Appendix — Robinson v. Secretary of Transportation

Supreme Court brief1987

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1 YQ6EPH F. SFANIOL, JR.

———— ——CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1987

ARTHUR B. ROBINSON,

Petitioner.

V.

Secretary of the Department of Transportation and

ALLAN McARTOR, National Administrator of the

Federal Aviation Administration,

Respondents.

APPENDIX

DARRELL S. ELLIOTT

Darrell S. Elliott, P.C.

Steele Park Building

50 South Steele, Suite 777

Denver, Colorado 80209

(303) 329-0331

Attorney for Petitioner

= ie

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Aviation Administration,

Defendants-Appellees.

TENTH CIRCUIT

FILED

) UnhetSaaeaCisestet Appa

ARTHURB. ROBINSON, ) June 10, 1987

PlaintiffAppellant, _) ROBERTL.HOECKER

) Clerk

VS. )

) No. 83-2122

DREWLEWIS, Secretary of t )

he Department ofTransportation, )

andJ.LYNNHELMS, National _)

Administrator of the Federal )

)

)

ORDERANDJUDGMENT

Before SEYMOUR andSETH, Circuit Judges, and

ELLISON, District Judge*

Plaintiff-Appellant, Arthur B. Robinson, appeals from

adverse judgment entered by the United States District

Court for the District of Colorado following trial to the

court on his complaint of deprivation of rights under Title

VII of the 1964Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

Section 2000 et seq.

This action was instituted after Plaintiff was terminated

*Honorable James O. Ellison, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.

on December 14, 1979 from the training program of the

Federal Aviation Administration for air traffic controllers

in Colorado. Plaintiff had been in the training program

since August 16, 1971.

Plaintiff had been previously terminated in December,

1974 after which he filed a discrimination complaint al-

leging he was trained on a particularly low volume traffic

sector whereas Anglo trainees were placed in high volume

sector training. The subsequent investigation by the

Department of Transportation resulted in a decision in

favor of Plaintiff. Accordingly, he was reinstated to his

former position in 1976.

During the pendency of his original complaint, the

training program had been reorganized from a three-phase

program to a thirteen-phase program. He reentered the

program at phase eight pursuant to the directive of the

Department of Transportation that he be given full and fair

training, and if that training was successfully completed,

that he be promoted retroactively according to the dates

he would have been promoted if he had been afforded the

opportunity to successfully complete his training without

interruption. Plaintiff now asserts he was denied full and

fair training as directed by the Department of Transporta-

tion.

Plaintiff successfully completed phases eight and nine

and was progressing to phase ten when a position opened

for phase eleven classroom radar training. Plaintiff and a

white male trainee interrupted their phase ten training to

take advantage of the phase eleven opening. He success-

fully completed phase eleven and then agreed to complete

his phase ten training before proceeding to phase twelve.

When he completed phase ten, his entry into phase twelve

training was delayed due to difficulty in receiving

credible training hours because of lower traffic volumes

and staff vacations in the months of December and

January during which he entered training. However, when

~

PLANO PIT Ke Mergers

his phase twelve training began, Plaintiff was allowed to

choose the sector inwhich he would be trained.

Plaintiff was first trained on sector 34 under George

Shrader. In addition to the required sixty hours, Shrader

provided twelve hours of remedial training but ultimately

concluded Plaintiff’s performance to be unsatisfactory. In

July,1979 Plaintiff was given a certification test and cer-

tification was denied. Based upon Plaintiff’s failure to

successfully complete his certification check after one

hundred hours of training, he was eventually terminated.

Plaintiff requested a Facility Employee Performance

Review Board to review his training. The Board affirmed

the decision that Plaintiff’s training should be terminated

and recommended he be offered reassignment to a posi-

tion in a flight service station.

Plaintiff was informed that he could request a volun-

tary down grade pursuant to FAA Order 3330.30B. Plain-

tiff never made such a request and was removed from his

trainee position.

Plaintiff appealed to the Merit Systems Protection

Board. The removal was affirmed after hearing. Plaintiff

then appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission which appeal was also denied. This action

was then filed in the United States District Court for the

District of Colorado.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered

following a two-day trial which concluded that Plaintiff

had failed to prove he was the victim of discrimination.

Judgment was awarded to the Defendants and the action

dismissed.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred

in concluding Plaintiff was not discriminated against be-

cause of his race.

1No authority is cited by the trial court, however, the paragraphing

clearly denotes the McDonnell test was applied.

The trial court held Plaintiff "established a prima facie

case of racial discrimination, based upon a legitimate in-

ference of continuing effects from the previous dis-

criminatory denial of an equal training opportunity".

The court found that this case could not be resolved

by the customary inquiry of whether the Defendants have

shown a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refus-

ing certification because of the affirmative duty to remedy

past discrimination by providing effective training.

Presumably, the trial court followed the three-step

analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green,

411 U.S. 792(1973) in analyzing the shifting burden of

proof in a discrimination case. 1 Recognizing that the ul-

timate burden ofproof remains at all times with the Plain-

tiff, the trial court incorporated into its findings the

factual ingredient of past discrimination as to this Plain-

tiff. In fact, a review of the record in its entirety reveals

that the court’s determination that Plaintiff established a

prima facie case is based primarily upon the fact of past

discrimination. It is further apparent that the trial court

correctly considered the evidence adduced by both parties

in concluding that a prima facie case had been made. See

ine, 450

U.S.248 (1981). Otherwise, the court’s determination

that "this is not a case which can be resolved by the cus-

tomary inquiry ofwhether the defendants have shown a

legitimate non-discriminatoryreason for refusing cer-

tification" has no meaning in the context in which it is

stated. This court affirms the trial court’s decision that

Plaintiff established a prima facie case and further agrees

with the trial court’s assessment that the record reflects

that Plaintiff was given more than adequate training op-

portunities anc that the delays in training were based

primarily upon forces over which the Defendants had no

control such as vacation schedules, union related reassign-

ments, and low volume traffic months. Had Plaintiff’s

training been undertaken during the months of December

and January, Plaintiff might well be reurging acomplaint

that his training was inadequate because it was too easy.

No evidence was presented that the Defendants in any way

manipulated the traffic in sector 34 after Plaintiff’s volun-

tary participation in choosing that sector for his training.

Defendants came forward with evidence showing a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing cer-

tification. Plaintiff then had the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the Defendants so that the

Defendants’ proffered explanation was unworthy of

belief. This Plaintiff wholly failed to do. See Sabol v.

Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009 910th Cir. 1975).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is af-

firmed in all respects.

JAMESO.ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 81-M-704 FILED

United States District Court

Denver, Colorado

ARTHUR B.ROBINSON, June 30, 1983

Plaintiff,

James R. Manspeaker

Clerk

¥.

DREW LEWIS, Secretary of the Department

of Transportation, and J. LYNN HELMS,

National Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Administration,

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW AND ORDER

Arthur Robinson, a black, claims racial discrimination

in his termination from employment as Air Traffic Con-

trol Specialist(ATCS) by the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion (FAA) of the Department of Transportation, effective

December 14, 1979. That termination was appealed to the

Merit Systems Protection Board which found no dis-

crimination. The matter then went to the Equal Employ-

ment Commission which concurred in the decision finding

nodiscrimination based on race. Mr. Robinson then filed

this civil action and received a trial de novo as provided

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. Section2000e, et seq.

