Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Schwartz v. Dean

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, | Supreme Court, U.S.

S?2-3 78 FILED

AUG 6 1987

WEAOT RE RTA R

JOSEPH FO SPaNn'oL. ir.

CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

NO.

IN RE “AGENT ORANGE”

PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION

Sub nom. NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., ET AL

and JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., ET AL,

Petitioners

Vv.

DAVID DEAN,

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C.

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ

BARRY S. BERGER

MARTIN R. NATHAN

723 Main, Suite 325

Houston, Texas 77002

JOHN M. O’QuINN, P.C.

JOHN M. O’QUINN

3200 Texas Commerce Tower

Houston, Texas 77002

— —_ —

‘Alpha Law Brief Co., Inc.— 8748 Westpark — Houston, Texas 77063 — 789-2000

I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. The District Court having found that the consensual

fee sharing Agreement (“Agreement”) entered into

in December of 1983, as amended in December of

1984 among the nine member Plaintiffs’ Manage-

ment Committee (PMC) in the mt lIti-district “Agent

Orange Product Liability Litigation” was valid and

should be enforced, did the Court of Appeals, upon

appeal of the District Court’s Order by one of the

members of the PMC, “Dean”, err in reversing the

holding of the District Court by holding that:

(1) Said fee sharing agreement was invalid and

should not be enforced in view of its potential

for creating conflict between counsel and mem-

bers of the class?

(2) Said “Agreement” violated ‘established prin-

ciples’ governing awards of attorneys fees in

such cases?

II. Did the subject fee sharing agreement violate any

III.

rules of ethics so as to require judicial intervention

rather than abstention?

Did Dean lack standing to challenge the “Agree-

ment” among the nine constituent members of the

PMC which he promoted, solicited and agreed to

on grounds of estoppel, and lack of clean hands in

equity to have standing to challenge his own “Agree-

ment”?

IV. Was the “PMC” a de facto ad hoc law firm as deter-

mined by the District Court for the purpose of allo-

cation of fees among the constituent members of

the PMC?

V. Was Rule 23(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

violated by the District Court’s upholding the valid-

ity of the fee sharing class which did not adversely

affect the distributable awarded class funds?

II

VI. Did the Court of Appeals err in rejecting the “clearly

VIL.

erroneous” standard of review of Lindy II and in

imposing its “de novo” review of the findings of the

District Court in this class “equitable fund doctrine”

case?

Did the Court of Appeals err in its holding that this

class litigation was not of the type that was to be

encouraged policywise when it involved the very

conduct of the Vietnam War and the decision to

defoliate the jungles with Agent Orange dioxin, a

principal issue in the 1964 presidential election and

is still newsworthy 23 years later, because it pre-

sented difficult legal obstacles?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............

COREY TE PRUE obo ec esis cceccccccccess

el ucduiscdecses

Seareeeer OF THE CASE .......................

PEFORMANCE OF THE FEE SHARING AGREEMENT

DOES NOT VIOLATE ETHICAL STANDARDS ....

A. There Has Been No Improper Sharing of Fees ...

B. Establishment Of The Fee Sharing Agreement Did

Not Create Any Improper Conflict Of Interest Be-

tween The Lawyers And The Clients ...........

ee ae a re

APPENDIX:

EXHIBIT A—Opinion of Second Circuit reversing

District Court, 818 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir.

oo) SESS ee ee

EXHIBIT B—Opinion of Second Circuit affirming in

part and reversing in part regarding

award of attorneys fees to the class,

818 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 1987) ......

EXHIBIT C—Affidavit of Newton B. Schwartz ....

EXHIBIT D—Order of Second Circuit Denying Mo-

tions for Rehearing and Rehearing En

ST Wierw hv estes sd keene eed ¥48.5.0% «

la

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Central Railroad & Banking v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885) 15

Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., 457 F.Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D.

ON. FORE s0cbc ne batwd kone thamctsinaasaand 16, 25

City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2nd Cir.

1974), on remand, [1976-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) {] 60,913

at 68,980 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), appeal after remand, 560

ee wt fe ss rere rere eer Orr Te 13, 16

In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 571 FS.

481 (E.D. N.Y. 1983), 611 F.Supp. 1221, 1454, 1460-

1461 (1985), reversed in part 818 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir.

ok eer re rey Frere Perr ee rr ree 5, 8,9

In Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 395, 400

TERRE SO. ai hav ahcdacds pec nuthesasaadan COukes 16, 22, 25

In Re Magic Marker Securities Litigation, [1979-1980]

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) {97,116 at 96,195 (E.D. Pa.

DUFUR cn cs ee eed oaks cn Gaes capendseacdsetnsted ss 15, 16, 25

International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.

pe MR Rn a mn ene marae 29

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Stand-

ard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973) on

remand 382 F.Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974) appeal after

remand 540 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1976) (en banc) ....13,15, 26

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council,

Uo... SOG SB, CE SR, See CE en aeie kc eaes 11

Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 18,

1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library) ...... RS, 21,22, 23

Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) .......... 15,29

Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

§ 96,921 at 95,863 (D. Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 614

ee” Ce ee EE atk kee ed ee oe Ka aaa 16, 25

Vv

Page

STATUTES

2B UBL. SIS) OO. a cccbiewassccasvaiasiseas 3

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Ne BEGG) vb casncddakesennscaentdenssdametakekiakes 2,13, 24

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

I TOD | bc chide) 0p nate eet adn vise es 18, 21

Sk SOE dase vas > nineteen skh deen deeb ienseeeeel 23, 24

re irre ee Penge are rene heen nna ea 23, 24

Se ee a Sicd viendo cdakeandsndendee eked esata 23

ar Oe Ua haca tks 60d sn0kdauariean tceenadee aes 23

AMERICAN BAR ASSICIATION MODEL RULES

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

ee BS on ccvcdSvcaan cee cenbeeesne select ie 18, 19, 20

Ne SAMOS cc ccdcancvencs sch cdeese sibacnetedeuseas 24

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FORMAL OPINIONS

Opinion No. 204 (Nov. 24, 1940), reprinted in ABA,

Opinions On Professional Ethics at pp. 490-93 (1967) .. 21,22

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INFORMAL OPINIONS

Informal Opinion No. 85-1514 (April 27, 1985), reprinted

in ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct

Ot we. GERAIS ov ivcccasasrcccsnwedantansngevers 22

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Mnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

NO.

IN RE “AGENT ORANGE”

PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION

Sub nom. NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., ET AL

and JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., ET AL,

Petitioners

v

DAVID DEAN,

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

To The Honorable Supreme Court of the United States:

Petitioners NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., a Texas

Professional Corporation and its three constituent mem-

bers, Newton B. Schwartz, Barry S. Berger and Martin

M. Nathan and JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., a Texas

Professional Corporation and JOHN M. O’QUINN,

an individual Texas lawyer, pray that a Writ of Certi-

orari issue to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided

on April 21, 1987. It reversed the orders of the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

2

which upheld a fee sharing agreement signed by all

members of the Agent Orange Plaintiffs’ Management

Committee (hereinafter “PMC”). Motions for Rehear-

ing and Rehearing En Banc were denied on July 1, 1987.

This case involves important questions as to attorneys

fees awarded under Rule 23(e) Fep. RULES Civ. Proc.

under This Court’s “equitable fund doctrine” and Agree-

ments promoted by Respondent David J. Dean, a New

York lawyer, (“DEAN”) in which he represented as an

inducement to participate that each participating attorney

would receive a 3-1 return on contributions expended

in the successful prosecution of the lawsuit on behalf of

the class. Dean later reneged after the settlement of the

class action for $180,000,000.00 and the award of $4.7

million dollars to the class attorneys. There was no im-

pact upon the class as to such total for attorneys fees

under the Agreements, but only upon Respondent DEAN*

who induced all other class attorneys to participate based

upon his representations. The difficult class action was

settled on the eve of trial after extensive discovery and

substantial efforts of time, talent and energy and commit-

ment of resources by the “PMC” against formidable

opponents, well financed, and overcoming difficult legal

obstacles.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit reversing that of the District Court is reported

at 818 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir. 1987) (and its related opinion

affirming in part and reversing in part regarding award

* The other two members of the PMC affected, Schlegel and

Musslewhite did not renege on the “Agreement” although substanti-

ally affected. See illustrative chart at page 8, infra.

3

of attorneys fees to the class is reported at 818 F.2d 226

(2nd Cir. 1987). They are attached hereto in the ap-

pendix respectively marked Exhibits “A” and “B”. Mo-

tions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc were denied

on July 1, 1987. Attached hereto as Exhibit “D”.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit entered its judgments on April 21, 1987. It denied

Petitioners’ timely Motions for Rehearing on July 1,

1987. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1) et seq.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., a Texas

Profession Corporation and its constituent members, New-

ton B. Schwartz, Barry S. Berger and Martin Nathan and

JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., a Texas Professional Cor-

poration and JOHN M. O’QUINN, an individual Texas

practitioner with associates, are two constituent members

of the nine-member Plaintiffs Management Committee

(“PMC”) which included Respondent “DEAN” and

seven other members of the “PMC”. David Dean, a

member of the PMC, appealed the holding of the District

Court which found that the fee sharing agreement entered

into by the nine constituent members of the PMC, includ-

ing David Dean, in December of 1983, (as revised and

amended in December of 1984) was valid, and should

be enforced. The Court of Appeals reversed the District

Court holding that the fee sharing agreement under which

six of nine members of the PMC including Petitioner

who agreed to advance funds for litigation and receive

a threefold return on said advancement of funds to be

paid out of the total ‘pot’ of legal fees awarded the nine

4

constituent members of the PMC by the District Court

out of the total class settlement funds, was invalid and

should not be enforced, inter alia, because of its potential

(all emphasis added) for creating a conflict between

counsel for the class and the class itself.’

Petitioners, members of the nine member PMC, are

adversely affected by the holding of the Court of Appeals

since they are denied the benefit of its agreement among

the nine-member PMC which was not only agreed to

by Dean (“Respondent”) but was also promoted and

solicited by him. The agreement among the nine-member

PMC did not affect the class nor the settlement funds

allocated to the class (out of which all attorneys fees

and expenses for all attorneys representing the class and

individual members thereof were awarded by the District

Court).

As pertains to this appeal,” a consortium of New York

lawyers commenced this litigation in 1979 under the helm

of Victor Yannacone, known as Yannacone & Associates

(hereinafter “Y&A”). Respondent (“DEAN”) was a

member of that consortium at all times to September

1983 when “Y&A” withdrew as class attorneys for the

class.°

The class included all Vietnam war veterans and their

families who were exposed to the defoliant Agent Orange

1. Significantly the other three non-contributing inital, in-

cluding ‘““Dean” were to receive a 3-1 investment multiplier on their

usual litigation costs (up to $50,000 base each or K3=—$150,000

each) the six contributing members were not to receive such 3-1.

2. The procedural background and history of this litigation is set

forth at 818 F.2d 145 et seq.

3. Petitioner Schwartz was initially a member but withdrew in

1981 over conflicts and differences with ‘““Y&A” as to overall manage-

ment, direction and other details.

while in the armed forces, and their families, wives and

children, who were injured, harmed and damaged as a

consequence, including children not yet conceived or born.

The withdrawai of “Y&A” was based upon financial

hardships and the consequent management problems en-

suing. It simply was out of funds and could not proceed

with even the basic taking of further depositions because

of lack of funds and manpower. A reconstituted Agent

Orange Plaintiffs’ Management Committee (“PMC”) was

initially appointed, consisting of Benton Musslewhite,

Stephen Schlegel and Thomas Henderson. Later that fall,

1983 six additional members were appointed by the Court,

including Petitioners and Respondent Dean. Jn Re Agent

Orange Product Liability Litigation, 571 F.S. 481 (E.D.

N.Y. 1983).

Prior to the execution of the original “PMC” Agree-

ment in December, 1983 Newton B. Schwartz in Septem-

ber 1983 personally advised Special Master Sol Schreiber

(appointed by then Presiding Judge George C. Pratt then

a District Judge and thereafter appointed Judge, U. S.

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) that:

1. Dean was soliciting funds from prospective counsel

offering multipliers from 2-1 to 4-1 for funds contributed

to further the litigation and that a 3-1 return on the con-

tributions in addition to the usual “equitable fund” hourly

fees, and multiplier, if any, was finally agreed upon as

of September 1983.

2. That no services at all need to be performed by

contributors in the litigation in order to qualify for this

contribution of funds.‘

4. See e.g. affidavit executed by Newton Schwartz May 31, 1985

and filed in the Trial Court papers June 4, 1985. Document No.

6276 at pp. 8-10. Appendix, Exhibit “C” attached hereto.

6

3. But that contributing counsel could participate as

fully as they wished. —

Schreiber vetoed such suggested disclosure to Judge

Pratt and “Dean” concurred in this nondisclosure.

Petitioner and five of the other members of the “PMC”

(out of nine total) immediately began the infusion of

capital and their time, talent and energies into the active

litigation discovery and hearings in October, even before

the December 7, 1983 execution (as of October) Agree-

ment which Dean personally created, promoted, solicited

the final 3-1 return on contribution as well as the parti-

cipation of counsel.’ He did so as Court designated lead

counsel responsible for the preparation of the Plaintiffs

case.

The original formula unanimously agreed upon pro-

vided, inter alia:

1. Threefold reimbursement for each $200,000.00

contribution, from the pool of attorneys fees;

2. After such distribution, 50% of the remainder

would be distributed equally among the nine

PMC members;

3. Then a 30% distribution according to the num-

ber of hours each member expended;

4. The remaining 20% in accordance with certain

quality and risk factors.

The Court of Appeals opinion is premised on the totally

incorrect assumption that there was no disclosure of this

Agreement. While none was apparently made to Judge

Weinstein, who replaced Judge Pratt in October 1983,

it ignores the undisputed disclosure to Special Master

5. Id. at pp. 8-10.

a

i

Schreiber in September 1983 even before its execution.

On May 7, 1984, the day set for trial, after extensive,

exhaustive around the clock discovery, nationwide and

internationally, and the expenditure of more than $2 mil-

lion in fresh funds, a settlhement was obtained for the

class for $180,000,000.00. This despite substantial de-

fenses raised, including that of the “government contract-

ors” defense, which contended that if the Defendant chem-

ical companies produced Agent Orange, a dioxin, in ac-

cordance with U. S. Government specifications, it was

absolved from further liability even to the ultimate users,

and those who were exposed to it, i.e., the Plaintiffs here-

in.

On June 11, 1984 the District Court ordered that Pe-

titions for attorneys fees were to be submitted by August

31, 1984. A fee hearing was scheduled for September

1984 but no notice was given to the class because of the

“need for continued intensive work by the attorneys until

the close of the fairness hearings and . . . the complexity

of the fee application”. Although his predecessor, through

Special Master Schreiber at least constructively knew of

the “3-1” provision for return on contributions, Judge

Weinstein evidently was not so informed until the PMC

did so when it submitted its Joint Fee Petition. After

Judge Weinstein questioned the Agreement, the PMC

members modified the original agreement. The original

Dean-proposed 3-1 return on contributions was retained,

with the amount of five individual members’ contributions

increased to $250,000.00 each.*®

6. The Sixth member Thomas Henderson contributed $200,000.00;

each of the three non-contributing members, including Respondent

Dean, received a 3-1 multiplier up to $50,000.00 each on their general

litigation expenses; the contributing PMC members did not receive

any multiplier on their general litigation expenses. Agent Orange I,

611 F.Supp. at 1454.

8

The remaining fees were to be distributed pro rata to

each PMC member “in the proportion the individual’s

and/or firm’s fee award bears to the total fees awarded”.

Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1454.

As amended, the final fee award by the District Court

awarded:

1. Approximately $4.7 million to the nine PMC mem-

bers on an individually apportioned basis;

2. The amount awarded by the District Court to each

of the nine PMC members, the amount of fees awarded

under the amended Agreement and the net effect of the

agreement are correctly set forth below (see fn. 2, 818

F.2d 216 at 220-221.)

