Appendix — Connecticut v. Federal Communications Commission

Supreme Court brief1988

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8 4 FILED

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OCT 15 67

Ne. SP. HF. SPANIOL, JR,

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

os

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, CITY OF NEW YORK, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF

CITIES, and AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,

Petitioners,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Joseph |. Lieberman, Michael Botein

Attorney General Robert T. Perry*

William B. Gundling, Michael I. Meyerson

Assistant Attorney General Media Law Clinic

Carl J. Schuman, . New York Law School

Assistant Attorney General

30 Trinity Street 57 Worth Street

es 5 Se ' New York, New York 10013

Hartford, Connecticut 06106 (212) 431-2160

(203) 566-4990

October 15, 1987 * Counsel of Record for Petitioners

(Additional Counsel on Inside Cover)

:

nV

i%

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Steven R. Shapiro

C. Edwin Baker

American Civil Liberties Union

132 West 43rd Street

New York, New York 10036

(212) 944-9800

CITY OF NEW YORK

Norman M. Sinel

Paul S. Ryerson

Robert Alan Garrett

Patrick J. Grant

Barbara J. Delaney

Arnold & Porter

1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 872-6700 .

Stephen Kramer

Assistant Corporation Counsel

City of New York

100 Church Street

New York, New York 10007

(212) 566-3929

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES

Cynthia Pols

General Counsel

Office of Federal Relations

National League of Cities

1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 626-3020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TO THE JOINT APPENDIX

\

\

Orders and Opinions Below PAGE

Report and Order in MM Docket No. 84-1296, 50 Fed.

Reg. 18,637 (1985) (released April 19, 1985)......... ]

Memorandum Opinion and Order in MM Docket No.

84-1296, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,770 (1986) (released June 5,

Ce hia re ane gt para yore are See yn se npr Senge are 96

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, decided July 17, 1987, in

American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1554

a ae PCO ale bi ads wk cake dew awa nee ke 115

Relevant Statute

Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (relevant

| ERE eee Pat, Serr ee ee meray ys 186

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Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20554

MM Docket No. 84-1296

MM—FCC 85-179—35670

7

In the Matter of

Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commission’s Rules

to Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications

Policy Act of 1984

-*

REPORT AND ORDER

(Proceeding Terminated)

Adopted: April 11, 1985 Released: April 19, 1985

By the Commission:

Commissioner Rivera not participating.

7

INTRODUCTION

1. By this action, the Commission amends its rules to

implement certain provisions of the Cable Communications

Policy Act of 1984. This action establishes rules and regula-

tions for cable systems in the areas of ownership, channel

usage, franchise requirements and pole attachments. In addi-

tion, it establishes regulations and guidelines governing the

regulation of basic cable service rates by franchising authori-

ties.

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BACKGROUND

2. On October 30, 1984, the Cable Communications Policy

Act of 1984 (Cable Act) was signed into law.' This legislation

amends the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, by

-adding a new Title VI, entitled “Cable Communications.”* The

intent of the Cable Act is to establish a national policy that

encourages the growth and development of cable television

services and assures that cable systems are responsive to the

needs and interests of the local communities they serve.’

3. On December 4, 1984, the Commission adopted a Notice

of Proposed Rule Making (Notice) in the above-captioned

proceeding.* In this Notice, the Commission proposed to

amend its rules to implement certain provisions of the Cable

Act.° In particular, the Notice proposed, inter alia: 1) defini-

tions for the terms cable operator, cable service, and cable

system; 2) procedures whereby an aggrieved party may petition

the Commission for a ruling or file a complaint concerning

commercial channel access; 3) rule changes regarding common

carrier ownership of cable systems in their rural service areas;

4) criteria for determining whether a cable system is subject to

effective competition; 5) standards for regulation of basic

l Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 1

et seq., 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).

2 The Cable Act also amends certain other provisions of the Commu-

nications Act of 1934, as amended. For example, the Cable Act also amends

Section 224(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, by adding a

new paragraph (c)(3). -

3 See House Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. Rep. No.

934, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984) (hereinafter House Report).

4 See Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Docket No. 84-1296,

49 FR 48765 (1984).

5 The Commission also recentiy initiated a separate rule making

proceeding regarding the equal employment opportunity provisions of the

Cable Act. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Docket No. 85-61,

FCC 85-102, adopted March 1, 1985.

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cable service rates by a franchising authority in those instances

where a cable system is not subject to effective competition;

and 6) modification of our rules concerning state regulation of

pole attachments to reflect new language contained in the

Cable Act.

4. One hundred and forty (140) parties filed comments and

sixty-three (63) parties filed replies in response to the Notice. A

list of all parties is contained in Appendix A. The Commission

was required by the Cable Act to complete this rule making

within 180 days of enactment.

DISCUSSION

Section 602—Definitions

5. Section 602 of the Cable Act defines a number of funda-

mental terms. In the Notice, we proposed to amend our rules

to adopt the definitions of cable operator, cable service, and

cable system contained in the Cable Act. In proposing these

changes, we noted that there are differences between the new

definitions and the definitions presently in our rules and that

these differences may affect the manner in which we currently

regulate certain segments of the cable industry. Comments were

sought on the proposed definitions of these terms. Each of

these terms is discussed below.

6. Cable Operator. The term “cable operator” is defined in

paragraph (4) of Section 602 of the Cable Act as follows:

. any person or group of persons (A) who provides

cable service over a cable system and directly or through

one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such

cable system, or (B) who otherwise ccetrols or is responsi-

ble for, through any arrangement, the management and

operation of such a cable system.

The term “affiliate” when used in relation to any person,

means another person who owns or controls, is owned or

controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with,

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such person.° A “significant interest” for the purposes of this

definition means a cognizable interest as provided in the

Commission’s rules for attributing interests in broadcast, cable

television and newspaper properties.’

7. Several parties submitted comments on the proposed

cable operator definition. Comments filed by the law firm of

Hogan & Hartson on behalf of various cable operators and

state cable associations (Hogan & Hartson) state that the

proposed definition, if read broadly, could include not only the

local entity providing cable service to the community but also

entities associated with the cable entity. This could include

companies with management contracts to run the cable system,

even if those companies have no ownership interests, and any

person with a “cognizable interest” in the cable system, even if

those persons do not participate in the management of the

system. Hogan & Hartson suggests that the Commission

“should clarify the definition by limiting it to a single cable

operator per cable system.” Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI)

believes that the Commission should clarify the use of the term

“affiliate” to indicate that it is not being used in its common

communications sense but rather is used to describe a purely

legal relationship. In this regard, TCI believes that the Com-

mission’s present rules are more reflective of congressional

intent.

8. The New York Telephone Company and the New England

Telephone and Telegraph Company (NYNEX), while support-

ing the Commission’s proposal, believes that more specificity is

needed. NYNEX is concerned that the definition may give rise

to uncertainty concerning the ability of the telephone compa-

nies to construct, sell or lease a cable system. NYNEX requests

that the definition be amended to specify that “controls or is

responsible for” pertains to provision of cable services, not

6 See Section 602(1) of the Cable Act.

7 See 47 CFR §§ 73.3555, 73.3615 and 76.501. See also House Report

at 41.

AS

facilities. Similar views are expressed by Pacific Bell and

Nevada Bell (Pacific) in its comments and by the Ameritech

Operating Companies (Ameritech) in its reply comments. Both

Pacific and Ameritech propose that language be added to the

proposed definition to affect this change.* BellSouth Corpora-

tion (BellSouth), on behalf of its operating telephone compa-

nies, supports the Commission’s proposed adoption of the

language contained in Section 602(4) of the Cable Act. Simi-

larly, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Southwestern

Bell) supports the definition but suggests the Commission add

language to clarify the meaning of “significant interest.” The

Communications Workers of America (CWA), in its comments,

suggests that the definition be amended to include either “cable

television system operator or cable operator” to ensure consist-

ency with the statute.

9. After review of the comments and replies, we believe that

our original proposal is generally appropriate. However, in

order to ensure completeness and consistency with the statute,

we will also amend our rules to include definitions of the

terms: affiliate; person; and significant interest. With regard to

limiting the definition to include only a single cable operator

per cable system, we feel that the definition of a cable operator

is intentionally broad and that a cable system may have more

than one operator. According to the definition, any person

who “provides cable service” and “owns a significant interest”

in a cable system either directly or through a subsidiary or

affiliated company would be a cable operator. In addition,

anyone who controls or is responsible for the “management

and operation” of a cable system would also come under the

definition of a cable operator and may also be subject to

8 Pacific proposes that the definition be amended to state that it “does

not include a person or group of persons who provides cable distribution

facilities for channel service to cable systems.” Ameritech proposes the

adoption of the language suggested by Pacific or the following language:

This definition shall not include a person or groups of persons who

lease or manage local distribution systems for the delivery of cable

services by third parties.

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sanctions for violations of the provisions of the Cable Act.” On

the other hand, mere ownership of facilities used by a cable

system would not be sufficient to qualify an entity as a cable

operator. Accordingly, telephone companies that merely con-

Struct or lease cable system facilities are not cable operators

under the Cable Act.

10. Cable Service. Section 602(5) of the Cable Act defines

the term “cable service” as follows:

(A) The one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video

programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B)

subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the

selection of such video programming or other program-

ming service.

The Commission’s rules do not contain a definition of cable

service or the terms “video programming” or “other program-

ming service” which are included in this definition.'® In the

Notice, we proposed to include only the definition of the term

cable service in our rules.

11. Most parties commenting on this matter favor the addi-

tion of the definition of cable service to the Commission’s

rules.'' Several parties, however, comment that the proposed

9 However, we will generally proceed against the franchisee who is a

matter of record with us.

10 The terms “video programming” and “other programming service”

are defined in Sections 602(11) and 602(16), respectively, of the Cable Act as

follows:

the term “video programming” means programming provided by, or

generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a televi-

sion broadcast station;

the term “other programming service” means information that a cable

operator makes available to all subscribers generally.

11 These parties include Ameritech, Anchorage Telephone Utility, Bell-

South, CWA, the City of New York (NYC), the Department of Justice

(DOJ), GTE Services Corp.(GTE), the National Telecommunications and

Information Administration (NTIA), NYNEX, Pacific, Southwestern Bell

and the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (Connecticut

PUC).

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definition of cable service is incomplete and potentially confus-

ing without also defining the terms “video programming” and

“other program services” contained in the Cable Act. A

number of parties suggest that the definition of cable service is

meant to delineate the boundary between such services and

services for which common carrier regulation could potentially

be imposed." In this regard, Southwestern Bell suggests a more

precise definition of cable service in order to differentiate more

clearly between cable services and telephone common carrier

services. Several telephone interests, such as BellSouth and

GTE, believe that our rules should state that the provision of

non-video programming by a telephone company is a permissi-

ble activity under the Cable Act.

12. DOJ requests that the Commission clarify the definition

of the term video programming contained in the Cable Act.

DOJ recommends that the Commission indicate that program-

ming “comparable” to that provided by a television broadcast

station includes satellite-delivered, advertiser-supported pro-

gramming networks such as ESPN, commercial-free TV pro-

gramming such as HBO, and pay-per-view services which are

not generally provided by broadcast television stations.

13. The National Cable Television Association, Inc. and the

Community Antenna Television Association (NCTA/CATA),

on the other hand, suggest that the Commission need not

define the term cable service in the rules, because the term does

not generally appear elsewhere in the Commission’s rules and

inclusion of the term is inappropriate given the unresolved

12 For example, Anchorage Telephone Utility states in its reply com-

ments that Congress included the definition of cable service “to differentiate

between cable services exempted from common carrier regulation and all

other non-cable communications services which can be provided over a cable

system. Anchorage also states that Congress intended that cable operators

should not be allowed to function as telecommunications common carriers.

Similarly, Southwestern Bell proposes that the Commission adopt Sections

3(b) and 621(d)(2} of the Cable Act concerning jurisdiction of the FCC and

the states with respect to cable service to ensure clear delineation between the

regulatory treatment of cable operators offering cable services and those

offering common carrier services.

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preemption issues related to two-way services provided by

cable systems. NCTA/CATA maintains that such inclusion

might suggest that the Commission had decided that any

services “other than those meeting the Cable Act’s definition

of ‘cable service’ could be regulated as common carrier services

‘ .” In its reply comments, NCTA/CATA states that the

term cable service is intended to distinguish between those

services “that cannot, by statute, be regulated on a common

carrier basis from those whose regulatory status is yet to be

determined by the Commission.” Inclusion of the definition, it

States, could be viewed as resolving the issue of preemption of

state regulation of two-way services provided by cable systems.

14. We stated in the Notice that the legislative history

indicated that the intent of Congress in defining cable service is

to mark the boundary between the cable services that the

legislation specifically exempts from common carrier regula-

tion under Section 621(c) of the Cable Act and all other non-

cable communications services which cable systems could

provide. We proposed to resolve only those issues raised in the

Cable Act and, therefore, not to address the issue of the

regulatory treatment of non-cable communications services

offered over cable systems.'* Consistent with our proposal,

therefore, we will avoid ruling at this time on the manner of

regulatory treatment of non-cable services. We emphasize that

our adoption of the term “cable service” in our rules in no way

represents any decision as to the regulatory treatment of non-

cable services.

13 This issue is currently under consideration before the Commission in

Cox Cable Communications, Inc. (CCB-DFD-83-1), which concerns preemp-

tion of state regulation of Cox’s institutional cable service in Omaha,

Nebraska. The House Report states that the Committee “does not intend to

resolve or even address the issue of the state or Federal treatment of non-

cable communications services offered over cable systems. . . .” See House

Report at 60. It also states that nothing in the Cable Act “shal! be construed

to affect existing regulatory authority with respect to non-cable communica-

tions services provided over a cable system.” See House Report at 41.

a

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15. We believe that inclusion of the term “cable service” in

our rules is necessary and consistent with the intent of Con-

gress. The term issued extensively not only throughout the

Cable Act but also in the rules we are adopting today. We

believe that adoption of the term precisely as stated in the

Cable Act is a necessary part of our implementation process.

We believe that the legislative history and intent provides

sufficient guidance regarding the definition of cable service.

Such service includes programming services that make non-

video information generally available to all subscribers and do

not include subscriber-specific information. Cable services in-

clude, for example, pay-per-view video programming, teletext,

one-way transmission of computer software, and on-line air-

line guides or catalog services that do not allow direct customer

purchases. Two-way services that allow subscribers to manipu-

late or otherwise electronically process information or data

would not be classified as cable services.'* Examples of such

non-cable services include at-home shopping and banking ser-

vices, data processing, video conferencing, and all voice com-

munications."

16. We are aiso amending our rules at this time to include

definitions of the terms “video programming” and “other

programming service” as they afe stated in the Cable Act.

These terms are contained within the definition of the term

“cable service” and we believe that their incorporation in the

rules will reduce potential confusion which may arise from

their absence. Further, with respect to the definition of video

programming, we conclude that this definition is sufficiently

expansive to include such video programming as that provided

by ESPN, HBO, and other satellite-delivered cable network

programming.