The plaintiff applied for employ ment by the FAA when

he was an employee of the United States Postal Service

in 1970. Because of some delay, including pending traf-

fic charges, Mr. Robinson did not enter on duty with the

FAA until August, 1971. He was assigned to the Air Route

Traffic Control Center at Longmont, Colorado, for train-

ing. Mr. Robinson successfully completed the first two

phases of his training and was terminated, effective

December 6, 1974, for a failure to complete the third

phase ofcontroller training. Mr. Robinson filed a formal

complaint of discrimination on June 12, 1974, alleging

that he was given unequal training because of his race.

After an investigation, the Department of Transportation

concluded that this allegation was true. More specifical-

ly, the DOT found that in the control room training, Mr.

Robinson was assigned primarily to Sector 31,with very

light traffic, whereas caucasian trainees under the same

supervisor had been assigned to sectors with heavier

volume and which were therefore conducive to better

training. Accordingly, it was directed that Mr. Robinson

be restored to the position of ATCS and provided with the

necessary training to reenter the third phase of the train-

ing program and upon satisfactory completion of full and

fair training, the plaintiff was to have been promoted

retroactively according to the dates hewould have been

promoted if he had been afforded an adequate opportunity

to complete the Phase III training. That decision was ef-

fective September 7, 1976. As a result,Mr. Robinson

returned to the Longmont center for additional training.

At that time, the regular training program had been

changed from three phases to 13 phases. Normally,

phases II, III and IV involved classroom work given at a

training center in Oklahoma City. Phases IX and X con-

sisted of on-the-job training at the interphone position in

the control room. Phase XI was classroom work on radar

training and phases XII and XIII involved on-the-job

training in the radar position in the control room.

When Mr. Robinson returned, he agreed that it was not

necessary for him to repeat the first seven phases of train-

ing and, accordingly, he worked in the control room at the

interphone position on assignment to several different

sectors. He also did regular staff work, including work on

the flight strip printer.

The plaintiff was assigned to the radar classroom and

laboratory training and completed it on November 18,

1978. In the normal progression, he would then have

moved to on-the-job training in the radar position in the

control room. However, Mr.Robinson had not yet

received certification on Sector 31. Accordingly, it was

recommended and the plaintiff agreed that he would return

to the interphone position on Sector 31 before beginning

radar on-the-job training.

That radar training did not begin until March, 1979.

For the OST radar training, Mr. Robinson was assigned to

George Shrader as the instructor. Mr. Shrader is a very

fundamentalist person who takes some pride in being

called "a gun-toting, bible banging bigot.". Mr. Shrader

and Mr. Robinson agreed that the training would be done

on Sector 34. Mr. Shrader did not find Mr. Robinson’s per-

formance to be satisfactory, and the plaintiff was assigned

to another instructor, Mr. James Carr, for additional

remedial training. After completion of those remedial

hours, a certification test was given to the plaintiff on

July17, 1979. At that time, another controller, Mr. Her-

ron, was "plugged into" the plaintiff’s position as well as

Mr. Adair, the supervisor. Mr. Adair was not satisfied

with the performance and certification was denied. Be-

cause of the denial of certification, Mr. Robinson was ter-

minated from employment, effective December 14, 1979.

The plaintiff has established a prima facie case of ra-

cial discrimination, based upon a legitimate inference of

continuing effects from the previous discriminatory

denial of an equal training opportunity. The agency had

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an affirmative obligation to remedy that past discrimina-

tion by providing effective training. Accordingly, this is

not a case which can be resolved by the customary inquiry

of whether the defendant has shown a legitimate, non-dis-

criminatory reason for refusing certification, free from

any discriminatory intent.

While the nickname accepted by Mr. Shrader might

generate some concern about his racial attitudes, the

record does not support any finding of bigotry on his part.

His fundamentalism is reflected in his demanding attitude

concerning performance, rather than any preconception

about the plaintiff based on his race. Upon the basis of

the entire record, I find that Arthur Robinson was given

more than adequate training opportunities. There is an in-

dication that the delay between the classroom and

laboratory radar training and the on-the-job radar training

was a disadvantage to him. However, that delay does not

appear to have been the result of any racial attitude. It is

clear that December and January are difficult months for

assigning training. In December, there are vacations as-

sociated with the holiday season. In January, the union

contract, then in effect, called for the new bidding of jobs

and many reassignments of personnel, causing disruption

in schedules. Apparently, there was some unfortunate loss

of records concerning the final certification of the inter-

phone training on Sector 31, and that was a part of the

cause for the four-month delay.

The plaintiff has perceived unfairness in the assign-

ment to Sector 34, which he considered to be more dif-

ficult than other available sectors for OJT radar training.

Yet, the evidence shows that Mr. Robinson was well ac-

quainted with all of the sectors and agreed to that assign-

ment. Indeed, it is to be noted that his previous complaint

was that his assignment to Sector 31 for interphone train-

ing was inappropriate because that sector was too easy.

There is no merit to the contention that the certifica-

tion check was done unfairly because Mr. Herron was

"plugged in" as the monitor for safety purposes. To the

contrary, that assignment was made to avoid any inference

of unfairness by using the normal practice of assigning the

training instructor, Mr. Carr, because of any possible con-

flicts between Mr. Carr and Mr. Robinson.

In considering the contested issues in this case, this

court is acutely aware that the performance standards ap-

plied to the plaintiff involved a considerable amount of

subjectivity and that such evaluations require close

scrutiny. Additionally, this court appreciates the critical

importance of the work of an airtraffic controller and the

human disasters which can occur as a result of any error

or inadequacy in performance. After careful considera-

tion of all the evidence in this case, including my percep-

tion of the instructors and supervisor who testified in this

case, considering their demeanor and manner as witnesses

on the stand, I find that the plaintiff’s race was not a fac-

tor in the denial of his certification and the resulting ter-

mination of his employment. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that this civil action is dismissed and judg-

ment shall enter for the defendant, without the award of

costs.

Dated: June 30, 1983

BY THE COURT:

Richard P. Matsch, Judge

RRO:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

JAMES R. MANSPEAKER, CLERK

U.S. Courthouse, Room C-145

June 30, 1983 1929 Stout Street

Denver, Colorado 80294

James W. Whitlow

Office of Chief Counsel

Federal Aviation Administration

800 Independence Ave., S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20591

Stephen Klein Asst. U.S. Attorney

Richard S. Shaffer

818 17th St., Ste. 510

Denver, CO 80202

RE: 81 M704 ARTHUR B. ROBINSON vy.

DREW LEWIS, et al.

Enclosed please find a copy of FINDINGS OF FACT

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER

signed by Judge Richard P. Matsch June 30, 1983 and a

copy of JUDGEMENT signed by Stephen P. Ehrlich,

Chief Deputy Clerk on June 30, 1983 in the above entitled

action.

