Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Yeiter v. Bowen

~ amit -

, » q 8 , Sitecese Qourr, US,

s [ FERED

\

MUG 4 «987

4

— HOL, IR.

CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1986

No.

IDA YEITER, a legally incapacitated person, by and

through her guardian, GERALD S. YEITER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vs.

OTIS R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health & Human Services,

Defendant-A ppellee.

4

Vv

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

ty

Vv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

—.,"*

—

Jerrrey H, Beusse (P-29869)

Bucuanan & Bos

Sixth Floor Frey Building

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

(616) 458-1224

Attorneys for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

or call collect (402) 342-2831

IT.

ITI.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

DID CONGRESS INTEND THE APPLICATION

PROCESS FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS TO RE-

SULT IN DENIAL OF SUCH BENEFITS

TO THOSE WHOSE DISABILITY PREVENTED

THEM FROM FILING A TIMELY APPLICA-

TION?

DID CONGRESS INTEND THE APPLICA-

TION PROCESS FOR DISABILITY BENE-

FITS TO RESULT IN DENIAL OF SUCH

BENEFITS TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED

DUE TO THEIR GUARDIAN’S FAILURE TO

FILE A TIMELY APPLICATION?

MAY CONGRESS, CONSISTENT WITH CONSTI-

TUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS

AND EQUAL PROTECTION, CONDITION RE-

CEIPT OF DISABILITY BENEFITS UPON

WRITTEN APPLICATION, WHERE SUCH CON-

DITION EFFECTIVELY OPERATES TO BX-

CLUDE THE MENTALLY DISABLED?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Prememtedl ccaccanecicecscnseeninctenianenn i

Index of Authorities 000... snide ee AS ica ill

CORI TOO C aaneecesecnininssninstncnienntiema a 1

Jurisdiction .......... nsssnusinnnsstenisesctebcanesieidiaiaingiaiad nn 1

Statutes Tmvolve dd nccccccccccsesssssescee ncinifaispiaiediiiaddemdiaiea aaa 1

Btntoment Of Cee acccminsenncencsmctssneennne ee

Reasons for Granting the Writ —____...- 4

I. There is a Special and Important Reason for This

Honorable Court To Grant Writ of Certiorari ..... +

II. The Court of Appeals Erred In Its Ruling ......W..... 6

Conmelusion 0... eee . 16

ill

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Brooks v. Southern Pacific Company, 105 Ariz. 442,

hd ladle catcseeacass- |e

Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S.

424, 85 S. Ct. 1050, 138 L. Ed. 2d 941 (1965) ............ 3,3

Case v. Califano, 441 F. Supp. 304 (D. South Carolina

I ieteriteciedosemcascnwcon Sa Py eee a Ne Gr ee cole esctiies 10, 13

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. —,

105 S. Ct. —, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) oo. 14

Dundon v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 469 (E.D.

se ctsscahamlancibcocaeemecee

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S. Ct. 1367,

ee ee OD

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25

Ll. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) .................... AP REE , 8

Green v. Weinberger, 500 F.2d 203 (Fifth Cir.

Neen na sacniaieamscshceiinianhanitne . 8

Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D.

ES . 1

Johnson v. United States, 87 F.2d 940 (Eighth

RI ee PSR TON OTF SOE 12

Keeting v. Michigan Central Railroad Co., 94 Mich.

GED eat ks ee .-

Kohrs v. Fleming, 272 F.2d 731 (Eighth Cir. 1959) ........ 5)

Leviner v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 1338 (Fourth Cir.

SE ETE TERE a a

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893,

47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) . Atal ede a 13

—— ola v. St. Joseph Hospital, 119 Mich. App. 10,

25 N.W.2d 609 (1982) ; lv. to appeal denied, 417

i. 944, — N.W.2d ot | ae 11

Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199 (Sixth Cir. 1980) ..... 8

lv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Reliance Insurance Co. v. Haney, 54 Mich. App. 237,

I Te ee, Oe ED dine eccrine eseeenceocin 11

Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297 (Fourth Cir. 1980) .....7, 13

Tuer v. Niedoliwka, 92 Mich. App. 694, 285 N.W.2d

Ek ee Fel AE MERE ee SAR oe | RON 11

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 8. Ct. 2040,

es ee eT inceictetieetetcetrcetetcneresaionen 14

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S. Ct. 2457,

45 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1975) —_ —___ ae 9, 12, 13

Williams v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1332 (Fifth Cir. 1979)... 5

SraTuTES AND REGULATIONS

Ie I FO i etic ah enenciaeealmesinananenens ae

Be ND Sicaccrcenecninnesinankncciinicnniiecerrantntboniaunmalananin 1, 3,4

TREATISES

Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 58.04 (Fourth

INE ciessiceschehcn lnm acacaonsieth heaps tenia peirapachliniatannlconlaii 7

OrHER Laws

Michigan Compiled Law § TOO455 (1). neceeeeeeeeeeneene 11

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate Jus-

tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Ida B. Yeiter, a legally incapacitated person, by and

through her guardian, Gerald S. Yeiter, respectfully re-

- quests this Court to grant the Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari, seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ Opinion.

o

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS DELIVERED BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit is unreported and is printed in Appendix

A hereto, infra, pages 1-6. The judgment of the Unit-

ed States District Court for the Western District of Mich-

igan, Southern Division, is printed in Appendix A hereto,

infra, pages 6-12.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Cireuit (Appendix A, infra, pages 1-6),

was entered on May 6, 1987. The jurisdiction of the Su-

preme Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the Social

Security Disability Act; i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 423(b). Specific-

1

ally, petitioner argues that her rights to due process and

equal protection as protected by the Fifth Amendment of

the Constitution of the United States have been violated.

©

STATEMENT OF CASE

This appeal by Petitioner Ida Yeiter concerns a men-

tally disabled wage earner and her right to Social Security

Disability Benefits. Disabled continuously since 1972, Re-

spondent Secretary of Health and Human Services has

limited benefits to the period from August 1982 to the

present. (Appendix 16-18) The Secretary’s basis for denial

of benefits retroactive to the date of Ida Yeiter’s injury

is simply that she failed to apply for benefits in 1972.

(Appendix 26, {8 & 32,1) Her failure to apply, however,

arose from the nature of her disability; i.e., complete men-

tal incompetency. Nonetheless, the Secretary main-

tains that denial of benefits to those who cannot apply or

complete written applications was both intended by Con-

gress and constitutionally permissible. This appeal chal-

lenges that position.

A tragie automobile accident occurred on November

14, 1972. Petitioner Ida Yeiter, then age 53, was its vic-

tim. (Appendix 26, {9 & 32, {1) Ida suffered such severe

injuries, including frontal lobe damage to her brain, that

she was rendered comatose for a period of over one year,

and thereafter remained for several years under the im-

mediate care of 24-hour-round-the-clock nursing. (Appen-

dix 26, {9 & 32, 1) She never recovered her former good

health and intellect. She remains, to this day, a legally in-

2

eapacitated person, in a stroke-like condition, her intellect

severely limited, her personality grossly neurotic, and with-

out full control of her motor skills, such as speech and walk.

From the date of her accident to the present, Ida Yeiter has

been and remains a legally incapacitated person, incapable

of acting in her behalf, and ineapable of directing others to

act in her place. The government, in answer to Petition-

er’s complaint before the United States District Court,

admitted the truth of this crucial fact. (Appendix 26, 99

& 32, 1)

Small wonder, then, that Ida B. Yeiter neither

applied for Social Security Disability Benefits nor directed

someone else to initiate, on her behalf, the disability appli-

cation process. This inability to apply necessarily arose

from the nature of her disability. It was and remains in-

herently impossible for Ida to comply with the procedural

requirement of a written benefits application.

Not until August 31, 1983, did Ida’s court-appointed

guardian, Gerald S. Yeiter, file the initial application for

Ida’s disability benefits. The guardian’s failure to file

lay in his misunderstanding and ignorance of Ida’s entitle-

ment to Social Security Disability Benefits.

