Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Loesch v. Heck

—

7 % Supreme Court, U S,

FILED

SEP 31 987

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No.

JOSEPH LOESCH,

Petitioner,

KATHRYN HECK,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

COURT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH C. LOESCH

18363 Germain Street

Northridge, California 92134

(818) 363-7792

In Propria Persona

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does the California Supreme Court allow a

freedom of judicial discretion in family law

matters that violates the standards of evidence

and compelling cause required by this Court in

regard to the due process and equal protection

rights reserved for the parent/child relationship?

Whether the Due Process and Equal Protection

rulings of this Court in cases such as Stanley v.

Illinois require that the relationship of a child

with her unwed parents, established by the

parents' sharing of custody, be protected from

unwarranted interference; or whether state

courts can proceed as at a "first determination"

of custody because the existing relationships

were not established by judicial decree?

Are children of unwed parents. classified

differently from children of nuclear households,

regarding their right to be brought up by both

father and mother, with the fullest possible

benefit of the contact, care, talents and

decisionmaking abilities of both parents?

Under Stanley v. _ MIllinois and aban _v.

Mohammed, does an unwed father have the same

parental rights as an unwed mother to continue

sharing equal custody of their child? If the

mother's agreement to continue shared parenting

i

is removed, is the father/child relationship

protected under the due process and equal

protection causes from unwarranted interference,

or set at issue by the mother's change of heart

and subject to redetermination by the state?

Do the due process and equal protection clauses

allow state courts to construe an unwed father's

requests to resume equal custody as a "campaign

to limit the mother", while the mother has seized

full custody of the child and asked the court to

terminate the father's custody rights?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CmeetRs PRORGGGE co cccccccscenndéctenssesecaces i

TOBIS OF AUtHOPIISS 2c cccccccscccsccssesscesssece Vv

ODEO BEIOW 2c cccccsecsccccessessscscesosesesacs 1

SUPIBGICLION cc cccccccccncesensebsasccsecsesiesenses 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions ........... 3

Statement GF CNS CASS os ccvccccccccsccssscccescces 5

PEGGOGETGL TEMSCOEY sc icccccscdesndtsscscccesoutses 6

Where Constitutional Issues Were Raised ....... 8

SUNG 1DGS TORTIE sc ccccccssccccccssccccscseces 10

Reasons For Granting the Writ ...........cceccees 15

A. Importance of the Questions ...............6. 15

B. Conflict Between State and Federal Standard 18

C. Procedural Due Process Rights Violated ..... 27

D. The State Courts Make A Suspect

Classification of Unwed Fathers and

BGP CHEMO scccsccecaccscsercceseocccases 31

B. Ummed FREMSTS scccccccccccscceccceessees 31

Pa |. MPPPTETTTTTTTTITITIT TTT ee 34

| MVP TTTITITITITILITTTTTTT TTT TT 37

iii

10.

ll.

APPENDIX

Page

. Denial of Petition For Hearing

of the California Supreme Court,

PEOG CUMO By BOSE cocccccvcccccccscccccccces A-1l

. Opinion of the Court of Appeals,

Dee MOTGN Bh, TOSe coccscssccccccaccccosces A-2

. Denial of Petition for Rehearing,

Court of Appeals, April 3, 1987 ............. A-23

. Order on Order To Show Cause

Of the Los Angeles Superior Court,

PHIOG SUMO BE, IGGE wcccccccccccscccccesccecs A-24

. Stipulation and Order on Order To Show Cause

SUEY Bp BOOS Cob cbc cevesecenececésecaceswace A-44

. Birth Certificate Ingrid Kathryn Loesch,

October 27, 1982 .....cccceeee peccccccccccces A-48

. Custody Agreement,

POMCUGRY Gy BOE chbdcecccncecescccecncessacs A-49

. Petitioner's Complaint To Establish

Paternity and Visitation Rights,

POUPUEET BE, BOGE ccccccccccecccecsaccecccess A-50

. Petitioner's Order To Show Cause

RR ME sot ida sinwcsdkedaedesdhses ews A-53

Respondent's Responsive Declaration

to Order To Show Cause, May 22, 1984 ...... Az-57

Respondent's Answer To Complaint,

BOMCSMUSH BS, TGSS cccccccccceccccscececceees A-61

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Application of Gault

BT B.Cl. 1428, 19S cccccccccccccccccccsccccees 29

Armstrong v. Manzo

380 U.S. 545, 552; 85 S.Ct.1187 (1965) ....... 29

Bell v. City of Milwaukee

746 F420 1205 (1954) wccccccccccccccscccccccecs 19

Burchard v. Garay :

(1986) 42 Cal.3d 531 .......... 18, 24-26, 34, 35

Caban v. Mohammed

441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760

60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ..ccccccccccccccccccccces 32

Craig v. Boren

(1976) 429 U.S.190, 197

97 S.Ct 45, 50 L.Ed. 20 397 ...ccccccccccccee 34

Dunn v. Blumstein

405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) ...cccccccccccccccces 20

Graham v. Richardson

(1971) 403 U.S. 365, 371-372, 375-376

91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed 2d 534 ....cccccccceeee 37

