Petition for Writ of Certiorari — DuPage Bank & Trust Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board

S 7 al 2 R 9 | | Gey Court, U.S,

No. AUG

In THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OctToBeR TERM, 1987

DUPAGE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,

as Trustee of Trusts Nos. 2602 and 2439,

Petitioner,

vs.

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY

COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, THE COUNTY OF

McHENRY, ILLINOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the

TOWN OF ALGONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Sanpra 8S. Kerrick *

WriuaM M. Franz

FRANZ & KERRICK

453 Coventry Green

Crystal Lake, Illinois 60014

(815) 459-8100

Counsel for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220

os &

19 198/

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The question is whether Illinois may impose taxes con-

trary to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United

States. Illinois is imposing a real estate tax on the sub-

ject property at a rate of 26 times that imposed on other

nearby property. The parties have admitted that both

properties are substantially similar in character and of

equal value, but differently classified. The Petitioner con-

tends the tax is unconstitutional. It is the de facto policy

of the State of Illinois that Equal Protection does not re-

quire a comparison of tax burdens between classes.

il

RULE 28.1 DISCLOSURE

The Petitioner, DuPage Bank and Trust Company of

Glen Ellyn, Illinois, is a mere title holding nominee of an

Illinois land trust. The taxpayers of the instant tax were

Illinois Institute of Technology, the contract seller; the

bankruptcy estate of Frank J. Kafka, successor to the con-

tract purchaser; and Sears Bank and Trust Company of

Chicago, the mortgage holder.

In 1981 DuPage Bank had no parents, affiliates or sub-

sidiaries. It is now owned by First Wisconsin National

Bank of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Illinois Institute of Technology is a private university

organized as a not-for-profit organization.

In 1981 Sears Bank was owned by a holding company,

Midland Bank Corp. Since that time Sears Bank has changed

its name to UnibancTrust Company of Chicago, and it is

now owned by a holding company, Unibanc, Corp.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ... i

BERPRMD GL RPREAPU RES oo. c cece ecceces il

py FN BW ivy 0) ayy | iv

RONEN APOE. ee cc ccc c cc ccccccccses 1

eee kk y dus scans sa diees ees 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

ES 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI:

EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIRES THAT ONCE

PROPERTIES HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED FOR

PURPOSES OF TAXATION, THAT THE TAX

TREATMENT, RELATIVE TO THE DIFFER-

ENCE IN CLASSIFICATION, BE NOT SO DIS-

PARATE AS TO BE WHOLLY ARBITRARY.

ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO

IGNORE THE CONSTITUTION AND DECI-

SIONS OF THIS COURT AND BE PERMIT-

TED TO TAX ADMITTEDLY SIMILAR PROP-

ERTIES WITH AN ARBITRARY DISPARITY

eG 6 ea ceed ines haseeees 7

ES 13

iV

APPENDIX APP.

PAGE

Opinion of Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Dis-

trict, 151 Ill. App. 3d 624, 502 N.E.2d 1250 .. la

Judgment Order of the Circuit Court of the Nine-

teenth Judicial District, McHenry County, IIli-

OPE Peer ner rye rr rt er rrr re lla

Order of Property Tax Appeal Board of Illinois

Department of Revenue ................... 15a

Notice of Decision of Illinois Supreme Court Deny-

Meer LOOVG (0 BOONE occ ccc cciccccnetnaes 18a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

—_—_———_

Cases PAGE

Department of Revenue v. Warren Petroleum Corp.,

2 ee eS | Brrr rer rr rrr ee 10

Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Carr, 272

io Re: A per re oe 11

Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410

U.S. 356 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910. 9

Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Railway v.

Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940) ............ 8,9

People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia Fields Country

Ceeb. Bid TE. TOR COD onic vcccscvivas:

Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954). = 6, 7

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV ........... 2

In Tne

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Octoser Term, 1987

DUPAGE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,

as Trustee of Trusts Nos. 2602 and 2439,

Petitioner,

vs.

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY

COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, THE COUNTY OF

McHENRY, ILLINOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the

TOWN OF ALGONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

The Petitioner, DuPage Bank and Trust Company, as

Trustee, respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue

to review the decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois

issued on December 31, 1986.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second

District, is reported at 151 Ili. App. 3d 624, 502 N.E.2d

1250 (1986). (Appendix, page la). The Judgment Order of

ilies

the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,

McHenry County, Illinois, is unpublished. (Appendix, page

lla). The order of the Property Tax Appeal Board of the

Illinois Department of Revenue is unpublished. (Appen-

dix, page 15a). The notice of the decision of the Illinois

Supreme Court denying leave to appeal is unpublished.

(Appendix, page 18a). ;

JURISDICTION

_—_—_—_——

The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second

District, was filed December 31, 1986. A Petition for Re-

hearing was denied February 9, 1987. The Supreme Court

of Illinois denied Petitioner leave to appeal on June 4,

1987.

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257(3). The instant Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is

being filed within 90 days of the denial of the petition

for leave to appeal by the Illinois Supreme Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens

of the United States and of the State wherein they

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-

tion the equal protection of the laws.

ee

~

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter involves the constitutionality of a real estate

tax. It is necessary to briefly review the assessment pro-

cedure.

Real estate in Illinois which is not used for public or

charitable purposes is subject to a real estate tax. Each

parcel is assessed by a local township assessor. Illinois

has several assessment classifications which essentially

classify real estate according to character so that the same

formula or method of assessment will be applied by the

assessor as he assesses all properties within the class. For

example, the same formula for assessments is applied to

all lands classified as farm lands. A different formula is

applied to lands classified as open space.

Once all the assessments for all parcels in all classes

within the township are completed, then the real estate

tax is imposed on the assessments so that a $10,000 assess-

ment will generally yield ten times as much tax as a $1,000

assessment.