The Secretary admits that Ida was continuously and

uninterruptedly disabled from November 14, 1972 to the

present date, but, pursuant to § 223(b) of the Social Se-

curity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(b), limits her award of Social

Security Disability Benefits to a period retroactive to

August, 1982. (Appendix 26, 7 & 32,{1) This section pro-

vides, in relevant part, that an individual who would have

been entitled to a disability insurance benefit for any month

shall be entitled to such benefit if an application is filed be-

fore the end of the twelfth month immediately preceding

—

4

such month. Essentially it is a one-year limitation on

awarding benefits retroactively. (Appendix 21)

In short, the Secretary admits that Ida is otherwise

entitled to Social Seeurity Disability Benefits dating back

to November 14, 1972 and is being denied retroactive bene-

fits only because of her failure (or that of her Guardian)

to have filed a timely application for such benefits con-

sistent with the provisions set out in § 228(b) of the Act.

(Appendix 26, {9 & 32, 91)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. There Are Special And Important Reasons For This

Honorable Court To Grant Writ of Certiorari

This case warrants review inasmuch as the Appellate

Court’s decision seriously offends the intent of Congress

when enacting the Social Security Disability Act as well as

Fifth Amendment rights of due process and equal protec-

tion afforded the mentally disabled. Viewed narrowly, the

decision under appeal seriously limits a mentally disableds’

access to Social Security Disability benefits.

The Social Security provision in dispute contains no

express language demonstrating that Congress intended to

place a procedural barrier between the mentally disabled

and disability benefits to which they are otherwise entitled.

Indeed, there is no evidence to be found within the legis-

lative history demonstrating that Congress expressly con-

sidered and adopted the position of the Appellate Court

and Respondent Secretary that legally incapacitated, men-

tally disabled persons are nonetheless obligated to partici-

pate in the administrative entitlement procedures in the

same manner and under the same constraints as mentally

abled disability benefit applicants. In short, the Appel-

- om,

late Court’s decision establishes a procedural requirement

which the mentally disabled are inherently incapable of

satisfying.

There is no question but that Congress intended the

Social Security Act to be remedial, humanitarian legisla-

tion whose ultimate objective was to ameliorate the harsh-

ness of a wage earner’s disability. Walliams v. Califano,

090 F.2d 1332, 1334 (Fifth Cir. 1979). Moreover, it is gen-

erally accepted that it was not the intention of Congress

to have the Secretary create inflexible formulae for the de-

termination of disability within the meaning of the Act,

for to be inflexible would bring about harsh and inequitable

results. Kohrs v. Fleming, 272 F.2d 731 (Eighth Cir.

1959).

Thus, allowed to stand, the Appellate Court’s decision

and Secretary’s position threatens to turn upside down,

in Lewis Carroll fashion, the congressional objective of

enacting humanitarian and remedial social welfare legisla-

tion. Those most in need are least protected.

Ida’s appeal must be seen in its full context. It repre-

sents more than Ida’s interests in her disability benefits

retroactive to 1972. Instead, Ida’s appeal presents this

Court with the opportunity to fashion judicial relief appro-

priate to a class of persons rarely able to impact on the

legislative process. Put differently, the class to which Ida

Yeiter belongs, the mentally and legally disabled, is a po-

litically disenfranchised group historically required to seek

solace and relief within the halls of this and other courts

throughout our nation. So abused are those so silent.

The relative importance of this case is also underscored

in that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Cireuit recommended its decision for full text publication.

6

(Appendix 1) Thus, its holding will be established not only

with respect to courts within the Sixth Circuit, but will

serve as guidance to federal courts throughout the United

States.

Petitioner prays that this Court will not permit in-

advertent congressional silence to perform serious damage

to the rights of the mentally disabled through the Sec-

retary’s rigid and inflexible interpretation of the law.

Most administrative harm to the mentally disabled

is done in this fashion—not through malice but through

neglect. Accordingly, important questions of federal con-

stitutional and statutory law are presented which have not

been, but should be, resolved by this Court.

II. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Its Ruling

Petitioner argued below that Congress failed to form

an intent as to whether or not the requirement of a written

application as a condition to entitlement to disability bene-

fits applied to the mentally disabled. Given, however, the

clear expression of Congress that the ultimate objective of

the Act was to ameliorate the harshness of a wage earner’s

disability, Petitioner submitted that an implied exception

existed for those, such as Ida Yeiter, who were inherently

incapable of satisfying the procedural requirement.

The Court of Appeals resolved this issue by tautology

in reasoning that because the Act makes no mention of an

exception for the mentally disabled, no exception was in-

tended. Petitioner prays that this Court will recognize the

historical role of the judiciary in discerning and interpret-

ing the spirit and intent of the legislature when applying

laws to factual circumstances never considered during pas-

sage. Congressional silence ‘‘establishes’’ inattention to

the plight and circumstance of the mentally disabled, and

nothing more.

“I

Historically, courts have given general welfare legis-

lation a liberal construction so as to ensure the accomplish-

ment of its beneficient objections. Sutherland, Statutory

Construction § 58.04 (Fourth Edition). Accordingly, it is

well established that the literal sense of terminology can-

not prevail over the reason and spirit of the expression

as a whole. Further, since the statute is passed as a whole

and not in parts, each part must be construed in connec-

tion with the general purpose of the statute, in this ease,

the remedial purpose of providing a safety net for those

who can no longer work.

Here, it is inconceivable that Congress intended

the procedural niceties of this remedial, humanitarian Act

to be used to deny benefits to those it was enacted to pro-

tect. It is equally inconceivable that Congress intended

such legislation to direct the Department of Health and

Human Services to measure or hold hostage the benefits of

mentally disabled persons due to the acts and omissions of

their court-appointed guardians.

Indeed, the Fourth Cireuit rejected such a similar ar-

gument for literal interpretation in similar circumstances

regarding the statutorily established 60-day time limit for

appealing the Social Security Disability decisions. In

Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297, 301 (Fourth Cir. 1980)

the Court noted:

Although Congress provided that a claimant must

exercise this right [to appeal] in sixty days, it did not

address the predicament of a claimant who was so men-

tally ill that he can not understand the administrative

procedure. Jn the absence of any manifestation of con-

gressional consideration of this problem, we will not at-

tribute to Congress an intent to apply the doctrine of

8

res judicata to deprive such a person of a hearing.

(Emphasis ours. )

This Court, as well as various lower courts, has often

recognized the necessity of tailoring administrative, judi-

cial and legislative procedures to the capacities and cireum-

stances of those who are to be heard so as to afford them

a meaningful opportunity to present their case. Goldberg

v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-269, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1020-1021,

25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 299-300 (1970). In this regard other

courts have noted that mental illness could, in an appro-

priate case, prevent the application of administrative res

judicata. Green v. Weinberger, 500 F.2d 203, 205 (Fifth

Cireuit 1974); Leviner v. Richardson, 443 F.2d 1338, 1341-

43 (Fourth Cireuit 1971); Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d

1199, 1203 (Sixth Cireuit 1980).

Consistent with the spirit of this judicial realism and

concern for the mentally disabled, the Court, in Dundon v.

United States, 559 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. N.Y. 1983), in sub-

stantially similar circumstances to the instant case, fash-

ioned an exception to the periods of limitation for the

comatose and mentally incompetent.

Of great significance, this Court, in Burnett v. New

York Central Railroad Company, 380 U.S. 424, 427, 85 8. Ct.

1050, 1054, 13 L. Ed. 2d 941, 944 (1965), examined the per-

iod of limitation (3 years) within which suits could be

brought asserting rights under the Federal Employers Lia-

bility Act (FELA) and specifically noted that the FELA

limitation period was not totally inflexible despite its literal

implications, and that under appropriate circumstances, it

could be extended beyond three years.

In reviewing these cases, the question may arise as to

whether or not the timely application for disability bene-

9

fits is substantively analogous to a period cf limitations.

In Wetnberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764; 95 S. Ct. 2457,

2466, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522, 538 (1975), this Court intimated

that these ‘‘timeliness requirements’’ are more akin to

periods of limitation than to elements of entitlement. If so,

a tolling provision for the mentally disabled should surely

be recognized. Indeed, there is ample authority, especially

when viewing contemporaneous decisions addressing con-

gressional intent and notions of fundamental fairness, to

support this Court’s finding of an exception to the language

of the Act’s one-year retroactive limitation on benefits.

