Opposition Brief — U. S. Telecom, Inc. v. Speakers of Sport, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1987
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Supreme Court, U.S, é
ErEBD-
\>) | of 6 1987
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
ChE RK
No. 87-286
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
U.S. TELECOM, INC. f/k/a U.S. TELEPHONE,
INC., AND U.S. TELEPHONE OF THE
MIDWEST, INC.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
SPEAKERS OF SPORT, INC., on its own
behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
CHARLES BARNHILL, JR.
(Counsel of Record)
DAVIS, BARNHILL & GALLAND
3 SOUTH PINCKNEY STREET
SUITE 804
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53703
(608) 255-5200
MICHAEL T. HANNAFAN, ESQ.
THREE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602
(312) 782-7490
NC
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a state court decision
refusing to dismiss claims of advertising
and disclosure practices in violation of
state and statutory common law presents
any issue which is appropriately
reviewable by this Court at this early
stage of the proceedings.
a ee ee
i
ii
SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 28.1 LIST
Speakers of Sport, Inc.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED . ... ++. - i
SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 28.1 LIST... . ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . - + © © © «© » Si
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...... -~ iv
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
EM OPPOSITION « © © «© e© © © © 1
ADDITIONAL STATUTES INVOLVED .. . 3
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .... . 3
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .. . 6
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE
CONCLUSION THAT SPEAKERS’
STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE NOT
PREEMPTED . . «© «© «© «© © «© « « 9
THE ANALYSIS OF THE :
COURT BELOW IS CONSISTENT
WITH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED
BY THIS COURT aves a « 12
THE CONCLUSION THAT SPEAKERS’
CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
THIS FCC PRIMARY JURISDICTION
IS CONSISTENT WITH NADER . . 23
THE FCC’S RULINGS DO NOT
CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION
OF THE COURT BELOW .... . 24
eee i ee a a ee ee ee ee 27
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Ashley v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 410 F.Supp.
1389 (W.D. Texas 1976) ..... 17
Bill Correctors, Ltd. v.
United States Transmission
Systems, Inc. et al., FCC
Dkt. No. E-84-11
(Released November 8, 1984) .. 22,26
Bruss Co, v. Allnet
606 F.Supp. 401
(M.D. Tid. 1985) «4 «© «© «© © © @ 8
iInc., 211 F.Supp. 47
(D. Idaho 1962) rev’d on
, 335 F.2d
348 (9th Cir. 1964)
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
CS os u-k.s i et ee 17
Lif i Matias gout ;
Loan Association v. Guerra,
v.8. , 107 S.Ct. 683
(1987) . - * * > 7 . >. > — -_ .* . & Fe 14
Certified Collateral Corp.,
et al., v. Allnet
Communications Services,
et al., FCC Dkt. No. E-86-61
(Released: April 14, 1987) .. 9,24
25,26
Page
_ I , bo Ri
Telephone Co., 553 F.2d 701
CS gg 17
Essential Communications
Systems, Inc. v. American
Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
610 F.2d 1114 (3rd Cir. 1979) . 17
Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940)... . 16
International Paper Company v.
Oullette, __. U.S. __,
Sy an ee Ts 2 et ht 603, 16,18
Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.
American Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 391 F.2d
406 (30 Gir. 2066)... « 0 « « 16
, 112 I11.2d
428, 493 N.E.2d 1045
(1986). ° s * se sd * * s . + . + 4,6,17
Nad Vv. irline
Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) . . .13,14,18
19,21,23
28
Nordlicht v. New York
Telephone Co., 799 F.2d
859 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
ee ss gs es ee 16
vi
Page
.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v.
Warren-Godwin Co, 251 U.S.
ay Aas 4% Pine ¢ y « SO 85
664 G.8. 386 (3006)... ...-. 13,24
Sound, Inc. v. American
631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir.
TAC ome ie es inh er &
Kellerman, _ So
107 S.Ct. 434 (1986) ...... 4
5 me. ty: ial |
Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 27 (1919). . 10,1i
We j .
Vv. Esteve Bros. & Co.,
BOe Wats We Eemeasc 6 ss te st 20,22
Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252
rata hk a ek ee ee le ow
U.S. STATUTES
Federal Aviation Act, 49 0.8.C. Gee.