If the taxpayer cannot settle his assessment with local

officials he may file a petition with the Property Tax Ap-

peal Board of the Illinois Department of Revenue. Hear-

ing on the petition is an administrative hearing de novo.

The taxpayer’s county and township are named respon-

dents. They must defend their proposed assessment.

In this case the taxpayer filed a petition to contest the

1981 assessment on a 107 acre parcel of land located ad-

jacent to a highway in the City of Crystal Lake. It was

not subdivided. It had some old, abandoned buildings on

a portion of the land, but for all purposes relevant to this

case, it was undeveloped land. No building permit could

a

be obtained without subdivision. The property generally

had commercial and mixed use zoning designations, but

subject to various contingencies and planned unit develop-

ment requirements. The zoning was neither final nor firm.

The taxpayer contended in its petition that its tax was

unconstitutional because the taxpayer’s undeveloped land

was being taxed 26 times higher per acre than other

similar undeveloped lands in the township. Without deny-

ing that the other undeveloped lands were similar to the

subject, the County answered that the taxpayer could not

compare its land to those other lands because the other

lands were properly in different assessment classifications.

Whether they were, in fact, similar properties was not

considered by the County in determining the tax.

To defend its proposed assessment, the County offered

proof of the recently recorded sale price of a nearby 66

acre parcel of undeveloped land on a major highway in

the township with superior firm industrial zoning and

which land qualified for a building permit without sub-

division. The County contended that the second parcel and

the subject were highly similar in character and that proof

of the sale price per acre of this second parcel should be

used to estimate the value of the subject, with an assess-

ment to be imposed on the subject on the basis of the

estimated value.

The taxpayer admitted that the two parcels were nearly

identical. The taxpayer submitted for the record the ac-

tual tax imposed on the County’s comparable to compare

it to the proposed tax on the subject. The subject’s pro-

posed tax burden was 26 times greater per acre than the

County’s comparable. The estimated tax of the subject

was $557.90 per acre, but the tax of the comparable was

only $21.00 per acre. Respondents offered no evidence of

assessments or tax burdens on any other properties to

compare to the subject.

a SS

The County objected to the taxpayer’s comparison of

taxes contending the Board could not consider the two

properties as “comparable” for imposing a tax unless they

were in the same class.

It is uncontested that the two parcels are properly in

different assessment classes, and that they are, in fact,

substantially similar in character and of the same value

per acre.

Because the two properties were so similar, the County

proposed to set the subject’s assessment based on an esti-

mated sale price derived from this comparable parcel.

However, it did not base the assessment of the com-

parable on its own sale price because a different formula

was being used in that class.

At the hearing the hearing officer ruled that the local

assessor could be cross-examined on whether he had at-

tempted to assess uniformly. Notwithstanding the ruling,

the State’s Attorney directed him not to answer the ques-

tion.

The taxpayer’s counsel argued orally that the tay was

unconstitutional as a-denial of Equal Protection and filed

a brief on the constitutional issue. The brief was part of

the record before the Board. The State’s Attorney de-

clined to argue the constitutional question at the hearing

and filed no brief for the County.

The Board issued a two page opinion ruling in favor

of the County’s proposed assessment. The opinion noted

the taxpayer had contended its tax was unconstitutional,

but overruled the objection without comment. (Appendix,

page 15a).

The taxpayer filed an appeal in administrative review

with the Circuit Court for McHenry County. The Circuit

Court reversed the Department of Revenue; declared the

oa

subject tax unconstitutional; and entered judgment for the

taxpayer for a ratable tax. (Appendix, pages 12a-13a). The

Circuit Court’s opinion relied on the decision of the Su-

preme Court of the United States in the case of Walters

v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237, 98 L. Ed. 660,

665 (1954), as controlling. Walters addressed classification

vis-a-vis taxation, holding that Equal Protection requires

that “different [tax] treatments be not so disparate, rela-

tive to the difference in classification, as to be wholly ar-

bitrary.”’ The Illinois Attorney General, on behalf of the

Department of Revenue, then filed an appeal with the Ap-

pellate Court of Illinois contending, inter alia, that Equal

Protection never requires a comparison of the tax burdens

between similar, but differently classified, properties.

In both written and oral arguments before the Appellate

Court, the taxpayer’s counsel argued that the Appellate

Court was obliged to follow the Supreme Court of the

United States in Walters, and to determine whether the

tax disparity between properties admitted to be substan-

tially similar, was so great as to be arbitrary.

Without mentioning Walters, the Appellate Court re-

versed the Circuit Court and ruled that Equal Protection

does not require Illinois to compare tax burdens between

classes. (Appendix, page 7a).

The taxpayer petitioned for a rehearing, specifically

directing the attention of the court to the fact that the

Appellate Court’s decision does not account for the Walters

decision and cannot be reconciled to the Walters decision.

The petition for rehearing was denied.

The Illinois Supreme Court has never decided an Equal

Protection classification case with the issue present here.

The taxpayer petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for

leave to appeal noting in the petition that the Appellate

Court had ignored the Walters decision. The Illinois Su-

preme Court denied leave to appeal.

a, ae

s

The present state of the law in Illinois is that a tax-

payer has no Equal Protection claim to contest a grossly

disparate tax burden for property substantially similar to

other property in the district but properly in a different

class. A tax 26 times higher per acre has been ruled con-

stitutional, literally as a matter of pure form over sub-

stance. The form of the classification wholly controls the

tax. The substance of similarities between the properties

has been ruled irrelevant.

Many other issues were litigated below which are not

appealed here.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIRES THAT ONCE PROP-

ERTIES HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED FOR PURPOSES OF

TAXATION, THAT THE TAX TREATMENT, RELATIVE

TO THE DIFFERENCE IN CLASSIFICATION, BE NOT

SO DISPARATE AS TO BE WHOLLY ARBITRARY. ILLI-

NOIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO IGNORE THE

CONSTITUTION AND DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND

BE PERMITTED TO TAX ADMITTEDLY SIMILAR PROP-

ERTIES WITH AN ARBITRARY DISPARITY OF 26

TIMES.