Amount of Fees Amount of Fees Net Effect

Awarded by Awarded Under Of The

District Court The Agreement Agreement

Dean (noninvestor) $1,424,283 $542,310 - $881,973

Schlegel (noninvestor ) 944,448 $393,312 - $549,136

Musslewhite (noninvestor ) 344,657 $206,991 - $137,666

Schwartz (investor)

O’Quinn (investor)

Brown (investor)

Locks (investor)

Chesley (investor )

Henderson (investor )

41,886 $513,026 +$471,140

132,576 $541,128 +$408,552

348,331 $608,162 +$259,831

487,208 $651,339 +$164,831

475,080 $647,534 +$172,456

515,163 $659,975 +$144,812

Ti LAL 9A LA AA

\ The total of all fees awarded by the District Court to

the members of the PMC remained unchanged.

In May of 1985 Dean moved to overturn the fee shar-

1g agreement, claiming that it violated professional ethics

and did not protect the rights of the class. After hearing

argument and testimony by expert witnesses including

Professor Arthur Miller, Petitioners’ expert in the matter,

the Court in Memorandum and Order issued June 27,

a

9

1985 denied Dean’s Motions and upheld the Agreement.

The District Court found, inter alia, that:

1. No conflict of interest had arisen in the litigation

from the fee sharing agreement; and

2. The interests of the class in obtaining a fair and

reasonable settlement had not been impinged. Agent

Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1461.

3. That the PMC was an ad hoc law firm “formed

for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange multi-

district litigation” Agent Orange I, Id. at 611 F.Supp. at

1458; therefore, the business realities required the PMC

to perform all functions of a law firm including the allo-

cation of fees among its members. This satisfied DR 2-

107A;

4. As to DR 5-103 which prohibits an attorney from

acquiring a proprietary interest in an action in which he

is involved, the District Court held that the contributing

members acquired no independent interest in the action

because the financial return from any initial advance for

expenses was to be paid from the fees otherwise awarded

to the PMC members and thus would not affect the class

fund. While acknowledging that a conflict of interest was

possible, it held that complex class actions require more

sophisticated analysis of ethical codes than ordinary two

party cases in order not to “unnecessarily discourage

counsel from undertaking the expensive and protracted

complex multiparty litigation often needed to vindicate

the rights of a class.” Jd. at 1460.

Any theoretical incentive to settle early: (1) did not

occur here, because there was never any settlement offer

or meaningful discussion until the weekend of May 5-6,

10

1984 preceding the May 7, 1984 trial date; and (2) it

would be offset by the counter balancing theoretical in-

centive to extend such litigation created by the lodestar

formula; and (3) the 3-1 multiplier applied, “whether the

case is settled today or five years from now.” Id. at 1460.

Additionaily the Court set forth five additional reasons

for approving the Agreement at issue:

1. The returns on the contributions did not affect the

class fund, since they were paid from the fee awards of

PMC members;

2. The “business” of law will require creative, yet

ethical methods for economical and efficient operation;

3. Without the funds advanced by the PMC, the liti-

gation would have collapsed and neither the attorneys

nor the class would receive any payments.” Nor would

there be any return on past, present or future investments

if the case were lost, initially or after any appeals were

exhausted; such was the high risk of time and funds;

4. The same $250,000.00 contributions could have

been advanced by the contributing PMC members in safe

investments yielding substantial returns;

5. If the PMC members had received their requested

$30 million in fees, the extent of the mathematical dis-

tortion would have been insubstantial.

The District Court, evidently unaware of the earlier

disclosure to Special Master Schreiber, cautioned that in

all future cases, such agreements should be disclosed at

the time of its formation, which is precisely when it was

done in this case in September 1983.

11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Agreement(s) here did not affect, one iota, the

class’ recovery. The original was proposed by Dean as a

necessary inducement to capable, resourceful, experienced’

counsel enter prolonged litigation which was highly risky

and speculative as later found by the Courts below. To

secure advancements for litigation costs in such a venture,

substantially more than the usual formulae, of hourly

rate, under traditional lodestar formulae even with po-

tential traditional multiplier for quality work and the

risk undertaken,* was essential to induce any contributing

attorneys willing to commit their time, talent, energies

and resources, whether cash or loan commitments by

them, to such difficult litigation. Here, unlike all other

known reported class actions, the ratio of litigation costs

expended and incurred to the date of trial ($2.3 million)

were nearly 12 of the fees awarded.

No case has as a matter of public policy more reason

to be prosecuted than this one. The political fallout from

our country’s involvement in the Vietnam war continues

even though that war ended in 1976. Yet, for the nearly

250,000 (% million) veteran claimants here involved,

and particularly those affected, actual or supposedly, by

the toxic chemical dioxin, Agent Orange, more than their

cherished monument in Washington and current best

sellers and hit movies about such war, they would have

7. The average number of years experience in the tort field of

the nine constituent members of “PMC” exceeded twenty years.

All were successful, active trial lawyers.

8. As encapsulated most recently in this Court’s decision in

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council, US. ,

106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986). Unlike that case, here there was no

“usual fee shifting statute” involved.

12 l

their vindication or “day in court” entitlement to a public

airing of the national policy involved. This is buttressed

by the fact that today, 11 years after the end of the war,

there are two movies depicting such war among the cur-

rent best attended and rated critically in the US.,

“Platoon” and “Full Metal Jacket”.

Dean knew the monumental risks in continuing such

litigation. He offered 3-1 because this is what he knew

it would take in the market place to arouse serious con-

sideration on such a risky commitment to a required

combination of capable, experienced and affluent trial

litigators.

Having so represented such agreement to induce his

fellow PMC members, is he not now estopped to deny

such agreement’s validity or to seek to set aside his own

Agreement, on both legal and ethical as well as moral

grounds?

The PMC was in fact an ad hoc law firm. It opened

its own law office in Brooklyn, New York and staffed it

with its repective members. Fee sharing agreements under

such circumstances are permissible just as they would

be among members of the same law firm.

Likewise, the members of the PMC who contributed

at the time, initially almost $1.5 million dollars and

incurred substantial additional debts for which they are

personally liable and more than that in their time and

substantial general litigation expenses without any multi-

plier, such as the 3-1 contracted to be awarded to the

three non-contributing members.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The opinion of the Court of Appeals below and

Grinnell I and II’ conflicts with that of the Third Circuit

in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and

Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973),

on remand, 382 F.Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal

after remand 540 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1976 en banc)

(hereinafter Lindy I and II respectively) and decisions of

the District Courts in the Second, Third and. District of

Columbia Circuits permitting and approving private fee

sharing agreements, even in lump sum awards, to class

counsel in an equitable fund action under the lodestar

approach;

2. The Court below under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) pro-

nounced the death knell for obtaining competent class

counsel in erroneously holding that the District Court’s

role was not properly satisfied as protector of the class

in holding hearings, and determining reasonableness in

the awarding of fees under the Agreement in this equit-

able fund case;

3. The Court of Appeals erroneously held that this

Agent Orange class action was not the type, which as a

matter of policy, was worthy of judicial encouragement

in view of the high risks involved in its prosecution and

defenses available thereto.

4. The Court of Appeals main premise, i.e., lack of

disclosure, fails factually because Petitioners here informed

the Special Master of the proposal to share attorneys fees

during the agreement’s formulative stages, including the

9. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974),

on remand, [1976-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) { 60,913 at 68,980 (S.D.

N.Y. 1976), appeal after remand, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).

14

3-1 return on contributions, and requested to inform the

then presiding Judge of such action, which was vetoed;

yet Petitioner and all other signatories except Dean* are

now penalized and have had their voluntary agreement

nullified by the Court of Appeals’ refusal to acknowledge

such uncontroverted disclosure. |

5. Erroneously, in the name of ethics, the Court of

Appeals has rewarded the very wrongdoer co-counsel,

Dean, who conceived, initiated, promoted and benefitted’®

most from their Agreement on tenuous theoretical ethical

grounds while rejecting out of hand (Dean’s) fraud in

the procurement of the agreement by promises of the very

3-1 return on investment now condemned by Dean and

the Court of Appeals; he is estopped from denying the

same on legal grounds and his procurement and participa-

tion in the same and on equitable grounds by reason of

his lack of clean hands and hence standing to challenge

his own procured agreement.

6. If the opinion below is allowed to stand, it will

preclude all future agreement between counsel respecting

mass toxic tort class actions and such have such a chilling

effect as to eliminate competent counsel from such cases

in the future, capable of prosecuting such litigation.

7. Ignoring such “clearly erroneous” standard, the

Court of Appeals here disregarded such detailed, pains-

* See page 2 footnote.

10. Dean had substantial time in the case which he most certainly

would lose unless he could induce Petitioners and others to enter

the case and assume the financial and a substantial part of the work

burden. A sizable portion of the fees he has been awarded is for

this time that would have been clearly lost but for the contributions

of Petitioners. There are no just reasons that he should get the

fruits of the agreement and Petitioners the pits.

15

taking findings of the District Court and erroneously sub-

stituted its judgment without regard to the facts extant,

de novo; hence its legal conclusions are incorrect.

DISCUSSION

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a similar

class action situation held that (on remand) in an anti-

trust case that the internal agreement of counsel was

“simply irrelevant” where the award otherwise conformed

with this Court’s criteria in “equitable fund” doctrine

cases first pronounced in Trustees v. Greenough, 105

U.S. 527 (1882) and Central Railroad & Banking v.

Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885):

“Finding the basic facts not clearly erroneous, and

determining that there is no error in the Court's

reasoning or in its application of the proper legal

precept, we affirm the district court on this point

(whereby a law firm (“Berger”) was awarded $893,-

500 under a fee sharing agreement instead of the

$139,186.85 found under the District Court’s hear-

ing for reasonable value for contributing materially

to the creation of the settlement fund). Implicit in

this conclusion is the understanding that the agree-

ment between Kohn and Berger to split fees is simply

irrelevant to the considerations mandated by Lindy I

(emphasis supplied). Lindy II, supra, 540 F.2d

at 109.

Case law subsequent to Lindy IJ demonstrates that in

the class action context, District Courts wisely encourage

the court-awarded fee to be allocated by counsel. See,

¢.g., Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y.

Sept. 18, 1981) (available on Lexis, Genfed library);

In Re Magic Marker Securities Litigation, [1979-1980]

16

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) © 97,116 at 96,195 (E.D. Pa.

1979); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

(CCH) € 96,921 at 95,863 (D. Del. 1979), appeal dis-

missed, 614 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1980); Del Noce v.

Delyar Corp., 457 F.Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D. N.Y. 1978);

in Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 395,

400 (D.D.C. 1978).

As Judge Brieant noted in Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.:

“Counsel have, to an extent, simplified this Court’s

work in fixing fees here by agreeing together that

a single fee shall be awarded, based on the total of

the services rendered, which counsel will divide

among themselves by private arrangement as if they

were law partners, or joint venturers as to this par-

ticular piece of business. Accordingly, the Court is

concerned only with the fairness and propriety of a

single amount, to be fixed by the Court in accord-

ance with the traditional principles of quantum

meruit and in compliance with Grinnell I and II,

just as if all the services had been rendered by a

single law firm.” 457 F.Supp. at 1055.

The justification for allowing the attorneys who have

functioned as an ad hoc law firm representing a class

to allocate a fee among themselves is straightforward,

i.e., “it is virtually impossible for the Court to determine

as accurately as can the attorneys themselves the internal

distribution of work, responsibility and risk.” In Re Am-

picillin Aantitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at 400 (emphasis

supplied ).

This issue has not been decided by this Court as to

either the methodology for awarding attorneys fees in

common fund cases, nor under what circumstances private

17

agreements of such counsel will be respected and honored.

Nor has the Court decided the ethical considerations

here involved, nor the concomitant issue of whether the

very counsel who promoted such 3-1 inducements can

later renege on his very own agreement after capitalizing

upon the resources, time, talents and energies expended

by his own selected co-counsel, itself an important ques-

tion of ethics, as is that of the Court of Appeals reward-

ing a wrongdoer and one lacking clean hands. That is

whether or not “Dean” has standing to raise the issue

under the equitable doctrine of “common fund” situations.

In fact the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

itself has in the past properly discussed three factors to

be considered by the District Courts in increasing the

lodestar:

“1. Analysis of Plaintiff's burden. .. .

2. Risks assumed in developing the case. This

category subsumes consideration of: (a) the number

of hours of labor risked without guarantee of re-

muneration; (b) the amount of out-of-pocket ex-

penses advanced for processing motions, taking de-

positions, etc.; (c) the development of prior ex-

pertise ...

3. The delay in receipt of payment for services

rendered.” 540 F.2d at 117 (emphasis supplied).

The italicized language demonstrates that a District

Court may increase the lodestar, i.e., apply a multiplier,

based upon the advancement of costs of the litigation.

This is precisely the effect of the 3 for 1 multiple con-

tained in the fee-sharing agreement approved by Judge

Weinstein,

Dcciteeieeeeeneneeneienentienieieeanmiccmaiaaiteameuaiaiiilll

18

The District Court recognized that without the agree-

ment the very continuation of the litigation was in doubt

and the $180 million settlement would not have been

created. Implementation of the Agreement does not con-

flict with any common fund decision. Indeed, its result is

well-supported by existing case law.

PERFORMANCE OF THE FEE-SHARING

AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE

ETHICAL STANDARDS

A. There Has Been No Improper Sharing Of Fees.

The District Court, looking both to DR 2-107(A) of

the American Bar Association Code of Professional re-

sponsibility and Rule 1.5 of the more recently enacted

American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional

Conduct, had little difficulty rejecting Dean’s argument

that the fee sharing agreement violated ethical standards

regarding the division of fees among attorneys. Judge

Weinstein found that ethical restrictions did not control

the present case because the PMC was “an ad hoc law

firm, a joint venture formed for the purpose of prosecut-

ing the Agent Orange multidistrict litigation.” 611 F.Supp.

at 1458. Such a factual finding is clearly supported by

the record.

A major portion of the sums advanced by the members

of the PMC paid the costs of operation of a separate law

office located in Brooklyn near the District Court which

was essential to the prosecution of the class action. Such

expenses included rent, furniture and office equipment,

payments to the office staff, telephone, photocopying ex-

penses and computer services. See Judge Weinstein’s main

19

opinion regarding fees and expenses, 611 F.Supp. 1296,

1330-31. Although the PMC was a joint venture for the

prosecution of a single case, these expenses represent the

normal capital expenditures of a law firm in operation.”

The District Court found that such an organization was

essential, stating:

“In short, the Brooklyn office served as the home

litigation office for the geographically scattered PMC

members and brought a levei of efficiency to the

litigation that was not present before and that was

badly needed.” 611 F.Supp. at 1331.

The funds contributed by the members were maintained

in separate PMC bank accounts and, in addition to pay-

ing office expenses, were used to pay deposition costs,

expert witness fees, class action notice expenses, computer

expenses and similar items, Dean Aff. at p. 8 (A 1285),

and, it is noteworthy, not to pay expenses of individual

PMC members. The costs were advanced for the capi-

talization of the joint venture and were not merely the

aggregate costs of individual attorneys who were par-

ticipating in the prosecution of the action.

The governing ethical rule does not prohibit the divi-

sion of fees in this case.

Model Rule 1.5 provides in pertinent part:

“(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are

not in the same firm may be made only if:

11. Even some of the attorneys working on the class action could

be deemed employees of the joint venture. See, e.g., Report of

Magistrate Scheindlin, which is an Appendix to Judge Weinstein’s

main opinion on attorneys fees, 611 F.Supp. 1347, 1363 (Alison

Pettiette, Esq., assigned to the PMC by Petitioner John M. O’Quinn,

was deemed in effect an associate of the “PMC’’).

speeiaeatemameiaan emma |

20

‘

(1) the division is in proportion to the services

performed by each lawyer or, by written agree-

ment with the client, each lawyer assumes joint

responsibility for the representation;

(2) the client is advised of and does not ob-

ject to the participation of all the lawyers involved;

and

(3) the total fee is reasonable.”

The Official Comment to Rule 1.5 indicates that the

rule contemplates the factual situation presented by this

case:

“A division of fee is a single billing to a client

covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are

not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates as-

sociation of more than one lawyer in a matter in

which neither alone could serve the client as well.

”

.

In the class, action context, the participation of the

Court, as Judge Weinstein recognized, must substitute

for that of the client, since as a practical matter the

class is only informed of what the Court approves from

material included in the notice of settlkement. Judge Wein-

stein found that the requirements of the Model Rules

were met. 611 F.Supp. at 1459. “First, each PMC mem-

ber assumed joint responsibility for prosecution of the class

action and that assumption of responsibility was approved

by the Court on behalf of the class. . . . Second, the total

fee allowed by the Court is reasonable by definition.” 611

F.Supp. at 1459.

