Commission does have the
AS6
discretion to fashion a definition of basic cable service differ-
ent from that contained in Section 602(2) of the Cable Act for
the purpose of developing rate regulation standards. While
some tension may be created by adopting a definition of basic
service for Section 623(b) of the Cable Act that differs from
the definition in Section 602(2), we believe that there is legisla-
tive guidance that permits such a change. First, in adopting
appropriate regulatory standards we must keep in mind the
underlying purposes of the Cable Act which are articulated in
Section 601. Foremost among these is the intent of the statute
to establish “standards which encourage the growth and devel-
opment of cable systems . . . , assure that cable communica-
tions provide. . . the widest possible diversity of information
sources and services to the public” and “promote competition
in cable communications and minimize unneccessary regula-
tion that would impose an undue economic burden on cable
systems.” We believe that we must implement Section 623(b)
consistent with these statutory goals.
117. Reflecting these procompetitive goals of the statute,
Section 623 preempts rate regulation of all cable services
provided by those cable systems subject to effective competi-
tion. In this regard, it is consistent with the Commission’s
long-standing policy to preempt local regulation of non-basic
or “pay” cable services, based on the premise that “unneces-
sary rate and tariff requirements can stifle price competition
and service and marketing innovation.”’’ As most recently
reaffirmed in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, only preemp-
tion of state and local regulation can assure cable systems the
breathing space necessary to expand vigorously and provide a
diverse range of program offerings to potential cable sub-
scribers in all parts of the country.”’* We also note that in
preempting rate regulation of basic service of these cable
systems, Section 623 goes even further than the Commission’s
preemption policy. The Cable Act authorizes local rate regula-
77 See Community at 740.
78 See Capital Cities Cable Inc. v Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
AS5S7
tion only for the provision of basic cable service for those cable
systems not subject to effective competition and gives the
Commission the responsibility to prescribe rules to make effec-
tive the national policy with respect to rate regulation of these
systems. We believe that the statute and legislative history give
the Commission broad discretion to implement this provision
consistent with the provisions of Title VI.
118. With this mandate in mind, and in light of the com-
ments, we are convinced that the definition of basic cable
service contained in Section 602(2), even with the modification
proposed in the Notice should not be applied to Section
623(b).”’ To do so, we believe, could induce an expansion of
rate regulation of cable systems that is inconsistent with the
basic goals of the statute. Such a definition of basic service
would permit a franchising authority to regulate multiple tiers
of cable service where a cable system prices its tiers on a
cumulative rather than an incremental basis.“’ Thus, while
some cable systems subject to these provisions would have one
regulated tier, many systems could have multiple tiers under.
79 - The definition of basic cable service contained in Section 602(2)
applies to Section 623(c) which sets forth the scope of permissible rate
regulation during a two-year “transition period” before the Commission’s
rate regulation rules become effective for all cable systems. This definition of
basic service is appropriate for this subsection because we believe this
subsection endeavors to paint a broad brush of permissible activity so as not
to cause any immediate dislocations in existing agreements between franchis-
ing authorities and cable systems.
80 We note that the legislative history of Section 602(2) indicates that
Congress contemplated that “basic cable service” as defined therein could
include multiple tiers of “basic service.” See House Report at 40. However,
the House Report also indicates that the Commission should not be bound
by the Section 602(2) definition, except during the two year period between
the passage of the Cable Act and the effectiveness of rate regulation under
Section 623. See House Report at 66. Accordingly, the fact that the Section
602(2) definition of basic tier can include multiple tiers is not controlling
within the context of Section 623. For these purposes, we believe the better
definition of “basic service” should be limited to a single tier.
