Appendix — Allen v. United States
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87 - -3 16 Supreme Court, U.S.
86 01g FILED
JUL 20 1987
No.
eos 2.4
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987
IRENE H. ALLEN, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX TO PETITION
D. DALE HARALSON RALPH HUNSAKER
Counsel of Record DAVID M. BELL
DENNEEN L. PETERSON SCOTT E. BOEHM
HARALSON. KINERK & MOREY, P.C. O'CONNOR, CAVANAGH. ANDERSON
82 South Stone Avenue WESTOVER, KILLINGSWORTH &
Tucson, Arizona 85701 BESHEARS
(602) 792-4330 One East Camelback, Suite 1100
Phoenix, Arizona 85012
(602) 263-2604
STEWART K. UDALL J. MacARTHUR WRIGHT
Attorney At Law WRIGHT & MILES
70 East Mitchell 60 North 300 East
Phoenix, Arizona 85012 P.O. Box 339
(602) 230-1254 St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 623-2612
ee
EDITOR'S NOTE
THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY
AT THE TIME OF FILMING. IF AND WHEN A
BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE
WILL BE ISSUED.
TABLE OF CONTENTS: APPENDIX”
Opinion of Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, filed April 20, 1987
Opinion of the Federal District
Court, filed May 10, 1984. ...
Opinion of the Federal District
Court, filed August 21, 1981...
Judgment of Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, filed June 9, 1987 .
Excerpts from the Atomic Energy
Bee OF 26ees. 6 6 x es ee ee
Excerpts from the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954. e 7 e e e 7” e e e e
*Appendices separated by blue
pages bearing title of appendix
subsection.
APPENDIX A
Opinion of Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
filed April 20, 1987
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
IRENE H. ALLEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
No. 84-2126
¥
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. C 79-0515)
Marc Johnston, Appellate Staff Attomey. Civil Division, Department
of Justice (Richard K. Willard. Acting Assistant Attorney General:
Robert S. Greenspan. Appellate Staff Attorney, Civil Division,
Department of Justi: Brent D. Ward, United States Attorney: Henry
A. Gill, Acting Assistant General Counsel, and Edward Jiran.
Attorney, Department of Energy: Ralph H. Johnson, Pamela L.
Wood, and Patrick O. Cavanaugh, Trial Attorneys, Torts Branch. Civil
Division, Department of Justice, with him on the brief), Washington
D.C. for Defendants-Appellants.
Dale Haralson of Haralson. Kinerk & Morey, Tucson, Arizona. and
Ralph E. Hunsaker of O'Connor, Cavanagh. Anderson, Westover.
Killingsworth & Beshears, Phoenix, Arizona (Denneen L. Peterson
of Haralson, Kinerk & Morey: David M. Bell and Scott E. Boehm of
O'Connor, Cavanagh. Anderson, Westover. Killingsworth &
Beshears; Stewart L. Udall of Beer and Toone, Phoenix, Anzona:
J. MacArthur Wright of Wright & Miles, St. George, Utah, with them
on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before McKAY, SETH, and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
In this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-80, nearly 1200 named plaintiffs have sued
the United States, alleging some 500 deaths and injuries as a result of
radioactive fallout from open-air atomic bomb tests held in Nevada in
the 1950s and 1960s. The district court selected and tried twenty-four
“bellwether” claims, in order to find a common framework for the
rest.' See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 258 (D. Utah
1984). The court entered final judgment in favor of the government
on fourteen of these claims and against the government on nine,
leaving one claim outstanding. Id. at 446-47. It then granted a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) motion permitting the government to appeal those
claims resolved against it. On appeal the government contends that
(1) the “discretionary function” exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
precludes government liability; (2) the government did not breach
any duty owed to the public; (3) the government did not cause
plaintiffs’ injuries; and (4) the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the
two-year statute of limitations in U.S.C. § 2401(b). We do not discuss
the last three issues, because we agree that the discretionary function
exception precludes government liability.
The district court opinion states the facts fully. See Allen, 588 F.
Supp. at 337-38, 348-50, 358-404. The authority for federal atomic
bomb tests came from the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Pub. L. No.
585, 60 Stat. 755 (“the 1946 Act”). See Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (present version of atomic energy statutes).
Under the 1946 Act, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) received
broad discretionary power to “conduct experiments . . . in the mili-
tary application of atomic energy.” 1946 Act. § 6(a): see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2121(a) (same authority in present statutes).> The AEC was
authonzed to carry on such experiments “only to the extent that the
express consent and direction of the President of the United States
' The trial lasted thirteen weeks. The tnal transcript runs more than 7.000 pages: the
exhibit evidence more than 54,000 pages. The district court deliberated for seven-
teen months, then issued an opinion which occupies 225 pages of the Federal
Supplement.
2In 1974, the AEC was abolished and its functions transferred to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438. 88 Stat. 1233.
has been obtained, which consent and direction shall be obtained at
least once each year.” Id. Additionally, the AEC was “authorized and
directed to make arrangements . . . for . . . the protection of health
during research and production activities.” 1946 Act, § 3(a). These
arrangements were to “contain such provisions to protect health. to
minimize danger from explosion and other hazards to life or prop-
erty .. . as [the AEC] may determine.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2012(d)-(e), 2013(d), 2051(d) (similar provisions in present
Statutes). ee
In 1950 the AEC chose an area in Nevada as a testing site. The
President approved this choice. Thereafter, between 195] and 1962.
eight series of open-air tests were conducted, with the President
approving each series of tests. Over one hundred atomic bombs were
detonated.
Each test explosion was executed according to detailed plans which
the AEC officially reviewed and adopted. Separate plans for protect-
ing the public, and for providing the pubiic with appropriate informa-
tion, were also adopted by the AEC. To actually execute the plans.
however, the AEC delegated some of its authority. The AEC selected
a “Test Manager” for each test series. who had some day-to-day
discretion. The Test Manager could, for example. postpone a given
test because of adverse weather conditions. The Test Manager in turn
delegated authority to a Radiological Safety Officer (a “Radsafe
Officer”) who was in charge of implementing plans to avoid radiation
dangers, and a Test Information Officer who was in charge of impie-
menting plans to provide public information on the tests. Both the
Radsafe Officer and the Test Information Officer also had some day-
to-day discretion in performing their duties.
At tral, as a basis for governmental liability. plaintiffs singled out
the alleged failure of the government. especially of the Radsafe Of-
ficers and the Test Information Officers, to fully monitor offsite fall-
out exposure and to fully provide needed public information on
radioactive fallout. The district court focused on these two failures in
finding government liability. Allen. 588 F. Supp. at 372-404.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes suits for damages
against the United States
“for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.”
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). In such suits, the United States is liable “in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Suit is not allowed, however, for
any claim
“based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid.
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.”
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis added). The key term. “discretionary
function,” is not defined. For over thirty-five years the federal courts
have been attempting to define it.
Plaintiffs in the present case attempted to distinguish between the
discretionary initiation of government programs, at the highest levels
of administration, and the decisions involved in carrying out pro-
grams, at lower levels. Plaintiffs argued that while low-level decisions
may involve some “judgment,” they do not fall within the discretion-
ary function exception cf § 2680(a). See. e.g.. Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955) (reference to “operational
level” of activity: no immunity found for government failure to oper-
ate lighthouse). The district court agreed. basing its finding of gov-
emment liability squarely on a distinction between high-level and
low-level government activity. Allen. 588 F. Supp. at 335-40.
After the district court judgment in the present case. the Supreme
Court decided United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984), in which it ex-
plicitly rejected distinctions based on the administrative level at
which the challenged activity occurred. In Varig, various plaintiffs
brought an FTCA suit against the United States, claiming that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had negligently imple-
mented plane inspection and design certification programs. allowing
improper flammable materials and a defective heater system to be
used to construct a specific Boeing 707 and a specific DeHavilland
Dove. The planes in question caught fire and burned, killing most of
those on board. The Supreme Court held. however, that the United
States was immune from suit. The court found that the contested
FAA actions constituted the performance of a “discretionary func-
tion,’ exempt under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) from potential FTCA lia-
bility. 467 U.S. at 819-21.
The plaintiffs in Varig focused on “low-level” decisions in their
suit. They challenged the actual issuance by the FAA of design
approval certificates for two plane types, the decision to enforce FAA
standards with a particular “spot-check”™ system, and the actual plane
inspections that were and were not carried out under that sytem. 467
U.S. at 799-803, 816-20. The Supreme Court found that each of these
actions constituted a discretionary function, immune from suit under
§ 2680(a):
“ ‘{T]he “discretionary function or duty” that cannot form a
basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the
initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It
necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable.’ *
Id. at 811 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15. 35-36
(1953)). The Court emphasized that it is “the nature of the conduct.
rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the dis-
cretionary function exception applies in a given case.” Varig, 467
U.S. at 813.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the AEC, in planning and con-
ducting its monitoring and information programs, was not making
the kind of policy judgments protected by § 2680(a). They point to
the general statutory provisions instructing the AEC to consider pub-
lic health and safety, and claim that these broad congressional direc-
tives leave no further room for discretion. We disagree.
In the case before us, as in Varig, the government actors had a
general statutory duty to promote safety: this duty was broad and
discretionary. In the case before us it was left to the AEC. as in Vang
it was left to the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA, to decide
exactly how to protect public safety. If anything, the obligation
imposed on the FAA to protect public safety was greater and the
discretion granted to the FAA by Congress was less, in the circum-
stances reviewed by Varig, than the comparable obligation imposed
and discretion available to the AEC in the present case. Compare 49
U.S.C. § 1421 (FAA safety duty) with 42 U.S.C. § 205K(d) (AEC
safety duty). We cannot say that what was protected by the Supreme
Court in Varig is now subject to liability.
Plaintiffs further contend that, even if the initial discretion granted
the AEC by statute was broad, test site personnel violated the AEC’s
own policy directives by failing to implement adequate protective
measures. We cannot accept this argument either. Neither the plain-
tiffs nor the district court have been able to point to a single instance
in which test site personnel ignored or failed to implement specific
procedures mandated by the AEC for monitoring and informing the
public. Indeed, the district court’s conclusions appeaf to be based, at
least in part, on perceived inadequacies in the AEC’s radiological
safety and information plans themselves.* The court relied heavily on
* The district court stated that its review of “the various radiation safety plans. public
information plans, and related documents” disclosed the “astounding fact” that no
concerted effort was made “to directly monitor and record internal contamination
or dosage in off-site residents on a comprehensive person-specific basis.” Allen.
588 F. Supp. at 373-74. aa
a 1954 report to the AEC by the Committee to Study Nevada Proving
Grounds which was moderately critical of the measures taken up to
that point to inform and warm the public. See Allen, 588 F. Supp. at
386-90, 392-93. The stated objective of this report, however. was
“(tlo be a basis for Commission decisions on future policy.” Pl. Ex
at 4. The operational plans the district court considered deficient
embody those AEC policy decisions. As such, these plans clearly fall
within the discretionary function exception.*
Government liability cannot logically be predicated on the failure
of test-site personnel to go beyond what the operational plans specifi-
cally required them to do. If, as the plaintiffs maintain, the AEC
delegated “unfettered authority” to a Test Manager and his subordi-
nates to implement public safety programs, this simply compels the
conclusion that those officers exercised considerable discretion. Their
actions, accordingly. also fall within the discretionary function
exception.
It is irrelevant to the—diseretion issue whether the AEC or its
employees were negligent in failing to adequately protect the public.
See Cisco v. United States, 768 F.2d 788, 789 (7th Cir. 1985):
General Public Utilities Corp.. 745 F.2d 239, 243, 245 (3d Cir. 1984).
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985).* When the conduct at issue
involves the exercise of discretion by a government agency or
employee, § 2680(a) preserves governmental immunity “whether or
+ In the one instance which suggested that a subordinate contradicted an official
direction by a superior, the district court quoted at length from a document which
it characterized as a modification or redetermination of AEC policy regarding oft-
site exposure levels by personnel at the “NTS operational level.” Allen. 588 F.
Supp. at 385-86. But the district court was actually quoting from the official
Operations Plan for the RANGER test series which had been annexed as an
appendix to the Rad-Safe Group’s after-series report. Def. Ex 88 at 66, 69.
* It is also irrelevant whether the alleged failure to warn was a maiter of “deliberate
choice.” or a mere oversight. See Allen. 588 F. Supp. at 337-38. We agree with the
treatment of this distinction in Myslakowski v. United States. 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir
1986). cert. denied. US. (1987):
“The. cntical error in the tnal court’s analysis is in its conclusion that
because the evidence does not show that the departmental policymakers
evaluated the pros and cons of requiring that a warning be given conceming
not the discretion involved be abused.” For better or worse, plaintiffs
here “obtain their ‘right to sue from Congress [and] necessarily must
take it subject to such restrictions as have been imposed. ” Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953) (quoting Federal Housing
Administration v. Burr. 309 U.S. 242, 251 (1940)).°
To be sure, the circumstances in Varig are not identical to those
now before us. Most notably, Varig involved the actions of a regula-
tory agency supervising private individuals. The Court observed in
Varig that the discretionary actions of government regulators were
at the core of what § 2680(a) was intended to protect. But Varig
expressly reaffirmed the earlier Supreme Court decision of Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). which found very broad govern-
mental immunity outside a regulatory setting. See Vang. 467 U.S.
at 810-14.
the rollover propensity of the jeep and then made a discretionary decision
not to give such warnings. it therefore follows that no discretionary decision.
of the kind contemplated by § 2680(a). was made... .
Stated otherwise. even the negligent failure of a discretionary government
policymaker to consider al] relevant aspects of a subject matter under conpid-
eration does not vitiate the discretionary character of the decision that
is made.
Indeed. it is, in part. toe provide immunity against liability for the con-
sequences of negligent failure to consider the relevant. even critical. matters in
discretionary decisionmaking that the statutory exception exists. If it were
otherwise, a judgment-based policy determination made at the highest
levels. to which all would concede that the statutory exception applies (the
decision to sell] surplus jeeps). would resv’) in no immunity if the decision
could be shown to have been made without consideration of important.
relevant factors. or was a decision negligently reached. If that reasoning were
sound, the discretionary function exception would be inapplicable in every
case in which a negligent ‘failure to consider a reievant risk could be
proved.”
~ Id. at 97-98. Accord in re Consolidated United States Atmosphenc Testing Litigation.
616 F. Supp. 759, 776-77 (N.D. Cal.). appeal docketed. No. 85-2842 (9th Cir. 1985).
© Plaintiffs rely heavily upon an AEC policy report accepting responsibilit. for
reimbursing radiation-caused losses. We cannot treat such an agency statement as
waiving the “discretionary function” exclusion Congress placed in the FTCA. The
existence of an adminstrative claims system does not constitute a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity. See United States v. Shearer. 473 U.S. 52. . 105 S. Ct.
3039. 3043 n 4 (1985): Feres v. United States. 340 U.S. 135. 144-45 (1950).
In Dalehite, private plaintiffs sued the government over deaths.
injuries, and property damage resulting from a disastrous explosion
of two shiploads of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. 346 U.S. at 22-23.
As with the AEC bomb-testing program before us here, Congress and
the President, in response to international tensions following World
War Il, had decided on a crash government program—in Daichite. a
program to feed the populations of Korea, Japan, and Germany. Id.
at 19-20. Broad general authority was given to the War Department.
and the War Department created a plan for massive fertilizer ship-
ments. The Army's Chief of Ordnance was delegated discretionary
responsibilities for carrying out the War Department plan, and he in
turn appointed a “Field Director of Ammunition Plants” to adminis-
ter the program. id. Other lower-level plant managers and supply
officers were also appointed.
As with the AEC bomb tests, the production of fertilizer in
Dalehite involved a mix of private and public facilities and
employees. Id. at 20-21. As with the AEC bomb tests. all plans for
manufacture, packing, and shipping of the fertilizer in Dalehite were
officially approved. Id. at 38-40. The Dalehite plaintiffs, like the
present plaintiffs, were unable to point to any instances in which
government employees acted negligently in performing specific, man-
datory duties. The Dalehite plaintiffs instead argued primarily. just as
the present plaintiffs argue here. that at various points the govern-
ment could have made better plans, and that the government failed to
fully investigate the hazards of the dangerous material involved and to
fully inform and warn the nearby populace. Id. at 23.
The Supreme Court in Dalehite found every contested government
decision, action, and omission to be the performance of a discretion-
ary function, exempt from suit under § 2680(a): the cabinet-level
decision to export the fertilizer, the lower-level failure to fully test for
explosive properties, the Field Director's fertilizer production plan,
the actual production of the fertilizer in accordance with the govern-
ment specifications, and the specific decisions to bag the fertilizer at
a certain temperature and to label the fertilizer in a certain way. Id. at
24, 36-42. The various actions and omissions of the Coast Guard.
supervising the actual loading of the ships, were also exempted. as
-10-
ee ee
was the general failure to warm the nearby populace of potential
dangers. Id. at 23-24, 43.’