The Arizona Supreme Court, in Brooks v. Southern

Pacific Company, 105 Ariz. 442, 466 P.2d 736 (1970), found

itself presented with a suit under the Federal Employers

Liability Act (FELA) in which the suit would have been

barred but for tolling by reason of the plaintiff’s mental

incompetency. The Arizona Supreme Court, finding this

Court’s reasoning in Burnett, supra, persuasive, held that

in the interest of justice, the FELA limitation period to be

flexible notwithstanding the absence of express language

containing exceptions. As the Court noted:

The fundamental unfairness of rigidly enforcing

the statute of limitations against mentally incompetent

persons has been recognized by the statutes of the Dis-

trict of Columbia and nearly all the states, including

Arizona. These statutes provide in varying ways for su-

spension of the statute of limitations when the plaintiff

is in ‘‘insane’’, of ‘‘unsound mind’’, mentally incom-

petent or under other definitions of mental disability.

See, Developments in the Law, Statute of Limitations,

Sixty-three Harvard Law Review 1177, 1229 (1950).

We emphasize that we are here deciding the question

of federal law and are not applying the statutes of this

or any other state. However, the extent to which legis-

lative bodies have provided exceptions for mental dis-

abilities is a relevant factor in considering the policies

10

underlying the statute of limitations. 105 Ariz. 444,

445, 446 P.2d at 738-739.

Similarly, and quite instructive to this appeal, the

Court, in Case v. Califano, 441 F. Supp. 304 (D.C. S.C.

1977), refused to affirm the secretary’s denial of benefits

on the basis of a failure to comply with statutorily-estab-

lished timeliness requirement where both the social secur-

ity claimant and her attorney were mentally ill. The Court

looked to analagous authority outside of social security

disability law to examine notions of fundamental fairness,

as embodied in the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment, when determining whether or not to excuse the claim-

ant’s failure to file a timely application of appeal due to

mental illness. The Court observed:

In this context, this Court feels that it is appro-

priate to look to analogous situations involving pris-

oner pro se petitions to determine whether the plaintiff

was unjustifiably prevented from presenting a poten-

tially meritorious claim due to administrative time re-

quirements. It is apparent from the record that the

combination of the mental illness of Mrs. Case and her

attorney resulted in the ‘‘blind leading the blind.’’ For

the secretary to deny benefits to this plaintiff on the

basis of a failure to comply with time requirements

under these facts shocks the conscience of this Court,

and is a clear denial of the basic due process rights to

notice and to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. /d.

at 307.

In both administrative and judicial proceedings

below, the Social Security Administration emphasized that

Ida Yeiter’s guardian could have applied for disability

benefits on the part of his ward but did not. The question,

however, is not whether a guardian ‘‘could have applied”’

for benefits on behalf of his ward, but rather whether or

11

not, as in the case of respondeat superior, the ward will be

held responsible for or affected by the guardian’s failure to

do so. Respondeat superior, as with other species of vicar-

ious liability, has as its premise factual cireumstances not

present in the instant case. Such circumstances fundamen-

tally include an implied rule of control of the master over

the behavior of the servant. Here Ida Yeiter exercised no

selection of or control over her guardian, Gerald Yeiter,

nor could she; her mental disability made such control im-

possible.

In any event, as a matter of law, petitioners’ guardian

could not adversely impact her rights to disability benefits.

The relationship between Ida Yeiter and her court-

appointed guardian was created and defined by the State

of Michigan; therefore, Michigan’s law of guardianship is

controlling with regard to the consequences flowing from

the acts and omissions of Ida Yeiter’s court-appointed

guardian. Neither Michigan statutory law, MCL § 700.455

(1) (Appendix 21), nor common law grants the guardian

the power to waive the rights of his ward. Reliance Insur-

ance Company v. Haney, 54 Mich. App. 237, 220 N.W.2d 728

(1974) (Guardian’s waiver of ward’s uninsured motorist

coverage) ; Tuer v. Niedoliwka, 92 Mich. App. 694, 285 N.W.

2d 424 (1979) (Guardian compromises ward’s claims

against tort-feasor).

Although petitioner has looked for and failed to find

an example of this issue arising in Social Security disabil-

ity litigation, a recent Michigan Court of Appeals decision

held that the appointment of a guardian for a minor ward

does not start the running of a period of limitation against

the minor ward. Paavola v. St. Joseph Hospital, 119 Mich.

|

12

App. 10, 325 N.W.2d 609 (1982); lv. to appeal denied, 417

Mich. 944,—N.W.2d—(1983) ; see also Keeting v. Michigan

Central Railroad Company, 94 Mich 219 (1892). It would

indeed be an ironic twist of social welfare policy if the men-

tally disabled are to be, in essence, penalized for their in-

ability to guide and control the acts and omissions of their

guardians.

Indeed, the Eighth Cireuit, in Johnson v. United

States, 87 F.2d 940 (Highth Cir. 1930) reviewed the rela-

tionship between the appointment of guardians and impact

on the rights of their wards by noting that ‘‘ ... it has been

generally held under such statutes that the insane person

may maintain an action by its guardian at any time during

the continuance of his disability.’’ Jd. at 942. (Kmphasis

ours. )

Here, the Court of Appeals avoided the guardianship

issue by holding that Ida Yeiter possessed no right to

disability benefits until after an application on her behalf

was filed. The Appellate Court’s conclusion is erroneous

on two grounds.

First, the conclusion is clearly contrary to the position

taken by this Court when it intimated that these ‘‘timeli-

ness requirements’’ are more akin to periods of limitations

than to elements of entitlement. Weiberger v. Salfi, 422

U.S. 749, 764, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522, 538

(1975); See page 9, supra. In short, in_ perfunctory

fashion, the Sixth Cireuit Court of Appeals casually

fashioned a bright line between Ida Yeiter and her receipt

of disability benefits insofar as the attachment of consti-

tutional guarantees is concerned. The Court refused to

acknowledge Ida Yeiter’s rights in the entitlement process

itself. No holding of this Court permits such reasoning.

13

Further, this Court has ruled that disability benefits

constitute property interests protected by the due process

clause of the constitution. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.

603, 611, 80 S. Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1435, 1444 (1960) ;

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 901,

47 L, Ed. 2d 18,—(1976). Ida Yeiter possesses a property

interest in her Social Security disability payments. She

was a wage earner fully within the requirements of the

Social Security Act for entitlement to disability benefits.

(Appendix 26, [8 & 32, 1) The only means, therefore,

by which the Secretary can avoid the conclusion that dis-

ability benefits are a ‘‘property right’’ of Ida Yeiter’s

protected by the Fifth Amendment, is to argue that no

property right is created until after the application for

benefits is initiated by the disabled person. As noted

earlier, however, this Court intimated in Weinberger v.

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L. Ed. 2d

522, 538 (1975), that such periods of limitation found

within the Act do not limit the nature of the right itself,

but only established timeliness requirements akin to stat-

utes of limitations. (See pgs. 9 & 12, infra) Ida Yeiter was

surely ‘‘vested’’ with sufficient interest in disability pay-

ments so as to invoke the protections of the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment. Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.

2d 297, 301 (Fourth Circuit 1980) (Noting that the Su-

preme Court has recognized entitlement to Social Security

Disability Benefits as a statutory property interest pro-

tected by the due process clause.) See also, Case v. Calit-

fano, 441 F. Supp. 304, 307 (D.C. 8.C. 1977). Clearly, this

Court, and others, has recognized that one’s interest in

disability payments constitutes a sufficient property inter-

est so as to invoke the protections of the due process clause

ena ee a eRe ee

14

of the Fifth Amendment. Here the date of filing was simply

an administrative means of measuring or calculating Ida

Yeiter’s property interest; i.e., her amount of disability

benefits.

The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that be-

cause the Act is facially neutral, it is not violative of peti-

tioner’s equal protection rights. Petitioner asserts that

to the extent that the one-year retroactively limitation of

the Act excludes the mentally disabled from Social Security

Disability Benefits because of their disability, it is viola-

tive of equal protection.

Petitioner recognizes that the disputed provision of

the Social Security Disability Act considered herein is

facially neutral; however, its application in cases such as

this has a viciously disparate effect on the mentally dis-

abled. Acknowledging Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,

96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976), petitioner real-

izes that this Court will most likely employ a rational

basis test in evaluating the Act. Petitioner prays, however,

that a ‘‘meaningful’’, rather than ‘‘mere’’, rational basis

test will be employed. The former involves an honest in-

quiry into the connection between legislative means and

ends. The latter often makes possible a pernicious form

of legislative and administrative carte blanche.