This case has been a six year test case by Illinois to

expand the State’s right to impose real estate taxes any

way it sees fit. It has patently ignored the Constitution

and failed to recognize a decision of the Supreme Court

of the United States in the case of Walters v. City of St.

Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237, 98 L. Ed. 660, 665 (1954). That

case is not recognized as law in Illinois.

In Walters the Supreme Court interpreted Equal Pro-

tection to require that if similar subjects have been prop-

sailien.

erly classified in different taxable classifications, then the

tax authorities must compare the extent of those similar-

ities to determine whether they justify the difference in

tax burden. If the disparity between the two tax burdens

for similar, but differently classified subjects, is so great

as to be arbitrary, then the higher tax is unconstitutional,

and the taxpayer will be entitled to a reasonably similar

tax burden. The Supreme Court declared that Equal Pro-

tection under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that:

“different [tax] treatments be not so disparate rela-

tive to the difference in classification, as to be wholly

arbitrary.” Ibid.

It is difficult to imagine a clearer directive to apply to

this case. The taxpayer has not found a single case in

any jurisdiction where the disparity in tax burdens for

similar properties was so vast as to charge one taxpayer

3.8% (1/26th) of the tax imposed on another taxpayer.

Since the subject and the County’s comparable are ad-

mitted by the parties to be similar, in fact, the Walters

case demands that the extent of the tax disparity be studied,

and if it is too great considering the similarities, then the

higher tax is constitutionally void.

It should be noted that the Walters test poses no threat

to any kind of classification. It does not require that sim-

ilar lands must have the same classification or even the

same system of classification. It does not require that the

tax burdens be identical or precisely uniform between

similar classes. The legislature does have broad author-

ity, unimpeded by Walters, to develop multiple classifica-

tions and systems. The legislature has authority to tax

certain classes at somewhat higher levels than others. The

Supreme Court has consistently endorsed the concept of

allowing the legislature wide latitude in these matters

both prior to and after its Walters decision. Nashville,

Chattanooga, and St. Louis Railway v. Browning, 310

U.S. 362, 368, 84 L. Ed. 1254, 1257 (1940), and Lehn-

hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359,

35 L. Ed. 2d 351, 355 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S.

910.

Walters goes beyond the underlying system of classifica-

tion and studies the tax, itself. It requires that once sim-

ilar subjects have been properly classified in different

classes, and once their assessments have been properly

determined per the mode for their respective classes, then

at that point, Equal Protection requires that their respec-

tive tax burdens, no matter how they are determined,

must be compared to determine whether the disparity is

so grossly disparate as to be arbitrary. If it is, then the

higher tax is unconstitutional, and the taxpayer will be

entitled to a reasonably similar lower tax burden.

The Illinois Supreme Court has indirectly addressed this

issue twice in obiter dicta, both favorably to this taxpayer.

In one case owners of a golf course complained of over-

assessment when their land was being assessed in a range

of $525 to $575 per acre while adjoining farm lands were

being assessed in a range of $150 to $363 per acre. The

Illinois Supreme Court studied the substance of the ac-

tual differences between the two classes to determine

whether the disparity between the classes was justified.

It found the golf course had significant improvements

(sprinkler system, etc.) installed at considerable expense

which had substantially enhanced the value of the golf

course beyond the value of the farm land. Then the court,

after considering the differences, determined that the

disparity in the tax burden was not arbitrary but was

based on real factors of substantial differences between

the properties. People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia Fields

Country Club, 374 Ill. 101, 103, 28 N.E.2d 109 (1940).

In the instant case the Appellate Court failed to apply

either the Walters or Olympia Fields analysis. The Court

=o

erroneously believed that Equal Protection never requires

an analysis between classes, but only within a class. This

interpretation of Equal Protection cannot, under any cir-

cumstances, be reconciled to the requirements of Walters

and Olympia Fields to determine whether the difference

in tax burden between classes is arbitrary.

Further, the Illinois Supreme Court spoke directly to

the issue of comparison between classes as a subject for

Equal Protection scrutiny in 1954, the year of Walters.

The Illinois Court was called upon to determine whether

a taxpayer had an unconstitutional tax burden because

it had to pay somewhat higher personal property taxes

for its similar, but differently classified, property. The

Court studied the difference in the tax burden and de-

clared that the difference was not disparate enough to

raise an Equal Protection claim, but went on to declare,

in dictum, that if the tax disparity would have been “‘sub-

stantial”, then the taxpayer would have an unconstitu-

tional tax under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is ap-

parent the Court did, in fact, apply the Walters type of

analysis, but the taxpayer did not have a “‘substantial”’

disparity as we do here. Department of Revenue v. Warren

Petroleum Corp., 2 Ill. 2d 483, 488, 489, 119 N.E.2d 215

(1954).

The Court went on in further dictum at 488, to declare

that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment guarantees ‘‘substantial equality in the resulting

[tax] burden” but not identity. A taxpayer would have

no Fourteenth Amendment claim to contest his tax until

the difference in tax burden became ‘“‘substantiai.’”’

The Illinois Department of Revenue and the Appellate

Court here mistakenly believed that Equal Protection never

requires such an analysis between classes.

The law is clear from the Supreme Court’s directive in

Walters that such an analysis must be applied where there

ee

is a gross disparity as is present here. Further, the tests

applied by the Illinois Supreme Court in Olympia Fields

and Warren Petroleum are substantially the same analysis

the Supreme Court of the United States applied in Walters.