Griswold v. Connecticut

381 U.S. 479, 300 (1965) occ cece cccccccccvee 20

In Re Marriage of Carney

24 Cal.3d 725, 157 Cal.Rptr. 383 ....... 10, 24-26

Jimenez v. Weinberger

417 U.S. 628, 634-638, 41 L.Ed.2d 363

94 S.Ct. 1204 (1974) ccccccccccccccccccccccces 37

Kramer v. Union Free School

399 U.S. G21, G27 (19GD) —«-_—-waccccccccccccccess 20

Vv

Lehr v. Robertson

WS Bebe Beee CEOS) cccsesvccccseccccscccseces 32

May v. Anderson

345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, 843

i ee) i PPrrrr Tee TTEEE CELE PEELE Ere ere 19

Meyer v. Nebraska

C1925) 20S Uslbe SOO, GOD .niccancsccccces 19, 20, 21

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland

TOk Wee GE, SORT BOOTED cise cccncccesccns 22

People v. Johnson

(1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1021, 1025 ............ 8

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

ook Se Bs | errr rrerrrerrrrer Terres 20

Quilloin v. Walcott

Se Sictla Bs BEM MEPTOD socccsnsicecve 19, 20, Ze

Roberts v. United States Jaycees

DS WiGs SENT REMMED see ccceerccrecceeeesesce 20

Roe v. Wade

ee Sects Bawa Bee weee CIGES) § kcctesuccecccese 20

Santosky v. Kramer

PE AEG. OE. Seer e hese nsdescseesesncssineen 19

Shelton v. Tucker

ee aes ee Se CREE fa ceweecesevecenacaes 20

Skinner v. Oklahoma

See ecient TE ORD) |p wecenccevecenséscas 21

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality

COL. cy Way COE OSS TEPCED cocavscncvescevens 23

Stanley v. Illinois

(1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L.Ed.2d 551,

J A ae: ere rrerre rr errr Tere 8-10, 18-24, 31

Trimble v. Gordon

(1977) 430 U.S. 762, 766-767,

97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed 2d 31

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1866)

118 U.S. 356, 373-374,

6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220

STATUTES

United States Constitution

Amendment XIV

California Civil Code

Section 197

California Civil Code,

Section 4600(a)

California Civil Code,

Section 4600(b)

California Civil Code

Section 4600.5(a)

California Civil Code

Section 4600.5(b)

California Civil Code

Section 7002

California Civil Code

Sections 7000-7018

eoseeeveeeeeeeweeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

eoeeeewtoeveeeweeeeeeeeee@

vii

eheeevsesaees 29, 37

TEeTeTITe TCL TT TET 34

2, 34

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No.

—_——__

JOSEPH LOESCH,

Petitioner,

KATHRYN HECK,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

COURT OF CALIFORNIA

Joseph Loesch respectfully prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court

of Appeals for the Second Appellate District of

California, entered in this cause on March 11, 1987.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Appellate Court for the

Second District of California is unpublished and

appears in the Appendix, page A-2. That Opinion

was entered on March 11, 1987. The California

Supreme Court denied a timely Petition for Hearing on

June 2, 1987 [Appendix-1].

JURISDICTION

The Order on Order to Show Cause requesting

restoral of the equal parental custody and control of

Ingrid Kathryn Loesch by both of her parents, filed

by Petitioner was entered by the California Superior

Court on June 28, 1985 [Appendix-24]. The order

terminated Petitioner's legal joint custody and limited

his contact with the child to a physical custody of

approximately one-fourth of the month.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Judicial

District of California entered its Opinion on March 11,

1987, affirming the trial court's Order [Appendix-2].

The Supreme Court of California denied a timely

Petition for Hearing, making final the decision of the

Court of Appeals, on June 2, 1987 [Appendix-1].

Jurisdiction to review the judgment of the

California Courts is conferred on this Court by

Article XIV of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

Constitution of the United States, and by Title 28,

United States Code, Sec. 1257(3). As set forth

below, the Opinion and Judgment of the California

Appellate and Supreme Courts’ raise important

questions under the Equal Protection and Due Process

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

nlon

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws."

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV

"The parent and child relationship extends equally to

every child and to every parent, regardless of the

marital status of the parents."

California Civil Code, Section 7002

"The mother of an unmarried minor child is entitled to

its custody, services and earnings. The father of

the child, if presumed to be the father under

subdivision (a) of Section 7004, is equally entitled to

the custody, services and earnings of the unmarried

minor. If either the father or mother be dead or

unable or refuse to take the custody or has

abandoned his or her family, the other is entitled to

its custody, services and earnings.

California Civil Code, Section 197

"The Legisiature finds and declares that it is the

public policy of this state to assure minor children of

frequent and continuing contact with both parents

after the parents have separated or dissolved their

marriage, and to encourage parents to share the

rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to

effect this policy."

California Civil Code, Section 4600(a)

-3-

"Custody should be awarded in the following order of

preference according to the best interests of the

child, pursuant to Section 4608: To both parents

jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 or to either parent.

In making an order for custody to either parent, the

court shall consider, among other factors, which

parent is more likely to allow the child or children

frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial

parent, and shall not prefer a parent as custodian

because of that parent's sex."

California Civil Code, Section 4600(b)

"There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden

of proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of

a minor child subject to Section 4608, where the

parents have agreed to an award of joint custody or

so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose

of determining the custody of a minor child of the

marriage."

California Civil Code Sections 4600.5(a)

"Upon the application of either parent, joint custody

may be awarded in the discretion of the court in

other cases, subject to the provisions of Section 4608.

For the purpose of assisting the court in making a

determination whether an award of joint custody is

appropriate under this subdivision, the court may

direct that an investigation be conducted pursuant to

Section 4602."

California Civil Code Sections 4600.5(b)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner JOSEPH LOESCH and_= Respondent

KATHRYN HECK are the unmarried parents of INGRID

LOESCH, born October 27, 1982 [Appendix-48].

From birth, the parents shared in Ingrid's care and

custody. The father provided the mother’ with

financial support, and provided Ingrid with her own

bedroom in his home as well as visiting her in the

mother's home. Ingrid was eventually sleeping in her

own bedroom in both parents' homes, an equal number

of nights [RT 110:7-15; 130:14- 131:2].

The parties' disagreed over taking Ingrid to the

doctor when ill, with the mother threatening to

withhold contact with the child if the father took her

to the doctor without permission [RT 52-53]. In

February 1984, the parents agreed to continue the

equal custody and sleeping arrangement per a new

schedule suggested by the mother [Appendix-49].

An argument about doctors' advice regarding the

mother's alcohol consumption while breastfeeding

Ingrid resulted in the mother taking Ingrid from the

father's home. The father requested they restore

their parenting schedule, in letters and phone calls;

the mother proposed he have less contact with the

child, and then refused any contact except in her

own home under’ supervision of her friends

(RT 127:21-25].

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history of the case reflects the

father's attempts to reestablish his previous joint

legal and physical custody of the child.

