Opposition Brief — Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co.

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No. 87-131

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In The CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

t)

SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

vs.

SHELL OIL COMPANY,

Respondent.

fay

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

fay

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

t).

ve

Jose A. BERLANGA

Burt BaLLANFANT*

Shell Oil Company

Legal Department

4708 One Shell Plaza

P. O. Box 2463

Houston, Texas 77001

(713) 241-2283

Sam A. LeBuanc, III

Pau O. DicHarry

Apams & REESE

4500 One Shell Square

New Orleans, LA 70139

(504) 581-3234

Attorneys for Respondent

*Counsel of Reeord

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

or call collect (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Court below was correct in holding that a

federal district court may dismiss a case on the merits

if the plaintiff fails to raise a fact issue about whether

a defendant was ‘‘in violation’’ of its permit when the

action was filed as that term is defined under the Clean

Water Act?

Whether the plaintiff, Sierra Club, had standing to bring

this action?

Whether the notice provided by the Sierra Club pursuant

to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 was adequate?

Whether 33 U.S.C. § 1365 is unconstitutional because it

confers power of the executive branch of government upon

citizens?

ii

PARTIES

Petitioner is Sierra Club, a non-profit corporation

organized under the laws of the State of California.

Respondent, Shell Oil Company, is a Delaware cor-

poration with its principal place of business in Houston,

Texas. All of Shell Oil Company’s common stock is owned

by SPNV Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation, whose

stock is owned by Shell Petroleum N.V., a Netherlands

company. The voting shares of Shell Petroleum N.V. are

held 60 percent by Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and

40 percent by Shell Transport and Trading Company, a

Public Limited Company in London, U.K. Shell Oil Com-

pany also has an interest in a number of companies. The

following companies are affiliated with Shell Oil Company

or one of its affiliates, but are not wholly owned sub-

sidiaries :

Pecten Middle East Services Company

Graveap, Inc.

Heat Transfer Research, Inc.

Inland Corporation

Loop, Ine.

Lucky Chance Mining Company, Inc.

Mesbie Financial Corporation of Houston

Oil Companies Institute for Marine Pollution

Compensation Limited

Oil Insurance Limited

Seadock, Inc.

East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company

Grande Eeallie Land Company, Ine.

Thums Long Beach Company

Van Salt Water Disposal Company

WIDC (Wyoming Industrial Development

Co~poration)

Cortez Capital Corporation

iii

George Newman & Company

Oil Companies Institute for Marine Pollution

Compensation Limited

Butte Pipe Line Company

Dixie Pipeline Company

Explorer Pipeline Company

Locap, Ine.

Olympic Pipe Line Company

Plantation Pipe Line Company

West Shore Pipe Line Company

Wolverine Pipe Line Company

Morrison Molded Fiber Glass Company

Xerkon Ine.

Huntsman Chemical Corporation

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i

PARTIES il

TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vv

I GIR ini iiciemsnrne 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ..... 6

I. The Decision Below was Decided on the Specific

Record Before the Appellate Court Consistent

with Fifth and First Cireuit Law 22000 6

II. The Respondent Lacks Standing to —— this

pS eee ane 7

Ill. The Respondent Failed to Provide eine

I 1. aiiecohenceaaninioticnipeenipmanaenianionaaeeee 7

IV. Section 1365 of the Act is Unconstitutional in

that it Grants Private Citizens the Authority to

Exercise Executive Functions 2.....ccccccccccccccssceeeceeeeeeeee 9

A. Eoin a Peres 9

I I ne 9

C. Structure of the Clean Water Act ....WW... 11

D. The Citizens Authority to Sue for Penalties

EE RRA aE OE eA ANCE 15

a SAR eee aan le tes LL zarRL roe Rear nn 17

APPENDIX:

EE eee eee eee App. 1

Notice Letter of January 20, 1984 ow App. 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CasEs

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 00000... 15

Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) 0. 9,15

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) . ..9, 10, 15

Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987) ...... 16

City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th

(ir.), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1975) (Clean

Air Act) Sasa adiesspotoas ad ck ables endin OC tain aeRO aoa NTE 8

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) on cccccccsssssssessesesee 16

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay

Foundation and Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inec., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986),

cert granted — US —, 107 S. Ct. 872 (U.S. Jan-

a: Bh. 5 eee ee ee ere 1,17

Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corpora-

tion, 756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir. 1985) 2 6

Tn Re Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869) ow. 10, 11

LN.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 979 (1983) 9,15

Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin-

istration, 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. is (Clean

Wee TA oc ee 8

Middlesex County Sewerage District v. National

Sea Clammers Association, 433 U.S. 1 (1981) 00... 7,13

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ww. 16,17

Pawtuxet Cove Marine, Ine. v. Ciba-Geigy Cor-

poration, 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition

for cert. filed (U.S. March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562) 1, 6, 17

Reeger v. Mill Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360

(W.D. Pa. 1984) (Clean Air and Clean Water

TD a a ee ea eee 8

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Company, 817 F.2d 1169

OEE CU, TO accesses neste 1

Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) ..... 9

Student Public Research Group of New Jersey,

Ine. v. Monsanto Company, 600 F. Supp. 1474

(TX Tas SD cn eens 16

United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.