The Agreement would not have been prohibited under

the old Code section. Under DR 2-107 (footnotes omit-

ted):

21

“(A) A lawyer shali not divide a fee for legal serv-

ices with another lawyer who is not a partner

in or associate of his law firm or law office,

unless:

(1) The client consents to employment of the

other lawyer after a full disclosure that a

division of fees will be made.

(2) The division is made in proportion to the

services performed and responsibility as-

sumed by each.

(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly

exceed reasonable compensation for all legal

services they rendered the client.”

In the ABA’s final draft of DR 2-107(A), a footnote’?

to subsection (A)(3) referred to ABA Formal Opinion

No. 204 (Nov. 24, 1940). Formal Opinion No. 204 pro-

hibited fee-splitting “[w]here an attorney merely brings

about the employment of another attorney but renders

no service and assumes no responsibility in the matter.”

ABA, Opinions on Professional Ethics at p. 490 (1967).

However, the division of either services or responsibility

may be a basis for division of fees. Formal Opinion No.

204, id. at p. 491. Thus, Dean’s complaint that one mem-

ber of the PMC did not contribute as many hours*® as

he did is of no consequence since all members of the

12. The footnotes to the final draft were carried over into the

Code as adopted in 1969 by the ABA House of Delegates to assist

in synthesizing with the earlier Canons of Professional Ethics and

Opinions of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics. Courts

have looked to the footnoted opinions in construing the Code. See,

e.g., Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 18, 1981)

(available on LEXIS).

i3. Petitioner Schwartz was awarded compensation by Judge

Weinstein for over 400 hours, hardly a token effort.

22

PMC were charged by the District Court with responsi-

bility for the class litigation and all shared that respon-

sibility. Indeed the members other than Dean as a group

contributed 70% of the time.

Moreover, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics

also stated in Formal Opinion No. 204 that “[mJeasuring

the relative division of service and responsibility between

associate attorneys is not within the province of this ethics

committee unless the resulting fee to the client is flag-

rantly excessive.” Jd. at pp. 490-91 (emphasis supplied).

Neither the Code nor the Model Rules defines “responsi-

bility”, but Dean’s reliance on ABA Informal Opinion

No. 85-1514 (April 27, 1985) (Appellant’s Brief at p.

26) is misplaced and his quotation is selective. That

opinion states that “[t]he Committee is of the opinion

that assumption of responsibility does not require sub-

stantial services to be performed by the lawyer since

assumption of responsibility is the alternative to a divi-

sion of fees in proportion to services performed.” ABA

Informal Opinion No. 85-1514 (April 27, 1985), reprint-

ed in ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Con-

duct at pp. 801:373, 374.

Like the Court decisions cited above at pp. 15-16, the ABA

Committees on Professional Ethics were not concerned

with the relative allocation of fees among attorneys jointly

responsible for a matter so long as the total fee to the

client was reasonable. The reason, as Judge Richey stated

in the Jn Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, is that such

allocation is best left to the attorneys themselves. See also

Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y. 1981)

(available in LExis).

23

B. Establishment Of The Fee-Sharing Agreement

Did Not Create Any Improper Conflict Of Interest

Between The Lawyers And The Clients.

Dean asserts that the Agreement had to create an im-

permissible conflict of interest between the PMC and the

class of Plaintiffs because it established in the PMC a

financial interest which would militate against the ability

of the attorneys to exercise their own independent profes-

sional judgment and cause a dilution of their loyalty to

the class in violation of DR 5-103(A) of the now super-

ceded ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.

The potential for conflict between attorneys and their

clients always exists where litigation is prosecuted under

an agreement where fees to be paid are contingent upon

the success of the suit. Nonetheless, a contingent fee

arrangement has long been authorized “because it may be

the only means by which a layman can obtain the services

of a lawyer of his choice.” ABA Code of Professional

Responsibility, EC 5-7, EC 2-20. The advancement of the

costs of litigation were permitted under DR 5-103(B),

with the caveat that the clients had to remain ultimately

responsible for the disbursements. The advancement of

costs is “ofven . . . the only practical means by which one

having a claim against another can economically afford,

finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer

to prosecute his claim” ABA Code of Professional Re-

sponsibility, EC 2-20. \

How else could major class actions proceed in the

absence of contingent fees and advancement of costs?

There will be very few representative Plaintiffs sufficiently

wealthy and charity minded to advance the fees and ex-

penses for the class as a whole.

24

It has long been obvious that, where an attorney has

contributed substantial effort pursuant to a contingency

fee agreement, there is a risk that the attorney might be

guided in his negotiations on behalf of a client by his

own self-interest in recovering a fee and that that self-

interest might be adverse to the client’s interest of obtain-

ing the largest possible recovery. That risk is minimized

in a federal class action since no settlement can be imple-

mented in the absence of notice to the class with an

opportunity to be heard, and an independent determina-

tion by a federal judge of the fairness and reasonableness

of the settlement after such a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(e). Indeed, pursuant to Rule 23, Judge Weinstein

considered the fairness and reasonableness of the settle-

ment prior to the determination of fees and expenses to

be awarded to counsel.

The Agreement did not conflict with old DR 5-103(A)

since there was no acquisition of a proprietary interest

in the cause of action. That is to say, the lawyers were

entitled to no particular share of the settlement amount

and were to be entitled only to that amount which the

District Court would ultimately determine to be fair and

reasonable. In terms of the relationship between the PMC

and the class, all that has been done was for the PMC

to agree that they would recover fees and disbursements

only as awarded by the District Court from the successful

prosecution of the litigation.

In addition, Rule 1.8(e) of the Model Rules has speci-

fically eliminated the requirement in DR 5-i03(B) that

the clients retain responsibility for the reimbursement of

disubrsements and now permits the reimbursement of

disbursements to be contingent upon the outcome. Rule

1.8(e) provides as follows:

25

“A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to

a client in connection with pending or contemplated

litigation, except that . . . a lawyer may advance

court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment

of which may be contingent on the outcome of the

matter.”

It should not be forgotten that the algebra of imple-

mentation of the Agreement could well have been very

different had settlement not been reached prior to triai.

Had the negotiations taken place months into the trial or

with the jury out, the value of the time contributed by

the members of the PMC likely would have grown much

larger in relation to the risk capital. This is, of course,

the routine situation in contingent fee litigation.

Dean does not suggest that the settlement was unfair

or unreasonable and the mere fact that it occurred at the

time that it did does not create the reality of any conflict

of interest. Judge Gagliardi in Ruskay, Judge Luongo in

In Re Magic Marker Securities Litigation, Judge Wright

in Valente, Judge Brieant in Del Noce and Judge Richey

in the Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, see p. 16 above, all

have approved the allocation among themselves by mem-

bers of a committee of counsel of compensation for work,

responsibility and risk. That is all that was done here.

No part of the settlement was allocated to the attorneys

other than amounts awarded by the Court under tradi-

tional notions of fairness and reasonableness.

Dean’s complaint is nothing more than the “sour

grapes” of a disgruntled contracting party, unhappy with

the result of an agreement he negotiated in a risky ven-

ture, entered into freely, and from which he derived some

but not all anticipated benefits. The amount awarded

26

Dean by the District Court, after adjustment pursuant to

the Agreement, left him with an effective hourly rate of

at least $86 after actual expenses. Had the District Court

awarded the members of the PMC even a modest risk

multiplier to time charges of 1.5, Dean’s effective hourly

rate would have increased to $196 and with a risk multi-

plier of 2.0, to $308.**

Surely Dean and all the other members of the PMC

expected the District Court to award a risk multiplier

were they to succeed in what was a most risky endeavor.

Indeed, the District Court’s extraordinary refusal to

award any risk multiplier was cited as error on appeal,

but the Court of Appeals denied such. Nonetheless, all

members of the PMC, including Dean, understood that

their Agreement would operate only if they were succesful

and only with respect to fees finally awarded. Dissatis-

faction with the award is no basis for avoidance of the

Agreement. Given the finding of the District Court that

the fee-sharing agreement did not affect the Plaintiff

class in any way, there is no basis in law, equity or ethics

to set it aside.

Professor Schuck, ante, in his definitive work on the

Agent Orange Litigation, “Agent Orange on Trial” has

correctly and pragmatically set forth the Fee Sharing

14. Hours Fees Fees Under Effective

Allowed Awarded Agmt. Hourly Rate

6,300.15 $1,424,284 $ 542,320 $ 86

1.5 risk

multiplier $2,136,426 $1,239,431 $196

2.0 risk

multiplier $2,848,567 $1,951,661 $308

A risk multiplier of 2.0 was approved in Lindy II. See 540 F.2d at

115-116.

ai

Agreement in issue as the only practical means to prose-

cute such litigation and Dean’s contentions as “more

hypocritical than ethical, more delusive than just.”

He candidly observed as material here:

“, . on December 13, 1984, the PMC executed an

amended agreement, which was to be retroactive to

October 1, 1983. The ‘off-the-top’ provision was

retained—indeed, the amount that each financier

might receive was increased to $750,000 (his $250,-

000 expenses contribution multiplied by three )—but

this advantage was extended to the others (Dean,

Schlegel and Musslewhite) albeit at a lower amount

($50,000 expenses each, multiplied by three). And

instead of the percentage allocation specified for the

remainder of the award, the new arrangement would

divide the fees remaining after the off-the-top deduc-

tions according to the proportion that each lawyer’s

fee award bore to the total fee award.

This last reason was obviated in May 1985 when

Dean moved to invalidate the new agreement. Con-

ceding that he had not signed it under duress or

ignorance, he pointed out that under its terms he

would receive $331,000 rather than the $1.34 million

that the court had awarded him, a diminution of

more than $1 million or 75 percent of his fee;

Schlegel’s reduction would be more than $530,000

and Musslewhite’s more than $150,000. In contrast,

Schwartz and O’Quinn would receive $475,000 and

$426,000 more, respectively, than the Court had

awarded them. Dean, the PMC’s chief counsel, would

receive an effective hourly rate of $55.62, while

Schwartz, essentially a passive investor, would re-

ceive more than $1,700 per hour. This arrangement,

Dean argued, constituted unethical fee splitting, dis-

proportionate to the services performed and respons-

ibility assumed, and champerty; it almost amounted

to a usurious loan.

28

Dean’s arguments have some force, yet the ethical

strictures they embody secm curiously anachronistic,

quaint reminders of bygone attitudes toward the

social functions of adjudication. The legal system

cannot have it both ways. If it desires the end, then

it must desire (or at least accept) the only practical

means to that end. If it wishes to encourage so-called

public interest tort litigation on behalf of diffuse,

poorly financed interests over extremely complex

issues of scientific or technical uncertainty, then it

must either transform the government into a tort

litigator on behalf of these interests (a solution

with enormous problems of its own), or it must

countenance, indeed welcome, private arrangements

for securing the resources necessary for effectively

prosecuting such cases. The truth is that in the fall

of 1983, if the Agent Orange litigation was to go

forward, the resources of the financiers were desper-

ately needed; it is no exaggeration to say that at that

critical moment and thereafter, they were needed far

more than the chief trial counsel, valuable as his

services were. The otherwise grotesque inbalance

revealed by Dean’s comparisons reflected the relative

value that their money and his services had for the

survival of the case at that point, a value Dean

obviously appreciated when he signed the agreement.

Although the opportunism of investors is not a pretty

or edifying sight, the prospect of meritorious cases

failing for want of resources is even less appealing.

Any set of principles that affirms the importance of

litigating very costly cases while denying the means

for doing so seems more /ypocritical than ethical,

more delusive than just.

On June 27, Weinstein rejected Dean’s challenge to

the agreement. After discussing the competing con-

siderations, the judge chose to address the ethical

problems case by case rather than announce any

general rule. In this case, he observed, any conflict

of interest and incentives to settle prematurely were

29

purely hypothetical, for he had found the settlement

to be fair and in the best interest of the class. In the

future, however, lawyers would be required to dis-

close to the court the existence and terms of such

a fee-sharing arrangement, so that the court could

protect the class—perhaps by requiring modifications,

reconsidering class certification, or notifying the

class—and the lawyers could proceed accordingly.*®

Of course, as to this latter caveat, Petitioners complied

with it by their disclosures to Special Master Schreiber

(Appendix Exhibit C, ante and infra).

This Court has long recognized the application in

equitable proceedings such as this (i.e., the equitable fund

doctrine under its Trustees v. Greenough, arie 105 U.S.

527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882) ). See e.g. International News

Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68

(1918) (held inapplicable there, although recognized in

principal).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing valid and compelling reasons, this

Honorable Court should issue its Writ of Certiorari and

grant this Petition. To do otherwise will be to pronounce

the death knell on the next vital public policy litigation

which poses serious legal obstacles and requires extensive

effort and resources to combat adversaries with unlimited

resources.*°

15. “Agent Orange On Trial”, Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-

versity, 1986 at p. 120, fn. 23.

16. It was estimated that as of the May 7, 1984 date of trial,

the seven chemical companies had expended some $74 million in fees

and costs. Firemans Funds, insurer for Dow Chemical, in addition to

counsel, employed up to ninety paralegals at the height of the litiga-

tion and had an annual budget exceeding $5 million, more than

the entire total award to the “PMC”.

Dated

30

Sep loon a / IIs 7

By:

Respectfully submitted,

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C.

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ

723 Main, Suite 325

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 224-4161

BARRY S. BERGER

723 Main, Suite 325

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 224-4161

JOHN M. O’Quinn, P.C.

JOHN M. O’QUINN

3200 Texas Commerce Tower

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 223-1000

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. Mail,

first class, postage prepaid, on this Sth day of August,

1987 as per the service list attached. Sop Gm be.

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ

AGENT ORANGE SERVICE LIST

Honorable Jack B. Weinstein

United States District Court

Eastern District of New York

225 Cadman Plaza East

Brooklyn, New York 11201

Wendell B. Alcorn, Esq.

CADWALADER, WICKER-

SHAM & TAFT

One Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

Thomas Besk, Esq.

UNIROYAL, INC.

World Headquarters

Middlebury, Connecticut 06749

Paul V. Esposito, Esq.

LEWIS, CVERBECK &

FURMAN

135 South LaSalle Street

Suite 1060

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Thomas Beck, Esq

HENDERSON & GOLDBERG

1612 Frick Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Morton G. Silberman, Esq.

CLARK, GAGLIARDI &

MILLER

The Inns of Court

99 Court Street

White Plains, New York 10601

Howard Lester, Esq.

LESTER, SCHWAB, KATZ

& DWYER

120 Broadway

New York, New York 10005

Benton Musslewhite, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF BENTON

MUSSLEWHITE, INC.

609 Fannin, Suite 517

Houston, Texas 77002

William C. Lucas, Esq.

TOWNLEY & UPDIKE

Chrylser Building

405 Lexington Avenue

New York, New York 10174

Leonard L. Rivkin, Esq.

RIVKIN, LEFF, SHERMAN

& RADLER

100 Garden City Plaza

Garden City, New York 11510

William Krohley, Esq.

KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN

101 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10178

David J. Dean, Esq.

DEAN, FALANGA & ROSE

1 Old Country Road

Carle Place, New York 11514

Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., Esq.

YANNACONE & YANNACONE

Post Office Drawer 109

62 Rose Avenue

Patchogue, New York 11772

Richard Goldstein, Esq.

SHEA & GOULD

330 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

David R. Goss, Esq.

BUDD, LARNER, KENT,

GOSS, PICILLO &

ROSENBAUM

33 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07101

Stephen J. Schlegel, Esq.

SCHLEGEL & TRAFELET,

LTD.

One North LaSalle Street

Suite 3900

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Irving Like, Esq.

REILLY, LIKE &

SCHNEIDER

200 West Main Street

Babylon, New York 11700

Neil Peterson, Esq.

Gene Locks, Esq.

GREITZER & LOCKS

1500 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Robert A. Taylor, Jr., Esq.

ASHCRAFT & GEREL

2000 L Street, N.W., Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

Arvin Maskin, Esq.

Department of Justice

Safeway Building - Room 904D

521 12th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Robert Conason, Esq.

GAIR, GAIR & CONASON, P.C.