14 With respect to data processing services or use of data bases, we

believe that the distinction between cable and non-cable services occurs with

regard to where the data processing takes place. For example, downloading

of data to a home computer that then is used to manipulate or process the

information would still be considered a cable service.

IS See House Report at 41-44,

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17. Cable System. The Notice also solicited comment on the

definition of the term “cable system” contained in the Cable

Act. The Cable Act defines a cable system as:

. . a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission

paths and associated signal generation, reception, and

control equipment that is designed to provide cable ser-

vice which includes video programming and which is

provided to multiple subscribers within a community

Furthermore, the definition of cable system in the Cable Act

specifically excludes inter alia: 1) facilities that only retransmit

the signals of television broadcast stations; and 2) facilities that

serve Only subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings

under common ownership, control, or management, unless

such facilities use public rights-of-way.

18. In the Notice, the Commission recognized several differ-

ences between this definition and the existing definition of a

cable system in the Commission’s rules. For example, the

Commission’s rules define a cable system as a facility that

distributes the signals of broadcast stations.'’ The Cable Act

redefines a cable system as a facility that provides video

programming and it specifically excludes facilities that only

retransmit broadcast signals.'* In this regard, we requested

comment on whether or not to include satellite-received

“superstations” within the meaning of television broadcast

Signals; our initial position was that such facilities not be

included within the meaning of television broadcast signals for

this purpose.

16 = Section 602(6) of the Cable Act.

17 The existing definition of a cable system is contained in Section

76.5(a) of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR § 76.5(a).

18 ~—s- The staff estimates that about ten to tweive percent of all cable

facilities, serving less than two percent of all subscribers, carry only broad-

cast signals.

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19. A second difference is that cable systems with fewer

than 50 subscribers are presently exempted from our rules.

Under the Cable Act, such systems are no longer exempted. A

third difference is that the Cable Act includes facilities, such as

satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, that serve

subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings under

common ownership, control or management, if such facilities

use public rights-of-way. The Commission’s rules exclude all

facilities that serve multiple unit dwellings under common

ownership, control or management.

20. In proposing to adopt the definition of a cable system

contained in the Cable Act, we noted that a number of

regulatory concerns remain for facilities which previously qual-

ified as cable systems but would no longer come under the

definition and sought comment on what, if any, other princi-

ples should be applied to such facilities. We indicated that

existing federal preemption policies such as those relating to

franchise fee limits, technical standards, mandatory signal

carriage, sports blackout, and network nonduplication rules

would no longer be applicable to these systems. In addition,

such facilities would no longer be eligible to be licensees in the

Cable Television Relay Service (CARS). We raised the question

of whether existing licensees should be “grandfathered” or

whether the CARS eligibility rules should be amended.

21. In general, most commenters support adoption of the

proposed definition of a cable system contained in the Cable

Act. Some concern, however, was raised by a number of

broadcast interests and others about the impact the Cable Act

definition of a cable system may have on the Commission’s

signal carriage rules.'? For example, the National Broadcasting

Company, Inc. (NBC) and the Corporation for Public Broad-

casting (CPB) argue that the definition of a cable system

should not exempt cable facilities that retransmit exclusively

broadcast signals. CPB indicates that at a minimum if the

19 The carriage rules cited by the commenters include sports blackout,

technical standards, network nonduplication protection and the mandatory

carriage Or must-carry rules.

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Commission adopts the Cable Act definition it must amend its

signal carriage rules to include facilities that retransmit exclu-

sively broadcast signals. Similarly, the Association of Indepen-

dent Television Stations, Inc. (INTV), in its reply comments,

States that the Commission should retain its current definition

of a cable system at least for the purposes of its “must-carry”

rules. Other parties, such as NCTA/CATA, also indicate that

the Commission should conduct a further inquiry to determine

the extent to which systems not covered by the Cable Act or the

rules should be subject to signal carriage rules, technical

requirements and other regulations similar to those applied to

cable systems.

22. DOJ, in its comments, states that the Commission’s

must-carry rules would not, as a practical matter, need to be

applied to “classic” cable systems (i.e., systems that retransmit

only broadcast signals) since these systems will generally re-

spond to demand for retransmission of those signals desired by

consumers. In its reply comments, DOJ indicates that the

Commission does retain authority over these systems and

suggests that the Commission could seek further comment on

whether such systems should remain subject to the “array of

Signal carriage regulations” historically applied to cable televi-

sion systems.

23. With regard to the retransmission of “superstations,”

the majority of commenters on this issue support the Commis-

sion’s proposal in this matter.*? They believe that satellite-

received superstations should not be included within the

meaning of television broadcast signals contained in the excep-

tion to the definition of a cable television system. The com-

menters generally agree that such television broadcast signals

be limited to only those signals received in a conventional

manner. In this regard, DOJ states that the Commission has

discretion in this matter but suggests that a reasonable way to

deal with this problem is to include such systems as cable

systems.

20 See, e.g., comments of Pennsylvania Cable Television Association

(PCTA), NYC, and DOJ.

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24. Most commenters object to our proposal to include

SMATYV systems serving multiple unit dwellings not under

common ownership, control or management as cable systems

only if they use public rights-of-way. Some SMATYV, cable and

municipal interests submit that the Cable Act is not intended to

alter the present status of non-commonly owned multiple unit

dwellings. Austin Satellite Television, Inc. et a/., for example,

states that the Commission proposal to include such facilities

in the exemption would require “otherwise legitimate cable

systems” to utilize public rights-of-way in order to be consid-

ered cable systems. The City of St. Louis, NYC, the Municipal

Coalition and the National League of Cities (NLC) agree and

state that the Cable Act imposes new regulations on SMATVs

that use public rights-of-way and serve commonly owned,

controlled or managed multiple unit dwellings.

25. Another issue which some commenters address is the

interpretation of the phrase “use of public rights-of-way.”

Private Cable Systems, Inc. and Direct Satellite Communica-

tions, Inc. suggest that the definition of the term should

remain a local responsibility and that the revised definition

should not automatically subject SMATV systems to federal

cable regulation.”’ In its reply, NTIA, on the other hand,

declares that Congress did intend to include systems which

make incidental use of public rights-of-way in the cable system

definition. Furthermore, NCTA/CATA, TCI, the National

Association of State Cable Agencies (NASCA), and the City of

Austin state that, regardless of their status under the Cable

Act, SMATVs should be subject to the same regulatory obliga-

tions as cable systems.

26. Several commenters were concerned with the impact of

the definition on small cable systems and SMATV operations.

The Microwave Communications Products Division of the

Hughes Aircraft Company (Hughes) states that this new defini-

21 Direct Satellite notes, for example, that it is not unusual for a

commonly-owned group of multi-unit dwellings to be situated on both sides

of a public street or for a developer to dedicate streets to a local municipality

following construction.

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tion will render many older and smaller cable systems ineligible

for CARS licenses. Hughes believes that such systems should

continue to be eligible for CARS licenses. Hughes does not

believe that grandfathering these existing small systems is the

appropriate solution. Hughes proposes that the CARS eligibil-

ity rules be amended to incorporate the existing Commission

definition of “cable system.”

27. After reviewing the record, we believe that adoption of

the definition of a cable system contained in the Cable Act is

appropriate. We concur with DOJ, which states in its com-

ments, that the Commission cannot define cable systems to

include systems that retransmit only broadcast signals given the

clear language to the contrary in the Cable Act. Accordingly,

facilities that merely retransmit broadcast signals will not be

considered cable systems for purposes of the Cable Act or the

Commission’s rules to the extent indicated herein. With respect

to the status of “superstations,” we believe that such signals

which emanate well beyond the local viewing area should not

be considered broadcast television signals for the limited pur-

pose of the broadcast-only exclusion contained in the defini-

tion of a cable system. To do otherwise would preclude from

regulation many systems which the Congress clearly intended

to include within the scope of the Cable Act’s definition of a

cable system. On the other hand, we agree with the commen-

ters that this proceeding is not the appropriate place to decide

the status of signal carriage requirements for such rebroadcast

only facilities. Accordingly, at this time, facilities now subject

to signal carriage rules will continue to remain subject to those

same requirements. Facilities constructed after the effective

date of these rules and not meeting the definition of a cable

system contained in the Cable Act, however, will no longer be

subject to any signal carriage requirements. With regard to the

exclusion of facilities serving multiple unit dwellings, we will

include as cable systems only such facilities that use public

rights-of-way. Further, with respect to CARS eligibility, we.

believe that CARS facilities should be limited to only those

systems which qualify as cable systems under the revised

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definition.” We will, however, grandfather existing systems

which hold CARS licenses as of the effective date of this

action. As a final matter, we emphasize that any regulations

which are inconsistent with the policy of the statute or place a

burden on interstate communications will continue to be re-

garded as in conflict with federal regulatory policy.”

Sections 611 and 612—Use of Cable Channels

28. Sections 611 and 612 of the Cable Act concern the use of

cable channels. Section 611 specifies that a franchising author-

ity may establish requirements to designate channels for pub-

lic, educational or governmental (PEG) use. In addition,

Section 611 prohibits the cable operator from exercising any

editorial control over the PEG channels. Section 612 estab-

lishes those conditions under which a cable operator must

designate channels for commercial use by persons unaffiliated

with the cable operator. The term “commercial use” is defined

in Section 612(b)(5)(B) as the provision of video programming,

whether or not for profit. Cable systems with fewer than 36

activated channels are not required to designate any channel

capacity for commercial use. Cable systems with 36 or more

activated channels must designate a certain percentage of their

capacity for commercial use.”

22 It should be noted, however, that such cable facilities may be eligible

for microwave systems above 18 GHz in the private radio services and can

also lease channel capacity from common carriers.

23 See, for example, Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 FCC 2d

1223 (1983), recon. denied FCC 84-206 (May 14, 1984), aff’d sub nom. New

York State Commission Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.

1984).

24 Systems with 36 to 54 activated channels must designate 10 percent

for commercial use and systems with 55 or more must designate 15 percent.

Except for systems with more than 100 channels, must-carry channels and

channels which cannot be used due to technical and safety requirements

(e.g., aeronautical channels) are subtracted from the system’s total capacity

for the purposes of determining the percentage of designated commercial

channels. In addition, any fractional amount of a channel is rounded up to

the next whole number of channels.

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29. Section 612 also provides a right of action for any

person aggrieved by the failure or refusal of a cable operator to

make commercial channel capacity available. The first avenue

of relief is the federal court system. However, Section 612 also

provides that parties may petition the Commission for relief

upon a showing that a cable operator or a multiple system

operator (MSO) has repeatedly violated this section.** The

Commission is also authorized to establish any additional rule

or order, including a rate schedule, if it finds that there is a

pattern or practice of abuse.

30. Commercial Channel Access Disputes. In order to im-

plement the provision of the Cable Act concerning commercial

channel access disputes, we proposed in the Notice to follow

the administrative procedures set forth in Section 76.7 of the

Commission’s rules. Section 76.7 provides procedures for peti-

tions for special relief whereby an aggrieved party may petition

the Commission for a ruling or file a complaint. We requested

comment on this approach as well as other remedial procedures

such as the show cause procedures contained in Section 76.9 of

the Commission’s rules.

31. Most parties commenting on this matter favor the use of

the special relief procedures proposed in the Notice. For

example, cable parties and other interests generally endorse the

use of the special relief procedures contained in Section 76.7 of

our rules for adjudication of commercial channel access dis-

putes. Several commenters suggest, however, that specific lan-

guage be added to the proposed rule to indicate that three prior

adjudications are required before the special relief procedures

may be invoked.

25 Three or more adjudicated violations would generally constitute a

pattern or practice of abuse with respect to a single cable operator. However,

three adjudications on three different cable systems all controlled by an MSO

may not necessarily constitute such a pattern. Nevertheless, to the extent that

a few violations which might otherwise appear to be isolated are found to be

the result of corporate headquarter decisions, directives or actions, these

actions may be grounds for a Commission finding that an MSO has engaged

in a pattern of abuse. See House Report at 53-54.

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32. The Cable Television Access Coalition (Access Coali-

tion) and Connecticut PUC contend that the burden of proof

in these matters should be on the cable operator and not the

petitioner. For this reason, they propose that a show cause

procedure be used. NYC, in its comments, suggests that an

aggrieved party should be able to choose any course of action,

e.g., special relief, show cause or forfeiture proceeding.

33. Some commenters express concern over what constitutes

commercial leased access in terms of rate discrimination. The

Access Coalition claims the “Commission should emphasize

that rate structures . . . must fall within a reasonable scope

”

34. After reviewing the comments and replies, we conclude

that the administrative procedures proposed in the Notice are

the most appropriate means of adjudicating commercial chan-

nel access disputes. The special relief procedures afford the

Commission significant flexibility in conducting a proceeding

and in determining an appropriate remedy. While such special

relief procedures do place the burden of proof on the peti-

tioner, we believe that this burden is not unreasonable and is

consistent with the prior adjudication standard set forth in the

Cable Act.” Therefore, we are amending our rules to include a

new rule section on commercial channel access as proposed in

the Notice. This new rule section wil! specify that the special

relief provisions contained in Section 76.7 shall be used in the

case of commercial channel access disputes. We will also

specify in this rule section that three prior adjudications are

necessary before the Commission will entertain petitions re-

garding commercial channel access. This action in no way

limits the sanction provisions, such as show cause orders and

forfeitures, which the Commission may take in response to

commercial channel access disputes.

26 There must be three or more adjudicated violations before an

aggrieved party may petition the Commission. Furthermore, the special relief

process may also protect MSOs from frivolous complaints of violating this

section.

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35. With respect to the issue of establishing rules to ensure

reasonable rates for commercial leased access, Section 612(f)

of the Cable Act states that “there shall be a presumption that

the price, terms, and conditions for use of [commercial]

channel capacity . . . are reasonable and in good faith unless

shown by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” We,

therefore, do not believe that additional rules or regulations

are appropriate or necessary and will not modify our rules at

this time to include language specific to “reasonable” rates for

commercial leased access. This action does not prevent parties

from filing commercial access dispute petitions that have met

the prior adjudication standard based upon unreasonable

rates, terms and conditions.

36. Other Issues. A number of other issues were raised by

the commenters regarding the requirements of Sections 611

and 612 of the Cable Act. The law firm of Farrow,

Schildhause, Wilson & Rains (Farrow) raises a number of

constitutional questions regarding access channels. Farrow

suggests that the forced opening of a cable system to PEG and

commercial access may be the taking of private property for

public use without just compensation or an improper restric-

tion on the First Amendment rights of cable operators. Farrow

Suggests that the Commission consider raising these constitu-

tional questions and staying access obligations while this ques-

tion is being litigated. Farrow also proposes that the

Commission allow special rélief petitions against franchising

authorities to permit an operator to test the constitutionality of

Section 612(h) of the Cable Act. This subsection allows a

franchising authority to prohibit a local cable system from

carrying leased channel programming that local authorities

consider obscene.

37. With respect to the constitutional questions raised by

Farrow concerning channel access, similar access matters have

been before the courts and have been found to be constitu-

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tional.*’ Further, the Commission is charged with implement-

ing the Cable Act in a timely fashion. We do not believe that

grant of a stay of all channel access obligations, until all

constitutional questions regarding the Cable Act are resolved,

is appropriate here.