1965) ceri. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) nnn eeeeceneeeneenene 11

STATUTES

5 U.S.C. § 502 oo cecnmnssnnnsnnntnnnnninnnnnnnninen 13

TET, GI nicest ction enrcsinidnsetaceiettnenniia 13

| TERA, © I) nici nics ntnstetteniceincincnnccinenspeteisecill 2

| SB TEC. § MOB N GR) iin 12

Oe a , SRR ach io iecccttecenerermiteerniens 2

RIF. CER St); Seana nna Eee 12

33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) .............. 12

33 U.S.C. § 1942 ce vovvnvsnnnsnnnnnnnn nn 2

5 8 OSS OAL SD (|: esnemeaiaeds i, 17

$3 U.S.C. $ 1366(a)(1)(2) ——_________._._...... 1

ER BS | | EY dle ONE 2

eT ee Se) TY | en 14

IE CR S| nnn 12

Be TET 6 I annaiincsinecsceiesnenseieestins sissies 14

BT Ts RE cecncinncesntccisnnieesnsisitshn areca een 12

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 13

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

U.S. Constitution

PE SE Sees ae LRN ame A 11, 14

FB Oe tipicne ecaaniaaias 14

REGULATIONS

35 C.F.R. 15623 reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. App. at

ge | Ne NEI nIr te ORNL Bee OREO SOR PEC

12

40 C.F.R. §1226 MMe Teas

TEextTs

Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing is an

Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,

17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881 (1983) eee

Lewis, Envirenmentalist Authority to Sue Indus-

try is Unconstitutional Under Separation of

Powers Doctrine, 16 ELR 10101 (Apr. 1986)

Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution

Control Laws (pts. 1-3), 13 ELR 10309 (Oct.

1983), 14 ELR 10063 (Feb. 1984), 14 ELR 10407

CRG III Fc issechs onacaecnieecccanteriecanieeriaanor

14

13

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE

ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Respondent Shell Oil Company respectfully prays that

this court deny the Sierra Club’s petition for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the

United States District Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Cireuit entered in Sterra Club v. Shell Oil Company, 817

F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1987) on May 29, 1987. While this

court has granted a writ of certiorari in Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Na-

tural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 791 F.2d 304 (4th

Cir. 1986), cert granted — US —, 107 S. Ct. 872 (US.

January 12, 1987), (hereinafter Gwaltney), (No. 86-473)

this case turns upon its own facts and is consistent with

Pawtuxet Cove Marine, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corporation,

807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert filed (U.S.

March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562) (hereinafter Pawtuzet).

Respondent respectfully submits that the decision of the

Fourth Cireuit in Gwaltney is incorrect.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Sierra Club’s presentation of Shell Oil Company’s

(‘‘Shell’’) compliance record according to its Clean Water

Act permit (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System Permit, hereinafter NPDES) at its petroleum

refinery in Norco, Louisiana, discloses the petitioner’s

failure to address the central factual determination made

by the trial court, ie., the plaintiff’s failure to raise a

fact issue concerning whether or not Shell was in violation

of the Act at the time that the Complaint was filed. Shell’s

factual presentation of the case was uncontradicted in spite

of the opportunity of the plaintiff to conduct extensive

discovery for more than a year. The uncontradicted fac-

tual record before the trial court revealed the following

permit and compliance history for Shell Oi] Company’s

oil refinery in Norco, Louisiana.

Shell’s Noreo Refinery was issued its first NPDES

permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1842 of the Clean Water Act in

July, 1977. Although that permit expired under its terms

on October 30, 1979, the permit remained in effect pursuant

to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c),

and 40 C.F.R. § 122.6 during pendency of Shell’s applica-

tion for a new permit. That second permit was issued on

May 16, 1980; the third and current permit was issued on

August 15, 1983.

On or about January 20, 1984, Sierra Club attorneys

sent a letter ostensibly under 33 U.S.C. 1365(b) to notify

Shell of the Sierra Club’s intent to file suit to enforce the

terms of Shell’s NPDES permit at the Norco Refinery.

Sierra Club filed its Complaint on July 24, 1984 alleging

violations by Shell of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(a). Specifically, the Sierra Club alleged 120 viola-

tions of Shell’s NPDES permit at the Norco Refinery be-

tween January, 1980 and March, 1984. Sierra Club also al-

leged that violations had occurred subsequent to March,

1984. At the time the suit was filed Sierra Club had no

evidence that Shell had violated its permit in any way

after March 7, 1984.

Respondent will summarize the record reviewed by

the appellate court with respect to Shell’s compliance his-

tory on two (2) of the eight (8) parameters at issue in the

litigation. A detailed discussion of these two (2) para-

meters is important to highlight the appellate court’s

thorough review of the record in order to determine

whether a factual issue had been created by the Sierra

Club’s showing before the district court.

TOTAL SUSPENDED SOLIDS (TSS)

Since 1976 each of Shell’s permits has contained

dual limitations which placed a Daily Maximum and Daily

Average limitation on the amount of pollutants that could

be discharged from Shell’s refinery. The TSS limitations

in effect under Shell’s second permit were more restric-

tive than the limitations of the first permit. While the

second permit was in effect a total of forty-eight (48) ex-

ceedences were reported to the Environmental Protection

Agency (hereinafter EPA). On August 15, 1983, the EPA

issued Shell’s third permit. Shell’s third permit, however,

contained higher limitations for TSS. After the issuance

of the third permit, there was only one TSS Daily Maxi-

mum exceedence. That exceedence occurred on December

29, 1983 in the midst of the coldest weather experiencd in

4

the Norco area in over twenty (20) years. No other T'SS

exceedences occurred between December 29, 1983 and

February 7, 1985.! Any problem that may have existed

with respect to the TSS limits was solved by the increased

limitations granted by the EPA. At the time the complaint

was filed, there was no continuing or recurring violation

of the TSS parameter at Shell’s Norco refinery.

