Opposition Brief — U. S. Telecom, Inc. v. Speakers of Sport, Inc.

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Supreme Court, U.S, é

ErEBD-

\>) | of 6 1987

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

ChE RK

No. 87-286

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

U.S. TELECOM, INC. f/k/a U.S. TELEPHONE,

INC., AND U.S. TELEPHONE OF THE

MIDWEST, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

SPEAKERS OF SPORT, INC., on its own

behalf and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF ILLINOIS

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES BARNHILL, JR.

(Counsel of Record)

DAVIS, BARNHILL & GALLAND

3 SOUTH PINCKNEY STREET

SUITE 804

MADISON, WISCONSIN 53703

(608) 255-5200

MICHAEL T. HANNAFAN, ESQ.

THREE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602

(312) 782-7490

NC

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether a state court decision

refusing to dismiss claims of advertising

and disclosure practices in violation of

state and statutory common law presents

any issue which is appropriately

reviewable by this Court at this early

stage of the proceedings.

a ee ee

i

ii

SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 28.1 LIST

Speakers of Sport, Inc.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . ... ++. - i

SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 28.1 LIST... . ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . - + © © © «© » Si

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...... -~ iv

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

EM OPPOSITION « © © «© e© © © © 1

ADDITIONAL STATUTES INVOLVED .. . 3

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .... . 3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .. . 6

THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE

CONCLUSION THAT SPEAKERS’

STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE NOT

PREEMPTED . . «© «© «© «© © «© « « 9

THE ANALYSIS OF THE :

COURT BELOW IS CONSISTENT

WITH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED

BY THIS COURT aves a « 12

THE CONCLUSION THAT SPEAKERS’

CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO

THIS FCC PRIMARY JURISDICTION

IS CONSISTENT WITH NADER . . 23

THE FCC’S RULINGS DO NOT

CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION

OF THE COURT BELOW .... . 24

eee i ee a a ee ee ee ee 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Ashley v. Southwestern Bell

Telephone Co., 410 F.Supp.

1389 (W.D. Texas 1976) ..... 17

Bill Correctors, Ltd. v.

United States Transmission

Systems, Inc. et al., FCC

Dkt. No. E-84-11

(Released November 8, 1984) .. 22,26

Bruss Co, v. Allnet

606 F.Supp. 401

(M.D. Tid. 1985) «4 «© «© «© © © @ 8

iInc., 211 F.Supp. 47

(D. Idaho 1962) rev’d on

, 335 F.2d

348 (9th Cir. 1964)

cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989

CS os u-k.s i et ee 17

Lif i Matias gout ;

Loan Association v. Guerra,

v.8. , 107 S.Ct. 683

(1987) . - * * > 7 . >. > — -_ .* . & Fe 14

Certified Collateral Corp.,

et al., v. Allnet

Communications Services,

et al., FCC Dkt. No. E-86-61

(Released: April 14, 1987) .. 9,24

25,26

Page

_ I , bo Ri

Telephone Co., 553 F.2d 701

CS gg 17

Essential Communications

Systems, Inc. v. American

Telephone and Telegraph Co.,

610 F.2d 1114 (3rd Cir. 1979) . 17

Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940)... . 16

International Paper Company v.

Oullette, __. U.S. __,

Sy an ee Ts 2 et ht 603, 16,18

Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.

American Telephone and

Telegraph Co., 391 F.2d

406 (30 Gir. 2066)... « 0 « « 16

, 112 I11.2d

428, 493 N.E.2d 1045

(1986). ° s * se sd * * s . + . + 4,6,17

Nad Vv. irline

Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) . . .13,14,18

19,21,23

28

Nordlicht v. New York

Telephone Co., 799 F.2d

859 (2d Cir. 1986),

cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.

ee ss gs es ee 16

vi

Page

.

Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v.

Warren-Godwin Co, 251 U.S.

ay Aas 4% Pine ¢ y « SO 85

664 G.8. 386 (3006)... ...-. 13,24

Sound, Inc. v. American

631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir.