38. Western Communications, Inc. (WCI) and Gill Indus-

tries, in their comments, request clarification of the commer-

cial channel access requirement. They are concerned that a

cable operator could be required to permit commercial channel

lessees access to the computer systems and associated hardware

used by the cable operator.” They state that making such

access mandatory would not be “reasonable” under Section

612(c)(1) of the Cable Act.” We concur with the commenters

on this issue. We find no basis either in the legislative history or

in the Cable Act that would require cable operators to afford

mandatory access to control systems by third party commercial

channel lessees. However, to the extent that a cable system

deliberately configures itself technically to preclude commer-

cial access, such action would likely be viewed as a direct

attempt to thwart Congressional intent and could result in

sanctions being imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction.

27 See, e.g., Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F.

Supp. 976 (D.R.1. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-1800 (Ist Cir. Oct. 27,

1983) (state agency jurisdiction question certified to R. I. Supreme Ct.,

A.2d (R. I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1985), and returned to Ist Cir. for

constitutional questions).

28 In addressable cable systems, each converter/descrambler is nor-

mally controlled by a central computer which uses an integrated program to

authorize program choices, automatically generate billing information, and

produce reports and accounts for the cable system.

29 This section of the Cable Act states that the cable operator may

establish rates, terms or conditions for commercial use that are sufficient to

ensure that such use will not adversely affect the operation of the cable

system.

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39. As a final matter, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. (Cap Cities)

and Hogan & Hartson request clarification concerning the

definition of activated channels. Cap Cities contends that the

language of the Cable Act is ambiguous. Hogan & Hartson, in

its comments, requests clarification on the use of aeronautical

channels and channels that have been designated for commer-

cial uses prior to the effective date of the statute. Specifically, it

believes that the Commission should declare that channel

availablity will be judged by the aeronautical rules under which

the cable operator elects to operate and that commercial use

which commenced prior to December 29, 1984, may still be

deemed commercial use for Section 612 purposes.

40. Section 612(b)(S)(A) of the Cable Act defines activated

channels as “those channels engineered at the headend of the

cable system for the provision of services generally available to

residential subscribers of the cable system, regardless of

whether such services actually are provided, including any

channel designated for public, educational, or governmental

use.” We do not believe that it is necessary at this time to

define “activated channel” in our rules. We believe that the

intent of the statute is clear. For purposes of compliance with

the access requirements of the statute, we will consider “acti-

vated channels” to include all channels used for the provision

of video and other programming services generally available to

subscribers, i.e., any channel used to provide cable service to

subscribers. In addition, those channels not carrying any pro-

gramming but capable of delivering cable service to subscribers

without additional engineering modification of the system will

be considered activated for the purposes of access channel

allocation.”

30 For example, channels that are currently set aside for future expan-

sion of services on the cable system would be counted as “activated

channels” whether or not new subscriber equipment would be necessary to

receive such services. (It should be noted that there is no requirement that the

cable operator provide any such new subscriber equipment necessary to

receive channels designated for commercial use.) Additional system capacity

that would require new equipment to be installed throughout the cable

A21

41. With respect to the questions of aeronautical and prior

commercial use, we agree with the commenters on both issues.

In determining the base of channels to which the commercial

channel percentage requirement is applied, it is up to the cable

system to declare under which aeronautical rules it chooses to

operate. Commercial use applicants cannot force cable opera-

tors to alter the aeronautical channel system under which they

operate in order to affect channel capacity. As for prior

commercial uses, we see no reason that a channel designated

for commercial use before the effective date of the statute

cannot continue to be used for the purposes of satisfying this

requirement.

Section 613—Ownership Restrictions

42. Section 613 of the Cable Act establishes restrictions on

the ownership and operation of cable television systems by

local television broadcasters and local telephone companies.

43. Cable/Broadcast Station Restrictions. Section 613(a)

of the Cable Act prohibits the ownership of a cable system by a

television broadcast licensee whose predicted Grade B contour

covers any portion of the cable community. This provision is

the same in substance as Section 76.501(a)(2) of the Commis-

sion’s rules. Accordingly, we did not propose any change to

this rule in the Notice.

44. Several commenters, such as WCI and TCI, agree that

Section 613(a) of the Cable Act and Section 76.501(a)(2) of the

Commission’s rules are equivalent and that no changes should

be made to our rules. NYC recommends the adoption of the

specific language of the Cable Act. The NLC believes that

there is no need to retain this rule since it duplicates the statute.

Marsh Media Ltd. (Marsh) believes that any television/cable

crossownership rules are unconstitutional and that the Com-

system would not be considered activated channels for the purpose of

determining commercial channel requirements. In this regard, the mere

absence of a cabie headend processor would not, in and of itself, be an

indication of lack of system capacity.

A22

mission should refrain from enforcing these statutory provi-

sions.

45. We believe that our current rule is appropriate and

should be maintained. As the rule is currently worded, it has

the same effect as Section 613(a) of the Cable Act. Therefore,

we believe there is no need to substitute the language of the

Statute, as NYC suggests. We believe that our rules should

contain the substance of the significant provisions of the Cable

Act. Accordingly, we will not adopt the NLC’s suggestion to

eliminate this rule.

46. Cable/Telephone Company Restrictions. Section

613(b) of the Cable Act establishes regulations pertaining to

cable system ownership by a common carrier within its tele-

phone service area. Section 613(b)(1) makes it unlawful for a

common carrier to provide video programming to subscribers

in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly

through an affiliate. Under Section 613(b)(2), a common -

carrier is prohibited from providing pole or conduit space, or

channels of communications, to any entity that it owns or

controls, if these facilities are to be used for the provision of

video programming directly to subscribers. These provisions of

the Cable Act are similar to the cable/telephone company

ownership prohibitions contained in Sections 63.54 and 63.55

of the Commission’s rules. In the Notice we proposed only to

replace the term “cable television service” with “the provision

of video programming” language contained in the Cable Act.

47. Many commenters agree with our proposal to amend

Part 63 of our rules by substituting “the provision of video

programming” for “cable television service.” BellSouth states

that this amendment would permit telephone companies to

provide other programming services, which was the intention

of the Cable Act. The joint comments of 105 cable operators

(Cable Operators) favor this proposal but add that the Com-

mission should explicitly state that all non-textual video serv-

ices including pay cable and pay-per-view are within the

definition of video programming.

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A23

48. Several commenters believe that clarifications may be

needed if the language of the statute replaces the wording of

our rules. For example, NTIA states that the Commission

should ensure that such an amendment will not prevent tele-

phone companies from continuing to offer broadband video

transport services under tariff. Centel Communications Com-

pany (Centel) believes that we should make it clear that this

change in terminology has no effect on our decision to permit

affiliates of telephone companies to have blanket Section 214

authorization when they propose to offer cable service outside

their telephone service area.”'

49. A few commenters believe that we should not change

“cable television service” to “the provision of video program-

ming.” The Joint Cable Operators, Florida Cable Television

Association and Cox Cable Communications, Inc. (Cox) state

that the intent of Section 613(b) is to codify current Commis-

sion rules and, therefore, we should retais) these rules as

presently written. NYNEX sees no need for this change.

However, if the rules are amended as proposed, they believe

that the definition of “video programming” should also be

adopted.

50. Several commenters address other issues not specifically

mentioned in the Notice. The NLC believes that those rules of

Part 63 that duplicate the Cable Act should be deleted. The

U.S. Telephone Association (USTA) suggests replacing the

term “telephone common carrier” with “common carrier.”

GTE believes the more appropriate term is “any common

carrier . . . im its service area,” as used in Section 613(b),

because these rules are meant to apply only to traditional

exchange telephone companies. Centel states that Note (1)(a)

of Section 63.54 of our rules is ambiguous and should be

modified to allow voluntary cooperation between telephone

31 Report and Order, Docket 84-28, 49 FR 21333 (1984).

A24

and cable companies.’ Telephone and Data Systems Inc. and

TDS Cable Communications Company (TDS) comments that

Note 1, as currently written, makes it difficult to ascertain

what type of “relationship” is permissible without a case-by-

case clarification.

51. Farrow believes that telephone companies proposing to

offer only broadcast signals on cable systems should not be

exempt from the cross-ownership restrictions. It states that

Section 613(b)(1) seems to make this clear when the section

provides that telephone companies may not sell video program-

ming. However, Farrow indicates that problems may arise since

Section 602(6) changes the definition of a cable system to

exempt systems carrying only broadcast signals. GTE disagrees

and states that pure retransmission systems should be exempt.

52. Several cellular radio operators, such as the Cellular

Telecommunications Division of Telocator Network of Amer-

ica, Inc. (Cellular), state that the application of crossownership

restrictions to non-wireline common carriers is not justified by

the policies and purposes of Section 613 and would not be in

the public interest. Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. comments that the

basis of the crossownership restrictions relates to the unique

monopoly position held by local landline telephone exchange

carriers in their telephone service areas. Non-wireline cellular

operators will not have a monopoly. Further, cable operators

are not dependent on non-wireline carriers for pole attach-

ments or transmission capacity. Therefore, non-wireline carri-

ers have no incentive for abuse, like landline carriers, and

should not be affected by these restrictions. GTE, in its reply

comments, believes that there is no reason to include wireline

cellular operators, if non-wireline common carriers are ex-

empted.

32 Note (1)(a) of Section 63.54 states:

As used above, the terms “control” and “affiliate” bar any financial or

business relationship whatsoever by contract or otherwise, directly or

indirectly between the carrier and the customer, except only the carrier-

user relationship. -

A25

53. We will substitute the language of the Cable Act, “provi-

sion of video programming,” for the term “cable television

service” in Part 63 of our rules. We believe that this change is

sufficient to make the substance of our rules conform to the

statute. The Cable Act is quite clear that its intention is to

restrict only the direct provision of video programming to

subscribers by common carriers in the same areas as they

provide telephone service.” In this regard, we believe that the

provisions of Section 613(b)(1) aiso apply to telephone compa-

nies proposing to offer only broadcast signals on their cable

systems. While such cable systems may be exempt from other

provisions of the Cable Act, it is clear that these cable systems

provide video programming directly to subscribers. Therefore,

without a waiver from the Commission, ownership of such a

system by a common carrier within its telephone service area

would be prohibited.

54. Finally, we will not apply the telephone company/cable

crossownership restriction to non-wireline cellular operators

and other radio common carriers.** Cellular operators provide

telephone service to their subscribers using radio communica-

tions and do not have telephone service areas in the traditional

sense. We have not applied these restrictions to non-wireline

common carriers in the past and nothing in the Cable Act or its

legislative history indicates that we should change this policy.

55. Attribution of Ownership. In the Notice, we requested

comment on the issue of attribution for the purpose of defin-

ing ownership and control as it relates to cable system owner-

ship by a common carrier. While the legislative history

specifically states that the Commission’s attribution rules apply

33 The Cable Act defines “video programming” as that which is

comparable to the programming provided by a television broadcast station in

Section 602(16). We interpret this to include broadcast stations, supersta-

tions, satellite delivered cable networks and pay cable whether the subscriber

fee is on a per channel or per program basis.

34 For similar reasons, these crossownership restrictions will not apply

to wireline cellular operators in areas in which they operate cellular systems

but do not provide wireline telephone service.

A26

for broadcast station-cable system crossownership, it is silent

on the issue of common carriers. We note that the current

Commission attribution standards differ for common carriers

and broadcast stations.

56. DOJ and numerous cable interests recommend that we

retain the current attribution rules. NCTA/CATA states that

we should not modify the attribution limits without specific

direction from Congress, as the cabie and common carrier

rules differ fundamentally in origin and purpose. TCI believes

that the attribution standards should not be relaxed since

common cafriers are not subject to multiple ownership rules

and there is the potential for extensive passive ownership.

Hogan & Hartson, in its reply comment, states that relaxation

of the attribution rules would subvert the independence of the

cable industry.

57. A few commenters suggest changes to the attribution

rules at this time. Several of these parties favor adoption of the

same standards for common carriers as for broadcasters and

cable operators. Among them, the American Council of Life

Insurance (ACLI) believes that the purpose of Section 613 is to

develop a uniform approach to ownership restrictions. If

Congress had intended a different standard for common carri-

ers, it would have said so in the legislative history, in their

view. Further, ACLI states that the current low standard

unduly inhibits the availability of investment capital. BellSouth

proposes to amend the attribution rules to permit the owner-

ship of telephone companies and cable systems as long as the

common parent company’s ownership in the cable system is

limited to no more than SO percent of the entire ownership of

the cable system.

58. We do not believe that it is appropriate to modify the

attribution rules in this proceeding. First, the commenters have

not submitted sufficient evidence to indicate the necessity of

such an action at this time. Second, there is nothing in the

Cable Act or legislative history that indicates that Congress

believed this change would be desirable. Specifically, the House

A27

Report states that it is “the intent of section 613(b) to codify

current FCC rules concerning the provision of video program-

ming over cable systems by common carriers.”*° Accordingly,

we will at this time maintain the current attribution limits for

common carriers with regard to restrictions on cable owner-

ship.

-59. Rural Crossownership Exemption. Section 613(b)(3) of

the Cable Act exempts telephone common carriers from the

ban on cable system ownership in rural areas as defined by the

Commission. Under this subsection of the Cable Act, tele-

phone companies will be able to own cable systems that serve

rural areas without applying to the Commission for waivers.

The House Report indicates that the intent of Section 613(b)(3)

of the Cable Act is to eliminate all legal and administrative

barriers preventing a common carrier from providing rural

cable television service.*° According to the House Report, the

Commission’s role is to define “rural area” and to certify that

a service area meets this definition. The Notice made no

specific proposal for this certification procedure.”

60. The Commission’s rules currently permit telephone

company ownership of a cable system in rural areas, as defined

in Section 63.58, when “no cable television system is under

construction or in existence within the proposed cable televi-

sion service area.” In other cases, the telephone company must

apply for a waiver. In the Notice, we proposed to expand the

exemption from the waiver process by deleting the phrase “if

no cable television system is under construction or in existence

within the proposed cable television service area” from our

rules. The Commission’s definition of rural area is based on

35. See House Report at 56.

36 See House Report at 56-57.

37 Currently, a telephone company that proposes to offer cable service

and qualifies for an exemption from Section 63.58 of our rules files for

Section 214 authority by submitting the information described in Section

63.01 of our rules and certifies that the service area is rural and that it has

applied for a franchise.

A28

population criteria using U.S. Department of Commerce, Bu-

reau of the Census, definitions and statistics. We proposed no

changes to this definition in the Notice.

61. Several telephone company interests and NTIA agree

with our proposal to simply delete the qualifying phrase from

Section 63.58 of our rules. These parties believe that such an

action is sufficient to make our rules consistent with the Cable

Act.