In none of the three cases did the taxpayer prove a

gross disparity in the tax. However, the Supreme Court

of the United States has decided a case with a gross tax

disparity where it specifically adopted a substance over

form test for Equal Protection in an Illinois revenue dis-

pute, Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Carr, 272 U.S.

494, 509, 71 L. Ed. 372 (1926):

‘““*, . when the question is whether a tax imposed

by a state deprives a party of rights secured by the

Federal Constitution, the decision is not dependent

upon the form in which the taxing scheme is cast, nor

upon the characterization of that scheme as adopted

by the state court. We must regard the substance

rather than the form, and the controlling test is to

be found in the operation and effect of the law as

applied and enforced by the state.’ ”

In that case the Supreme Court declared unconstitu-

tional an Illinois tax when foreign insurance companies

were being charged an occupation tax based on 100% of

net receipts, but domestic insurance companies were classi-

fied separately and only taxed on a basis of 30% of net

receipts. The Court was not concerned with the form of

the two classifications but looked directly to the substance

of what was being taxed and determined that Equal Pro-

tection would not allow such tax discrimination between

the two classes which were substantially similar. Jd. at

516.

Here, the Circuit Court declared the tax disparity of

26 times to be unconstitutional under both the Walters

test and the Hanover holding because the subject land

and the comparable land were so similar. That judgment

=

should have been affirmed by the Appellate Court and

should be reinstated by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court should grant certiorari and reverse

the Appellate Court on the constitutional issue to serve

notice on Illinois that it is not exempt from the mandate

of the Constitution or the directives of the Supreme Court

on the issues of Equal Protection and taxation. The Illi-

nois assessment officials from the local assessor to the

Department of Revenue have each demonstrated an atti-

tude that the best way to handle a constitutional objec-

tion by a taxpayer is to simply ignore the objection, to

refuse to address it at a hearing, and to decline to directly

rule on its merits. A constitutional system will not toler-

ate such arrogance in the use of their power by those

public officials charged with upholding the Constitution.

These officials are not immune from constitutional account-

ability. Their collective activities pose a dangerous cor-

ruption of the power to tax by the State of Illinois. They

- have refused to recognize the Constitution in determin-

ing the instant tax.

A tax at a level 26 times that charged for nearly iden-

tical property in the district is so excessive and oppressive

as to deny Equal Protection, all as prohibited by the Four-

teenth Amendment to the Constitution. =

==

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner prays that this Court grant the Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari and, upon review, reverse the

decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois and reinstate

the judgment of the Circuit Court for the taxpayer on

the constitutional issue.

Respectfully submitted,

Sanpra S. KErRIckK *

WituiamM M. Franz

FRANZ & KERRICK

453 Coventry Green

Crystal Lake, Illinois 60014

(815) 459-8100

Counsel for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

—ia—

(Filed December 31, 1986)

Nos. 2-85-509, 2-85-542 consolidated

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

DuPAGE BANK & TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee

of Trusts No. 2602 and 2439,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VS.

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY COUNTY

BOARD OF REVIEW; THE COUNTY OF McHENRY, ILLI-

NOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the TOWN OF AL-

GONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County.

No. 84 MR 0056

Hon. Roland A. Herrmann, Judge Presiding.

Presiding Justice NASH delivered the opinion of the

court:

Defendant, the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) ap-

peals from a judgment of the circuit court which, on ad-

ministrative review, reversed a decision of the PTAB up-

holding the 1981 assessment of property held by the plain-

tiff, the DuPage Bank & Trust Company, as trustee. The

PTAB contends the trial court erred in finding: (1) the

assessment violated the constitutional requirement of uni-

formity of taxation; and (2) that the subject property was

entitled to a farmland classification.

—2a—

The subject property is a 107-acre parcel consisting of

two tracts, 36.75 acres and 71 acres, located in a com-

mercial/industrial area in the city of Crystal Lake. The

south one-quarter of the property is improved with build-

ings once used by the Illinois Institute of Technology and

McHenry County College, but abandoned since 1973. From

July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1982, the 36.75 acre tract was zoned

PUD Commercial and the 71 acre tract PUD for other

uses.

The property was assessed at $540,520 for 1981, and

plaintiff appealed to the McHenry County Board of Re-

view for a reduction of the assessment and for a farmland

classification as provided in section 20e of the Revenue

Act of 1939 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 120, par. 501le). The

board of review denied the requested relief, but adjusted

the assessment to $476,060 to correct an error in the

amount of acreage.

Plaintiff appealed the land assessment ($456,060 attrib-

utable to land and $20,000 attributable to improvements)

to the PTAB and a hearing de novo was held on Decem-

ber 3, 1982. Plaintiff argued that the assessed valuation

of the subject property was 26.5 times that of similar

properties and offered three parcels as comparables: a

70.44 acre farm assessed at $21,400 as farmland; a 134

acre golf course assessed at $52,280 as open space; and

a 66.28 acre farm assessed at $19,890 as farmland. Plain-

tiff also submitted a photograph of the subject property

taken in November 1982, showing a corn crop on it.

The Algonquin Township Assessor testified that the fair

market value of the subject property on January 1, 1981

was $2.7 million. The assessor based his valuation upon

sales of comparably zoned property with road frontage

and upon his estimation that it would take approximate-

ly 10 years to improve the property to its optimum mar-

ket value. The assessor also testified that he was familiar

with the subject property and had not observed any farm-

ing of it for 10 years prior to 1982, at which time the

property had been planted with corn.

—3a—

The PTAB found that the assessment was proper and

plaintiff sought administrative review of that decision in

the circuit court of McHenry County. The trial court found

that the U.S. Constitution requires uniformity of taxation

irrespective of the classification of property and that the

property had not been uniformly assessed as compared

with the other properties submitted. The circuit court also

determined that the PTAB’s finding that no farming had

taken place on the property until 1982 was contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence and that it was en-

titled to a farmland classification. The court reversed the

decision of the PTAB and reduced the assessment of plain-

tiff's property from $4,262 to $304 per acre. The PTAB

appeals.