The father filed a Complaint and Order to Show

Cause on February 24 and April 4, 1984, asking that

legal and physical custody be restored per the

mother's schedules of 2/5/84 [Appendix-50, 53]. In

May of 1984 the mother replied to the Order to Show

Cause with a Responsive Declaration asking for sole

legal and physical custody of Ingrid, on grounds that

the child experienced difficulty with the sleeping

arrangement; her Answer to Complaint claimed a lack

of knowledge of Joseph Loesch being Ingrid Loesch's

father, and asked that if he were found to be the

father, that the court not restore his joint custody

[Appendix-57, 61].

Petitioner substituted new counsel in June, 1984

who attempted to negotiate a temporary stipulation of

father-daughter contact. The mother refused any

temporary schedule except to a decreased paternal

custody arrangement, with the provision that it be in

effect six months or more. As Ingrid was then being

allowed some contact with the father, and relying on

his attorney's warning that a six-month agreement of

decreased custody might divert the court from the

original equal custody, Petitioner chose to wait for

the OSC hearing in August. Thereupon the mother

completely withheld the child again.

The father made an Ex Parte request of the

court to immediately restore Ingrid's contact with him,

-6§-

and Temporary Restraining Orders, which the mother

declared "moot," as she now had the child in her

custody. The father's Ex Parte Request was denied,

but an early hearing date was set. On the hearing

date, the mother signed a temporary stipulation

[Appendix-44] allowing the father the decreased

schedule she had lately offered and withdrawn; she

then objected to it being ordered by the court, and

obtained a further continuance of three weeks from

the court, with no provision for the child to see her

father. On advice of counsel pursuant to California

Civil Code Section 197, the father insisted on his

right to see his daughter and picked her up from a

babysitter. The mother claimed this was an

"abduction," and sought an Ex Parte order termin-

ating all of the father's custody rights, subjecting

him to visitations monitored by her friends.

The Ex Parte judge who had followed the case

denied the mother's request and ordered a week of

shared custody and a hearing on July 3, 1984. On

that date, the mother allowed the signed stipulation to

be made an order of the court [Appendix-44]. The

stipulation provided a temporary order for joint legal

and physical custody, and psychiatric evaluation by a

court-appointed psychiatrist, pending the hearing on

Appellant's February, 1984 Order to Show Cause.

There followed a year of delays, necessitated by

the psychiatrist's schedule, the court, and _ the

attorneys; for that year the temporary stipulation

remained in effect. The parties completed psychiatric

-7-

evaluation by Gary Chase, M.D., Senior Psychiatric

Consultant to the Los Angeles County Superior Court

Family Law Departments; his recommendations to the

Court were filed December 3, 1984. A second

recommendation was filed February 17, 1985.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED

Petitioner first raised the issue of constitutional

rights in June 1984, in the Memorandum of Points and

Authorities to his Ex Parte request, by citing under

relevant California Civil Codes and Stanley v. Illinois,

his essential constitutional right to raise his children,

equal to the mother, regardless of marital status and

without need of specific judicial permission. Pertinent

quotations were from California Civil Code §§7002 and

197, set forth on pages 2 and 3 above, "Statutory

Provisions", as well as the following:

"With respect to the rights of a presumed

father who has not obtained a judgment

declaring him to be the father of a minor,

the Court in People v. Johnson (1984)

151 Cal.App.3d 1021, 1025...stated:

"Thus, the Act--including section

7004--was plainly intended to establish

and promote the rights of putative

fathers, and to remove obstacles to the

maintenance of parental relations for the

benefit of '‘illegitimate' children. And

section 197 does not specify that only

those parties who have by judicial

decree achieved formal status as a

parent (cf. $7006) are entitic. to

custody. Rather, it grants equal

custodial rights to anyone ‘presumed to

be a father under section 7004,'

thereby indicating that the substance of

-8-

OSTEO RT TT OER TOTP OGA A AERA R NT PT LOT POET

the relationship--spousal and _ ffilial,

rather than prior judicial adjudication

shall have precedence..." (emphasis

original).

...The Court in In Re Tricia M.

discussed the constitutional rights of fathers

as decided in Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405

U.S. 645 [31 L.Ed.2d 551, 92 S.Ct. 1208]:

"Mr. Justice White, writing for the

Court in Stanley set out some basic

concepts in this area:

'The rights to conceive and to

raise one's children have been deemed

"essential," [citation], "basic civil

rights of man," [citation], and

"[rJights far more precious ... than

property rights," [citation].

"Nor has the law refused _ to

recognize those family relationships

unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony

...-"To say that the test of equal pro-

tection should be the ‘legal’ rather than

the biological relationship is to avoid

the issue. For the Equal Protection

Clause necessarily limits the authority

of a State to draw such ‘legal' lines as

it chooses." [Citations.]' (Stanley v.

Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-652 [31

L.Ed.2d 551, 558-559, 92 S.Ct. 1208,

1212-1213.].)" (emphasis added)

Petitioner next raised these rights in a Memo of

Points and Authorities submitted to the trial court at

the beginning of the hearing on June 4, 1984. Equal

parental rights were again raised in Petitioner's

Request for a Statement of Decision, filed with the

court on June 17, 1987. These issues were thereafter

raised in Appellant's Opening’ Brief and _6 all

subsequent briefs to the California Courts.

JUNE 1985 HEARING

After delays of 13 years, there was a full

hearing in June 1985 in Los Angeles Superior Court

by Judge Robert Fainer.

The Judge did not address protecting the

original, de jure custody arrangement that was the

cause of action in the Order to Show Cause. He did

not require a _ substantial showing of cause for

changing the child's established custody as required

by California and U.S. case law (In Re Marriage of

Carney, 24 Cal.3d 725, 157 Cal.Rptr. 383; Stanley v.

Illinois). The mother made an unsubstantiated claim

that the child had more illness, anger, and problems

sleeping in the mother's home when she was also

sleeping in the father's home, which was at odds with

her statements that the father was "overly concerned"

about the child's health matters, and the court

psychiatrist's encouragement to gradually resume an

equal sleepover schedule. Aside from the "sleeping

problems" there was no good cause suggested or

required by the court for the mother wanting to fully

terminate the father's legal and physical custody.