62. Many cable interests argue that the deletion of the

qualification for exemption is not justified by the legislative

history or intent of the Cable Act.** They state that Section

613(b) of the Cable Act was amended after the House Report

that the Commission relied on was written. They quote later

House comments that the “policy of subsection 613(b) is that

telephone companies should not provide video programming

directly to subscribers in their telephone service areas.” As

viewed by cable operators such as the Mid-America Cable

Television Association, this statement indicates an absolute ban

on the provision of cable service by telephone companies in

their service areas including rural areas. Further, these compa-

nies argue that the Commission exemption for rural areas was

designed only “to allow them [telephone companies] to own

cable systems where cable service would otherwise be denied to

local residents.”*’ Therefore, they state there are no grounds

for eliminating the qualifying statement from our rules.

63. The Community Antenna Television Association

(CATA) comments that the Commission has previously recog-

nized the importance of independent cable service wherever

possible as a matter of public policy and in the interest of fair

competition. They believe that the qualification limiting tele-

phone company ownership to those areas where independent

cable service is impractical is an integral part of the definition

of rural area. Thus, it should not be eliminated. Further, this

limitation is justified by a “demonstrated pattern of abuse by

38 = Cong. Rec., October 1, 1984, at H10438.

39 —- Cong. Rec., October 1, 1984, at H10436.

A29

telephone companies which results when these companies are

unfettered in their dealings with cable systems,” according to

CATA.”

64. With regard to the definition of rural areas as it is now

written, several telephone interests agree with our proposal to

continue to define rural areas in terms of population. A few

cable commenters, Southwestern Bell and DOJ state that this

definition should be modified. Southwestern Bell believes that

a broader definition is needed to bring cable service as rapidly

as possible to rural areas, as Congress intended. However, they

make no specific suggestion on how this should be accom-

plished. DOJ and others state that the definition could be

improved by basing it upon a population density stanaard.

DOJ states that the definition should be “crafted to further the

policy objective of prohibiting telephone-cable crossownership

except in those markets where an unaffiliated cable system

would not be economically feasible.” Further, DOJ notes that

population density has traditionally been a yardstick used by

the cable industry to determine potential viability of cable

systems. Among the other commenters, Mid-America recom-

mends that the definition include a density standard of less

than 10 households per route mile.

65. A further concern of commenters is the process that a

telephone company will be required to use to certify that the

proposed cable service area is rural. Commenters representing

telephone interests assert that the application procedures for

certification pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications

Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 63.01 of the Commis-

sion’s rules are too burdensome and should be modified or

eliminated. Clarks Telephone Company ef ai. states that a

simple certification that the area is rural should be substituted

for the 214 application. TDS believes that all that is required

for certification is a map showing the boundaries of the area to

40 The CWA disagrees with this position. It states that the most

practical means for_providing cable service in rural areas is to have telephone

companies offer it. These operations would be conducted with the necessary

safeguards of all line-of-business operations.

A30

be served and a statement that it meets the Commission’s

definition of a rural area. Eagle Telecommunications, Inc./

Colorado, among others, proposes that telephone companies

certify that their service area is rural in conjunction with their

cable operator registration statement.*!

66. The cable operators that commented on this issue be-

lieve that nothing in the Cable Act or the legislative history

exempts telephone companies serving rural areas from the

requirements of Section 214. TCI, for example, asserts that

telephone companies should demonstrate that the proposed

service area is rural in their Section 214 applications. In

addition, TCI states that telephone companies should also be

required to project that the likely future population growth in

the area (TCI suggests this be done for perhaps five years) will

not remove the area from the rural category. Further, TCI

believes any rural exemption request should be put on public

notice and formal notification should be given to local cable

operators. In its reply, Hogan & Hartson argues that the

elimination of the requirements of Section 214 is contrary to

the instructions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.

Circuit.”

67. It is clear from the statute and the comments of the

Congress that Section 613(b)(3) is intended to permit telephone

company ownership of cable systems in their rural service areas

without any qualifications. The amendments made to Section

613 after the House Report was written have no effect on

subsection (b)(3). The legislative comments referred to by the

objecting cable interests were addressing a general policy.

Congress has stated that cable systems in rural areas are

exceptions to this policy. The proposed legislation in the House

4) For example, this position was generally supported by the National

Telephone Cooperative Association, TDS and BellSouth.

42 National Cable Television Association, Inc. v FCC, 747 F.2d 1503

(D.C. Cir. 1984). In that decision, the Court required the Commission to

consider whether “allowing a local phone company to provide cable services

will reduce the public convenience and necessity by allowing the local phone

company to engage in anti-competitive practices... .”

A31

Report includes this subsection exactly as it was adopted.”

While the Commission’s previous policy was to limit telephone

company ownership of cable systems without the grant of a

waiver to those areas where there would not be independent

cable ownership, the provisions of the Cable Act require that

we modify this policy. Accordingly, the exemption qualification

will now be eliminated from our rules.

68. The Cable Act and legislative history state that the

Commission is responsible for defining “rural area.” There is

no indication that Congress disapproves of the Commission’s

current definition. From our experience, these criteria gener-

ally define areas that are indeed rural, and are unlikely to be

served by independent cable systems. Accordingly, we will not

modify the existing definition of rural areas, as given in -

Section 63.58. For cable systems that qualify under our defini-

tion of rural, we will adopt an abbreviated process for granting

Section 214 authority. In doing so, we will eliminate the burden

of submitting the detailed information required by Section

63.01 of our rules. Instead, we will adopt a new Section 63.09

which will require submission of basic information on the

system providing video programming and certification that the

proposed service area is rural under one of the definitions

contained in Section 63.58 of our rules. The Part 63 applica-

tions will be put on public notice and the public will be given

an opportunity to file objections. We believe that this proce-

dure will meet the requirement that we certify that a proposed

cable system will serve a rural area without burdening either

the telephone company or the Commission. We note that the

Cable Act does not specifically address the issue of Section 214

authority and the certification process. However, the legislative

history emphasizes the need to expedite the provision of cable

service to rural areas. We believe that this simple process

43 See House Report at 6, 104. This subsection is quite clear and

simple. It states that “[t]his subsection shall not apply to any common carrier

to the extent such carrier provides telephone exchange service in any rural

area (as defined by the Commission).” (Emphasis added.)

a

A32

minimizes the administrative burden and is an important

means to accomplish this goal. Finally, we do not agree with

those commenters that suggest that a telephone company

should be required to project the future population growth of

the rural area it proposed to serve. We believe that such a

requirement is not in keeping with the intent of this section of

the Cable Act to foster the provision of cable service and that

estimates of population growth would be highly speculative at

best.

69. Waivers. Section 613(b)(4) of the Cable Act permits

the Commission to waive these crossownership restrictions in

those circumstances where a waiver is justified in accordance

with Section 63.56 of its rules. TCI comments that a telephone

company asking a waiver should have the burden of demon-

strating that it is unlikely that independent cable service would

otherwise be provided in the foreseeable future. NYNEX states

that the Commission should take steps to prevent the situation

whereby once a telephone company demonstrates an interest in

filing for a waiver, an independent cable company states its

intent to construct a cable system, thereby precluding the

telephone company. Viacom International Inc. (Viacom) com-

ments that the Commission should ascertain whether a tele-

phone company is subject to line-of-business restrictions by the

AT&T consent decree, before a waiver is granted. If so, we

should ascertain whether DOJ approval is likely.

70. We note these comments. However, we believe that our

current waiver rules and procedures balance the concerns of all

parties. We also note that the Cable Act specifically states that

“waivers shall be made in accordance with Section 63.56. . .

(as in effect on September 20, 1984).” Accordingly, we will

make no changes to Section 63.56 of our rules at this time.

71. Other Matters. Section 613(c) of the Cable Act gives

the Commission the authority to enact rules relating to local

crossownership between cable systems and other media of mass

communications.” Given this authority, we stated in the Notice

44 Section 613(g) of the Cable Act defines “media of mass communica-

tions” as it is defined earlier in Section 309(i)(3)(c)(i) of the Communications

A33

that we believed that this was an appropriate time to consider

whether the cable crossownership restrictions should apply to

other competing media of mass communications, such as

~ MDS.

72. The cable interests commenting on this issue generally

believe that it is unnecessary to apply cable crossownership

restrictions to additional mass media, especially MDS. For

example, Cap Cities states that cable and MDS typically serve

different classes of subscribers with different services and that

the situations where they are head-to-head competitors are the

exception, rather than the rule. Viacom believes that we should

not adopt cable ownership restrictions for these other compet-

ing media, unless there is evidence that such restrictions are

necessary. DOJ comments that restrictions of this nature would

be premature, since there is no indication of concentration of

ownership of these other video technologies.

73. Other commenters on this issue believe either that there

is a definite need for additional ownership restrictions or there

may be such a need. The NLC recommends the initiation of a

separate rule making proceeding to consider the possibility of

new rules. The Connecticut PUC urges adoption of cross-

ownership restrictions for all other media, including print, at

this time.** TRAC/H. Geller/D.Lampert (Geller) in reply com-

ments, states that crossownership should be prohibited be-

tween a cable operator and either an MDS licensee or a

customer-programmer of MDS. While MDS has had difficulty

competing with cable, MMDS will be the main competitor to

Act of 1934, as amended. Media of mass communications are defined as:

television, radio, cable television, multipoint distribution service,

direct broadcast satellite service and other services, the licensed facili-

ties of which may be substantially devoted toward providing program-

ming or other information services within the editorial control of the

licensee.

45 TCI also comments that the Commission should not repeal its ban

on network ownership of cable systems.

A34

cable, according to Geller. Southwestern Bell states that equity

requires crossownership bans for all competing media. The

Anchorage Telephone Utility concurs with this opinion in its

reply comments. It believes that:

If the FCC imposes cross ownership restrictions on local

broadcasters and telephone companies on the theory that

it will prevent establishment of media monopolies, it must

either apply the same restrictions to other competing

media or eliminate the restrictions for all competing

media.

74. We do not believe that additional ownership regulations

are appropriate at this time. We are not aware of any concen-

tration of ownership of the alternative video delivery systems,

especially by cable operators. Further, there is no evidence that

there is likely to be a problem in the foreseeable future. We

again note that we have the authority to establish additional

rules. If we deem such restrictions necessary, we will institute

the appropriate rule making proceeding to consider the estab-

lishment of additional ownership restrictions.

75. Section 613(e) enables a state or franchising authority to

own a cable television system as long as editorial control is

exercised through a separate entity in order to preclude undue

government control of programming. In the Notice we stated

that we did not believe that this provision of the Cable Act has

any impact on our rules. Accordingly, no proposal wss made

and we will take no further action relating to this section.”

76. Section 613(f) of the Cable Act grandfathers any combi-

nation of interests held on July 1, 1984, to the extent such

interests were not inconsistent with applicable Federal or state

law or regulations on that date. In the Notice, we indicated

that we believe this provision is consistent with our rules.

46 ~The Connecticut PUC seeks a clarification as to whether a coopera-

tive of municipalities may hold an interest in a cable system. We do not

believe that this type of ownership would be in conflict with the Cable Act as

long as editorial control is exercised through an entity separate from the

franchising authority.

eth. lees

A35

Accordingly, we proposed no changes. Nothing in the com-

ments has convinced us otherwise.”

Section 621 and 622—Franchise Requirements and Fees

77. Sections 621 and 622 of the Cable Act concern franchis-

ing requirements and fees. Under Section 621, franchising

authorities are authorized to grant one or more franchises

within their jurisdiction.“’ This section also sets forth certain

conditions regarding the construction of cable systems and the

use of public rights-of-way. In addition, Section 621 requires

that franchise authorities assure that no class of potential

residential cable subscribers is denied service due to income

class. Finally, this section of the Cable Act gives the Commis-

sion authority to require the filing of informational tariffs for

intrastate, non-cable communications services. Section 622 of

the Cable Act limits the franchise fee paid by the cable

operator to the franchising authority to no more than five

percent of gross revenue.

78. Use of Public Rights-of-Way. In the Notice, we indi-

cated that Section 621 delineates certain conditions regarding

the construction of cable systems over public rights-of-way. We

stated that cable system construction is authorized over public

rights-of-way and through easements designated for compati-

47 Marsh was the only party to address this issue. In its comments and

reply comments, Marsh contends that we should change the grandfathering

date of July 1, 1970, of Section 76.501 of our rules to the July 1, 1984, date

of the Cable Act. Also, for the purposes of grandfathering the Commission

should recognize executory, as well as cognizable interests. These arguments

are the same as those made by Marsh in a petition for reconsideration in

Docket 20423. That proceeding will resolve the question of the extent that

Marsh's own cross-interest is grandfathered. Marsh appears to be the only

cable/broadcast entity that might be affected by a change in our rules.

Accordingly, we do not believe these issues need be addressed here and will,

therefore, give them full and appropriate treatment in the separate proceed-

ing.

48 Recently, the courts have questioned a franchising authority’s right

to grant an exclusive franchise. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City

of Los Angeles et al., No. 84-5541, slip op. (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1985).

A36

ble uses. The Notice also stated that a property owner that has

already granted or is obligated to grant an easement for

utilities cannot deny cable access. However, the cable franchi-

see must ensure the safety and appearance of the property

accessed through the easement and must bear the costs of the

installation, operation or removal of the equipment.

79. Several commenters requested clarification of this lan-

guage. Pacific believes that differences between the terms

“designated for compatible uses” used in the Notice and

“dedicated for compatible uses” used in the Cable Act may

result in future misinterpretations of this section. A few com-

menters (e.g., Oxford Development Corp. and Direct Satellite

Communications, Inc.) claim that the statutory language

should not be construed to mean that franchised cable opera-

tors have “mandatory access” rights. Other commenters sug-

gest that the Commission should codify rules to define the

Cable Act’s easement requirements and obligations and the

circumstances of liability under Section 621(a)(2) of the Cable

Act.

80. We agree with the commenters on the use of the term

“dedicated.” Our use of the phrase “designated for compatible

uses” in the Notice was not intended to be any more or less

encompassing than the phrase “dedicated for compatible uses”

used in the Cable Act.*” With respect to the access issue, the

House Report states that “[a]ny private arrangements which

seek to restrict a cable system’s use of such easements or rights

of way which have been granted to other utilities are in

violation of this section and not enforceable.” Based on the

legislative history and clear language of the statute, we find

that a cable system does have the right to access through an

easement as long as the other conditions of this section are

met. Furthermore, we believe that the language and provisions

49 Examples of such uses include easements dedicated for electric, gas

or other utility transmission. See House Report at 59.

50 See House Report at 59.

owas

A37

of these sections of the Cable Act are generally self-

explanatory and that they need not be codified by our rules.*!

81. “Redlining’-Prohibition. In the Notice, we stated that

Section 621 requires that a franchising authority assure that no

class of potential residential cable subscribers be denied cable

service due to income status (This practice of denying service to

lower income areas is commonly called “redlining.”). We stated

that the franchising authority must require that all areas of the

franchised area be wired. However, we indicated that the

franchising authority could award separate franchises within

its jurisdiction.