We consider first the PTAB’s contention that the cir-

cuit court erred in reversing the PTAB’s finding that the

property was not entitled to a farmland assessment.

A determination by an administrative agency will not

be disturbed upon review unless contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence. (Citizens Utilities Co. v. Depart-

ment of Revenue (1986), 111 Ill.2d 32, 47, 94 Ill.Dec. 737,

488 N.E.2d 984; Cherry Bowl, Inc. v. Property Tax Ap-

peal Board (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 326, 328, 55 Ill.Dec. 472,

426 N.E.2d 618; Robinson v. Property Tax Appeal Board

(1979), 72 Ill.App.3d 155, 156, 28 Ill.Dec. 583, 390 N.E.2d

942.) In order to qualify for assessment as farmland, real

property must have been used as a farm for the two years

preceding the tax year in question. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch.

120, par. 501e.) Section 1(25) of the Revenue Act of 1939

defines “farm” with reference to certain enumerated farm-

ing activities, such as the growning of crops and the rais-

ing of livestock. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 120, par. 482(25).)

In determining whether property is entitled to a farmland

classification for assessment purposes, the focus is on the

present use of the property. Santa Fe Land Improvement

Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (1983), 113 Il.

App.3d 872, 875, 69 Ill.Dec. 708, 448 N.E.2d 3, appeal

denied.

tien

—

At the hearing before the PTAB, the township assessor

testified that he was familiar with the subject property

and had not observed any farming activity on it for the

ten years prior to 1982. The only evidence of farming sub-

mitted by the plaintiff was a photograph taken in 1982

showing a corn crop on the property. No evidence was

presented to establish that the property had been farmed

in 1981, the tax year in question. Counsel for the plain-

tiff stated to the PTAB that farming had been “‘intermit-

tent” and that for some years, including 1981, the prop-

erty had been allowed to lie fallow. We conclude the trial

court erred in finding that the PTAB’s denial of a farm-

land classification was contrary to the manifest weight of

the evidence.

Plaintiff also argues that fallow lands should be classified

at farmland, and represents that it is a practice in Mc-

Henry County to assess fallow lands as farmland. How-

ever, the Revenue Act does not contain an exception for

fallow lands and, in any event, no evidence was offered.

to support the conclusion that the subject property was

farmed prior to 1981 and then allowed to lie fallow as a

farming practice. Moreover, plaintiff's representations as

to local assessment practices are dehors the record, and

thus do not constitute support for his argument. We con-

clude that the circuit court erred in applying a farmland

classification to the property and in reducing the assessed

valuation on that basis.

The PTAB next contends that the trial court erred in

finding that the subject property was not assessed in ac-

cordance with the constitutional principle of uniformity of

taxation, which requires that like property be equally

taxed in proportion to value. (Apex Motor Fuel Co. v.

Barrett (1960), 20 Ill.2d 395, 401, 169 N.E.2d 769; People

ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1934), 357 Ill. 173,

180, 191 N.E. 296.) Plaintiff argues that classification is

irrelevant to the achievement of uniformity of taxation,

and states that the assessed valuation of the subject prop-

erty is 26.5 times that of similar parcels which are classi-

fied as farmland or open space.

—5a—

The 1970 Illinois Constitution contains a uniformity

clause which provides:

“Except as otherwise provided in this Section,

taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly

by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly

shall provide by law.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §4(a)).

The 1870 Illinois Constitution contained a similar provi-

sion (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IX, § 1). Our supreme court

has determined that the clause requires only that taxa-

tion be uniform as to the class upon which it operates.

(People ex rel. Bosworth v. Lowen (1984), 102 Ill.2d 242,

248, 80 Ill.Dec. 70, 464 N.E.2d 1053; Hoffmann v. Clark

(1977), 69 Ill.2d 402, 423, 14 Ill.Dec. 269, 372 N.E.2d 74.)

Since the subject property bore a different tax classifica-

tion than the parcels which plaintiff offered as comparable,

it has not been shown that the assessment offended the

Illinois constitution.

Plaintiff also contends that the disparity between the

assessed valuation of the subject property and the other

“comparables” offends the Equal Protection Clause of the

United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., amend. XIV,

§ 1.) The threshold inquiry in equal protection analysis

is whether similarly situated persons are treated dissimi-

larly. (Hisenstadt v. Baird (1972), 405 U.S. 438, 446-47,

92 S.Ct. 1029, 1034-35, 31 L.Ed.2d 349; Jenkins v. Wu

(1984), 102 Ill.2d 468, 477, 82 Ill.Dec. 382, 468 N.E.2d 1162;

People v. Sampson (1985), 130 Ill.App.3d 438, 445, 86 IIl.

Dec. 403, 473 N.E.2d 1002.) The United States Supreme

Court has held that the States may classify property for

taxation purposes, provided equality is accorded to all

members of the same class. (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore

Auto Parts Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 359, 93 S.Ct. 1001,

1008, 35 L.Ed.2d 351; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis

Ry. v. Browning (1940), 310 U.S. 362, 368, 60 S.Ct. 968,

971, 84 L.Ed. 1254.) The Illinois Supreme Court has also

noted that, “It has long been settled that the power of

the legislature to make classifications, particularly in the

field of taxation, is very broad, and that the fourteenth

—fa—

amendment imposes no ‘iron rule’ of equal taxation.” De-

partment of Revenue v. Warren Petroleum Corp. (1954),

2 Ill.2d 483, 489-90, 119 N.E.2d 215.

Plaintiff does not contest the constitutionality of the

statutes establishing farmland and open space classifica-

tions and, as we have determined, the subject property

was not entitled to a farmland classification. Since plain-

tiff's property and the parcels offered as comparables bore

different tax classifications, they may properly be assessed

and taxed differently without offending the equal protec-

tion clause.

