Opposition Brief — Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co.
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Supreme Court, Uios ...
SIL BD *
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No. 87-131
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In The CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987
t)
SIERRA CLUB,
Petitioner,
vs.
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Respondent.
fay
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
fay
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
t).
ve
Jose A. BERLANGA
Burt BaLLANFANT*
Shell Oil Company
Legal Department
4708 One Shell Plaza
P. O. Box 2463
Houston, Texas 77001
(713) 241-2283
Sam A. LeBuanc, III
Pau O. DicHarry
Apams & REESE
4500 One Shell Square
New Orleans, LA 70139
(504) 581-3234
Attorneys for Respondent
*Counsel of Reeord
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
or call collect (402) 342-2831
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the Court below was correct in holding that a
federal district court may dismiss a case on the merits
if the plaintiff fails to raise a fact issue about whether
a defendant was ‘‘in violation’’ of its permit when the
action was filed as that term is defined under the Clean
Water Act?
Whether the plaintiff, Sierra Club, had standing to bring
this action?
Whether the notice provided by the Sierra Club pursuant
to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 was adequate?
Whether 33 U.S.C. § 1365 is unconstitutional because it
confers power of the executive branch of government upon
citizens?
ii
PARTIES
Petitioner is Sierra Club, a non-profit corporation
organized under the laws of the State of California.
Respondent, Shell Oil Company, is a Delaware cor-
poration with its principal place of business in Houston,
Texas. All of Shell Oil Company’s common stock is owned
by SPNV Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation, whose
stock is owned by Shell Petroleum N.V., a Netherlands
company. The voting shares of Shell Petroleum N.V. are
held 60 percent by Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and
40 percent by Shell Transport and Trading Company, a
Public Limited Company in London, U.K. Shell Oil Com-
pany also has an interest in a number of companies. The
following companies are affiliated with Shell Oil Company
or one of its affiliates, but are not wholly owned sub-
sidiaries :
Pecten Middle East Services Company
Graveap, Inc.
Heat Transfer Research, Inc.
Inland Corporation
Loop, Ine.
Lucky Chance Mining Company, Inc.
Mesbie Financial Corporation of Houston
Oil Companies Institute for Marine Pollution
Compensation Limited
Oil Insurance Limited
Seadock, Inc.
East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company
Grande Eeallie Land Company, Ine.
Thums Long Beach Company
Van Salt Water Disposal Company
WIDC (Wyoming Industrial Development
Co~poration)
Cortez Capital Corporation
iii
George Newman & Company
Oil Companies Institute for Marine Pollution
Compensation Limited
Butte Pipe Line Company
Dixie Pipeline Company
Explorer Pipeline Company
Locap, Ine.
Olympic Pipe Line Company
Plantation Pipe Line Company
West Shore Pipe Line Company
Wolverine Pipe Line Company
Morrison Molded Fiber Glass Company
Xerkon Ine.