80 Pine Street

New York, New York 10005

Hon. Raymond J. Dearie

United States Attorney

By: L. Kevin Sheridan

Executive Assistant

U.S. Attorney

U.S. District Court

Brooklyn, New York 11201

Hon. Shira Scheindlin

Magistrate

U.S. Courthouse

225 Cadman Plaza East

Brooklyn, New York 1120!

Albert J. Fiorella, Esq.

1565 Franklin Avenue

Mineola, New York 11501

Stanley Chesley, Esq.

WAITE, SCHNEIDER,

BAYLESS & CHESLEY

1513 Central Trust Tower

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Phillip E. Brown, Esq.

HOBERG, FINGER, BROWN,

COX & MOLLIGAN, P.C.

Central Tower

702 Market Street

San Francisco, California 94103

John O’Quinn, Esq.

O’QUINN, HAGANS &

WETTMAN

3200 Texas Commerce Tower

600 Travis

Houston, Texas 77002

Sol Schreiber, Esq.

MILBERG, WEISS, BERSHAD,

SPECTHRIE & LERACH

One Penn Plaza, Suite 4915

New York, New York 10119

Agent Orange Plaintiffs’

Management Committee

26 Court Street, Suite 304-8

Brooklyn, New York 11242

Clerk of Panel

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation

1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Suite 1002

Washington, D.C. 20005

Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq.

KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN,

HAYS & HANDLER

1575 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

Ms. Nancy Petrillo

Deputy Law Clerk

United States District Court

Eastern District of New York

225 Cadman Plaza East

New York, New York 11201

la

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

In re “AGENT ORANGE” PRODUCT

LIABILITY LITIGATION.

(Appeal of David DEAN).

No. 1118, Docket 85-6365.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued April 10, 1986.

Decided April 21, 1987.

One member of plaintiff's management committee in

Agent Orange class action appealed from order of the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

New York, Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge, 611 F.Supp.

1452, which upheld fee sharing agreement between lead

counsel. The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge,

held that agreement under which certain members of

management committee would advance funds for litigation

expenses and receive threefold return on that investment

out of the fee settlement was invalid and would not be

enforced in view of its potential for creating conflict be-

tween counsel and the class.

Reversed.

2a

Leon Friedman, Hempstead, N.Y., for appellant Dean.

Elihu Inselbuch (Gilbert, Segall and Young, New York

City, Richard B. Schaeffer, New York City, of counsel)

for appellee Agent Orange Piaintiffs’ Management Com-

mittee.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER and MIN-

ER, Circuit Judges.

MINER, Circuit Judge:

Our discussion of the background and procedural his-

tory of this litigation appears in Judge Winter’s lead opin-

ion, 818 F.2d 145. This portion of the Agent Orange

appeal concerns the district court’s approval of a fee

sharing agreement entered into by the nine-member Plain-

tiffs’ Management Committee (“PMC”) in December of

1983. Under the agreement, each PMC member who had

advanced funds to the class for general litigation expenses

was to receive a threefold return on his investment prior

to the distribution of other fees awarded to individual

PMC members by the district court. In result, the agree-

ment dramatically increased the fees awarded to those

PMC members who had advanced funds to the class for

expenses, and concurrently decreased the fees awarded to

non-investing PMC members, who only performed legal

services for the class.

David Dean, lead trial counsel for the plaintiff class and

a non-investing member of the PMC, challenges the validity

of the agreement, to which he was a signatory, contending

that it violates DR 5-103 and DR 2-107(A) of the ABA

Code of Professional Responsibility (“ABA Code”). The

ABA Code provisions prohibit an attorney from acquiring

a proprietary interest in an action in which he is involved

and from dividing a fee with an attorney who is not a

3a

member of his firm, unless such division is made pursuant

to client consent and is based upon services performed

and responsibility assumed. In addition, Dean asserts that

such an agreement, which premises the size of a fee on

the amount advanced for expenses rather than on services

rendered, violates the standards and principles developed

in this circuit for the award of attorneys’ fees in equitable

fund class actions and inevitably places class counsel in

a position at odds with the interests of the class itself.

Although not informed of the existence of the fee shar-

ing agreement until September of 1984, four months after

the parties reached a settlement, the district court ap-

proved the agreement, holding that “there is no reason

to believe that the existence of the PMC’s fee-sharing

agreement had any appreciable untoward effect on the

decision to settle.” In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability

Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1452, 1461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)

(“Agent Orange I’). In essence, the court determined that

the substantial financial demands placed upon counsel

in complex multiparty litigation require flexibility in

reviewing internal fee sharing agreements so as not to

discourage future representation of large plaintiff classes.

At the same time, however, the district judge ruled that,

in all future cases, counsel must notify the court of any

fee sharing agreement at the time of its inception. In this

way, according to the district judge, “the court at the out-

set can determine whether to permit the fee allocation

agreement to stand before any attorney invests substantial

time and funds.” Jd. at 1463.

Because we find that the agreement before us violates

established principles governing awards of attorneys’ fees

in equitable fund class actions and creates a strong

4a

possibility of a conflict of interest between class counsel

and those they were charged to represent, we reverse the

district court’s approval of the agreement. Accordingly,

the fees originally allocated by the district court, based

on the reasonable value of service actually rendered, will

be distributed to the members of the PMC.

I. BACKGROUND

In September of 1983 Yannacone and Associates with-

drew as attorneys for the class, claiming financial and

management hardships. The district court then approved

appointment of the PMC as new class counsel. The

PMC was comprised of three members—attorneys Stephen

Schlegel, Benton Musslewhite and Thomas Henderson.

In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 571

F.Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In later months the dis-

trict court approved the expansion of the PMC to en-

compass six additional members, including appellant

David Dean. Dean, a member of the original panel of

class counsel had been closely involved with the Agent

Orange litigation since its inception in 1979. In October

of 1983 the district court appointed him to be the at-

torney responsible for leading the preparation and po-

tential trial of plaintiffs’ case.

In December of 1983, as a means of raising the capital

necessary for the maintenance and continuation of the

lawsuit, the nine PMC members entered into a written

fee sharing agreement whereby six of the members each

promised to advance the class $200,000 for general liti-

gation expenses. The agreement provided that the invest-

ing members would be reimbursed threefold from the

pool of attorneys’ fees awarded to PMC members upon

successful completion of the action. The fees remaining

5a

in the pool after the investment payouts would be dis-

tributed pursuant to a fifty-thirty-twenty percent formula:

fifty percent of the remainder would be distributed equal-

ly among the nine PMC members, thirty percent would

be distributed according to the number of hours each

member expended in the case, and twenty percent would

be distributed in accordance with certain quality and

risk factors relating to each PMC member’s work in the

action, as determined by a majority vote of the PMC.

All PMC members, including Dean, signed the agreement.

The district court, however, was not notified of its ex-

istence.

The action was settled in May of 1984 and the district

court, by order dated June 11, 1984, notified counsel

that petitions for attorneys’ fees were to be submitted to

the court no later than August 31, 1984. A hearing on

the issue of fees was scheduled for late Septei.oer. In

ordering the hearing, the district court waived applica-

tion of Rule 5 of the Local Rules of the Eastern District

of New York requiring notice to the class of all fee ap-

plications and fee sharing agreements prior to the hearing

on such fee petitions. The court gave as its reasons “the

need for continued intensive work by the attorneys until

the close of the fairness hearings and . . . the complexity

of the fee applications.” Notice of Proposed Settlement

of Class Action, reprinted in In re “Agent Orange’ Pro-

duct Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 867 (E.D.

N.Y. 1984). When the court waived application of the

local rule, it was unaware of the PMC fee sharing agree-

ment.

It was not until the PMC submitted its joint fee peti-

tion that the court finally learned of the agreement. At

the September hearing on the fee petitions, the district

6a

judge expressed doubts as to the agreement’s propriety

and requested further briefing on the issue. Faced with

the reservations expressed by the district judge, the PMC

members modified their agreement in December of 1984.

The revised agreement, and the one now before us, pro-

vided that five of the six investing members of the PMC

each would advance an additional $50,000 for general

litigation expenses, bringing their total investments to

$250,000 each. In return for these advances, as well as

for the $200,000 advanced by the sixth investing mem-

ber, the new agreement provided for the same threefold

return as did the original agreement. The fifty-thirty-twenty

percent formula for the distribution of the remaining por-

tion of the fees, however, was eliminated. In its place,

the revised agreement called for the remainder to be dis-

tributed pro rata to each PMC member “in the proportion

the individual’s and/or firm’s fee award bears to the total

fees awarded.”* Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1454.

1. The agreement, in pertinent part, provided as follows:

' When and if funds are received, either by the AOPMC or in-

dividual members thereof, the first priority distribution will be

to distribute to Messrs. Brown, Chesley, Henderson, Locks,

O’Quinn and Schwartz, an amount equivalent to the actual

monies expended for which these six signatories were responsible

toward the common advancement of the litigation up to

$250,000.00 with a multiplier of three (i.e., none of these six

individuals will receive more than $750,000.00 each), which

shall be paid to them for having secured the funds for the

AOPMC and to Messrs. Dean, Schlegel and Musslewhite an

amount equivalent to the actual monies expended by these three

signatories toward the common advancement of litigation up to

$50,000.00 with a multiplier of three (i.e., none of these three

signatories will receive more than $150,000.00 each). Any addi-

tional expenses will be reimbursed without a multiplier as ordered

by the Court. All of the expenses plus the appropriate multiplier

will be deducted from the total fees and expenses awarded by

the Court to all of the AOPMC firms. The remaining fees will

then be distributed pro rata to each signatory in the proportion

Ta

On January 7, 1985, the district court issued a Mem-

orandum and Order awarding over $10 million in fees

and expenses to the various counsel whose work had ben-

efitted the class, applying the principles of fee distribution

in equitable fund actions set forth in City of Detroit v.

Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (“Grinnell

I’) and City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093

(2d Cir. 1977) (“Grinnell IT’). In re “Agent Orange”

Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y.

1985) (“Agent Orange IT’). As later amended and sup-

plemented, the district court’s decision awarded over $4.7

million in fees to the nine members of the PMC on an

individually apportioned basis. David Dean, due to his

lengthy involvement in the class action and the excep-

tional quality of his work, was awarded $1,424,283.75,

or over thirty percent of all fees awarded to the PMC.

Each of the six investing members of the PMC was award-

ed a much lower percentage of the entire PMC fee award,

with one investor being awarded only $41,886. The high-

est award to an investor was $515,163.

Once the fee sharing agreement was applied to these

awards, however, the amount of fees each PMC member

Wx. to receive changed dramatically. In Dean’s case, ap-

plication of the agreement reduced his award to $542,310,

a reduction of $881,973. In contrast, Newton Schwartz,

an investing member of the PMC to whom the district

court awarded $41,886, was now to receive $513,026,

equivalent to an hourly rate of $1,224.81. The awards

to all other investing members were similarly enhanced

the individual’s and/or firm’s fee award bears to the total fees

awarded.

In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1452,

1454 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Revised Fee-Sharing Agreement,

Dec. 13, 1984).

8a

and, in turn, the awards to the two other non-investing

members were diminished, resulting in a distortion of the

district court’s individual PMC member fee awards. The

total of all fees awarded by the court to the members of

the PMC, of course, remained unchanged.’

In May of 1985, Dean moved in the district court to

overturn the fee sharing agreement, claiming that it vio-

lated professional ethics and did not protect the rights of

the class. In a Memorandum and Order issued June 27,

1985, the court denied Dean’s motion and upheld the

agreement, albeit with some reluctance. The court found,

as a factual matter, that no conflict of interest had arisen

in the litigation from the fee sharing agreement and, con-

sequently, that the interests of the class in obtaining a

fair and reasonable settlement had not been impinged.

Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1461. Initially, the court

recognized its obligation to review the agreement in its

capacity as protector of the rights of the plaintiff class.

It then went on to examine the propriety of the agreement

2. The effect of the fee sharing agreement on the district court’s

fee awards to the individual PMC members is shown by the follow-

ing chart.

Amount of Fees Amount of Fees Net Effect

Awarded by Awarded Under of the

District Court the Agreement Agreement

Dean (noninvestor) $1,424,283 $542,310 - $881,973

Schlegel (noninvestor ) 944,448 393,312 - 549,136

Musslewhite (noninvestor ) 344,657 206,991 - 137,666

Schwartz (investor) 41,886 513,026 + 471,140

O’Quinn (investor) 132,576 541,128 + 408,552

Brown (investor) 348,331 608,162 + 259,831

Locks (investor) 487,208 651,339 + 164,171

Chesley (investor) 475,080 647,534 + 172,456

Henderson (investor) 515,163 659,975 + 144,812

Brief for Appellant at 8.

9a

under DR 2-107(A) and DR 5-103 of the ABA Code

and the practical effect of the agreement on the PMC’s

representation of the class.

As to DR 2-107(A), which prohibits an attorney from

splitting his fee with another attorney not of the same

firm unless he has the consent of his client and the “di-

vision is made in proportion to the service performed and

responsibility assumed by each,” the court determined that

the PMC should be viewed as an ad hoc law firm “formed

for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange multi-

district litigation,” Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1458.

The court reasoned that the business realities of the liti-

gation required the PMC to be able to perform those

functions ordinarily performed by actual law firms, such

as splitting fees among its members. The district court

also noted that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct

(“Model Rules”) adopted by the ABA in 1983, although

not adopted in New York, reflect “an increased recogni-

tion” of these business realities by permitting fee sharing

agreements based upon services rendered or upon written

acceptance of joint responsibility by the attorneys if the

client is advised of the participation and does not object

and the total fee is reasonable. Model Rule 1.5(e). Rec-

ognizing the practical problem of client consent in class

actions, however, the district court concluded that its duty

to protect the rights of the class ordinarily could not be

performed unless the attorneys involved notified the court

of the existence of such an agreement “as soon as pos-

sible,” Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1459.

As to DR 5-103, which prohibits an attorney from

acquiring a proprietary interest in an action in which he

is involved, the court found that the investing members

10a

acquired no independent interest in the action because

the financial return from any initial advance for expenses

was to be paid from the fees otherwise awarded to the

PMC members, and thus would not affect the class fund.

While the court did recognize that a conflict of interest

could arise from such an agreement, it cautioned that

complex class actions require a more sophisticated analysis

of ethical codes than ordinary two-party cases in order

not to “unnecessarily discourage counsel from undertak-

ing the expensive and protracted complex multiparty lit-

igation often needed to vindicate the rights of a class.”

Id. at 1460. Accordingly, the district court held that a

case-by-case analysis of such fee sharing agreements to

identify potential conflicts of interest should be adopted.

The court conceded that an agreement of the sort

before it conceivably could create an interest on the part

of the investors to settle early, regardless of the benefit

to, or interest of, the class. This is because an attorney

whose fee is based upon the amount of funds advanced

for expenses in an action will receive the same fees

“whether the case is settled today or five years from now.”

Id. The court reasoned, however, that any possible in-

terest to settle early would have been offset by the theo-

retical incentive to extend such litigation created by the

lodestar formula and concluded that, as a factual matter,

no conflict had arisen here.

The court then set forth five additional, though non-

dispositive, reasons for approving the agreement. First,

the returns on the investments did not affect the class

fund, since they were paid from the fee awards of PMC

members. Second, the court r-cognized that the “business”

of law will at times require creative, yet ethical, methods

lla

for economical and efficient operation. Third, without

the funds advanced by the PMC members, it was possible

that the litigation would have collapsed and neither the

attorneys nor the class would receive any payments.

Fourth, the court noted that the PMC members could

have earned substantial returns, though not quite three-

fold, on these same funds if they had undertaken more

traditional investments. Fifth, if the PMC members had

received the amount of fees requested in their joint

petition, nearly thirty million dollars, the extent of the

distortion of the fees by the investment agreement would

have been insubstantial.

In sum, the district court determined that the practical

needs of this form of litigation required an inventive

method of fund raising in order to guarantee effective

representation of class rights. At the same time, however,

it labeled as “troubling” the PMC’s failure to inform the

court of the existence of the agreement until months

after a settlement had been reached. /d. at 1462. In light

of class counsel’s fiduciary obligations to the class and

the court’s role as guardian of class rights in relation to

settlement review, the district court found that both the

class and the court had a right to be notified of the exist-

ence of such an agreement. To this end, the court pro-

claimed that in all future cases, class counsel would be

obligated to make the existence of a fee sharing agree-

ment known to the court at the time of its formation.