B@Ge. © © © 6 @ 6 2,19
vii
U.S. STATUTES Page
Federal Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seg. passim
47 U.S.C. Sec. 414 ...... .3,15,19
ILLINOIS STATUTES
Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices
Act and Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986,
Chapter 121 1/2,
Sec. 261 et seq. and
362 et seg. nos 6 2 © « © e« 2
RULES
United States Supreme
Re aS 8 & « 6 8 6 le 7,28
No. 87-286
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
U.S. TELECOM, INC. f/k/a U.S. TELEPHONE,
INC., AND U.S. TELEPHONE OF THE
MIDWEST, INC.,
Petitioner,
SPEAKERS OF SPORT, INC., on its own
behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
Respondent SPEAKERS OF SPORT, INC.
("SPEAKERS"), on its own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
2
respectfully requests that this Court
deny the petition of U.S. TELECOM, INC.
f/k/a U.S. TELEPHONE INC. AND U.S
TELEPHONE OF THE MIDWEST, INC. ("US Tel"
or “petitioner") for a writ of certiorari
seeking review of the decision of the
Appellate Court of Illinois.} In that
decision, the Appellate Court denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss SPEAKERS’
state common law and statutory fraud
claims as, inter alia, preempted by the
Federal Communications Act ("the
Communications Act"), 47 U.S.C. Sec. 151
(1982) and subject to the primary
jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission ("the FCC").
Petitioner’s request for leave to appeal
was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court.
1149 Ill. App. 3d 898, 501 N.E. 2d
318 (lst Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114
Ill. 2d 558, 508 N.E. 2d 736 (1987).
,
¢
x
3
ADDITIONAL STATUTES INVOLVED
Section 414 of the Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 414 (1982), states:
Nothing in this Act contained shall
in any way abridge or alter the
remedies now existing at common law
or by statute, but the provisions of
this Act are in addition to such
remedies.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
SPEAKERS filed this action as a
class action on behalf of all customers
of US Tel alleging that by failing to
disclose to its customers and potential
customers that they would be
systematically charged for uncompleted
telephone calls, US Tel had engaged in
common law fraud and violated the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act and the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.* SPEAKERS
also alleged that petitioner’s conduct
2T1l. Rev. Stat., 1986, Chapter 121
1/2, Secs. 261 et seg. and 312 et seg.
————————— ~~
4
constituted common law breach of
contract.
US Tel moved to dismiss’ the
complaint on the ground that it was
preempted by federal law, subject to the
primary jurisdiction of the FCC, and
duplicative of a similar action pending
in federal court. The trial court
granted the motion and SPEAKERS appealed.
The Appellate Court reversed.
Following a recent Illinois Supreme
Court decision in Kellerman v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 112 I1ll.2d 428,
493 N.E. 2a 1045 (1986),2 the Court
below heiad that although the
oe en ee
3Kellerman involved fraud claims
against the defendant (MCI
Telecommunications Corp. or "MCI")
virtually identical to those raised here.
MCI moved to dismiss on grounds of
preemption and primary jurisdiction, and
the trial court’s denial of that motion
was ultimately affirmed by the Illinois
Supreme Court. Id. Last year, this
Court denied MCI’s petition for a writ of
certiorari. Tele-communications Corp. v.
Kellerman, _U.S. __, 107 S.Ct. 434 (1986).
5
Communications Act preempted claims
challenging the quality of telecommuni-
cations services or the reasonableness
of rates charged for said services, it
did not preempt common law or statutory
claims unrelated to those concerns. As a
result, the Court concluded, SPEAKERS’
damage claims for injury caused by US
Tel’s dissemination of fraudulent and
deceptive advertisements were not
preempted, and SPEAKERS was free to seek
to hold US Tel to the same advertising
and disclosure standards as any other
firm, regardless of whether it was in
other respects subject to federal
regulation.
The Court also rejected the argument
that the FCC had primary jurisdiction
over SPEAKERS’ claims. Finding that such
Claims raised no issue requiring the
agency’s specialized or technical
expertise, it held that the trial court
ibaa hai acai
6
had erred in dismissing them on this
ground. 4
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
The instant petition is virtually
identical to the certiorari petition
filed by MCI in the Kellerman case which
this Court denied last year. See supra,
note 1. Petitioner nonetheless contends
that it should be granted, asserting
conflicts with four cases decided by this
Court under the Act of 1910 (the most
recent decided sixty years ago), a
number of federal district court
decisions, and an administrative
determination by the FCC. It contends
further that state court proceedings, if
4The Court below also rejected the
claim that the case should be dismissed
as duplicative of a pending federal suit,
since none of the counts in the federal
court action alleged state common law or
statutory claims, and the disposition of
that case therefore implicated none of
the considerations of comity,
multiplicity and res judicata that would
justify dismissal.