This Court recently ruled that a rationality test

‘‘with teeth’’ is now favored. Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-

ing Center, 473 U.S. —, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 107 S. Ct. —

(1985). Here, the unquestioned end that the one-year

retroactivity limitations sought to reach was that of pro-

tecting the fiscal integrity of the Social Security system.

The fiseal integrity of the Social Security system, however,

will not be threatened by an exception to the one-year

15

retroactive limitation for the mentally disabled; hence,

application of the limitation to the mentally disabled is not

rationally related to the end of safeguarding the system’s

fiscal integrity. Indeed, the only consequence will be to

end a government windfall now paid for by mentally dis-

abled wage earners.

Handicapped persons, especially the mentally inea-

pacitated, possess most, if not all, of the indicia of sus-

pectness, regarding equal protection claims, enumerated

by this Court. Even if, however, the mentally disabled

fail to rise to the level of a suspect or quasi-suspect class

in this Court’s eyes, they are certainly considered by ordi-

nary Americans as ‘‘a group that ranks amongst [the]

most misfortuned ...’’. Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F.

Supp. 846, 849 (KE. D. Mich. 1972). Similarly, a Texas

federal court, quoting former American Bar Association

President, Chesterfield Smith, observed:

The plight of the mentally disabled is amongst the

saddest and most alarming problems facing our so-

ciety, and too little is done to alleviate the effects of

this problem. ... The mentally disabled have been the

victims of widespread governmental complacency and

outright neglect. This is outrageous. But, worst of

all, most of us have accepted it without protest. Wash-

ington Post, October 15, 1971, Section A, at 1.

This appeal challenges such complacency and neglect.

16

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that a writ of cer-

tiorari issue from this Hororable Court to review the judg-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Cireuit in Ida B. Yeiter, a legally incapacitated person, by

and through her guardian, Gerald S. Yeiter, v. Secretary

of Health and Human Services. In the event that the Peti-

tion is granted, Petitioner prays that the judgment of the

Court below be reversed and that the cause be remanded.

Respectfully submitted,

JEFFREY H. Beusse (P-29869)

Bucuanan & Bos

Sixth Floor Frey Building

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

(616) 458-1224

Attorneys for Petitioner

DATED: August 4, 1987

App. 1

APPENDIX A

OPINIONS BELOW

Recommended for Full Text Publication

See, Sixth Circuit Rule 24

No. 86-1345

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Ipa B. Yerrer, a legally )

incapacitated person, by and )

through her guardian, Gerald S. ) On Appgat from the

Yeiter, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) United States Dis-

) trict Court for the

v. ) Western District of

) Michigan.

Secretary oF Heattu & Human )

SERVICEs, )

Defendant-Appellee. )

Decided and Filed May 6, 1987

Before: KEITH, KENNEDY and RYAN, Circuit

Judges.

KENNEDY, Cireuit Judge. The sole issue in this

appeal is whether plaintiff-appellant Ida B. Yeiter (‘‘plain-

tiff’’) is entitled to disability insurance benefits retro-

active to the onset of her disability or is limited, as pro-

vided in 42 U.S.C. §423(b) and as the District Court

found, to benefits retroactive to one year prior to filing

of her application. We AFFIRM the District Court’s

judgment.

App. 2

Plaintiff is mentally and functionally incapacitated

from injuries sustained in an automobile accident on No-

vember 14, 1972. Her husband, appointed her guardian in

March, 1973, filed an application for disability insurance

benefits on August 31, 1983. Benefits were awarded retro-

active to August, 1982, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423(b),

which provides in pertinent part: ‘‘An individual who

would have been entitled to a disability insurance benefit

for any month had he filed application therefor before the

end of such month shall be entitled to such benefit for such

month if such application is filed before the end of the 12th

month immediately succeeding such month.’’ Plaintiff

filed for reconsideration, arguing that since she was men-

tally incompetent and therefore unable to file for benefits

herself, she should receive benefits from the date of her

disability. The Secretary denied the petition for reconsid-

eration and the District Court upheld the denial.

Plaintiff ma!.es four arguments in support of her claim

for additional retroactive benefits and Amici Curiae. Dis-

abled Peoples’ International, Human Rights Advocates,

and International Disability Law, Ine. (‘‘ Amici’’), make an

additional one. We find none of these arguments per-

suasive.

Plaintiff first argues that Congress did not intend the

one-year limit on retroactive benefits to apply where the

failure to file for benefits arises from the disability itself,

¢.7.. as in mental ineompetency. However the statute does

not permit such a construction. Title 42 U.S.C. § 416

(i)(2)(B) provides that ‘‘{n]o period of disability shall

begin as to any individual unless such individual files an

application for a disability determination with respect to

such period .... 7’ Prior to 1958, there were no retro-

App. 3

active benefits. Wheiu Congress amended the statute to al-

low such benefits, it limited them to twelve months. There

is simply no basis for construing that limitation inappli-

cable to certain disabilities. Congress was aware that per-

sons were losing benefits they otherwise were entitled to

because they did not file timely applications. Nonetheless,

in unambiguous language, it chose to limit retroactivity to

twelve months. Moreover, although plaintiff was under a

disability, her guardian or some other person acting on her

behalf could have filed an application.

Plaintiff’s second argument is that she should not be

bound by her guardian’s waiver of her benefits, since un-

der state law a court-appointed guardian may not waive

a ward’s rights. However, plaintiff is not denied benefits

because of her guardian’s waiver. Rather, she did not be-

come entitled to those benefits because she did not file an

application. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in

Schwetker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 790 (1981) :

Congress expessly provided in the Act that only one

who ‘thas filed application’? for benefits may receive

them, and it delegated to [the Secretary of Health and

Human Services] the task of providing by regulation

the requisite manner of application. A court is no

more authorized to overlook the valid regulation re-

quiring that applications be in writing than it is to

overlook any other valid requirement for the receipt of

benefits.

See also Johnson v. United States, 572 F.2d 697, 699 (9th

Cir. 1978) (holding, in case involving benefits for a minor,

that ‘‘filing is a substantive condition of eligibility’’).

Third, plaintiff argues that 42 U.S.C. § 423(b), when

applied to the mentally incapacitated, violates principles of

fundamental fairness and thus violates the due process pro-

App. 4

visions of the fifth amendment. Laying aside the question

of whether plaintiff had a property interest in benefits

for which no application had been filed, there is nothing

fundamentally unfair in conditioning benefits upon the

filing of an application. hat application for benefits can

be filed not only by the claimant, but also by a guardian, a

person responsible for the care of the claimant, or the man-

ager or principal officer of an institution caring for the

claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.612(c). A person who is mental-

ly ineapacitated and totally unable to care for himself or

herself will ordinarily be in the care of someone. That

person responsible for claimant’s care will have a strong

incentive to file for benefits. The means thus provided for

securing benefits meets due process requirements.

Finally, plaintiff claims that 42 U.S.C. § 423(b) vio-

lates her constitutional guarantee of equal protection. She

acknowledges that the rational basis test is appropriate,

but urges application of a rationality test ‘‘with teeth,’’

citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 482

(1985). She asserts that application of the one-year retro-

active limitation to the mentally incapacitated is not ra-

tionally related to the end of safeguarding the fiscal integ-

rity of the social security system. If only the mentally

handicapped were singled out, that might be true; however,

all claimants receive retroactive benefits for the same

period—one year. Congress’ purpose in limiting benefits

to one vear has a rational basis in that it preserves the

fiscal integrity of the social security trust fund. As the

Supreme Court stated in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.

471, 485 (1970) (citation omitted) :

In the area of economies and social welfare, a

State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause

App. 5

merely because the classifications made by its laws

are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘‘reason-

able basis,’’ it does not offend the Constitution simply

because the classification ‘‘is not made with mathe-

matical nicety or because in practice it results in some

inequality.”’

Amici argue that the failure to allow benefits retro-

active to the date of disability violates international law.