82. Many cable interests claim that the Commission has

misinterpreted this section of the Cable Act. These commenters

assert that the Notice indicates that all areas of the franchise

area must be wired when in fact this is not the case. NCTA/

CATA, in its comments, indicates that the intent of this section

is to prevent “redlining” and does not require wiring of those

homes that are too remote to wire economically. We agree that

the intent of this section was to prevent the exclusion of cable

service based on income and that this section does not mandate

that the franchising authority require the complete wiring of

the franchise area in those circumstances where such an exclu-

sion is not based on the income status of the residents of the

unwired area.

83. Informational Tariffs. Section 621(d)(1) authorizes the

Commission to collect informational tariffs for intra-state,

non-cable services offered by a cable system that would be

subject to regulation by the FCC if provided on a common

carrier basis. In the Notice, we suggested that the Commission

did not need the information at this time but retains the right

to collect this information in the future.

5] In this regard, we believe that any disputes which may occur as a

result of the provisions of this section are best settled at the local level

utilizing the remedies available therein.

A38

84. Several telephone company interests state that we should

collect this information in order to monitor the state of the

industry. Southwestern Bell is concerned that without filing

tariffs, telephone companies may not find out about such

services that may be common carrier in nature. DOJ claims we

should require tariffs because the beneficial data they would

yield outweighs the marginal cost associated with their use.

Pacific, however, suggests we should not require tariffs to be

filed and that this requirement is best left to the states. NCTA/

CATA, in its reply comments, states that there is no basis for

requiring tariffs. It indicates that such a tariff requirement

would be unduly burdensome and unnecessary.

85. We continue to believe that the filing of informational

tariffs at this time is unnecessary. We have recently taken

action to reduce tariffing requirements for non-dominant com-

mon carriers and we see no reason to impose such a new

requirement on cable systems.*’ We believe that we can effec-

tively monitor this situation through trade publications and

other materials. Therefore, we will not require that informa-

tional tariffs be filed, but we do reaffirm our authority to

require them in the future should such action be deemed

necessary.

86. Franchise Fees. Section 622 of the Cable Act specifies

that the franchise fee paid by the cable operator to the

franchising authority be no more than five percent of gross

revenue. This section also prohibits the Commission or any

other Federal agency from regulating the amount of the fran-

chise fee or the use of the funds derived from the franchise fee.

87. In the Notice, we proposed to delete Section 76.31 of

our rules concerning franchise standards. This rule limits the

franchise fee to three percent of gross revenue with a five

percent fee obtainable upon a showing of reasonableness. This

rule also contains suggested, but not mandatory, procedures

§2 See Fourth Report and Order, CC Docket 79-252, 48 FR §2452

(November 18, 1983). See also Fifth Report and Order, CC Docket 79-252,

49 FR 34824 (September 4, 1983).

oe |

A39

for the local franchising process.*’ These provisions are gener-

ally dealt with in Section 621 and other sections of the Cable

Act.

88. In general, comments from individual cities and the

NLC support deletion of the Commission’s franchise fee rules.

These parties also contend that Section 622(i) of the Cable Act

specifically precludes the Commission from establishing any

regulations that deal with the resolution of disputes between

franchising authorities and cable operators. Several commen-

ters suggest that the franchise rules and standards should be

retained in some form. The Town of Islip, N.Y., supports

retaining Section 76.31’s recommended procedures for all new

franchises and would have the Commission supervise negotia-

tion of renewal between the operator and franchising authority.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recommends

retaining the timely wiring standard found in Section 76.31.

89. NCTA/CATA, in its comments, suggests rewording Sec-

tion 76.31 to specify that the franchise fee may not exceed five

percent. NCTA/CATA also indicates that the Commission

should define what is and is not to be included in the fee. In

addition, NCTA/CATA suggests that the Commission specify

relief procedures for cable operators seeking enforcement and

interpretation of the provisions. A number of other cable

interests support deleting the existing rule, but request that the

Commission retain and assert its jurisdiction over any disputes

that may occur regarding franchise fees. Hogan & Hartson, in

its reply comments, states that the “Commission should exer-

cise its jurisdiction to regulate franchise fees . . . to prevent

the balkanization that will result if such disputes are left to the

courts.” Hogan & Hartson also states that the Commission

53 For example, these recommendations include that: 1) the franchi-

see’s qualifications and construction arrangements should be approved by

the franchising authority as part of a full public proceeding affording due

process; 2) initial and renewal franchises should not exceed 15 years; and, 3)

construction should be significant within the first year of certification and be

completed under a reasonable timetable; etc.

A40

should rule that Section 76.31 of the rules was in effect until

December 29, 1984, the effective date of the Cable Act. Miami

Cablevision echoes this position and further states that the

Commission’s rules (76.31) should be applied in full force to

those fee controversies pending with the Commission on

December 29, 1984.

90. After examining the record, we believe our initial pro-

posal to eliminate Section 76.31 of the rules concerning fran-

chise requirements and fees is the appropriate course of action.

Section 622(i) of the Cable Act clearly states that “[a]ny

Federal agency may not regulate the amount of the franchise

fees paid by a cable operator, or regulate the use of funds

derived from such fees, except as provided in this section.” We

believe that this provision renders our rules invalid with respect

to setting franchise fee limits.** Section 622 of the Cable Act

spells out quite clearly the terms of the franchise fee and how it

is defined and administered. Therefore, there is no need for us

to further define these matters.*° We believe that any disputes

involving the franchise fee are best resolved through the

courts. Accordingly, we are deleting Section 76.31 of the rules,

entitled “Franchise standards.” In addition, we are also delet-

ing Section 76.30 concerning applicability of Section 76.31.°°

54 In this regard, the House Report states:

Subsection 622(i) prohibits any agency of the United States, including

the FCC, from regulating the amount of the franchise fee or the use to

which funds collected through the fee will be put. The current FCC

regulations which restrict the use of franchise fee revenues to cable-

related uses and permit franchise fees of 5 percent only if a waiver is

granted by the FCC are invalid by the terms of this legislation. See

House Report at 65.

55 As far as reinstating petitions that were pending prior to December

29, 1984, we decline to return them to active status. The Commission no

longer has regulatory interest in adjudicating petitions that have been

rendered moot by the Cable Act.

56 Section 76.30 states the’ the existing franchise fee rule is applicable

only to systems with 1000 or more subscribers.

A4l

Section 623—Regulation of Rates

91. Section 623 of the Cable Act specifies the manner in

which subscriber rates for cable services may be regulated. In

particular, the regulation of basic cable service is permitted by

a franchising authority whenever a cable system is not subject

to effective competition.*’ The Cable Act specifically charges

the Commission with the responsibility of defining effective

competition and establishing standards for rate regulation. In

addition, the Cable Act requires that the Commission submit a

report to Congress within six years on the effect of competition

in the marketplace as it relates to rate regulation of cable :

systems.

Definition of Effective Competition

92. In the Notice, we recognized the desirability of defining

“effective competition” in a manner that can be easily inter-

preted and readily applied by a franchising authority within its

community or communities. On the other hand, we noted that

the definition chosen should also permit the correct identifica-

tion of those situations where a cable system may have signifi-

cant market power. The Notice also reviewed the actions taken

by several states in deregulating cable television service.

93. In the Notice, we sought comment on what constitutes

effective competition and what kinds of signals or services

compete with basic cable service. We also requested comment

on defining effective competition in terms of the availability of

off-the-air signals in the cable system’s community. In this

regard, we indicated that if such a signal complement criterion

were chosen, one approach would be to define effective compe-

tition in a given market as the presence of four unduplicated

broadcast signals, including the programming of the three

57 Section 623(g) of the Cable Act grandfathers for two years any

existing state law which provides for any limitation or preemption of

regulation by local franchising authorities. This regulation applies to cable

systems franchised after the effective date of these rules, and to all cable

systems after December 29, 1986. The Cable Act grandfathers certain

franchise rate obligations during the two intervening years.

i eieeaeeeeeenadteaainiiil

A42

major networks. We also suggested that in determining

whether a signal was available in a franchise area the predicted

Grade B contour might be a more appropriate criterion than

one based on either a specific mileage zone (e.g., 35 miles) or

the Commission’s must-carry rules. Finally, comments were

requested on whether a penetration level criterion should be

included in the definition of effective competition.

94. Most of the parties filing comments or reply comments

in this proceeding addressed the issues raised in this section of

the Notice. :

95. Signal Complement Criteria. Although little consensus

can be found among the commenting parties, they generally

suggest defining effective competition based on some form of

signal complement criterion. Well over half of the commenters

feel that the proposed requirement of four off-the-air broad-

cast signals is too strict. Cox, NTIA and Time Inc., for

example, suggest a three signal criterion. NCTA/CATA, Hogan

& Hartson, and comments submitted by the law firm of

Fleischman and Walsh, P.-C. on behalf of various cable televi-

sion interests (VCTI), in comments representative of most

cable interests, argue for a two signal criterion.’ Other com-

menters argue that the four broadcast signal criterion sug-

gested in the Notice is insufficient to ensure effective

competition. DOJ and the Telecommunications Research and

Action Center (TRAC) assert that a minimum of five broad-

cast signals is necessary in order for there to be effective

competition with cable service.’ The National Federation of

Local Cable Programmers suggests seven signals. The NLC

58 Both Cox and VCTI also argue that foreign broadcast station signals

(e.g., Canadian and Mexican) represent effective competition in some cable

markets and should be counted for this purpose. Section 76.5(b) of our rules

defines television broadcast station to include any “station liceased by a

foreign government,” and accordingly any such stations will be included.

59 DOJ also suggests that other criteria be considered in addition to the

signal complement.

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A43

proposes requiring a total of ten signals including five alterna-

tive delivery channels.”

96. Several of the parties suggesting additional (more than

four) signals also indicate that the statute requires that the

Commission define the circumstances in which a “cable sys-

tem” is not subject to effective competition. These parties state

that a standard based on alternatives to “basic cable service”

only, as suggested in the Notice, is not appropriate given the

statutory language. This view was expressed by NLC and the

City of New York, among others. DOJ and a number of other

parties believe that the Commission was correct in limiting the

question of effective competition to basic cable service. These

parties note that franchise rate regulation authority is limited

to regulation of basic cable service.

97. Several parties in their reply comments criticize the

Department of Justice’s proposals for an effective competition

standard based on five signals. They state that DOJ provides

little justification other than supposition and intuition. On the

other hand, an empirical study by NCTA/CATA was cited by

many as providing factual support for a standard based on

fewer than three signals.

98. After full consideration of the record on this issue, we

continue to believe that a standard for defining effective

competition based on the availability of off-the-air broadcast

signals in the cable system’s community is appropriate. In

adopting this definition, we do not mean to minimize the

importance of the various alternative sources of video pro-

gramming such as multipoint distribution services, direct satel-

60 In addition to NLC, a number of commenters (irrespective of their

views on the number of signals) support the inclusion of various alternative

delivery systems in our effective competition standard. See, e.g., comments

filed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, VCTI, TRAC, and the U.S.

Catholic Conference. Other parties argue that the programming provided on

these systems (STV, MDS, MMDS, and DBS) is most substitutable with that

provided on the pay cable channels and therefore should not be included.

A44

lite reception, and video cassette recorders.°' Such services are

significant providers of video programming services and do, in

fact, offer competition to cable services.” Congress has al-

ready made the decision that nonbasic services should not be

subject to such regulation at either the federal or local levels.~’

This decision appears to have been made based, at least in

61 —_— In this regard, we note that the Cable Act amends Section 705 of the

Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to permit the reception by

individuals of any satellite cable programming for private viewing. This

action significantly increases the programming options available to all

viewers. We also note that the Commission has proposed preemption of

certain restrictive local zoning regulation of satellite receive-only antennas.

See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CC Docket No. 85-87, FCC 85-144,

adopted March 28, 1985S.

62 See Report and Order in Docket No. 83-670, 49 FR 33588 (August

23, 1984); Report and Order in Docket No. 19142, 96 FCC 2d 634 (1984);

Report and Order in Docket No. 83-1009, 49 FR 31877 (August 8, 1984) and

Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 83-1009, 50 FR 46666

(February 1, 1985).

63 Some commenters express concern that cable systems may have

market power in the provision of nonbasic service and that this power could

be extended to their provision of basic service. Therefore, these commenters

contend, rate regulation of basic service should be permitted whenever there

is a lack of competition in noabasic service. We believe the commenters’

argument is based upon a concern about the marketing practice of cable

operators whereby consumers can subscribe to a pay tier only if they a/so

subscribe to the basic tier. This marketing practice, often called a “tying

arrangement,” is addressed in the antitrust literature. We believe that the

commenters’ argument is incorrect. This is so because a cable operator has

the ability to charge a price for nonbasic service that is the most profitable.

He, therefore, has no incentive to raise basic service rates in order to earn

increased profits. Thus, we believe that the manner in which cable operators

market basic and nonbasic services represent an efficient business practice

and is not a threat to the competitive provision of basic service. “The law’s

theory of tying arrangements is merely another example of the discredited

transfer-of-power theory, and perhaps no other variety of that theory has

been so thoroughly and repeatedly demolished in the legal and economic

theory.” See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 1978, p. 372. Accord-

ingly, we see little point in determining whether a cable system may have

market power in the provision of a service that a franchising authority is

prohibited statutorily from regulating.

A45

2

:

‘

2

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part, on a belief that alternative video delivery systems pro-

vided sufficient existing or potential competition to nonbasic

services that rate controls would be counterproductive. How-

ever, the Cable Act requires the Commission to look at compe-

tition for the limited purpose of determining in what situations

rate regulation of basic cable service may take place. For the

most part, programming provided by basic cable service in-

cludes local, over-the-air signals and other services. Therefore,

we believe that a standard based on the reception of terrestrial

television signals is appropriate and provides a reasonable

benchmark for determining effective competition with basic

cable service. Furthermore, we feel that this standard meets the

congressional intent of an administratively manageable stan-

dard for the Commission, franchising authorities and cable

operators.

99. Number of Signals Required. The number of over-

the-air broadcast signals required to provide effective competi-

tion to basic cable service must be sufficient to allow viewers

adequate and significant programming choices. Further, the

number of signals should ensure that the basic tier offering

does not become a source of market power for the cable

operator. Based on the record in this proceeding, we believe

that three broadcast signals are the minimum number of

signals needed to meet these objectives. A limited statistical

sampling of two, three, four and five signal markets using

Arbitron viewing data provides further evidence to support this

conclusion.” In comparing the cable viewership of the pro-

gramming which is most likely to be included in the basic tier

with the off-air local broadcast viewership, we found that in

two signal markets the viewership share of such programming

could be as large or larger than the off-air viewership of the

typical local station in such a market. This could potentially be

a source of market power for the cable operator. In three signal

markets, the cable viewership of such basic programming was

in general less than the off-air viewership of a single local

64 See Arbitron 1/982 County Coverage Surveys, Cable-Controlled.

A46

signal. In the worst case, the impact of the provision of basic

service programming would be comparable to adding one more

competitor to a (three competitor) market. Further support for

the reasonableness of an effective competition standard of

three signals can be found in the economic literature. In an

empirical study of American industry, Kwoka demonstrated

that the presence of a third competitor of sizable market share

may be sufficient to guarantee competition in a given indus-

try.” For the case at hand, involving at least three broadcast

signals and a cable system, there will generally be not just a

third but a fourth competitor of sizable market share. Accord-

ingly, we feel that the programming of basic cable service is not

likely to be a significant source of market power in these

circumstances and that retaining the four signal standard

proposed in the Notice could subject a number of cable

systems to unnecessary rate regulation.