CHROMIUM, HEXAVALENT AND TOTAL

Shell used chromates for the purpose of corrosion con-

trol in its water cooling towers at its Norco refinery. Be-

tween the approximate dates of January, 1980 and July,

1984, Shell’s records submitted to the EPA reflect that

there were a total of eighteen (18) exceedences of hexa-

valent chromium. In addition, during that same time per-

iod, there were a total of two (2) Daily Maximum exceed-

ences of total chromium. The last chromate excecedance, a

hexavalent chromium exceedence, occurred on March 7,

1984.

Sierra Club lawyers were advised in March, 1984 by

William L. Caughman, Jr., Environmental Conservation

Manager for the Norco refinery, that Shell was contem-

plating the elimination of chromates for corrosion control

at the Norco refinery. Mr. Caughman recommended in

1. The district court’s ruling on Shell’s Motion for Summary

Judgment was based on various supporting materials.

The supporting materials included three (3) affidavits from

William L. Caughman, Jr., excerpts of the depositions of

William L. Caughman, Jr., excerpts from R. E. Deister’s

deposition, a summary of the reported exceedences and

the Stipulation of the Sierra Club. The material was pre-

sented in support of Shell’s factual presentation of its case

and was uncontroverted.

May, 1984, that a non-chromate corrosion control system

be implemented. In June, 11984, Mr. Caughman’s recom-

mendation was accepted. By January, 1985, the Norco

refinery was utilizing a non-chromate corrosion control

system. Shell’s use of a non-chromate corrosion control

system at the refinery eliminated the likelihood that Shell

would ever experience a recurring problem with the

chromate parameters.

The Sierra Club made no further inquiry regarding

chromates prior to filing its action in July, 1984. At the

time Sierra Club filed its Complaint, it had no evidence

that there had been any exceedences occurring between

March 8, 1984 and July 21, 1984, the date the Complaint

was filed. See App. at App. 1.

OTHER PARAMETERS

The remainder of Shell’s compliance record merely

reveals a variety of multiple, sporadic and past exceed-

ences of different parameters during an extended time

period. Of the five reported phenol exceedences, four oc-

curred during a pipe rupture in 1981. The four TOC

(Total Organic Carbon) exceedences reported in 1982 oc-

curred at a separate outfall from the remainder of the ex-

ceedences. ‘he evidence and testimony presented by Shell

demonstrated that the Shell laboratory responsible for

making the tests experienced a short period of time during

which the elevated readings were attributed by the labora-

tory manager, R. EK. Deister, to errors made by persons

in charge of preparing the sample bottles used to conduct

the tests. The records submitted by Shell to the EPA

demonstrated that there were a total of eleven (11) ph

exceedences since January, 1980. However, the last ph

exceedence prior to the filing of the Complaint occurred

on June 23, 1982. Shell’s records also indicated a total

of 15 BOD (Biochemical Oxygen Demand) exceedences.

Of that total, 7 occurred during unusually severe weath-

er conditions in the Noreo area in December, 1983 and

January, 1984. The last BOD exceedence prior to the

filing of the Complaint, occurred on January 16, 1984.

There were no other exceedences of this parameter for

more than six months prior to the date the plaintiff

filed its Complaint.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW WAS DECIDED ON THE

SPECIFIC RECORD BEFORE THE APPELLATE

COURT CONSISTENT WITH FIFTH AND FIRST

CIRCUIT LAW.

The Respondents’ Opposition to the Petition for Cer-

tiorari addresses the propriety of the Appellate Court’s

ruling on the basis of the factual records and current Fifth

and First Circuit law and those arguments will not be re-

peated here. The court is respectfully referred to the con-

solidated opposition for a recitation of all the applicable

arguments. Respondent points out, however, that under the

standards articulated by the Fifth Cireuit in Hamker v.

Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corp., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.

1985) and by the First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove Marina,

Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986),

Petition for Cert. filed (U.S. March 17, 1987) (No. 86-

~]

1562), the uncontradicted factual record before the district

and appellate courts demonstrated that Shell was not in

violation on or near the date the Complaint was filed.

Petitioner simply failed to raise a genuine issue of ma-

terial fact and the trial court granted a summary judgment

for Shell. The Fifth Cireuit found no error with the trial

court’s decision, and affirmed.

Il. THE RESPONDENT LACKS STANDING TO

BRING THIS ACTION

Respondent contends that the Petitioner does not have

standing to bring this action. The arguments on standing

are addressed in the consolidated opposition and will not

be repeated here. The Court is respectfully referred to the

consolidated brief for a full recitation of the applicable

arguments.

III. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADE-

QUATE NOTICE

Sierra Club’s notice letter of January, 1984, cited

forty-seven (47) alleged violations of the Act. See App. at

App. 6. Respondent contends that the notice is deficient

because it makes reference to alleged violations of expired

permits and the notice cited twenty-five (25) alleged TSS

violations of a limit which was subsequently increased.

The notice letter on its face did not make any reference

at all to a non-compliance under Shell’s permit in effect

at the time that the Complaint was filed. Only alleged

violations of expired permits were cited.