In Varig. The Supreme Court approved the view of § 2680(a)
expressed in Dalehite, strongly rejecting any suggestion that later
cases had narrowed the broad immunity found there. Varig. 467 U.S.
at 810-14. Given the Court's holding in Dalehite, reaffirmed in Varig.
we must conclude that the government is immune from liability for
the failure of the AEC administrators and employees to monitor
radioactivity more extensively or to warn the public more fully than
they did.*
? The Court in Dalehite approved-a series of earlier lower court interpretations of
§ 2680(a). which the Court stated were generally “in conformity with our holding.”
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36 n. 32. The cited cases demonstrate the Court's intent in
Dalehite to include extremely low-level and mundane decisions and implementa-
tions of decisions within the discretionary function exception of § 26801a). See.
e.g.. Toledo v. United States. 95 F. Supp. 838. 839, 841 (D.P.R. 1951) (suit over car
damage caused by tree at government facility falling on car: court holds that
§ 2680(a) bars recovery for failure to remove diseased experimental tree. but notes
that negligent removal of tree might not be exempt): Olson v. United States. 93 F.
Supp. 150. 152-53 (D.N.D. 1950) (suit for property damage caused by questionable
discretionary decision of government employees to release flood waters from dam:
court holds that § 2630(a) bars recovery).
o
We have previously followed the command of the Supreme Court in Vang. See
Russel! v. United States . 763 F.2d 786, 787 (i0th Cir. 1985) (no government FTCA
liability possible. for failure of federal mine inspectors to more fully inspect Utah
coal mine). Most of the post- Varig decisions of the other circuits are in accord with
our holding today. See e.g.. Myslakowski v. United States. 806 F.2d 94. 97-99
(6th Cir. 1986) (no liability for Postal Service decision to sell used jeeps. without
warning buyers of jeep propensity to tip over). cert.denied. US.
(1987); Ford v. American Motors Corp. . 770 F.2d 465. 466-68 § Sth Cir.
1985) (same); Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp. . 795 F.2d 301. 306-09 (3d Cir. 1986)
(no liability for GSA decision to sell asbestos without warming of hazards): Merklin
v. United States, 788 F.2d 172. 174-75 (3d Cir. 1986) (no liability for AEC inspec-
tors’ failure to wam uranium proccssing plant employees of health hazards dis-
covered during AEC inspections); Ostera v. United States. 769 F.2d 716. 718 (1lth
Cir. 1985) (no liability for FBI decision to obtain release of particular person from
prison to use as informant): Begay v. United States. 768 F.2d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.
1985) (no liability for U.S. Public Health Service failure to warn uranium miners of
radiation hazards); Cisco v. United States. 768 F.2d 788. 789-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (no
liability for EPA failure to warn residents of landfill dirt contaminated with dioxin):
In the instant case, no evidence was presented of any act or omis-
sion of the AEC or its employees that clearly contravened a specific
Statutory or regulatory duty. or that exceeded statutory or regulatory
authority. There was no evidence, for example, that the Test Informa-
tion Officer failed to release information he was required to give out.
or that the Radsafe Officer failed to take a specific radiation measure-
ment that had been decided upon. Plaintiffs’ entire case rests on the
fact that the government could have made better plans. This is proba-
bly correct, but it is insufficient for FTCA liability.
Our decision here adheres to the principle enunciated by the
Supreme Court of broad sovereign immunity. An, inevitable conse-
quence of that sovereign immunity is that the United States may
escape legal responsibility for injuries that would be compensible if
caused by a private party. There remain administrative and legislative
remedies; we note the express authorization-under 42 U.S.C. § 2012()
for the government to make funds available for damages suffered by
the public from nuclear incidents. Nonetheless, judicial reluctance to
Baxley v. United States, 767 F.2d 1095. 1097-98 (4th Cir. 1985) (no liability for
FAA failure to regulate “ultralight” aircraft); Shuman v. United States. 765 F.2d
283, 291 (Ist Cir. 1985) (no liability for Navy failure to warm shipyard workers of
asbestos hazards): Hylin v. United States, 755 F.2d 551. 554 (7th Cir. 1985) (no
liability for federal mine inspectors’ failure to fully inspect clay mine): Feyers \v.
United States . 749 F.2d 1222, 1227 (6th Cir. 1984) (no liability for Army’s failure to
inspect Chrysler's operation of government-owned railyard). cert. denied. 47! U.S.
1125 (1985):General Public Utilities Corp. v. United States. 745 F.2d 239. 247 (3d
Cir. 1984) (no liability for Nuclear Regulatory Commission's faiiure to warm of
possible equipment defects at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility). cert. denied.
469 U.S. 1228 (1985): Flammia v. United States. 739 F.2d 202. 204 (Sth Cir. 1984)
(no liability for INS'’s “specific operational decision” to permit a Cuban refugee
known to be a convicted felon to enter the United States). But see Aslakson vy.
United States. 790 F.2d 688. 691-94 (8th Cir. 1986) (FTCA liability possible tor
government agency's failure to comply with its own already established safety
policy); Henderson v. United States. 784 F.2d 942. 943 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (FTCA
liability possible, for government missile facility safety decision not made “at the
pianning stage.” but “operational in nature”), Collins v. United States. 783 F.2d
1225, 1228-31 (Sth Cir. 1986) (FTCA liability possible. for failure of Mine Safety
and Health Administration to close mine, when challenged decisions of subordi-
nates did not involve “policy” decisions. or involved only explicit mandatory
duties); Alabama Electric Cooperative v. United States. 769 F.2d 1523. 1526-29
(1th Cir. 1985) (FTCA liability possible. for “operational” decisions of Army
Corps of Engineers in constructing river dikes).
-]2-
a
Ce
Ne weticousalh
recognize the sometimes harsh principle of sovereign immunity
explains much of the tangle of the prior FTCA cases.
The Court stated in Varig that the purpose of § 2680(a) was to
avoid any judicial intervention that “would require the courts to
‘second-guess’ the political, social, and economic judgments of an
agency.” 467 U.S. at 814. The bomb-testing decisions made by the
President, the AEC, and all those to whom they were authorized to
delegate authority in the 1950s and 1960s, were among the most
significant and controversial choices made during that period. The
government deliberations prior to these decisions expressly balanced
public safety against what was felt to be a national necessity, in light
of national and international security. However erroneous or mis-
guided these deliberations may seem today. it is not the place of the
judicial branch to now question them.
For the above reasons, we find all challenged actions surrounding
the government atomic bomb tests in the 1950s and 1960s to be
immune from suit, as the performance by a federal agency of a
“discretionary function,” protected by § 2680(a).
We REVERSE the district court’s decision with regard to those
nine claims in which the government was found to have liability and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
(THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY)
No. 84-2126 — IRENE H. ALLEN. et al. v. UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA. McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
It undoubtedly will come as a surprise to many that two hundred
years after we threw out King George III, the rule that “the king can
do no wrong” still prevails at the federal level in all but the most
trivial of matters. After the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982) (FTCA), many people, as well as the
lower federal courts, assumed that the old governmental immunity
from responsibility for negligent conduct that injures individual
citizens was gone. Many endorsed what appeared to be the FTCA’s
policy that if the citizens at large benefited from a government pro-
gram, that coliective citizenry, not the isolated individual injured by
the negligent conduct of the program, would bear the economic
burden of that injury. This case dramatically illustrates that, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in United States v. S.A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
the FTCA (and for that matter Congress's injunction that a program
be carried out safely) is largely a false promise in all but “fender
benders” and perhaps some cases involving medical malpractice by
government doctors.
When Congress decided to employ above-ground testing. it repeat-
edly evinced the general intent that the tests should be conducted so
as not to jeopardize the health and safety of the population down-
wind.' However, it did not delineate the health and safety measures
to be taken. No mention is made of how fallout from open-air
testings should be monitored or how the public should be educated
regarding the effects of fallout—the two issues litigated in this case.
The responsibility for developing defined health and safety plans and
for disseminating information was instead delegated to the AEC.
Based on ample evidence, the trial court found that the people who
designed the downwind safety program deviated from optimum prac-
tices based on the best available scientific knowledge. On a fully
' See The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 and The Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1982 & Supp. III 1985}). For detailed discussion of the two act's safety provisions.
see Allen v. United States. 588 F. Supp. 247, 348-50 (D. Utah 1984).
Diente — _ , —
supported record, the trial court found the following deviations in the
plans which would clearly support liability for injury under standard
tort analysis as applied by the trial court: the decision to monitor
randomly rather than on a “comprehensive, person-specific basis,”
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 374 (D. Utah 1984): deci-
sions not to use thyroid or whole body counters, id. at 375; decisions
regarding the limited extent of urine, fecal. and blood sampling. id. at
374; the decision not to test milk samples “in order to avoid arousing
public concern,” id. at 375; the decisions to forego internal fallout
assessment from inhalation of fallout particles, id. at 376: decisions
regarding the extent of follow-up monitoring in downwind com-
munities, id. at 379; the decision to distribute film badges and pocket
dosimeters to a select number of residents rather than to every resi-
dent, id. at 379-81, 384-85; the decisions regarding duration of
monitoring, id. at 381; the decisions with respect to the quantum of
personnel and equipment committed to the monitoring program. id.
at 381-82; and the decisions concerning the content and appropriate
tone of the information given the public as well as the decisions to
use pamphlets and films as the education media, id. at 385-404.
Again, on a fully supported record, the trial court found that these
departures from accepted safety standards were the proximate cause
of suffering and death from cancer in many of the plaintiffs. Under
the then-available legal precedents, the tnal court reasonably con-
cluded that the FTCA showed Congress’s intent that the Government.
which benefited from the testing. should bear these particular costs.
The critical analysis dealt with Congress’ decision in the FTCA to
exempt from liability those government acts broadly and vaguely
described as “discretionary functions.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
At the time of the tnal court's decision, the leading construction of
that provision by the Supreme Court was Dalehite v. United States.
346 JS. 15 (1953). Language in Dalehite invited some courts to
focus on the bureaucratic level of the decision maker in determining
whether the ensuing decision or action was clothed with immunity
under the discretionary function exception. Cabinet-level actions
were considered clearly of a “planning” nature and thus immune.
A vehicular collision resulting from driver negligence involved “oper-
ational” action and was not immune. See Dalehite. 346 U.S. at 28.
r,
37. Struggling to give meaning to the elusive terms “discretionary
function.” and noting particularly the subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court in Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1957), and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955),
some courts thought the Supreme Court intended to narrow the
sweep of its Dalehite interpretation of that exception. See. e.g.. Relf
v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 423, 427 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd. 593 F.2d
1371 (D.C. Cir: 1979). Following that pattern. the trial court in this
case focused on the decisions made at the operational level. It con-
cluded they were not immune.
Since the appeal was lodged in this case, the Supreme Court
decided Varig Airlines. That opinion removed all doubt as to whether
the discretionary function exception is to be construed broadly or
narrowly. In Varig the Court explicitly denounced both the
increasingly narrow construction given the exception since Dalehite
and the interpretation of Dalehite that focused on the bureaucratic
level of the decision maker. The Court stated, “[I]t is the nature of
the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether
the discretionary function applies in a given case.” Varig Airlines.
467 U.S. at 813. it breathed vitality into Dalehite by selectively quot-
ing language other than the planning/operational language most often
cited previously: “Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion.” Id. at 81! (quoting Dalehite, 346 U.S. at
36). The Court thus shifted the discretionary function inquiry back
toward examining the nature and character of the governmental
action to determine whether it is of the type intended to be protected
from tort liability by Congress. Those decisions “grounded in social.
economic, and political policy.” id. at 814, are insulated from our
review, regardless of who the decision maker happens to be or how
negligent the decision or action may be.
The majority opinion fully deals with the Supreme Court's focus in
Varig Airlines. It is sufficient here to note that the focus is on the
nature of the planning or decision making rather than on the level at
which that planning or its implementation takes place. While that
may create analytical problems even in automobile accident cases
where the driver is left to “plan” how to drive and carry out his
mission in the most economic fashion. both the facts and language of
ote
Varig easily cover the facts of this case. Vang involved an allegedly
faulty safety inspection program for aircraft. The factual paralle!
to the safety programs at issue here cannot be distinguished on a
principled basis. Varig Airlines gives little help to lower courts apply-
ing the new standard to specific facts—if the FTCA waiver of immu-
nity indeed applies to anything but trivial government failures. such
as automobile accidents. Nonetheless, it removes all doubt that
the discretionary function exception swallows the negligent decisions
before us.
The AEC devised safety and information plans pnor to every
open-air detonation, tailoring the plans to the demands of each spe-
cific project. None of the tnal court’s documented list of failures
represents an instance of deviation from, or negligent implementation
of, the safety and information plans adopted.? Rather. the court's
extensive criticisms and ultimate conclusions of negligence were
directed at the substance and failures of the plans themselves.
On appeal, plaintiffs do assert that “the evidence clearly demon-
Strates negligent and wrongful failure to execute and deviation from
. . . the plans approved by the Commission.” Brief for the Appellee
at 22 (emphasis in original). However, the evidence does not support
this allegation. Not one example is given of a failure to monitor or
distribute information as prescribed in the plans.* Rather. plaintiffs
2 If the evidence had demonstrated such deviation or negligent implementation.
neither Varig Airlines nor Dalehite would bar our review. Both those cases confirm
that conformity to a discretionary plan insulates the governmental action from
review. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36 (“It necessarily follows that acts of subordi-
nates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official
directions cannot be actionable.” ): Varig Airlines. 467 U.S. ai 820 (acts of FAA
employees immune from review because dictated by immune policy-based pro-
gram). Deviation from an immune plan or negligent implementation of an immune
plan. however. can strip the action of the discretionary function exception. for such
governmental action does not involve the type of social. economic. or political
policy considerations ai the core of the exception
> At one point in their bref, plaintiffs state that the test manager “authonzed [the
radsafety} officers to go beyond the information radsafety plans.” Bnef for the
Appellee at 57. In other words. the test manager authorized the officers to deviate
from the plan. Plaintiff argues that because the officers were so authonzed. their
failure to deviate froni the plan subjects the Government to liability. This reasoning
-4-
challenge. mirroring the trial court's concerns, goes toward the failure
of the plans to specifically prescribe greater monitoring or more
diffuse and in-depth information distribution. Plaintiffs’ statement
that “test site personnel negligently and wrongfully failed to imple-
ment basic radiological protection measures which were common at
the time,” id. at 24 (emphasis added), demonstrates the true charac-
ter of their allegations. Plaintiffs concede as much by stating that the
trial court “determined that the fallout monitoring program and infor-
mation program which coincided with the 1951-1962 open-air testing
at the Nevada test site did not comport with the ‘best available
scientific knowledge.” ” Id. at 42-43 (emphasis added).
In arguing that the safety and information plans themselves are not
immune from our review under the discretionary function exception,
plaintiffs contend:
Where Congress has placed a mandatory duty upon the govern-
ment to protect public health and safety, such as it did upon the
Commission, it left no room for further policy-making
regarding public safety. Where there is not policy-making there
is no “discretion” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
and no immunity.
Id. at 13. Essentially, they assert that because the two Atomic Energy
Acts demonstrate a concern for public health and safety. even though
no specific health and safety measures are mandated therein, the
safety plans devised to address that concern involved no social.
economic, or political policy making.
On the contrary, the broad safety language of the Atomic Energy
Acts had to be translated into concrete plans. and that translation
involved the very essence of social, economic, and political decision
making—the precise policy choices protected by the discretionary
function exception. See General Pub. Util. Corp. v. United States,
745 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1984) (means chosen by Nuclear Regula-
is at direct odds with Varig Airlines and Dalehite. See supra note 2. It is just such
deviation from a discretionary plan that can deprive the action of the protection of
the discretionary function exception
tory Commission to fulfill its broad statutory duty to review safety of
nuclear facilities protected by discretionary function exception), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985). These decisions concerned choices
involving the social psychology of how best to inform without alarm-
ing residents, the most cost-effective way of using public funds to
monitor fallout levels, and how best to use a finite number of person-
nel. In short, they required the AEC “to establish priorities for the
accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives
sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing
and funding.” Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820. While those choices
deviated from the standards against which liability is measured where
liability is available, Congress’ determination to retain government
immunity for “discretionary functions.” as understood post-Varig
Airlines, puts those choices beyond our ability to review and puts
compensation for injury to individuals stemming from those choices
beyond our power to order.
While we have great sympathy for the individual cancer victims
who have borne alone the costs of the AEC’s choices, their plight is a
matter for Congress. Only Congress has the constitutional power to
decide whether all costs of government activity will be bore by all
the beneficiaries or will continue to be unfairly apportioned, as in this
case. Until Congress amends the discretionary function exception to
the FTCA or passes a specific relief bill for individual victims. we
have no choice but to leave them uncompensated. I must therefore
concur in the majority opinion which has carefully reviewed and
applied the controlling law to the facts of this case.
APPENDIX B
Opinion of the Federal District Court
District of Utah, filed May 10, 1984
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
IRENE ALLEN, et al., Civil No. C 79-0515-J
Plaintiffs,
VS.