II. DISCUSSION

Dean’s appeal presents an issue of first impression:

whether an undisclosed, consensual fee sharing agreement,

which adjusts the distribution of court awarded fees in

amounts which represent a multiple of the sums advanced

12a

by attorneys to a class for litigation expenses, satisfies the

principles governing fee awards and is consistent with

the interests of the class.

{[1, 2] At the outset, we note that the fees in this

case were awarded pursuant to the equitable fund doc-

trine, first set forth in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.

(15 Otto) 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882), and Central

Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 5 S. Ct.

387, 28 L.Ed. 915 (1885). The underlying rationale

for the doctrine is the belief that an attorney who creates

a fund for the benefit of a class should receive reasonable

compensation from the fund for his efforts. Central Rail-

road, 113 U.S. at 125. Because the calculation of fees

necessarily will affect the funds available to the class,

this circuit has adopted a lodestar formula for fee com-

putation. Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099; Grinnell I,

495 F.2d at 471. The lodestar seeks to protect the

interests of the class by tying fees to the “actual effort

made by the attorney to benefit the class.” Grinnell II,

560 F.2d at 1099. Accordingly, fees are calculated by

taking the number of hours reasonably billed and multi-

plying that figure by an hourly rate “normally charged

for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area.”

Id. at 1098. Once calculated, the court may, in its dis-

cretion, increase or decrease this figure by examining

such factors as the quality of counsel’s work, the risk

of the litigation and the complexity of the issues. /d.

Discretion to adjust the lodestar figure upward because

of superior quality, however, is limited to exceptional

situations and must be supported by “specific evidence”

and “detailed findings” by the district court. Pennsylvania

v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clear Air,

U.S.— ., 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439

13a

(1986). Adherence to these principles is essential not

only to avoid awarding windfall fees to counsel, but also

to “avoid every appearance of having done so,” Grinnell

I, 495 F.2d at 469.

[3, 4] Of equal importance to our analysis is Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(e), which requires court approval of any settle-

ment of a class action suit and squarely places the court

in the role of protector of the rights of the class when

such a settlement is reached and attorneys’ fees are

awarded. Grinnell IT, 560 F.2d at 1099. In fulfilling this

role, courts should look to the various codes of ethics

as guidelines for judging the conduct of counsel. Agent

Orange I, 611 F. Supp. at 1456. In addition, where only

retrospective review of counsel’s conduct is available,

courts should not be limited to an examination of the

actual effects of such conduct on the litigation, but rather

as the ABA Code and Grinnell I imply, the appearance

and potential effect of the conduct should be reviewed

as well. See Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469; ABA Code of

Professional Responsibility Canon 9 (1975).

[5] The ultimate inquiry, therefore, in examining fee

agreements and setting fee awards under the equitable

fund doctrine and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), is the effect an

agreement could have on the rights of a class. Because

we find that the agreement here conflicts substantially

with the principles of reasonable compensation in com-

mon fund actions set forth in Grinnell I and Grinnell II,

and that it places class counsel in a potentially conflicting

position in relation to the interests of the class, we

reverse.

Initially, it is beyond doubt that the agreement, by

tying the fee to be received by individual PMC members

l4a

to the amounts each advanced for expenses, completely

distorted the lodestar approach to fee awards. In setting

fees here, the district judge meticulously examined coun-

sel’s fee petitions in accordance with the Grinnell deci-

sions and arrived at individual awards for each PMC

member based upon the services that each had provided

for the class. By providing for threefold returns of ad-

vanced expenses, however, the agreement vitiated these

principles. The distortion was so substantial as to in-

crease the fees awarded to one investor by over twelve

times that which the district judge had determined to be

just and reasonable, and, in a second case, to decrease

the otherwise just and reasonable compensation of a non-

investor by nearly two-thirds.

There is authority for a court under certain circum-

stances, to award a lump sum fee to class counsel in an

equitable fund action under the lodestar approach and

then to permit counsel to divide this lodestar-based fee

among themselves under the terms of a private fee sharing

agreement. E.g., Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71-3169, slip op.

at 10-13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1981); In re Magic Marker

Securities Litigation, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.

Rep. (CCH) {€ 97,116, at 96,195 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16,

1979); Valente v. Pepsico, inc., [1979 Transfer Binder]

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) € 96,921, at 95,863 (D. Del.

June 4, 1979), appeal dismissed, 614 F.2d 772 (3d Cir.

1980); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D.

395, 400 (D.D.C. 1978); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.,

457 F.Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). We reject

this authority, however, to the extent it allows counsel

to divide the award among themselves in any manner

they deem satisfactory under a private fee sharing agree-

ment. Such a division overlooks the district court’s role

15a

as protector of class interests under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)

and its role of assuring reasonableness in the awarding

of fees in equitable fund cases. See Kamens v. Horizon

Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

§ 98,007, at 91,218 & n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1981);

Steiner v. BOC Financial Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder]

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 4 97,656, at 98,490 (S.D.

N.Y. Oct. 10, 1980); cf. Jones v. Amalgamated War-

basse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1983)

(“if the court finds good reason to do so, it may reject

an agreement as to attorneys’ fees just as it may reject

an agreement as to the substantive claims”), cert. denied,

466 U.S. 944, 104 S. Ct. 1929, 80 L.Ed.2d 474 (1984).

In addition, this approach overlooks the class attorneys’

“duty . . . to be sure that the court, in passing on [the]

fee application, has all the facts” as well as their “fiduci-

ary duty to the . . . class not to overreach.” Lewis vy.

Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

A careful examination of those decisions permitting

internal fee sharing agreements to govern the distribution

of fees reveals no case where return on investment was

a factor. More important, in a number of those cases

the courts apparently assumed that the internal fee shar-

ing agreement would be based substantially on services

rendered by individual counsel. E.g., Ruskay, slip op.

at 14 n. 4 (“Since the court has satisfied itself that the

proposed distribution will not result in compensation

beyond services performed, it declines to overrule the

agreement.”); Jn re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81

F.R.D. at 400 (“Since the fee application purports to be

based upon the rates and time spent by the several at-

torneys, it is presumed that these factors also weigh

heavily in this internal agreement.”).

16a

[6] Accordingly, while the practice of allowing class

counsel to distribute a general fee award in an equitable

fund case among themselves pursuant to a fee sharing

agreement is unexceptional, we find that any such agree-

ment must comport essentially with those principles of

fee distribution set forth in Grinnell I and Grinnell II.

This does not mean that a fee sharing agreement must

replicate the individual awards made to PMC members

under the district court’s lodestar analysis. Even after

the court makes the allocation, the attorneys may be

in a better position to judge the relative input of their

brethren and the value of their services to the class.

See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at

400. Nor does this mean that class counsel need follow,

line by line, the lodestar formula in arriving at an agree-

ment as to fee distribution. Obviously, the needs of large

class litigation may at times require class counsel, in

assessing the relative value of an individual attorney’s

contribution, to turn to factors more subjective than a

mere hourly fee analysis. It does mean that the distribu-

tion of fees must bear some relationship to the services

rendered.

In our view, fees that include a return on investment

present the clear potential for a conflict of interest be-

tween class counsel and those whom they have under-

taken to represent. “[W]henever an attorney is confronted

with a potential for choosing between actions which may

benefit himself financially and an action which may bene-

fit the class which he represents there is a reasonable

possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety

will occur.” Zy/stra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d

102, 104 (Sth Cir. 1978). The concern is not necessarily

in isolating instances of major abuse, but rather is “for

17a

those situations, short of actual abuse, in which the client’s

interests are somewhat encroached upon by the attorney’s

interests.” Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the

Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 266 (Oct. 8,

1985). Such conflicts are not only difficult to discern

from the terms of a particular settlement, but “even the

parties may not be aware that [they exist] at the time

of their [settlement] discussions,” id. This risk is magnified

in the class action context, where full disclosure and con-

sent are many times difficult and frequently impractical

to obtain. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,

93 F.R.D. 485, 490-91 (D. Md. 1982); Gould v. Lumon-

ics Research Ltd., 495 F.Supp. 294, 297 n. 6 (N.D. II.

1980).

[7] The district court recognized that the agreement

provided an incentive for the PMC to accept an early

settlement offer not in the best interests of the class, be-

cause “[a]n attorney who is promised a multiple of funds

advanced will receive the same return whether the case

is settled today or five years from now.” Agent Orange

I, 611 F.Supp. at 1460. Given the size and complexity

of the litigation, it seems apparent that the potential for

abuse was real and should have been discouraged. Unlike

the district court, however, we conclude that the risk of

such an adverse effect on the settlement process provides

adequate grounds for invalidating the agreement as being

inconsistent with the interests of the class. The conflict

obviously lies in the incentive provided to an investor-

attorney to settle early and thereby avoid work for which

full payment may not be authorized by the district court.

Moreover, as soon as an offer of settlement to cover the

promised return on investment is made, the investor-

attorney will be disinclined to undertake the risks asso-

18a

ciated with continuing the litigation. The conflict was

especially egregious here, since six of the nine PMC

members were investing parties to the agreement.

[8] The district court’s factual finding, that the ade-

quacy of the settlement demonstrated that the agreement

had no effect on the PMC’s conduct, is not dispositive.

The district court’s retrospective appraisal of the adequacy

of the settlement cannot be the standard for review. The

test to be applied is whether, at the time a fee sharing

agreement is reached, class counsel are placed in a posi-

tion that might endanger the fair representation of their

clients and whether they will be compensated on some

basis other than for legal services performed. Review

based on a fairness of settlement test would not ensure

the protection of the class against potential conflicts of

interest, and, more important, would simply reward

counsel for failing to inform the court of the existence

of such an agreement until after a settlement.

We also reject the district court’s finding that its author-

ity to approve settlement offers under Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(e) acts to limit the threat to the class from a potential

conflict of interest. At this late stage of the litigation,

both class counsel and defendants seek approval of the

settlement. The court’s attention properly is directed to-

ward the overall reasonableness of the offer. and not

necessarily to whether class counsel have placed them-

selves in a potentially conflicting position with the class.

It would be difficult indeed for a court at this stage to

hold that, regardless of the terms of the settlement, class

counsel had not fulfilled its obligation to the class. Given

this focus and other administrative concerns that may

come to bear, we find the approval authority, in this con-

19a

text, to be insufficient to assure that the ongoing interests

of the class are protected. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby,

333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dis-

senting) (at this stage of litigation, “[a]ll the dynamics

conduce to judicial approval of such settlements”), cert.

dismissed, 384 U.S. 28, 86 S. Ct. 1250, 16 L.Ed.2d 335

(1966); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,

93 F.R.D. at 491 (court authority to review settlement

offers not adequate to safeguard against dangers of con-

flict of interest); Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The

Plaintiff As Monitor In Shareholder Litigation, 48 Law

& Contemp. Probs. 5, 26-27 (Summer 1985) (judicial

review not a significant barrier to collusive settlements).

Equally unpersuasive is the district court’s determin-

ation that the potential incentive to settle early is offset

by an incentive, fostered by the lodestar formula, to pro-

long the litigation. While a number of commentators have

asserted that use of the lodestar formula encourages

counsel to prolong litigation for the purpose of billing

more hours, e.g., Wolfram, The Second Set of Players:

Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limit of Proportional Dis-

cipline, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 293, 302 (Winter

1984), the formula’s effect in this regard is far from clear,

See Coffee, supra, at 34-35 (“the claim that the lodestar

formula results in excessive fees is nonetheless a red

herring”); Mowrey, Attorneys Fees In Securities Class

Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J.Corp.Law. 267, 343-48

(1978) (attorneys’ fees awards by district courts have

not risen since adoption of lodestar analysis); see also 7B

C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Pratice and

Procedure § 1803, at 508 (1986) (no empirical data

show any incidence of district courts awarding excessive

fees). Moreover, the court’s authority in reviewing fee

20a

petitions and approving or disapproving hours billed in

an equitable fund action works as a substantial and direct

check on counsel’s alleged incentive to procrastinate. In

re Equity Funding Corporation of America Securities

Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1977);

7B C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 1803, at

511. Consequently, we do not view the lodestar system as

countervailing the clear interest in early settlement created

by the private agreement.

[9] Additionally, potential conflicts of interest in class

contexts are not examined solely for the actual abuse they

may cause, but also for potential public misunderstand-

ings they may cultivate in regard to tthe interests of class

counsel. Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d

86, 95 (7th Cir. 1977); Prandini v. National Tea Co.,

557 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1977). While today we

hold that the settlement reached here falls within that

range of reasonableness permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(e), we are not insensitive to the perception of many

class members and the public in general that it does not

adequately compensate the individual veterans and their

families for whatever harm Agent Orange may have

caused. To be sure, the settlkement does not provide the

individual veteran or his family substantial compensation.

Given the facts of this settlement, the potentially negative

public perception of an agieement that awards an invest-

ing PMC member over twelve times the amount the

district court has determined to be the value of his services

to the class provides additional justification for invalidat-

ing the agreement and applying the lodestar formula.

[10,11] We find the various additional rationales for

approving the fee sharing agreement set out in the district

2la

court’s decision equally unpersuasive. First, the fact that

the returns on the advanced expenses did not directly

affect the class fund is of little consequence, since we have

already determined that the district court’s responsibility

under Grinnell I and Grinnell I, as well as under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(e), goes beyond concern for only the over-

all amount of fees awarded and requires attention to the

fees allocated to individual class counsel. Second, while

we sympathize with counsel regarding the business deci-

sions they must make in operating an efficient and man-

ageable practice and agree that a certain flexibility on the

court’s part is essential, we are not inclined to extend this

flexibility to encompass situations in which the bases for

awarding fees in an equitable fund action are so clearly

distorted. Third, whether this class action would have

collapsed without an agreement calling for a threefold

return is a matter of speculation. Any such collapse, how-

ever, would have been due to the pervasive weaknesses in

the plaintiffs’ case. Fourth, we find wholly unconvincing

the district court’s suggestion that the investors could

have made a sizeable return on their funds if they had

invested them in other ventures. We take notice of the fact

that a threefold return on one’s money is a rather gen-

erous return in any market over a short period of time.

Fifth, while the effect of this fee sharing agreement might

have been dwarfed to the point of insignificance if the fees

awarded to counsel had been much greater, this simply

is too speculative to defend the agreement as not affecting

the interests of the class. Finally, we do not find class

counsel to have formed an ad hoc partnership. They

merely are a group of individual lawyers and law firms

associated in the prosecution of a single lawsuit, and they

lack the ongoing relationship that is the essential element

of attorneys practicing as partners.

22a

[12] We do not agree with the district court’s ruling

that in all future class actions counsel must inform the

court of the existence of a fee sharing agreement at the

time it is formulated. This holding may well diminish

many of the dangers posed to the rights of the class. Only

by reviewing the agreement prospectively will the district

courts be able to prevent potential confiicts from arising,

either by disapproving improper agreements or by reshap-

ing them with the assistance of counsel to conform more

closely with the principles of Grinnell I and Grinnell II.

In the present case, however, where the district court was

not made aware of the agreement, and the potential for a

conflict of interest arising was substantial, the adoption

of a rule for future cases in no way alleviates the fatal

flaws of this agreement and does not offset the need for

its invalidation.

Although appellant Dean is successful on this appeal,

his conduct has been far from praiseworthy. He freely

consented to the formation of the agreement in December

of 1983 and later to its revision in 1984. He did not even

inform the district court of the existence of the agreement

or of his objections to it until long after the settlement

was reached. If he had called the agreement into question

immediately, a great deal of time and expense could have

been saved.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Having determined that the fee sharing agreement

violates the principles for awarding fees in an equitable

fund action and places class counsel in a position poten-

tially in conflict with the interests of the class which they

represent, we reverse. We award all the PMC members

the fees to which the district court determined they were

entitled.

ee Se a

Cre ees

23a

EXHIBIT B

In re “AGENT ORANGE” PRODUCT

LIABILITY LITIGATION.

(Appeal of ATTORNEYS’ FEE AWARDS).

No. 1097, Dockets 85-6305, 85-6325, 85-6343,

85-6345, 85-6347, 85-6351, 85-6353, 85-6355,

85-6357, 85-6359, 85-6361, 85-6363, 85-6383,

85-6389 and 85-6397.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued April 10, 1986.