AS58
regulation, and some systems could have all their tiers regu-
lated.“' Most of these regulated tiers would include services
that are universally considered to be “pay” services. This is an
unreasonable outcome for two reasons. First, if at all possible,
a regulation should not be so constructed that its impact
depends upon the manner in which the service is marketed or
delivered, as would be the case with this proposed definition.*”
Second, this definition would permit rate regulation of services
which has been determined on numerous Occasions in the past
are best provided on an unregulated basis.®° Nothing in the
Statute supports a determination that we must permit the pay
81 For example, consider the following cases:
Cable system | Provides service as follows:
Tier A - “must-carry” signals and access channels
Tier B - satellite delivered services such as ESPN and CNN
Tier C - pay services such as HBO and Showtime
Cable system II, according to its franchise agreement, provides the
same services as follows:
Tier A - “must+carry” signals and access channels
Tier B - “must-carry” signals and access channels + satellite
delivered services such as ESPN and CNN
Tier C - Tier A and B services + Pay services such as HBO and
Showtime.
While both cable systems are providing the same services, under the Section
602(2) definition of basic cable service Tier A on Cable System I could be
regulated by the franchising authority while Tiers A, B, and C on Cable
system II could be subject to rate regulation. We believe that such a result is
clearly not intended by the statute.
82 In this regard, we disagree with the comments of the NLC that the
definition of basic cable service contained in the statute establishes the
necessary distinction between basic and nonbasic services. On the contrary,
we believe that this definition fails to draw any meaningful distinction
between these two services.
83 See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972);
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968): New York
State Commission on Cable Television y. FCC, 669 F.2d §8 (2d Cir 1982);
Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. y. Kelly, 373 F.2d 765 (2d Cir 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979),
AS9
services of these cable systems to be rate regulated. We,
therefore, intend to modify the definition proposed in the
Notice and adopt the following definition of basic cable service
for rate regulation purposes:
Basic cable service is the tier of service regularly provided
to all subscribers that includes the retransmission of all
must-carry broadcast television signals as defined in
§§ 76.55 to 76.61 of the rules, for, in ‘the absence of at
least three must-carry signals, any unaltered broadcast
television signals] and the public, educational and govern-
mental channels, if required by a franchising authority
under Section 611 of the Communications Act.”
This definition of basic service resolves the problems created
by the definition contained in Section 602(2) of the Cable Act.
In addition, it creates a reasonable, historically based, demar-
cation between basic and nonbasic services which will permit
the rate regulation of only the core or “basic” offering of those
cable systems not subject to effective competition.” We be-
lieve, therefore, that it is consistent with the goals of the
statute and longstanding Commission policy.
119. Asa final matter, we note the comments made by some
parties that the definition of basic cable service adopted in
Section 602(2) is inconsistent with our decision in Commu-
84 This definition is preferable to the “lowest-priced” tier proposal of
many of the cable interests. In general, we believe it is imprecise to define a
service by its price. Further, in this instance, such a definition would appear
inappropriate as the price of the tier in question is to be determined by the
regulatory authority.
85 For purposes of rate regulation under Section 623 of the Cable Act,
superstations or satellite delivered television signals shall not be considered
unaltered broadcast television signals as defined in basic cable service. See
paragraph 27 supra. Further, where a cable system carries a large number of
unaltered broadcast signals, the Commission may consider waiver requests
for permission to retier these signals.
86 In Community, we stated that basic subscriber service consists of
that service regularly provided to all subscribers, and that basic service must
contain all the signals mandated by the Commission’s rules.
A60
nity.” These parties believe that the statute intentionally reject
the policies underlying that decision. We believe that a fair
reading of the statute would not support that conclusion. We
determined, in Community, that the cable operator must have
discretion in the selection and packaging of its programming
services consistent with First Amendment freedoms and the
rigors of the economic marketplace. In this regard, we stated
that a cable operator “is free to add, delete, or realign its
service as long as the basic service contains all the signals
mandated by the Commission’s rules.”* We believe that the
statute goes far to ensure that no restrictions are placed on
cable systems that unnecessarily restrict this freedom.