As stated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Middle-

sex County Sewerage District v. National Sea Clammers

Assn., 433 U.S. 1 (1981) notice is mandatory. Notice of

8

alleged violations relating to expired permits or limita-

tions which are no longer applicable cannot support juris-

diction. The language which prohibits the filing of an

action without giving proper notice has been held to be

jurisdictional in several environmental contexts. City of

Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.), ceri.

denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1975) (Clean Air Act); Massachu-

setts v. United States Veterans Administration, 541 F.2d

119 (1st Cir. 1976) (Clean Water Act); Reeger v. Mill

Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (Clean

Air and Clean Water Acts). The purpose of the notice

provision is to trigger governmental action thereby al-

leviating the need for judicial action. Highland Park,

supra at 691. Recourse to the court is appropriate only

when the administrative action taken is inadequate.

Massachusetts, supra at 121.

The last item referenced by the Sierra Club in its

notice letter is dated April, 1983. See App. at App. 7. On its

face such a notice cannot be sufficient to ‘‘trigger’’ govern-

mental action particularly in view of the reference within

that notice to outdated limitations. The only concern

which can be gleaned from the Sierra Club’s notice is that

the plaintiff was concerned about a problem related to an

expired permit. Plaintiff’s listing of more recent alleged

violations in an appendix to its complaint is of no conse-

quence since the Act requires notice before an action is

filed. As stipulated by the Sierra Club at the time the

complaint was filed, the Sierra Club had no factual evi-

dence of any violations which occurred between March 8,

1984 and July 21, 1984. For the above reasons, the notice

letter of January, 1984, was insufficient and failed to

comply with the requirements of Section 1365(b) of the

Act.

IV. SECTION 1365 OF THE ACT IS UNCONSTITU-

TIONAL IN THAT IT GRANTS PRIVATE CITI-

ZENS THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE EXECU.

TIVE FUNCTIONS

A. Separation of Powers

The principle of separation of powers between the

various branches of government is embedded in the very

structure of the Constitution. The Constitution divides

the powers of the Federal Government into three categor-

ies, Legislative, Executive and Judicial. [.N.S. v. Chadha,

462 U.S. 979, 951 (1983). As noted by the Supreme Court,

the reason for dividing the powers of government was to

‘diffuse power the better to secure liberty.’’ Bowsher v.

Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).

B. Executive Function

The Constitution vests the Executive Power of govern-

ment in the President. U.S. Const. Art. II, §1, cl. 1. En-

forcement of the laws is an executive function.

Legislative power, as distinguished from execu-

tive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to

enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the

duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive

functions. Springer v. Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S.

189, 202 (1928).

The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)

struck down provisions of the Federal Election Campaign

Act providing primary responsibility for conducting civil

litigation in U.S. District Courts to an eight member Fed-

eral Election Commission composed of members appointed

by the President as well as members appointed by the

Senate and the House of Representatives. The Supreme

10

Court based its decision in Buckley on the doctrine of

separation of powers between the branches of government

and the constitutional requirement that only officers of the

United States appointed pursuant to the Constitution may

engage in the enforcement of the public law. Buckley,

supra., pp 118-143.

The authority of the Executive Branch to seek for-

feiture of property to the government highlights the

unique position of the executive in such matters. In Re

Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869), the Supreme Court

considered whether an informer had a vested interest in a

shop seized for violation of laws prohibiting the use of

property to aid, abet or promote insurrection. At the

time, the Act of August 6, 1861, provided that an informer

was entitled to a moiety from the proceeds of a forfeiture.

The court decided that the informer had no vested in-

terest in the subject matter of the action and upheld the

lower courts decision to permit dismissal of the libel in

one instance and the reversal of a decree in favor of the

United States at the request of the Attorney General in

another. The total and complete autonomy of the execu-

tive in these matters has been clearly established.

Whether tested, therefore, by the requirements of

the Judiciary Act, or by the usage of the government,

or by the decisions of this court, it is clear that all

such suits, so far as the interests of the United States

are concerned, are subject to the direction and within

the control of the Attorney-General. Confiscation

Cases, at 458-459.

The penalty extracted by the government for violation of

environmental provisions is no different than the penalty

11

of forfeiture imposed for violation of numerous laws estab-

lished by Congress.”

The autonomy of the Executive Branch in matters re-

lated to the criminal enforcement of laws is likewise un-

disputed. In United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th

Cir. 1965) cert. dented, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) the Fifth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals held in an en bane decision that a

United States Attorney was justified in refusing an order

of a district court to prepare and sign an indictment. In

the Cox case the grand jury had made it clear that they

wanted to bring indictments against certain persons. The

U.S. Attorney refused and could not be ordered by the

court to do so. The importance of this case is that it un-

derscores the exclusive authority of the Executive Branch

in the enforcement of the law to the exclusion of private

citizens even if clothed with the mantle of authority

granted to a grand jury. In matters relating to the en-

forcement of the law, the holdings in Cox and in Confisca-

tion Cases support the proposition that the Executive

Branch has the right to enforce civil laws to the exclusion

of any right by private citizens to collect penalties.

C. Structure of the Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act reflects in part that Congress

worked within the Constitutional requirement providing

that the laws of the United States be enforced by Officers

of the United States in accordance with U.S. Const. Art.

II, 42, el. 2. The Act grants to the administrator of the

2. The CWA was amended on February 4, 1987, to provide

for penalties in the amount of $25,000 per day for each

violation.