Decided April 21, 1987.

Appeal was taken from order of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York,

Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge, 611 F.Supp. 1296, which

awarded attorney fees from fund resulting from settle-

ment of Agent Orange class action against manufacturers.

The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that:

(1) Court’s across-the-board reduction in certain expenses

and billable hours was proper; (2) use of national hourly

rates was proper; (3) awards based on $150 per hour

for partners, $100 per hour for associates, and $125 per

hour for law professors were adequate; (4) Court did

not abuse its discretion in awarding multipliers for quality

to six members of plaintiffs’ management committee;

(5) Court properly declined to award risk multiplier;

but (6) Court should not have abrogated award to one

24a

firm because of that firm’s use of discovery materials

obtained in class litigation to represent clients who had

opted out of the class.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Paul M. Bernstein, New York City (Bernstein Litowitz

Berger & Grossmann, New York City, Edward A. Gross-

mann and Penny P. Domow, New York City, of counsei),

for appellant Agent Orange Plaintiffs’ Management Com-

mittee.

Edward F. Hayes, III, Huntington, N.Y. for appellants

McMillan, Bigg, Lonnie, Davison and MacLaren.

Benton Musslewhite, Houston, Tex., pro se.

Robert A. Taylor, Jr., Washington, D.C. (Ashcraft &

Gerel, Wayne M. Mansulla, Washington, D.C., of coun-

sel) for appellant Ashcraft & Gerel.

Leon Friedman, Hempstead, N.Y., for appellants Dean,

Falanga & Rose.

Henderson & Goldberg, Pittsburgh, Pa., Thomas W.

Henderson and Antonio D. Pyle, Pittsburgh, Pa., of

counsel, for appellant Henderson & Goldberg, P.C.

Greitzer and Locks, Philadelphia, Pa., Neil R. Peterson,

Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel, for appellants Greitzer and

Locks, Schlegel & Trafelet, Henderson & Goldberg,

O’Quinn, Hagan & Whitman, Newton B. Schwartz, P.C.,

Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley and Hoberg, Finger,

Brown, Cox & Milligan.

Edward J. Nowakoski, West Caldwell, N.J., of counsel,

for appellant Kraft & Hughes.

= at. eg oe eee Dee, ~ *,

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4

;

:

‘

;

25a

Sullivan & Associates, Daniel C. Sullivan and Gregory

A. Stayart, Chicago, IIl., of counsel, for appellant Sullivan

& Associates, Ltd.

Stephen J. Schlegel, Chicago, IIl., pro se.

Richard D. Heideman, A. Thomas Johnson, Heideman

Law Offices, Louisville, Ky., of counsel, for appellant

Estate of Lowell M. Coffey.

Townley & Updike, New York City, Richard J. Barnes

and John E. Sabetta, New York City, of counsel, for

appellee Monsanto Co.

Kelley Drye & Warren, New York City, William M.

Crowley and Patricia C. Tui, New York City, of counsel,

for appellee Hercules Inc.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER and MIN-

ER, Circuit Judges.

MINER, Circuit Judge:

Our discussion of the background and procedural his-

tory of this litigation appears in Judge Winter’s lead

opinion, 818 F.2d 145. The nine members of the Plain-

tiffs’ Management Committee (“PMC”) and various out-

side counsel appeal, on a number of grounds, the district

court’s decision setting attorneys’ fees. On June 18, 1985,

the district court issued an amended order, awarding over

seven million dollars in fees and three million dollars in

expenses to eighty-eight attorneys and law firms involved

in the action. In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability

Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Agent

Orange’). The nine members of the PMC, individually

and as a group, challenge the district court’s use of a

national hourly rate in calculating the fee awards under

26a

the lodestar formula set forth in City of Detroit v. Grinnell

Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (“Grinnell I’), and

City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d

Cir. 1977) (“Grinnell II’), the level of the quality multi-

pliers it set, and its failure to apply a risk multiplier to

the fee awards and to credit certain hours and expenses.

Four outside counsel challenge the district court’s findings

as to the value of their work to the class and the decision

to abrogate various contingency fee arrangements be-

tween counsel and certain class members. For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In May of 1984, on the eve of trial, a settlement was

reached with the chemical company defendants, calling

for the establishment of a $180 million dollar fund for

the benefit of the class. By order dated June 11, 1984,

the district court required fee petitions to be filed no later

than August 31, 1984, and scheduled hearings on the

petitions for the early fall. Notice of Proposed Settlement

of Class Action, reprinted in In re “Agent Orange”

Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 867 (E.D.

N.Y. 1984). Pursuant to this procedure, well over 100

attorneys and law firms filed petitions, claiming tens of

thousands of hours of work performed for the benefit

of the class. The fee petitions fell into three categories:

those filed by the nine members of the PMC; those filed

by members of Yannacone and Associates, the original

consortium of attorneys in charge of the action; and those

filed by attorneys not connected with any court-appointed

entity representing the class.

In reviewing fee petitions, the district court developed

guidelines falling into two categories—one covering the

27a

hours to be credited for work performed and the other

covering the expenses to be reimbursed. The hourly guide-

lines were as follows:

1. Court Time: One half of the time requested for

review of court orders was permitted on the ground

that the majority of court orders were made in open

court or after extensive briefing. Telephone confer-

ence time with court personnel was awarded in full,

except that no time was awarded for conferences

relating to internal management difficulties of the

PMC. Attendance at, and preparation for, court

hearings was awarded in full. Review of hearing

transcripts was awarded in full for those attorneys

attending the hearing. Nonattending attorneys were

awarded for only half such time. Travel to and from

hearings and court appearances also was awarded

on a fifty percent basis.

2. Management Committee Meetings: All time for

PMC meetings on substantive issues was permitted.

Travel to and from such meetings was awarded on

a fifty percent basis. No time was awarded for

meetings on nonsubstantive topics. The same division

was made for telephone conferences among PMC

members.

3. Educational Reading: Time for review of scien-

tific materials relating to the causation issue and

other issues in the case was awarded on a fifty

percent basis on the ground that such knowledge

could be used by counsel in future cases.

4. Depositions: Half of the time was awarded for

travel to and from depositions, for attendance by

nonparticipating attorneys, and for review and read-

ing. All time for preparing and summarizing depo-

sitions was granted. No limit on the length of depo-

sitions was enforced.

28a

5. Document Preparation: All time for review and

preparation of legal documents was awarded, except

that those hours used to prepare documents con-

cerning internal PMC organizational issues were not

credited.

6. Mail: If a short period of time for review of a

substantial amount of mail was requested, no time

was awarded under the assumption that counsel

simply was opening the mail. If a lengthy period of

time was claimed for review of only a few letters, all

time was credited under the assumption that counsel

was reviewing a letter brief.

7. Intra-Firm Conferences: This time was credited

on a fifty percent basis when related to substantive

issues.

Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1320-21, 1350-51. The

expense guidelines were as follows:

1. Travel: Documented expenses for hotels were

reimbursed at ninety dollars per day. Meals were

reimbursed at fifty dollars per day and twenty dollars

per day if the attorney was in his home city.

2. Paralegal Time: Paralegals were treated as an

expense and reimbursed at a rate of twenty dollars

per hour.

3. Out-of-Pocket Expenses: Telephone, mailing, du-

plication and similar expenses were reimbursed in

full if adequately documented.

4. Percentage Approval: When counsel submitted

adequate documentation to prove expenses but were

unable to establish that those expenses were all

related to compensable activity, expenses were reim-

bursed on a percentage basis.

5. “ees for Non-Causation Experts: A cap of

$5,000 per expert was set on the ground that their

7 Sms

tee Cink

29a

input was not substantial and not reasonably related

to class interests.

Id. at 1321-22, 1351.

Following these guidelines and applying the lodestar

formula for calculating attorneys’ fees in an equitable

fund action, see Grinnell 1, 495 F.2d at 471, the district

court awarded $10,767,443.63 in individual fees and ex-

penses to various counsel who, in the ceurt’s view had

performed work beneficial to the class. In arriving at the

lodestar figure, the court employed national hourly rates

of $150 for the work of a partner, $100 for the work of

an associate, and $125 for the work of a law professor.

Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1326. The court, in its

discretion, further applied quality multipliers, ranging

from 1.50 to 1.75, to the fees allowed various members

of the PMC and other counsel who had exhibited excep-

tional skill in the litigation and settlement negotiations.

Id. at 1328. The district judge, however, declined to apply

a risk multiplier to the lodestar figure. /d.

Not satisfied with these awards, two groups of attorneys,

including the PMC, now raise numerous objections on

appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. PMC Members

The district court awarded the individual members of

the PMC an aggregate of $4,713,635.50 in fees and

$650,356.97 in individual expenses. In addition, the court

awarded the PMC, as a whole, expenses in the sum of

$1,711,155.87. These attorneys now raise four specific

challenges to their individual awards.

30a

1. National Hourly Rates

Faced with a flood of fee petitions from counsel located

in all regions of the country, the district court utilized

national! hourly rates for calculating the fee awards for

each attorney. While it recognized that the general rule

for fee calculation in this circuit requires the use of “the

hourly rate normally charged for similar work by attor-

neys of like skill in the area,” Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at

1098, the district court noted that special problems arise

“in applying this general standard in a complex multi-

district litigatior that is national in scope, involves coun-

sel from all over the country and extends over many years

during which the rates for particular lawyers and classes

of lawyers are changing,” Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at

1308.

Specifically, the court pointed out that if the general

rule were interpreted to require imposition of the rates

normally imposed within the district, the rule would make

little sense in the context of this action, given that the

vast majority of counsel involved were non-local. Alterna-

tively, if the rule were interpreted to require imposition

of varying rates depending upon the location of each

counsel’s practice, the district judge perceived that such

a rule would minimize the court’s familiarity with the

rates to be awarded, require an almost unworkable case-

by-case review of such rates, and consistently benefit non-

local counsel at the expense of the class fund. The district

judge concluded that in large multiparty litigation, where

substantial numbers of specialized non-local attorneys are

involved, utilization of a national hourly rate is appro-

priate because it “recognizes the national character of the

lawsuit and of class counsel while retaining a vitally im-

SaaS ee Ee DSP ER win’

aR REZ esc a ESD ul

iat tas

3la

portant administrative simplicity together with an essential

neutrality of result as between fee applicants and fund

beneficiaries.” Id. at 1309.

Relying on five separate sources, the district court

developed the national rates to be applied in this action.

First, the court considered data compiled in the National

Law: Journal Directory of the Legal Profession (B. Ger-

son, M. Liss & P. Cunningham eds. 1984), a periodical

that provided rate information concerning law firms of

fifty or more attorneys throughout the country as of March

1983. Second, the court reviewed the submissions of coun-

sel, in particular the defendants’ Memorandum Concern-

ing Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Applications for Attorneys’ Fees

and for Reimbursement of Expenses, which provided

further information on national rates. Third, the court

reviewed various surveys of law firm economics, dated

1980 through 1984, and other periodicals relating to the

manner in which firms bill their clients. Fourth, the court

took notice of its own experience in setting fee awards

in class actions. Finally, the district judge reviewed recent

fee awards by other courts to understand more fully the

manner in which other jurisdictions set appropriate rates.

Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1325-28 (citing, inter alia,

In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 590

n. 22 (3d Cir. 1984); Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749

F.2d 945, 955-56 (1st Cir. 1984)). From an analysis of

this data, the district court arrived at national hourly

rates of $150 for partners, $100 for associates and $125

for law professors.

The members of the PMC challenge the use of national

rates on the ground that they do not comport with the

principles governing attorneys’ fee awards in equitable

32a

fund actions. They assert that the practice in this and

other circuits required the court to review independently

the hourly rate for each attorney in order to ensure that

he was compensated at a level commensurate with that

of other counsel of like skill in the area in which he prac-

tices. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 590-91

(classifying application of national hourly rates as legal

error on the grounds that the district court presented no

evidentiary basis for their establishment and such rates

ignored the market rates that the attorneys would com-

mand in their respective communities). Relying on large

class action cases in other circuits where courts have

awarded varying rates to counsel from different localities,

e.g., In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities

Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977), they

argue that, while the task may be a difficult one, other

jurisdictions routinely undertake it.

[1] In passing on the efficacy of national hourly rates,

we note that fees in this action were awarded under the

equitable fund doctrine, which seeks to ensure that coun-

sel who have performed services beneficial to the class

receive fair and just compensation for their respective

efforts. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 527,

536, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882). In order to provide counsel

with such compensation and, at the same time, temper

these awards to prevent windfalls, we have adopted a lode-

star formula for calculating fees in equitable fund and

statutory fee contexts. Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099;

Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469-71. Under the formula, the

district court initially multiples the number of hours rea-

sonably billed by the hourly rate normally charged for

equivalent work by similarly-skilled attorneys in the area.

Grinnell I1, 560 F.2d at 1098. Once calculated, the dis-

9

a

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3

=

s

e

s

Ef

33a

trict court then may, in its discretion, upwardly or down-

wardly adjust this figure by considering such factors as

the quality of counsel’s work, the probability of success

of the litigation and the complexity of the issues. Id.

While at least one circuit looks to the rates employed

in the area in which the attorney practices, Cunningham

v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 1985),

we traditionally have interpreted Grinnell I and Grinnell

II as requiring use of the hourly rates employed in the

district in which the reviewing court sits. Polk v. New

York State Department of Correctional Services, 722 F.

2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). We generally have adhered

to this rule whether the attorney involved was local or

non-local. Id.; accord Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d

240, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

1204, 103 S.Ct. 1190, 75 L.Ed.2d 436 (1983); Chrapli-

wy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 768-69 (7th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956, 103 S.Ct. 2428, 77

L.Ed.2d 1315 (1983); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thomp-

son, 689 F.2d 137, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc).

We and other circuits have strayed from this rule only

in the rare case where the “special expertise” of non-local

counsv. was essential to the case, it was clearly shown

that local counsel was unwilling to take the case, or other

special circumstances existed. Polk, 722 F.2d at 25; Ava-

lon Cinema, 689 F.2d at 140-41.

[2] Accordingly, the issue for review here is’ whether

the district court erred in deviating from this established

precedent. While we concede that such conduct in the

ordinary case would constitute legal error and require

recalculation of the lodestar, we conclude that, in an ex-

ceptional multi-party case such ds this, where dozens of

34a

non-local counsel from all parts of the country are in-

volved, public policy and administrative concerns call for

the district court to be given the necessary flexibility to

impose a national hourly rate when an adequate factual

basis for calculating the rate exists.

An examination of the alternatives to the use of na-

tional rates in large multiparty class actions of this sort

readily establishes the necessity for affording district courts

this discretion. Use of our forum rule would distort dra-

matically the purposes of the lodestar calculation itself—

to ensure fair and just compensation to counsel and to

prevent the award of windfall fees. This distortion would

occur because, in cases in which the vast majority of

attorneys involved are non-local, the forum rule neces-

sarily will either overcompensate or undercompensate a

substantial number of non-local attorneys. Undercompen-

sation could deny counsel their right to fair and just fees;

Overcompensation would not be consistent with the need

to prevent windfalls. Adherence to the forum rule in cases

in which the inherent limitations of the rule are magni-

fied, i.e., where few local counsel and vast numbers of

non-local counsel are involved, therefore, makes little

sense.

Resort to a varying approach, depending upon the area

in which the individual practices, fares no better. In an

action of the magnitude of Agent Orange, in which well

over one hundred fee petitions were filed by counsel

throughout the country, such an approach would pose

an administrative nightmare for the district court. As the

district judge here noted, “[slimplicity becomes an espec-

ially important goal in a complex case involving a hund-

red or more fee applications and tens of thousands of

Dlr Rien, sek white D HG EES wale eae Re A AbD.

35a

pages of supporting documentation and requiring a num-

ber of years for prosecution during which rates for par-

ticular attorneys and geographic locations change in differ-

ent ways.” Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1308. While ad-

ministrative interests normally should not be the primary

concern of a court in formulating substantive rules of re-

view, we observe that the attorney-by-attorney approact

recommended by the PMC simply would over-tax the

capacity of a district court to review fee petitions ade-

quately. Cf. New York Association for Retarded Children

v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983) (burden-

saving measures may be taken by district court in light

of voluminous fee petitions).