120. Several sections of the Cable Act place limits on a
franchising authority’s power to regulate cable programming
services. Section 624 specifies that for new franchises, and
renewals of existing franchises, the franchising authority may
not require a cable system, either directly or indirectly, to
provide particular video or other information services or even
a broad category of such services. Further, the franchising
authority may only enforce requirements in the franchise for
broad categories of these services. Section 625 specifies proce-
dures available to cable operators in seeking modifications of
their franchise obligations. With regard to programming, it
provides in subsection (a) that a cable operator may obtain
modification of a requirement for services contained in its
franchise if it demonstrates to the franchising authority or in
court that the “mix, quality, and level of services required by
the franchise at the time it was granted will be maintained after
such modification.” Subsection (c) permits the cable operator
upon 30 days’ advance notice to the franchising authority to
rearrange, replace or remove a particular cable service if the
service becomes unavailable or is available only with substan-
tially higher copyright fees for which the operator has not
87 See comments of DOJ and NLC.
88 See Community at 9. See also In re: Cox Cable New Orleans, Inc. vy.
City of New Orleans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 85-106,
adopted March 5, 1985.
—— lie, lla oe
ey
A6l
otherwise been specifically compensated. Subsection (d) pro-
vides that a cable operator may freely retier or repackage
services where the tiers involved are not subject to rate regula-
tion. Finally, Section 9(b) of the Cable Act grandfathers any
retiering, repricing or deletion of services pursuant to the
Community decision, as of September 26, 1984.
121. We believe that the Cable Act does not substantially
alter the Commission’s Community decision and that these
sections of the Cable Act, taken together, afford the cable
operator substantial freedom to replace and retier its services.
Section 625(d) gives cable operators complete freedom to retier
and repackage programming services among the tiers that are
exempted from rate regulation, notwithstanding any provisions
in the franchise agreement to the contrary."’ When the Com-
mission’s rules become effective after the two-year transition
period the majority of cable systems will be exempted from all
rate regulation. Most cable operators will, therefore, have
complete freedom to retier and repackage all their “basic” and
“pay” programming services. Those cable operators subject to
rate regulation will have their freedom to retier and repackage
restricted somewhat by the statute, but this constriction is
applicable only to programs on their regulated tiers. In addi-
tion, any cable operator subject to regulation may obtain a
modification of a franchise programming obligation unde:
Section 625(a) after demonstrating to the franchising authority
that the proposed modification will maintain the mix, quality
and level of the programming services. While this provision
may in fact limit the cable operator’s freedom somewhat
during the two-year transition period, we do not believe it will
be burdensome after this period because most cable systems
will not have any regulated tiers of service and, of those
89 Unlike Community which permitted unrestricted deletion (with no
replacement) of a programming service, we believe that the Cable Act
prevents cable systems from deleting a program service except where the
particular category of programming is no longer available, or available only
at a substantially higher, uncompensated price.
A62
systems that do, only the one tier that contains basic cable
service will be regulated.
122. Regulatory Process. Section 623 of the Cable Act also
specifies that the Commission has the responsibility of devel-
oping the procedures and methodologies which a franchising
authority must follow in regulating basic cable service rates. In
the Notice, we proposed a number of administrative proce-
dures for the rate setting process. For example, we indicated
that there should be formal notice to the public, an opportu-
nity for interested parties to make their views known, and a
formal statement when a decision on a rate matter is made. We
also stated that rate of return regulation of basic cable service
was inappropriate due to its inherent costliness and complexity.
We, therefore, proposed in the Notice a comparable rate
method that would set the regulated basic cable service rate
equal to the level in comparable unregulated markets. To
ensure greater flexibility and ease of implementation, we also
proposed a plus or minus ten percent “zone of reasonableness”
of the average rate of the comparable cable systems.
123. Few objections were raised with the administrative
procedures proposed in the Notice. Accordingly, we will re-
quire franchising authorities in exercising their right to regulate
basic rates to provide (1) formal notice of a rate standard (or
change thereof) to the public; (2) opportunities for interested
parties to make their views known, at least through written
submissions; and (3) a formal statement (including summary
explanation) to the public when a decision on a rate matter is
made. In response to concern expressed in comments filed by
city of Winona, Mn., we acknowledge that such procedures
would not be binding in the two year transition period pro-
vided for existing franchises.
124. Many parties urge the Commission to assume the role
of arbiter of last resort in disputes between cable operators and
franchising authorities. Due to the large and growing number
of cable systems and the limited resources of the Commission,
our role must necessarily be limited. At this time, we view our
SS —————
A63
responsibilities as largely restricted to the interpretation of our
new rules and to those areas where the Cable Act calls
specifically for Commission intervention. We believe that other
matters must generally be settled through public hearings,
negotiations, and, if necessary, by the courts.