—— <<
-
permitted to continue, will have a
disruptive effect on the reorganization
of the telecommunications industry.
Plainly, the writ should be denied.
This case presents neither a "conflict"
as contemplated by Supreme Court Rule 17,
nor any issue of sufficient importance to
warrant this Court’s concern.
First, the four cases decided under
the Act of 1910 do not create any
conflict warranting review. Not only are
they distinguishable from the instant
case, but this Court’s more. recent
analyses of the preemption and primary
jurisdiction doctrines fully support the
decision of the Court below.
Second, notwithstanding that a
number of federal district courts have
reached different results with respect to
different complaints (which included
Claims, not present here, that’ the
charges were “unreasonable” or "unjust"
———————___—————— i ~<
wi il
8
within the meaning of the Communications
Act), those decisions do not create a
conflict within the meaning of Supreme
Court Rule 17. Moreover, at least one
federal district court has held, on
indistinguishable facts, that federal
preemption is not warranted. Bruss Co.
v. Allnet Communication Services, 606
F.Supp. 401 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
Third, there is no possibility of
conflict between vindication of SPEAKERS’
Claims and the FCC interpretations on
which US Tel relies. Far from
immunizing US Tel from responsibility for
SPEAKERS’ claims, the FCC has endorsed
the principle of disclosure as consistent
with federal policy.
Finally, this case raises no issue
of sufficient importance to warrant this
Court’s review at this early stage. US
Tel has made no showing to support its
contention that the litigation will, if
9
permitted to proceed, cause any
disruption to the reorganization of the
telecommunications industry. Indeed as a
practical matter, it appears that
resolution of the technical problem (lack
of “answer supervision") alleged to have
been fraudulently concealed is imminent.
See In re: Certified Collateral Corp.,
et al. v. Allnet Communications Services,
et al. ("Allnet"), FCC Dkt. No. E-86-61
(Released: April 14, 1987), para. 4.
(Appendix E.) Thus, this action will not
obstruct the accomplishment of any
federal purpose.
I.
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT DO NOT
CONFLICT WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT
SPEAKERS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE
NOT PREEMPTED
Petitioner’s analysis of this
Court’s preemption decisions’ relies
exclusively on cases decided sixty years
10
ago and more,> and disregards
developments in the law over recent
years. These developments have clarified
and refined the law, and made clear that
the earlier decisions are limited to
their particular facts. That is, in each
of the four cases cited by US Tel, the
plaintiffs’ claims related directly to
the rates charged for telegraph services
and limits on liability for the quality
of those services. They therefore fell
unmistakably within the scope of the Act
of 1910, whose "outstanding consideration
[was] that of uniformity and equality of
rates." Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. at 572.
The plaintiffs in Warren-Godwin,
Esteve Bros. and Priester each challenged
SPostal Telegraph-Cable Co. v.
Warren-Godwin Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Boegli,
251 U.S. 315 (1920); Western Union
e n Co, ¥, Vv —» oo8
U.S. 566 (1921), and Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252
(1928).
11
fixed rates for the transmission of
"unrepeated" telegraph messages, i-.e.,
messages sent at a discounted rate and
therefore subject to a more limited
liability than available under state
negligence law. Such rates were
expressly authorized by the Act cf 1910
which permitted classification of
messages "into day, night, repeated,
unrepeated, letter, commercial, press,
Government and such other classes as are
just and reasonable." The Act also
provided explicitly that "different rates
may be charged for the different classes
of messages." The plaintiff in Boegli,
on the other hand, challenged a state law
penalty for negligent failure to deliver
a telegram. The federally fixed rates
and limits on liability for unrepeated
messages in the first three cases were
enforced, and the state penalty in the
fourth held preempted, all in furtherance
| —
12
of the federal objective of ensuring
uniform and equal rates.
By contrast, SPEAKERS’ claims in
this case do not relate to the statutory
purpose of the Communications Act in
ensuring quality service at uniform and
reasonable rates. As demonstrated infra,
current principles of law establish that
their dismissal on preemption grounds is
unwarranted.
II.