100. Therefore, after careful consideration of the arguments

presented as to the appropriate number of broadcast signals

required for effective competition with basic cable service, we

have decided to relax the effective competition standard pro-

posed in the Notice. We now conclude that the existence of

three or more off-the-air broadcast signals in the cable market

provides viewers with adequate programming choices and

presents an effective constraint on the market power of a cable

system in the provision of basic service. We recognize that

many cable systems provide a number of services in addition to

the retransmission of off-the-air signals. For example, a cable

system may typically provide additional broadcast signals,

access channels, and certain satellite delivered programming on

65 Viewership of basic cable services (excluding must-carry signals)

ranged from three quarters to approximately equal to the off-the-air viewer-

ship of the typical local signal, which in this sample was about 33%. We feel

that a market or viewership share of 33% or less is a reasonable indication of

lack of market power. See U.S. v. Aluminum Co of America et al., 148 F. 2d

416, 424 (1975).

66 See John E. Kwoka, “The Effect of Market Share Distribution on

Industry Performance,” Review of Economics & Statistics, Vol. LX1, No. 1,

February 1979, pp. 101-109.

——— = wee

A47

its basic cable tier.” Nevertheless, we do not believe that a

cable system gains significant market advantage by the provi-

sion of this additional programming in those markets where

there are sufficient (/.e., three or more) off-the-air broadcast

signals. Accordingly, a cable system will be considered to face

effective competition whenever the franchise market receives

three or more unduplicated broadcast signals.”

101. Program Content of Signals. in the Notice, we pro-

posed that the programming of three major networks be

included as part of the signal complement requirement. A

number of commenters support this network programming

requirement. For example, DOJ, NLC, the Department of

Defense, and TRAC concur with this position. These parties

believe that a cable system could conceivably gain market

power by importing a signal which provides network program-

ming not receivable off-the-air in the franchise area. Several

commenters, NCTA/CATA, VCTI, NTIA, Heritage Commun-

ications, Inc., Hogan & Hartson, and California Cable Tele-

vision Association (CCTA), among others, oppose any

67 Exampies of satellite delivered programming or cable networks are

the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network and Cable News

Network.

68 The existence of market power depends on both the ievel of demand

for a particular product and the elasticity of that demand. For these

additional basic services to be a source of market power, it must first be

shown that a significant demand exists for these services and that such

demand is relatively inelastic. None of the commenters were able to present

any evidence to support either of these contentions. In fact, several of these

same commenters readily concede that no market power is obtained from the

provision of some of these additional services, such as the public access

channels. In this regard, it should also be noted that most satellite services

presently provided on cable systems either are not rated or have very small

viewing shares according to the national rating services.

69 Furthermore, we also agree with those commenters that state that it

was the intent of the Cable Act to significantly deregulate the provision ot

cable service. We believe that a requirement of five or more signals would not

have the effect that Congress clearly intended.

A48

programming content requirement.” In its comments, VCTI

argues that past Commission policies (e.g., spectrum alloca-

tion, must-carry rules, etc.) have not been based upon some

“entitlement” of viewers to the programming of the three

major networks. In addition, VCTI points out that indepen-

dent and noncommercial programming have become increas-

ingly popular and that the presence of either in a market may

contribute more to programing diversity than the offering of a

third network affiliate.

102. After weighing the arguments presented on both sides

of the issue, we conclude that a programming content require-

ment based on major network programming should not be

included in the Commission’s standard for effective competi-

tion.’' We continue to have significant First Amendment con-

cerns with any requirement based on the programming content

of broadcasters. We also note that such a requirement would

not be consistent with our past efforts to foster alternative

program sources. For these reasons, we will not adopt such a

requirement.

103. Signal Availability Standard. The Notice indicated

that if a broadcast signal standard is chosen, a method must

also be developed for determining when a signal is available in

a given franchise area. A number of approaches were suggested

in the Notice including counting all signals within a specific

mileage zone (i.e., the 35-mile zone) and a standard based on

the Commission’s must-carry rules.” In the Notice, we sug-

gested a standard based on counting stations that placed a

0 CCTA also argues that duplicated signals should be counted. It notes

that programming duplication is not an issue in either television license

renewal or must-carry requirements.

71 It should be noted, however, that in the vast majority of markets

with three or more unduplicated signals, the programming of the three major

networks is provided

759

- Must-carry signals include ail television stations within a 35-mile

zone, certain Grade B contour signals and signals that have attained signifi-

cantly viewed status within the cable community. See Sections 76.54, 76.55,

76.57, 76.59 and 76.61 of the Commission’s rules

eS it aA a Sh Sat NE A Mig Ell este Atlin

2 Ae AO Ne cme BL atl

A49

predicted Grade B signal contour over the cable community.

Comment was also requested on whether a penetration level

should be included in our definition of effective competition.

104. Most cable interests and certain other parties suggest

counting a signal if it meets any of the must-carry require-

ments. For example, NCTA/CATA, VCTI, TCI, Cap Cities

and CCTA, argue that a signal should be counted if it satisfied

any one of a number of criteria, such as Grade B, significantly

viewed, 35-mile, or must-carry. NTIA, Hogan & Hartson and

Time, Inc., support the Grade B contour criteria proposed in

the Notice. They indicate that the Grade B proposal is the most

cost-efficient and easiest to administer alternative.

105. The majority of the parties associated with the local

franchise process and a number of other commenters support a

stricter standard for counting signals. NLC and TRAC argue

that the 35-mile zone criterion should be used. ACLU and the

Cable Television Information Center support using the Grade

A city contour. Several commenters, for example, the National

Association of Towns and Townships, the Vermont Depart-

ment of Public Service, DOJ and the Department of Defense

argue for a standard based on “actual” as opposed to predicted

reception. In addition, a requirement that cable penetration be

less than 70% was supported by several of these parties

including the NLC and TRAC.” These commenters cite pene-

tration as a good indicator of the dependence of viewers on

cable service for adequate reception of local broadcast signals.

106. The choice of an appropriate signal reception criterion

is a difficult one. The use of any of the above alternatives will

result in some cable systems being judged to have effective

competition when in fact reception of three or more signals

may not always be possible in the franchise area. On the other

hand, some cable systems will be judged, whatever the alterna-

73 Several states have such a penetration requirement for statewide

deregulation of cable systems. DOJ proposes a variation based on the

maximum penetration level of basic service. Specifically, it suggests basic-

only subscribers must be less than 20% of all subscribers for there to be

effective competition.

ASO

tive chosen, to not face effective competition when in fact the

majority of homes in the franchise area are receiving more

than three broadcast signals. Since no compelling arguments

were given to the contrary, we believe that weight should be

given to the administrative convenience of irmplementing a

signal availability test.

107. Furthermore, given the intent and purposes of the

Cable Act, we feel that in developing a standard for the

purposes of rate regulation, it is more appropriate to favor a

presumption that competition does in fact exist rather than to

assume that consumers will make no efforts to seek out

alternatives to basic cable service. Clearly, in this regard, there

is considerable evidence viewers do take significant measures,

such as improved antennas, use of rotors and amplifiers, to

receive broadcast signals they deem desirable even if those

viewers are in areas with fringe or marginal reception. Accord-

ingly, at this time, a signal will be counted for purposes of

effective competition if it places a predicted Grade B contour

over any portion of the cable community or is significantly

viewed within the cable community. * However, in order to

ensure that franchise authorities are permitted to rate regulate

in those areas where there is not effective competition, fran-

chise authorities may submit showings and engineering studies

74 We believe that “significantly viewed in the cable community” will

give a more accurate analysis of those signals that are available in the cable

community and eliminate any problems this standard may have within

hyphenated communities. In addition, a number of parties submitted com-

ments on the issue Of availability of broadcast signals from television

translators. For example, VCTI, Cox, and Hogan & Hartson present argu-

ments for the inclusion of such signals in the determination of effective

competition. We agree that broadcast signals of translator stations should be

considered. However, in view of the varying power and the relatively small

geographic service area of translator stations, we believe that it is inappro-

priate to count translators on an equal basis with broadcast stations.

Accordingly, signals of translator stations shall be counted only if such

stations are located within the cable community; provided, however, that

translators used to retransmit a station already providing a Grade B contour

or significantly viewed within the cable community may not be considered

for this purpose.

AS1

to indicate that such signals are in fact not available anywhere

within the cable community. Such studies shall include field

strength measurements made in accordance with Section

73.686 of the Commission’s rules.

108. With regard to any additional criterion based on cable

penetration figures, we are unconvinced that such statistics are

reliable indicators of broadcast reception problems. We believe

that cable subscriber penetration is determined by a number of

factors other than the availability of off-the-air signal recep-

tion. More specifically, price, quality of service, income and

area viewing tastes will all have a significant impact on the

demand for cable service and the resulting subscriber penetra-

tion of cable service within a particular area. We find that the

adoption of a penetration standard would be arbitrary and

unjustifiable for the thousands of cable communities that not

only have varying television reception, but also include viewing

households with divergent incomes and tastes. We are also

sympathetic to commenters’ arguments that a penetration

criterion would penalize cable operators who have attained

substantial subscriber penetration by providing low-priced

popular cable offerings and services. In this regard, we believe

that a penetration standard could create a disincentive for

cable operators to upgrade the quality and level of the services

they now provide. Accordingly, we conclude that adoption of a

cable penetration criterion as part of the effective competition

standard would not be in the public interest.

109. Several commenters express concern that some cable

systems maybe susceptible to disruption in their long term

plans due to the nature of our definition of effective competi-

tion. For example, a system operating in a market within three

Grade B contours could become subject to rate regulation if

one of the broadcast stations should go dark (even temporar-

ily), reduce its power, or directionalize its signal. In this regard,

Cox, in its comments, proposes that once a market satisfies the

criteria for effective competition, it cannot be reclassified.

While we are sympathetic to a cable operator’s desire for

regulatory certainty, we believe that this solution would be

A5S2

contrary to the intent of the statute and would ignore those

situations where effective competition might be removed. Ac-

cordingly, in those situations where a cable system has been

found previously to be subject to effective competition but

subsequently was found to not be subject to effective competi-

tion due to changed circumstances in the cable system commu-

nity, the cable system shall be exempt from rate regulation for

a period of at least one year. We believe that this one year

period will allow a cable operator sufficient time to make the

transition from an unregulated to a regulated entity.

Standards for Rate Regulation

110. Section 623 of the Cable Act also requires that the

Commission establish standards for the regulation of basic

cable rates by a franchising authority. In the Notice, we noted

that this involves not only specifying what services can be

regulated but also in what manner. Thus, we must define

“basic cable service” for the purpose of rate regulation and

establish the standards for such rate regulation. These issues

are discussed in turn.

111. Definition of Basic Cable Service. Section 602 of the

Cable Act defines basic cable service as “any service tier which

includes the transmission of local television broadcast signals.”

The House Report encourages the Commission “to fashion a

definition of basic cable service most appropriate to achieve

the purpose of the regulations consistent with the provisions of

Title VI.” In this context, we stated in the Notice that it was

appropriate to include “significantly viewed” as weil as local

signals. Accordingly, we proposed defining basic cable service

as “any service tier(s) which include(s) the retransmission of

must-carry television broadcast signals as defined in Sections

76.55 to 76.61 of the rules.”

112. There is considerable disagreement among the parties

with respect to the Commission’s discretion to develop a

definition of basic cable service for the purposes of rate

regulation different from that contained in Section 602 of the

PPE SE as

AS3

Cable Act. NCTA/CATA states that the Cable Act generally

reflects Congressional endorsement of the Commission’s pro-

hibition on regulation of rates for optional services and there-

fore gives the Commission discretion to alter the definition of

basic cable service in developing standards for rate regulation.

In this regard, it quotes extensively from the House Report:

The Committee wishes to stress that it intends to give the

Commission flexibility in promulgating these regulations.

The definition in Sec. 602 of basic cable service is in-

tended primarily for use in determining the extent of

regulation that will be permitted during the. . . transi-

tion period. The regulations of the Commission under this

subsection serve a different purpese—defining the cir-

cumstances and extent of regulation that may occur be-

yond the transition period.

NCTA/CATA does not, however, support the Commission’s

proposed definition. It states that the definition in the statute

as well as our proposed modification would permit regulation

of multiple tiers of basic service where a cable system offers a

lowest-priced basic tier that includes retransmission of local

broadcast signals and also offers another tier at a single, higher

price that includes everything on the lowest-priced tier plus

additional services. NCTA/CATA states that while the statute

permits this practice during the two-year transition period as

the result of a political compromise, the Commission’s pre-

emption policies and the Cable Act’s endorsement of the

Commission’s prohibition on regulation of rates for optional

services requires that the Commission prevent such rate regula-

tion from continuing beyond the transition period. Thus,

NCTA/CATA recommends that the Commission make clear

that basic cable service includes no more than the lowest priced

tier of service that includes all local broadcast signals. In

addition, NCTA/CATA urges the Commission to affirm that

basic cable service includes only the retransmission of local

broadcast signals and that any ancillary services provided

along with basic service should not be deemed “basic service.”

Thus, NCTA/CATA asserts, regulated cable systems would be

AS54

free to remove or retier any of these other services. Such a

statement, NCTA/CATA asserts, would simply reaffirm the

Commission’s fundamental policy in this area,” and nothing in

the Cable Act requires the Commission to set aside its previous

decisions. ”®

113. NTIA states that the Commission “clearly has the

power, and probably a mandate to adopt a definition of ‘basic

cable service’ different than the one contained in Section 602(2)

in order to further effectuate the purposes of the Cable Act.”

NTIA proposes that the Commission adopt a definition of

basic cable service which is based on the retransmission of

unaltered broadcast television signals rather than one based on

must-carry signals, as proposed in the Notice. NTIA states that

this alternative definition would ensure that franchising au-

thorities whose cable systems are outside of all television

markets (i.e., areas where there are no signals which cable

operators are required to carry under the must-carry rules)

have the authority to rate regulate the basic service of these

cable systems if they are not subject to effective competition.

NTIA states that this proposal more fully carries out the intent

of the statute. ;

75. See Community Cable TV, Inc. (hereinafter Community), 95 FCC

2d 1204 (1983) and Community Cable TV, Inc., (Reconsideration), 56 RR 2d

735 (1984).

76 The individual cable interests that filed are in general agreement with

NCTA/CATA’s proposed definition of basic cable service, giving equal

support to the concept that basic cable service should include either (1) must-

carry signals only; or (2) the lowest-priced tier which contains the must-carry

signals. In addition, they state that cable operators must retain the freedom

to retier ancillary services out of “basic service” granted them by the

Commission’s decision in Community. These parties include PCTA, TCI,

Cap Cities, VCTI, New Jersey Cable Television Association, Time (reply

comments), CCTA, Cox, Cable Operators and Hogan & Hartson. We also

note that several parties urge that the PEG channels be included in the

definition of basic service. These parties include TCI, the City of Boston, the

U.S. Catholic Conference, and the New York Citizens’ Committee - for

Responsible Media.