Both the father and the mother alleged physical

violence at the February 1984 argument and other

occasions; the mother presented no claim of injury,

while the father presented evidence of injury to his

hand, and the judge found the mother in contempt of

a court restraining order for physical behavior. The

mother stated that she felt a family consisted of two

persons, "mother and daughter." She denied that

-10-

the cause of action arose from the father objecting to

her alcohol consumption while breastfeeding, and her

objections to him seeking medical care for the child.

The father testified that the mother ignored the

child's medical needs and the pediatricians’ advice,

and a MediCal worker testified that the mother had

allowed the child's medical coverage to lapse. The

judge stated that mother was "irresponsible"; in

response, the mother later testified that the father

was “overly concerned" about medical care.

The mother also denied hitting the child on the

forehead in an incident the father had caused to be

investigated by a child abuse worker, a doctor and

the court psychiatrist.

There were no allegations of neglectful care by

the father. The father asked that he assume full

medical responsibility and insurance costs for the

child, and that the court restore equal custody as

per a schedule recommended by the court psych-

iatrist, and that the court order counseling for the

mother regarding possible problems with alcohol abuse

and self-control.

The recommendations of the court psychiatrist

were received by the court; Petitioner attempted to

present evidence regarding the events of the original

cause of action, including an injury; the judge stated

that he was "not interested" in events that were two

years old", but allowed Petitioner's attorney to "make

a record."

-ll-

Ignoring the original custody at issue, the judge

proceeded as if custody were being determined for

the first time. He showed himself ready to make a

decision before hearing the evidence in the case

[RT 28:10; 32:17-19; 34:12-21; 40:18-22]; during the

hearing he stated he was not interested in the

circumstances of preceding the temporary stipulation,

as it was "two years ago" [RT 110-112], and stated

he was going to make an order other than Judge

Sandoz' order (on the stipulation) [RT 124:10-15].

The judge expressed interest in making an order

of counseling for the parties; Petitioner's attorney

emphasized that Petitioner was in court to seek

restoral of his equal custody, and would go to

counseling as well. Petitioner's attorney asked the

other attorney about getting the mother to agree to

restored custody and counseling; the judge stated

that he did not want the attorneys to "make a deal",

but that it was "better that he make an order" and

that he “would not be blocked by [the father]", that

he didn't think "50-50" custody was the answer, that

he preferred the parties stipulate to an order of

counseling [RT 28:10-19; 34:11-26; 28:16-21]. The

judge suggested that with equal custody, Petitioner's

parents would in fact raise the child;" counsel

informed the judge that the father worked four

ten-hour days, and could personally care for the

child. [RT 34:18-26; 37:27-38:14; 35:5-10].

In addition to the facts above, the Judge was

given the following evidence with regard to the father

-12-

resuming joint and equal custody:

That the father is a loving and _ responsible

parent, capable of providing a good, stable home for

the child [RT:18-19; 50:14-51:9]; that Ingrid had her

own bedroom in his home (and the home of his

parents, where he resided at time of the hearing as a

result of attorney costs [RT 128:21-130:2; 226:1-3];

that the father spends his time with Ingrid in

activities geared toward a child [RT 50:14 - 51:9]; he

is concerned for her physical well being and willing

to assume medical costs and__ responsibilities

[RT 51:24-52:8; 71:28-72:7]; and Ingrid has benefited

from her relationship with her father [RT 50:14-51:9].

The judge found the father to have made an

unreasonable "campaign in court to limit the access of

the mother," and to have caused the communication

problems by that campaign in court and by the

father's allegation of child abuse and alcohol abuse,

and his "refusal" of the judge's urgings to go to

counseling. The judge found the mother in in

contempt of court for one incident of violence, and

ordered her to resume medical coverage, and urged

her to include a substance-abuse program in her

counseling. (Appendix B). The judge terminated the

father's legal custody, specifically restricted him from

caring for the child's medical needs except in an

emergency, and reduced his original physical custody

to one-fourth of the month. The Court of Appeal

affirmed.

-13-

The Appellate Court also did not recognize the

original custody that was at issue, and referred only

to the temporary stipulation as having insufficient

legal status to require a showing of changed

circumstances before the child's custody could be

changed.

-14-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. Importance of the Questions

Aside from the importance of these questions to

Petitioner and his child, the question of essential and

fundamental rights in the parent/child relationship

has not been addressed by this Court in the area of

where those rights are most commonly threatened and

lost: not where there is death of a parent, improper

interference by state adoption agencies, or clearly

proven failures on the part of either parent to care

for the child. The parent/child relationship is most

at risk where one parent simply asserts that they

have a parental relationship that is superior and more

essential to the child than that of the other parent.

And by virtue of state courts favoring court decrees

rather than familial bonds, one parent can force the

other into a complete redetermination of the

established parent/child relationships by forcing a

hearing in state courts.

The child's need and right to ongoing love and

care from her father and mother, and the essential,

fundamental right of a parent to care for and raise

his own child, is redetermined by state officials in

cases where there is no fault or failure to justify

decreasing the parent/child bond. Yet in state

courts, the regard for family custody relationships

established by court decrees is consistently higher

than the regard for relationships established by the

-15-

Bak cin,

natural relationship of a parent and child, and their

personal history of being with each other.

The increasingly lucrative divorce-law business,

and the increasing numbers of children and parents

deprived of their most precious possession--each

other--makes the "ordinary custody decision" a

crucial concern of the state. The divorce rate and

the numbers of legally separated children and parents

in the United States makes equal protection and due

process for the parent/child relationship an issue

urgently needing assistance from this court.

There is also need to encourage unwed, or

divorced, fathers who wish to maintain their paternal

relationship with their children. In cases such as the

one at bar, there is strong evidence that a father

wishing to help raise his children--a_ generally

accepted "good" that cannot happen often enough--he

runs a high risk of emotional and economic devasta-

tion, as well as punitive labels and court orders by

judges who do not recognize paternity as half of a

child's world. As much as women have called for

recognition in the marketplace and political system,

men need to be given an equal place in the family and

in their children's eyes.