JAMES R. MANSPEAKER,

CLERK

BY

Alicia N. Hoegh, Deputy Clerk

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Arthur B. Robinson

Petitioner, )

) Petition No. 03800169

v. )

)

Department of Transportation )

Respondent. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 1980, Arthur B. Robinson (hereinafter

referred to as petitioner) initiated a petition to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for

review of the initial decision-of the Merit Systems Protec-

tion Board (MSPB) rendered May 1,1980, on his allega-

tions of discrimination based on race (black) in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seg. The initial decision ofthe

MSPB became its preliminary decision on June 5, 1980.

The MSPB decision found that the Department of

Transportation (hereinafter referred to as agency) had not

engaged in discrimination based on race as alleged by

petitioner. Because the petition involves an action pend-

ing subsequent to January 10,1979, the effective date of

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, it is governed by

the provisions of that Act and EEO Regulations 29 C.F.R.

Section 1613.414 et seq. Although those Regulations

only provide for complainants to petition the EEOC for

review of preliminary decisions of the MSPB, the present

petition was accepted for consideration by the Commis-

te ee

sion pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Section 1613.416 because of

the confusion occasioned by the enactment of the Civil

Service Reform Act of 1978 and the implementation of

regulations under the Act

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was employed by the agency as an Air Traffic

Control Specialist (ATCS). His position description re-

quired the acquisition of higher and higher levels of

knowledge and skills until he was a fully certified ATCS.

On October 1, 1979, the agency issued petitioner a notice

of proposed removal because ofhis failure to satisfactori-

ly complete Phase 13 (on-the-job radar training) of the En

Route Air Traffic Training Program. The agency sub-

sequently decided to remove petitioner, effective-

December 14, 1978.

The En Route Traffic Training Program Guide

provided for 60 hours of training to qualify on each con-

trol position of operation and,when necessary, up to 40

hours of additional remedial training., The Guide also re-

quired that the ATCS demonstrate his ability as measured

by a prescribed set of performance evaluation factors and

standards. Petitioner received 60 hours of training on

Sector 34. Since his performance was consistently below

the acceptable training standards, petitioner was given an

additional 40 hours of remedial training by a second train-

ing instructor. Both of petitioner’s instructors testified that

petitioner often exceeded the acceptable error rate estab-

lished by the Training Program Guide, although he did

not fall below the acceptablestandards on every training

session. The instructors’ testimony is corroborated by the

evaluation forms prepared by eachinstructor after each

training session. Petitioner failed his certification check

on Sector 34, and therefore failed tasuccessfully complete

Phase 13 of the training program.

A Facility Employee Performance Review Board met

to review the training of petitioner. The Board recom-

mended that petitioner’s training be terminated and that

he be reassigned to a position commensurate with his

training and his ATCS skills. Petitioner was offered such

a position by the agency; however, he declined the offer.

As a result, petitioner was subsequently removed.

Petitioner contended that his removal was the result

of racial discrimination. In support of this allegation,

petitioner made reference to a previous discrimination

complaint filed when he failed Phase 3 of the training

program in 1974. In that case,the agency found that

petitioner had been discriminated against because he was

not afforded the same training as non-black employees.

The agency ordered that petitioner be reinstated and af-

forded full and fair training opportunities. Petitioner con-

tends that the instant action is a continuation of the

previous discrimination in that the training he received

during Phase 13 was inadequate and that he was treated

differently than other trainees. In support of this conten-

tion, petition eralleged that, unlike other trainees, he was

not afforded priority training as required by agency train-

ing policy; that his training in Phase 13 was delayed for

four months without cause; that he was assigned to train

on Section 34, asector more difficult to train on than other

sectors; and that an instructor other than his assigned

training instructor monitored his certification check on

Sector 34. The record indicates that petitioner was the

only black trainee out of a group of approximately 10

trainees in Phase 13.

The agency maintained that petitioner’s removal was

not based upon considerations of his race but upon an ob-

jective and nondiscriminatory evaluation of his training

progress. The agency claimed that not only did petitioner

receive the same quality training as other trainees, but he

received additional and personalized instruction. Any dif-

ee

ferences in the training given to petitioner in comparison

with other trainees, was purportedly a response to the par-

ticular circumstances and progression of petitioner’s

training program.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Under the principles of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) a complainant alleging

employ ment discrimination in violation of Title VII must

carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case

of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the agency to

articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the al-

leged discriminatory personnel action. Finally, the com-

plainant must be afforded an opportunity to show that the

agency’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were in facta _

pretext for discrimination.

In the present case, petitioner succeeded in estab-

lishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing

that he was treated differently in some respects than other

trainees and that he was the only black in his training

group. The agency presented evidence that petitioner’s

progress in the training program, as measured by objec-

tive criteria applicable to all trainees, was below accept-

able standards. However, the agency presented sufficient

evidence to show that any differences in training received

by petitioner was the result of legitimate, nondis-

criminatory criteria.

Petitioner contended that he was not given priority

training as required by Agency Order ZOV 3120.28.

Petitioner claimed that the Order specified that persons

with one year in grade were to be given priority training

in order to qualify for promotion. However, the Agency

Training Officer testified that the Order only applied to

the resolution of any potential conflict between trainees

vying for training on a day to day basis because of the

overlapping of ATCS shift. The Training Officer testified

that what petitioner was referring to was a trainee who was

considered "time critical" because of time in grade. Such

"time critical". employees were handled administratively

by the agency and were not covered by Agency Order

ZoV3120. 28. Moreover, petitioner was not considered

"time critical" because he had not been ingonsideration for

promotion and therefore was not entitled to any priority

training status. Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, only

one trainee in the program had been declared “time criti-

cal." The agency’s evidence supports the view that

petitioner was treated no differently than other trainees in

this regard.

Petitioner also alleged that his training in Phase 13

was delayed for four months after the classroom portion

of his radar training, thereby lessening his chances of

qualifying during Phase 13. The record establishes that

when petitioner entered the classroom portion of the radar

training, he was half-way through his on-the-job training

on an interphone (non-radar)position (Sector 31). After

completing the classroom radar training, petitioner had

the choice of going directly into Phase 13 on-the-job radar

training, or of completing his on- the-job training for the

interphone position. After consulting with his supervisor,

petitioner agreed to complete his on-the-job interphone

training before proceeding to Phase 13 training. Because

of staffing requirements, it took petitioner four months to

complete his interphone training. The record indicates

that such a delay is not unusual because of the staffing

needs of the airport tower. Only one other trainee in

petitioner’s class was in the same position as petitioner

and he also agreed to return to on-the-job interphone train-

ing before proceeding to Phase 13 training. Therefore, the

evidence does not support petitioner’s contention that the

delay in his Phase 13 training was the resultof racial dis-

crimination.

Petitioner’s Phase 13 training began on Sector 34, a

sector he claimed was the most difficult sector to qualify

on. He stated that since it was such a difficult sector, his

Supervisor should have advised him about the difficulty

of the sector or selected another sector for him to qualify

on. However, the evidence establishes that petitioner had

already qualified on an interphone position on Sector 34

and was well aware of the difficulty of the sector.

Petitioner’s supervisor gave all trainees the choice of

which sector they wanted to qualify on in Phase 13 train-

ing; petitioner selected sector 34. While few trainees

selected Sector 34, trainees did select other sectors to train

on that were just as complex and difficult as Sector 34.