The specific governmental conduct Amici complain of is

the government’s failure to provide plaintiff or her guar-

dian with advance notice of her potential entitlement to

disability benefits. We can find no source for the require-

ment that the government must locate mentally incompe-

tent persons and inform them of their potential entitleent

to benefits under a government program. Assuming that

international law does require that the state care for men-

tally incapacitated persons, the United States provides a

system for such care. In addition to disability insurance,

the federal government provides medical care through

Medicaid, and for those not covered by the social security

system, supplemental security income. State governments

also provide for the mentally handicapped. The state does

not deprive persons of a fundamental right by requiring

reasonable procedures to claim a benefit. It should be kept

in mind that, with respect to retroactive benefits, the claim

is for the payment of money; care for the mentally incapa-

citated claimant has already been provided for that period

by some person or institution.

Finally, the question of violation of international law

was not raised in the District Court. It may not be raised

for the first time on appeal. Wright v. Holbrook, 794 F.2d

1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1986).

App. 6

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IDA YEITER,

Plaintiff,

Vs. Case No. G85-5 CA

SECRETARY OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant.

/

OPINION

(Filed March 24, 1986)

This social security case is before the court on cross-

motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiff and the

Secretary. Plaintiff has challenged the Secretary’s deci-

sion to deny plaintiff retroactive benefits beyond the 12-

month period provided in 42 U.S.C. § 423(b).' Plaintiff

advances a three-part argument that based on 1) con-

gressional intent and statutory interpretation, 2) due proc-

ess, and 3) equal protection, she has unlawfully been denied

retroactive benefits beyond the 12-month period preceding

the date of her application. Based on the diseussion below,

the court resolves these arguments in favor of the Secre-

tary. As a result, plaintiff’s motion for summary judg-

ment is denied, the Secretary’s motion for summary judg-

ment is granted, and the complaint is ordered dismissed.

App. 7

Background

Plaintiff was involved in a severe automobile accident

on November 14, 1972 which left her brain damaged (Tr.

43). On March 30, 1973 Gerald Yeiter was appointed as

plaintiff’s legal guardian and charged with the custody

and management of her person and estate (Tr. 32-33). On

August 31, 1983, plaintiff, by and through her guardian,

filed an application for disability benefits (Tr. 43).

The Secretary found that plaintiff was disabled as

of November 14, 1972, but limited an award of benefits

retroactive only to August, 1982, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(b).

In November, 1984, the parties agreed to utilize the

expedited appeals process pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.923-

928 (Tr. 1). These regulations provide that the normal

administrative review process may be bypassed when the

only issue is the constitutional:ty of a portion of the Social

Security Act and, but for administrative application of the

allegedly unconstitutional provision, the claim would have

been allowed. Plaintiff and the Secretary stipulated that

the issue to be presented to the court was whether § 423(b)

was inapplicable to plaintiff’s case, by virtue of its alleged

unconstitutionality and by the doctrine of equitable statu-

tory construction (Tr. 1).

Suit was filed by plaintiff on January 3, 1985. The

transcript of the administrative proceedings had been filed,

both parties have fully briefed the issues and the case is

ripe for a decision by the court.

App. 8

Intent and Construction of 42 U.S.C. § 423(b)

Plaintiff’s first argument can be summarized as fol-

lows: First, since plaintiff is mentally incapacitated, she

did not have the ability to file an application or to direct

someone to file an application on her behalf. Plaintiff’s

guardian did not file on her behalf until August, 1983 due

to his ‘‘misunderstandings and ignorance”’ of plaintiff’s

entitlement. Second, prior to 1958, there was no provision

in the Act to allow retroactive benefits. In amending the

Act to allow retroactive payment of benefits for 12 months

prior to the application date, Congress intended to remedy

the situation where an otherwise deserving applicant would

be penalized for failing to file a timely application. Since

there is no evidence that Congress gave any attention to

the specific case where an individual fails to file due to

mental incompetence, plaintiff asserts that an exception

should be read into the statute which would suspend the

operation of the 12-month retroactivity rule.

The first prong of this argument, that plaintiff herself

could not file and her guardian did not file until some elev-

en years after her accident due to ignorance, is not per-

suasive and has repeatedly been rejected by the courts.

The fundamental requirement to obtain benefits under the

Act is the filing of a written application. Schweiker v.

Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 790 (1981) ; 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) (2) (B).

If the individual is incapacitated, the application can be

made by a court appointed representative. Berner v. Finch,

335 F.Supp. 318, 322 (E.D. Mo. 1971); 20 C.F.R. § 404.612

(c). Ignorance of the potential availability of benefits

does not serve to suspend the requirement of an applica-

tion, nor does it provide grounds to ignore the plain man-

|

App. 9

date of § 423(b) that retroactive benefits cannot be award-

ed beyond the 12 months prior to the application date.

Mitchell v. Harris, 496 F.Supp. 230, 233 (D. N.J. 1980) ;

Sweeney v. Secretary, 379 F.Supp. 1098, 1099, 1102 (E.D.

N.Y. 1974); Donnelly v. Gardner, 286 F.Supp. 288, 289-90

(W.D. Wise. 1968).

Plaintiff argues, however, that this court should carve

a narrow exception, tailored to plaintiff’s circumstances,

which would allow her to collect some eleven years worth

of retroactive benefits. Plaintiff maintains that the ‘‘ broad,

humanitarian remedial purposes’’ of the Act supports such

an exception and would effectuate congressional intent to

provide retroactive benefits. Plaintiff argues that a lib-

eral construction of §¢423(b) would prevent the govern-

ment from benefiting ‘‘by technical rules whose effect is

to eliminate benefits to those most in need and least able

to initiate the disability determination process’’ (Plain-

tiff’s brief at 17).

Plaintiff’s argument is flawed in several respects. In

the first instance, contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, she

was able, through her guardian, to ‘‘initiate the disability

’? Second, in urging a liberal con-

struction of § 423(b), plaintiff would apparently have this

court ignore the literal requirement of the statute. This

the court cannot do. In Sweeney, 379 F.Supp. at 1100,

the court in rejecting a plea for liberal interpretation of

§ 423(b) stated:

determination process.

‘<The word ‘construction’ itself implies, in this con-

text, the resolution of an ambiguity, and the liberal

construction rule means nothing more or less than that

the real ambiguities in the meaning of the Act should,

as a general rule, be decided in favor of the claimant.

App. 10

Where, however, there can be no doubt as to the im-

port of the statutory requirements, there is no room

for ‘construction’, be it liberal or otherwise.’’

In this light, plaintiff does not argue the plain meaning

of the statute, but rather, she urges that its application,

in her case, is unfair. While plaintiff’s eleven year delay

in filing for benefits, due apparently to her guardian’s

unawareness of her potential entitlement, is undeniably

unfortunate, the statute’s 12-month rule is unambiguous,

‘Cand cannot be construed away by this court.’’ Mitchell,

496 F.Supp. 233.

Constitutional Considerations

Plaintiff’s first constitutional argument is based on the

assertion that she has a property interest in her dis-

ability benefits and that failure to provide her with full

retroactive benefits violates the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment. Implicit in this argument is the

notion that plaintiff’s property interest vested at the time

of the accident which ultimately rendered plaintiff disabled.

It is settled law that ‘‘the interest of an individual in

continued receipt of these [disability] benefits is a statu-

torily created ‘property interest protected by the Fifth

Amendment.’ ’’ Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33

(1976) (emphasis added). In Mathews, the court held that

once an individual is receiving benefits, those benefits may

not be terminated without procedures that comport with

due process. Plaintiff has provided no authority, and the

court has found none, which supports the proposition that

plaintiff’s property right vested prior to the filing of her

application. Indeed, in Mitchell, supra, the court rejected

al

App. 11

an argument that the retroactivity rule in § 423(b) as ap-

plied to those who were ignorant of their potential el-

igibility constituted denial of property without due process.

496 F.Supp. at 233. In Mitchell, as in this case, the claim-

ant was disabled for a number of years before an applica-

tion for benefits was filed. The Mitchell court refused

to find that the claimant had an ‘‘accrued property right’’

in retroactive benefits prior to the filing of an application.

496 F.Supp. at 233. Once plaintiff did file, her rights to

12 months of retroactive benefits, as provided for hy 4 423

(b) was established. The court did not find that the plain-

tiff had any interest worthy of constitutional protection

in an award of benefits retroactive to the date of dis-

ability. Id. at 234.

The essence of plaintiff’s argument is that the date

of her application should not be permitted to affect the

period to which she is entitled to benefits. The Supreme

Court has noted that the Act provides that only those who

have filed an application for benefits may be entitled to

them and that the courts have no power to alter this re-

quirement or to ‘‘overlook any other valid requirement

for the receipt of benefits.’’ Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 790.