From an economic standpoint, this court needs to

promote relationships established by parental

cooperation and responsible thinking; the incredible

state cost and backlog of the divorce courts, and the

high state cost of maintaining the members of broken

families, urges that court decrees not be required

-16-

before common sense can rule. basic _ family

relationships.

But most importantly, there is a terrible need

for the children of divorce -- an increasing popula-

tion -- to be released from the suspect classification

under which they currently lose their relationship

with one of their parents. The right to ongoing care

and upbringing by Dad and by Mom is accorded to

children of intact nuclear families. Somehow, state

officials decide that the same child who loved and

depended on the protection and love of her father

and mother, can do well without one of them when the

parents break up. The child has no voice, except in

the questions the "disposable" parent cannot answer.

--"Why can't I see you?"

-17-

B. Conflict Between State and U.S. Standards

The decision below conflicts with rulings of this

court in Stanley v. Illinois and other cases regarding

the Equal Protection and Due Process rights of the

Parent/Child relationship. By asserting state court

determinations as the legally recognized beginning of

the Parent-Child relationship, the California courts

make a suspect classifications of unwed parents and

their children.

As stated above, the cause of action in this case

was arbitrury interference with equal parental custody

shared by the father and mother. Petitioner's case

concerns the difference between the standards of this

Court and the California state courts in recognizing

established parent/child relationships, as exemplified

by Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, and

Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).

This Court has granted and affirmed a high legal

status for parent/child custody relationships

established by biological relation and the practice of

parental care, whereas the California state courts

reserve such legal status for child custody arranged

by court decree. The state courts emphasize judicial

determinations as the recognized legal point of origin

of parent/child relationships outside the nuclear

family setting, and feel free to redetermine custody

relationships formed by parental practice as if the

custody relationship were being determined for the

first time. This conflicts with the standards set

forth by this court. While this Court has more often

-18-

ruled on parent/child rights in regard to adoption

eases rather than “best interests" custody cases, the

Court has established clear principles regarding

family rights standards of evidence required for the

state to find parent/child relationships not in the best

interests of all concerned.

This Court has recognized the rights of parents

and children to have their relationship with each

other as being basic, fundamental rights protected by

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-

tution. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972);

also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978);

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965).

The Court has frequently emphasized primacy of

the parent-child relationship. The rights to conceive

and to raise one's children have been. called

"essential" and "[rjights far more precious. than

property rights". Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746

F.2d 1205 (1984); Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923) 262 U.S.

390, 399; May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73

S.Ct. 840, 843 97 L.Ed. 1221. The liberty guaranteed

by the Fourteenth Amendment is found to protect the

right of the individual "to marry, establish a home

and bring up children". Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.

A "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in

the care and management of their child" was cited in

Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. 1388.

In constitutional law a fundamental right is

defined as a right so basic or essential that the state

must have a compelling interest to override it and

-19-

must, even in those cases, use the least restrictive

means possible to secure the compelling interest.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-163 (1973); Dunn v.

Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Kramer v.

Union Free School, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).

And this Court has stated that the relationship

between a parent and child is_ constitutionally

protected from state intrusion. Quilloin v. Walcott,

434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405

U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Roberts v. United States

Jaycees 104 S.Ct. 3244 (1984) citing Meyer v.

Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S.

510 (1925).

These cases make it clear that parents have a

fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their

minor children. What remains to be examined

regarding this case is whether these parental rights

exist only within a traditional nuclear family setting

or if they are present independently of such a

structure.

The Supreme Court has addressed that question

in Stanley v. Illinois, supra. In Stanley, the Court

1 The least restrictive alternative doctrine was

defined in Shelton v. Tucker as follows:

[E]ven though the governmental purpose be

legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot

be pursued by means that. broadly stifle

fundamental personal liberties when the end can

be more narrowly achieve. The breadth of

legislative abridgement must be viewed in light

of the least drastic means for achieving the same

basic purpose. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).

-20-

discussed an unwed father's right to custody of his

children. In addressing the constitutionality of state

adoption statutes which presumed to remove the

children from the father when the recognized parental

status of the mother was lost through her death, the

court pointed out that it repeatedly has placed

emphasis on "the importance of the family," and it

stated that "[t]he rights to conceive and raise one's

children have been deemed 'essential', ‘basic civil

rights of man' and ‘rights far more precious. . . than

property rights.’ (at 651, citing Skinner v.

Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941); Meyers v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1932)). The Court

stated that

The private interest here, that of a man in

the children he has sired and raised,

undeniably warrants deference and, absent

a powerful countervailing interest, pro-

tection. It is plain that the interest of a

parent in the companionship, care, custody,

and management of his or her children

‘comes to this Court with a momentum for

respect lacking when appeal is made to

liberties which derive merely from shifting

economic arrangements. Stanley, at 651.

Thus, the Stanley Court recognized the right of the

biological father, absent a showing of unfitness, to

continue to raise his children even though the

traditional bond of marriage was absent in this family

setting. (Id. at 658-59).

In the case at bar, there was no evidence of

unfitness on the part of the father to prevent him

continuing to raise his daughter in an equal custody

ee

arrangement. As developed above in the Statement of

Case, the mother alleged that the child was more

frequently ill from sleeping in both parents’ homes.

If that allegation were true--and it conflicts with the

mother saying that the father was "overly concerned"

about health matters, and the court. psychiatric

expert encouraging more of the’ shared sleeping

arrangement--the "least restrictive alternative" would

be to alter the sleeping arrangement: not to terminate

the father's custody rights, or attempt to deny that

he was the father. And the reasons given by the

court for interfering with the father's custody--that

he was unreasonable and inflexible and had a court

campaign to limit the mother, thereby making her the

more reasonable parent (more in the best interests of

the child)--is completely at odds with the father

asking that equal custody be restored, and the

mother seizing the child, denying paternity, asking

for full custody and declaring that to her a family

consists of "two people -- mother and daughter."

The Stanley standard of protection for an

established parent/child relationship was unjustifiably

denied this unwed father.

The importance of a biological relationship as a

basis for extending constitutional protection was made

clearer in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.