Petitioner’s allegation that he was required to train on a

sector more difficult than other trainees were required to

train on is therefore without merit.

Regarding the assignment of another instructor to

monitor petitioner’s certification check on Sector 34,

petitioner stated that such action was unusual and made

him nervous. The record indicates that such a procedure,

although unusual, was used for some trainees. Moreover,

petitioner’s instructor recommended such a procedure to

petitioner’s supervisor in an attempt to be more fair to

petitioner. Petitioner’s instructor felt that because he was

more familiar with petitioner’s weaknesses and past mis-

takes, he might be more prone to interrupt thecertification

process in the event problems arose in petitioner’s control

of the air traffic. The certification check was still con-

ducted by petitioner’s supervisor and another instructor

was only used to monitor the check for the purpose of in-

terceding inthe control of air traffic if such action was

warranted. Whether such action made petitioner nervous

or not, the evidence establishes that the reason for using

the procedure was nondiscriminatory.

The evidence of record establishes that the agency’s

conduct of petitioner’s training was based on legitimate

and nondiscriminatory reasons. The petitioner failed to

present any evidence to show that the agency’s legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons were actually a pretext for dis-

crimination. The evidence shows that petitioner received

as much or more training as other trainees, and that any

differences in his training program were the result of the

specialized circumstances and progress of his training.

Petitioner failed to successfully complete Phase 13 of his

training. Pursuant to agency procedures, petitioner was

offered a position commensurate with his training in lieu

of his removal. Because of his declination of that offer

and his failure to successfully complete his Phase 13 train-

ing, the agency initiated petitioner’s removal pursuant to

agency regulations. Petitioner failed to establish that

such actions were the result of discrimination based on

race.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the EEOC is to concur in the prelimi-

nary decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board find-

ing no discrimination based on race as alleged by

petitioner.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Section 1613.417(d), the

petitioner is hereby notified that this is the Commission’s

final decision and that petitioner has a right to file a civil

action in the appropriate United States District Court

within thirty (30)calendar days of receipt of this decision.

FOR THE COMMISSION:

4/19/8)

DATE

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

alk

DENVER FIELD OFFICE

Building 46, Denver Federal Center

Box 25025

Denver, Colorado 80225

CERTIFIED MAIL NOS. 8980108 & 8970109

Return Receipt Requested

Date:

May 1, 1980

Mr. Arthur B. Robinson

3710 York Street

Denver, CO 80205

Dear Mr. Robinson:

Enclosed is a copy of the initial decision in the appeal

described beiow.

Appeal of: Arthur B. Robinson

Action appealed: Removal

Initial decision: Appeal is affirmed.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph H. Hartman

Presiding Official

Enclosure

cc: Owens Oliver

Attorney at Law

7903 Ralston Road

Arvada, CO 80002

cc: Daniel Peterson

Federal Aviation Administration

10455 E. 25th Avenue ARM-7

Aurora, CO 80010

cc: Director of Personnel & Training

(TAD-10) Dept. of Transportation

Washington, D.C. 20590

cc: Office of Personnel Management

Attn: Jeannette Nevile

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION

BOARD DENVER FIELD OFFICE

ARTHUR B. ROBINSON

DECISION NO. DEO75209051

v.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

DECIDED

May 1, 1980

INTRODUCTION

On January 2, 1980, Mr. Arthur B. Robinson appealed

from the action of the Department of Transportation,

Federal Aviation Administration, Denver, Colorado,

removing him from the position of Air Traffic Control

Specialist, GS-2152-11, effective December 14, 1979.

JURISDICTION

Because this appeal involves an action pending sub-

sequent to January 10, 1979, the effectis e date of the Civil

Service Reform Act of 1978, it is governed by that Act.

Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111(1978) (codified in scat-

tered sections of 5 U.S.C.).

An employee in the competitive service, ‘who is not

serving a probationary period under an initial appointment

and who is not otherwise excluded by statute, is entitled

to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board)

under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701 from a removal from the Federal

service. 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7511-7514. Regulations of the Of-

fice of Personnel Management governing removal from

employ ment from the Federal service are in accord with 5

U.S.C. Secs. 7511-7514. 44 Fed. Reg. 47033 (1979)

(codified at 5 C.F.R. Part 752C).

The record in this matter shows that appellant occupied

a position in the competitive service. He was not serving

a probationary period under an initial appointment at the

time of his removal. Accordingly, his appeal was found

to be within the appellate jurisdiction of the Board.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7513(a) and 7701(c) (1)(B),

the Board must sustain this removal action if it is sup-

ported by the preponderance of the evidence and was

taken for such cause as would promote the efficiency of

the service. The agency has alleged that appellant was

removed because he had failed to satisfactorily complete

Phase 13 (on-the-job radar training) of the En Route Air

Traffic Training Program.

The agency Training Program Guide provides for 60

hours of creditable training to qualify on each control

position of operation and, when necessary, up to 40 hours

of additional remedial training. The guide also requires

that the demonstration of ability, during training, will be

measured against a prescribed set of on-the-job training

evaluation factors which involves sets of tolerance levels

for errors for each training session. In this case the

tolerable errors were as follows: Separation - 0; Coor-

dination and Communication - 2;Traffic Management and

Control judgment - 3; Operating Methods and Procedures

- 3; and, Equipment and Phraseology - 3.

In specification 1, the agency has alleged that appel-

lant exceeded the above tolerance levels in one or more of

the factors during the first 60 hours of creditable hours of

training during thirteen separate training sessions. In

specification 2, the agency has alleged that appellant ex-

ceeded the same tolerance levels in one or more of the fac-

PO Ao

tors during the additional 40 hours of remedial training

during nine separate training sessions.

In support of the above allegations, the agency

presented the testimony of appeilant’s supervisor and his

instructors during the time in question. The agency also

presented the various evaluation forms for each training

session which shows that the errors were committed as

Stated in the proposal notice. The forms, in all cases, were

signed by appellant, his instructor and supervisor either

on or subsequent to the particular training session.

In response to the charge and attendant specifications

appellant has conceded that he committed the errors with

the exception of the one factor involving Phraseology.At

the hearing, it was established that the agency had a policy

of recording on tape, at various times, the employee’s

voices while they were communicating with En Route air

traffic. Appellant obtained some of the taped recordings

of his voice and asked another employee, Mr. Michael

Violette, to review the tapes for quality of Phraseology.

After establishing that he had some experience in review-

ing tapes of this type and based upon his past history of

training people for this type of work, Mr. Violette tes-

tified that he had reviewed three tapes and he felt that

appellant’ s phraseology was good, if not excellent. It is

noted that Mr.Violette was sure that the tapes involved

transmissions to pilots on Sector 34, but he could not iden-

tify the time periods during which the tapes were

recorded.

The record shows that appellant had two instructors

during his on-the-job radar training. Mr. George Shrader

was his training instructor during the first 60 hours and

Mr. James Carr was the instructor during the 40 hours of

remedial training. Both instructors testified and it is cor-

roborated by the various evaluation forms prepared by

each instructor that appellant ex ceeded the tolerance level

on the equipment and Phraseology factor during the

course of his training. It is noted that appellant did not

ex ceed the tolerance level on this factor on each and every

training session. I do not find any conflict between the

testimony of appellant’s instructors and Mr. Violette be-

cause it is evident that appellant’s phraseology was satis-

factory during some of his training sessions. Therefore,

it is possible that the tapes reviewed by Mr. Violette were

recorded during those sessions when appellant did not

have any problems with his phraseology.