Section 423(b) is a valid statutory limitation on retro-

activity, and plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she

has a property interest in anything beyond what she was

entitled to once an application was filed on her behalf.

Plaintiff’s equal protection argument is premised on

her assertion that since she, herself, was unable to file

for benefits, §423(b) discriminates against her since it

operates to deny her benefits that she would have received

if there had been a filing closer in time to the date of her

disability. Plaintiff argues that the statute is defective

App. 12

due to its failure to provide exceptions for the mentally

disabled. This argument, however, ignores the obvious.

Plaintiff had a guardian who was vested with the authority

to act in her behalf. As previously noted, applications

may be filed by others on behalf of someone not capable

of looking out for their own best interests. If the guardian

has not acted in plaintiff’s best interests, it is not because

the Social Security Act prevented him from doing so.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

is denied, the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment

is granted and the complaint is ordered dismissed.

Entered: March 21, 1986

/s/ Wendell A. Miles

Wendell A. Miles

Chief U.S. District Judge

FOOTNOTE

1 420U.S.C. § 423(b) provides, in pertinent part:

“An individual who would have been entitled to a dis-

ability insurance benefit for any month had he filed appli-

cation therefor before the end of such month shall be

entitled to such benefit for such month if such application

is filed before the end of the 12th month immediately

succeeding such month.”

——

App. 13

APPENDIX B

OTHER OPINIONS

AGREEMENT FOR UTILIZATION OF

EXPEDITED APPEALS PROCESS

IN RE

Ida B. Yeiter

To permit utilization of the expedited appeals process as

provided in 20 CFR 404.923 through 404.928, the claimant,

Ida B. Yeiter and Paul Rosenthal, Acting Chief Admin-

istrative Law Judge, Office of Hearings and Appeals, So-

cial Security Administration, agree that:

The following facts and procedural history are not in dis-

pute:

1.

bo

An application for disability insurance benefits

was filed on Ida B. Yeiter’s behalf on August 31,

1983. It was alleged that she had been disabled

since November 14, 1972. She was found to have

been disabled from the alleged onset date and

benefits were awarded effective with August,

1982. A request for reconsideration was filed

on the basis that benefits should have been award-

ed back to the date of onset of disability and not

just one year prior to the month of application.

The rationale supplied was that the claimant was

and is mentally incapacitated and unable to apply

in her own right and that her legal Guardian

failed to act in her interest. The reconsideration

determination dated June 13, 1984, affirmed the

initial determination under authority of Section

223(b) of the Social Security Act. A hearing was

requested and prior to a hearing being held claim-

ant’s attorney requested expedited appeal.

Section 223(b) of the Social Security Act states,

in pertinent part, that an individual who would

have been entitled to a disability insurance bene-

App. 14

fit for any month shall be entitled to such benefit

if an application is filed before the end of the 12th

month immediately succeeding such month.

3. Except as indicated in paragraph 4 of this agree-

ment, the Secretary’s interpretation of the law is

not in dispute.

4. The sole issue in dispute is the application of See-

tion 223(b) of the Social Security Act, which is

alleged to be unconstitutional by the claimant,

and to be inapplicable underneath the doctrine of

equitable statutory construction.

5. Except for the provision challenged, the right of

the claimant is established.

6. The Secretary’s Reconsideration Determination

dated June 13, 1984, is final for purposes of Sec-

tion 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

405(g).

This agreement, when signed by all parties thereto, shall

constitute a waiver by the parties and the Secretary of

Health and Human Services with respect to the need of

the parties to pursue the remaining steps of the admin-

istrative appeals process. The period for filing a civil

action in the District Court of the United States, as pro-

vided in Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. 405(g) shall begin as of the date on which the par-

ties and the Chief Administrative Law Judge, the duly

authorized representative of the Secretary of Health and

Human Services, sign the agreement. Any civil action

under the expedited appeals process must be filed within

60 days following the date on which the agreement is signed

by the Chief Administrative Law Judge on behalf of the

Secretary.

— =

amen

App. 15

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have signed their

names to this agreement.

DATED: Nov. 5, 84 /s/ G@. Samuel Yeiter

Ida B. Yeiter, Claimant

By and through her

Guardian, Samuel Yeiter

DATED: Nov. 5, 1984 /s/ M. J. Stephen Fox

M. J. Stephen Fox,

Attorney-at-Law

DATED: Nov. 07, 1984 /s/ Paul Rosenthal

Paul Rosenthal

Acting Chief Adminis-

trative Law Judge

Office of Hearings and

Appeals, SSA

App. 16

Department of

Health and Human Services

Social Security Administration

RECONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

\2

Program Center District Office or Branch Office

Suite 600

Chicago IL 60606 250 Monroe Northwest

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

Name of Wage Earner Social Security Claim No.

or Self-employed Person 364-16-1745 HA

Ida B. Yeiter

Name of Claimant Type of Claim

ida B. Yeiter Disability Insurance Benefits

Determination :

Gerald S. Yeiter applied for disability insurance benefits

on behalf of Ida B. Yeiter on August 22, 1983. On Febru-

ary 6, ‘1984, Mr. Yeiter was notified that Mrs. Yeiter was

entitled to disability insurance benefits effective August

1982. On March 15, 1984, Mr. Yeiter filed a timely re-

quest for reconsideration, stating that he believed that

Mrs. Yeiter should be entitled to disability insurance bene-

fits effective with the onset of her disability rather than

one year prior to the month in which the application was

filed.

The issue to be resolved is Mrs. Yeiter’s month of entitle-

ment to disability insurance benefits. This depends on

when she first meets the requirements for entitlement un-

der the provisions of the Social Security Act.

Section 223(a)(1) of the Social Security Act provides that

disability insurance benefits will be payable to every indi-

vidual who is insured for disability insurance benefits, has

App. 17

not attained age 65, has filed an application for disability

insurance benefits, and is under a disability.

Section 228(b) of the Social Security Act provides that

disability insurance benefits may be payable for up to 12

months before the month in which an application is filed

if all other factors of entitlement are met.

Section 404.612 of Social Security regulations No. 4 pro-

vides that if a claimant is mentally incompetent, an appli-

cation for benefits on her behalf may be made by a court-

appointed representative or a person who is responsible

for the care of the claimant.

Mrs. Yeiter’s disability began on November 14, 1972. Mr.

Yeiter, through his attorney, alleges that Mrs. Yeiter was

mentally incompetent and therefore unable to apply for

disability insurance benefits in her own right and Mr.

Yeiter, her legal guardian, did not act in her best interests

by not applying for those benefits.

There is no provision in the Social Security Act to

allow for payment of disability insurance benefits for

more than 12 months prior to the month in which an appli-

cation was filed. Although Mrs. Yeiter is mentally incom-

petent, her legal guardian could have applied for disability

insurance benefits on her behalf at an earlier date. Since

he did not do so, benefits cannot be paid for months prior

to August 1982.

It is determined upon reconsideration that Ida B. Yeiter

is entitled to disability insurance benefits effective Au-

gust 1982 based on the application filed August 22, 1983.

App. 18

AUTHORITY:

Section 223(a)(1) and 223(b) of the Social Security Act;

Section 404.612 of Social Security Regulations No. 4.

Burton L. Blanchard, Chief

Reconsideration Review Section

6/13/84

Date

ee: District Office, Suite 600

250 Monroe Northwest

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

A. Hudale: 1j

06/11/84

App. 19

APPENDIX C

JUDGMENT BELOW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IDA YEITER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. G85-5 CA

Vs.

SHUCRETARY OF HEALTH JUDGMENT

AND HUMAN SERVICES (March 24, 1986)

Defendant.