MEMORANDUM
OPINION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT
a
BACKGROUND: BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR PHYSICS .... 10
EES Se , 5]
BACKGROUND: BASIC PRINCIPLES
COP Teemaeee evra .......... “ Os
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION ............... 130
LEGAL ANALYSIS: SiATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ... 159
LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE DUTY ISSUE ...... SSee
LEGAL ANALYSIS: BREACH OF DUTY ......... 205
THE QUESTION OF CAUSATION ...............318
A Sata ... 407
FINDINGS OF ULTIMATE FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
<2 DRO yal a cin aw kW i's «accees 416
EES ee see ee
APPENDIX A ...... SEY An a ee nT ee 466
EEE LO eee 477
APParaeA ....... + CR Sar IT Ee ee 483
a arcana 6 1a 4g pe no sa 00.4 eee ss 488
BRUCE S. JENKINS. JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
(THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
IRENE ALLEN, et al.. Civil No. C 79-0515-J
)
)
Plaintiffs. )
)
VS. ) MEMORANDUM
) OPINION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. )
)
Defendant. )
In a sense this case began in the mind of a thoughtful resident of
Greece named Democritus some twenty-five hundred years ago. In
response to a question put two centuries earlier by a compatriot.
Thaies, concerning the fundamental] nature of matter. Democritus
suggested the idea of atoms. This case is concerned with atoms, with
government, with people. with legal relationships. and with social
values.
This case is concerned with what reasonable men in positions of
decision-making in the United States government between 1951 and
1963 knew or should have known about the fundamental nature of
matter.
'
to
'
No. C 79-0515-J
It is concerned with the duty, if any. that the United States
government had to tell its people. particularly those in proximity
to the experiment site, what it knew or should have known about
the dangers to them from the government's experiments with
nuclear fission conducted above ground in the brushlands of
Nevada during those critical years.
This case is concerned with the perception and the apprehension
of its political leaders of international dangers threatening the
United States from 195] to 1963. it is concerned with high level
determinations as to what to do about them and whether such
determinations legally excuse the United States from being an-
swerable to a comparatively few members of its population for
injuries allegedly resulting from open air nuclear experiments con-
ducted in response to such perceived dangers.
It is concerned with the method and quantum of proof of the
cause in fact of claimed biological injuries. It is concerned with
the passage of time, the attendant diminishment of memory. the
availability of contemporary information about open air atomic
testing and the application of a statute of repose.
It is concerned with what plaintiffs—laymen. not experts—
knew or should have known about the biological consequences that
could result from open air nuclear tests and when each plaintiff
knew or should have known of such consequences.
It is ultimately concerned with who in fairness should bear the
cost in dollars of injury to those persons whose injury is demon-
strated to have been caused more likely than not by nation-state
conducted open air nuclear events.
The complaint in this action alleges that each plaintiff. or his
predecessor, has suffered injury or death as a proximate result of
exposure to radioactive fallout that drifted away from the Nevada
Test Site and settled upon communities and isolated populations in
southern Utah, northern Arizona and southeastern Nevada. Each
of the plaintiffs or their decedents resided in that area. Each
claims serious loss due to radiation-caused cancer or leukemia.
Each asserts that the injury suffered resulted from the negligence
-3- No. C 79-0515-J
of the United States in conducting open air nuclear testing. in
monitoring testing results, in failing to inform persons at hazard of
attendant dangers from such testing and in failing to inform such
persons how to avoid or minimize or mitigate such dangers.
A. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1976) and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1976). Venue of this action is proper pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1976).!
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is the exclusive legal
remedy for claims against the United States “for money
damages. . . for. . . personal injury or death caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment,. . . ~ This action was tried to the Court, without a jury.
pursuant to the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) that “|a]ny
action against the United States under section 1346 shall be tried
by the court without a jury,. . . “ See OConnor v. United States.
269 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1959).
B. NATURE OF THE ACTION
This action is a consolidation of the individual claims of the
1,192 named plaintiffs in this lawsuit. This is not a class action.
Cf. Annot., 48 A.L.R. Fed. 860 (1980). Trial was held in this
action beginning September 14, 1982 and concluding with final
arguments on December 17, 1982. The trial encompassed 24 of the
claims in their entirety. Pursuant to the suggestion of the court
these cases were selected by plaintiffs’ and defendant's counsel as
“bellwether” cases. The effort was to provide a selection of “typi-
cal” cases which when decided and reviewed may provide a legal
and factual pattern against which the remaining issues in the pend-
ing cases may be subsequently matched.
The trial was conducted as well so as to make a full and com-
plete record concerning legal. historic. and scientific matters com-
mon to ail of the 1,192 plaintiffs with the idea in mind of avoiding
ail
-4- No. C 79-0515-J
future duplication of effort. See Park Lane Hosiery Company. Inc.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Other than as noted in this opinion.
this court has not decided the remaining issues in the claims of the
more than 1,100 plaintiffs that are still pending in the consolidated
case.
This opinion decides claims of individuals. each with his own
history and relationship to the open air nuclear tests. It fully de-
cides 24 separate cases. tied together by common legal. historic
and scientific threads of unique importance.
C. THE TRIAL
This action has been pending since August 30, 1979. It has been
the subject of extensive pre-trial motions, dealt with on a prelimin-
ary basis by this Court's earlier opinion. See Allen v. United
States. 527 F. Supp. 476 (D. Utah 1981). That opinion in a general
way defined the framework for the trial that followed.
Appearances of counsel at the trial, which began on September
14, 1982 and continued for 13 weeks. were as follows:
For the plaintiffs: Ralph E. Hunsaker, Esq. and David
M. Bell, Esq.. of O'Connor. Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover.
Killingsworth & Beshears, of Phoenix, Arizona: Dale
Haralson, Esq. of Haralson, Kinerk & Morey. of Tucson.
Arizona: Stewart L. Udall. Esq.. of Phoenix. Arizona: and
J. MacArthur Wright. Esq. of St. George. Utah.
For the defendant United States: Henry A. Gill. Jr. Esq..
Special Attorney. U.S. Department of Justice. Washington.
D.C.; Deborah C. Ratner, Esq. and Pamela Wood. Esq.. Trial
Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington. D.C:
Jake Chavez, Esq. and Edward Juran. Esq.. Trial Attorneys.
U.S. Department of Energy. Washington. D.C.; Ralph H.
Johnson. Esq.. Assistant U.S. Attorney. Salt Lake City, Utah
During the course of trial. this court received into evidence the
testimony of 98 witnesses as well as more than 1.692 documentary
exhibits.*
-5- No. C 79-0515-J
The evidence provides testimony of witnesses ranging from
those who participated in the testing program and related opera-
tions to highly trained and gifted “experts” offering conflicting
opinions, to claimants who seek solace for their test-blamed
SOrTOW.
The record contains historic documents. internal agency memo-
randa newly declassified, agency directives and correspondence.
epidemiological studies, scientific texts and articles. as well as
extracts from news media of the day and public information
pamphlets.
D. THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY
We all seek to simplify and to order. The mind eschews the
uncertain. We strain for certainty and perfect knowledge in an
infinitely complex and dynamic universe. In doing so, we often fail
to distinguish between those things which we directly experience,
see, feel, hear, taste, smell—facts we experience—from those facts
we infer. Each is a form of knowledge. Each we say we know.
But we must be constantly aware of the nature of that which we
say we “know.”
For example, we “know” of the existence of the atom. We
“know” of the existence of gamma rays. We have never seen an
atom or a gamma ray. We infer that atoms exist. The atom is a
mind-created abstract model which provides a convenient, co-
herent and consistent explanation of an immense collection of
perceived effects.* It is a model fashioned by many minds after a
meticulous sifting of the observed and the reported.‘ But, we
remain uncertain still of our scientific certainties.
This court has attempted to formulate an ordered theory of
decision. While the effort lacks the mathematical purity of physi-
cal theory, it is the judicial resolution of the questions raised by
this case with which the court is concerned. The theory of deci-
sion melds the method of science with principles of law and public
policy.
In doing so, the court endeavors to follow the suggestions of-
|
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=
-6- No. C 79-0515-J
fered in a recent address by Chief Judge Howard T. Markey of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal! Circuit:
The differences between the judicial and the scientific-tech-
nological processes are profound and pervasive. Failure to
recognize that difference has led to judicial expressions of
frustration and an unfortunate tendency to rest judicial deci-
sions on current, and often transient, “truths” and “facts” of
science and technology. The purpose and function of science
is to learn physical facts. . . .
The purpose and function of law is to resolve disputes and
to facilitate a structure for the organization of a just so-
ciety—in a word, to provide justice.
Science normally evolves a new, general physical principle
from hypotheses proven by numerous specific experiments.
The normal judicial process is precisely the reverse, for.
when properly conducted, it applies an existing, generally
: accepted moral or social value—an ethical principle—a rule
of law—to a specific problem. . .
Judges and lawyers must approach with great care. the idea
that court decisions can be justified solely on the findings of
science, lest the quest for justice be lost along the way.
For the particular “scientific truth” relied upon may prove
transient indeed.
Markey, “Needed: A Judicial Welcome for Technology,” 79 F.R.D.
209, 210-211 (1979). Judge Markey highlights a premise of this
court's theory of decision:
The first need, then, is to view technological evidence as
merely one evidentiary element in the judicial matrix of deci-
sion and not necessarily as the sole justification for the
judge’s legal decision.
Id. at 21] (emphasis in original).
-7- No. C 79-0515-J
At the core of this case is a fundamental principle—a time-
honored rule of law, an ethical rule, a moral tenet:
[T]he law imposes [a duty] on everyone to avoid acts in their
nature dangerous to the lives of others.
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). The
more particularized rules of negligence and proximate cause as a
basis for liability which are applied in the body of this opinion are
rooted in this principle of duty. In this case, as in any other case in
tort law, the answer to the ultimate question: “Who should bear
the burden of the risks created by the defendant's conduct?” is
uitimately a question of policy and of public values.
In the law. as in science, one always faces uncertainty.° This
court, faced with the duty of judgment in this case, does not have
the luxury of the zealous absolutists who “know beyond doubt”
that each and every cancer in the Great Basin is the result of open
air atomic testing, or of their absolutist counterparts who “know
beyond doubt” that none resulted. The court is disciplined by the
record and the application of rules of law.
The court's findings of fact have a certainty that is relative to the
evidence presented to the court by others. They are not fixed in
absolute terms. Judicial determination of facts in this case is indis-
tinguishable from fact-finding in other cases no matter how “com-
plex” the facts here might be.’
Thus, this opinion speaks in terms of “natural and probable”
consequences, “substantial” factors and things “more likely than
not.”
In the pragmatic world of “fact” the court passes judgment on
the probable. Dispute resolution demands rational decision. not
perfect knowledge.
§. No. C 79-0515-J _
Il.
BACKGROUND: BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RADIATION
AND NUCLEAR PHYSICS
Evaluation of the risks and consequences of exposure to atomic
radiation in this case demands some familiarity with the concepts
of radiation physics and its basic language. Such familiarity is a
prelude to the knowledgeable application of rules of law.
It does not come easily. It did not come easily for the court.
The effort of the court has been to set forth as best it can the
peculiar language and pertinent concepts of radiation physics as
the court understands them from the record. to enable those con-
cerned to understand the legal relationships of the parties as found
by the court and the legal consequences of party action.
The synopsis found in the next section of this opinion is part of
the judicial effort to understand this case. It does supply some of
the reasons why this court has found as it has found and has
decided as it has decided. It does supply some of the reasons why
the rules of law discussed and applied in subsequent sections have
been applied as they have.
A. Scientific Notation and Mathematica! Prefixes
Nuclear physics explores the universe using numbers and quan-
tities which range from the extremely large to the infinitesimally
small. To simplify the task of using numbers larger than 10 or less
than 1, a shorthand system of expression has been devised that
relies upon exponential powers of ten. Scientific notation. as this
system is called, works in this fashion: Consider, for example. the
number 100. One hundred is one way of expressing the quantity |
x 100, or 1 X (10x10). Using exponents, this expression is short-
ened to 1x10°, which still means 100. Similarly, 1.000
(1x10x10x10) may be expressed as 1x10* (or simply 10*) one mil-
lion (1,000,000) as 1x10° (or 10°) and so forth. More complex
numbers may be expressed in this fashion:
6,205 ,000,000 = 6.205 x 10°
1,899,205 = 1.899205 x 10°
-9- No. C 79-0515-J
89,450,000,000,000 = 8.945 x 10"
Decimal fractions may be expressed in scientific notation as
well. For example, 0.01 equals 1/100 or, as we have seen 1/10-.
The common form of stating this fraction in scientific notation is
1xl0-2, or 10-7. Thus a negative exponent indicates a frac-
tional quantity while a positive exponent indicates a value greater
than 1.°
Consider the following examples:
(1) 0.0032 = 32/10,000 = 32/10° = 32 x 10-4 or. more
commonly, 3.2 < 10-3
(2) 0.65 = 65/100 = 65/10? = 65 x 10°? or 6.5 x 10
(3) 0.000042 = 42/1,000,000 = 42/10°° or 4.2 x i0-‘
Scientific notation proves extremely useful in performing mathe-
matical operations involving very large or very small numbers.
Multiplication is accomplished through simpie multiplication of
the initial terms and through addition of the exponential terms. For
example,
(1) 6,500,000 x 42,120,000,000 = ?
Switching to scientific notation gives us
(6.5 x 10°) x (4.212 x 10°) = ?
which is computed in this fashion:
(6.5 x 4.212) X 10°*'® = 27.378 x 10"
or. expressed in simplest form, 2.7378 x 10'’. This expression
seems far simpler to write than 273,780,000,000.000,000, which is
the more conventional form. Fractions are multiplied in the same
fashion:
(1) 1.2 X 10-4 X 6.88 x 10°" = ?
(1.2 X 6.88) x 10"~-#* ("P= 8.256 x 10°'*,
a number expressed conventionally as .QOQOQQ0Q0000000008256.
Division of numbers expressed in scientific notation is accom-
plished in a parallel way:
(1) 6.2 x 10° + 3.8 x 10 = ?
(6.2 + 3.8) x 10°- > = 1.6315789 x 10
-10- No. C 79-0515-J
(2) 3.2 x 10 + 4.5 x 10"' = ?
(3.2 + 4.5) x 10°8- ') = .71111 x 10’ or
7.111 X 10%—a short way of saying 7,111,000.
(3) 1.62 x 10°? + 6.04 x 10° = ?
(1.62 + 6.04) x 10"-?)-® = 2682 x 10-* or
2.682 < 10-°—a short way of writing 0.000000002682.
Numbers such as these are commonplace in nuclear physics.
For example, Planck’s Constant. a fixed number defining the
proportional relationship between the frequency of a
light wave and its energy, is expressed as 6.6261965 x 10°*4. a term
far more easily handled in computations than ts
0.0000000000000000000000000000000006626 1965. its conven-
tional equivalent.’ Scientific notation makes it possible for a smal!
electronic calculator with an eight-digit or ten-digit display to cal-
culate numbers ranging from 10%? to 10°°°. Mathematical opera-
tions beyond either limit of that range have no practical value:
nothing in our experience is either that large or that small.'°
The mathematics used in nuclear physics 1s simplified for practi-
cal purposes through use of scientific notation. Another system of
simplification involves units of measurements routinely used by
humans in describing matter. energy and their interactions. At this
point in history. science maintains a preference for units in the
metric system. Mass is measured in grams. length in units called
meters, volume in litres. energy in units such as ergs or joules.
Often. calculations are made in terms of very large or very smal!
quantities—thousands of units or infinitesimal fractions of units.
One may be working with a thousand grams or a million grams or
with a billionth of a gram. A system of word prefixes has been
devised under the International System of Units to adjust units to
more closely relate to the actual quantities being utilized. Table |
lists these prefixes and their definitions.
Thus, when one is working with 6 x 10°, or 6,000 grams. one ts
also working with 6 kilo grams. Likewise, if the quantity is
0.000000082 grams. or 8.2 x 10°° g. a more workable expression
may be 8.2 x 10°° or .0820 micrograms (wg). As will be seen. it is
not uncommon to speak of micrograms. or picocuries (a tiny unit
of radioactivity) of fallout material deposited in human bodies. or
-|}- No. C 79-0515-J
of kilograms of material. or megacuries of fallout radioactivity
generated by detonation of a nuclear weapon.'- The difference
between a picocurie of radioactivity and a megacurie of radioac-
tivity is a factor of 10'® or 1,000,000,000,000.000,000.'* Yet both:
units are meaningful to the evidence in the record before this
court. See Part IV(A), infra.
TABLE |. Prefixes for the Units in the
International System!!
Prefix Symbol ms Power
tera T 10!
giga G 10”
mega M 10°
kilo K 10°
lecto L 10-
deka da 10!
deci d 10° ' or 1/10
cent! ¢ 10> - or 1/106
milli m 10> * or 11.000
micro rv 10-° or 1/1.000.000
nano n i:
pico Pp 10- '-
femto f 10>!
atto a it)" +
Simply by referring to Table 1, one can determine what multiple
or fraction of a standard unit is being discussed in the text. Quick
reference to Table | prefixes will aid the reader in identifying the
units used and in making a meaningful comparison of quantities.