Huntsman Chemical Corporation
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED i
PARTIES il
TABLE OF CONTENTS iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vv
I GIR ini iiciemsnrne 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ..... 6
I. The Decision Below was Decided on the Specific
Record Before the Appellate Court Consistent
with Fifth and First Cireuit Law 22000 6
II. The Respondent Lacks Standing to —— this
pS eee ane 7
Ill. The Respondent Failed to Provide eine
I 1. aiiecohenceaaninioticnipeenipmanaenianionaaeeee 7
IV. Section 1365 of the Act is Unconstitutional in
that it Grants Private Citizens the Authority to
Exercise Executive Functions 2.....ccccccccccccccssceeeceeeeeeeee 9
A. Eoin a Peres 9
I I ne 9
C. Structure of the Clean Water Act ....WW... 11
D. The Citizens Authority to Sue for Penalties
EE RRA aE OE eA ANCE 15
a SAR eee aan le tes LL zarRL roe Rear nn 17
APPENDIX:
EE eee eee eee App. 1
Notice Letter of January 20, 1984 ow App. 6
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CasEs
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 00000... 15
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) 0. 9,15
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) . ..9, 10, 15
Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987) ...... 16
City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th
(ir.), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1975) (Clean
Air Act) Sasa adiesspotoas ad ck ables endin OC tain aeRO aoa NTE 8
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) on cccccccsssssssessesesee 16
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation and Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inec., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986),
cert granted — US —, 107 S. Ct. 872 (U.S. Jan-
a: Bh. 5 eee ee ee ere 1,17
Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corpora-
tion, 756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir. 1985) 2 6
Tn Re Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869) ow. 10, 11
LN.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 979 (1983) 9,15
Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin-
istration, 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. is (Clean
Wee TA oc ee 8
Middlesex County Sewerage District v. National
Sea Clammers Association, 433 U.S. 1 (1981) 00... 7,13
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ww. 16,17
Pawtuxet Cove Marine, Ine. v. Ciba-Geigy Cor-
poration, 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition
for cert. filed (U.S. March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562) 1, 6, 17
Reeger v. Mill Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360
(W.D. Pa. 1984) (Clean Air and Clean Water
TD a a ee ea eee 8
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Company, 817 F.2d 1169
OEE CU, TO accesses neste 1
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) ..... 9
Student Public Research Group of New Jersey,
Ine. v. Monsanto Company, 600 F. Supp. 1474
(TX Tas SD cn eens 16
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1965) ceri. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) nnn eeeeceneeeneenene 11
STATUTES
5 U.S.C. § 502 oo cecnmnssnnnsnnntnnnnninnnnnnnninen 13
TET, GI nicest ction enrcsinidnsetaceiettnenniia 13
| TERA, © I) nici nics ntnstetteniceincincnnccinenspeteisecill 2
| SB TEC. § MOB N GR) iin 12
Oe a , SRR ach io iecccttecenerermiteerniens 2
RIF. CER St); Seana nna Eee 12
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) .............. 12
33 U.S.C. § 1942 ce vovvnvsnnnsnnnnnnnn nn 2
5 8 OSS OAL SD (|: esnemeaiaeds i, 17
$3 U.S.C. $ 1366(a)(1)(2) ——_________._._...... 1
ER BS | | EY dle ONE 2
eT ee Se) TY | en 14
IE CR S| nnn 12
Be TET 6 I annaiincsinecsceiesnenseieestins sissies 14
BT Ts RE cecncinncesntccisnnieesnsisitshn areca een 12
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 13
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
U.S. Constitution
PE SE Sees ae LRN ame A 11, 14
FB Oe tipicne ecaaniaaias 14
REGULATIONS
35 C.F.R. 15623 reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. App. at
ge | Ne NEI nIr te ORNL Bee OREO SOR PEC
12
40 C.F.R. §1226 MMe Teas
TEextTs
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing is an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881 (1983) eee
Lewis, Envirenmentalist Authority to Sue Indus-
try is Unconstitutional Under Separation of
Powers Doctrine, 16 ELR 10101 (Apr. 1986)
Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution
Control Laws (pts. 1-3), 13 ELR 10309 (Oct.
1983), 14 ELR 10063 (Feb. 1984), 14 ELR 10407
CRG III Fc issechs onacaecnieecccanteriecanieeriaanor
14
13
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Respondent Shell Oil Company respectfully prays that
this court deny the Sierra Club’s petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States District Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Cireuit entered in Sterra Club v. Shell Oil Company, 817
F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1987) on May 29, 1987. While this
court has granted a writ of certiorari in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Na-
tural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 791 F.2d 304 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert granted — US —, 107 S. Ct. 872 (US.
January 12, 1987), (hereinafter Gwaltney), (No. 86-473)
this case turns upon its own facts and is consistent with
Pawtuxet Cove Marine, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corporation,
807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert filed (U.S.
March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562) (hereinafter Pawtuzet).