/

At a session of the Court held in and for said

District and Division in the City of Grand Rapids,

Michigan, this 24 day of March, 1986

PRESENT: WENDELL A. MILES

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

In accordance with the Opinion dated March 2, 1986,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment is denied, the Secretary’s motion

for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is

ordered dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/3s/ Wendell A. Miles

Chief U.S. District Judge

App. 2U

Certified As A True ( /Opy

Gerald H. Liefer, Clerk

By /s/ J. Fuller

Deputy Clerk

U.S. District Court

Western Dist. of Michigan

Date MAR 25 1986

App. 21

APPENDIX D

OTHER MATERIALS

42 USCS $ 423 Disability ...

(b) Filing of application. An application for disa-

bility insurance benefits filed before the first month

in which the applicant satisfies the requirements for

such benefits (as prescribed in subsection (a)(1) shall

be deemed a valid application (and shall be deemed

to have been filed in such first month) only if the

applicant satisfies the requirements for such henefits

before the Secretary makes a final decision on the

application. If, upon final decision by the Secretary,

or decision upon judicial review thereof, such appli-

cant is found to satisfy such requirements, the appli-

vation shall be deemed to have been filed in such first

month and no request under section 205(b) [42 USCS

§ 405(b)| for notice and opportunity for a hearing

thereon is made, or if such a request is made, before

a decision based upon the evidence adduced at the

hearing is made (regardless of whether such decision

becomes the final deciison of the Secretary). An

individual who would have been entitled to a disability

insurance benefit for any month had he filed appli-

eation therefor before the end of such month shall

be entitled to such benefit for such month if such

application is filed before the end of the 12th month

immediately succeeding such month.

Michigan Compiled Laws

§ 700.455. Powers, rights, and duties of guardian of legally

incapacitated person.

Sec. 455. (1) <A guardian of a legally incapacitated per-

son has the same powers, rights, and duties respecting the

guardian’s ward that a parent has respecting the parent’s

unemancipated minor child except that a guardian is not

liable to third persons for acts of the ward solely by rea-

App. 22

son of the parental relationship. In particular, and without

qualifying the foregoing, a guardian has the following

powers and duties, except as modified by order of the

court:

(a) To the extent that it is consistent with the terms of

an order by a court of competent jurisdiction relating to

detention or commitment of the ward, the guardian is en-

titled to custody of the person of his or her ward and may

establish the ward’s place of abode within or without this

state.

(b) If entitled to custody of the ward the guardian shall

make provision for the care, comfort, and maintenance of

the ward and, when appropriate, arrange for the ward’s

training and education. ‘he guardian shall have the re-

sponsibility of securing services to restore the ward to the

best possible state of mental and physical well-being so

that the ward can return to self-management at the earliest

possible time. Without regard to custodial rights of the

ward’s person, the guardian shall take reasonable care of

the ward’s clothing, furniture, vehicles, and other personal

effects and commence protective proceedings if other prop-

erty of the ward is in need of protection.

(c) A guardian may give any consent or approval that

may be necessary to enable the ward to receive medical or

other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service.

(d) If conservator for the estate of the ward is not ap-

pointed, a guardian may:

(i) Institute proceedings to compel a person under a duty

to support the ward or to pay sums for the welfare of the

ward to perform that duty.

App. 23

(ii) Receive money and tangible property deliverable to

the ward and apply the money and property for support,

care, and education of the ward. The guardian may not use

funds from the ward’s estate for room and board which the

guardian or the guardian’s spouse, parent, or child have

furnished the ward unless a charge for the service is ap-

proved by order of the court made upon notice to at least 1

of the next of kin of the incompetent ward, if notice is pos-

sible. The guardian shall exercise care to conserve any

excess for the ward’s needs.

(e) To report the condition of the ward and of the estate

which is subject to the guardian’s possession or control, as

required by the court or court rule. The report shall detail

the condition of the ward, any medical or sanitory treat-

ment or care to which the ward was subjected, and what

reasons, if any, exists for the continuation of the guardian-

ship or limited guardianship.

(f) If a conservator is appointed, the ward’s estate re-

ceived by the guardian in excess of those funds expended to

meet current expenses for support, care, and education of

the ward shall be paid to the conservator for management

as provided in this act, and the guardian shall account to

the conservator for funds expended.

(2) <A guardian of a person for whom a conservator also

is appointed shall control the custody and care of the ward

and is entitled to receive reasonable sums for his or her

services and for room and board furnished to the ward as

agreed upon between the guardian and the conservator if

the amounts agreed upon are reasonable under the circum-

stances. The guardian may request the conservator to ex-

pend the ward’s estate by payment to third persons or in-

stitutuions for the ward’s care and maintenance.

App. 24

(3) If a ward dies while under guardianship, and a con-

servator has not been appointed for the estate of the ward,

and if the guardian has possession of any money of the

deceased ward, the court may, upon petition of the guardian

and with or without notice, hear a claim for burial expense

or any other claim as the court considers advisable. Upon

hearing the claim the court may enter an order allowing

or disallowing the claim or any part of it and provide in

the order of allowance that the claim or any part of it be

paid immediately if the payment can be made without in-

jury or serious inconvenience to the ward’s estate.

UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

IDA B. YEITER, a legally

incapacitated person, by

and through her guardian,

Gerald S. Yeiter,

Plaintiff,

vs File No.:

MARGARET HECKLER, Secretary COMPLAINT

of Health and Human Services, (Jan, 3, 1985)

Defendant.

/

Ida B. Yeiter, a legally incapacitated person, by and

through her attorneys, Buchanan & Bos, make the follow-

ing representations to this Court for purposes of obtaining

judicial review of an adverse decision of the Secretary of

Health and Human Services:

Peas

| |

App. 25

1. That Ida B. Yeiter (whose social security account

number is 364-16-1745) is a resident of Kent County, Michi-

gan.

2. That Iida B. Yeiter complains of a decision by the

Secretary of Health and Human Services which adversely

effects her in whole or part. The decision has become the

final decision of the Secretary for purposes of judicial re-

view vis-a-vis use of the expedited appeals process as pro-

vided for in 20 CFR 404.923 through and including 404.928.

3. That the decision of the Secretary bears the follow-

ing caption:

In the case of Claim) for Period of

Disability and Disability

Insurance Benefits

Ida B. Yeiter

Claimant

Ida B. Yeiter | S4-1G-1745

Wage Earner —t™”™” ‘Social Security Number

4. That Ida B. Yeiter has exhausted her administra-

tive remedies in this matter as seen in the Order of Dis-

missal dated November 27, 1984, (Exhibit 1) and the Sec-

retary’s agreement with plaintiff for utilization of the ex-

pedited appeals process, dated November 7, 1984 (Exhibit

2), and therefore this court has jurisdiction for judicial re-

view pursuant to the aforesaid statutory provisions for the

expedited appeal process together with that otherwise pro-

vided for in 42 USC 405(g).

5. That an application for disability insurance bene-

fits and for a determination of a period of disability was

filed on behalf of Ida B. Yeiter, a legally incapacitated

person, on August 31, 1983.

atin

App. 26

6. That therein, Ida B. Yeiter, by and through her

guardian, Gerald S. Yeiter, alleged that she had been dis-

able continuously and uninterruptedly since November 14,

1972.

7. That thereafter, the Secretary determined Ida B.

Yeiter to have been continuously and uninterruptedly dis-

abled from November 14, 1972, to the present date, but

limited award of social security disability benefits retro-

active to August, 1982, pursuant to See. 223(b) of the Social

Security Act which provides, inner alia, that an individual

who would have been entitled to a disability insurance bene-

fit for any month shall be entitled to such benefit if an ap-

plication is filed before the end of the 12th month immedi-

ately succeeding such month.

8. That the Secretary does not dispute that Ida B.

Yeiter is ctherwise entitled to social security disability

benefits dating back to November 14, 1972, but for the

failure of her or someone acting on her behalf to have filed

an application for disability insurance benefits consistent

with those provisions set out in Sec. 223(b) of the Social

Security Act.

9. That Ida B. Yeiter was in a severe automobile ac-

cident on November 14, 1972, and suffered, inner alia,

frontal lobe damage to her brain such that she remained

comatose for a period of approximately 14 months, was

bedridden for several years thereafter requiring 24-hour

round-the-clock nursing care, and never recovered from

these and other injuries such that from November 14, 1972,

to the present date, she has been and remains a legally in-

eapacitated person incapable of acting in her own behalf

and ineapable of directing others to act in her own behalf.

App. 27

10. That as a result of her mental incapacity, Ida B.

Yeiter neither applied for social security disability bene-

fits on her own behalf nor directed anyone, including her

guardian, Gerald 8. Yeiter, to act on her behalf by filing an

application for disability benefits.

11. That the Social Security Act was designed for the

protection of society and enacted to alleviate the burdens

resting on large numbers of the population because of the

insecurities of modern life, particularly those accompany-

ing old age, unemployment, and disability, through the

establishment in advance of a provident fund for the needy

worker out of which he or she will be paid, inter alia, dis-

ability benefits.