B. The Atom: Protons, Neutrons and Electrons
After centuries of careful observation, our best answer to
Thales’ 2,500-year-old question ‘What is the world made of?”
seems to be that all matter is composed of atoms. See G. Amaldi,
The Nature of Matter (1966). Atoms are very tiny packages of
mass which have specific physical qualities.'* In the natural world
around us, science has identified 92 species of atoms commonly
referred to as elements. Each element has unique physical and
chemical properties. Each element's atoms differ slightly in struc-
ture and composition from the atoms of any other element. Some
elements are familiar: copper, iron, oxygen. gold, carbon. calcium
and two dozen others are well known as part of our own chemical
$3.
No. C 79-0515-J
makeup, or as part of the everyday world around us. Others. such
as praseodymium, rubidium, and polonium, are far more obscure.
Each, however, represents a different type of atom.
In addition to the 92 “natural” elements, scientists have pro-
duced a dozen more “synthetic” elements, such as plutonium.
which are heavier, and often more unstable and short-lived than
their “natural” brethren.'> A complete list of the known chemical
elements is found in Table 2.
Table 2 THE ELEMENTS*
Atomic Element's Chemical Atomic Element’s Chemical
Number Hame Symbol Number Name Symbol
] Hydrogen H 33 Arsenic As
2 Helium He 34 Selenium Se
3 Lithium Li 35 Bromine Br
4 Beryllium Be % Krypton Kr
5 Boron B 37 Rubidium Rb
& Carbon 38 Strontium Sr
7 Nitrogen N 39 Yttnum Y
8 Oxygen oO 40 Zirconium Zr
9 Fluorine F 4} Niobium Nb
10 Neon Ne 42 Molybdenum Mo
1] Sodium Na 43 Technetium Te
12 Magnesium Mg at Ruthemium Ru
13 Aluminum Al 45 Rhodium Rh
14 Silicon Si 46 Palladium Pd
15 Phosphorus P 47 Silver Ag
16 Sultur S 48 Cadmium Cd
17 Chlorine Ci 49 Indium In
18 Argon Ar SO Tin Sn
19 Potassium K 5] Antimony Sb
20 Calcium Ca 52 Tellunum Te
21 Scandium Sc 53 lodine l
22 Titanium Ti Ss Xenon Xe
23 Vanadium Vv 55 Cesium Cs
24 Chromium Cr So Barium Bu
25 Manganese Mn 37 Lanthanum La
26 Iron Fe 58 Cenum Ce
27 Cobalt Co 59 Praseodymium Pr
28 Nickel Ni 60 Neodymium Nd
29 Copper Cu 6] Promethium Pm
30 Zinc Zn 62 Samanum Sm
3] Gallium Ga 63 Europium Eu
32 Germanium Ge 64 Gadolinium Gd
en
-}3- No. C 79-05i5-J
Table 2 (continued)
Atomic Elements Chemical Atomic Elements Chemical
Number Hame Symbo! Number Name Symbol
65 Terbium Tb 86 Radon Rn
66 Dysprosium Dy 87 Francium Fr
67 Holmium Ho 88 Radium Ra
68 Erbium Er 89 Actinium Ac
69 Thulium Tm 90 Thorium Th
70 Ytterbium Yb 9] Protactinium Pis
7I Lutetium Lu 9 Uranium U
72 Hafnium Ht 93 Neptunium Np
73 Tantalum Ta O4 Plutonium Pu
74 Tungsten W 95 Americium Am
75 Rhenium Re 96 Cunum Cm
76 Osmium Os 97 Berkelium Bk
Pf Indium ir 9% Califomium Ct
78 Platinum Pr 99 Einsteinium Es
799 Gold Au 100 Fermium Fm
80 Mercury He 10] Mendelevium Md
8] Thatiium TI 102 Nobelium No
82 Lead Pb 103 Lawrencium Lw
83 Bismuth Bi 104 (Kurchatovium) Ku
84 Polonium Po 105 (Hahnium) Ha
85 Astatine Al
*See also Appendix D. infra.
The differences between atoms of different elements are ac-
counted for by variations in their composition and structure. All
atoms are thought to be composed of three types of smaller parti-
cles: protons, neutrons and electrons. A proton is a tiny particle
with a mass of approximately 1.672 x 10°°4 gm. or 1.007 atomic
mass units.'© Each proton carries a positive electric charge.'? An
electron is a particle with a negative electric charge equivalent to
that of a proton but with 1/1837 the mass of a proton, or 5.5 x 104
amu. An electron has a diameter of approximately | x 10°'* cm. A
neutron is a subatomic particle having no electric charge (hence
the name) yet having a mass of 1.0087 amu—-slightly heavier than
a proton. An atom of a particular element represents a specific
combination of protons, neutrons and electrons.
Far from being randomly distributed within an atom, these parti-
cles are ordered according to specific principles of structure:
-]4- No. C 79-0515-J
(1) Each atom contains a nucleus at its center;
(2) Protons and neutrons are located within the nucleus:
(3) The nucleus is tiny in relation to the atom itself. comprising
about 1/100,000th of the volume of the atom, yet containing al-
most all of its mass; :
(4) Electrons orbit the nucleus in constant motion. and in pat-
terns better described using the physics of standing waves;!*
(5) An electrostatically neutral atom is one with an equal num-
ber of electrons and protons; an atom with an imbalance of pro-
tons and electrons will itself act as a charged particle. called an
ion. lons—electrically charged atoms—are often far more reactive
with other atoms than are neutral, un-ionized atoms:
(6) Electrons are distributed in the space around the nucleus in
stable orbitals, which correspond to a discrete amount of energy.
often called an energy state:
(7) Only certain energy states. or orbitals. are allowed in atoms
of a given element:
(8) An electron may move from one energy level to a higher
energy level, by absorbing energy from an outside source in an
amount equal to the difference between the two energy levels: an
electron may fall to a lower energy level by emitting energy in the
amount of the difference between the two levels. The energy is
emitted in the form of a photon.!?
An electron may absorb energy (i.e.. become “excited™) to a
degree sufficient to allow it to leave the atom altogether. This
phenomenon is called ionization, and is the key to innumerable
chemical reactions.
The simplest element is hydrogen, whose atoms consist of a
single proton in the nucleus and a single electron in the surround-
ing orbitals. The number of protons in the nucleus determines the
number of electrons in the atom’s orbital shells. which has a
i:
-15- No. C 79-0515-J
significant effect on the atom’s chemical characteristics. The num-
ber of protons is often referred to as the atomic number and is
identified in the literature by the symbol Z. An element's atomic
number determines its place in an important scheme of classifica-
tion known as the Periodic Table. See Table 3. The elements in
each column grouping, or period, share similar electron structures,
physical and chemical properties. See I. Asimov, Understanding
Physics: The Electron, Proton, and Neutron 13-18 (1966); C. Ham-
mond, “The Elements.” in Handbook of Chemistry and Physics.
pp. B-2 to B-40 (64th ed. Weast 1983).
In addition to the atomic number, atoms are described according
to atornic weight, symbolized by the letter A, which quantifies the
total mass of an atom as expressed in atomic mass units (amu).
The atomic weight of hydrogen is approximately 1.00797 amu. the
single proton being the source of almost all of its mass. Heavier
elements have nuclei containing neutrons as well as more protons.
Helium, for example, has two protons and (usually) two neutrons
in its nucleus, giving it an atomic number (Z) of 2 and atomic
weight (A) of approximately 4.0026. While varying the number of
protons will change the atom from one element to another. varying
the number of neutrons changes the atomic weight of the atom
without radically affecting its physical or chemical properties.
Atoms of the same element which have different numbers of neu-
trons in the nucleus are referred to as isotopes of the element.
Hydrogen, for example. has three isotopes: the most common
form. protium, has no neutrons; deuterium, or heavy hydrogen.
has one proton and one neutron; tritium, the heaviest. has two
neutrons for each proton. Isotopes are often referred to by an
abbreviation of their atomic weights called a mass number. Radi-
um (Z = 88, A = 226.054) becomes simply radium 226 or 7?Ra.
Radium 224 (A = 224.0202) is another isotope of the same ele-
ment having two less neutrons. In lighter elements the number of
neutrons and protons in the nucleus tends to be equal. or nearly so.
In the heavier elements toward the bottom of the Periodic Table,
neutrons outnumber protons. Lead, for example, has 82 protons (Z
= 82) and an average of 115 neutrons (A = 207.19) in its nuclei.
compared to Calcium (Z = 20, A = 40.08) or Neon (Z = 10. A
= 20.183).
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-17- No. C 79-0515-J
C. Radiation and Radioactivity
Perhaps the simplesi definition of radiation is the one most
easily understood: radiation is a transfer of energy through space
(or some other accommodating medium). Usually energy is radi-
ated in the form of light or heat. though as we shail see. energy
can be radiated through emission of particles having momentum. ~*"’
Despite its outward appearance, light—or more broadly. electro-
magnetic radiation--is not transmitted as a continuous flow of
energy. When light is radiated, its energy is packaged in discrete
units,?! tiny bundles of energy called photons. Careful observation
has disclosed that photons have some properties which are best
explained if they are considered as waves: other properties are best
explained if photons of light are thought of as particles. The energy
of a particular photon, or light wave particle. is relaied to its
frequency as follows:
E = hv
When E is energy (in ergs), v is the frequency (in Hertz) and /
is a number known as Planck's Constant. See note 9. supra. The
relationship may also be described in terms of wavelength.
E= Ws)
E is energy
h is Planck's constant
c is the speed of light
Ad is the wavelength
In short, the higher the frequency (or the shorter the wave-
length) of light, the greater its energy. Visible light falls roughly
midway on the spectrum of light energy with wavelengths
[A]ranging from 7 x 10° cm for red light through 4 x 10-5 cm for
violet. Wavelengths longer than those for visible light fall toward
the infrared end of the spectrum: radar waves. radio waves.
and microwaves have photons of less energy than visible light.
Light wave particles of greater energy range from ultraviolet light
having sufficient energy to cause sunburn (A ~10°° cm) to x-rays,
gamma rays (A ~~10°* to 10°'° cm) and high energy cosmic rays
(A > 10°'? cm) which are of particular interest to this lawsuit.
-18- No. C 79-0515-]
Differences in photon energy are crucial. We are constantly
awash in an invisible ocean of radio waves which pass by—and
through—our bodies with no perceivable harmful effect. However.
exposure tO gamma rays, which easily may be one-hundred trillion
(10'*) times more powerful than broadcast radio waves. raises
serious human health concerns. See Part 1V, infra.
At the end of the last century, scientists in Europe led by
Wilhelm Roentgen discovered basic techniques for producing high
energy photons—*x-rays.” Roentgen called them—in the labora-
tory. By bombarding a metal plate within a sealed glass vacuum
tube with high-voltage electrons. invisible radiation was produced
which would cause certain chemicals to fluoresce brilliantly. and
which could fog-er-darken photographic plates wrapped in paper.
or even concealed within a box. See S. Glasstone. Sourcebook on
Atomic Energy 48-5] (2d ed. 1958); I. Asimov, Understanding
Physics: The Electron, Proton and Neutron 33-35 (1966). In 1896.
the French physicist Henri Becquerel discovered that the same
kind of penetrating radiation emanated from uranium salts.°? In
1898, Marie Curie gave this phenomenon of constant emission of
penetrating. ionizing radiation the name radioactivity. S. Glass-
tone. Sourcebook on Atomic Energy. at 53: see Mme.
Sklodowska-Curie, 126 Comptes Rendus 110] (1898). One of the
first properties observed in both x-rays and radioactive substances
was the induction of an electrical charge in the air surrounding an
x-ray tube or immediately in contact with a sample of radioactive
material. This ionizing effect enabled early researchers to detect
such radiation using very simple devices. “[T]o detect nuclear
particles we detect ionization.” E. Pollard & W. Davidson.
Applied Nuclear Physics 43 (1942) (emphasis in original). Radia-
tion detection and measurement techniques are still very heavily
dependent upon this particular quality. See_e.g.. N. Tsoulfanidis.
Measurement and Detection of Radiation (1983).°* As we shall
see, the adverse health effects of exposure to radiation are also a
product of ionization. See Pari 1V infra.
D. lonizing Radiation: Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Rays.
Early research work done by Ernest Rutherford and others using
heavy radioactive elements such as radium. polonium. thorium
-19- No. C 79-0515-J
and uranium, disclosed that ionizing radiation emanating from
radioactive materials could be resolved into three different types:
alpha rays (a), beta rays (B) and gamma rays (y). Application of a
strong magnetic field to a stream of ionizing radiation emitted by a
sample of radium salts readily deflected beta rays in a fashion
indicating that beta radiation carries a negative charge. See Fig. 1.
Less easily deflected in the opposite direction were alpha rays.
which were deduced to have a positive electrostatic charge and
greater momentum than beta rays. Gamma rays passed undeflected
by the strongest magnetic fields: their highly penetrating qualities
led researchers to conclude that gamma rays and x-rays were very
similar (which they are). See e.g., J. Cork, Radioactivity and
Nuclear Physics 11 (1947). Soon it was determined that beta rays
exhibited all the properties of high-energy electrons. while alpha
rays were identified as consisting of the nuclei of helium atoms
stripped of both outer electrons. Both gamma rays and x-rays were
found to consist of very short wavelength high-energy photons.°+
Of crucial importance was the discovery that radioactivity is the
product of internal processes within the nucleus of the atom rather
than the result of excitation by some undetected outside source of
energy. Radioactivity properties are unaffected by external forces.
such as heat. light or pressure. or by any chemical reaction.-*
Instead. they operate according to specific principles of nuclear
physics.
The basic principle finds simple expression in the work of
Pollard and Davidson: “This process, the passage from one nearly
stable nucleus to one which is stable, is the underlying process of
radioactivity.” Applied Nuclear Physics 102 (1942). Recalling that
the nuclei of atoms are made up of various combinations of pro-
tons and neutrons, and that within atoms of a given element, the
ratio of neutrons to protons may vary from isotope to isotope.
careful observation of radioactive properties reveals that some pro-
ton/neutron ratios tend to be far more stable than others. Radio-
activity represents the mechanism of internal adjustment by which
less stable nuciei transform their composition into a proton
neutron ratio having greater stability. Emission of an alpha parti-
cle, for example, lightens the nucleus in evenhanded fashion: the
numbers of neutrons and protons are each reduced by 2. Radio-
-20- No. C 79-0515-J
Ro
i
l'IG. 4.
1. The a-rays are very slightly penetrating, and appear to constitute the principal
part of the radiation. These rays are characterised by the laws by which they are
absorbed by matter. The magnetic field acts very slightly upon them. and they were
formerly thought to be quite unaffected by the action of this field. However. in a
strong magnetic field, the a-rays are slightly deflected: the deflection is caused in the
same manner as with cathode rays, but the direction of the deflection is reversed: it
is the same as for the canal rays of the Crookes tubes.
Il. The B-rays are less absorbable as a whole than the preceding ones. They are
deflected by a magnetic field in the same manner and direction as cathode rays.
Ill. The y-rays are penetrating rays, unaffected by the magnetic field. and com-
parable to ROntgen rays.
Consider the following imzzinary experiment:—Some radium. R. is placed at the
bottom of a small deep cavity. hollowed in a block of lead. p (Fig.4). A sheaf of rays.
rectilinear and slightly expanded, streams from the receptacle. Let us suppose that a
strong uniform magnetic field is established in the neighbourhood of the receptacle.
normal to the plane of the figure and directed towards the back. The three groups of
rays. a, B. ‘y, will now be separated. Then rather faint y-rays continue in their
Straight path without a trace of deviation. The B-rays are deflected in the manner of
cathode rays, and describe circular paths in the plane of the figure. If the receptacle
is placed on a photographic plate, a C, the portion, B C, of the plate which receives
the B-rays is acted upon. Lastly, the a-rays form a very intense shaft which is slightly
deflected, and which is soon absorbed by the air. These rays describe in the plane of
the figure a path of great curvature, the direction of the deflection being the reverse
of that with the B-rays.
If the receptacle is covered with a thin sheet of aluminium (0.1 m.m. thick). the
a-rays are suppressed alrnost entirely, the B-rays are lessened. and the y-rays do not
appear to be absorbed to any great extent.
AL
Fig. 1. Mme. Mane Sklodowska Curie, Radioactive Substances. thesis presented to
the Faculty of Sciences. Paris. 1903 (pap. reprint ed. 1961), at 33-34.
<j. No. C 79-0515-J
active transformation by a-particle emission is observed most
often in the decay of heavy elements (Z>84),.°° such as uranium
(Z = 92, A = 238), which ultimately “decay” to the very stable
nuclear structure found in lead 206 (Z = 82. A = 206):
SP “Pb + tHe (a-particle)
A nucleus which has a greater ratio of neutrons to protons than
is found in more stable forms may emit a beta particle (B-)—a
high energy negative electron—as one of the neutrons is trans-
formed into a proton. Strontium-90, with 38 protons and 52 neu-
trons, is radioactive. It decays by B-emission into Yttrium-90, with
39 protons and 5] neutrons. Yttrium-90 in turn decays into
Zirconium-90 by B-emission. Zirconium-90 with 40 protons to 50
neutrons, is the stable, naturally predominate isotope of that ele-
ment. Radioactivity ceases.