Respondent respectfully submits that the decision of the
Fourth Cireuit in Gwaltney is incorrect.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Sierra Club’s presentation of Shell Oil Company’s
(‘‘Shell’’) compliance record according to its Clean Water
Act permit (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit, hereinafter NPDES) at its petroleum
refinery in Norco, Louisiana, discloses the petitioner’s
failure to address the central factual determination made
by the trial court, ie., the plaintiff’s failure to raise a
fact issue concerning whether or not Shell was in violation
of the Act at the time that the Complaint was filed. Shell’s
factual presentation of the case was uncontradicted in spite
of the opportunity of the plaintiff to conduct extensive
discovery for more than a year. The uncontradicted fac-
tual record before the trial court revealed the following
permit and compliance history for Shell Oi] Company’s
oil refinery in Norco, Louisiana.
Shell’s Noreo Refinery was issued its first NPDES
permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1842 of the Clean Water Act in
July, 1977. Although that permit expired under its terms
on October 30, 1979, the permit remained in effect pursuant
to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c),
and 40 C.F.R. § 122.6 during pendency of Shell’s applica-
tion for a new permit. That second permit was issued on
May 16, 1980; the third and current permit was issued on
August 15, 1983.
On or about January 20, 1984, Sierra Club attorneys
sent a letter ostensibly under 33 U.S.C. 1365(b) to notify
Shell of the Sierra Club’s intent to file suit to enforce the
terms of Shell’s NPDES permit at the Norco Refinery.
Sierra Club filed its Complaint on July 24, 1984 alleging
violations by Shell of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a). Specifically, the Sierra Club alleged 120 viola-
tions of Shell’s NPDES permit at the Norco Refinery be-
tween January, 1980 and March, 1984. Sierra Club also al-
leged that violations had occurred subsequent to March,
1984. At the time the suit was filed Sierra Club had no
evidence that Shell had violated its permit in any way
after March 7, 1984.
Respondent will summarize the record reviewed by
the appellate court with respect to Shell’s compliance his-
tory on two (2) of the eight (8) parameters at issue in the
litigation. A detailed discussion of these two (2) para-
meters is important to highlight the appellate court’s
thorough review of the record in order to determine
whether a factual issue had been created by the Sierra
Club’s showing before the district court.
TOTAL SUSPENDED SOLIDS (TSS)
Since 1976 each of Shell’s permits has contained
dual limitations which placed a Daily Maximum and Daily
Average limitation on the amount of pollutants that could
be discharged from Shell’s refinery. The TSS limitations
in effect under Shell’s second permit were more restric-
tive than the limitations of the first permit. While the
second permit was in effect a total of forty-eight (48) ex-
ceedences were reported to the Environmental Protection
Agency (hereinafter EPA). On August 15, 1983, the EPA
issued Shell’s third permit. Shell’s third permit, however,
contained higher limitations for TSS. After the issuance
of the third permit, there was only one TSS Daily Maxi-
mum exceedence. That exceedence occurred on December
29, 1983 in the midst of the coldest weather experiencd in
4
the Norco area in over twenty (20) years. No other T'SS
exceedences occurred between December 29, 1983 and
February 7, 1985.! Any problem that may have existed
with respect to the TSS limits was solved by the increased
limitations granted by the EPA. At the time the complaint
was filed, there was no continuing or recurring violation
of the TSS parameter at Shell’s Norco refinery.
CHROMIUM, HEXAVALENT AND TOTAL
Shell used chromates for the purpose of corrosion con-
trol in its water cooling towers at its Norco refinery. Be-
tween the approximate dates of January, 1980 and July,
1984, Shell’s records submitted to the EPA reflect that
there were a total of eighteen (18) exceedences of hexa-
valent chromium. In addition, during that same time per-
iod, there were a total of two (2) Daily Maximum exceed-
ences of total chromium. The last chromate excecedance, a
hexavalent chromium exceedence, occurred on March 7,
1984.