125. With regard to the method employed by the franchising
authority in establishing basic cable rates, a majority of com-
menters opposed the “comparable rate” method proposed in
the Notice. The reason most often cited is the inherent com-
plexity of objectively choosing “comparable” cable systems.
As NTIA notes, “the problems associated with determining
comparability could bog down rate proceedings and result in
costly litigation.” The majority of commenters feel that rates
should be established through negotiation, although some
believe that this might include the “comparable rate” or some
other methods as optional tools. After deliberation, we concur
that the means by which the appropriate regulated rate is
determined is best decided consistent with the statute by the
local franchising authority.
126. Many commenters, for example, NCTA/CATA, NTIA,
Cable Operators, Hogan & Hartson, and TCI, recommend
that cost increases be automatically allowed without the delay
and cost of franchising authority approval. Such “pass-thru’s”
would be presumably in excess of the annual 5% automatic
rate increase to which most cable systems are entitled. Most
commenters suggest that such “pass-thru’s” should be based
on identifiable cost increases. For example, increases in pro-
gramming costs caused by increased distant signal copyright
fees. Other commenters, such as the Cable Operators, suggest
that cost increases based on the Consumer Price Index should
be allowed without franchising authority approval. It is our
view that the value of an automatic pass through of costs is the
avoidance of pro forma administrative proceedings. Accord-
ingly, our rules will permit cable systems to automatically pass
through any readily identifiable increase (or decrease) in cost
which is entirely attributable to the provision of basic service,
e.g., the price of programming appearing on the basic service
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tier and copyright fees for retransmission of distant broadcast
signals appearing on the basic service tier. These rate increases
may be taken in addition to the 5% automatic annual increase
to which most cable systems are entitled. Furthermore, they
may be taken by any cable .ystem whith is not otherwise
entitled to the 5% automatic annual rate increase.” All other
rate increases must be obtained through good faith negotiation
with the franchising authority.
127. As a final matter, the rules we are adopting today
which implement the rate regulation provisions of the Cable
Act, delineate what a franchising authority may do in the way
of rate regulation. This authority, however, is permissive. The
Cable Act does not, in any way, require franchising authorities
to regulate rates where they find such regulation unnecessary
or inappropriate. Indeed, we recognize that rate regulation in
many instances may be inefficient and counterproductive to
the provision of cable services within a franchise community.”
128. Six Year Report. Section 623(h) of the Cable Act
requires the Commission toSubmit a report to Congress in six
years regarding rate regulation of cable services, including
recommendations for legislative changes. In the Notice, we
proposed that this study would include an economic study of
cable rates and offerings as they relate to local demographic
and market characteristics as well as the degree of regulatory
control. While much of the necessary data could be obtained
from trade publications, a formal submission of the data may
be required of a random sampling of cable operators. This
90 It should be noted that Section 623(e) specifies that a fixed basic
service rate will not preclude the use of the 5% automatic annual increase by
the cable operator.
91 In light of the discretion we have granted franchising authorities
with respect to implementing the rate regulation standard, it bears emphasis
that the Cable Act specifically prohibits the regulation of a cable system as a
common carrier or a public utility by reason of providing any cable service.
(See Section 621(c) of the Cable Act. See also House Report at 60.)
Furthermore, we note that neither a cable operator nor a franchising
authority may waive mandatory sections of the Cable Act in reaching
franchise agreements.
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submission of data may be required of a random sampling of
cable operators. This submission could be a much simplified
version of the former annual cable financial report (FCC Form
326), as suggested by the U.S. Catholic Conference in its reply
comments. To minimize the cost and burden of the study, only
a random sample of regulated and unregulated cable systems
would be utilized. In its comments, the National League of
Cities emphasizes the importance it attaches to this study and
Suggests several data to be collected or calculated, including
rates, offerings, penetrations, subscriberships, and rates of
return. The California Department of Consumer Affairs in its
comments recommends that the study include: (1) national and
State trends in basic service rates; (2) the status of alternative
delivery technologies, such as MDS, DBS, LPTV or telephone
carriers; (3) the change in the number and mix of channels
offered as part of basic service; (4) a summary of complaints
filed with the FCC; and (5) a summary of the availability and
use of leased access channels. These and other Suggestions are
appreciated and will be given due consideration at the time of
actually designing and implementing the study.