12

EPA the authority to administer the Act. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(d). The Administrator, the head of the Agency, is

appointed by the President with the advice and consent

of the Senate. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 C.F.R. 15623

reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. App. at 81 (West Supp. 1986). Un-

der the Act the administrator has broad powers to enforce

the provisions of the law by administrative or judicial ac-

tion. 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Under § 1319(d), the administrator

may seek civil penalties in the amount of $10,000 per day

for violation of permit conditions.’ The Attorney General

of the United States shall at the request of the adminis-

trator appear and represent the United States in civil and

criminal actions filed under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1367.

Officers or employees of the EPA are also authorized to

appear and represent the United States under certain con-

ditions. /d. The Attorney General is the head of the

Department of Justice appointed by the President with

3. Respondent acknowledges the existence of qui tam actions.

Several statutes, such as the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.

§ 3729, as amended provide private citizens with a per-

centage of a recovery of any action for actions brought

against persons who defraud the government. No court

has yet addressed the constitutionality of qui tam actions

in the context of a challenge based on the separation of

powers doctrine. Significant differences exit between the

qui tam statutes and citizen suits. Private citizens do not

obtain an interest in the recovery, i.e., the penalty. The

very essence of standing in environmental cases is predi-

cated on an individualized injury and not based on se-

curing a benefit for the public at large. Additionally, the

need to provide incentives to private individuals is not

present. Unlike the cases involving fraud, there is no need

to encourage informers. All information necessary to file

an action is provided to the government and available to

the public. Qui tam actions do not support the consti-

tutionality of citizen suits simply because the rationale

for their existence is substantially different.

13

the advice and consent of the Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 503. The

Department of Justice is an executive department of the

government. 5 U.S.C. § 502. While the foregoing demon-

strates the constitutional structure established by Congress

to enforee the provisions of the Clean Water Act, Con

gress exceeded the constitutionally permissible limits when

it chose to give private citizens the right to exercise an

executive function: i.e., the right to collect a penalty pre-

sumably destined for the U.S. Treasury.

It is important to note that many environmental sta-

tutes provide for dual enforcement by federal or state gov-

ernments and for a private cause of action by citizens. The

Clean Water Act was enacted in 1970° and has served as a

model for many environmental statutes. The difference

between the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act is that

private citizens may seek monetary penalties in addition

to injunctive relief. This difference is significant because

the Clean Water Act does not directly provide that penal

ties collected are payable to the United States Treasury.’

Private citizens do not fall under the provisions applicable

to custodians of public money who may be removed from

office for failure to promptly deposit public money in the

4. The Act on its face does not require a citizen to deposit

penalties in the Treasury. However, the Supreme Court sug-

gested in a footnote that the penalties collected by private

citizens are payable to the government. Middlesex County

Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1,

14 & n.25 (1981).

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642.

6 See Generally: Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pol-

lution Central Laws (pts. 1-3). 13 ELR 10309 (Oct. 1983),

14 ELR 10063 (Feb. 1984), 14 ELR 10407 (Nov. 1984).

VI

See footnote 4

14

U.S. Treasury. 33 U.S.C. § 3302. More importantly, pri-

vate citizens have not been appointed by the President to

enforce environmental laws as required by the Constitu-

tion. U.S. Const. Art. Il, § 2, el. 2. The lack of authority

and oversight over the activities of persons who exercise

executive functions means that the Parsident cannot effec-

tively meet his obligation to ‘‘take care that the Laws be

faithfully executed.’’ U.S. Const. art. LI, §3.°

By enacting a statutory scheme providing aggrieved

citizens the right to sue for relief in connection with the

enforcement of environmental laws, Congress brought the

separation of powers and standing doctrines into con-

sideration.’ In so doing, Congress authorized private citi-

zens to question and circumvent the Executive Branch’s

initiative and prosecutiorial discretion in certain areas.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(2). The concept that highlights

the interplay between the separation of powers doctrine

and congressional mandates for environmental protection

is standing. Indeed, by permitting a broader interpreta-

tion of the constitutional standing requirements, individ-

8. The problem is illustrated by a review conducted of set-

tlements reached in 1983 involving citizen suits which re-

vealed that in 90°/o of the cases environmental organiza-

tions and not the federal government received monetary

payments. See Generally: Lewis, Environmentalist Author-

ity to Sue Industry is Unconstitutional Under Separation

of Powers Doctrine, 16 ELR 10101 (Apr. 1986). In Febru-

ary, 1987, Congress amended the Act to provide that con-

sent decrees must be submitted to the Attorney Genera!

and the Administrator of the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3).

The stated purpose of the provision is to protect the in-

terests of the United States.

9. See Generally: Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing

is an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17

Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881 (1983).

15

uals can now bring before the courts a number of issues

previously considered to be committed to the discretion

of other branches of government.’ While the purpose of

the standing requirement has often been stated that it is

‘‘to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens a

presentation of issues,’’ standing nevertheless requires

that an individual have an injury in fact.'' The existence

of a personal stake in the litigation is the essence of stand

ing. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It is the ability to

particularize an injury that serves as a means to insure

that policy decisions by the executive branch of govern

ment are subject to judicial review only when it is neces

sary to address a direct injury to an individual. Permit

ting private citizens to collect monetary penalties merely

encourages interference with the prosecuturial discretion

granted to an executive Branch of government and violates

the delicate governmental balance sought to be established

by the framers of the Constitution.