Although not a panacea, the use of national hourly

rates in exceptional multiparty cases of national scope,

where dozens of non-local counsel are involved, appears

to be the best available method of ensuring adherence to

the principles of the lodestar analysis. The risk of over-

compensation or undercompensation on a large scale,

apparent under the forum rule, is somewhat neutralized,

while, at the same time, the administrative burden on the

district court, apparent under the varying rate rule, is

reduced to a manageable level. In granting the district

court this discretion, however, we caution that such rates

should be employed only in the exceptional case present-

ing problems similar to those presented here. We further

caution that, even in similar cases, national hourly rates

should be employed only when the district court is pre-

sented with an adequate evidentiary basis on which to

fix such rates. Once the court is satisfied with the evidence,

it should make clear, factual findings that support its

determination.

36a

We are aware that at least one circuit has rejected the

imposition of national hourly rates on the ground that

they do not comport with the lodestar principle. In re

Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 591. To the extent, however, that

the Third Circuit’s decision was based upon the fact that

the national rates employed did not comport with that

circuit’s rule requiring the hourly rate to reflect the rate

normally charged in the locale in which counsel practices,

we already have rejected its analysis by following a forum

rate rule. See Polk, 722 F.2d at 25. In addition, Jn re

Fine Paper, though not entirely clear on this point, may

be read to condemn only national hourly rates not based

on an adequate evidentiary record. The Third Circuit,

in reversing the district court’s adoption of such rates,

indicated that the district court there had not referred to

any evidence supporting the existence of such rates, 751

F.2d at 590, and noted that “the subject is not one on

which judicial notice is appropriate,” id. If read in that

context, our decision is in accord with that of the Third

Circuit, since we limit the utilization of national rates to

those instances in which an adequate evidentiary basis

exists. Finally, even assuming that Jn re Fine Paper stands

for an absolute prohibition on the imposition of national

hourly rates, we note that, subsequent to that decision,

the Third Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded Attorney

Fees, organized at the behest of the Chief Judge of that

Circuit, recommended that the court permit the utilization

of such rates in exceptional cases. Court Awarded Attor-

ney Fees, Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237,

260-62 (Oct. 8, 1985).’

1. The Task Force made its recommendation in the context of

certain statutory fee cases. It also recommends the abolition of the

lodestar formula for equitable fund cases and suggests such fees be

based upon a percentage of the recovery. 108 F.R.D. at 254-59.

37a

[3] Given our determination that the utilization of na-

tional hourly rates in limited circumstances is proper, we

further conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in calculating the specific hourly rates in the

present case. In its decision, the court set forth the five

bases upon which it computed these rates. The PMC does

not challenge specifically those bases and we find little

reason to question them. Hourly rates for counsel in this

action were difficult to calculate because the majority of

attorneys involved normally would have been compen-

sated through contingency fee arrangements rather than

on an hourly basis. Difficulties aside, however, the dis-

trict judge, in our view, took adequate steps to ensure

a fair and just hourly rate of compensation. We therefore

hold that the national hourly rates of $150 for partners,

$100 for associates and $125 for law professors con-

stituted an element of fair and just compensation for

counsel in the context of this case.

2. Quality Multipliers

Having computed the initial lodestar figure, the district

court awarded discretionary quality multipliers of 1.5,

and in one case 1.75, to six members of the PMC on

the ground that these attorneys had exhibited exceptional

skills in the litigation and settlement negotiations. The

six PMC recipients now challenge the level of the mul-

tipliers as being unjustifiably low and further challenge

the district court’s failure to award quality multipliers in

connection with the fees of the three other PMC mem-

bers.

[4] The decision to ailow a quality multiplier rests in

the sound discretion of the district court, Hensley v. Eck-

38a

erhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.

Ed.2d 40 (1983); Grinnell II], 560 F.2d at 1098, due to

“the district court’s superior understanding of the litiga-

tion and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate

review of what essentially are factual matters.” Hensley,

461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct. at 1941. The Supreme Court,

however, in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 899, 104

S. Ct. 1541, 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), and more

recently in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council for Clear Air, USS. , 106 S. Ct. 3088,

92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986), has severely restricted those in-

stances in which a district court may allow such a multi-

plier.”

In Blum, a decision concerning application of the lode-

star analysis to a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the

Court determined that factors such as quality of repre-

sentation are presumed to be fully reflected in the initial

lodestar figure, derived by multiplying the number of

hours reasonably billed by the court-established hourly

rate. Blum, 465 U.S. at 899, 104 S. Ct. at 1549. Accord-

ingly, the Cuurt concluded that an adjustment to the lode-

star figure for such a factor would only be proper in “the

rare case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence

to show that the quality of service rendered was superior

to that one reasonably should expect in light of the hourly

rates charged and that the success was ‘exceptional.’ ” Id.

(emphasis added). In Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council,

a decision concerning application of the lodestar analysis

2. Blum and Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council are statutory fee

cases whereas here fees were awarded under the equitable fund

doctrine. While the lodestar formula applies to both types of cases,

equitable fund cases may afford courts more leeway in enhancing

the lodestar, given the absence of any legislative directive.

39a

to a fee award under section 304(d) of the Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(d) (West 1983), the Court

reaffirmed the narrow approach taken in Blum, declaring

that calculating fee awards under the lodestar analysis

“leaves very little room for enhancing the award based on

[counsel’s] post-engagement performance.” Delaware Val-

ley Citizens’ Council, 106 S. Ct. at 3098.

[5] Given these pronouncements, the issue, in our view,

is not whether the quality multipliers awarded by the

district court here were set too low, but rather whether

they should have been awarded at all. In what we con-

sider to be a close case, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the multi-

pliers for quality to six of the PMC members, or in fail-

ing to award them to the other three members.

The district court specifically found that these six

attorneys, as well as several outside counsel who have

not appealed, deserved to be awarded quality multipliers

at various rates because each had “demonstrated an

unusual degree of skill in presenting complex and often

novel issues to the court,” Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at

1328, or had “shown a level of organization and efficiency

that goes beyond what is usually expected,” id. Under

ordinary circumstances, even assuming the high level

of work performed by counsel here, we would be con-

Strained to reverse the district court’s award in light of

the severe restrictions set forth in Blum and Delaware

Valley Citizens’ Council. While the work indeed may have

been of high quality, the presumption is that such factors

already are reflected in the initial lodestar figure.

In this case, however, we find that the use of a national

hourly rate skews the normal lodestar analysis enough

40a

to require consideration of quality factors in order to

satisfy the requirements of just and fair compensation.

While we affirm the use of national rates in the present

case, we realize that such rates inherently cannot be

calculated as precisely as those under the forum rule,

or those under the varying locale rule. Consequently, the

Blum and Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council presumption

of inclusion of quality factors within the initial lodestar

figure should not, in our view, apply to those instances

in which the district court utilizes this less precise analysis.

3. Risk Multiplier

The district court declined to award a risk multiplier

to any attorney involved in the case. It reasoned that risk

of success should not be judged solely from the vantage

point of whether a complete recovery at the conclusion

of the action is viable, but also should include an evalu-

ation of the likelihood that the parties will reach a settle-

ment. In this regard, the court noted that it was probable

that the defendant chemical companies would settle the

case ‘to avoid the further burden of litigation and to

improve their respective financial pictures.” A gent Orange,

611 F.Supp. at 1311. The court also recognized that

awarding risk multipjiers in a case such as Agent Orange,

which held out little chance for a victory on the merits

but a significant chance of settlement, would fuel the

filing of nuisance litigation “in which settlement becomes

the main object and attorney fee awards an overpowering

motivating force.” /d.

Furthermore, the court indicated that strict application

of inversely proportionate risk multipliers to cases such

as Agent Orange, which it described as a high-risk case

of highly questionable merit, would lead to a confounding

7

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4la

disparity in the treatment of cases falling just above and

just below the standard for frivolousness under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11. Attorneys in successful cases bordering on

the frivolous, yet falling just above the proscriptions of

Rule 11, would be awarded the highest risk multipliers,

since the risk of success in such cases obviously would

be great. In contrast, counsel in similar cases falling just

below Rule 11’s proscriptions, would not only receive no

tisk multiplier, but also would be subject to court-imposed

sanctions for having brought such a case.

Finally, the court took note that, as a matter of public

policy, the need to utilize a risk multiplier in a given case

must be viewed in relation to the equally important con-

cerns of judicial administration and legal morality. To

this end, the refusal to allow a multiplier here would

force the legal community “to think at least twice before

initiating sprawling, complicated cases of highly question-

able merit that will consume time, expense and effort on

the part of all concerned, including the courts, in a degree

vastly disproportionate to the results eventually obtain-

able.” Jd. at 1312. While such a policy would not reward

the filing of these questionable cases, the court did note

that counsel’s entitlement to a lodestar award without a

multiplier would nonetheless serve adequately to encour-

age attorneys to represent plaintiffs in cases of this nature.

The PMC challenges the district court’s failure to allow

a risk multiplier on the fround that it does not comport

with principles of just and fair compensation. While con-

ceding that plaintiffs’ cases would have been difficult to

prove, the PMC members strongly take exception to the

district court’s description of the action as being of

dubious or questionable merit. As to the probability of

42a

the parties reaching a settlement in the action, the PMC

members point to the fact that such a settlement was not

reached until the eve of trial, and label as “economic

suicide” the notion that they advanced funds and spent

thousands of hours working on the case with some inner

assurance that defendants would make a reasonable settle-

ment proposal because of the bothersome nature of the

litigation.

[6] We have labeled the risk-of-success factor as

“perhaps the foremost” factor to be considered under the

second prong of the lodestar analysis. Grinnell I, 495

F.2d at 471. The multiplier takes into account the realties

of a legal practice by rewarding counsel for those success-

ful cases in which the probability of success was slight

and yet the time invested in the case was substantial. /d.;

see 7B C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 1803, at 524-27 (1986). As the chance

of success on the merits or by settlement increases, the

justification for using a risk multiplier decreases. Grinnell

I, 495 F.2d at 471. The need for this type of multiplier

is magnified when the “diminutive character of the indi-

vidual claims” forces counsel to bring the action on a

class basis. 7B C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra,

€ 1803, at 527. Without the prospect of some considera-

tion for the risks and uncertainties of the action, “the

necessary incentive [for prosecuting such a suit] would

be lacking and a major weapon for enforcing various

public policies would be blunted.” /d.

The problem with risk multipliers, however, is that they

tend to reward counsel for bringing actions of dubious

merit. If such multipliers are awarded on a perfectly pro-

portionate basis, i.e., the greater the chance that the case

43a

would not succeed theh higher the multiplier, “the net

effect . . . would be to make a marginal case as attractive

to bring as a very strong case.” Laffey v. Northwest Air-

lines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,

472 U.S. 1021, 105 S. Ct. 3488, 87 L.Ed.2d 622 (1985).

This in turn, would provide an incentive for counsel to

flood “the courts with unmeritorious litigation,” Mc-

Kinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th

Cir. 1984), “leading . . . to a situation in which every

conceivable claim would be litigated, subject only to the

ability of the courts to handle the burden,” Laffey, 746

F.2d at 27; accord Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in

Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L.J. 473, 491 (1981).

The net result, of course, would be a dilution of the judi-

ciary’s ability to handle those cases with potentially

meritorious claims.

[7,8] A court, therefore, in adjudging whether to

award a risk multiplier, should examine closely the nature

of the action in order to determine whether, as a matter

of public policy, it is the type of case worthy of judicial

encouragement. In our view, the case here clearly is not

and, consequently, we agree with the district court’s

decision not to impose a risk multiplier.

From the outset, the factual and legal difficulties

hindering the successful prosecution of plaintiffs’ case

have been staggering. Factual evidence of causation has

been at best tenuous and, if not for the last-minute settle-

ment, the military contractor defense would have pre-

vented class members from realizing any recovery at all.

When these significant weaknesses in plaintiffs’ case are

viewed in light of the sheer magnitude of the action and

the thousands of hours of court time that this type of

44a

action requires, it becomes clear that the federal courts

should not actively encourage the bar to file such dubious

actions in the future.

Besides matters of public policy, the settlement itself

presents a rationale for denying counsel’s request. While

today we hold that the settlement falls within the range

of reasonableness under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, we are aware

that the $180 million settlement provides a very small

return to the class in light of the claims asserted. In our

estimation, the relatively smali size of the settlement

reflects class counsel’s realization of the extreme difficulty

they would incur in overcoming the inherent weaknesses

of their case, in particular the military contractor defense,

and the defendant chemical companies’ realization that

they could end a burdensome litigation at very low cost.

Award of a risk multiplier in such circumstances, as the

district court reasoned, only would further the unwelcome

prospect of nuisance litigation being brought in federal

courts.

In denying class counsel their requested multiplier, we

note that each attorney has received the fair value of his

services to the class under the lodestar analysis. An addi-

tional award of a risk multiplier not only would provide

excessive Compensation but would encourage counsel to

accept similar matters for litigation in the future. We find

no reason to do more to encourage litigation that could

substantially occupy the federal judiciary in matters of

little merit.

4. Hours and Expenses

The PMC members challenge the district court’s guide-

lines on the grounds that they improperly failed to credit

45a

certain hours and reimburse certain expenses. Specifically,

they challenge the court’s decision to disallow fifty per-

cent of the time spent on reading scientific literature, to

disallow fifty percent of the time spent on travel, to

disallow a portion of the time spent reviewing mail and

on the telephone, to disallow fifty percent of the time

spent reviewing depositions, and to disallow a substantial

amount of post-settlement work. As to expenses, they

challenge the court’s decision to reduce expenses by a

percentage when such expenses could not be connected

with compensable activity, to set a maximum fee for non-

causation expert witnesses, and to treat paralegals as a

cost. In sum, they allege that, taken together, if not

separately, such radical deductions in their hours and

expenses billed constituted an abuse of the court’s dis-

cretion.

[9] The district court is given broad discretion in

setting fee awards. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct.

at 1941, Carey, 711 F.2d at 1146. We cannot reverse

a district court’s finding in this regard merely because

we might have weighed the information provided in the

fee petitions differently or might have found more of the

hours billed as being beneficial to the class. Cf. Anderson

v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511-

12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The district judge is in the

best position to weigh the respective input of counsel,

considering its “superior understanding of the litigation.”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct. at 1941. Accord-

ingly, we will reverse a district court’s findings as to which

hours to compensate “only when it is apparent that the

size of the award is out of line with the degree of effort

reasonably needed to prevail in the litigation.” Carey,

711 F.2d at 1146.

46a

[10-12] We find no abuse of discretion here. The

critical inquiry when reviewing hours billed to the com-

mon fund in a class action is whether the work performed

resulted in a benefit to the class. See Grinneli II, 560

F.2d at 1099. In determining which hours were beneficial,

we note that there “are no hard-and-fast rules,” Seigal v.

Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980), but

that “[a]mple authority supports reduction in the lodestar

figure for overstaffing as well as for other forms of dupli-

cative or inefficient work,” id. Moreover, we and other

circuits have held that in cases in which substantial

numbers of voluminous fee petitions are filed, the district

court has the authority to make across-the-board percent-

age cuts in hours “as a practical means of trimming fat

from a fee application.” Carey, 711 F.2d at 1146; accord

Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy Inc.,

766 F.2d 646, 657 (7th Cir. 1985); Copeland v. Mar-

shall, 641 F.2d 880, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in banc).

But see In re Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 596 (court must

identify with some specificity any disallowed hours).

Under such circumstances, no item-by-item accounting of

the hours disallowed is necessary or desirable. Ohio-Sealy,

776 F.2d at 658.

Here, the fee petitions, to say the least, were volumin-

ous, consisting of tens of thousands of pages of billing

sheets and other exhibits. To suggest that the district court

could not take advantage of percentage reductions in such

a context would be absurd. In reviewing these across-the-

board cuts, we find nothing that we could classify as an

abuse of discretion. Moreover, it is not unusual for hours

of travel time, deposition time and other quasi-administra-

tive items to be compensated at lower rates. E.g., Sun

Publishing Co. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 594 F.Supp.

47a

1512, 1520 (E.D. Va. 1984); Steinberg v. Carey, 470

F.Supp. 471, 479-80 (S.D. N.Y. 1979). But see Crum-

baker v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 781 F.2d 191,

193-94 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reasonable travel time should

be compensated at the same rate as other working time).