THE ANALYSIS OF THE COURT BELOW IS
CONSISTENT WITH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED
BY THIS COURT
A recent series of preemption
decisions by this Court supports’ the
conclusion of the Court below that
SPEAKERS’ state law claims are not
preempted because they do not fall within
the scope of, and do not create any
irreconcilable conflict with, federal
13
law.© In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238 (1984), for example, this
Court set out the two basic ways in which
state law can be preempted. Where
Congress evidences an intent to occupy an
entire field of activity, any state law
within that field will be preempted. 464
U.S. at 248. Disputes will arise only as
to whether a particular claim is or is
not “within the field." Where federal
legislation has not entirely displaced
state regulation, as evidenced for
example by a savings clause, state law is
preempted only to the extent that it
conflicts with federal law. This occurs
either when compliance with both state
and federal law is impossible, or when
©silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238 (1984); California Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra
’
U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987);
’
U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987); Nader
v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290
(1976).
14
the state law in question obstructs the
accomplishment of the (\legislative
purpose. Ia.”
The express purpose of
Communications Act regulation is to
7In Silkwood, the Court held that
the plaintiff’s state damage claims for
injuries caused by radioactive
contamination were not preempted by the
Atomic Energy Act, by which act the
federal government had "occupied the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns,
except the limited powers expressly ceded
to the States." Notwithstanding that the
plaintiff’s state claims for personal
injury had not been expressly preserved,
the Court relied on legislative history
to conclude that Congress intended that
they survive.
See also California Federal Savings
veaee -8.Ct.
at 689 (state law regulating pregnancy
discrimination not preempted by federal
law, where Congress explicitly disclaimed
categorical preemption and the state law
neither conflicted with federal law nor
obstructed underlying federal policy);
‘
107 S.Ct. at 811-12 (state law not
preempted by Clean Air Act where not
inconsistent with Act, and thus > ging
the scope of savings clause); Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. at 300
(state law claims preserved by savings
clause and not inconsistent with
provisions or purposes of Federal
Aviation Act).
15
>
monitor the quality of and rates charged
for interstate telecommunications
services in order to "’make available ...
to all the people of the United States a
rapid, efficient ... communication
service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges.’" 47 U.S.C. Sec.
151. Thus, the Act’s primary concern is
with the quality and cost of service, as
opposed to SPEAKERS’ concern over
standards for advertising to potential
customers, the focus of SPEAKERS’ concern
in this case. |
That Congress did not intend to
supplant state laws addressing other
concerns is evident from the Act’s broad
savings clause, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 414, which
states that "[(njothing in this Act
contained- shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions of
this Act are in addition to such
16
remedies. "8 As long ago as 1940, this
Court recognized that the Communications
Act was not designed as a new code for
the adjustment of private rights. FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 138 (1940). More recently, a
federal court of appeals held that the
effect of the Act’s savings clause was to
preserve state-law remedies that do not
interfere with the federal government’s
authority over telephone charges or
8Neither federal court of appeals
decision cited by US Tel, Ivy
, 391 F.2d 486, 490 (2d
and Telegraph Co.
Cir. 1968) and Nordlicht v. New York
, 799 F.2a 859 (2d Cir.
Telephone Co.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 929 (1987)
so much as acknowledged the existence of
the savings clause, perhaps because the
Claims in those cases related directly to
the quality and rates of the service
provided. The plaintiff in Ivy
complained explicitly of "standards" of
the service provided and the extent of
the defendant’s liability for failure to
comply with such standards. The
plaintiff in Nordlicht challenged the
lawfulness of the defendant’s charging
practices.
17
services, and which did not otherwise
conflict with an express provision of the
Act. Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
Telephone Co., 553 F.2d 701, 707-08, n.6
(lst Cir. 1977).9
The conclusion of the Court below
that SPEAKERS’ claims are not preempted
presents no conflict with decisions of
this Court. Although federal law clearly
9See also Kellerman, 112 I11.2d at
440-41; Ashley v. Southwestern Bell
, 410 F.Supp. 1389 (W.D.
Texas 1976)(plaintiff’s invasion of
privacy tort action against the
telephone company for disclosure of
telephone records and wiretaps held not
preempted by Communications Act); Cable
Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F.Supp.
47 (D. Idaho 1962) yrev’d on other
grounds, 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964)
denied 379 8.8. 989
(1965) (contractual dispute not related to
the rendition of interstate communication
services held not preempted by the
Communications'9 Act); Essential
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 610 F.2d
1114, 1120-21 (3rd Cir. 1979) and Sound,
—_ - i fe)
Coe.» 631 F.26 1324, 1329 i: a PP
1980) (anti-trust laws held not preempted
by Communications Act.)