D. The Citizens Authority To Sue For Penalties Is

Unconstitutional

In light of the Supreme Court’s recently reaffirmed

concerns over the need to maintain a clear separation of

powers between the branches of government, this Court

must concern itself with the question of who may engaye

in the executive function of collecting money for the gov

ernment. Synar, supra.; Chadha, supra. Under the auth-

orities cited in Buckley, supra, executive functions may

be exercised only by officers of the United States subject

10. Id. pp. 885-890.

11. Jd. pp. 890-894.

16

to appointment and control of the President. Delegation

of executive functions to private citizens by Congress is

an unconstitutional act directly contrary to the Appoint-

ments Clause of the Constitution.!”

The Constitution mandates those who enforce the laws

of the United States be appointed by the President and

subject to his direction and control.

The vesting of the executive power in the Pres-

ident was essentially a grant of the power to execute

the laws. But the President alone and unaided could

not execute the laws. He must execute them by the

assistance of subordinates. ... As he is charged spe-

cifically to take care that they be faithfully executed,

the reasonable implication, even in the absence of ex-

press words, was that as part of his executive power he

should select those who were to act for him under his

direction in the execution of the laws. Myers v. United

States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).

* * *

12.

Two District Courts have considered a similar constitu-

tional argument in the context of the Clean Water Act

and has ruled against it. Student Public Research Group

of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Company, 600 F. Supp.

1474 (D. N.J. 1985). The District Court in SPIRG, relied on

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) to hold that

Congress may vest enforcement power in whomever it

pleases even if it acts unwisely. Davis held that an indi-

vidual had an implied cause of action for damages under

the Fifth Amendment based on her termination from em-

ployment as a staff member to a congressman for sex dis-

crimination. Davis does not, however, stand for the prop-

osition that Congress may authorize private citizens to

perform the functions granted to the President by the Con-

stitution. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem

Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987) the Court

relied on the Monsanto case to approve the use of citizen

suits and also reasoned that the separation of powers argu-

ment was not appropriate because the Legislative Branch

did not retain Executive power for itself, but merely grant-

ed it to private individuals.

17

As stated by the Court in Myers, the President must ap-

point those who enforce the law as part of his constitu-

tional duty to ensure the laws are adequately enforced.

Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the

arguments before stated, is that article 2 grants to the

President the executive power of the government—i.e.,

the laws, including the power of appointment and re-

moval of executive officers—a conclusion confirmed by

his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully

executed ...’’ Id., at pp. 163-164.

Congress may not avoid the Constitutional limitations

of the Appointments Clause merely because it may be pro-

moting a socially beneficial result. The principle of separa-

tion of powers embodied in the Constitution must be ob-

served to insure the proper balance of power between the

various branches of government including well intentioned

but misguided attempts by Congress to relinquish the law

enforcement function of the executive to private citizens.

Therefore, this court must find that 33 U.S.C. § 1365 of the

Clean Water Act is unconstitutional to the extent it seeks

to delegate the exclusive authority of the executive branch

to seek imposition of penalties for violation of environ-

inental laws.

©

CONCLUSION

The writ of certiorari should not be granted in this

case. Respondent submits that the decision by the Fifth

Circuit in this case was correct and consistent with the

First Cireuit in Pawtuxet. Respondent submits that the

Fourth Cireuit’s decision in Gwaltney is incorrect. Addi-

tionally, the decision of the Fifth Circuit may be upheld

18

given the Petitioner’s lack of standing, its failure to give

adequate notice, and the unconstitutionality of the citizen

suit provision of the Clean Water Act. For the above rea-

sons, Petitioner’s writ of certiorari should not be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Jose A. BERLANGA

Burt BALLANFANT*

Shell Oil Company

Legal Department

4708 One Shell Plaza

P. O. Box 2463

Houston, Texas 77001

(713) 241-2233

Sam A. LeBuano, III

Pau. O. Dicuarry

ApvamMs & REESE

4500 One Shell Square

New Orleans, LA 70139

(504) 581-3234

Attorneys for Respondent

App. 1

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AT NEW ORLEANS

SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 84-3583

¥:

SHELL OIL COMPANY, Sect. J MAG 2

Defendant.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff Sierra Club and Defendant Shell Oil Company

(‘‘Shell’’), through their respective undersigned counsel,

hereby agree to the following stipulated facts which shall

be binding upon both parties and their representatives for

the purposes of this action. It is specifically agreed by the

parties that this stipulation is in lieu of the depositions of

Sierra Club personnel and agents noticed by Shell on July

15, 1985, and scheduled pursuant to Magistrate Wynne’s

Minute Entry of July 26, 1985. The parties hereby stipulate

as follows:

1. Shell prepares Discharge Monitoring | Reports

(‘‘DMRs’’) and Non-Compliance Reports (‘‘NCRs’’) and

submits them, as required by federal regulation according

to the terms of its NPDES permit, to the United States

Environmental Protection Agency (‘‘EPA’’).

2. In the fall of 1983, the National Resources Defense

Council (‘‘NRDC’’), as representatives of the Sierra Club,

examined and evaluated EPA NPDES discharge permit

compliance files in several states, including Louisiana. The

App. 2

NRDC reviewed information from the files of the EPA

and the State of Louisiana, including DMRs, NCRs, two

Notices of Deficiency dated February 21, 1979 and May 6,

1981, and a letter from Shell to EPA dated December 13,

1982, responding to deficiencies noted by EPA on Novem-

ber 29-30, 1982, a 1980 and a 1981 NPDES permit applica-

tion, NPDES permits dated July 1977, May 1980 and Aug-

ust 1983, correspondence between Shell and EPA, and Lon-

isiana state compliance and inspection reports. On the basis

of the above review, the NRDC determined that Shell Oil

at Norco, Louisiana, was a company with a pattern of per-

mit non-compliance and that no diligent prosecution had

been made by Federal or State authorities. The informa-

tion collected by Sierra Club’s representatives concerning

Shell Oil’s Noreo, Louisiana, facility was forwarded to

Sierra Club’s counsel, the Center for Law in the Public In-

terest, in or around October of 1983. Shell does not concede

the characterization of its permit history.