8S —L—e wy —£_. 07 r (stable)
Atoms with an overabundance of protons may decay by emitting
a positively charged electron, or positron (B + ), or by capturing an
electron from a nearby orbital. Either process reduces the number
of protons and increases the number of neutrons by |. For
example,
'30
'$N (stable) + B+ (positron)
When the radioactivity properties of the nuclides?’ are plotted on
a graph of numbers of neutrons (N) and protons (Z), a pattern
emerges. See Fig. 2.
Radioactive decay enhances nuclear stability not only by adjust-
ing the total number of particles, but also by carrying away dis-
crete bundles, or quanta, of energy from the nucleus. Alpha parti-
cles don't quietly drift away from the nucleus of Plutonium-239;
they are propelled away at high speed with an energy of more than
5 MeV—five million electron volts. While 5 MeV is a trifling
amount of energy in the sphere of human endeavors, at the atomic
level it is enormous. In 1919, Rutherford bombarded nitrogen
atoms with a particles of lesser energy. The a particles slammed
into the nitrogen nuclei, yielding oxygen nuclei—a different ele-
ment—and a free proton:
$He (a particle) + '3N
'XO + {H (proton)
130
110
100
Neutron number, NV
-22- No. C 79-0515-J
> &
& % HE
CRRIRRAIN ER
= NSS PNB aN!
; : ge
\ ie <p a OANXA
NIN AN = \
A eS
Where a nuclide has more than one mode of disintegration. the predominant mode
- 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 + 100
Atomic number, Z
A nuclidic chart.
* Stable.
Z negatron emitter.
X positron emitter (or electron capture).
4 alpha emitter.
has been used. The sloping lines represent constant A values (isobars).
Fig. 2.
D. Halliday, Introductory Nuclear Physics 9 (1950).
-23- No. C 79-0515-J
E. Pollard & W. Davidson, Applied Nuclear Physics 5-6 (1942)
A nucleus may also expel energy through emission of a gamma
ray (‘y) of a particular wavelength. Likelihood of gamma emission
depends on the specific nuclides. Strontium-90 does not emit
gamma rays during decay. lodine-13] does. Cobalt-60 emits two
gamma rays in the MeV range, and has been used as an important
source of radiation in the treatment of cancer. The detailed proper-
ties and mechanics of radioactivity and nuclear transformations are
as awe-inspiring as they are complex. Why it is, for example. that
unstable heavy nuclei emit a particles poses a challenging theo-
retical question, the answer to which is beyond the scope of this
inquiry.** Yet a specific understanding of the statistical behavior of
radionuclides (e.g., concepts such as radionuclide “half-life” ) and
of the ways in which ionizing radiation interacts with other matter
is crucial to adequate analysis of the causation and negligence
issues raised in this action.
E. Statistical Nature of Radioactivity
Current theory holds that events at the atomic or sub-atomic
level occur according to Statistical probabilities rather than any
strict determinism.?? Radioactive decay in any given quantity of a
radioactive element occurs at a constant rate, yet no one can tell at
what time any particular atom will decay. We know only the
probability that it will decay within a chosen time period. or
viewed another way, that over a chosen period of time. x number
of nuclei in our sample will decay into “daughter” nuclides. The
most important expression of this statistical approach is found in
the concept of half-life. The half-life of a radionuclide is the
specific length of time. during which half of the nuclei in any
amount of the radionuclide will have decayed. For example. if you
Start with a one gram sample of radium-226 (7°Ra),. after 1,600
years only half of the sample (0.5 gm) remains 7*°Ra. The other
half has undergone radioactive decay:
78Ra ———> *i2Rn + 3He + Q (energy)
After another 1,600 years, only half of that remainder is still
226Ra (0.25 gm). Passage of 1,600 more years witnesses decay of
one-half of that fraction, leaving 1/8 gram (0.125 gm) of 77°Ra.
i
G
-24- No. C 79-0515-J
The process of decay continues at this rate until no more °°°Ra
remains. To say, therefore, that a radionuclide such as stron-
tium-90 has a half-life of 28.1 years means that half of the quan-
tity existing at the beginning of the 28.1 years remains %Sr at the
end of that time.
Half-life varies dramatically from radionuclide to radionuclide.
Some isotopes last for half-lives of only a few seconds; others last
far longer. Uranium (*38U), although radioactive, has a half-life of
4.51 x 10° years—nearly the age of the earth itself. See R. Heath.
“Table of the Isotopes,” in Handbook of Chemistry and Physics
B-232 to B-316 (64th ed. Weast 1983).°° Half-life is indicative not
only of the persistence of a radionuclide in the laboratory or the
environment, but also of the intensity of its radioactive decay.
Radiation yielded by one gram of iodine-!36, an isotope found in
the fireball of a nuclear explosion, is intense: emitting B particles
and y rays in the MeV range, '*] decays rapidly. reflecting a half-
life of 83 seconds.
11 -----= '3Xe (stable) + B — +y + Q (energy)
Consequently its radioactivity fades rapidly. After 15 minutes. less
than 1/2000 of the original amount is identifiable as '*¢]. After an
hour more, the fraction remaining is nearly 2.28 x 10°'* of the
original amount. In contrast, Plutonium-239, a radionuclide pres-
ent in every nuclear fallout cloud to date.*! persists with a half-life
of 24.400 years. Consequently, all but a fraction of the estimated 3
tons of 749Pu deposited on the earth by fallout can still be found
somewhere. See ‘‘Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation.”
Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation (1977). PX-706/DX-605 [hereinafter cited as
the UNSCEAR Report (1977)], at 148.
Half-life is not an average lifetime for a radionuclide:*? it is an
expression of rate, of the statistical probability of decay over a
specific time period
The half-life of a radionuclide gives some immediate insight
into its behavior and the nature of the hazard that might be
associated with it. A small quantity of radionuclide with a
half-life in the order of minutes will not persist long enough
-25- No. C 79-0515-J
to present a significant hazard a few days later and it is not
likely to become dispersed very far by natural forces. In
contrast, a radionuclide with a half-life on the order of sev-
eral years may represent a long-term hazard and become
widely dispersed if not held in containment... .
F. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and the
Environment 44 (1982). The quantity of radioactive material that
persists in relation to the number of half-lives is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
PERCENT OF ORIGINAL
NUMBER OF RADIOACTIVE ATOMS
30
20 F
Or
4 4 1 4
' 2 3 4 3 6
NUMBER OF HALF LIVES
Fig. 3. Relationship of time, expressed as number of half-lives. to the quantity of a
radioactive subsiance.
Quantity of radioactive material may be expressed in either of
two ways: (1) the mass of the material: or (2) its radioactivity. To
3
-26- No. C 79-05]5-J
say, however, that a sample of Strontium-90 has a mass of x. grams
does not by itself offer any perspective on the amount of ionizing
radiation being emitted by the sample at any given moment. The
activity of a known mass of radioactive material may be computed
as follows:
A* ~_ 0.693mN,
T,oAF,
Where A* is the activity of the sample:
m is the mass of the sample:
A is the atomic weight of the radionuclide:
T,,> is the half-life in years (or whatever):
F, is the conversion factor from years (or whatever) to a desired
time period, e.g. minutes; seconds, etc.
N, 1S a constant, known as Avogadro's number, expressing the
number of atoms in a mole (a mass in grams equal to the nuclide’s
atomic weight) of material. See F. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radio-
ecology: Nuclear Energy and the Environment, supra at 45. For
example, a 1.2 gram sample of sodium-24, an important radio-
active by-product of nuclear weapons testing having a half-life of
15.0 hours, would have an initial activity of
A* (0.693)(1.2 grams)(6.022 x 10°* atoms/moles)
(15.0 hours)(24 grams/mole)(3600 seconds/hr. )
= 3,864 x 10!’ disintegrations per second.
This activity represents a rate of emission paralleling that of a
sample of pure radium-226 having a mass of 1.0557 x 10’ grams.
or 10.5 metric tons. Of course, 74Na activity would fade quickly in
comparison to the 77®Ra; the mean life of *4Na atoms would be
21.64 hours, while atoms in our 10.5 metric tons would persist for
a mean life of 2,308.8 years, making it a far more serious hazard
overall. 34
Expression of radioactivity in terms of rate of decay (e.g.. disin-
tegrations per second) is a common measurement. The most fre-
quently used unit of activity is the curie (Ci), which represents a
mass undergoing 3.7 x 10'° disintegrations per second. Practical
quantities of radioactive materials are more easily expressed in
fractional units, such as millicuries (mCi), microcuries (wCi). or
picocuries (pCi), representing 10°*, 10°° and 10°! curies. respec-
-27- No. C 79-0515-J
tively.*4 A tiny new unit, the Becquerel (Bq). represents an ac-
tivity of one disintegration per second, or the equivalent of 27 pCi.
Yet the radioactive fallout yield of even a “nominal” nuclear de-
vice is more easily expressed in megacuries—millions of curies of
activity.
Measurement in curies does not. however. define the type or
energy of the radiation being emitted. That information is specific
to each radionuclide and is important to the evaluation of the risk
created by exposure to curie, millicurie, or microcurie amounts of
material.
F. Interactions of Radiation with Matter
Each type of radiation emitted by radioactive materials interacts
with other matter in important yet distinct ways. Alpha particles
carry an electrostatic charge of +2 units. When an a particle
passes near another atom, the electrons in its orbital shells are as
attracted to the a particle by virtue of their own negative (-)
charge. Some electrons are merely excited by the event, 1.e., they
move from a lower to a higher energy state while remaining in
orbit around the nucleus. For many others. however, the coulombic
attractions of the a particles are too strong: these electrons are
stripped away from their original atoms and travel freely for a
time, leaving the mother atom in an ionized state. Balance of
electric charges is soon restored, but #n reaching neutrality, some
atoms form new combinations with other atoms—new molecules
are born. In many ways, an a particle can be visualized as a tiny.
speedy electromagnet. sweeping free electrons into its path.
The electrostatic attraction is a mutual one; the electrons in
nearby atoms are attracted by — and attract — the speeding a
particles. The coulombic forces energize the electrons, pulling
them away from atoms by giving them sufficient energy to escape.
At the same time the electrons act as a drag on the a@ particle. Its
energy is reduced by the amount that the electrons’ energy is
increased. According to fundamental physical law.*> the energy is
conserved, neither created or destroyed. The ionization that occurs
in the path of an a particle represents a transfer of energy. The
amount of energy transferred per unit of distance traveled by the a
particle is known as a linear energy transfer (LET). See e.g..
-28- No. C 79-0515-J
Committee on the Biological Effects of lonizing Radiations, The
Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation: 1980, at 13 (1980), DX-1025 (hereinafter cited as the
“BEIR-Iil Report”). Alpha radiation is “high-LET™ radiation: so
many electrons are excited or ionized by a particles that a great
deal of energy is transferred in a short distance. The range of an a
particle traveling through matter thus tends to be fairly short.
As soon as the @ particle has transferred the bulk of its energy.
it slows down sufficiently to capture two electrons of its own.
becoming a neutral, inert helium atom.*°
The range of an a particle depends largely upon the energy of
the particles and the density of the medium through which it
passes. Radioactive a-emitters shower their surroundings with par-
ticles having an energy between 0.1 MeV and 10 MeV. Such
energies give the alpha radiation a range in air of less than 10 cm.
The range in more dense material, for example paper. aluminum
foil, or human cell tissue is far less, on the order of a few um. The
range of a particles, or conversely. the stopping power of material
bombarded by them, is computed with good accuracy through a
system of mathematical formulae not directly relevant here.*7 For
the purposes of this case, the general range of a particle radiation.
i.e., a few centimeters in air, a few microns (ym) in living tissue**
is important information to use in assessing the risks presented by
potential and actual exposure to a-emitting radionuclides. *°
Beta particles (B-) interact with matter somewhat differently
than a radiation. As a consequence of B- particles having far less
mass than an a particle (M, = 1/7360 M,,) and a negative rather
than positive electric charge.*° relatively low linear energy transfer
(LET) takes place per unit of distance traveled. Beta particies are
far more easily deflected by collisions with other electrons or
nuclei, and cause ionization of atoms by colliding with other elec-
trons or by passing near enough to repel electrons (having the
same negative charge). Having a low LET factor, however, means
that B- particles in the 100 Kv-2 MeV energy spectrum have
significantly greater range and penetrating power than do a parti-
cles carrying even twice as much energy. They may traverse several
meters in air at speeds approaching that of light. J. Cork. Radioac-
tivity and Nuclear Physics 118 (1947). In cell tissue, B- particles
may leave a trail of ionization several millimeters in length.
-29- No. C 79-0515-J
Beta particles, like other ionized electrons, also radiate energy
in the form of gamma rays as they are deflected by nuclei and slow
down, eventually returning to orbitals of other atoms. This “brak-
ing” radiation, called Bremsstrahlung. may in turn strike other
electrons, exciting them into further ionizations.
Gamma radiation interacts with matter in several different ways:
(1) photoelectric absorption; (2) Compton scattering: (3) pair pro-
duction; (4) Rayleigh scattering: or, it may not interact at all.
passing through the exposed material completely unimpeded.
Since gamma rays have no electric charge. ionization by gamma
radiation occurs only when a gamma ray strikes an orbital elec-
tron. If a gamma ray striking an electron is totally absorbed, the
electron is stripped away from the atom, and possessed of the full
energy of the gamma ray, careens through surrounding matter in a
fashion very much akin to a B particle. Thousands of ionizations
result. This “photoelectric” effect is the dominant form of inter-
action for gamma rays whose energy is less than 1.0 MeV.?!
For gamma rays of greater energy (0.3-3 MeV), the phe-
nomenon known as Compton scattering is predominant: a gamma
ray Striking an electron may only impart a portion of its energy to
the particle. The ionized electron is driven in one direction, the
gamma ray photon, now of lesser energy, is defiected on a new
path. In Compton scattering, a gamma ray may thus 1onize several
electrons before its energy is wholly transferred.
For gamma rays of an energy of 1.02 MeV or greater another
interaction may occur if the photon strikes a nucleus: the gamma
ray can disappear, leaving a positron (8 + ) and an electron (B-) in
its place. This phenomenon, known as pair production, ultimately
generates further gamma radiation: when the positron comes in
contact with another electron both particles are annihilated, yield-
ing two gamma photons of an energy approximating 0.51 MeV
each. These go on to ionize other electrons, or pass out of the
irradiated material entirely. At energies above 10 MeV, pair pro-
duction is the predominant interaction. See I F. Whicker & V.
Shultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and the Environment
51 (1982). Finally, gamma rays of low energy (<100 Kev) may
experience Rayleigh scattering, the elastic deflection of the gamma
-30- No. C 79-0515-J
photon by an electron with no energy being transferred to the
electron.
Gamma radiation by itself does no damage to exposed matter—
if it passes through without collision.4° When the gamma rays
collide with electrons, as they may at any point along their path.
ionizations occur just as if the matter had been bombarded with
high energy beta particles. As we sha!] see, ionization of matter in
living tissue may cause serious harm to the affected cells. and
ultimately, the whole organism.
A fourth type of radiation emitted by nuclear explosion. free
neutrons, also causes ionization in a somewhat indirect fashion.
A neutron may be absorbed by a nucleus with which it collides.
yielding a free proton, an a@ particle, another neutron, or a gamma
ray. These charged particles and gamma rays interact with matter
as previously described. Neutrons may also collide with nuclei and
scatter them without being absorbed. Neutrons remaining in the
free state decay into free protons and B- particles at a rate giving
them a half-life of roughly 10.8 minutes:
dn
ip + g- +¥
(¥ is an antineutrino) H. Semat & J. Albright. Introduction to
Atomic and Nuclear Physics 447, 498-500 (Sth ed. 1972).**
While neutron interactions are a significant health concern in
cases of direct exposure to a nuclear explosion or to a nuclear
reactor, they are important to this case in only one respect: free
neutrons from a nuclear explosion will interact with the surround-
ing air or with soil drawn up into the mushroom cloud. forming
radioactive isotopes through absorption reactions. This additional
activity adds to the radioactive burden of the fallout cloud, in-
creasing the total risk of radiation exposure from the event. See
Part Ill, infra.
G. The Mass-Energy Relationship
Mention has already been made of the Laws of Conservation of
Mass and Energy—the concepts that in any chemical reaction the
total mass of the system remains constant. and that in any physical
interaction the total energy of the system remains constant. In an
3]. No. C 79-0515-J
absolute sense, neither matter nor energy is created or destroyed in
any reaction. Yet an atomic bomb, a device containing only a few
kilograms of metallic material yields energy—heat. light. and ex-
plosive force—in incredible amounts.