494, 499-500 (1977), wherein an extended family

relationship was protected from discrimination favoring

nuclear families. Stanley and Moore show that family

relationships linked biologically and _ functionally

-22-

similar to that of the nuclear family occupy a place in

the American tradition similar to that of the nuclear

family, and consequently enjoy the same constitutional

protections from state or other interference.

The Court went further in defining constitutional

protection of family relationships in Smith v.

Organization of Foster Families For Equality ("Smith")

431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977) and Quilloin v. Walcott,

434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). The Smith Court noted

-that the usual understanding of family implies

biological relationships. . . ." and that the

importance of the family stems from the _ emotional

attachments that are developed there (Id. 843, 844)

(emphasis added). The actual importance of the

emotional ties in identifying a _ constitutionally

protected relationship was strongly stated in Quilloin

v. Walcott.

Quilloin, like Stanley, involved an unwed

father's parental rights. The unwed father's rights

were not enforced by this Court, not because he was

outside a nuclear family setting, but because he was

outside the determining standard for those parental

rights: though he had the biological connection, he

had not exercised custody and responsibility, and

there was not a strong emotional bond between the

parent and child.

This contrasts with William Stanley and the

petitioner herein, who both developed significant ties

and involvement as parents before the lower courts

chose to redetermine their parental status. This

-23-

unwed father not only exercised custody and respons-

ibility, with the likelihood of an emotional bond with

his daughter, but was specifically found by the

court's psychiatric expert to be "quite warm, loving

and devoted to Ingrid" and "a _ safe, reassuring

father" who "certainly would provide responsibly and

well for her" [November 5 Report of Dr. Chase,

pages 8-10]. Dr. Chase recommended restoring the

father's custody in increments to three days per

week.

It seems clear from those elements isolated by

the Court as necessary for constitutional protection of

the parent/child relationship that the _ relationship

between unwed parents and their child is entitled to

such protection. The Court recognizes what this

unwed father possessed: the necessary biological

relationship stressed by the Stanley-Moore-Smith line

of cases, the established emotional ties singled out as

controlling by the Court in Smith and Quilloin,

contribution of substantial support and the exercise

of custody and care of the child as stressed by the

Court in Quilloin and Stanley.

The California Supreme Court, which at one time

recognized the Stanley principles in custody disputes

by stressing, in In Re Marriage of Carney, the

importance of ongoing and_ established family

relationships as they developed through custody

agreements of the parents, has lately altered that

standard in Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531.

-24-

Under Burchard v. Garay (which was cited by

the Appellate Court herein in support of the lower

court's freedom to change custody), state courts do

not need to find a substantial change of circumstances

to justify changing a child's established relations with

her parents where custody is by parental agreement.

Rather, courts can proceed as if these relationships

were being formed for the first time (by the court),

since substantial legal status is reserved for custody

determinations by judicial decree. The mere" fact

that the child is strongly bonded to a parent and has

her sense of security in expecting ongoing care and

closeness with her parent does not have the weight of

a judicially determined relationship.

Though the Burchard court recognized Ana

Burchard's de jure custody, it altered the "change of

circumstances rule" established in In Re Marriage of

Carney, supra, stating that the rule actually only

applies "once it has been established that a particular

custody arrangement is in the best interests of the

child...whenever custody has been established by

judicial decree" [Id. at 535].

"The change of circumstances standard is

based on principles of res_ judicata."

[citations] "The Rule established in a

majority of jurisdictions, which we here

endorse, applies that standard whenever

custody has been established by judicial

decree. A minority of states limit the

standard further, applying it only when

custody was’ determined through = an

adversarial hearing. No state, so far as we

have ascertained, applies the changed-

-25-

circumstance standard when there has been

no prior judicial determination of custody."

Burchard, at 535. (emphasis added)

Justice Mosk found that the majority distinction

to overly limit the changed circumstances require-

ment, and felt it constituted "denial of protection to

an entire class of children solely because custody was

not originally established by judicial decree." [Id. at

546, 547) Along with Justice Lucas, he agreed with

tne Burchard majority's decision--based on _ the

Carney rule, with the view that the majority's

interpretation amounted to "a tacit cverruling of

...-Carney." [Id. at 546]

"In Carney we expressly held that the rule

applied regardless of how custody was

originally decided upon... We imposed on

the noncustodial mother the burden of

proving that a _ substantial change in

circumstances had occurred... and we

eoncluded that she had not carried her

burden [Carney at 740]. It is difficult for

me to conceive how we could have

established the point more clearly." [Id. at

547] (emphasis added)

Like Ana Burchard, Ingrid's father had lawfully

acquired (joint) custody by practicing, from Ingrid's

birth, the equal custody rights both parents have

under California Civil Code Sections 197 and 7002.

Unlike the Burchard waiving of the "rule", the lower

courts herein did not recognize the importance of an

established relationship, but emphasize the status of

judicial decrees, denying protection to the parent/

child relationship because Ingrid belongs to the

-26-

classification of children mentioned by Justice Mosk.

And the Appellate Court herein did refer to the

changed circumstances rule; not in regard to Ingrid's

family bonds, but in regard to the temporary custody

stipulation of these proceedings.

C. Due Process Rights That Were Violated

Due Process Rights of Joseph and Ingrid Loesch

were violated by the state courts as follows:

- The lower courts refused to recognize the

estabished parent/child relationship that existed as

the cause of action.

In the case at bar, Petitioner sought state pro-

tection of his established equal custody relationship

with his daughter when the mother arbitrarily seized

full custody of the child. The lower courts never

addressed whether the Petitioner had a defendable

right, in his established parenting of Ingrid, for

which he could seek court protection. They referred

only to the temporary custody stipulation as being

modified.

2. The lower courts failed to address the

evidence presented in the case.

As stated above, the lower courts did not have

evidence of "compelling cause" for terminating or

reducing the father's custody.’ They also ignored the

weight of evidence on a simple evidentiary level.