TAC ome ie es inh er &

Kellerman, _ So

107 S.Ct. 434 (1986) ...... 4

5 me. ty: ial |

Western Union Telegraph Co.

v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 27 (1919). . 10,1i

We j .

Vv. Esteve Bros. & Co.,

BOe Wats We Eemeasc 6 ss te st 20,22

Western Union Telegraph Co.

v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252

rata hk a ek ee ee le ow

U.S. STATUTES

Federal Aviation Act, 49 0.8.C. Gee.

B@Ge. © © © 6 @ 6 2,19

vii

U.S. STATUTES Page

Federal Communications Act,

47 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seg. passim

47 U.S.C. Sec. 414 ...... .3,15,19

ILLINOIS STATUTES

Illinois Consumer Fraud and

Deceptive Business Practices

Act and Uniform Deceptive

Trade Practices Act,

Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986,

Chapter 121 1/2,

Sec. 261 et seq. and

362 et seg. nos 6 2 © « © e« 2

RULES

United States Supreme

Re aS 8 & « 6 8 6 le 7,28

No. 87-286

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

U.S. TELECOM, INC. f/k/a U.S. TELEPHONE,

INC., AND U.S. TELEPHONE OF THE

MIDWEST, INC.,

Petitioner,

SPEAKERS OF SPORT, INC., on its own

behalf and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF ILLINOIS

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Respondent SPEAKERS OF SPORT, INC.

("SPEAKERS"), on its own behalf and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

2

respectfully requests that this Court

deny the petition of U.S. TELECOM, INC.

f/k/a U.S. TELEPHONE INC. AND U.S

TELEPHONE OF THE MIDWEST, INC. ("US Tel"

or “petitioner") for a writ of certiorari

seeking review of the decision of the

Appellate Court of Illinois.} In that

decision, the Appellate Court denied

petitioner’s motion to dismiss SPEAKERS’

state common law and statutory fraud

claims as, inter alia, preempted by the

Federal Communications Act ("the

Communications Act"), 47 U.S.C. Sec. 151

(1982) and subject to the primary

jurisdiction of the Federal

Communications Commission ("the FCC").

Petitioner’s request for leave to appeal

was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court.

1149 Ill. App. 3d 898, 501 N.E. 2d

318 (lst Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114

Ill. 2d 558, 508 N.E. 2d 736 (1987).

,

¢

x

3

ADDITIONAL STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 414 of the Communications

Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 414 (1982), states:

Nothing in this Act contained shall

in any way abridge or alter the

remedies now existing at common law

or by statute, but the provisions of

this Act are in addition to such

remedies.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS

SPEAKERS filed this action as a

class action on behalf of all customers

of US Tel alleging that by failing to

disclose to its customers and potential

customers that they would be

systematically charged for uncompleted

telephone calls, US Tel had engaged in

common law fraud and violated the

Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

Business Practices Act and the Uniform

Deceptive Trade Practices Act.* SPEAKERS

also alleged that petitioner’s conduct

2T1l. Rev. Stat., 1986, Chapter 121

1/2, Secs. 261 et seg. and 312 et seg.

————————— ~~

4

constituted common law breach of

contract.

US Tel moved to dismiss’ the

complaint on the ground that it was

preempted by federal law, subject to the

primary jurisdiction of the FCC, and

duplicative of a similar action pending

in federal court. The trial court

granted the motion and SPEAKERS appealed.

The Appellate Court reversed.

Following a recent Illinois Supreme

Court decision in Kellerman v. MCI

Telecommunications Corp., 112 I1ll.2d 428,

493 N.E. 2a 1045 (1986),2 the Court

below heiad that although the

oe en ee

3Kellerman involved fraud claims

against the defendant (MCI

Telecommunications Corp. or "MCI")

virtually identical to those raised here.