AS55

114. The Department of Justice believes that the Cable Act

sanctions the Commission’s decision to preempt state and local

rate regulation of all but basic cable television service. How-

ever, it states that it is not clear whether the Commission has

discretion under the Cable Act to define basic cable service. It

states that the Cable Act does not authorize the Commission to

define basic cable service either generally or for purposes of

Section 623. “While the legislative history does suggest that the

Commission may ‘fashion a definition of basic cable services

most appropriate to achieve the purpose’ of its ‘effective

competition’ criteria, . . . it seems apparent that the Commis-

sion could not define ‘basic cable service’ inconsistently with

the Act, e.g., limited to the must-carry channels.” DOJ be-

lieves, however, that the Commission’s proposed definition of

basic cable service that interprets local television broadcast

signals as the must-carry signals is a proper interpretation of

the statute, supported by the legislative history.

115. NLC states, in its reply comments, that the Commis-

sion’s responsibilities under Section 623(b) of the Cable Act

should be construed in the context of the plain language of the

Cable Act and the purpose of the section to allow for rate

regulation in communities when the cable system is not subject

to effective competition. NLC agrees with DOJ that the Com-

mission has little discretion to fundamentally alter the defini-

tion of basic service contained in the Cable Act. In this regard,

NLC states that Congress considered and ultimately rejected

both definitions of basic service proposed by the various cable

parties (i.e., must-carry signals and the lowest priced tier which

includes the must-carry signals). NLC states that the definition

of basic service contained in the Cable Act is intended to

establish regulatory certainty and stability where conflicting

court decisions created confusion with respect to the proper

definition of basic service. NLC believes that the definition

contained in the statute establishes the necessary distinction

between basic and nonbasic services.

116. After careful consideration of the full record in this

proceeding including the statute, the legislative history and the

comments, we conclude that the Commission does have the

AS6

discretion to fashion a definition of basic cable service differ-

ent from that contained in Section 602(2) of the Cable Act for

the purpose of developing rate regulation standards. While

some tension may be created by adopting a definition of basic

service for Section 623(b) of the Cable Act that differs from

the definition in Section 602(2), we believe that there is legisla-

tive guidance that permits such a change. First, in adopting

appropriate regulatory standards we must keep in mind the

underlying purposes of the Cable Act which are articulated in

Section 601. Foremost among these is the intent of the statute

to establish “standards which encourage the growth and devel-

opment of cable systems . . . , assure that cable communica-

tions provide. . . the widest possible diversity of information

sources and services to the public” and “promote competition

in cable communications and minimize unneccessary regula-

tion that would impose an undue economic burden on cable

systems.” We believe that we must implement Section 623(b)

consistent with these statutory goals.

117. Reflecting these procompetitive goals of the statute,

Section 623 preempts rate regulation of all cable services

provided by those cable systems subject to effective competi-

tion. In this regard, it is consistent with the Commission’s

long-standing policy to preempt local regulation of non-basic

or “pay” cable services, based on the premise that “unneces-

sary rate and tariff requirements can stifle price competition

and service and marketing innovation.”’’ As most recently

reaffirmed in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, only preemp-

tion of state and local regulation can assure cable systems the

breathing space necessary to expand vigorously and provide a

diverse range of program offerings to potential cable sub-

scribers in all parts of the country.”’* We also note that in

preempting rate regulation of basic service of these cable

systems, Section 623 goes even further than the Commission’s

preemption policy. The Cable Act authorizes local rate regula-

77 See Community at 740.

78 See Capital Cities Cable Inc. v Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).

AS5S7

tion only for the provision of basic cable service for those cable

systems not subject to effective competition and gives the

Commission the responsibility to prescribe rules to make effec-

tive the national policy with respect to rate regulation of these

systems. We believe that the statute and legislative history give

the Commission broad discretion to implement this provision

consistent with the provisions of Title VI.

118. With this mandate in mind, and in light of the com-

ments, we are convinced that the definition of basic cable

service contained in Section 602(2), even with the modification

proposed in the Notice should not be applied to Section

623(b).”’ To do so, we believe, could induce an expansion of

rate regulation of cable systems that is inconsistent with the

basic goals of the statute. Such a definition of basic service

would permit a franchising authority to regulate multiple tiers

of cable service where a cable system prices its tiers on a

cumulative rather than an incremental basis.“’ Thus, while

some cable systems subject to these provisions would have one

regulated tier, many systems could have multiple tiers under.

79 - The definition of basic cable service contained in Section 602(2)

applies to Section 623(c) which sets forth the scope of permissible rate

regulation during a two-year “transition period” before the Commission’s

rate regulation rules become effective for all cable systems. This definition of

basic service is appropriate for this subsection because we believe this

subsection endeavors to paint a broad brush of permissible activity so as not

to cause any immediate dislocations in existing agreements between franchis-

ing authorities and cable systems.

80 We note that the legislative history of Section 602(2) indicates that

Congress contemplated that “basic cable service” as defined therein could

include multiple tiers of “basic service.” See House Report at 40. However,

the House Report also indicates that the Commission should not be bound

by the Section 602(2) definition, except during the two year period between

the passage of the Cable Act and the effectiveness of rate regulation under

Section 623. See House Report at 66. Accordingly, the fact that the Section

602(2) definition of basic tier can include multiple tiers is not controlling

within the context of Section 623. For these purposes, we believe the better

definition of “basic service” should be limited to a single tier.

AS58

regulation, and some systems could have all their tiers regu-

lated.“' Most of these regulated tiers would include services

that are universally considered to be “pay” services. This is an

unreasonable outcome for two reasons. First, if at all possible,

a regulation should not be so constructed that its impact

depends upon the manner in which the service is marketed or

delivered, as would be the case with this proposed definition.*”

Second, this definition would permit rate regulation of services

which has been determined on numerous Occasions in the past

are best provided on an unregulated basis.®° Nothing in the

Statute supports a determination that we must permit the pay

81 For example, consider the following cases:

Cable system | Provides service as follows:

Tier A - “must-carry” signals and access channels

Tier B - satellite delivered services such as ESPN and CNN

Tier C - pay services such as HBO and Showtime

Cable system II, according to its franchise agreement, provides the

same services as follows:

Tier A - “must+carry” signals and access channels

Tier B - “must-carry” signals and access channels + satellite

delivered services such as ESPN and CNN

Tier C - Tier A and B services + Pay services such as HBO and

Showtime.

While both cable systems are providing the same services, under the Section

602(2) definition of basic cable service Tier A on Cable System I could be

regulated by the franchising authority while Tiers A, B, and C on Cable

system II could be subject to rate regulation. We believe that such a result is

clearly not intended by the statute.

82 In this regard, we disagree with the comments of the NLC that the

definition of basic cable service contained in the statute establishes the

necessary distinction between basic and nonbasic services. On the contrary,

we believe that this definition fails to draw any meaningful distinction

between these two services.

83 See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972);

United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968): New York

State Commission on Cable Television y. FCC, 669 F.2d §8 (2d Cir 1982);

Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. y. Kelly, 373 F.2d 765 (2d Cir 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979),

AS9

services of these cable systems to be rate regulated. We,

therefore, intend to modify the definition proposed in the

Notice and adopt the following definition of basic cable service

for rate regulation purposes:

Basic cable service is the tier of service regularly provided

to all subscribers that includes the retransmission of all

must-carry broadcast television signals as defined in

§§ 76.55 to 76.61 of the rules, for, in ‘the absence of at

least three must-carry signals, any unaltered broadcast

television signals] and the public, educational and govern-

mental channels, if required by a franchising authority

under Section 611 of the Communications Act.”

This definition of basic service resolves the problems created

by the definition contained in Section 602(2) of the Cable Act.

In addition, it creates a reasonable, historically based, demar-

cation between basic and nonbasic services which will permit

the rate regulation of only the core or “basic” offering of those

cable systems not subject to effective competition.” We be-

lieve, therefore, that it is consistent with the goals of the

statute and longstanding Commission policy.

119. Asa final matter, we note the comments made by some

parties that the definition of basic cable service adopted in

Section 602(2) is inconsistent with our decision in Commu-

84 This definition is preferable to the “lowest-priced” tier proposal of

many of the cable interests. In general, we believe it is imprecise to define a

service by its price. Further, in this instance, such a definition would appear

inappropriate as the price of the tier in question is to be determined by the

regulatory authority.

85 For purposes of rate regulation under Section 623 of the Cable Act,

superstations or satellite delivered television signals shall not be considered

unaltered broadcast television signals as defined in basic cable service. See

paragraph 27 supra. Further, where a cable system carries a large number of

unaltered broadcast signals, the Commission may consider waiver requests

for permission to retier these signals.

86 In Community, we stated that basic subscriber service consists of

that service regularly provided to all subscribers, and that basic service must

contain all the signals mandated by the Commission’s rules.

A60

nity.” These parties believe that the statute intentionally reject

the policies underlying that decision. We believe that a fair

reading of the statute would not support that conclusion. We

determined, in Community, that the cable operator must have

discretion in the selection and packaging of its programming

services consistent with First Amendment freedoms and the

rigors of the economic marketplace. In this regard, we stated

that a cable operator “is free to add, delete, or realign its

service as long as the basic service contains all the signals

mandated by the Commission’s rules.”* We believe that the

statute goes far to ensure that no restrictions are placed on

cable systems that unnecessarily restrict this freedom.

120. Several sections of the Cable Act place limits on a

franchising authority’s power to regulate cable programming

services. Section 624 specifies that for new franchises, and

renewals of existing franchises, the franchising authority may

not require a cable system, either directly or indirectly, to

provide particular video or other information services or even

a broad category of such services. Further, the franchising

authority may only enforce requirements in the franchise for

broad categories of these services. Section 625 specifies proce-

dures available to cable operators in seeking modifications of

their franchise obligations. With regard to programming, it

provides in subsection (a) that a cable operator may obtain

modification of a requirement for services contained in its

franchise if it demonstrates to the franchising authority or in

court that the “mix, quality, and level of services required by

the franchise at the time it was granted will be maintained after

such modification.” Subsection (c) permits the cable operator

upon 30 days’ advance notice to the franchising authority to

rearrange, replace or remove a particular cable service if the

service becomes unavailable or is available only with substan-

tially higher copyright fees for which the operator has not

87 See comments of DOJ and NLC.

88 See Community at 9. See also In re: Cox Cable New Orleans, Inc. vy.

City of New Orleans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 85-106,

adopted March 5, 1985.

—— lie, lla oe

ey

A6l

otherwise been specifically compensated. Subsection (d) pro-

vides that a cable operator may freely retier or repackage

services where the tiers involved are not subject to rate regula-

tion. Finally, Section 9(b) of the Cable Act grandfathers any

retiering, repricing or deletion of services pursuant to the

Community decision, as of September 26, 1984.

121. We believe that the Cable Act does not substantially

alter the Commission’s Community decision and that these

sections of the Cable Act, taken together, afford the cable

operator substantial freedom to replace and retier its services.

Section 625(d) gives cable operators complete freedom to retier

and repackage programming services among the tiers that are

exempted from rate regulation, notwithstanding any provisions

in the franchise agreement to the contrary."’ When the Com-

mission’s rules become effective after the two-year transition

period the majority of cable systems will be exempted from all

rate regulation. Most cable operators will, therefore, have

complete freedom to retier and repackage all their “basic” and

“pay” programming services. Those cable operators subject to

rate regulation will have their freedom to retier and repackage

restricted somewhat by the statute, but this constriction is

applicable only to programs on their regulated tiers. In addi-

tion, any cable operator subject to regulation may obtain a

modification of a franchise programming obligation unde:

Section 625(a) after demonstrating to the franchising authority

that the proposed modification will maintain the mix, quality

and level of the programming services. While this provision

may in fact limit the cable operator’s freedom somewhat

during the two-year transition period, we do not believe it will

be burdensome after this period because most cable systems

will not have any regulated tiers of service and, of those

89 Unlike Community which permitted unrestricted deletion (with no

replacement) of a programming service, we believe that the Cable Act

prevents cable systems from deleting a program service except where the

particular category of programming is no longer available, or available only

at a substantially higher, uncompensated price.

A62

systems that do, only the one tier that contains basic cable

service will be regulated.

122. Regulatory Process. Section 623 of the Cable Act also

specifies that the Commission has the responsibility of devel-

oping the procedures and methodologies which a franchising

authority must follow in regulating basic cable service rates. In

the Notice, we proposed a number of administrative proce-

dures for the rate setting process. For example, we indicated

that there should be formal notice to the public, an opportu-

nity for interested parties to make their views known, and a

formal statement when a decision on a rate matter is made. We

also stated that rate of return regulation of basic cable service

was inappropriate due to its inherent costliness and complexity.

We, therefore, proposed in the Notice a comparable rate

method that would set the regulated basic cable service rate

equal to the level in comparable unregulated markets. To

ensure greater flexibility and ease of implementation, we also

proposed a plus or minus ten percent “zone of reasonableness”

of the average rate of the comparable cable systems.

123. Few objections were raised with the administrative

procedures proposed in the Notice. Accordingly, we will re-

quire franchising authorities in exercising their right to regulate

basic rates to provide (1) formal notice of a rate standard (or

change thereof) to the public; (2) opportunities for interested

parties to make their views known, at least through written

submissions; and (3) a formal statement (including summary

explanation) to the public when a decision on a rate matter is

made. In response to concern expressed in comments filed by

city of Winona, Mn., we acknowledge that such procedures

would not be binding in the two year transition period pro-

vided for existing franchises.

124. Many parties urge the Commission to assume the role

of arbiter of last resort in disputes between cable operators and

franchising authorities. Due to the large and growing number

of cable systems and the limited resources of the Commission,

our role must necessarily be limited. At this time, we view our

SS —————

A63

responsibilities as largely restricted to the interpretation of our

new rules and to those areas where the Cable Act calls

specifically for Commission intervention. We believe that other

matters must generally be settled through public hearings,

negotiations, and, if necessary, by the courts.

125. With regard to the method employed by the franchising

authority in establishing basic cable rates, a majority of com-

menters opposed the “comparable rate” method proposed in

the Notice. The reason most often cited is the inherent com-

plexity of objectively choosing “comparable” cable systems.

As NTIA notes, “the problems associated with determining

comparability could bog down rate proceedings and result in

costly litigation.” The majority of commenters feel that rates

should be established through negotiation, although some

believe that this might include the “comparable rate” or some

other methods as optional tools. After deliberation, we concur

that the means by which the appropriate regulated rate is

determined is best decided consistent with the statute by the

local franchising authority.