Section 624—Regulation of Services, Facilities, and Equipment
129. Lockboxes. Section 624 of the Cable Act states that
“liJn order to restrict the viewing of programming which is
obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable
operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the
subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service
during periods selected by that subscriber.” In the Notice, we
sought guidance from the commenters regarding the appropri-
ate remedy for the failure of a cable operator to abide by this
subsection of the Cable Act.
130. Comments submitted by The Municipal Coalition, the
Office of Cable Television of the District of Columbia, and the
reply comments of NLC, state that the FCC has no jurisdiction
to punish a cable operator for failure to comply with the
“lockbox” requirement. VCTI states that the Commission
retains jurisdiction in this area. NCTA/CATA in its reply
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comments, states that the Commission retains general author-
ity since the Cable Act is to be incorporated in the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, as amended, 47 USC 151 et seq., and
Section 1 of the Act gives the Commission the duty to execute
and enforce the provisions of the Act.
131. The cable parties ask that the Commission clarify the
meaning of this section of the statute. For example, TCI asks
that the Commission state that cable operators should not be
required to provide a lockbox for commercial access channels.
VCTI states that the obligation to provide a lockbox should be
triggered upon a judicial finding that programming is obscene
or indecent. Hogan & Hartson states that these devices need
only be provided to restrict viewing of programming reason-
ably regarded as obscene or indecent under local community
standards and not for protection against all programming.
Finaliy, all the cable parties state that the Commission should
ensure that franchise authorities will not penalize them for
technical problems associated with lockboxes. For example,
lockboxes may cause interference on adjacent channels or they
may be unable to block one channel without blocking an entire
tier.
132. We believe we have the authority to ensure that the
lockbox provisions of Section 624 of the Cable Act are carried
out. In this regard we intend to adopt the procedures pursuant
to 47 CFR § 76.7 Special relief, to afford the public, cable
operators and franchising authorities a vehicle to ensure imple-
mentation of Section 624. We also believe that we should
clarify the cable operators’ responsibilities with respect to this
provision. Thus, we believe that the cable operator must
provide, upon subscriber request, by sale or lease,~a lockbox
for any channel over which it has editorial control. (This would
exclude commercial access, PEG and must-carry channels.) We
do not believe that a judicial or local community finding of
obscenity should be a prerequisite for triggering the cable
operator’s obligation. Indeed, we believe that the provision for
lockboxes largely disposes of issues involving the Commis-
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sion’s standard for indecency,” and would also be a significant
factor in cases related to obscenity and similar offensive
programming.” Finally, with regard to lockbox technical prob-
lems, we expect cable entities to use quality state of the art
equipment and we need not resolve this issue at this time.
133. Technical Standards. Section 624(e) of the Cable Act
allows the Commission to set technical standards related to
facilities and equipment required by a franchising authority
pursuant to a franchise agreement. This provision does not
affect the authority of a franchising authority to establish
standards regarding facilities and equipment in the franchise
that are not inconsistent with standards established by the
FCC.
134. The parties that commented generally support our
proposal. Storer and VCTI request that the Commission reaf-
firm its 1974 policy statement preempting technical stan-
dards.” In particular, the parties recommend that we include
the preemption policy in our rules.
135. In this Report and Order we reaffirm our policy on
federal preemption of cable TV technical standards. We did
not propose any changes in our preemption policy in the
Notice and we adopt none now. In the Notice, we addressed
the narrower issue of whether we should make any changes in
the standards we have already adopted. In this regard, we note
that the Commission recently adopted a Notice of Proposed
Rule Making which proposes to revise or delete existing techni-
cal standards for cable.” It proposes no change in our preemp-
tion policy. We believe any revisions in our technical standards
are most appropriately dealt with in that proceeding.