The key is found in a simple, fundamental relationship between
matter and energy. a relationship which Albert Einstein originally
defined and which most people have at some time seen expressed
as
E = me
E represents energy. expressed in ergs: m represents mass, ex-
pressed in grams; c is the speed of light. expressed in cm/second
(c = 2.9979250 x 10'° cm sec-'). Put together in the simplest
terms, matter and energy are equivalent. Matter may be converted
to energy by a factor of approximately 9 x 10°° ergs per gram. 49 x
107° ergs, if released all at once. generate the explosive power of
approximately 21.5 kilotons of TNT—more than either of the
bombs dropped on Japan. Cf. S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, The
Effects of Nuclear Weapons 13 & Table 1.45 (3d ed. 1977)
DX-1242. A “nominal” yield nuclear device (approx. 20 kt TNT)
derives its energy from the annihilation of a little less than one
gram of matter.4°
If E = mc*, then m = E/c?. Using this equation and a conver-
sion factor factor (1 kt TNT equals 4.18 < 10'° ergs) then the
quantity of matter consumed can be calculated:
(4.18 x 10” ergs(20)
(9 x 10° cm*/sec’)
9.288 x 10°! grams, or 0.9288 gm.
m=
m
Similarly, the energy released in radioactive decay can be pre-
cisely accounting for by finding the difference in mass between the
mass of the original nuclide and the mass of the daughter nuclide
and emitted particles. The decay products will be a tiny bit
lighter.4©
H. The Nuclear Fission Process
The discovery of radioactivity at the turn of the last century led
quickly to further discoveries. The nature and properties of alpha.
beta and gamma radiation were closely scrutinized. In 1920, physi-
-32- No. C 79-0515-J
cists predicted the existence of a new particie—the neutron—
having roughly the sdme mass as a proton, but no electric charge.
In 1932, experimental bombardment of beryllium metal with a
particles yielded a new highly penetrating form of radiation that
British physicist James Chadwick correctly identified as neutrons.
By 1937, reports were published indicating that elements heavier
than uranium could be synthesized through bombardment of ura-
nium with neutrons.*’ By early 1939, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strass-
man published evidence that bombarding uranium with neutrons
produces an unprecedented reaction: fission of the uranium nuclei
into two lighter fragments.** It was soon determined that fission of
uranium yielded two fragments of unequal mass, at least two
additional free neutrons, and a shower of gamma rays and neu-
trinos. The atomic numbers (Z) of the two fragments add up to 92.
the atomic number of uranium. The weights of the fission products
and the three neutrons released by fission*? add up to an amount
slightly less than the mass of the uranium atom plus one neutron: a
difference of approximately 0. 18 amu.
238U + jn ——= CU") ‘Ba + Kr + 3in+Q
where Q represents the energy released in this reaction. H. Semat
& J. Albright, Introduction to Atomic and Nuclear Physics 510
(Sth ed. 1972). Conversion of that mass difference to energy ac-
cording to E=me? gives an energy (Q) of nearly 175 MeV. The
two fission products are both highly radioactive nuclides which
soon decay to stable elements ('4'Pr and %-Zr). releasing 22 MeV
of additional energy in the process. The sum of these energies is
nearly 200 MeV per fission of 7**U—close to the energy value
determined by theoretical calculation. See S. Glasstone, Source-
book on Atomic Energy 390-393 (2d ed. 1958); H. Semat & J.
Albright, Introduction to Atomic and Nuclear Physics 509-510
(Sth ed. 1935); 3 E. Hyde, et al.. The Nuclear Properties of the
Heavy Elements: Fission Phenomena 5 (1971).
If gauged according to everyday human activity, 200 MeV is a
small amount of energy, hardly noticeable. Yet at the atomic level.
200 MeV is enormous: even the radioactive decay of powerful
a-emitters such as 77°Ra or 73!Pu barely releases 1/40 of the
energy yielded per event by fission. Normal chemical processes.
such as those involved in the combustion of fossil fuels. involve
erential
-33- No. C 79-0515-J
2 Neutrons
Neutron in G7" fission ene
/
/
|
1st generation 2nd generation 3rd generation 4th generation 5th meration
9
neutron neutrons neutrons neutrons neutrons
1 neutron) | 2 neutrons) (4 neutrons) | (8 neutrons) (16 neutrons)
|
Figure 4. An expanding chain reaction, in which the number of neutrons doubles
with every fission. from 1. 2. 4. 8. 16. 32 to tnillions. The fission of some nucle!
releases 3 neutrons. giving a tripling at each stage. from 1. 3. 9, 27. 81. 243. to
trillions of neutrons. Nuclear processes are so fast that the trillions of neutrons can be
generated from one in less than a millionth of a second. giving a nuclear explosion
From: J. Calvin Giddings, Chemistry, Man, and Environmental Change 425 (1973)
{illustration by Alexis Kelner}
-34- No. C 79-0515-J
energies per atom on the order of a few eV. not MeV. Sec
H. Semat & J. Albright, supra at 570.
The phenomenon of uranium fission generated great excitement
from the moment of its discovery. Not only was fission a fascinat-
ing theoretical novelty once thought to be totally impossible. and
not only did each fission of a uranium nucleus release dramatic
quantities of energy, but the process offered a key to something
much greater: couldn't the free neutrons released by one fission
event be used to trigger two or three others? Scientists imagined a
fission chain reaction in which each fission event leads to one or
two more, ultimately yielding energy in practical. even explosive
quantities. Assume, for example, that a chain reaction could be
produced in which each fission of 7°5U would lead to two more
(2:1). See Fig. 4. While a single fission instantly yields nearly 180
MeV, or 3.2 x 10°'' joules of energy, a chain reaction growing at
the 2:1 rate would produce after 40 generations nearly 1.1 x 10!-
fission events.*° yielding nearly 2 x 10'* MeV, or 32 joules—
enough power to set a small light bulb aglow for a second or two.
After 37 more generations, the total yield approaches 4.3 x 10!-J,
or roughly the equivalent of | kiloton of TNT. Five additional
generations would produce a total energy equivalent to 33 kt of
TNT. Cf. S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weap-
ons 13 (3d ed. 1977) DX-1242. Assuming a perfect 2:1 chain reac-
tion, an explosive yield of 33 kilotons would require fission of 4.8
x 10-4 atoms. or approximately 1.887 grams of 7**U—less than five
pounds.
This amount is close to the actual mass of fissionable 7**U that
would be consumed in a device of 33-kt yield. Under normal
conditions, however, a 1.8 kg lump of 275U will not be “critical.”
i.e., undergo a chain reaction that will result in an explosion. The
actual “critical mass” of fissionable metals, whether 7*5U, 7*’Pu.
233U or whatever, which will spontaneously produce such a reac-
tion has been estimated to be in the range of 3-30 kg*', depending
on a number of factors. In smaller amounts, too many neutrons
escape through the surface of the metal to sustain the reaction. A
nuclear fission bomb, therefore, will contain a larger (subcritical )
mass of fissionable material than is actually consumed in the sub-
sequent fission reaction.
-35- No. C 79-0515-J
In a weapon, a “critical” or “‘supercritical’”’ mass of 7*5U
may be achieved in one of two ways: (1) through violently forcing
two subcritical quantities of metal together; or (2) by compressing
a subcritical mass upon itself to the point that it becomes
supercritical.
This second method, the implosion technique, is the far more
efficient—and far more technically difficult—design. See also J.
McPhee, The Curve of Binding Energy 75-95, 108-10 (1974).
The reaction would take place very quickly. Each generation
would complete its fission in 0.0] microseconds (millionths of a
second). An 82-generation chain reaction would take approx-
imately 0.82 microseconds to complete. In fact, fission chain reac-
tions in ?35U can proceed more rapidly; on the average. 7**U
fission releases 2.5 neutrons per event, permitting a chain reaction
of greater than the 2% rate. Glasstone reports that one kiloton of
TNT equivalence can be reached by the Sist generation.** 58
generations would yield roughly 100 kiloton TNT equivalence.
It is seen, therefore, that 99.9 percent of the energy of a 100-
kiloton fission explosion is released during the last 7 genera-
tions, that is, in a period of roughly 0.07 microseconds.
Clearly most of the fission energy is released in an extremely
short time period. The same conclusion is reached for any
value of the fission explosion energy.
S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons § 1.57
at 17 (3d ed. 1977), DX-1242. Thus. for a 100-kiloton 235,. bomb.
the chain reaction starts and ends in 0.58 microseconds, the last
0.08 microseconds of that process determining the gross energy
yield of the fission device.*4
The time-scale of a nuclear chain-reaction explosion is not
merely curious atomic trivia. The energy yield in the last 0.1
microsecond of fission is a critical factor determining weapons
design, as are considerations such as rate of neutron escape per
“generation.” As a fission reaction proceeds, the tremendous re-
lease of nuclear energy creates immense heat and pressure: the
temperature at the core of the mass of uranium or plutonium
a tae
-36- No. C 79-0515-J
reaches millions of degrees Celsius by the Slst fission “genera-
tion.’*4 Intense heat causes intense pressure, forcing the mass
apart violently. To achieve maximum explosive yield, the device—
by now a superheated mass—must somehow hold together long
enough for the next seven or eight generations of fission to take
place. Consequently, nuclear weapons designers have worked on
ways of encasing the fissionable portion of a device in a “tamper.”
a shell of heavy material which by mere inertia** will hold the
mass together for the crucial 0.07-0.08 microseconds. Using tam-
per material that will also reflect neutrons serves two purposes: (1)
containment of the fissionable material long enough to achieve
high yield; and (2) increasing the number of free neutrons avail-
able for fission by reducing the rate of neutron escape from the
reacting mass. Uranium-238, for example, proves useful for this
purpose. ©
The testing of various materiais as tampers for neutron reflectors
was among the many purposes of the series of open-air detona-
tions at the Nevada Test Site. The value, for example. of beryllium
as a neutron reflector might be one of many technical questions
answered by a specific test.5’? This type of testing has varying
impact on the radioactive fallout burden in surrounding areas: use
of a heavy tamper of °*8U leaves far higher quantities of plutonium
in the fallout cloud than does the fission process itself. The >°8U in
the shell, bombarded with neutrons from the chain reaction and
vaporized by its heat, is converted in significant part to 7°’Pu by
this reaction:
SU + dn *3Pu
Some unreacted **8U would remain as well. If the neutrons
emitted by the bomb’s initial processes are of sufficient energy.
238 will itself undergo fission, adding to the energy of the explo-
sion and to the quantity of highly radioactive fission products in its
fallout.
C33U*)——=28Np
The greater time-scale permitted by use of efficient tamper
reflector material as well as improved design technique is indis-
pensable to another process: the nuclear fusion reaction of a
hydrogen bomb.
-37- No. C 79-0515-J
1. The Hydrogen Bomb
The reality of the fission bomb in turn opened the door to the
possibility of a device utilizing the nuclear processes of the sun
and stars. nuclear fusion, to achieve energy yields in the megaton
range.** Rather than splitting heavy atoms to produce energy.
fusion binds the lightest elements together into new atoms. At the
core of the sun, temperatures range into the millions of degrees.
Celsius. In that heat, the nuclei of hydrogen atoms develop ener-
gies greater than 100 kev, permitting a number of reactions to
occur:
(1) 1H + {[H--~-> 7H + ,. + 1.4MeV
(2) 7H + 7H--—-— jH + |H + 4.03 MeV
(3) 7H + 7H --——= 3He + jn + 3.27 MeV
(4) jH + {|}H~-~-—> 3He + , + 5 MeV
(5) 7H + {H---— $He + jn + 17.06 MeV
(6) 7H + 3He -—--—= He + {H + 18.4 MeV
(7) 3He + 3He —--—= $He + 2/H + 13 MeV
(8) {H + }H---—= He + 2)n + 11.3 MeV
The end result is the conversion of hydrogen to helium with the
release of significant energy:
4iH ———— 3He + 2,, + , + 26.7 MeV
_§. Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy 442-443 (2d ed.
1958).5° The reactions proceed at widely varying rates: fusion of
two 'H nuclei at the core of the sun, for example, takes between
10° and 10!' years.
Fusion reactions of the heavy isotopes of hydrogen, in contrast.
take between | and 30 microseconds at a temperature of 20 million
degrees Celsius. These reactions were of interest to those who
sought to develop the hydrogen bomb. The temperatures in the
core of a fission explosion approach those found in the sun and
other stars, even if only for a time period of about | microsecond.
Development of a hydrogen bomb, therefore, required develop-
ment of a nuclear fission “trigger” that could create temperatures
in the 20 million to 200 million degree range and maintain them
long enough to initiate nuclear fusion reactions using tritium (*H
and deuterium (7H). This in turn would ignite additional deu-
-38- No. C 79-0515-J
terium-deuterium reactions, or might utilize the a lithium reaction
SLi + dn $He + 7H + 4.8 MeV
to generate more tritium-deuterium fusion. At 200 million de-
grees Celsius a deuterium-tritium mixture will “ignite: in as little
as 0.28 microseconds (compared to a reaction time of roughly 4.8
microseconds to ignite deuterium fusion by itself). see e.g.. W.
Lawrence, The Hell Bomb 41, 46 (1950), with an energy yield per
reaction of 17.6 MeV, compared to 3.2 or 4.0 MeV. See S.
Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons € 1.69 at
21 (3d ed. 1977) DX-i242. Pound for pound, heavy hydrogen will
yield 1.5 to 4 times as much energy through fusion than does
uranium or plutonium in a fission device. Using a large amount of
deuterium fuel. a thermonuclear explosion can produce energy in
the range approaching 100 megatons of TNT.°!
A number of the tests in the 1950's at the Nevada Test Site were
directly related to development of a suitable fission bomb “trig-
ger” device for producing a hydrogen fusion explosion. Actual
tests of fusion-based, or thermonuclear, bombs took place in the
United States Pacific Test Range in the Marshall Islands. but pre-
liminary work was done on an expedited basis at NTS in reaction
to fears concerning rapid weapons development by the U.S.S.R.°-
See e.g., “AEC Test Program.” AEC 388/1 (Dec. 24. 1950.
DX-82; *““AEC Pre-Greenhouse Test Program.’ AEC 388/3
[Ranger Series] (Jan. 5, 1951) DX-83.°*
Development of the “super”, as the hydrogen bomb was then
called, was one goal behind establishment of the NTS: improve-
ment of fission weapons in an atmosphere of national emer
gency caused by events in Korea was another. See 2 R. Hewlett
& F. Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the United States
Energy Commission 535 (1969), DX-1002; Nevada Test Org..
“Background information on Nevada Nuclear Tests (May |.
1957), PX- 245.° ;
II]. NUCLEAR FALLOUT
A. Nature of Fallout Radioactivity
The processes of nuclear fission and nuclear fusion release tre-
-39- No. C 79-0515-J
mendous amounts of energy as predicted by Einstein's postulate
E = mc?. Both processes directly produce reaction products.
gamma radiation and free neutrons of significant energy. Mary of
the gamma rays are absorbed by air surrounding the bomb which
along with the reactants themselves, generate tremendous amounts
of heat. A luminous “fireball” forms around the exploding device
within the first second following detonation, glowing at many
times the apparent brightness of the sun.®* The fireball quickly
expands outward as a toroidal (i.e.. doughnut-shaped) cloud of
superheated material, drawing great amounts of cooler air up into
the familiar “mushroom” cloud associated with atomic explo-
sions. See Fig. 5.
UPDRAFT THROUGH
CENTER OF TOROID
TOROIDAL CIRCULATION
OF HOT GASES
COOL AIR BEING DRAWN
UP INTO HOT CLOUD
Fig. 5. Cutaway showing artist's conception of toroidal circulation within the radi-
oactive cloud from a nuclear explosion.
For those who are exposed directly to the explosion of a fission
or thermonuclear device, the heat, the blast, the gamma and neu-
tron radiation pose serious and often lethal risks of injury. See
-40- No. C 79-0515-J
Comm. for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by
the Atomic Bombs. . . . , Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physi-
cal, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings 105-334
(pap. ed. 1981) (hereinafter cited as “Hiroshima and Nagasaki}.
The plaintiffs in this action, however, do not allege direct exposure
to atomic blast effects. Instead they are concerned with exposure
to the residual radiation present in the smoky ashes of the fireball.
The residual radioactivity of an atomic explosion—the material
which becomes “fallout—is derived from three sources: (1) fis-
sion products, i.e., the nuclear fragments resulting from the split-
ting of uranium or plutonium nuclei; (2) unused nuclear fuel (esp.
plutonium), and (3) induced activity. i.e., radionuclides generated
by bombarding stable elements in the bomb materials, air, tower
metal, soil, seawater, etc. with neutrons. Any detonation of a
nuclear device produces residual radioactivity in these three ways.
The amount of materiai contributed by each process, however.
varies with the specific qualities of each explosion.
(1) Fission Products
The direct products of the nuclear fission process are the most
important source of fallout radioactivity.
Neither uranium nor plutonium split into standardized frag-
ments: fission results in the formation of more than 200 difierent
isotopes of 36 elements, ranging from zinc (Z = 30) to dys-
prosium (Z = 66). The most common fission products have mass
numbers of 95 and 139; those with mass numbers approximating
117, representing fission into nearly equal halves. comprise 1% or
less of the total. Yield of other products grouped in relation to
mass number is generally illustrated in Fig. 6.
Both uranium and piutonium have a significantly greater number
of neutrons than protons, See Table 4.