126. Many commenters, for example, NCTA/CATA, NTIA,

Cable Operators, Hogan & Hartson, and TCI, recommend

that cost increases be automatically allowed without the delay

and cost of franchising authority approval. Such “pass-thru’s”

would be presumably in excess of the annual 5% automatic

rate increase to which most cable systems are entitled. Most

commenters suggest that such “pass-thru’s” should be based

on identifiable cost increases. For example, increases in pro-

gramming costs caused by increased distant signal copyright

fees. Other commenters, such as the Cable Operators, suggest

that cost increases based on the Consumer Price Index should

be allowed without franchising authority approval. It is our

view that the value of an automatic pass through of costs is the

avoidance of pro forma administrative proceedings. Accord-

ingly, our rules will permit cable systems to automatically pass

through any readily identifiable increase (or decrease) in cost

which is entirely attributable to the provision of basic service,

e.g., the price of programming appearing on the basic service

A64

tier and copyright fees for retransmission of distant broadcast

signals appearing on the basic service tier. These rate increases

may be taken in addition to the 5% automatic annual increase

to which most cable systems are entitled. Furthermore, they

may be taken by any cable .ystem whith is not otherwise

entitled to the 5% automatic annual rate increase.” All other

rate increases must be obtained through good faith negotiation

with the franchising authority.

127. As a final matter, the rules we are adopting today

which implement the rate regulation provisions of the Cable

Act, delineate what a franchising authority may do in the way

of rate regulation. This authority, however, is permissive. The

Cable Act does not, in any way, require franchising authorities

to regulate rates where they find such regulation unnecessary

or inappropriate. Indeed, we recognize that rate regulation in

many instances may be inefficient and counterproductive to

the provision of cable services within a franchise community.”

128. Six Year Report. Section 623(h) of the Cable Act

requires the Commission toSubmit a report to Congress in six

years regarding rate regulation of cable services, including

recommendations for legislative changes. In the Notice, we

proposed that this study would include an economic study of

cable rates and offerings as they relate to local demographic

and market characteristics as well as the degree of regulatory

control. While much of the necessary data could be obtained

from trade publications, a formal submission of the data may

be required of a random sampling of cable operators. This

90 It should be noted that Section 623(e) specifies that a fixed basic

service rate will not preclude the use of the 5% automatic annual increase by

the cable operator.

91 In light of the discretion we have granted franchising authorities

with respect to implementing the rate regulation standard, it bears emphasis

that the Cable Act specifically prohibits the regulation of a cable system as a

common carrier or a public utility by reason of providing any cable service.

(See Section 621(c) of the Cable Act. See also House Report at 60.)

Furthermore, we note that neither a cable operator nor a franchising

authority may waive mandatory sections of the Cable Act in reaching

franchise agreements.

A65

submission of data may be required of a random sampling of

cable operators. This submission could be a much simplified

version of the former annual cable financial report (FCC Form

326), as suggested by the U.S. Catholic Conference in its reply

comments. To minimize the cost and burden of the study, only

a random sample of regulated and unregulated cable systems

would be utilized. In its comments, the National League of

Cities emphasizes the importance it attaches to this study and

Suggests several data to be collected or calculated, including

rates, offerings, penetrations, subscriberships, and rates of

return. The California Department of Consumer Affairs in its

comments recommends that the study include: (1) national and

State trends in basic service rates; (2) the status of alternative

delivery technologies, such as MDS, DBS, LPTV or telephone

carriers; (3) the change in the number and mix of channels

offered as part of basic service; (4) a summary of complaints

filed with the FCC; and (5) a summary of the availability and

use of leased access channels. These and other Suggestions are

appreciated and will be given due consideration at the time of

actually designing and implementing the study.

Section 624—Regulation of Services, Facilities, and Equipment

129. Lockboxes. Section 624 of the Cable Act states that

“liJn order to restrict the viewing of programming which is

obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable

operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the

subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service

during periods selected by that subscriber.” In the Notice, we

sought guidance from the commenters regarding the appropri-

ate remedy for the failure of a cable operator to abide by this

subsection of the Cable Act.

130. Comments submitted by The Municipal Coalition, the

Office of Cable Television of the District of Columbia, and the

reply comments of NLC, state that the FCC has no jurisdiction

to punish a cable operator for failure to comply with the

“lockbox” requirement. VCTI states that the Commission

retains jurisdiction in this area. NCTA/CATA in its reply

- A66

comments, states that the Commission retains general author-

ity since the Cable Act is to be incorporated in the Communi-

cations Act of 1934, as amended, 47 USC 151 et seq., and

Section 1 of the Act gives the Commission the duty to execute

and enforce the provisions of the Act.

131. The cable parties ask that the Commission clarify the

meaning of this section of the statute. For example, TCI asks

that the Commission state that cable operators should not be

required to provide a lockbox for commercial access channels.

VCTI states that the obligation to provide a lockbox should be

triggered upon a judicial finding that programming is obscene

or indecent. Hogan & Hartson states that these devices need

only be provided to restrict viewing of programming reason-

ably regarded as obscene or indecent under local community

standards and not for protection against all programming.

Finaliy, all the cable parties state that the Commission should

ensure that franchise authorities will not penalize them for

technical problems associated with lockboxes. For example,

lockboxes may cause interference on adjacent channels or they

may be unable to block one channel without blocking an entire

tier.

132. We believe we have the authority to ensure that the

lockbox provisions of Section 624 of the Cable Act are carried

out. In this regard we intend to adopt the procedures pursuant

to 47 CFR § 76.7 Special relief, to afford the public, cable

operators and franchising authorities a vehicle to ensure imple-

mentation of Section 624. We also believe that we should

clarify the cable operators’ responsibilities with respect to this

provision. Thus, we believe that the cable operator must

provide, upon subscriber request, by sale or lease,~a lockbox

for any channel over which it has editorial control. (This would

exclude commercial access, PEG and must-carry channels.) We

do not believe that a judicial or local community finding of

obscenity should be a prerequisite for triggering the cable

operator’s obligation. Indeed, we believe that the provision for

lockboxes largely disposes of issues involving the Commis-

A67

sion’s standard for indecency,” and would also be a significant

factor in cases related to obscenity and similar offensive

programming.” Finally, with regard to lockbox technical prob-

lems, we expect cable entities to use quality state of the art

equipment and we need not resolve this issue at this time.

133. Technical Standards. Section 624(e) of the Cable Act

allows the Commission to set technical standards related to

facilities and equipment required by a franchising authority

pursuant to a franchise agreement. This provision does not

affect the authority of a franchising authority to establish

standards regarding facilities and equipment in the franchise

that are not inconsistent with standards established by the

FCC.

134. The parties that commented generally support our

proposal. Storer and VCTI request that the Commission reaf-

firm its 1974 policy statement preempting technical stan-

dards.” In particular, the parties recommend that we include

the preemption policy in our rules.

135. In this Report and Order we reaffirm our policy on

federal preemption of cable TV technical standards. We did

not propose any changes in our preemption policy in the

Notice and we adopt none now. In the Notice, we addressed

the narrower issue of whether we should make any changes in

the standards we have already adopted. In this regard, we note

that the Commission recently adopted a Notice of Proposed

Rule Making which proposes to revise or delete existing techni-

cal standards for cable.” It proposes no change in our preemp-

tion policy. We believe any revisions in our technical standards

are most appropriately dealt with in that proceeding.

92 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

93 See Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

94 See Report and Order, Docket No. 20018, 31 RR 2d 1187 (1974).

95 See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Docket No. 85-38, FCC

85-66, adopted February 12, 1985.

A68

Section 639—Obscenity

136. Section 639 of the Cable Act establishes the Federal

standards and criminal penalties applicable to the transmission

of any cable service which is obscene or otherwise unprotected

by the Constitution. Any violation is punishable by a fine of

up to $10,000 and/or by imprisonment for up to two years.

Section 76.215 of our rules provides that “[n]Jo cable television

system operator when engaged in origination cablecasting shall

transmit or permit to be transmitted on the origination cable-

casting channel or channels material that is obscene or inde-

cent.” We stated in the Notice that these criminal provisions

supersede our rule and we therefore proposed to delete Section

76.215 of our rules.

137. NCTA/CATA, TCI and Viacom filed comments in

support of the Commission’s proposal. They state that it is

appropriate to delete our rule in deference to the statute. The

parties specifically note that the “lockbox” provision of Sec-

tion 624 of the Cable Act provides added justification for

deleting Section 76.215 of our rules.

138. The NLC states in its reply comments that the Commis-

sion has the authority under Section 624(f)(2)(A) of the Cable

Act to enforce Section 76.215 of our rules. However, NLC also

States that it is an open question whether government restric-

tions on indecent materials over cable systems are permissible

under the First Amendment. Morality in Media (Morality)

states that Section 639 of the Cable Act does not specifically

prohibit the transmission of indecent material, as does our

rule. Therefore, in the opinion of Morality, the new legislation

does not supersede the Commission rule. In addition, they

state that colloquys in both houses of Congress indicate that

Congress expected the Commission to retain its present rule on

indecent origination cablecasting. Morality, therefore, pro-

poses that the Commission preserve the indecency concept in

Section 76.215 of the rules as separate standard.

139. After careful review of all the comments, we believe it

is appropriate to delete Section 76.215 of our rules. We believe

that our rule is duplicative of and indeed surpassed vy other

A69

statutory provisions and, thus, the public will continue to be

protected from obscene and indecent programming on cable

systems despite its deletion. We note in this regard that obscene

and other “offensive” programming on cable is restricted in

three other provisions of the Cable Act. Section 612 gives the

franchising authority the power to prohibit or restrict pro-

gramming which, in the judgment of the franchising authority

is obscene or “in conflict with community standards in that it

is lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or is otherwise unpro-

tected by the Constitution of the United States.” Section 624

allows cable operators and franchising authorities to specify in

a franchise or renewal agreement that obscene or otherwise

unprotected programming can be prohibited or restricted. In

addition, Section 624 requires cable operators to offer lock-

boxes that will enable viewers to restrict the viewing of any

given channel. Finally, Section 638 maintains all existing crimi-

nal and civil causes of action against cable operators and

programmers based on the content of their services, including

obscenity and other similar laws.

Section 4—Pole Attachments

140. Section 4 of the Cable Act amends Section 224(c) of the

Communications Act of 1934 by adding a new paragraph

Section 224(c)(3). This addition provides that a state will not be

considered to be regulating the rates, terms and conditions for

pole attachments for Section 224(c)(1) purposes unless it has

issued and made effective rules and regulations implementing

the state’s regulatory authority over pole attachments and

takes final action on individual complaints within the time

limits specified in the Cable Act. This is in addition to the

present requirement that states certify to the Commission that

they regulate pole attachments under Section 224(c)(2). In the

Notice, we proposed to amend our rules to reflect the new

language contained in the Cable Act by requiring a state to

include a statement in its certification that the state has issued

and made effective rules and regulations implementing its

A70

regulatory authority over pole attachments and to enclose a

copy of the rules and regulations with the certification.

141. Several parties submitted comments on our proposed

rule change. Most of the cable interests state that the Cable Act

requires that the Commission no longer accept a state’s pro

forma certification of compliance with Section 224(c). These

commenters state that under the Cable Act, the FCC now has

the responsibility to review each state’s certification to deter-

mine whether in fact the state has complied with the require-

ments of Section 224(c). In this regard, they state that our

proposed rule does not explain precisely what constitutes

“rules and regulations implementing the state’s regulatory

authority over pole attachments,” and therefore does not meet

the intent of the statute. These parties offer modifications to

our rules. For example, NCTA/CATA, Michigan Cable Televi-

sion Association and Hogan & Hartson state that the Cable

Act should be interpreted to require that the state’s regulations

(1) be cable-specific and (2) define with reasonable certainty

the methodology used in effecting pole relief. In addition, the

Cable Operators propose that in addition to the filing of

detailed documentation regarding the determination of certifi-

cation, states be required to submit a report of any pole

attachment rate decisions each year and that the Commission

review these rates and consider decertifying the state if the

rates fall outside a zone of reasonableness.

142. BellSouth and Pacific, on the other hand, generally

support the Commission’s proposed rule changes. BellSouth,

however, proposes that the rules be revised to recognize that

tariffs on file with the state commission be prima facie evi-

dence that the state is regulating pole attachments and to

clarify that a state is not required to issue its rules and

regulations by the effective date of the Cable Act. Texas Power

and Light Company et a/. states that no new rules are required

because the statute is clear on its face. It states that problems

can be handled on a case-by-case basis.

A7l1

143. After review of the comments and replies, we believe

that our proposed rule, with one minor change, is the most

appropriate interpretation of our new statutory mandate.

Thus, we will add to the certification requirement that a state

shall certify that it has issued and made effective rules and

regulations implementing its regulatory- authority over pole

attachments. We disagree, however, with the commenters who

argue that the Commission has the responsibility to review

each state’s certification to determine whether the state’s rules

and regulations comply with Section 224(c). Indeed there are

no requirements in the statute as to the contents or format of

the state’s rules and regulations. Moreover, there is no indica-

tion in either the stafute or the legislative history that Congress

intended that the rules and regulations adopted by the state

must be cable specific or that the Commission should define

the methodology to be followed by the states. The legislative

history of the original Section 224 made it clear that receipt of

“certification from the State shall be conclusive upon the

Commission” and that the “FCC shall defer to any State

regulatory program operating under color of State law.””

Further, no rate-setting formula was imposed on the states.

Congress believed “the States should have maximum flexibility

to develop a regulatory response to pole attachment problems

in accordance with perceived State or local needs and priori-

ties.””’ There is nothing in the legislative history of the Cable

Act that indicates Congress has reversed this position or has

now empowered this Commission to act as an arbiter as to the

content or form of the rules and regulations adopted by each

state. The new Section 224(c) merely makes it clear that a state

will not be considered to be regulating pole attachments unless

it has issued and made effective rules to implement that

authority. While we will not define the methodology to be

followed by the state, we believe that the rules and regulations

should include a specific methodology which has been made

publicly available in the state. Therefore, we will require that a

96 = See S. Rep. No. 95-580, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) at 17.

97 Id.

A72

state certify that its rules and regulations include a specific

methodology for regulating pole attachments. Accordingly, if

the state certifies that it has rules in place which include a

specific methodology, which has been made publicly available

in the state, we will not inquire further unless a complaint is

filed with us that alleges that a party attempted to file a

complaint at the state level and could not because of the lack

of appropriate procedures or that the complaint it filed with

the state remained unresolved 180 days after the complaint was

filed (or within the applicable period prescribed for final action

if the state’s rules provide for resolution within 360 days after

the filing of a complaint). We believe that the requirement for

a timely resolution of complaints should obviate any concern

on the part of cable operators that some states may certify

prematurely to the Commission that they have issued and made

effective rules and regulations. Moreover, since the Commis-

sion will not examine the contents of the state’s rules and

regulations, we have decided that it would be unnecessarily

burdensome to require that each state submit a copy of its rules

and regulations along with its certification. Thus, we will

delete this requirement from the proposed rules. We will,

however, require that the state certify that its rules and regula-

tions include a specific methodology. We are not persuaded to

adopt the rules proposed by BellSouth. The Commission will

not inquire whether tariffs are on file in a particular state, but

will rely on the certification by the state. The certification may

be made at any time, and the Commission will revise its list as

States certify or decertify.

Regulatory Flexibility Final Analysis

144. Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, the

Commission’s final analysis is as fol

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Appendix — Connecticut v. Federal Communications Commission · 485 U.S. 959 | Frix