In support of his argument that equal protection re-

quires uniformity of taxation irrespective of classification,

plaintiff relies on the United States Supreme Court deci-

sions in Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois (1934),

292 U.S. 535, 54 S.Ct. 830, 78 L.Ed. 1411, and Hanover

Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr (1926), 272 U.S. 494, 47 S.Ct.

179, 71 L.Ed. 372. Plaintiff argues that these decisions

mandate uniformity of taxation for all kinds of property,

however classified. We do not agree.

In the Concordia case, the net receipts of foreign in-

surance companies were assessed at a different rate than

other personal property. The Supreme Court held that

this practice violated the equat-protection clause because

there was no reasonable basis to discriminate against this

species of personal property. (292 U.S. 535, 54 S.Ct. 830;

see National-Ben Franklin Fire Insurance Co. of Pitts-

burgh v. Brenza (1952), 411 Ill. 337, 342-43, 104 N.E.2d

218.) In the Hanover case, the Court also found that

dissimilar tax treatment of property of the same class of-

fended the equal protection clause. (272 U.S. 494, 516, 47

S.Ct. 179, 185.) Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, in neither

case did the United States Supreme Court state that the

equal protection clause mandates uniformity of taxation

irrespective of classification. The Illinois Supreme Court

has said that the fourteenth amendment requires no more

than uniformity among members of the same class (Peo-

ple ex rel. Miller v. Doe (1961), 22 Ill.2d 211, 219, 174

any [ae

N.E.2d 830), and that rule will be applied here. We con-

clude that the assessment of the subject property did not

offend the equal protection clause.

Plaintiff next contends that the assessment was im-

proper under the doctrine of constructive fraud. Fraud

must be established by clear and convincing evidence. (Jn

re Application of Rosewell (1985), 106 Ill.2d 311, 318, 88

Ill.Dec. 28, 478 N.E.2d 343; Clarendon Associates v. Kor-

zen (1973), 56 Ill.2d 101, 104, 306 N.E.2d 299; People ex

rel. Rosewell v. Dee El Garage, Inc. (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d

382, 385, 9 Ill.Dec. 328, 366 N.E.2d 585.) Deliberate mis-

conduct by the assessor need not be shown. (People ex

rel. Skidmore v Anderson (1974), 56 IIl.2d 334, 339, 307

N.E.2d 391.) In People v. International Business Ma-

chines Corp. (1982), 89 Ill.2d 287, 293, 59 I[ll.Dec. 923,

926-27, 432 N.E.2d 867, 870-71, constructive fraud in as-

sessments was described as follows:

“Some guidelines have been established for the proof

necessary to establish constructive fraud. Assess-

ments that are disproportionately higher than those

for similar property or assessments that are based

on the assessor’s own private opinion showing a lack

of knowledge or a lack of honest judgment are indica-

tive of constructive fraud. (Clarendon Associates v.

Korzen (1973), 56 Ill.2d 101, 104-05 [806 N.E.2d 299];

People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans (1934), 31 Ill.2d 477,

479 [202 N.E.2d 543); Aldrich v. Harding (1930), 340

Ill. 354, 358 [172 N.E. 772]; People ex rel. Carr v.

Stewart (1924), 316 Ill. 35, 30 [145 N.E. 6000].) Simi-

larly, overvaluation may be so excessive, under some

circumstances, as to justify the conclusion that it was

not honestly made and, therefore, is constructively

fraudulent. (Clarendon Associates v. Korzen (1973),

56 Ill.2d 101, 104-05 [806 N.E.2d 299]; People ex rel.

Paschen v. Hendrickson Pontiac, Inc. (1957), 12 Ill.2d

477, 480 [147 N.E.2d 29]; People ex rel. Callahan v.

Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. (1956), 8 Ill.2d 66, 69-70

[182 N.E.2d 544].)”

a:

Plaintiff states that there here exists a 2650% disparity

between the assessment levels of the subject property and

similar property and, in support of his argument, has com-

pared the 1981 assessed valuations and 1981 taxes for the

respective parcels to find the disparity.

In analyzing such a case, our courts have first required

that the property selected for comparison purposes be

similar in kind and character and be similarly situated.

(People ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson (1950), 406 Ill. 280,

285, 94 N.E.2d 151; People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia

Fields Country Club (1940), 374 Ill. 101, 108, 28 N.E.2d

109; People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1934),

357 Ill. 173, 181, 191 N.E. 296.) The “‘comparables”’ relied

upon by plaintiff did not meet this test because they bore

different tax classifications than the subject property. Two

of the parcels were assessed as farmland and one as open

space, in accordance with sections 20e and 20g-1 of the

Revenue Act of 1939, respectively, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch.

120, pars. 50le, 501g-1). These sections of the statute

designate that such lands may be valued on the basis of

their use as farmland and open space rather than by fair

cash value, which is the basis upon which real property

is normally assessed under section 20 (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981,

ch. 120, par. 501), and was the basis upon which the sub-

ject property was assessed. Also, farmland is assessed in

part on the basis of its productivity. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981,

ch. 120, par. 501e.) The fact that farmland and open space

are assessed on a different basis than other real prop-

erty reflects a recognition by the General Assembly that _

such property is distinct from other real property and is

entitled to special treatment. (See Hoffmann v. Clark

(1977), 69 Ill.2d 402, 425-27, 14 Ill.Dec. 269, 372 N.E.2d

74.) It follows that specially classified property is not

“comparable” with other real property because the manner

in which its value is determined for tax purposes is dif-

ferent. The respective assessment levels, which are pro-

portionate to fair market value, cannot be compared. We

conclude plaintiff has not established fraud by comparing

the assessed valuation of its property with that of prop-

erty classified as farmland or open space.

vocal ll

a,

Plaintiff also argues that the valuation of his property

was so excessive that fraud must be inferred. Our supreme

court has stated that the taxpayer alleging excessive valu-

ation must show that the property has been assessed at

a valuation grossly in excess of its market value. (People

v. Wilson (1937), 367 Ill. 494, 498, 12 N.E.2d 5; People

ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1934), 357 Ill. 178,

179, 191 N.E. 296.) The only evidence offered in the pres-

ent case is that the fair market value of the subject prop-

erty on January 1, 1981 was $2.7 million dollars and its

assessed valuation was $476,060. Thus, the subject prop-

erty was assessed at approximately 17%, which the record

shows was the county wide assessment median. The record

fails to support plaintiff's assertion that the valuation of

its property was fraudulently excessive.