This imbalance is carried on into the fission products, which usu-
ally have more neutrons than do the naturally occurring isotopes of
the same elements.®’ Consequently, all but a few of the fission
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Mass number
Figure 6. Graph showing yields of fission product chains of **SU as a function of
mass number. [After “Plutonium Project Report on Nuclei Formed in
Fission.” Revs Modern Phys.. 18, 539, (1946). |
TABLE 4
isotope protons neutrons _np_
2331) 92 14] £532
235) 9? 143 1.554
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orm) 94 145 1.542
-42- No. C 79-0515-J
product radionuclides are extremely unstable—and highly radio-
active. They seek stability through emission of beta particles.
which shifts the nuclear ratio in favor of protons. Many also re-
lease excess energy in the form of gamma radiation. Most products
must undergo a series of B-decay transitions before reaching a
stable, or nearly stable ratio of particles. The characteristics of
each product’s series, called a decay chain, is important to a
determination of the total yield of fission products.
Consider, for example, the fission product krypton-95: it experi-
ences six B-decay transitions before reaching a stable nuclide
(half-lives are given in parentheses):
SKr——e $Rb——= 2S —P-e 5 a
(very short) (<2.5 sec.) (48 sec.) (10.9 min.)
875 — pe Nb ——e 5Mo
(65 days) (35days) (stable)
The n/p ratio of 9°Kr is 1.63; the n/p ratio for 9*Mo is }.26. far
closer to parity, lending it greater stability. Some decay chains are
as long (e.g., ?°Br or '**Xe); others are notably shorter. A select
few fission products are “born” stable, contributing no radioac-
tivity to the fallout clouds (e.g., °Zr, '5*Sm, or ®°Kr). A fairly
complete listing of fission product decay chains is provided in
Appendix A of this opinion.
While the existence (or nonexistence) of 9*Kr in the fireball of
a nuclear explosion or the core of a nuclear reactor is a curious
theoretical novelty, it is not by itself very significant. Overall
review of the properties of all known fission products, how
ever, disclose important general characteristics of fission product
activity:
1. fission products, if radioactive, emit B- particles an aver-
age of 3 times before reaching stability:
2. many fission products also emit gamma rays:
3. the half-lives of most fission products and “daughter”
nuclides in the decay chains are very short when compared
-43- No. C 79-0515-J
to naturally occurring nuclides such as °**U or even 77°Ra:
and
4. the chemical and physical properties of fallout will change
as radioactive decay proceeds down the chains.
From these generalizations, we may infer that the explosion of a
fission device produces an intensely radioactive cloud of fallout
which releases tremendous beta and gamma radiation in the first
few hours and which declines at a rapid rate until only the longer-
lived radionuclides and stable isotopes remain. These inferences
are borne out by the experimental evidence derived from atomic
testing.
A “Nominal” 20-kiloton fission bomb releases a massive quan-
tity of radioactivity into the environment. Less than two kilograms
of fission products yield activity more easily measured in mega
curies—millions of curies, even if only gamma radiation is consid-
ered. See Table 5.
TABLE 5
T y activity _
] min. 820.000 MCi
5 min. 120.000 MCi
1 hr. 6.000 MCi
1 day 133 MCi
1 wk. 13 MCi
1 mo. 2.3 MCi
] yr. 0.11 MCi
10 yr. 0.08 MCi
100 yr. 0.006 MCi
Table 5. T represents the elapsed time since detonation of the
20-kt fission device. [source: U. S. Atomic Energy Comm.. Assur-
ing Public Safety in Continental! Weapons Tests 91 n. 6 (1953).
PX-740. ]
Glasstone and others report that for gamma rays, the fission
product radioactivity at seconds following detonation of a “nom-
inal’ 20-kt bomb may be estimated according to the formula:
4.1x 10"a"' ad sec
A, (in Mci) =
( = 3.7 < $0'™ sec -'
-44- No. C 79-0515-J
Further, “(t]he rate of emission of beta particles from the fission
products is roughly twice that of gamma-ray photons: hence at a
time t sec. after detonation: ”
: wy) — 82 < 10°(t'?)d sec!
Kenora 37 x 10" d sec"!
S. Glasstone. ed.. The Effects of Atomic Weapons § 8.11-8.12 at
251 (1950), PX-690/DX-470; see also K. Way & E. Wigner. “The
Rate of Decay of Fission Products,” 73 Phys. Rev. 1318 (1948).
Using the latter formula, a table similar to Table 5 may be pre-
pared reflecting fission product beta activity:
TABLE 6
T B- activity
1 sec. 2.2 x 108 MCi
] min. 1.6 x 106 MCi
5 min. 234.000 MCi
1 hr. 11.881 MC;
1 day 262 MCi
1 wk. 25 MCi
] mo. 4.33 MCi
1 yr. 0.22 MCi
10 yr. 0.0139 MCi
100 yr. 0.000878 MCi
Table 6. T represents elapsed time since detonation of 20 kt
fission device.
Assigning an average energy of 0.4 MeV to the beta particles
emitted by fission products.®? quick calculation discloses an over-
all energy of equal or greater magnitude than that radiated as
gamma rays:
(3.3 X 107+) t"'?) MeV sec"!
However, the potential risks of exposure to beta radiation were
sometimes discounted because of the particles’ much shorter
range. But see e.g.. A. Broido & Teresi, “Tolerance in Man to
External Beta Radiation,” USNRDL Tech. Memo. No. 4 (Aug. 6.
1954), PX-565, “Analysis of Hazards Associated with Radioactive
Fallout Material,” 5 Health Physics 63-9 (1961). PX-563: AEC
Symposium, “The Shorter-Term Biological Hazards of a Fallout
Field,” 126-160 (Dec. 1956) PX-699/DX-641: Part VIII. infra.
aan
ital ieee
-45- No. C 79-0515-J
Fission product radioactivity, even if evaluated only in terms of
gamma radiation, can yield tremendous rates of radiation ex-
posure: for example, if the fission products from a one-kiloton
explosion (a quantity of material not larger than 58 grams. or
about 2 ounces) were spread uniformly over a smooth plane one
square mile in area, the rate of radiation exposure at a height of
three feet off the ground at one hour after detonation would be
nearly 2,800 rads/hr.—far more than the acute lethal dose for
human beings. S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons § 9.159 at 454 (3d ed. 1977), PX-1242: see infra at Part
IV. Ounce for ounce, radioactive isotopes are the most toxic mate-
rials known to man. J. C. Giddings. Chemistry, Man & Environ-
mental Change 412 (1973). And they are inevitably the product of
detonation of a nuclear weapon, because every weapon tested so
far has used fission of uranium or plutonium as the source of at
least part of its tremendous explosive power. All nuclear devices
tested in the atmosphere have produced some quantity of highly
radioactive fission products that return to the surface as “failout™.
Fortunately, the rate of fission product activity declines very
rapidly as indicated by the tables and equations, supra. and by
Fig. 7.
The curve indicated by Fig. 7 represents the radioactivity of
fission products over a period of time as decreasing according to
the relationship:
R, ~ Re?
where R, is the dose rate at time ¢ and R, dose rate at unit time.
Glasstone & Dolan, supra §§ -at 9. 146—9. 153, at 450-52. This
rate of decay has important implications for the monitoring of
fallout activity and the assessment risks posed by exposure to
fallout. See Part II] (D); Part VIII, infra.
(2) Residual Uranium and Plutonium
To produce a “nominal” 20 kt nuclear explosion, the complete
fission of approximately 1,200 grams of 7*5U or 7*%Pu is required.
The “critical mass” of fissionable material, the minimum amount
that makes such a chain reaction possible. is significantly larger:
-46- No. C 79-0515-J
100 T T — T 7
w”
-
oC
>
So
& 80
3 a “
3
= 60
vs
s |
>
: \
> 40
-
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— 20
ad
WwW
ce = =
re) i i — = i wall sail
2] 2 * € 8 10 12
TIME AFTER EXPLOSION (HOURS)
Figure 7. Rate of Decay of fission products after a nuclear explosion
(activity 1s taken as 100 at | hour after the detonation).
approximately 3 kg. for >*?Pu and roughly 10 kg. for °45U, depend-
ing upon shape. See J. C. Giddings, Chemistry. Man and Environ-
mental Change 432 (1973). Most of the fissionable “fuel” of an
atomic bomb thus remains unused by the fission process. Vapor-
ized by the intense heat of the fireball, the remaining **5U or
239Pu becomes a part of the radioactive fallout cloud. Similar
residues may likely be present as a result of the use of 7**U as a
component material of the bomb. Free neutrons produced by the
fission process can produce plutonium from uranium-238 by the
following processes:
6 249
usNp
T,, = 2.35 min. 2.45 d. 24400 yr.
24
4K] 1 — 44
23 + jn 233 je 94
Further, the abundance of high-energy neutrons present in the
fireball of a thermonuclear explosion may interact with uranium-
235 and uranium-238 to produce a variety of isotopes of plutonium
(e.g.. 738Pu, *4°Pu, °4'Pu) and heavier nuclides such as Amer-
icium (-4!'Am) and Curium (-4*Cm).”” In fact. the heavy element
-4)- No. C 79-0515-J
einsteinium (753Es) was first identified in the debris from the
explosion of the first H-bomb in the Pacific in 1952. C. R. Ham-
mond, “The Elements,” in Handbook of Chemistry and Physics.
at B-12 (64th ed. Weast 1983).
Plutonium will always be present in fallout from nuclear detona-
tions. According to the UNSCEAR Report, 90% of the plutonium
now dispersed in the environment came from tests carried out
prior to 1963; by 1973 an estimated 320 kCi of 749Pu and °4°Pu and
another 26 kCi of 75*Pu had been so dispersed. UNSCEAR Report
(1977), Px-706/DX-605, at 148.7! Converting from kilocuries of
239Pu activity to actual mass of the heavy metal we can estimate
that nearly 5 metric tons’? of plutonium have been dispersed by
fallout. 7*
While a “nominal” fission detonation may produce many fis-
sion products in gram (or milligram) amounts, plutonium is dis-
persed in kilogram quantities. Yet plutonium contributes less to
fallout activity because it is less radioactive than most fission
products: its half-life of 24.400 years (*39Pu is far longer than
most fallout components. The 0.06 curies of radioactivity pro-
duced by | gram of plutoniuin-239 is far less than that of
cesium-137, or iodine-131, or other important fission products:
Specific Activity
nuclide half-life (Ci/gm)
at 5 24,400 yrs 0.06
IMCs 30.28 yrs 86.1
"Sr 28.1 yrs 141.0
~_ 8 days 1.24 x 10°
Plutonium, of course, persists for a much longer period: 99% of
the iodine-13]1 produced in open air testing has long since decayed,
while 99+ % of the plutonium ever dispersed in the environment
still remains.’* Plutonium, uranium and other heavy element resi-
dues represent a significant long-term component of nuclear fall-
out. In fact, “in the period from 20 hours to 2 weeks after the
burst, depending to some extent upon the weapon materials, those
isotopes can contribute up to 40% of the total activity of the
weapon debris.” S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons § 9.32 at 405 (3d ed. 1977).
-48- No. C 79-0515-J
(3) Induced Activity
The tremendous flux of free neutrons present in the firebal! of a
nuclear detonation themselves create radioactive residues of sig-
nificance to radioactive fallout.
It was discovered early that free neutrons colliding with the
nuclei of atoms could react, perhaps merely by joining the nucleus
and forming a new isotope of the element, or perhaps by joining
the nucleus and ejecting other particles in the process, transform-
ing the nuclide’s identity. For example. nitrogen reacts with free
neutrons to form Carbon-i4, an important radionuclide:
4C+iH+Q
Carbon-14 is a B-emitter with a half-life of 5730 years. As noted
above, neutrons can react with light nuclides such as lithium-6,
breaking thern apart:
'SN + in
SLi + jn———— _ (1Li*) ——— iH + He
Or, neutrons may add to the mass of sodium nuclei, rendering
them unstable and radioactive:
jiNa —_ iiNa
Sodium-24 is a B-emitter with a half-life of 15.0 hours:
iiNa i3Mg (stable) + g- + ,
This type of transformation, or activation, of nuclei by free neu-
trons occurs with many elements in the atmosphere, soil or sea
which are directly exposed to the nuclear fireball. Sodium-24.
silicon-31, manganese-56 and other nuclides may be produced in
significant quantities.
The non-explosive components of the device itself, or the steel
tower on which it may have rested before detonation, may also be
an important source of induced radioactivity; neutron-capture re-
actions generate radioactive isotopes of iron, copper, zinc, man-
ganese and cobalt, as well as aluminum, although the radioactive
form of the latter, aluminum-28, has a very short half-life, about
2.3 minutes. S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, supra, at 405-407.
A number of factors influence the role which induced radio-
activity plays in determining the nature of fallout radiation. Fire-
<
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ts
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ae hy
-49- No. C 79-0515-J
balls detonated on or near the surface can interact with many
thousands of tons of surface material, while a detonation high in
the atmosphere draws very little soil or seawater into its billowing
clouds of explosion residues, reacting only with surrounding mass
of air. The design of test explosions at the NTS reflects in part a
recognition of this problem: often devices were exploded at a
height above the surface greater than the estimated radius of the
initial fireball. The shock wave would press downward on the
surface at all points, hopefully minimizing the amount of soil and
dust drawn into the cloud itself.
Induced activity can be a significant source of fallout radio-
activity in a surface detonation. See Table 7.
TABLE 7. Approximate yields of several important activation radionuclides
per megaton of fission.
radionuclide half-life yield (in MCi)
iH 12.5 years <1
y % 5600 years 3.4 x 10°
Ar 260 years 59
7#Na 1S hours 2.8 x 10'!
+3P 14 days 1.9 x 10%
i3K 12 hours 3 x 10'"
$3Ca 52 days 4.7 =x 10’
3¢Mn 16 hours 3.4 x 10!!
32Fe 2.9 years 1.7 x 107
SoFe 46 days 2.2 x 10°
1. F. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and
the Environment 107 (1982) and sources cited therein.
Comparison of these figures with fission product yield estimates
(e.g., 125 MCi of '3'I per megaton of fission) plainly demonstrates
that induced activity is a significant variable affecting total fallout
radioactivity and its characteristics. And unlike fission products,
induced activity fallout is not produced in neatly predictable
amounts and proportions. Reference to the yield curve in Fig. 7
thus does not adequately index fallout activity due to activation
products. 75
-50- No. C 79-0515-J
B. Isotopes and Environmental Impact
Because of their rapid rate of decay, some of the fission and
activation products of a nuclear explosion are of minimal impor-
tance to assessment of the risks of injury posed by fallout. They
die too quickly. Isotopes such as iodine-136, with its 83 second
half-life, have all but vanished within minutes after detonation.
long before the hot gases and dust of the mushroom cloud could
reach offsite communities. Other isotopes, such as 8-day
iodine-131, or 30-year cesium-137, have come to be recognized as
posing serious risks of injury to the downwind environment.
Furthermore, the chemical properties of fallout radionuclides
affect their hazard potential. Isotopes such as krypton-85 (T, , =
10.5 yrs.) or xenon-135 (T,,. = 9.2 hours) are inert gases by
nature; they don’t react with other chemicals, and they literally do
not “fall out.” Other products such as strontium-90 (T,, = 28.5
years) or plutonium-239 (T,,. = 24,400 years) settle as dust on
foodstuffs and upon ingestion, are absorbed into bone tissue.
where they bombard sensitive marrow tissue with ionizing parti-
cles. The hazard presented by each component isotope of the
fallout cloud is thus a product of both nuclear and chemical
factors.
The nuclides that are of interest to our inquiry are identified
according to a number of factors such as (1) total yield: (2) half-
life; (3) radiation energies; (4) refractory or volatile qualities: (5)
chemical characteristics; (6) uptake and concentration in the food
chain; (7) degree to which the nuclide is retained in the body: and
(8) concentration of the nuclide in sensitive tissue.
The refractory (i.e., heat resistant) qualities of a given isotope.
for example, are an important factor determining whether it wil!
be found mainly in the early fallout at the site of the explosion.
or whether it will escape in the cloud of hot gases and debris
that becomes “delayed” fallout affecting offsite communities. The
fallout yield of any nuclear device experiences fractionation, the
uneven distribution of radioactive products in early and delayed
fallout debris:
The phenomenon of fractionation is due to both chemical
and physical separation of the radionuclides. Chemical sepa-
ration occurs in the first few minutes. At zero time. every-
=e) hoe.
-5i- No. C 79-0515-J
thing in the vicinity of the device is vaporized. As the fireball
cools to about 3000°C the FeO [iron oxide] and soil compo-
nents form liquid droplets in which the refractory elements
dissolve. The fireball cools to the melting point of soil and
iron oxides to 1500°C in about 20 sec... . The solidified
droplets contain the refractory elements. while the volatile
elements and their radioactive daughters remain in the gas
phase. In 6-8 min., when the cloud has cooled to ambient
temperature, -50°C, the volatile elements (except for Kr and
Xe) and their daughters condense. .