In view of the foregoing, I find that the weight of the

evidence supports a finding that appellant’s instructors

properly evaluated him on the phraseology factor as well

as the other factors as set out in the proposal notice. It is

noted that appellant exceeded the tolerance level of the

other factors as well as the Equipment and Phraseology

factor and his ability to perform his job was judged on the

basis of all the factors and not just on the one set out

above. Accordingly, I find that the preponderance of the

evidence supports the agency charge that appellant failed

to satisfactorily complete Phase 13 of his training

program, and it is sustained.

In connection with his appeal, appellant has alleged

that the agency’s decision,to remove him was based on ra-

cial discrimination because he is black. If appellant can

establish that prohibited discrimination tainted the

removal action, the removal cannot be sustained. 5

U.S.C.A. Sec. 7701(c)(2)(B).

In support of his allegation, appellant has referred to

a previous action wherein the agency had found that he

had been discriminated against by agency officials and it

had ordered corrective action. In that action, appellant

was removed on December 6, 1974. The basis for his

removal was his inability to successfully complete Phase

3 of the training program. The agency found that appel-

lant was discriminated against by agency officials when

he was not afforded the same training as non-black

employees. The corrective action ordered by the agency

at that time, was retroactive restoration with full and fair

training opportunities in Phase 3.

Appellant contends that the instant action is a con-

tinuation of the previous discriminatory acts by agency of-

ficials. He has contended that the training he received

during Phase 13. was inadequate and that he was treated

differently than other trainees in the way he was trained.

In support of his contentions, appellant! states that: (1) He

was not afforded priority training as required by agency

training policy, (2) his training in Phase 13 was delayed

for four months without cause,(3) he was assigned to a

sector (34) which he considered to bemore difficult than

other available sectors for on-the-jobtraining, and (4)

during his certification check, another instructor (Mr.

Harold Herron) monitored sector 34 instead of his

assigned training instructor (Mr. James Carr).

Regarding priority training and the delay in training,

appellant stated that Agency Order ZOV 3120.28 requires

that trainees, who are approaching time-in-grade and in

need of training in order that they may be considered for

promotion, are to receive first priority in training. Appel-

lant contends that he should have been given priority con-

sideration under that order because other employees from

his training class (classroom radar) were placed in a

priority status and they did not have any greater right to

priority training status than he did in November 1978. He

further argues that, instead of receiving priority con-

sideration,his on-the-job radar training was delayed for

four months after he had completed the classroom train-

ing on radar. Appellant claims that the delay lessened his

chances of qualifying during Phase 13 because he was not

as familiar with the various sectors as he had been im-

mediately after completing the classroom section on radar.

Mr. Benham Ignacio, Agency Training Officer, tes-

tified that appellant had misinterpreted the intent of that

Order. It is Mr.Ignacio’s position that the Order related

only to the resolution of any potential conflict between

trainees vying for training on the same sector on the same

position. Mr. Ignacio stated the conflict in question is

caused by the need to maintain overlapping crews of Air

Traffic Controllers to facilitate proper control over air

traffic. When two crews that overlapped reported for

work and each crew had trainees on the same sector, the

supervisors used the Order as guidance to resolve the

question of which trainee would receive training on the

sectorduring that shift and which one would not be trained

if aconflict existed. Mr. Ignacio stated that this deter-

mination was made on a day-to-day basis, and it was not

intended as a means for placing any trainee on an uninter-

rupted training scheduled for the entire phase of training

as indicated by appellant. Mr.Ignacio further testified that

the training status appellant had referred to was called

critical training and it was handled administratively and

is not addressed in the referenced Order. He also stated

that it was his responsibility, as training officer, to decide

whether a trainee will be declared "time critical" and it

was his position that appellant was not time critical at

anytime during the training program. Mr. Ignacio pointed

out that he had reviewed the records of all trainees who

completed classroom radar at the same time as appellant

and he noted that the various trainees differed in their

stages of training. It also is noted that only one of the

trainees who testified was declared time critical contrary

to appellant’s previous statement about priority training

Status of other trainees within his class.

The evidence in this record establishes that while

trainees attended various classes together, each trainee

was pursuing an individual course of training. This was

especially true where on-the-job training was involved.

When appeliant entered the classroom portion of radar

training, he was half way through his on-the-job training

j

of a non-radar position (31) and agreed with his supervisor

that he should complete that training before proceeding to

Phase 13 training. Only one other trainee within

appellant’s class was in the same position as appellant and

healso returned to on-the-job training on a non-radar sec-

tor. Appellant’s supervisor, Mr. Doak Adair, testified that

appellant was afforded equai treatment in training and that

any delay in training on radar was due only to staffing re-

quirements of thefacility and appellant’s completion of

non-radar on-the-job training (interphone). Management

officials also testified that,with the additional 40 hours of

remedial training, appellants’ proficiency in working with

radar sectors should have been restored sufficiently to

allow him the opportunity to qualify on Phase 13 regard-

less of the four month delay. It also was pointed out by

Mr. Ignacio that he had experienced asimilar delay in com-

pleting his training when he was atrainee. During cross

examination, Mr. Ignacio testified that it had taken him

seven months to complete training on his first inter-

phoneposition. In view of the above, I find that the agen-

cy did notviolate its Order or deny appellant priority

training under the Order, and that the agency had a

legitimate reason for delaying appellant’s entry into Phase

13 training.

Regarding appellant’s assignment to sector 34, he has

contended that it was the most difficult sector to qualify

on, and since his supervisor (Mr. Adair) was responsible

for assigning him to asector for certification purposes, Mr.

Adair should have advised him about sector 34 or selected

another position for certification purposes. Appellant

Stated that he was not aware of the work load of sector 34

until he was assigned to it. The undisputed evidence

shows that appellant was given the opportunity to choose

the sector that he wanted to be trained on,and he selected

sector 34. Mr. Adair testified that appellant had com-

pleted his training for the interphone positions forall the

sectors within his group and was aware of the amount of

traffic on each sector. Mr. Adair also testified that while

he is responsible for assignment of trainees toa sector for

training, he allows the trainee to choose the sector if he

is familiar with the various traffic patterns. Mr. Adair fur-

ther testified, that other sectors under his supervision are

just as complex as sector 34, and other trainees have been

assigned to those sectors for certification purposes. In

view of the above, I find that appellant’s contention that

he was required to train on a sector more difficult than

other trainees were required to train on is without merit.

Regarding the assignment of another instructor to

monitor the sector during the certification process, appel-

lant stated that such action was unusual and made him

nervous during his certification. Appellant further con-

tends that it affected his ability to concentrate. The

evidence shows that, normally, appellant’s instructor will

monitor the sector during the certification process.

Appellant’s instructor, at that time, was Mr. James Carr.