18
dominates the field of telecommunications
regulation, the savings clause of the
Communications Act negates the inference
that Congress "left no room" for state
causes of action. Cf. International
Paper Company, 107 S.Ct. at 812. Rather,
the concerns of federal policy are
limited to supervision of the quality and
rates of interstate service, leaving
parties free to address other concerns
under state law so long as compliance
with both state and federal law is
possible, and the vindication of such
Claims does not interfere with the
accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives of Congress.
In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc., the Court applied precisely this
test to facts nearly identical to those
of this case when it considered the
preemptive effect of the Federal Aviation
Act. After being "bumped" from an
19
overbooked flight, the plaintiff in Nader
sued the airline for fraudulent
misrepresentation. Like SPEAKERS in this
case, he did not challenge the quality of
or charges for the airline’s service, but
complained instead of its failure to
disclose to him in advance of the sale of
his ticket that its flights were
systematically overbooked.
The airline moved to dismiss on the
ground that the FAA had conferred primary
jurisdiction over such claims on the
Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB"). The
Court disagreed. Noting both the stated
purpose of the FAA to promote "adequate,
economical and efficient service... at
the lowest cost," and the FAA’s savings
Clause (virtually identical to Section
414 of the Communications Act),1° the
19Tt provides that "[nJothing
contained in this chapter shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing by common law or by statute, but
20
Court concluded that Congress intended
that common law or _ statutory claims
survive absent irreconcilable conflict
with the federal statutory scheme.
Notwithstanding the explicit statutory
authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB") to investigate "unfair or
deceptive practices" and a then on-going
rulemaking proceeding concerning the very
overbooking practices as to which the
plaintiff alleged he was defrauded, the
Court found that no such conflict
existed. It explained:
There is no [CAB] requirement that
air carriers engage in overbooking
or that they fail to disclose that
they do so. Any impact on rates
that may result from the imposition
of tort liability or from practices
adopted by a carrier to avoid such
liability would merely be
incidental. Under the
circumstances, the common-law action
and the statute are not "absolutely
inconsistent" and may coexist, as
the provisions of this chapter are in
addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 1506.
21
contemplated by the [savings
clause]. -
426 U.S. 300.11
The Court’s reasoning in Nader is
fully applicable here. The FCC does not
require that telephone companies bill for
uncompleted calls, or that they fail to
11 ys Tel seeks to distinguish Nader
on the ground that the CAB, unlike the
Fcc, has no authority to entertain
private claims or grant private remedies.
It relies on United States Navigation Co.
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932),
to argue that since the Communications
Act provides a remedial scheme for
private complaints, and authorizes the
FCC to prescribe as well as prohibit
carriers’ conduct, its jurisdiction over
private claims is exclusive.
The distinction does not square with
Court’s analysis of the Cunard decision
in Nader. In Cunard, an antitrust action
was dismissed on primary jurisdiction
grounds because initial consideration by
the Interstate Commerce Commission had
not been sought. As the Court observed
in Nader, however, the plaintiff’s
antitrust claims were covered by
unambiguous provisions of the Shipping
Act which explicitly exempted affected
shipping companies from the operation of
the antitrust laws. 462 U.S. at 301. In
the instant case, no exemption
immunizing carriers from state law
liability is present.
nasa aria SAS SSE RM IT 2 RE Se EE SL I I
22
disclose that they do so. Indeed, the
FCC has stated its view that disclosure
to customers would be beneficial. See
Transmission Systems, Inc., et al.,
("Bill Correctors") FCC Dkt. No. E-84-11
(Released: November 8, 1984), paras. 8-
9. Any impact on the quality of services
or the rates for those services that
could result from the imposition of state
law would be incidental at most. Thus,
SPEAKERS’ state law claims are not
"absolutely inconsistent" with the
Communications Act, and may easily
coexist with it as contemplated by the
savings clause.
III.