3. In or around December 1983 or January 1984, the

Sierra Club Executive and Conservation Administration

Committees in San Francisco, California, in consultation

with the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, determined that

Shell Oil, Norco, Louisiana should be notified of the Sierra

Club’s intent to file suit under the Clean Water Act to en-

force the terms of Shell’s NPDES permit, and authorized

its counsel, the Center for Law in the Public Interest, to

do so.

4. At this time, the Executive Committee of the Sierra

Club was composed of Denny Shaffer, Michelle Perrault,

Sandy Tepfer, Phil Hocker and Marty J. Fluharty. The

Conservation Administration Committee of the Sierra Club

was composed of Michael MeCloskey, Phillip Berry and

App. 3

Denny Shaffer. Mr. McClosky is the only member of either

Committee employed by the Sierra Club, and at the time of

the review discussed herein, served as its Executive Direc-

tor. ;

do. On or about January 20, 1984, the Center for Law

in the Public Interest sent a letter to representatives of

Shell to notify Shell of its intent to file suit under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(b) to enforce the term of Shell’s NPDES permit at

the Norco, Louisiana refinery. This stipulation does not

waive any objections Shel! may have to the adequacy of

such notice.

6. The Sierra Club’s decision to send the letter de-

scribed in paragraph 5 above was based on a review and

analysis by the NRDC and Sierra Club’s counsel in consul-

tation with the Sierra Ciub Legal Defense Fund described

in paragraph 3 above.

7. In or about April 1984, the Center for Law in the

Public Interest made an FOIA request for all DMRs and

NCRs filed by Shell with EPA since April 1983. In May

1984, the Center for Law in the Public Interest obtained

DMRs covering the period of time from April 1983 to Feb-

ruary 1984, and NCRs covering the period of time from

April 1983 to March 1984. No additional requests for DMRs

and NCRs were made by Sierra Club or its counsel to the

EPA until after the filing of the lawsuit.

8. On or about March 13, 1984, representatives of the

Center for Law in the Public Interest met with William

Caughman, manager of the Environmental Conservation

Department, Shell-Norco refinery, and Shell employees

Charles Bland and Cynthia Graham, for the purpose of dis-

cussing the permit exceedances reflected in the DMRs and

App. 4

the purported justifications therefor reflected in the NCRs.

9. Asa result of this meeting, Sierra Club requested

that they be sent the most recent DMRs and NCRs. On

April 12, 1984, Shell sent to Sierra Club DMRs and NCRs

from April 1983 through February 1984 and a December

1983 Bioassay report.

10. Prior to the filing of this action, the investigation

and inquiry into the Shell-Norco permit exceedances made

by the Sierra Club’s representatives and its counsel was

composed of the review of the records described in para-

graphs 1, 2, 7 and 9 hereof and the meeting described in

paragraph 8 hereof.

11. Prior to the filing of the Complaint, the informa-

tion and documents described in paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9

were reviewed and analyzed by Sierra Club’s counsel. At

the time the Complaint was filed, neither the Sierra Club

nor its counsel had any factual evidence of any violation of

Shell’s NPDES Permit (1A0003522) other than the infor-

mation reflected in the DMRs, NCRs and Notices of De-

ficiency described in paragraphs 1, 2, 7 and 9 hereof.

12. At the time the complaint was filed, the Sierra

Club had no factual evidence of any violation which oc-

curred between March 8, 1984 and July 21, 1984, other than

as stated in paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9.

13. At the date of these stipulations, the Sierra Club

has no evidence of any violation occurring between the

dates of March 8, 1984 and July 21, 1984.

et ent Se

1 bes lai 4

aint het

App. 5

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Susan B. Bovee

Burton H. Finkelstein

Susan B. Bovee

FINKELSTEIN, THOMPSON,

LEVENSON & LEWIS

2828 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Suite 200

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 337-8000

/s/ Katherine P. Ransel

ADVOCATES FOR THE

PUBLIC INTEREST

1575 Eye Street, N.W.

Suite 650

Washington, D.C. 20005-1105

(202) 371-0199

/s/ Michael Osborne

OSBORNE, McCOMISKY &

RICHARDSON-HARP

3420 Prytania Street

New Orleans, LA 70115

(504) 891-4418

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sierra Club

APPROVED AND SO

ORDERED:

/s/ Jose A. Berlanga

SHELL OIL COMPANY

4708 One Shell Plaza

Houston, TX 70001

(713) 241-2233

/s/ Paul O. Dicharry

Sam A. LeBlanc, III

Paul O. Dicharry

ADAMS AND REESE

4500 One Shell Square

New Orleans, LA 70139

(504) 581-3234

Attorneys for Defendant

Shell Oil Company

UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE

App. 6

CENTER FOR LAW

In The Public Interest

1575 Eye Street, NW

Suite 650

Washington, D.C. 20005-1105

Telephone (202) 371-0199

Legal Staff Los Angeles Office

Nancy C. Crisman . 3; ’ |

Carlyle W. Hall, Jr.* 10951 West Pico Boulevard |

; Third Floor

i ohn B. Phillipe’ Los Angeles, California |

i 90064-2166

Katherine F. Ransel -

Joel R. Reynolds* Telephone: (213) 470-3000

Marilyn O. Tesauro*

Fredric D. Woocher*

Nicholas C. Yost

Of Counsel

Robert Blake*

Geoffrey Cowan

Administrative Officer

Marsha H. Kwalwasser

Visiting Fellows

Lawrence A. Goldberg

Jocelyn D. Larkin

Cynthia D Robbins

Ethan P. Schulman

*Admitted In Calif.