Last, plaintiff contends that the assessment of its prop-

erty was improper because the township assessor specu-

lated as to its value if it were improved in accordance

with its PUD designation. A valuation is speculative and

arbitrary if based upon the happening if an uncertain

event rather than upon what the property would fairly

and reasonably bring at a present fair sale. (People ex

rel. Rhodes v. Turk (1945), 391 Ill. 424, 428, 63 N.E.2d

513; People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferr,; Co. (1934),

357 Ill. 178, 181, 191 N.E. 296.) In Wiggins, waterfront

property was improperly valued as a possible industrial

site even though there had been no such development in

the area and no offers to buy the property.

In the present case, the record shows that when the

subject property was assessed as of January 1, 1981, it

bore a PUD designation, in part PUD Commercial. The

township assessor testified that he based his valuation on

sales of comparably zoned property also having road front-

age. Plaintiff did not offer any contrary eviderce of fair

market value. We conclude the assessor’s valuation was

not speculative, as it was based upon valid factors exist-

ing at the time of the assessment.

—10a—

Accordingly, as the decision of the PTAB was not against

the manifest weight of the evidence, the judgment of the

circuit court will be reversed.

REVERSED.

REINHARD and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.

—lla—

(Dated June 6, 1985)

State of Illinois

County of McHenry—ss

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE 19TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

McHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS

No. 84 MR 0056

DuPAGE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee of

Trusts No. 2602 and 2439,

Plaintiff,

Vv

D

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS DE-

PARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY COUNTY

BOARD OF REVIEW; THE COUNTY OF McHENRY, ILLI-

NOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the TOWN OF

ALGONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT ORDER

This cause came on to be heard pursuant to the Admin-

istrative Review Act (Jll. Rev. Stat., Chpt. 110, § 3-101

et seq.) for a judicial review of the 1981 assessments on

a 107 acre parcel of land in the City of Crystal Lake, Ili-

nois. The assessments are appealed by the taxpayer from

the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) which con-

ducted a hearing de novo on December 3, 1982, and ren-

dered its decision on May 17, 1984, under Consolidated

Dockets 81-3200-F-2 and 81-3201-F-2. The County’s tax

—12a—

index numbers for the parcels are 19-05-426-003-0030 and

19-05-476-008-0060.

This is an appeal of the “land’”’ assessments. There is

no appeal and no contest as to the “improvements’”’ assess-

ments.

The facts in this case are largely uncontested. The issues

involve questions of law and whether the PTAB correct-

ly applied the law to the facts of the case. In Adminis-

trative Review upon questions of law, the Court may

review the legal effect of those facts. For this reason, a

summary of the propositions of law and facts in the record

is necessary (as allowed by Jl. Rev. Stat., Chpt. 110,

§ 3-111{c)).

The taxpayer contended that as a matter of law the U.S.

Constitution requires uniformity of assessments and a

ratable tax burden for all properties in the district that

are comparable by the standard criteria used to appraise

real estate—such as zoning, location, topography, soils,

drainage, etc.

The taxpayer and the County suggested certain parcels

that were comparabie to the subject, one being directly

across the street from the subject. The taxpayer then sub-

mitted the assessments on those comparable properties.

The disparity in the tax burden is approximately 2609%.

It is uncontested that the PTAB assessed the subject

based solely on the township assessor’s estimate of the

subject’s projected sale price, yielding an overall assess-

ment of $4,262 per acre. The admitted comparable prop-

erties were assessed at a flat rate of approximately $300

per acre. The justification given by the State for this dis-

crepancy was that the subject was technically in a differ-

ent “class’’ from the comparables. The County did not

submit for the record a single assessment of any other

property for comparison.

The taxpayer contended that this method of assessment

constitutes an error of law in that the gross disparity in

the tax burden on admittedly comparable (but different-

—13a—

ly classified) properties denies the instant taxpayer of

Equal Protection as well as various other constitutional

guarantees. The PTAB rejected those legal objections.

This Court finds that those objections should have been

sustained as a matter of law. The U.S. Supreme Court

has addressed classification vis-a-vis taxation and ruled

that Equal Protection requires that “different treatments

be not so disparate, relative to the difference in classifica-

tion, as to be wholly arbitrary”. Walters v. City of St.

Louis, (1954), 74 S.Ct. 505, 347 U.S. 231, 237, 98 L.Ed.

660, 665. Further, Equal Protection requires that “Tax-

ing by a uniform rule requires uniformity not only in the

rate of taxation, but also uniformity in the mode of the

assessment on the taxable value”. Concordia Fire Insur-

ance v. Illinois, (1933) 292 U.S. 535, 54 S.Ct. 830, 78 L.Ed.

1411. Illinois revenue collections are also subject to provid-

ing the same reductions and debasements of assessment

levels so as to provide substantial equality in the tax

burden. Hanover Fire Insurance v. Carr (1926) 272 U.S.