MCI moved to dismiss on grounds of

preemption and primary jurisdiction, and

the trial court’s denial of that motion

was ultimately affirmed by the Illinois

Supreme Court. Id. Last year, this

Court denied MCI’s petition for a writ of

certiorari. Tele-communications Corp. v.

Kellerman, _U.S. __, 107 S.Ct. 434 (1986).

5

Communications Act preempted claims

challenging the quality of telecommuni-

cations services or the reasonableness

of rates charged for said services, it

did not preempt common law or statutory

claims unrelated to those concerns. As a

result, the Court concluded, SPEAKERS’

damage claims for injury caused by US

Tel’s dissemination of fraudulent and

deceptive advertisements were not

preempted, and SPEAKERS was free to seek

to hold US Tel to the same advertising

and disclosure standards as any other

firm, regardless of whether it was in

other respects subject to federal

regulation.

The Court also rejected the argument

that the FCC had primary jurisdiction

over SPEAKERS’ claims. Finding that such

Claims raised no issue requiring the

agency’s specialized or technical

expertise, it held that the trial court

ibaa hai acai

6

had erred in dismissing them on this

ground. 4

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The instant petition is virtually

identical to the certiorari petition

filed by MCI in the Kellerman case which

this Court denied last year. See supra,

note 1. Petitioner nonetheless contends

that it should be granted, asserting

conflicts with four cases decided by this

Court under the Act of 1910 (the most

recent decided sixty years ago), a

number of federal district court

decisions, and an administrative

determination by the FCC. It contends

further that state court proceedings, if

4The Court below also rejected the

claim that the case should be dismissed

as duplicative of a pending federal suit,

since none of the counts in the federal

court action alleged state common law or

statutory claims, and the disposition of

that case therefore implicated none of

the considerations of comity,

multiplicity and res judicata that would

justify dismissal.

—— <<

-

permitted to continue, will have a

disruptive effect on the reorganization

of the telecommunications industry.

Plainly, the writ should be denied.

This case presents neither a "conflict"

as contemplated by Supreme Court Rule 17,

nor any issue of sufficient importance to

warrant this Court’s concern.

First, the four cases decided under

the Act of 1910 do not create any

conflict warranting review. Not only are

they distinguishable from the instant

case, but this Court’s more. recent

analyses of the preemption and primary

jurisdiction doctrines fully support the

decision of the Court below.

Second, notwithstanding that a

number of federal district courts have

reached different results with respect to

different complaints (which included

Claims, not present here, that’ the

charges were “unreasonable” or "unjust"

———————___—————— i ~<

wi il

8

within the meaning of the Communications

Act), those decisions do not create a

conflict within the meaning of Supreme

Court Rule 17. Moreover, at least one

federal district court has held, on

indistinguishable facts, that federal

preemption is not warranted. Bruss Co.

v. Allnet Communication Services, 606

F.Supp. 401 (N.D. Ill. 1985).

Third, there is no possibility of

conflict between vindication of SPEAKERS’

Claims and the FCC interpretations on

which US Tel relies. Far from

immunizing US Tel from responsibility for

SPEAKERS’ claims, the FCC has endorsed

the principle of disclosure as consistent

with federal policy.

Finally, this case raises no issue

of sufficient importance to warrant this

Court’s review at this early stage. US

Tel has made no showing to support its

contention that the litigation will, if

9

permitted to proceed, cause any

disruption to the reorganization of the

telecommunications industry. Indeed as a

practical matter, it appears that

resolution of the technical problem (lack

of “answer supervision") alleged to have

been fraudulently concealed is imminent.

See In re: Certified Collateral Corp.,

et al. v. Allnet Communications Services,

et al. ("Allnet"), FCC Dkt. No. E-86-61

(Released: April 14, 1987), para. 4.

(Appendix E.) Thus, this action will not

obstruct the accomplishment of any

federal purpose.

I.

THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT DO NOT

CONFLICT WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT

SPEAKERS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE

NOT PREEMPTED

Petitioner’s analysis of this

Court’s preemption decisions’ relies

exclusively on cases decided sixty years

10

ago and more,> and disregards

developments in the law over recent

years. These developments have clarified

and refined the law, and made clear that

the earlier decisions are limited to

their particular facts. That is, in each

of the four cases cited by US Tel, the

plaintiffs’ claims related directly to

the rates charged for telegraph services

and limits on liability for the quality

of those services. They therefore fell

unmistakably within the scope of the Act

of 1910, whose "outstanding consideration

[was] that of uniformity and equality of

rates." Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. at 572.

The plaintiffs in Warren-Godwin,

Esteve Bros. and Priester each challenged

SPostal Telegraph-Cable Co. v.

Warren-Godwin Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919);

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Boegli,

251 U.S. 315 (1920); Western Union

e n Co, ¥, Vv —» oo8

U.S. 566 (1921), and Western Union

Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252

(1928).

11

fixed rates for the transmission of

"unrepeated" telegraph messages, i-.e.,

messages sent at a discounted rate and

therefore subject to a more limited

liability than available under state

negligence law. Such rates were

expressly authorized by the Act cf 1910

which permitted classification of

messages "into day, night, repeated,

unrepeated, letter, commercial, press,

Government and such other classes as are

just and reasonable." The Act also

provided explicitly that "different rates

may be charged for the different classes

of messages." The plaintiff in Boegli,

on the other hand, challenged a state law

penalty for negligent failure to deliver

a telegram. The federally fixed rates

and limits on liability for unrepeated

messages in the first three cases were

enforced, and the state penalty in the

fourth held preempted, all in furtherance

| —

12

of the federal objective of ensuring

uniform and equal rates.

By contrast, SPEAKERS’ claims in

this case do not relate to the statutory

purpose of the Communications Act in

ensuring quality service at uniform and

reasonable rates. As demonstrated infra,

current principles of law establish that

their dismissal on preemption grounds is

unwarranted.

II.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE COURT BELOW IS

CONSISTENT WITH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED

BY THIS COURT

A recent series of preemption

decisions by this Court supports’ the

conclusion of the Court below that

SPEAKERS’ state law claims are not

preempted because they do not fall within

the scope of, and do not create any

irreconcilable conflict with, federal

13

law.© In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238 (1984), for example, this

Court set out the two basic ways in which

state law can be preempted. Where

Congress evidences an intent to occupy an

entire field of activity, any state law

within that field will be preempted. 464

U.S. at 248. Disputes will arise only as

to whether a particular claim is or is

not “within the field." Where federal

legislation has not entirely displaced

state regulation, as evidenced for

example by a savings clause, state law is

preempted only to the extent that it

conflicts with federal law. This occurs

either when compliance with both state

and federal law is impossible, or when

©silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464

U.S. 238 (1984); California Federal

Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra

’

U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987);

’

U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987); Nader

v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290

(1976).

14

the state law in question obstructs the

accomplishment of the (\legislative

purpose. Ia.”

The express purpose of

Communications Act regulation is to

7In Silkwood, the Court held that

the plaintiff’s state damage claims for

injuries caused by radioactive

contamination were not preempted by the

Atomic Energy Act, by which act the

federal government had "occupied the

entire field of nuclear safety concerns,

except the limited powers expressly ceded

to the States." Notwithstanding that the

plaintiff’s state claims for personal

injury had not been expressly preserved,

the Court relied on legislative history

to conclude that Congress intended that

they survive.

See also California Federal Savings

veaee -8.Ct.

at 689 (state law regulating pregnancy

discrimination not preempted by federal

law, where Congress explicitly disclaimed

categorical preemption and the state law

neither conflicted with federal law nor

obstructed underlying federal policy);

‘

107 S.Ct. at 811-12 (state law not

preempted by Clean Air Act where not

inconsistent with Act, and thus > ging

the scope of savings clause); Nader v.

Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. at 300

(state law claims preserved by savings

clause and not inconsistent with

provisions or purposes of Federal

Aviation Act).