92 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
93 See Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
94 See Report and Order, Docket No. 20018, 31 RR 2d 1187 (1974).
95 See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Docket No. 85-38, FCC
85-66, adopted February 12, 1985.
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Section 639—Obscenity
136. Section 639 of the Cable Act establishes the Federal
standards and criminal penalties applicable to the transmission
of any cable service which is obscene or otherwise unprotected
by the Constitution. Any violation is punishable by a fine of
up to $10,000 and/or by imprisonment for up to two years.
Section 76.215 of our rules provides that “[n]Jo cable television
system operator when engaged in origination cablecasting shall
transmit or permit to be transmitted on the origination cable-
casting channel or channels material that is obscene or inde-
cent.” We stated in the Notice that these criminal provisions
supersede our rule and we therefore proposed to delete Section
76.215 of our rules.
137. NCTA/CATA, TCI and Viacom filed comments in
support of the Commission’s proposal. They state that it is
appropriate to delete our rule in deference to the statute. The
parties specifically note that the “lockbox” provision of Sec-
tion 624 of the Cable Act provides added justification for
deleting Section 76.215 of our rules.
138. The NLC states in its reply comments that the Commis-
sion has the authority under Section 624(f)(2)(A) of the Cable
Act to enforce Section 76.215 of our rules. However, NLC also
States that it is an open question whether government restric-
tions on indecent materials over cable systems are permissible
under the First Amendment. Morality in Media (Morality)
states that Section 639 of the Cable Act does not specifically
prohibit the transmission of indecent material, as does our
rule. Therefore, in the opinion of Morality, the new legislation
does not supersede the Commission rule. In addition, they
state that colloquys in both houses of Congress indicate that
Congress expected the Commission to retain its present rule on
indecent origination cablecasting. Morality, therefore, pro-
poses that the Commission preserve the indecency concept in
Section 76.215 of the rules as separate standard.
139. After careful review of all the comments, we believe it
is appropriate to delete Section 76.215 of our rules. We believe
that our rule is duplicative of and indeed surpassed vy other
A69
statutory provisions and, thus, the public will continue to be
protected from obscene and indecent programming on cable
systems despite its deletion. We note in this regard that obscene
and other “offensive” programming on cable is restricted in
three other provisions of the Cable Act. Section 612 gives the
franchising authority the power to prohibit or restrict pro-
gramming which, in the judgment of the franchising authority
is obscene or “in conflict with community standards in that it
is lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or is otherwise unpro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States.” Section 624
allows cable operators and franchising authorities to specify in
a franchise or renewal agreement that obscene or otherwise
unprotected programming can be prohibited or restricted. In
addition, Section 624 requires cable operators to offer lock-
boxes that will enable viewers to restrict the viewing of any
given channel. Finally, Section 638 maintains all existing crimi-
nal and civil causes of action against cable operators and
programmers based on the content of their services, including
obscenity and other similar laws.
Section 4—Pole Attachments
140. Section 4 of the Cable Act amends Section 224(c) of the
Communications Act of 1934 by adding a new paragraph
Section 224(c)(3). This addition provides that a state will not be
considered to be regulating the rates, terms and conditions for
pole attachments for Section 224(c)(1) purposes unless it has
issued and made effective rules and regulations implementing
the state’s regulatory authority over pole attachments and
takes final action on individual complaints within the time
limits specified in the Cable Act. This is in addition to the
present requirement that states certify to the Commission that
they regulate pole attachments under Section 224(c)(2). In the
Notice, we proposed to amend our rules to reflect the new
language contained in the Cable Act by requiring a state to
include a statement in its certification that the state has issued
and made effective rules and regulations implementing its
A70
regulatory authority over pole attachments and to enclose a
copy of the rules and regulations with the certification.