494, 47 S.Ct. 179, 71 L.Ed. 372. For these reasons, this

Court finds that because the subject was essentially com-

parable to the other properties submitted, that the U.S.

Constitution requires that the subject bear a ratable tax

burden regardless of what technical classification it may

bear.

The taxpayer also argued in the alternative that it was

entitled, as a matter of law, to be classified as a “farm”

under Jil. Rev. Stat., Chpt. 120, § 482 (25).

At various places in the taxpayer’s Complaint and brief

to the PTAB and in the transcript of the hearing before

PTAB, the taxpayer demonstrated a history of farming.

The finding of fact by the PTAB that “no farming activ-

ity of any kind had taken place on the subject until 1982”,

is not supported by the record and is contrary to the mani-

fest weight of the evidence.

This Court finds that the subject should have been classi-

fied as a “farm” and assessed accordingly.

—l4a—

The Court further finds that under both of the~tax-

payer’s theories, as a matter of law, it is entitled to an

assessment in the range of $300 per acre.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED

that the decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal

Board of May 17, 1984, is reversed and vacated, and that

the taxpayer, DuPage Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee

of Trust No. 2602 and 2439, has judgment herein.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the 1981 land assessment for the

subject be entered on the agriculture assessment rolls as

follows:

Parcel 19-05-426-003-0030 at $304 per acre

Parcel 19-05-476-008-0060 at $304 per acre. ~

DaTED: June 6, 1985

ENTER: /s/ ROLAND A. HERRMANN

Judge

—l5a—

(Dated May 17, 1984)

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD’S DECISION

APPELLANT DuPage Bank & Trust, et al

DOCKET NO. 81-3200-F-2 and 81-3201-F-2

PARCEL NO. See reverse side

The subject property consists of a 107 acre tract of land

located in Crystal Lake, McHenry County, Illinois. The

subject is improved with five buildings containing some

95,000 square feet. The appellant contends that the sub-

ject property, which is comprised of two parcels, should

be granted a farm assessment.

Appearing on behalf of the appellant were Mr. Wiiliam

Franz and Ms. Sandra Kerrick, attorneys at law. Mr. Franz

presented a memorandum of law in support of his con-

tention. He argued that the present assessments on the

subject property violates the constitutional requirement

of uniformity of taxation. He contended that a tax burden

on the subject at a level 26 times that of a comparable

property is unconstitutional. Mr. Franz next argued that

the subject parcel has been unreasonably and illegally

classified for assessment purposes. Thirdly, the appellant

maintained that the assessments on the subject property

are violative of the constitutional requirement that the

level of assessment rate cannot be more disparate than

2% times. Fourthly, Mr. Franz argued that the present

classification of the subject parcel was based on specula-

tion. He contended that the board of review assumes that

the subject will one day be used as an income producing

property. The appellant also argued that the assessments

violate due process and equal protection as guaranteed

under the United States Constitution. Finally, the tax-

payer maintained that the assessments are so disparate

as to constitute constructive fraud.

—1l6a—

The board of review was represented by its three members,

Mr. Robert Eickstadt, Mrs. Bernadine Darling, and Ms.

lola Desmond, Mr. Randall Woloski, Supervisor of Assess-

ments, Mr. David Stone, Assistant State’s Attorney and

Mr. Robert Kunz, Algonquin Township Assessor. Mr. Kunz

testified that in his opinion the subject parcels had a fair

market value of $2,700,000 on January 1, 1981. He also

stated that he has frequently observed the subject prop-

erty. He testified that the subject is located on a route

he often takes. With regard to both parcels, the witness

stated that he had never observed any farming activity

until 1982, at which time the subject was tilled and planted

with corn. On cross-examination of Mr. Kunz, the appellant

made a motion to strike all of the testimony with regard

to the valuation of the subject property.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the

Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction

over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

The Board further finds that the subject property’s pres-

ent assessments, as set forth in the appellee’s evidence,

are proper. The Board notes that land is accorded prefer-

ential treatment only if the definition of ‘“farm’”’ is met.

(Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, 482 (25)). Furthermore, under 501(e),

a tract of property must have been used as a farm for

the two preceding years. The assessor’s testimony clear-

ly revealed that no farming activity of any kind had taken

place on the subject parcel until 1982. It should be noted

that no rebuttal testimony was offered on this point.

Therefore, this Board finds that the subject property is

accurately assessed.

DOCKET NO. PIN LAND IMPR. TOTAL

81-3200-F-1 19-05-426-003-0030 $182,320 -0- $182,320

81-3201-F-1 19-05-476-008-0060 $273,740 $20,000 $293,740

The State Tax Appeal Board from the facts and exhibits

presented finds the decision of the McHenry County Board

of Review to be correct and that the correct assessed

valuation of the property is:

—17a—

LAND See reverse side IMPR See reverse side

TOTAL See reverse side

Subject only to the State Multiplier as applicable.

/s/ BENNETT BRADLEY

Chairman

/s/ W. J. INGELMAN

Member

DISSENTING /si JAKE J. RINGGER

Member

DATE 5-17-84 /s/ JOAN BUCK

Clerk

Final administrative decisions of the Property Tax Ap-

peal Board are subject to review in the Circuit Court

under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act.

A complaint for such review must be filed within 35 days

of the date of this decision.

—18a—

(Letterhead of)

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

SPRINGFIELD, ILL. 62706

(217) 782-2035

June 4, 1987

Ms. Sandra Kerrick

Franz, Naughton & Leahy

453 Coventry Green

Crystal Lake, IL 60014

No. 64951—DuPage Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee,

etc., petitioner, v. Property Tax Appeal Board

of the Illinois Department of Revenue, et al.,

etc., respondents. Leave to appeal, Appellate

Court, Second District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition for

leave to appeal in the above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate

Court on June 26, 1987.

~ 2 i ree bee le

Piast Tee ak A