THE CONCLUSION THAT SPEAKERS’ CLAIMS
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THIS FCC PRIMARY
JURISDICTION IS CONSISTENT WITH NADER
The rejection by the Court below of
US Tel’s primary jurisdiction argument is
also consistent with Nader, in which this
23
Court rejected the airline’s contention
that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction required referral of the
plaintiff’s claims to the CAB to permit
it to determine whether its overbooking
practice was "deceptive" within the
meaning of the FAA. This Court held:
Referral of the misrepresentation
issue to the Board cannot be
justified by the interest in
informing the court’s ultimate
decision with "the expert and
specialized knowledge," of the
Board. The action brought by
petitioner does not turn on a
determination of the reasonableness
of a challenged practice - a
determination that could be
facilitated by an informed
evaluation of the economics or
technology of the regulated
industry. The standards to be
applied in an action for fraudulent
misrepresentation are within the
conventional competence of the
courts, and the judgment of a
technically expert body is not
likely to be helpful in the
application of these standards to
the facts of this case.
462 U.S. at 305-6 (citations omitted).
Here, SPEAKERS’ claims do not turn on a
determination of the reasonableness of
24
US Tel’s billing practices, as to which
evaluation of economic and technical
considerations might come into play.
Rather ,\ the standards implicated by its
action for fraud are well within the
conventional competence of the _ state
court.
IV.
THE FCC’S RULINGS DO NOT CONFLICT
WITH THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW
Finally, US Tel argues that the
FCC’s recent decision in Allnet, supra,
preempts SPEAKERS’ state-law claims.
Contrary to US fTel’s assertion, the
allegations rejected by the FCC in that
decision were not identical to those made
here. The FCC charges focused on the
charges imposed by various’ named
carriers, rather than the carriers’
fraudulent failure to disclose those
charges in advance. They alleged simply
"that each [complainant] purchased
25
telecommunications services from one or
more of the defendant carriers and each
has been overcharged for some of those
services," and they sought "refund of the
overcharges and relief from the practices
|
|
leading to the overcharges." Allnet at
para. 1.
Thus, unlike the claims in the
instant case, the administrative charges
in Allnet were well within the scope of
the agency’s primary concerns. But even
if they had been otherwise, their
rejection by an unreviewed ruling of an
administrative agency would hardly give
rise to a level of conflict that would
warrant this Court’s review.
In any event, the FCC ruling creates
no conflict with SPEAKERS’ state court
claims. In its earlier ruling in Bill
Correctors supra, to which the Allnet
decision refers, the agency expressed its
rrr
26
views on the value of disclosure,
stating:
[W]e believe that the consumer, if
od j , can
determine whether the _ service
adequately protects against
unreasonable overcharges. Customers
inf i © thei : .
j can best
evaluate whether a particular
service meets their needs in the
competitive marketplace...
Therefore, we believe it is
Ww
of the practices the carriers
employ to guard against inadvertent
overcharging resulting from the
current deficiencies in the
interexchange arrangements of local
exchange carriers.
Bill Correctors at paras. 8-9, (emphasis
supplied). If anything, these comments
demonstrate that SPEAKERS’ claims are
fully consistent with federal policy, and
negates any suggestion of conflict
between those claims and the purposes or
enforcement of the Communications Act.
CONCLUSION
The savings clause of the
Communications Act negates any inference
———————
27
that Congress intended to preempt all
state law claims against
telecommunications carriers. MThe Act is
directed not to setting standards for
advertising, but rather to ensuring the
availability of quality communications
services at reasonable rates. There is
no possible conflict, therefore, between
the federal law and SPEAKERS’ claims of
common law and statutory fraud.
Moreover, given the unrelatedness of
those claims to the technical mission of
the FCC, there is no ground for dismissal
of SPEAKERS’ claims as subject to the
primary jurisdiction of the FCC. Their
resolution will require none of the
agency’s technical expertise and is well
within the conventional competence of the
state court.
Accordingly, there is no reason for
the Court to concern itself now with this
case. The effect of the present
28
litigation on federal regulation of the
telecommunications industry will be, at
the very most, incidental. Nader, 426
U.S. at 300. Petitioner has made no
showing otherwise. It has also failed to
demonstrate any conflict within the
meaning of the Supreme Court Rule 17, or
to substantiate its claims about the
doctrinal and practical importance of
this case which is wholly peripheral to
any vital issue that might attract
Court’s concern.
© 6 \snetaraiice pce cnet i aaa
SPD RL nr da An ater Cato
29
WHEREFORE, SPEAKERS’ respectfully
requests this Court to deny the petition
for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES BARNHILL
(Counsel Of Record)
DAVIS, BARNHILL & GALLAND
3 SOUTH PINCKNEY STREET
SUITE 804
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53703
(608) 255-5200
MICHAEL T. HANNAFAN
MICHAEL T. HANNAFAN, LTD.
THREE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602
(312) 782-7490
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.