The district judge gave reasons, though somewhat gener-

alized, for each percentage cut that he made. We find

these to be an adequate reflection of the benefit that the

class derived from counsel’s work.

[13,14] We also find no abuse of discretion in the

district court’s guidelines for expenses. Counsel are en-

titled to reimbursement only for those expenses incurred

in the course of work that benefitted the class. In re

Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. 1357,

1388-89 (N.D. Ga. 1979), modified and remanded on

other grounds, 645 F.2d 488 (Sth Cir. 1981). Overstaff-

ing and other extravagances are not recoverable. /d.

[15-17] Given this standard, the district court’s find-

ing that the reports of the noncausation witnesses were of

only marginal use to the class and were “uniformly inade-

quate” suggests that the court in fact was generous in

setting the cap for fees to these experts at $5,000 each.

Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate,

Re: Fee Petitions, appendixed to and incorporated in

Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1351 (1985). We also

find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s deter-

mination that expenses connected with those hours dis-

allowed as not being beneficial to the class should not be

reimbursed. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 98

F.R.D. 81, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,

751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984). Finally, although we con-

cede that under certain circumstances it may be appropri-

48a

ate not to treat paralegal time as an expense in a large

class action, see Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 70

F.R.D. 366, 374-75 (E.D. Pa. 1976), we note that the

district court in so doing was simply following our prior

directive, see Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 473. We decline to

reevaluate that rule here.

B. Outside Counsel

1. Ashcraft & Gere!

Ashcraft & Gerel, a Washington, D.C. law firm that

assisted the PMC in this action between March of 1983

and October of 1983, appeals the district court’s fee and

expense award. In its initial fee calculations, the district

court awarded Ashcraft & Gerel fees in the amount of

$78,935 and expenses in the amount of $46,233.18. The

district court limited the fees and expenses to the work

performed between the above dates. Pursuant to the re-

commendation of the Magistrate, Ashcraft & Gerel’s fee

and expense awards then were increased to $138,788

and $54,897.39. This increase primarily reflected the

recommendation of the Magistrate that review of Ash-

craft & Gerel’s work not be limited to the short time

period, but should include as: well the period prior to

March of 1983.

The Magistrate’s recommendation, adopted by the dis-

trict court, also reflected a negative quality multiplier

of .25 on the ground that in 1983 the firm had withdrawn

from the litigation when the PMC refused its request to

be given exclusive control of the action. When the firm

withdrew, other counsel involved were forced to perform

numerous services that Ashcraft & Gerel already had

performed. The Magistrate thus concluded that the firm

49a

“failed to discharge [its] bur¢en when it decided to cease

work on the case, thereby requiring other attorneys to

duplicate its work.” Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1367.

In adopting the Magistrate’s recommendations, how-

ever, the district court offset the fee awarded to Ashcraft

& Gerel against the benefits obtained by the firm’s many

opt-out clients from “the use of discovery materials as-

sembled through the multidistrict discovery process and

paid for by the class.” Jd. at 1343. The district court

further found that the value of such services for the opt-

outs far exceeded the firm’s services to the class. Conse-

gently, the court abrogated any fee award to the firm,

but maintained the modified expense award.

[18,19] While we find that the district court’s award

of fees and expenses prior to abrogation reflects fair and

just compensation for Ashcraft & Gerel’s services to the

class, we conclude tha: abrogation of the fee award con-

stituted an abuse of discretion. In analyzing the general

problem of individus’ use of discovery materials, the

district court properly determined that, in return for the

use of discovery materials obtained in the multidistrict

litigation, such individual plaintiffs “could be assessed a

reasonable fee, to be paid back into the fund as their fair

share of the legal expenses assumed by the class.” Jd. at

1317. The court then suggested two ways in which this

could be done. First, the court could require counsel in

the opt-out cases to report to the district court any fee

received from the opt-out plaintiffs so that the court could

deduct the appropriate amount. Jd. Second, the court

could assess the opt-out plaintiffs for the cost of the dis-

covery at the time they made use of it. /d.

Neither of these means of assessment permitted the

court to offset Ashcraft & Gerel’s opt-out clients’ pay-

50a

ments for use of discovery maierials, against fees awarded

to the firm for its representation of class members. The

fee awarded the firm here has no relation to services per-

formed for the opt-outs. Abrogation of the fee, therefore,

has the net effect of relieving the class from its respons-

ibility to pay Ashcraft & Gerel fair and just compensation

for services it provided, rather than assessing the opt-out

plaintiffs for use of the discovery materials.

Accordingly, we conclude that Ashcraft & Gerel should

be awarded the fee that the district court, accepting the

Magistrate’s recommendation, determined to be fair and

just. |

2. Suilivan & Associates

Sullivan & Associates, a law firm primarily involved

in the litigation during the early days of the action, chal-

lenges the district court’s fee award on the ground that

the court improperly determined that much of its work

was not beneficial to the class. The district court awarded

the firm $52,311 in fees and $20,573.08 in expenses.

The court, upon the recommendation of the Magistrate,

denied the firm’s motion to supplement the award. The

court found that the hours requested were excessive and

that the firm had spent most of its time furthering the

interests of its opt-out clients.

After reviewing the district court’s calculations, we

conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. The dis-

trict court was in a much better position to determine

whether the work performed by the firm benefitted the

class. For the same reasons as given in section II(A) (4),

supra, we find no basis upon which to question the district

court’s figures.

Sla

3. Australian Counsel

William T. McMillan, Ross V. Lonnie, Paul J. Davi-

son, Roger L. MacLaren, and Michael S. Bigg, all Aus-

tralian attorneys, appeal the district court’s award of fees

and expenses. The district court awarded McMillan

$3,650 in fees and $27,178.34 in expenses, Lonnie no

fees and $3,055.93 in expenses, Davison no fees and

$2,042.08 in expenses. MacLaren no fees and $3,683.39

in expenses, and Bigg $5,700 in fees and $22,561.76 in

expenses. The basis for the challenge to these awards is

that they do not adequately reflect the services that coun-

sel performed for the class.

We again find no abuse of discretion. Appellants have

given us no adequate reason to question the district

court’s calculations and we decline to do so.

4. Kraft & Hughes

Kraft & Hughes, a New Jersey firm peripherally in-

volved in the litigation, challenges the district court’s

award. The court awarded the firm $2,425 in fees and

$3,935.48 in expenses. The firm now argues that this is

no more than the out-of-pocket costs of its involvement

and substantially undercredits its contribution to the liti-

gation. Moreover, the firm contends that it was improper

for the district court to abrogate the contingency fee

agreements that the firm had with a number of class

members.

Kraft & Hughes concedes in its presentation to this

court that it cannot establish the factual findings of the

district court to be clearly erroneous. Consequently, the

firm bases its appeal primarily on the ground that its

fee agreements with its clients, as a matter of law, should

52a

not have been abolished. We find this argument, how-

ever, to be without merit.

[20, 21] It is well established that a district court,

pursuant to its rulemaking authority or on an ad hoc

basis, may review a contingency fee agreement. Boston

and Maine Corp. v. Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green,

P.A., 778 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir. 1985); Dunn v. H.K.

Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108 (3d Cir. 1979). When

dealing with an equitable fund action, “the court has an

even greater necessity to review the fee agreement for

[Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)] imposes upon it a responsibility

to protect the interests of the class members from abuse.”

Dunn, 602 F.2d at 1109. That is exactly what the district

court did here in requiring counsel, prior to receiving

fees from the settlement, to certify that he or it had

retained no fees or expenses from any class members.

We find no basis to overrule the district court’s decision

in this regard.

fil. CONCLUSION

To summarize: we affirm the district court’s utilization

of national hourly rates and conclude that they may be

used in the circumstances revealed here. We further affirm

the district court’s award of quality multipliers to various

counsel, and the district court’s denial of risk multipliers.

We affirm the district court’s decision regarding hours

credited and expenses reimbursed to the PMC. We reverse

the decision to offset Ashcraft & Gerel’s fee against the

use of the multidistrict discovery materials by the firm’s

opt-out clients and order the reinstatement of the pre-

viously approved fee without allowance for a risk multi-

plier. As to all other aspects of the district court’s de-

cision respecting attorney's fees, we affirm.

53a

EXHIBIT C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MDL 381

“AGENT ORANGE”

PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION

(Filed June 4, 1985)

THE STATE OF TEXAS §

S

COUNTY OF HARRIS §

AFFIDAVIT

NEWTON B. SCHWART being duly sworn, deposes

and says:

I am a stockholder and member of the professional

corporation NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C. In such

capacity I am a member of the Agent Orange Plaintiffs’

Management Committee. I make this affidavit in oppo-

sition to the application of David J. Dean to set aside

the Fee Sharing Agreement executed by members of the

“AOPMC” (as the Plaintiffs Management Committee is

hereinafter referred to).

54a

This affidavit does not seek to alter, amend or modify

in the slightest way the “AOPMC AGREEMENT” (“The

Agreement”), except that as stated in the Motion of the

“AOPMC” to Compel Arbitration of the fee sharing

agreement as amended (“THE AGREEMENT”) and in

the Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of

the “AOPMC” excluding Dean of course, that this Court

is without jurisdiction to hear or entertain the same in

any way under recent decisions of the U. S. Supreme

Court holding that the Federal Arbitration Act was man-

datory in its language and requires District Courts to

compel arbitration of pending arbitrable claims.

I do not seek to reduce by any amount under “THE

AGREEMENT” as agreed upon therein by all signatories

thereto including DEAN. “THE AGREEMENT” would

not invalidate this Court’s mandate and would enforce

what all of the parties thereto, including DEAN know-

ingly agreed to and enabled the AOPMC to participate

in the prosecution to the results obtained on May 7, 1984

and in the implementation thereof after said date to the

present. As set forth in detail herein, contributions of

both substantial time, talent and energies as well as fi-

nances are currently being required by the present seven

members of the “AOPMC”. DEAN has consistently re-

fused to participate and now declines to participate in

any of the large financial burdens being shouldered by

the remaining seven members other than himself. They

all unanimously stand by their agreements. Stephen J.

Schlegel the primary case manager, who was rightly

commended by this Court for his performance in this

case, stands by “THE AGREEMENT” although he may,

as Dean partially correctly points out in his affidavit (at

p. 1 thereof) he may be unfavorably impacted “by more

55a

than one half million dollars’. Even former member

Benton Musslewhite candidly acknowledged his intention

to be bound by “THE AGREEMENT” in open Court

before Your Honor on or about February 7, 1985 even

though he was then withdrawing from the “AOPMC”

for philosophical differences respecting the settlement

with which no “AOPMC” member questions his sincerity.

As shown herein, the impact percentagewise upon Benton

Musslewhite and The Law Offices of Benton Musslewhite

(“LOBM” collectively hereinafter) is even more pro-

nounced percentagewise, were that a relevant fact as Dean

implies.

To invalidate “THE AGREEMENT” freely negotiated

and executed and even later modified by and between

able and experienced counsel, not clients and not at all

affecting the clients, will do more than have a chilling

effect upon future class actions of a doubtful or ques-

tionable liability nature, as this was. It will be the death

knell to effective representation by competent counsel.

This case has already taken its toll. One “AOPMC” mem-

ber, John O’Quinn, one of the most able and successful

counsel in the United States, stated to the Court that

“this was my last class action”. This is regrettable. Be-

cause counsel of John’s class and competence and zeal

in preparation and skill do not often come down the pike,

as we say. And that was even before the Dean Motion

to invalidate. The undersigned is involved in other class

action litigation. Were Dean to be successful, future par-

ticipation in such litigation would become out of the

question, for reasons totally ignored by Dean and his

counsel, but regrettably present in the real world.

My firm’s and my (collectively hereinafter “NBSPC’)

involvement with this litigation began in late 1979 and

56a

initially aborted in 1982. It was derivatively through

“LOBM”.

He had been invited into the litigation. I attended sev-

eral meetings both in Long Island and one in Houston

with the person whom I thought was the lead counsel

and in charge generally, Victor John Yannacone, Jr. and

some of the members of the Long Island consortium of

lawyers. During this two year period my participation con-

sisted primarily of obtaining and evaluating medical rec-

ords on personal clients of “LOBM”, filing and reviewing

pleadings in the local Texas cases filed and in financing

“LOBM’s” participation in the Yannacone & Associates

consortium.

Frankly, I do not recall any particular dealings with

David J. Dean during this period, but did not understand

that he was to be “Chief Trial Counsel” during this period

of time. (Dean affidavit at p. 1). After several years,

because of the combination of the following events, my

firm ceased any participation in the litigation until May,

1983:

1. The lack of organization of Yannacone & Asso-

ciates (“Y&A”).

2. The dominance of Victor J. Yannacone in what

I perceived to be well meaning, but misguided directions.

The emphases were upon organizing the veterans, bring-

ing them into the litigation with a commendable crusad-

ing zeal which only Victor can do, to his credit, and the

concomitant lack of meaningful discovery and prepara-

tion even for the limited issues to be tried under then

Presiding Judge Pratt’s orders.

3. Lack of meaningful financing with each member

contributing what he could or was able to do, which is

57a

not to criticize any member of “Y&A”. Their valiant

efforts held the litigation together and warded off the

chemical company foes, obviously vastly superior in re-

sources, until the “AOPMC” cavalry could arrive in the

fall of 1983.

In March, 1983 “LOBM” held a meeting with my

firm and the other Houston firm which had participated

t: sume extent in financing his participation in this

Litigation, Friedman & Chaffin. His views were (1) to

revive both of our participation which then was each

under $40,000.00 principally to “LOBM” (all of these

expenditures are itemized and supported on the “Appli-

cation for Reimbursement of Fees and Expenses” on file

herein and will not be repeated in detail even as to the

$250,000.00 borrowed funds which were contributed, as

Dean acknowledged as to each of six present “AOPMC”

members) (Dean affidavit at p. 9 et seq.) and (2) and

that “Y&A” were floundering and on their way out.

Further that there would be financial inducements to

re-entering the litigation, including being able to par-

ticipate at the national level as opposed to merely on

local cases of “LOBM” as our participation had been

in the prior period of involvement. He mentioned that

he would be one of the new proposed committee to

prosecute the case and that David Dean was replacing

Victor Yannacone as Plaintiff's Court spokesman. He

continued to use Melvin Block of Brooklyn in associa-

tion with a Philadelphia attorney whose name I cannot

recall (perhaps Garuselski or a similar sounding name)

as liason for him. My firm re-entered the litigation when

I participated in a meeting at Irving Like’s office in

Babylon in mid July. NBSPC began making $5,000.00

58a

per month contributions to either LOBM or one was

made to Levine & Grossman in New York c/o or for

“Y&A”. The cancelled checks are attached to the afore-

described “Application for Reimbursement etc.”, com-

mencing with one for $15,000.00 on April 15, 1983.

On May 2, 1983 our check to Levine & Grossman was

deposited in an account “Y&A And Trial Associates”

at Mfg Hanover.

Because of his subsequent personal difficulties, I in-

sisted that Benton sever ties with Melvin Block, which

he reluctantly did although agreeing to pay Block himself

as Benton is wont to do. The mid July 1983 meeting at

Babylon was a shouting contest principally between

Victor Yannacone and Albert Fiorella, Jr. Dean was

present and did not as I recall acknowledge being either

Court spokesman or Chief Trial counsel. This date I

point out as the nadir or low water mark in the fortunes

of this litigation from the Plaintiffs view point. It was

also the date (about July 16, 1983) that I called Mr.

Pete Johnson, a member of the New York bar, who had

been highly recommended by AI Fiorella, Jr. It was brief.

He knew Robert Strauss, former national Democratic

Committeeman from Dallas under President Carter and

a presidential trouble shooter. The gist of my conversa-

tion with him, and it was mutually exploratory, was that

he had the manpower and resources to commit to picking

up the pieces and preparing the case for trial. The other

side of the coin was that he wanted full charge of the

case and the removal of Dean. David was the only person

he specified by name as [ recall. I related this immedi-

ately by phone to Stephen Schlegel in Chicago and asked

that he follow up on it. I also reported it to Benton and

Al Fiorella.

59a

Johnson, based upon Fiorella’s information, and that

gleaned from a cursory inquiry about him, was one of

the few attorneys who had both the capability, financial

abi

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Schwartz v. Dean · 484 U.S. 926 | Frix