H. Hicks, “Calculation of the Concentration of Any Radionuclide
Deposited on the Ground by Offsite Fallout from a Nuclear Deto-
nation,” 42 Health Physics 585, 586 (1982). DX-i162. (citations
omitted). Hicks lists elements important to fallout in two
categories:
Lead
Volatile at 1500°C Refractory at 1S00°C
[in gaseous state] [condensed as liquid or solid}
Germanium Beryllium
Arsenic Sodium
Selenium Manganese
Bromine lron
Krypton Cobalt
Rubidium Copper
Molybdenum Strontium
Technetium Yttrium
Ruthenium Zirconium
Rhodium Niobium
Rhenium Banum
Palladium Lanthanum
Silver Cenum
Cadmium Praseodymium
Indium Neodymium
Tin Promethium
Antimony Samanum
Tellurium Thonum
lodine Uranium
Xenon Neptunium
Cesium Plutonium
Tungston Americium
Gold Curium
-52- No. C 79-0515-J
See id. at 598, app. I. Elements in the “refractory” column will
predominate in early fallout debris; those in the “volatile column
will more likely be found in delayed fallout residues. See also
Appendix D, infra.
A number of variables affect how efficiently the fractionation
process separates nuclides of the two categories as the fallout
cloud develops. For example, strontium-90, a refractory isotope
produced in significant quantities by fission explosions. does not
condense in the initial refractory particles because it does not yet
exist in quantity. Strontium-90 is produced primarily as a “daugh-
ter’ isotope of the volatile elements krypton and rubidium:
8Br——= Kr — = Rpb— = "S
(short) (33 sec.) (2.7 min.) (28 yrs.)
See Appendix A. Within 20 seconds of rapid cooling as described
by Hicks, less than half of the krypton-90 has decayed into
rubidium-90, and only a tiny fraction of that amount has decayed
into strontium. Achieving a 90+ % yield of strontium-90 through
rubidium decay takes longer than 10 minutes, longer than it takes
much of the fallout cloud to cooi to ambient temperatures. Thus
strontium-90, a “refractory” isotope. will more likely condense as
many “volatile” elements do, simply because of the timing in-
volved. It becomes an important constituent of delayed fallout.
which reaches downwind and global communities. Its long half-
life (28.1 years), its close chemical similarity to the key nutrient
calcium, the moderate solubility of its compounds and its ten-
dency to concentrate in bone tissue, where it bombards sensitive
marrow cells with high-energy beta particles, underscores its sig-
nificance as a radioactive contaminant.
Where external exposure to fallout is of concern, the pathway to
man is a simple one: direct contact with fallout materials in one’s
immediate surroundings. Fallout particles may come to rest upon
skin or clothing, on houses or automobiles or other nearby sur-
faces, or fallout—particularly the tiniest particles—miay be in-
haled, a direct pathway resulting in internal exposure. See e.g..
Brodsky. “Criteria for Acute Exposure to Mixed Fission Product
Aerosols,” 11 Health Physics 1017-32 (1965), PX-1045; G. Taplin.
et al., “Evaluation of the Acute Inhalation Hazard from Radio-
active Fallout Materials,” Operation Teapot. WT-1172 (Feb. 1958).
DX-359.
id ae
AMT NEC ee ee
‘Da amsth act er f
ae oak
Aieibwar sd
PERN
-53- No. C 79-0515-J
Internal exposure is the product of a number of environmental
processes. Besides direct inhalation. fallout particles may fall on
fruits and vegetables in the garden, or on foodstuffs exposed to the
air, where they may be ingested unless carefully washed away.
Fallout may be deposited on open fields and rangeland where it is
ingested by livestock. A portion of the ingested fallout wili be
absorbed by the animals who may pass it on to people through
meat or milk products.
Fallout reaching the soil may in turn be absorbed by the root
systems of plants which may be eaten by people or by livestock
who eventually pass it on to people. A fraction of fallout may find
its way into the water supply: persons receive additional expo-
sure by drinking the contaminated water, or by eating fish whose
bodieshave absorbed and concentrated the fallout radionuclide
contaminating their aquatic environment.
Calculation of internal radiation exposure from these various
sources is a complicated process that is fraught with tremendous
uncertainty. Overlooking a single pathway can easily render analy-
sis of internal exposure largely ineffective. For example. in a 1953
publication of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission entitled
Assuring Public Safety in Continental Weapons Tests. reported:
Uptake by Animals. Cattle and other animals may eat plants
which contain radioactive materials from fallout. Studies
have been made of the possibility of hazard to humans as a
result of eating meat from such animals. These studies indi-
cate that the bone-seeking radioisotopes are of the greatest
potential concern, and that the chief among these is
radiostrontium.
Cattle abserb 25 to 30 percent of the ingested strontium.
with about 25 percent reaching the bone. A few days after
entrance of radiostrontium into the body. about 99 percent of
the remaining amount will be in the bones. The only poten-
tial hazard to human beings would be the ingestion of bone
splinters which might be intermingled with muscle tissue
during butchering and cutting of the meat. An insignificant
amount would enter the human body in this fashion.
-54- No. C 79-0515-J
Id. Px-740, at 122 (emphasis added). If one evaluates internal
exposure solely in terms of strontium-90 ingested from meat and
fish, the UNSCEAR Report (1977) confirms that at least in two
strontium-90 studies, “[mJeat, fish and eggs contribute only to a
small] extent.” Id. PX-706/DX-605, at 130. However, to say that
bone splinters present the only hazard to human beings is patently
absurd: no mention at all is made of milk and dairy products. the
major pathway of strontium-90, iodine-131 and other radionuclides
received from animal products. The UNSCEAR Report (1977)
informs us that “In general, it may be said that %°Sr in the diet
comes mainly from milk products, grain products, fruit and vege-
tables,” id. at 130, with milk products contributing about 30 per-
cent of the strontium-90 transfer from food in the areas studied.
The dairy products pathway is doubly important: not only does
milk carry far more strontium-90 than the occasional bone bit in a
hamburger, it is consumed more often by children, whose growing
bones more readily absorb dietary strontium and who are more
susceptible to radiation injury than are adults. See e.g., “Stron-
tium-90 Concentrations on the Surface, in Milk, and in Bone for
1963. . . ,” DASA (Dec. 1962), PX-448. Milk is also amimportant
source of iodine-131 and related isotopes that will be absorbed and
will bombard the tiny thyroid glands of children at a dosage rate
higher than that for an adult consuming the same quantities. See
e.g., National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements.
Protection of the Thyroid Gland in the Event of Release of Radio-
iodine, NCRP Rep. No. 55 (1977), DX-1179, at 9-10 (“since the
thyroid gland increases in size with age, the juvenile gland will
receive a larger average absorbed dose per millicurie intake than
will the adult. . . *); Pendleton, et al., “lodine-131 in Utah during
July and August 1962,” 141 Science 640,641 (1963), PX-672.
These examples illustrate that the risks of internal exposure to
fallout radioactivity are a product both of the specific properties of
each radionuclide and the characteristics of the organisms—
including humans—that ingest them. Dr. John Gofman has de-
tailed some of the most important variables:
For each radionuclide there are several cruciai factors that
will determine how much energy is actually deposited in the
tissue, including:
-55- No. C 79-0515-J
a. the route of entry of the radionuclide into the body.
b. the fraction of the administered dose that actually
reaches the tissue of interest.
c. the biological rate of removal of the radionuclide from
that tissue.
d. the amount of radiation the tissue of interest receives from
the portion of the radionuclide deposited in tissues other than
the one of interest (so-called crossfire radiation). . .
e. the number of microcuries of the radionuclide taken in
(crucially dependent on the correct measurement of the
strength of the radionuclide source).
f. careful calculation of the average energy of the beta [or
alpha] particles emitted, of any ancillary gamma rays emitted
and of any loss of radiation out of the specified tissue.
g. metabolic or other factors that might alter the distribu-
tion of the radionuclide in the various tissues of the people
studied.
J. Gofman, Radiation and Human Health 44 (1981), PX-1046. See
also Hamilton, “The Metabolism of the Fission Products and the
Heaviest Elements,” 49 Radiobiology 325-43 (1947), PX-640:
Dunning, “Criteria for Establishing Short-Term Permissible Inges-
tion of Fallout Material,” 19(?) Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 111-20
(Apr. 1958), DX-701; Finkel, “Relative Biological Effectiveness of
Internal Emitters,” 67 Radiology 665 (Nov. 1956), PX-669; AGC
Symposium, “The Shorter-Term Biological Hazards of a Fallout
Field,” 147-232 (Dec. 1956) PX-699/DX-641; K. Z. Morgan, *Tol-
erance Concentrations of Radioactive Substances,” 5](4) J. Phys.
& Colloid Chem. 984-1003 (July 1947), PX-823.
One of the other factors affecting the distribution of radio-
nuclides in various tissues is one wholly independent of either
nuclide or organism: in food chains that contain an abundance of
stable nutrient elements (e.g., calcium. iodine-127, potassium),
absorption of the chemically analogous radionuclides (e.g.. stron-
tium-90, the iodine isotopes, cesium-137) is significantly reduced
in comparison to ecological systems that are nutrient-poor. See
1 F. W. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and
: -56- No. C 79-0515-J
the Environmentl42 (1982). A person whose diet provides an
abundant supply of potassium, for example, will absorb and retain
less cesium-137 from contaminated food than will someone whose
diet lacks that nutrient. Similar effects are observed in livestock.
poultry and fish. Fresh water fish, for example. will retain
cesium-137 and strontium-90 in their tissues at a rate 200 times
greater than will salt water fish. See id. at 143, tbl. 1.
Radioactive isotopes of nutrient elements, or of elements that
are chemically similar to nutrients, are far more likely to be ab-
sorbed and retained than many of the relatively insoluble metal
oxides found in fallout debris. A frequently used method of com-
paring relative rates of retention is computation of the biological
half-life. The biological half-life is simply the time period in
which one half of a given quantity of absorbed material leaves the
body The rate at which a particular radionuclide leaves tissue
varies from organ to organ:
The biological excretion rate of an element from the hu-
man body is not necessarily the same for the whole body and
for a particular organ. In fact, in most cases, the biological
elimination rates are different for different organs and for the
body as a whole. For example, the biological half-life of
iodine is 138 days for rejection from the thyroid, 7 days for
the kidneys, 14 days for the bones, and 138 days for the whole
body.
N. Tsoulfanidis, Measurement and Detection of Radiation 497
(1983).
Before the internal exposure attributed to a particular contami-
nant may be evaluated. the biological half-life of the nuclide must
be adjusted to account for radioactive decay. While iodine-131 has
a biological half-life (in the thyroid) of 138 days. its 8-day radio-
active half-life determines that an absorbed quantity of iodine-131
will have decayed almost entirely before a meaningful fraction of
it is eliminated by the body. The energy released by radioactive
decay will largely be diffused along thousands of ionization tracks
in the absorbing tissue. Adjustment of the two half-lives. radio-
active and biological, yields an effective half-life of 7.6 days.
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No. C 79-0515-J
The radioactive, biological and effective half-lives for several
common radionuclides are listed in Table 8.
TABLE 8
Radiological, Biological. and Effective Half-Lives of Certain Common Isotopes
Organ of Radiological Biological Effective
Isotope reference half-life half-life half-life
4H Total body 12.3 y l2d l2d
“a, Total body 5.700 y 10d 10d
Fat l2d
Bone 40d
2p Total body 14.3d 257d 13.5d
Liver 18 d &d
Bone 111Sd I4.1d
Brain 257d 13.5d
“7 Total body 1.28 x 10° y 58 d 58 d
“re Total body 1,100d 800 d 463 d
Spleen 600 d 388 d
Lungs 3,200 d 819 d
Liver 554 d 368 d
Bone 1.680 d 665 d
*"Fe 45.1d
i Total body 0.25 d ld 0.2d
Kidneys 20d 0.25 d
Lungs 5d 0.24d
Skin 10d 0.24 d
Liver 3d 0.25 d
Bone 25d 0.25d
1.725 x 10’
— Total body y 138 d 138 d
Thyroid 138 d 138 d
Kidneys 7d 7d
Liver 7d 7d
Spleen 7d 7d
Testes 7d 7d
Bone I4d l4d
ie Thyroid 8d 138 d 7.6d
— Total body 7.12 x 10% y 100 d 100 d
Kidneys Sd ISd
Bone 300 d 300 d
a) 4.66 x 10" y
re Total body 24.000 175 y 175 y
Liver 825 82 y
Kidneys 87.75 87.7 y
-58- No. C 79-05i5-J
N. Tsoulfanidis, Measurement and Detection of Radiation 49%
(1983).
If the radioactive and biological half-lives are known. the effec-
tive half-life may be calculated according to the formula:
_ (TrTb)
ci Tb + Tr
where Te is the effective half-life. Tr the radioactive half-life and
Tb the biological half-life. J. Gofman, Radiation and Human
Health 422-24 (1981), PX-i046.7© Computation of the total radia-
tion exposure or dose rate from the effective half-life of a specific
radionuclide requires more than simple mathematics:
As a result of the combined radioactive and biological
elimination of a radioisotope from the whole body or from
an organ, the dose rate to the body or the organ is not
constant over time. Consider an amount of a certain radio-
isotope that delivers a dose rate equal to DE(Q) at the time
of ingestion. If the effective half-life of the isotope is Te. the
total dose delivered to the body. or the organ. over a period
of time T is
DE;={ | DE(O)e~* dt = somal — e-T)
= ee 7; [ - exp(-In2Z)
If the time period T [is much greater than] Te, then
DE.. + DEW) 7,
ws In 2
N. Tsoulfanidis, Measurement and Detection of Radiation 497-499
(1983). Crucial to the whole calculation is the use of accurate
information concerning the quantity of radionuclide ingested: the
formula is useless if DE(O) is unknown. How much fallout debris
one ingests and absorbs is a product of all of the variables pre-
viously discussed. Plainly, accurate estimation of internal radiation
exposure is not a simple process. Exposure to fallout debris in-
volves all of these variables, and the sum of these calculations for
not one, but dozens of biologically significant radionuclides. See
e.g., Y. Ng et t al., “Prediction of the Maximum Dosage to Man
from the Fallout of Nuclear Devices—IV. Handbook for Estima-
ting the Maximum Internal Dose from Radionuclides Released to
the Biosphere,” LLRL (May 1968), PX-720.
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-59- No. C 79-0515-J
The complexity of the problem yields a great temptation for
everyone to generalize. Abstract computations derived from hypo-
thetical models are far easier than painstaking calculations based
upon exacting observation and analysis. It is far easier to project a
hypothetical dose of radiation received worldwide from an evenly
distributed and known quantity of one radionuclide than it is to
calculate in 1984 the total dose. that Sally Jones or Timmy Smith
received by 1962 from eating unknown quantities of food or milk
from unknown sources contaminated with unknown yet real
quantities of fallout radioactivity of largely unknown composition.
Consequently. hypothetical (especially worldwide) projections are
common in the literature: analyses of specific persons or particular
small communities are rare.
The record in this case is replete with examples of analysis
based upon worldwide or nationwide projections. More localized
Studies are far fewer in number. Of the group concerning the
Nevada/Utah/Arizona area, several were undertaken only after the
commencement of this lawsuit. A common characteristic of each
study, however, is the presence of at least one hypothetically de-
rived generalization about phenomena which are incurably vari-
able—and unpredictable at least to some extent.
How much fallout radioactivity follows the complex network of
environmental and biological pathways to reach man is determined
in the first instance not by the dynamics of the pathways but by the
initial amount of the fallout debris that is deposited at a particular
place in time. This initial distribution pattern is itself a product of
important and often unpredictable variables. In the standard hand-
book on the subject—published in 1950. a year before Nevada
testing began—the authors observed: ’
With regard to the internal radiation hazard, it is not pos-
sible to make any sound estimate of the amount of material
which is likely to be ingested in various circumstances. A
person working under normal indoor conditions, for exam-
ple, would absorb much iess than one engaged in an occupa-
tion in which there was much dust. Children, because of
their habits and closeness to the ground, would be expected
to ingest more than adults. These factors would greatly com-
plicate a rehabilitation program, and make it almost impos-
-60- No. C 79-0515-J
sible to attempt to assess universal permissible contamination
levels.
J. Hirschfelder, S. Glasstone, et al., The Effects of Atomic Weap-
ons € 12.74 at 396 (1950), PX-690/DX-470.
C. Factors Affecting Fallout Distribution
The fallout yield of a nuclear explosion is predictable with some
degree of accuracy, so long as certain information about the device—
is known. How airborne fallout is ultimately dispersed in the en-
vironment, however. is far less amenable to abstract calculation.
Fallout distribution is influenced by a series of variables which
seemingly multiply without end. Yet fallout dispersal has been the
subject of repeated generalization at the theoretical level. Monitor-
ing techniques have assumed and relied upon the soundness of
various dispersal models. The validity of many radiation exposure
and dosage estimates in turn has depended in large part on the
accuracy of those monitoring techniques.
From the moment of detonation, radioactive material is dis-
persed unevenly: while the head of the mushroom cloud contains
90% of the fallout activity, distribution within the cloud is any-
thing but uniform. As the cloud expands, large fallout particles
begin falling to the surface, while winds propel smaller particles of
radioactive dust away from the site of the explosion. Hot gases
diffuse quickly into the surrounding air, blending with the environ-
ment in the eddies of numberless air currents.
Weather has a dominant influence on how and where a fallout
cloud is dispersed. Important variables include the altitude to
which the cloud rises and the wind speed and direction at the
higher altitudes through which the cloud may rise. The degree of
wind shear, i.e., a change in wind direction at d
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