Mr. Carr testified that he had recommended to Mr. Adair

that another instructor should be assigned to monitor the

Sector during the appellant’s certification because it

would be more fair to the appellant. Mr. Carr stated that

he might have interceded in the sector sooner than some-

body else when problems arose arid he wanted the appel-

lant to have every opportunity to complete his

certification. Mr. Adair testified that based on the recom-

mendation, another Air Traffic Control Specialist from

appellant’s crew was assigned to monitor the sector.

There is no evidence in this record to show that this ac-

tion was taken to interfere with or cause any problems for

appellant during the certification process. The cer-

tification check was stillconducted by Mr. Adair and Mr.

Herron was monitoring only for the purpose of interced-

ing in the control of air traffic if such action was war-

ranted.

After having reviewed the evidence, I find that

appellant’s allegation that the agency decision to remove

him was based on race discrimination is not supported by

the preponderance of the evidence.

The evidence in this case shows that appellant received

as much training as was available under the training

program. He was assigned to two different training in-

structors during the training process, and, in one instance,

had another Specialist monitor the sector during the cer-

tification process to assure that he was afforded impartial

treatment during that process. Appellant was still unable

to qualify or pass the certification check for Phase 13. Mr.

Ignacio testified that agency policy makes it clear that any

person hired for an air traffic control career must progress

from the entrance grade through the full performance level

of the position he was hired for. In this case, appellant

was required to successfully complete all phases of his

training. Mr. Ignacio stated that appellant had successful-

ly completed his training through Phase 13 and was

eligible for assignment to a tower or a flight service sta-

tion. In lieu of separation, the agency offered appellant

reassignment to one of those positions, but he declined the

offer. In view of his declination and his failure to qualify

for his position, the agency initiated his removal.

In summary, I find that the preponderance of the

evidence supports the agency’s action, that appellant was

not discriminated against by the agency because of his

race, and that the removal action was warranted. There-

fore, I find that the action was taken for such cause as does

promote the efficiency ofthe service.

INITIAL DECISION

The agency action is affirmed.

This is an initial decision. It will become a final

decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board on June

5, 1980, unless a petition for review is filed with the Board

or the Board reopens the case on its own motion.

Any party to the proceeding, the Director of OPM, and

the Special Counsel may file a petition for review. The

Director may request review only if he/she is of the

opinion that the decision is erroneous and will have a sub-

Stantial impact on any civil service law, rule, or regulation

under the jurisdiction of the Office of Personnel manage-

ment. The Board may grant a petition for review, after

providing an opportunity for response by other parties,

due diligence, was not available when the record was

closed; or

(2) The decision of the presiding official is based on an

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation.

All petitions for review shall set forth objections to

the initial decision, supported by references to applicable

laws or regulations, and with specific reference to the

record. The petition for review must be received by the

Secretary of the Merit Systems Protection Board,

Washington, D.C. 20419, no laterthan June 5, 1980.

Three copies of the petition must be filed with the

Secretary.

The appellant has the right to petition the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to consider the

Board’s final decision on the issue of discrimination.

Such a petition must be filed with the Equal Employ ment

Opportunity Commission, Office of Review andAppeals,

24U1 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506.

The appellant also has the right to file a civil action

under the antidiscrimination laws in any appropriate U.S.

District Court. Either a petition to EEOC or a civil action

in a U.S. District Court must be filed no later than 320

days after the appellant’s receipt of the final decision.

Except for actions filed under the anti discrimination

laws, apetition for judicial review of a final Board

decision must be filed in the appropriate U.S. Court of Ap-

peals or in the U.S.Court of Claims no later than 30 days

after receipt of notice of the Board’s final decision.

For the Board:

Joseph H. Hartman

Presiding Official

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE: August 21, 1979

TO:DV-§31

SUBJECT: Facility Employee Performance Review Board

- ATCS Arthur Robinson

FROM: Central Area Officer, DV-531

TO: Chief, Denver Center

A Facility Employee Performance Review Board was

convened on August 15, 1979, to review the training, per-

formance, progress, and desires of ATCS Arthur Robin-

son. Mr. Robinson’ s training was terminated on July 25,

1979, for failing to progress satisfactorily on Sector 34

radar. The board consisted of thefollowing members:

fichael P. Hipsher,, Chairman; Benham E.Ignacio,

EPDO, Member; David L Lee, Team Supervisor, Mem-

ber; Wilbur A. Heiser, Team Supervisor, Member; James J.

Torres, ATCS,Member representing ARM-9.

Listed is a chronology of Mr. Robinson’s training since

hisreinstatement on October 13, 1976:

. Reinstatement

to Denver Center. Started the first seven phases of the

thirteen-phase training program. These phases were non-

pass-fail, a condition of his reinstatement.

April 19, 1977 (Phase VIII). Began non-radar training

on Sectors 31 and 36.

Results: Satisfactory.

June 9, 1977 (Phase 1X). Began non-radar OJT training

(interphone).

Results: August 27, 1977, Sector 33/36 interphone cer-

tification) 55 hours. November 13, 1977, Sector 32 inter-

phone certification) 59 hours.

November 17, 1977 (Phase X), Began non-radar OJT

training (interphone).

Results: January 7, 1978, Sector 34 interphone cer-

tification) 29 hours.

February 27, 1978, Sector 37 interphone certification ) 41

hours. May 27, 1978, Sector 35 interphone certification )

56 hours.

June 15, 1978, began Sector 31 interphone training (did

notcomplete training prior to Phase XI training which

began onSeptember 11, 1978).

September 11, 1978 (Phase XI). Began radar DYSIM

training on Sectors 31 and 36.

Results: Satisfactory.

March 1979, Completed Sector 31 interphone certifica-

tidn. The certification form is not present in Mr.

Robinson’s training records, although both Mr. Robinson

and his Team Supervisor, Doak Adair, agreed the certifica-

tion had taken place.

NOTE: Mr. Robinson completed Phase XI DYSIM train-

ing on November16, 1978. He was assigned Sector 31 in-

terphone to complete the last of the interphone positions

prior to beginning radar OJT training. Thirty-eight hours

ot training had been completed prior to Phase XI.

Fourteen training hours were logged in December. Only

five training hours were logged in January due to staffing.

Only five training hours were logged in February due to

Staffing.

_March 19, 1979 (Phase XII), Began radar OST training

on Sector34.

May 9, 1979, Completed 72 hours of radar training on

Sector 34.

Results: Unsatisfactory - 40 hours of remedial training

requested.

July 17, 1979. Completed 40 additional hours of

remedial training on Sector 34.

Results: Unsatisfactory.

July 25, 1979. Letter sent to Mr. Robinson from Team

Supervisor Doak Adair advising termination of training.

Mr. Robinson seemed to have many problem areas. The

reports indicate that so many of the problems would occur

time after time, indicating a lack of progress. This lack

of progress made it impossible for him to certify on Sec-

tor 34 radar. In summary,his problems involved:

1. Communication, This was a major problem

throughout the training on Sector 34 radar. Instructors

stated that pilots and adjacent sectors had problems under-

standing Mr. Robinson. Mr.Robinson had problems hear-

ing or understanding what was said to him.

. Coordination. Many instances of either incomplete

or pe coordination. This may be due in part to the

problems ofcommunication.

3. Separation. Many times the instructor had to point

out where there was a Separation problem and sometimes

would have to intervene.