15

>

monitor the quality of and rates charged

for interstate telecommunications

services in order to "’make available ...

to all the people of the United States a

rapid, efficient ... communication

service with adequate facilities at

reasonable charges.’" 47 U.S.C. Sec.

151. Thus, the Act’s primary concern is

with the quality and cost of service, as

opposed to SPEAKERS’ concern over

standards for advertising to potential

customers, the focus of SPEAKERS’ concern

in this case. |

That Congress did not intend to

supplant state laws addressing other

concerns is evident from the Act’s broad

savings clause, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 414, which

states that "[(njothing in this Act

contained- shall in any way abridge or

alter the remedies now existing at common

law or by statute, but the provisions of

this Act are in addition to such

16

remedies. "8 As long ago as 1940, this

Court recognized that the Communications

Act was not designed as a new code for

the adjustment of private rights. FCC v.

Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.

134, 138 (1940). More recently, a

federal court of appeals held that the

effect of the Act’s savings clause was to

preserve state-law remedies that do not

interfere with the federal government’s

authority over telephone charges or

8Neither federal court of appeals

decision cited by US Tel, Ivy

, 391 F.2d 486, 490 (2d

and Telegraph Co.

Cir. 1968) and Nordlicht v. New York

, 799 F.2a 859 (2d Cir.

Telephone Co.

1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 929 (1987)

so much as acknowledged the existence of

the savings clause, perhaps because the

Claims in those cases related directly to

the quality and rates of the service

provided. The plaintiff in Ivy

complained explicitly of "standards" of

the service provided and the extent of

the defendant’s liability for failure to

comply with such standards. The

plaintiff in Nordlicht challenged the

lawfulness of the defendant’s charging

practices.

17

services, and which did not otherwise

conflict with an express provision of the

Act. Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico

Telephone Co., 553 F.2d 701, 707-08, n.6

(lst Cir. 1977).9

The conclusion of the Court below

that SPEAKERS’ claims are not preempted

presents no conflict with decisions of

this Court. Although federal law clearly

9See also Kellerman, 112 I11.2d at

440-41; Ashley v. Southwestern Bell

, 410 F.Supp. 1389 (W.D.

Texas 1976)(plaintiff’s invasion of

privacy tort action against the

telephone company for disclosure of

telephone records and wiretaps held not

preempted by Communications Act); Cable

Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F.Supp.

47 (D. Idaho 1962) yrev’d on other

grounds, 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964)

denied 379 8.8. 989

(1965) (contractual dispute not related to

the rendition of interstate communication

services held not preempted by the

Communications'9 Act); Essential

Telephone and Telegraph Co., 610 F.2d

1114, 1120-21 (3rd Cir. 1979) and Sound,

—_ - i fe)

Coe.» 631 F.26 1324, 1329 i: a PP

1980) (anti-trust laws held not preempted

by Communications Act.)

18

dominates the field of telecommunications

regulation, the savings clause of the

Communications Act negates the inference

that Congress "left no room" for state

causes of action. Cf. International

Paper Company, 107 S.Ct. at 812. Rather,

the concerns of federal policy are

limited to supervision of the quality and

rates of interstate service, leaving

parties free to address other concerns

under state law so long as compliance

with both state and federal law is

possible, and the vindication of such

Claims does not interfere with the

accomplishment of the purposes and

objectives of Congress.

In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,

Inc., the Court applied precisely this

test to facts nearly identical to those

of this case when it considered the

preemptive effect of the Federal Aviation

Act. After being "bumped" from an

19

overbooked flight, the plaintiff in Nader

sued the airline for fraudulent

misrepresentation. Like SPEAKERS in this

case, he did not challenge the quality of

or charges for the airline’s service, but

complained instead of its failure to

disclose to him in advance of the sale of

his ticket that its flights were

systematically overbooked.