12. That the disability provisions of the Social Secur-

ity Act should not be strictly construed to deny disability

benefits but should be given a liberal construction in favor

of awarding disability benefits.

COUNT I

13. That plaintiff Ida B. Yeiter adopts, as if fully set

forth herein, those allegations contained in Paragraphs 1

through 12 above.

14. That Sec. 223(b) of the Social Security Act has

been construed by the Secretary to be without any excep-

tions, whether expressed or implied, with respect to the

limitation that disability insurance benefits be awarded

retroactively to a maximum of twelve (12) months immedi-

ately prior to the date of the application for disability

benefits.

15. That claimants such as Ida B. Yeiter, who are

mentally incapacitated, are incapable of either applying in

App. 28

their own behalf for social security disability benefits

within a timely manner or directing others to act on their

behalf to apply in a timely manner for social security dis-

ability benefits.

16. That to strictly construe Sec. 223(b) of the So-

cial Security Act as so done by the Secretary produces

severe and oppressive consequences clearly contrary to the

remedial spirit and letter of the Social Security Act and

therefore an implied exception to Sec. 223(b) should be

read into the act applicable to those cases where social se-

curity disability claimants, such as Ida B. Yeiter herein,

are determined to be mentally incapacitated continuously

and uninterruptedly from the date of disability to the date

of application for disability benefits.

17. That construing the Social Security Act, See.

223(b), in the above manner, is mandated by and finds

support in the judicial doctrine of equitable statutory

construction and is otherwise consistent with the intent of

Congress.

WHEREFORE, Ida B. Yeiter seeks judicial review

by this Court wherein this Honorable Court construes the

Social Security Act, Sec. 223(b), to contain the implied

exception to the limitations on retroactive awards of dis-

ability benefits such that the limitation therein is stricken

as inapplicable to Ida B. Yeiter, and further prays for an

entry of order by this Court directing the Secretary to

award disability benefits to the plaintiff retroactive

through November 14, 1972.

COUNT II

18. That plaintiff adopts as if fully set forth herein

Paragraphs 1 through 17 above.

~ Va.

App. 29

19. That to the extent Congress has intended See.

223(b) of the Social Security Act to apply, in the same

manner, to all individuals otherwise eligible for disability

benefits, including those capable of applying for disabil-

ity benefits or directing others to apply for disability

benefits, together with those who are incapable of apply-

ing for disability benefits in their own behalf or directing

others to apply for disability benefits in their behalf,

Congress created a statutory scheme whose purpose and

effect is to produce unequal results in treatment and con-

dition with respect to those persons mentally ineapaci-

tated, to the detriment of Ida B. Yeiter, violating her

right to due process and equal protection of the law as

guaranteed to plaintiff under the Fifth Amendment of

the United States Constitution.

20. That to the extent that Congress has presumed

all disabled individuals to be capable of either applying

for disability benefits on their own behalf or directing

others to apply for disability benefits on their behalf,

Congress has made a presumption neither necessarily true

nor universally true, and this irrebuttable presumption

violates the constitutional rights guaranteed Ida B. Yeiter

as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

21. That the Social Secarity Administration’s con-

struction of See. 223(b) of the Social Security Act, if cor-

rect, denies Ida B. Yeiter equal protection of the law as

guaranteed to her under the Fifth Amendment of the

United States Constitution.

22. That such unequal treatment otherwise violates

Ida B. Yeiter’s procedural and substantive due process

App. 30

rghts guaranteed to her under the Fifth Amendment of

the United States Constitution.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff Ida B. Yeiter seeks judicial

review by this Court and further requests this Court to

find See. 223(b) of the Social Security Act to be uncon-

stitutional either on its face or as applied to Ida B. Yeiter

under the factual circumstances set forth herein above,

and further prays for an entry of order by this Court di-

recting the Secretary to award disability benefits retro-

active through November 14, 1972.

BUCHANAN & BOS

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATED: January 3, 1985

By: /s/ M. J. Stephen Fox

M.J. Stephen Fox (P-32456)

Business Address:

Sixth Floor Frey Building

Grand Rapids, MI 49503

(616) 458-1224

e0103501

DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Social Security Administration

OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

ORDER

OF DISMISSAL

IN THE CASE OF: CLAIM FOR:

Period of Disability and

Ida B. Yeiter Disability Insurance Benefits

(Claimant)

364-16-1745

(Social Security Number)

Se nt

App. 31

The claimant, through her attorney, related on her Request

for Hearing dated August 15, 1984, that her constitutional

rights had been violated and that the Social Security Ad-

ministration’s statutory construction was incorrect under

the doctrine of equitable construction. By letter dated

September 24, 1984, the attorney requested that the expe-

dited appeals process be invoked. Subsequenily, the Office

of the Chief Administrative Law Judge for the Office of

Hearings and Appeals determined that the criteria for

use of the expedited appeal procedure were met and a

formal agreement was prepared. The claimant, by and

through her guardian, Samuel Yeiter, and her attorney

signed the agreement on November 5, 1984. On Novem-

ber 7, 1984, Paul Rosenthal, Acting Chief Administrative

Law Judge, signed the agreement as authorized repre-

sentative of the Social Security Administration.

As defined in Regulation 404.927 of the Social Security

Regulations, after an expedited appeals process agreement

is signed, the remaining steps of the Administrative review

process need not be completed. Instead, the claimant may

file an action in a federal district court within 60 days

after the date the agreement is signed by the Social Se-

curity Administration representative.

The request for the expedited appeals process and the

subsequent signing of the agreement constitute a request

for withdrawal of the claimant’s Request for Hearing

filed on August 15, 1984. Regulation 404.957 provides, in

pertinent part, that an Administrative Law Judge may

dismiss a Request for Hearing if a party to the hearing

asks to withdraw his or her request.

App. 32

Accordingly, in accordance with Regulation 404.957, the

Administrative Law Judge dismisses the claimant’s Re-

quest for Hearing filed on August 15, 1984.

/s/ William EK. Decker

Administrative Law Judge

November 27, 1984

Date

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN,

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IDA YEITER,

Plaintiff, No. G85-5 CA CA

Vv. Honorable

Wendell A. Miles

SECRETARY OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES, ANSWER

Defendant.

/

Now comes the Defendant, Secretary of Health and

Human Services, by its attorneys, John A. Smietanka,

United States Attorney for the Western District of Michi-

gan, and Martin F. Palus, Assistant United States Attor-

ney, and in answer to the Complaint, says as follows:

1. Defendant admits the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 9.

2. Except to admit that Ida B. Yeiter did not apply

for Social Security disability benefits on her own behalf,

the defendant is without knowledge or information suffi-

App. 33

cient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments of

paragraph 10.

3. Paragraphs 11 and 12 consist of plaintiff’s argu-

ment or characterization of her action, to which no re-

sponsive pleading is required; to the extent a response

may be deemed required, defendant denies the averments

of paragraphs 11 and 12.

4, The defendant admits the averments of paragraph

13 and adopts by reference the responses to paragraphs

1 through 12.

5. Defendant admits the allegations contained in

paragraph 14.

6. Paragraphs 15 through 17 consist of plaintiff’s

argument or characterization of her action, to which no

responsive pleading is required; to the extent a response

may be deemed required, defendant denies the averments

of paragraphs 15 through 17.

7. The defendant admits the averments of para-

graph 18 and adopts by reference the responses to para-

graphs 1 through 17.

8. Paragraphs 19 through 22 consist of plaintiff’s

argument or characterization of her action, to which no

responsive pleading is required; to the extent a response

may be deemed required, defendant denies the averments

of paragraphs 19 through 22.

9. Defendant states that the findings of fact of the

Secretary of Health and Human Services are supported

by substantial evidence and are conclusive.

10. Defendant states that in accordance with section

205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g), De-

App. 34

fendant files as part of the Answer a certified copy of

the transcript of the record including the evidence upon

which the findings and decision complained of are based.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment dis-

missing the Complaint with costs and disbursements and

for judgment in accordance with section 205(g¢) of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(¢), affirming her de-

cision.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN A. SMIETANKA

United States Attorney

/s/ MARTIN F. PALUS

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: 5/9/85