Not D.C.

January 20, 1984

W. L. Caughman, Jr.

Manager, Environmental Conservation

Shell Oil Company

P. O. Box 10

Noreo, LA 70079

en oF

App. 7

Dear Mr. Caughman:

Section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act (‘‘the Act’’), 33

U.S.C. § 1865(b), requires that sixty (60) days prior to the

filing of a citizens suit in federal district court under § 505

(a) of the Act, an alleged violator, the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency and the State in which the alleged violations

occur must be given notice of the alleged violations.

The Sierra Club hereby places you on notice, pursuant

to 33 U.S.C. § 1865(b), that a review of your discharge

monitoring reports indicates that, Shell Oil Co., Norco Re-

finery has violated and continues to violate ‘‘an effluent

standard or limitation’’ under § 505(a)(1)(A) of the Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(A), by failing to comply with

NPDES/SPDES (‘‘Section 402’’) permit number LA0O00-

3522, in the following respects:

Permit

Outfall Date Limitation Violation

002 Jan. 1981 Hexavalent Chromium

avg. 1.9 Ibs/day 7.3 lbs/day

002 Jan. 1980 Hexavalent Chromium

max. 4.1 Ibs/day 27.4 |lbs/day

002 Dec. 1980 Hexavalent Chromium

max. 3.7 Ibs/day 5.2 lbs/day

002 Feb. 1981 Hexavalent Chromium

max. 3.7 |Ibs/day 4.7 |bs/day

002 Jan. 1983 Hexavalent Chromium

max. 3.7 Ibs/d 5.0 lbs/d

002 March 1983 Hexavalent Chromium

max. 3.7 Ibs/d 4.0 Ibs/d

002 April 1983 Chromium max. 46 Ilbs/d 50 |bs/d

002 Nov. 1980 pH max. 9.0 std units 9.8 s.u.

002 May 1981 pH max. 9.0 std units 9.6 S.u.

002 luly 1981 pH max. 9.0 std units 11.0 s.u.

002 Jupe 1982 pH max. 9.0 std units 9.7 s.u.

002 June 1981 Phenols avg. 11.0 lbs/d 227.0 Ibs/d

002 June 1981 Phenols avg. 22.7/d 1,338 lbs/d

002 Aug. 1980 BOD® max. 3,436 Ibs/d 3,561 Ibs/d

002 July 1981 BOD? max 3,436 Ibs/d 6,140 Ibs/d

App. 8

Permit

Outfall Date Limitation Violation

002 Jan. 1982 BOD* max. 3,436 Ibs/d 4,930 Ibs/d

002 Aug. 1982 BOD* max. 3,436 Ibs/d 3,690 Ibs/d

002 June 1981 COD avg. 13,370 Ibs/d 28,600 Ibs/d

002 April 1983 COD max. 25,792 Ibs/d 36,500 Ibs/d

002 April 1980 TSS avg. 1,661 Ibs/d 2,240 Ibs/d

002 May 1980 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,600 Ibs/d

002 July 1980 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,700 Ibs/d

002 Aug. 1980 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,880 Ibs/d

002 Feb. 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 2,124 Ibs/d

002 April 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,600 Ibs/d

002 May 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 2,100 Ibs/d

002 June 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 2,700 Ibs/d

002 July 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,800 Ibs/d

002 March 1980 TSS max. 2,598 Ibs/d 890 Ibs/d

002 April 1980 TSS max. 2,598 Ibs/d 6,680 Ibs/d

002 May 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 4,090 Ibs/d

002 July 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 2,600 Ibs/d

002 Aug. 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,200 Ibs/d

002 Oct. 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 2,480 Ibs/d

002 Feb. 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 8,400 Ibs/d

002 May 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,100 Ibs/d

002 June 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 6,900 Ibs/d

002 July 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 6,000 Ibs/d

002 Aug. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 lbs/d 2,400 Ibs/d

002 Sept. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,301 Ibs/d

002. Oct. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,200 Ibs/d

002 Nov. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 2,700 Ibs/d )

002 Feb. 1983 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,900 Ibs/d

002 April 1983 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 6,600 Ibs/d |

004 April 1982 TOC max. 5 mg/! 6.0 mg/!

004 June 1982 TOC max. 5 mg/I 9.0 mg/l

004 Aug. 1982 TOC max. 5 mg/I 9.0 mg/l

App. 9

We believe this NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE suf-

ficiently states the grounds for complaint. If, however, you

have any questions or wish to discuss the matter, please

contact us.

Sincerely,

/s/ Signature illegible

Nicholas C. Yost

Nancy C. Crisman

Katherine P. Ransel

Center for Law in the

Public Interest

1575 Eye Street, N.W.

Suite 650

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 371-0199

Counsel for the Sierra Club

ec: Honorable William D. Ruckelshaus

Dick Wittington

Dale Givens

bee: Michael Osborne, Esq.

Buck Parker

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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