141. Several parties submitted comments on our proposed
rule change. Most of the cable interests state that the Cable Act
requires that the Commission no longer accept a state’s pro
forma certification of compliance with Section 224(c). These
commenters state that under the Cable Act, the FCC now has
the responsibility to review each state’s certification to deter-
mine whether in fact the state has complied with the require-
ments of Section 224(c). In this regard, they state that our
proposed rule does not explain precisely what constitutes
“rules and regulations implementing the state’s regulatory
authority over pole attachments,” and therefore does not meet
the intent of the statute. These parties offer modifications to
our rules. For example, NCTA/CATA, Michigan Cable Televi-
sion Association and Hogan & Hartson state that the Cable
Act should be interpreted to require that the state’s regulations
(1) be cable-specific and (2) define with reasonable certainty
the methodology used in effecting pole relief. In addition, the
Cable Operators propose that in addition to the filing of
detailed documentation regarding the determination of certifi-
cation, states be required to submit a report of any pole
attachment rate decisions each year and that the Commission
review these rates and consider decertifying the state if the
rates fall outside a zone of reasonableness.
142. BellSouth and Pacific, on the other hand, generally
support the Commission’s proposed rule changes. BellSouth,
however, proposes that the rules be revised to recognize that
tariffs on file with the state commission be prima facie evi-
dence that the state is regulating pole attachments and to
clarify that a state is not required to issue its rules and
regulations by the effective date of the Cable Act. Texas Power
and Light Company et a/. states that no new rules are required
because the statute is clear on its face. It states that problems
can be handled on a case-by-case basis.
A7l1
143. After review of the comments and replies, we believe
that our proposed rule, with one minor change, is the most
appropriate interpretation of our new statutory mandate.
Thus, we will add to the certification requirement that a state
shall certify that it has issued and made effective rules and
regulations implementing its regulatory- authority over pole
attachments. We disagree, however, with the commenters who
argue that the Commission has the responsibility to review
each state’s certification to determine whether the state’s rules
and regulations comply with Section 224(c). Indeed there are
no requirements in the statute as to the contents or format of
the state’s rules and regulations. Moreover, there is no indica-
tion in either the stafute or the legislative history that Congress
intended that the rules and regulations adopted by the state
must be cable specific or that the Commission should define
the methodology to be followed by the states. The legislative
history of the original Section 224 made it clear that receipt of
“certification from the State shall be conclusive upon the
Commission” and that the “FCC shall defer to any State
regulatory program operating under color of State law.””
Further, no rate-setting formula was imposed on the states.
Congress believed “the States should have maximum flexibility
to develop a regulatory response to pole attachment problems
in accordance with perceived State or local needs and priori-
ties.””’ There is nothing in the legislative history of the Cable
Act that indicates Congress has reversed this position or has
now empowered this Commission to act as an arbiter as to the
content or form of the rules and regulations adopted by each
state. The new Section 224(c) merely makes it clear that a state
will not be considered to be regulating pole attachments unless
it has issued and made effective rules to implement that
authority. While we will not define the methodology to be
followed by the state, we believe that the rules and regulations
should include a specific methodology which has been made
publicly available in the state. Therefore, we will require that a
96 = See S. Rep. No. 95-580, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) at 17.
97 Id.
A72
state certify that its rules and regulations include a specific
methodology for regulating pole attachments. Accordingly, if
the state certifies that it has rules in place which include a
specific methodology, which has been made publicly available
in the state, we will not inquire further unless a complaint is
filed with us that alleges that a party attempted to file a
complaint at the state level and could not because of the lack
of appropriate procedures or that the complaint it filed with
the state remained unresolved 180 days after the complaint was
filed (or within the applicable period prescribed for final action
if the state’s rules provide for resolution within 360 days after
the filing of a complaint). We believe that the requirement for
a timely resolution of complaints should obviate any concern
on the part of cable operators that some states may certify
prematurely to the Commission that they have issued and made
effective rules and regulations. Moreover, since the Commis-
sion will not examine the contents of the state’s rules and
regulations, we have decided that it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require that each state submit a copy of its rules
and regulations along with its certification. Thus, we will
delete this requirement from the proposed rules. We will,
however, require that the state certify that its rules and regula-
tions include a specific methodology. We are not persuaded to
adopt the rules proposed by BellSouth. The Commission will
not inquire whether tariffs are on file in a particular state, but
will rely on the certification by the state. The certification may
be made at any time, and the Commission will revise its list as
States certify or decertify.
Regulatory Flexibility Final Analysis
144. Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, the
Commission’s final analysis is as fol
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