-27-

Where all court documents showed a campaign by

the mother to limit the access of the father, the court

stated the opposite, completely controverted

conclusion. The judge repeatedly ignored the fact

that the father had a four-day work week and could

personally care for Ingrid three days; he maintained

that the paternal grandparents would raise the child

in an equal custody arrangement. Where a MediCal

worker and the mother and the judge made statements

that showed the mother irresponsible regarding

medical care, and the father expressed willingness to

assume the responsibility, the court found the mother

(in the text of its order) to be the more responsible

parent, and restricted the father from providing

medical attention; the Court of Appeal justified this

on the basis that yearly checkups were sufficient to

compensate for possible neglect of medical care.

--For a two-year-old child. The father was accused

of causing stress by his concerns about child abuse,

despite the fact that a child abuse worker, an

examining doctor, and the court psychiatrist also

found cause for concern. Finally, the recommendation

of the court's top psychiatric panel member that the

father's custody be increased back to nearly equal

custody, was completely ignored by the trial court,

and explained as simply "not binding" by _ the

Appellate Court.

A judges' refusal to consider evidence and

psychologists’ reports denies due process right to

-28-

"meaningful hearing." Armstrong v. Mango, 380 U.S.

545, 552; 85 S.Ct.1187 (1965). One of the essential

elements of due process is the right to submit --and

to have considered--evidence supporting a litigant's

cause, particularly evidence involving a child's well

being and custody. Application of Gault, 87 S.Ct.

1428, 1435. The father had a right to benefit from

evidence submitted on his own behalf: the uncontra-

dicted, unimpeached statements of the Los Angeles

Superior Court's senior psychiatric panel member, as

well as the clarity of the other pleadings and

testimony showing the father's fitness to share

custody and to care for Ingrid.

3. The Court punished the father for seeking

due process, applying heavy handed justice with

facially neutral terminology.

The court's reversal of the "campaign to limit"

the other parent, and the assignment of "unreason-

ableness" and "inflexibility" to the father, as a

reason for terminating/decreasing his custody,

provides facially neutral explanations of the court's

order. The record conflicts too strongly for this to

be appropriate.

Mere recitation of a proper state purpose is not

sufficient to establish a compelling state interest

which can justify such state action Trimble v.

Gordon, supra.

-29-

4. The Judge applied his personal beliefs,

rather than the correct constitutional principles and

standards of evidence, to the cause of action.

As stated above, the judge herein announced

himself opposed to "50-50" custody well in advance of

hearing the case; he ended his hearing with a

statement that "I am one of the old fashioned judges

who has opposed joint custody..."

The record shows the judge would not accept the

fact that the Petitioner would personally raise the

child on his days off work; it also shows that he felt

that a father who would want to become closely

involved in a child's life could not be "normal".

THE COURT: Do you believe you would

have a healthy, normal life if you adjusted

your entire life to -- in such a way to

convince the court that you should have

custody of the minor child, would you have

a normal life if that is all you are going to

do is spend it with your child?

THE WITNESS: I am still going to work a

job. Yes, I will have a normal life.

THE COURT: You mean to suggest to me

you should be given custody of the child

while you are working, do you?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

eostHE COURT: What you are really

telling me is while you are working you

want your parents to start all over again

with a two or three year old child. Is that

what you are telling me?

THE WITNESS: No. Really--

THE COURT: Sounds like it. [RT 73-74]

-30-

—

9. The Judge applied unequal standards to the

custody requests of the mother and the father, as

developed below.

6. The State's termination of this father's legal

custody and reduction of his physical custody violated

the standards of this court, in that it interfered with

a fundamental parent/child relationship with no

substantial evidence of compelling cause to do so. |

D. The State Courts Make A Suspect Classification

Of Unwed Fathers And Their Children

1. Unwed Fathers

In Stanley v. Illinois, the unwed father fully

participated in the upbringing of his children without

interference by the state so long as the mother of the

children was alive and consenting to his paternal

role. Upon her death, the father lost his parental

rights under Illinois law.

This Court found the position that unwed fathers

"can have protected their parental status via marriage

or adoption of the children" so as to _ promote

"legitimacy", to be a state purpose insufficient to

outweigh the father's personal interest in continuing

to raise his own children.

The Court found that conditioning Stanley's

paternal rights on the presence or absence of the

-\

unwed mother's parental status and her "protective"

consent to the father's paternal role, was a denial of

the essential, fundamental nature of the unwed

father's rights. His parental rights could not be

diminished (he became a stranger, under Illinois law,

to his children) by sudden absence of maternal

approval.

In Stanley, the state automatically revoked the

father's parenting upon death of the mother, and

made his children wards of the state.

While this case did not involve death of the

mother, or adoption agencies, the parenting of this

unwed father herein was set at issue and subjected to

a redetermination when the "protection" afforded by

maternal agreement ceased.

As in Stanley, this father's parental role should

have been recognized as substantial and equal to the

maternal role, regardless of the presence or absence

of maternal consent. The parent child relationship

had become established and had all the aspects of a

substantial family bond.

In Stanley, Caban v. Mohammed 441 U.S. 380, 99

S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) and other cases,

this Court has ruled that parental rights exist for

equally for men and women under the Fourteenth

Amendment. In Stanley v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme

Court found that a child has an equal right to be

raised by her father and her mother, and if custody

is awarded to one parent it must be to the better

parent. See aiso Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S.Ct.2985

~32-

(1983), and Caban v. Mohammed, . The California

legislature, if not the California courts, has declared

that the parent-child relationship extends equally to

every child and every parent, and exists regardless

of the marital status of the child's parents (Civil

Code §7002); fathers and mothers are equally entitled

to the custody of their children (Civil Code §197).

California Code of Civil Procedure §4600(b) also

recognizes the inherent equality of parents, by

favoring whichever parent will allow frequent access

to the other parent.

As shown in this case, state courts feel a

discretionary freedom to ignore the legislative

emphasis on the _ sharing parent, and to apply

different standards of evidence to the custody

requests of mothers and fathers. The idea that the

father unreasonably limits the mother by asking for

equal custody while the mother withholds the child

and causes the father to seek court relief; and that

upon finally getting a hearing, the courts "are not

interested in what happened two years ago" and

applies a blind eye to the "campaign" of the mother

asking for full custody, indicates unique thinking

where the rights of mothers and fathers. are

concerned. She is "the more flexible, reasonable"

parent and the court grants her most of the full

custody she requested. --effectively certifying the

mother's rignt to seize custody of the child.