The airline moved to dismiss on the

ground that the FAA had conferred primary

jurisdiction over such claims on the

Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB"). The

Court disagreed. Noting both the stated

purpose of the FAA to promote "adequate,

economical and efficient service... at

the lowest cost," and the FAA’s savings

Clause (virtually identical to Section

414 of the Communications Act),1° the

19Tt provides that "[nJothing

contained in this chapter shall in any

way abridge or alter the remedies now

existing by common law or by statute, but

20

Court concluded that Congress intended

that common law or _ statutory claims

survive absent irreconcilable conflict

with the federal statutory scheme.

Notwithstanding the explicit statutory

authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board

("CAB") to investigate "unfair or

deceptive practices" and a then on-going

rulemaking proceeding concerning the very

overbooking practices as to which the

plaintiff alleged he was defrauded, the

Court found that no such conflict

existed. It explained:

There is no [CAB] requirement that

air carriers engage in overbooking

or that they fail to disclose that

they do so. Any impact on rates

that may result from the imposition

of tort liability or from practices

adopted by a carrier to avoid such

liability would merely be

incidental. Under the

circumstances, the common-law action

and the statute are not "absolutely

inconsistent" and may coexist, as

the provisions of this chapter are in

addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C.

Sec. 1506.

21

contemplated by the [savings

clause]. -

426 U.S. 300.11

The Court’s reasoning in Nader is

fully applicable here. The FCC does not

require that telephone companies bill for

uncompleted calls, or that they fail to

11 ys Tel seeks to distinguish Nader

on the ground that the CAB, unlike the

Fcc, has no authority to entertain

private claims or grant private remedies.

It relies on United States Navigation Co.

v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932),

to argue that since the Communications

Act provides a remedial scheme for

private complaints, and authorizes the

FCC to prescribe as well as prohibit

carriers’ conduct, its jurisdiction over

private claims is exclusive.

The distinction does not square with

Court’s analysis of the Cunard decision

in Nader. In Cunard, an antitrust action

was dismissed on primary jurisdiction

grounds because initial consideration by

the Interstate Commerce Commission had

not been sought. As the Court observed

in Nader, however, the plaintiff’s

antitrust claims were covered by

unambiguous provisions of the Shipping

Act which explicitly exempted affected

shipping companies from the operation of

the antitrust laws. 462 U.S. at 301. In

the instant case, no exemption

immunizing carriers from state law

liability is present.

nasa aria SAS SSE RM IT 2 RE Se EE SL I I

22

disclose that they do so. Indeed, the

FCC has stated its view that disclosure

to customers would be beneficial. See

Transmission Systems, Inc., et al.,

("Bill Correctors") FCC Dkt. No. E-84-11

(Released: November 8, 1984), paras. 8-

9. Any impact on the quality of services

or the rates for those services that

could result from the imposition of state

law would be incidental at most. Thus,

SPEAKERS’ state law claims are not

"absolutely inconsistent" with the

Communications Act, and may easily

coexist with it as contemplated by the

savings clause.

III.

THE CONCLUSION THAT SPEAKERS’ CLAIMS

ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THIS FCC PRIMARY

JURISDICTION IS CONSISTENT WITH NADER

The rejection by the Court below of

US Tel’s primary jurisdiction argument is

also consistent with Nader, in which this

23

Court rejected the airline’s contention

that the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction required referral of the

plaintiff’s claims to the CAB to permit

it to determine whether its overbooking

practice was "deceptive" within the

meaning of the FAA. This Court held:

Referral of the misrepresentation

issue to the Board cannot be

justified by the interest in

informing the court’s ultimate

decision with "the expert and

specialized knowledge," of the

Board. The action brought by

petitioner does not turn on a

determination of the reasonableness

of a challenged practice - a

determination that could be

facilitated by an informed

evaluation of the economics or

technology of the regulated

industry. The standards to be

applied in an action for fraudulent

misrepresentation are within the

conventional competence of the

courts, and the judgment of a

technically expert body is not

likely to be helpful in the

application of these standards to

the facts of this case.