4. Equipment. Has a problem understanding and

remembering how to set up and adjust equipment.

S. Computer. Continually had a problem with computer

entries. At times would make error in entry and not catch

it.

6. Procedures. Had problems understanding some of

the sector operating procedures.

7. Phraseology. Did not adhere at times to standard

phraseology and had many problems using wrong or

mixing up theaircraft identification.

8. Speed. Due to the many problems encountered, Mr.

Robinson was unable to attain the speed needed to be cer-

tified on Sector 34 radar. He seemed to do fairly well

when traffic was light. However, when traffic would build

then the problems became worse and, at times, the instruc-

tor had to intervene to take over the sector completely.

9. Weather. Didn’t seem to understand the importance

of turbulence and adverse weather and its effect on aircraft

inflight. Had to be told to issue turbulence reports and

areas of weather.

10. Radar Vectoring. Had probiems determining when

a vector was needed. Also had trouble with headings and

just how they would affect the aircraft.

Some other problems encountered were in the areas of

Stripmarkings, military procedures, NAVAIDS, and ap-

proach plates.

The board interviewed Mr. Robinson to obtain his view

on the training he had received and his desires for the fu-

ture. Michael Curtis sat in as Mr. Robinson’s PATCO rep-

resentative. The board also interviewed Doak Adair, Mr.

Robinson’s Team Supervisor.

MR. ROBINSON'S FEELINGS |

Mr.. Robinson discussed situations that affected his

training:

1. Mr. Adair let Mr. Robinson select the sector he

would begin radar training on. Mr. Robinson felt he

should have been assigned a sector in accordance with

Order ZDV 3120.28. Mr. Robinson said he did not know

that Sector 34 "got so busy" when he initially selected it

to begin training.

2. Should have started radar training after completion

of Phase XI instead of finishing the last 22 hours of the

allowable 60 hours on Sector 31. He should have been

declared time critical so that he could receive his promo-

tion.

3. Unfairly evaluated by instructors Shrader and Carr.

4. Had to work around some FPL’s assigned the inter-

phone position because they would not perform their as-

signed duties. This presented an additional workload to

him.

5. Mr. Robinson felt some personnel would deliberate-

ly send him "deals." .

6. Felt the certification on March 19, 1979, was unfair.

‘ a. Certification should have been stopped due to

weather and traffic.

b. Instructor should not have intervened because

the traffic was separated.

c. Another instructor (Harold Herron) was plugged

in with Mr. Robinson during the certification. Mr.

Robinson felt it should have been Mr. Adair.

7. Felt his concentration was destroyed because of in-

structor comments.

a. During one training session Mr. Shrader stated

"you should have known that you’ve been in train-

ing seven years."

b. Received word from Bill Dew that Doak Adair

had stated he was "not hacking the program and

wouldn’t be signed off."

8. Felt the additional time given him that was not logged

was just holding him back from his certification.

9. Felt he was being harassed when Mr. Shrader would

discuss approach plates during a classroom training ses-

sion on their day in lieu of a mid. Mr. Robinson was train-

ing on high altitude and felt only high altitude procedures

should be discussed.

\IR. ROBINSON'S DESIRES

Requests:

1. Change of crew.

2. Change of sector.

3. DYSIM refresher problems.

4. Begin initial OJT radar training again.

5. Be declared time critical.

MR. ADAIR’ S FEELINGS

Mr. Adair was interviewed to review Mr. Robinson’s

training progression.

1. Mr. Adair stated that Mr. Robinson was very incon-

sistent in his daily training. One day he would do a good

job; the next one or two days his performancé would be

unsatisfactory.

2. Mr. Robinson committed many repetitive errors.

3. Felt that counseling was sufficient - that Mr. Robin-

son knew the status of his progress.

4. Was aware that a personality conflict may have ex-

isted, but that Mr. Robinson had not mentioned it in any

of the counseling sessions; therefore, he was not con-

cerned.

5. Concerning the problem of Mr. Bill Dew talking to

Mr. Robinson. Mr. Adair had asked Mr. Dew to talk with

Mr. Robinson to see if he could detect or help with any

problems. Mr. Adair said he did not tell Mr. Dew that Mr.

Robinson would never get signed off.

6. Had to use Mr. Robinson in staffing during January

and February due to shortage of controllers. The time

critical problem never was discussed.

7. Was asked about controllers not performing their in-

terphone duties while Mr. Robinson was on radar. Mr.

Adair stated he had noticed the problem on one occasion,

but that corrective action had been taken.

MR. CURTIS’ FEELINGS

1. Mr. Robinson should have been started on radar after

Phase XI, although he had completed more than half of his

interphone training on Sector 31.

2. Should not have started on Sector 34 even though he

chose it.

3. Should have received mox- training on Sector 31

during January and February regardless of poor staffing.

This could have been done by declaring Mr. Robinson

time critical.

BOARD’ S DELIBERATIONS

neil

(NOTE: Mr. Torres disagreed with several of board’s

decisions and the recommendations. Those paragraphs

will be properlynoted. )

1. Mr. Robinson’s statement that he did not know that

Sector 34"got so busy" is not a valid reason for failing to

meet certification requirements. Mr. Adair offered Mr.

Robinson aselection of any sector to begin radar training.

Mr. Robinsonwas certified on Sector 34 interphone and

knew the traffic flow.

2. Phase XI radar DYSIM was completed in November

1978; however,radar training was not started until March.

Mr.Robinson had completed 38 of the allowable 60 hours

on Sector 3 linterphone prior to Phase XI training. It was

logical to complete thelast 22 hours of Sector 31 prior to

Starting radar training.

3. The personality conflict between Mr. Robinson and

Mr. Shrader was not of significant importance because Mr.

Robinson never did complain or request another instruc-

tor. (This comment excludes Mr. Torres.)

4. There was no evidence to support the statement that

other controllers were handing Mr. Robinson "deals."

5. The certification on Sector 34 radar was fair and un-

biased. Mr. Hferron was plugged into the radar jack with

Mr. Robinson while Mr. Adair observed from the over-

head. (This comment excludes Mr. Torres.)

6. Additional time given but not logged was an asset in-

Stead of a detriment.

7. That Mr. Shrader was not harassing Mr. Robinson by

reviewing approach plates during non-contro] time even

through Mr. Robinson was currently working ona high al-

titude sector. The instructor has a commitment to recog-

nize deficiencies and correct them regardless of the phase

of training.

; DIN

1. All phases of required training had been ad-

ministered. Mr. Robinson received more than the allow-

an

able training time - 72 hours of initial radar training and

40 hours of remedial radar training for a total of 112 hours.

(100 hours is allowed).

2. Counseling sessions were conducted advising Mr.

Robinson of his training status.

3. Repetitive errors were committed and documented

on a daily basis.

4. Personality conflict may have existed between Mr.

Robinsonand Instructor George Shrader sometime during

the first 72 hours of training; however, a change of instruc-

tor was never requested. When Mr. Robinson was ques-

tioned why he did not ask for another instructor he stated,

"I don’t want to make waves."

5. A break in training did occur between the end of

Phase XI and beginning OJT radar training on Sector 34.

North Are a staffing was the prime reason; however, any

training time lost during this period was adequately made

up during remedial training.