The United States Constitution guarantees not

only the enforcement of fair and reasonable laws, but

-33-

also the fair and reasonable enforcement of laws.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1866) 118 U.S. 356, 373-374,

6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220.

Where a classification involves gender, it will not

withstand a constitutional challenge unless it serves

important governmental objectives. Craig v. Boren

(1976) 429 U.S.190, 197, 97 S.Ct 45, 50 L.Ed. 2d 397.

Judge Fainer's presumption of proper gender roles

and stereotypes was shown throughout the hearing,

especially in his question about a father having a

"healthy, normal life if you adjusted your entire life

to--in such a way to convince the court that you

should have custody of the minor child, would you

have a normal life if that is all you are going to do is

spend it with your child?" [RT 73:18-22].

2. Children

"Nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws." Amendment XIV.

California law extends the parent-child

relationship equally to every child and every parent

regardless of the marital status of the child's parents

(Cal. Civil Code §§ 197, 17002). However, the

California courts enjoy a freedom of discretion in

family law matters that allows them to _ override

statutory law and the result is, as Justice Mosk said

in Burchard v. Garay, supra, "to deny protection to

an entire class of children" because the _ child's

custody was not established by judicial decree, but

by the parents.

-34-

Addressing the majority's distinction of the

"change of circumstances rule", Justice Mosk wrote

that

",..the limited application of the changed

circumstances rule that the majority adopt

is in conflict with the primary purpose of

the rule. The child whose custody was

established by means other than _ judicial

decree has the same need for and right to

stability and continuity --and accordingly

the same entitlement to the protection the

rule is intended to provide--as the child

_whose custody was originally established by

judicial decree." [at 548] (emphasis added)

The federal cases mentioned above that establish

equal protection of parent/child relationships are

incorporated herein by reference.

The state's action of denying Ingrid Loesch the

right. to continue her established relationships with

both of her parents makes her a member of a

"suspect classification". She is a member of that

classification not as a matter of gender, but by her

involuntary status as a child of unwed parents. In

that light this Court should apply strict scrutiny to

the state's action in assessing whether the suspect

class of children of unwed parents are being denied

by state action the equal protection of law, compared

to the class of children of parents who are married.

Ingrid's emotional bond to both parents’ was

subordinated to the _ state redefining the "best

interests" which all of related decisions of this Court

find to be the maintaining of family inter-relationships

-35-

--the emotional bonding, caring and instruction of the

parent/child relationship.

The court's. specific interference with the

father's right to assure his daughter's medical care,

restricting him from taking Ingrid to the doctor

without the permission of the parent who the judge

had found to be "irresponsible" with regard to

medical matters, particularly where it concerned

involvement of the father, was not only unjustified

interference with a parental right to care for

("raise") one's child. The child's right and need to

be respomusibly cared for was ignored. The Appellate

court's comment that yearly checkups would offset

possible harm from lack of attention to illnesses and

doctor care, is at odds with the frequency of illness

and physical vulnerability characteristic of a child of

Ingrid's age.

The child's need to have such care, instruction

and ongoing emotional security in [her] two parents

is not questioned when the child lives in the nuclear

family setting. If those established parent/child

bonds have fundamental status for parents, wed or

unwed, who are adults and presumably have devel-

oped abilities to care for themselves, how much more

essential are those rights for the child, whose need

to rely on the continued care and affection from her

parents is crucial to her development, and which she

is helpless to defend or regain if the relationship with

a parent is crippled by a court order.

-36-

Under the principles of fundamental family

rights, children's rights to have the love and

upbringing of their father and mother cannot be

conditioned on the father and mother favoring each

other. The parents "belong", in their parental role,

not to each other but to the child. Otherwise,

children are subject to suffering undue loss because

when the relationships of other people fail, the state

moves in and acts to deprive the child of her

relationship with one of her parents.

If state action classifies individuals on the basis

of a suspect category or burdens a fundamental

interest, it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.

Graham v. Richardson (1971) 403 U.S. 365, 371-372,

375-376, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed 2d 534; Trimble v.

Gordon (1977) 430 U.S. 762, 766-767, 97 S.Ct. 1459,

52 L.Ed 2d 31. The California Legislature abolished

the concept of "illegitimacy" in 1975 (Stats. 1975,

Ch. 1244) and all other distinctions between children

whose parents are married and those whose parents

are not (Civil Code §§7000-7018). This is consistent

with the United States Supreme Court in Trimble v.

Gordon, supra, and Jimenez v. Weinberger 417 U.S.

628, 634-638, 41 L.Ed.2d 363, 94 S.Ct. 1204 (1974).

CONCLUSION

It is proper under Federal and California law for

an unwed father to seek State protection of his

relationship with his child, if the unwed mother

presumes to seize full custody, when the paternal

~ =

relationship has been established by exercising

custody and care of the child, with an emotional

bonding between the father and the child. This does

not constitute a "campaign" to limit access of the

mother, but a request for equal protection and due

process, and in fact is a request that extends equal

protection to the unwed mother as well. Where, as

here, there is no substantial evidence of a compelling

cause for interference with such a relationship, the

order must be reversed, to maintain the standards for

fundamental rights established by the United States

Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, a Writ of Certiorari

should be issued to review the judgment and opinion

of the California Court.

Respeetfully submitted,

Scene dl Pd

Josep! bs Loesch _“

18363 |Germain Street

Northridge, California 91324

In Propria Persona

-$8-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the 3lst day of

August, 1987, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the United States was served on

the counsel for Respondent, Ronald A Fiore, Esq.,

16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 645, Encino,

California 91436, by depositing copies thereof in the

United States mail, Certified Return Receipt

Requested.

Joseph C. Loesch

-39-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the 6th day of

October, 1987, a true copy of the foregoing Petition

for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the

United States, corrected to include a Table of

Authorities and Appendix, was served on the counsel

for Respondent, Ronaid A Fiore, Esq., 16133 Ventura

Boulevard, Suite 645, Encino, California 91436, by

depositing copies thereof in the United States mail,

Certified Return Receipt Req ested.

-40-