462 U.S. at 305-6 (citations omitted).

Here, SPEAKERS’ claims do not turn on a

determination of the reasonableness of

24

US Tel’s billing practices, as to which

evaluation of economic and technical

considerations might come into play.

Rather ,\ the standards implicated by its

action for fraud are well within the

conventional competence of the _ state

court.

IV.

THE FCC’S RULINGS DO NOT CONFLICT

WITH THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW

Finally, US Tel argues that the

FCC’s recent decision in Allnet, supra,

preempts SPEAKERS’ state-law claims.

Contrary to US fTel’s assertion, the

allegations rejected by the FCC in that

decision were not identical to those made

here. The FCC charges focused on the

charges imposed by various’ named

carriers, rather than the carriers’

fraudulent failure to disclose those

charges in advance. They alleged simply

"that each [complainant] purchased

25

telecommunications services from one or

more of the defendant carriers and each

has been overcharged for some of those

services," and they sought "refund of the

overcharges and relief from the practices

|

|

leading to the overcharges." Allnet at

para. 1.

Thus, unlike the claims in the

instant case, the administrative charges

in Allnet were well within the scope of

the agency’s primary concerns. But even

if they had been otherwise, their

rejection by an unreviewed ruling of an

administrative agency would hardly give

rise to a level of conflict that would

warrant this Court’s review.

In any event, the FCC ruling creates

no conflict with SPEAKERS’ state court

claims. In its earlier ruling in Bill

Correctors supra, to which the Allnet

decision refers, the agency expressed its

rrr

26

views on the value of disclosure,

stating:

[W]e believe that the consumer, if

od j , can

determine whether the _ service

adequately protects against

unreasonable overcharges. Customers

inf i © thei : .

j can best

evaluate whether a particular

service meets their needs in the

competitive marketplace...

Therefore, we believe it is

Ww

of the practices the carriers

employ to guard against inadvertent

overcharging resulting from the

current deficiencies in the

interexchange arrangements of local

exchange carriers.

Bill Correctors at paras. 8-9, (emphasis

supplied). If anything, these comments

demonstrate that SPEAKERS’ claims are

fully consistent with federal policy, and

negates any suggestion of conflict

between those claims and the purposes or

enforcement of the Communications Act.

CONCLUSION

The savings clause of the

Communications Act negates any inference

———————

27

that Congress intended to preempt all

state law claims against

telecommunications carriers. MThe Act is

directed not to setting standards for

advertising, but rather to ensuring the

availability of quality communications

services at reasonable rates. There is

no possible conflict, therefore, between

the federal law and SPEAKERS’ claims of

common law and statutory fraud.

Moreover, given the unrelatedness of

those claims to the technical mission of

the FCC, there is no ground for dismissal

of SPEAKERS’ claims as subject to the

primary jurisdiction of the FCC. Their

resolution will require none of the

agency’s technical expertise and is well

within the conventional competence of the

state court.

Accordingly, there is no reason for

the Court to concern itself now with this

case. The effect of the present

28

litigation on federal regulation of the

telecommunications industry will be, at

the very most, incidental. Nader, 426

U.S. at 300. Petitioner has made no

showing otherwise. It has also failed to

demonstrate any conflict within the

meaning of the Supreme Court Rule 17, or

to substantiate its claims about the

doctrinal and practical importance of

this case which is wholly peripheral to

any vital issue that might attract

Court’s concern.

© 6 \snetaraiice pce cnet i aaa

SPD RL nr da An ater Cato

29

WHEREFORE, SPEAKERS’ respectfully

requests this Court to deny the petition

for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES BARNHILL

(Counsel Of Record)

DAVIS, BARNHILL & GALLAND

3 SOUTH PINCKNEY STREET

SUITE 804

MADISON, WISCONSIN 53703

(608) 255-5200

MICHAEL T. HANNAFAN

MICHAEL T. HANNAFAN, LTD.

THREE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602

(312) 782-7490

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition Brief — U. S. Telecom, Inc. v. Speakers of Sport, Inc. · 484 U.S. 925 | Frix