6. Acertification was attempted on March 19, 1979.

Separation was not insured on two occasions and Mr. Her-

ron had to intervene. An interview with Mr. Adair con-

firmed the intervention was necessary to insure safety.

BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION

The board (excluding Mr. Torres) recommends

Mr. Robinson’straining be terminated and he be recom-

mended for reassignment tothe flight service option. Mr.

Robinson is a dependable employeeand is a hard worker.

Mr. Robinson be reinstated in the OJT radar training

program. The reasons are listed below:

1. Mr. Robinson only had one instructor (Mr. Shrader)

for the first 72 hours of training; instructors should be

rotated.

2. A major personality conflict existed between Mr.

Robinsonand Mr. Shrader. Mr Adair was aware of the

problem and should have taken corrective action. Also,

ew eee —

when Mr. Carr (Mr.Robinson’s instructor at that time)

recommended an instructor change, Mr. Adair ignored the

request.

3. ATCS Herron should not have been plugged into the

radarposition with Mr. Robinson during the certification

while Mr.Adair monitored from the overhead. This made

Mr. Robinson nervous. Mr. Adair should have been

plugged into the sector with Mr. Robinson.

4. Mr. Robinson shouid never have been reassigned to

the North Area after reinstatement.

5. Mr. Shrader’s comment to Mr. Robinson during a

training session: "you should have known that you’ve

been in training seven years."

MICHAEL P. HIPSHER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 81-M-704

ARTHUR B. ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

VS.

DREW LEWIS, Secretary of the Department

of Transportation, and J. LYNN HELMS,

National Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Administration,

Defendants.

REPORTER’ S TRANSCRIPT

Trial to the Court

Day One, Morning Session

Volume I

Proceedings before the HONORABLE RICHARD P.

MATSCH, J udge, United States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Colorado,commencing at 8:35 a.m. on the 15th day

of December, 1982, in Courtroom C-202, United States

Courthouse, Denver, Colorado.

APPEARANCES

RICHARD S. SHAFFER, Attorney at Law, Denver,

Colorado, appearing for the plaintiff.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE by

STEPHEN KLEIN, Attorneyat Law, Denver, Colorado

and OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL OF THEFEDERAL

AVIATION ADMINISTRATION by JAMES W. WHIT-

LOW, Attorney atLaw, Washington, D.C., appearing for

the plaintiffs.

Q. (By Mr. Shaffer) Mr. Robinson, were you -- THE

COURT: Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 is received, if you’re in

doubt about it. Go ahead.

Q. (By Mr. Shaffer) Were you discharged by the

Federal Aviation Administration in 1979?

A. I was.

Q. When?

A. December the 14th, 1979.

Q. What occurred between July 17th, 1979 and Decem-

ber the14th, 1979?

A. Mr. Kiss gave me a letter proposing to remove me.

I wrote letters to the regional office and to him. I stated

why I felt that I hadn’t received proper training: the delay

in training whereas opposed to the other trainees proceed-

ing with their training after coming out of classroom and

lab, the working of the printer, why I had to wait why I

could not have gone into an earlier class, and this nature

of things.

Q. And when did you say you were finally terminated?

A. December the 14th, 1979.

Q. Mr. Robinson, do you have any of those tapes that

were made of your work as a trainee, when you were work-

ing on sector 34 for example?

A. Yes, sir. I think there are two tapes -- I mean two

Sessions on each side. Both sessions -- I mean two ses-

sions on each side.

Q. And do those reflect your work at that period of

time?

A. Yes, sir, including the certification.

MR. SHAFFER: I move at this time for the admission

of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18. There is only one copy one ver-

sion of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18. They are these two casset-

tes.

THE COURT: What’s the purpose of offering them?

They’re not going to mean very much to me.

woe a

/

MR. SHAFFER: I understand that. We wil! sub-

sequentlycall Mr. Robert Smith as a witness for the piain-

tiff. He is or at least was until the time of the strike, a

traffic controller - journeyman controller. And we would

be prepared to ask Mr. Smith, who has never heard these

tapes, to listen to them and comment upon them, if the

Court desires to so proceed.

THE COURT: I don’t know. Mr. Klein, what’s your-

position on this? This is a bit different.

MR. KLEIN: Well, Your Honor, I have the same objec-

tion I’ve been making. I have not heard them myself. I

don’t know what the relevance of itis. In addition to that,

as I understand it they are tapes of a particular training

session on the radar scope.

THE COURT: Is that right? Are they tapes of sessions

other than the certification?

MR. SHAFFER: I would advise the Court that some

weeksago and I’m sorry that I don’t have the specific date,

perhapsMr. Klein can inform the Court -- I called Mr.

Klein, aware of my problem with getting these materials

to him. And I specifically advised him that I had these

tapes and the dates of these tapes. This is several weeks

ago.

MR. KLEIN: It was on -- as it savs in mv motion to ex-

clude evidence, it was on December the 3rd, after I

received a phone call from your office. Your Honor, later

that afternoon I received a call from Mr. Shaffer. And he

told me that he had tapes and other documents that he was

-- what he was intending tointroduce. By the way, the

tapes are the only ones that he’s now trying to introduce.

The documents that have already come in are even dif-

ferent from that conversation, but he told me --

THE COURT: Let’s just stay with the tapes.

MR. KLEIN: The tapes, he mentioned those to me. And

I said to Mr. Shaffer that I assumed that early next

week, this was December 3rd, Friday, that he would

deliver his documents to me, his exhibits to me. And he

said he would get back to me the first of next week, which

was December 6. And it was on December 9th, when I had

not heard from Mr. Shaffer at all, that I filed my motion.

MR. SHAFFER: I did state to him the specific dates

ofthe tape.

THE COURT: Well, but if we were to receive them it

would be necessary that Mr. Smith listen to them, and then

it would be necessary for somebody from the defendant’s

side to listen to them so that they could be prepared to tes-

tify to their perceptions, right?

MR. SHAFFER: I agree. It’s a tedious process, Your-

Honor.

THE COURT: And that’s why it’s not going to come in.

We’ re not going to interrupt the trial now to perform that

kind of an evaluation as preparation for testimony. I

mean, that should certainly have been done before trial,

and I’m not going to delay this trial to do it now. So, !'m

ex cluding them on the basis of counsel’s objection that he

didn’t know he was going to meet that kind of evidence.

That is your objection?

MR. KLEIN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You win one. How is that marked? Are

those 18”

MR. SHAFFER: Exhibit 18, I think.

THE COURT: I don’t know. You don’t have to leave

them here. It’s on the record that 18 constitutes the ac-

tual, guess, copy of a tape recording as you ’ve identified

it.

Q. (By Mr. Shaffer) Mr. Robinson, are you presently

employed?

A Yes, I am.

Q. In what capacity?

A. With the Worldwide Service as a storeroom man at

LowryAir Force Base.

Q. As a what?

A. Storeroom man.

; Q. And what --

A. In other words, I keep records of all purchases com-

ing in and distribution of goods going out.

How long have you been so employed?

Approximately 16 months, but only four months as a

storeroom man.

What did you do before that?

Washed pots and pans.

At Lowry?

At Lowry.

POPO

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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