Sierra Club lawyers were advised in March, 1984 by
William L. Caughman, Jr., Environmental Conservation
Manager for the Norco refinery, that Shell was contem-
plating the elimination of chromates for corrosion control
at the Norco refinery. Mr. Caughman recommended in
1. The district court’s ruling on Shell’s Motion for Summary
Judgment was based on various supporting materials.
The supporting materials included three (3) affidavits from
William L. Caughman, Jr., excerpts of the depositions of
William L. Caughman, Jr., excerpts from R. E. Deister’s
deposition, a summary of the reported exceedences and
the Stipulation of the Sierra Club. The material was pre-
sented in support of Shell’s factual presentation of its case
and was uncontroverted.
May, 1984, that a non-chromate corrosion control system
be implemented. In June, 11984, Mr. Caughman’s recom-
mendation was accepted. By January, 1985, the Norco
refinery was utilizing a non-chromate corrosion control
system. Shell’s use of a non-chromate corrosion control
system at the refinery eliminated the likelihood that Shell
would ever experience a recurring problem with the
chromate parameters.
The Sierra Club made no further inquiry regarding
chromates prior to filing its action in July, 1984. At the
time Sierra Club filed its Complaint, it had no evidence
that there had been any exceedences occurring between
March 8, 1984 and July 21, 1984, the date the Complaint
was filed. See App. at App. 1.
OTHER PARAMETERS
The remainder of Shell’s compliance record merely
reveals a variety of multiple, sporadic and past exceed-
ences of different parameters during an extended time
period. Of the five reported phenol exceedences, four oc-
curred during a pipe rupture in 1981. The four TOC
(Total Organic Carbon) exceedences reported in 1982 oc-
curred at a separate outfall from the remainder of the ex-
ceedences. ‘he evidence and testimony presented by Shell
demonstrated that the Shell laboratory responsible for
making the tests experienced a short period of time during
which the elevated readings were attributed by the labora-
tory manager, R. EK. Deister, to errors made by persons
in charge of preparing the sample bottles used to conduct
the tests. The records submitted by Shell to the EPA
demonstrated that there were a total of eleven (11) ph
exceedences since January, 1980. However, the last ph
exceedence prior to the filing of the Complaint occurred
on June 23, 1982. Shell’s records also indicated a total
of 15 BOD (Biochemical Oxygen Demand) exceedences.
Of that total, 7 occurred during unusually severe weath-
er conditions in the Noreo area in December, 1983 and
January, 1984. The last BOD exceedence prior to the
filing of the Complaint, occurred on January 16, 1984.
There were no other exceedences of this parameter for
more than six months prior to the date the plaintiff
filed its Complaint.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. THE DECISION BELOW WAS DECIDED ON THE
SPECIFIC RECORD BEFORE THE APPELLATE
COURT CONSISTENT WITH FIFTH AND FIRST
CIRCUIT LAW.
The Respondents’ Opposition to the Petition for Cer-
tiorari addresses the propriety of the Appellate Court’s
ruling on the basis of the factual records and current Fifth
and First Circuit law and those arguments will not be re-
peated here. The court is respectfully referred to the con-
solidated opposition for a recitation of all the applicable
arguments. Respondent points out, however, that under the
standards articulated by the Fifth Cireuit in Hamker v.
Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corp., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.
1985) and by the First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove Marina,
Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986),
Petition for Cert. filed (U.S. March 17, 1987) (No. 86-
~]
1562), the uncontradicted factual record before the district
and appellate courts demonstrated that Shell was not in
violation on or near the date the Complaint was filed.
Petitioner simply failed to raise a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact and the trial court granted a summary judgment
for Shell. The Fifth Cireuit found no error with the trial
court’s decision, and affirmed.
Il. THE RESPONDENT LACKS STANDING TO
BRING THIS ACTION
Respondent contends that the Petitioner does not have
standing to bring this action. The arguments on standing
are addressed in the consolidated opposition and will not
be repeated here. The Court is respectfully referred to the
consolidated brief for a full recitation of the applicable
arguments.
III. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADE-
QUATE NOTICE
Sierra Club’s notice letter of January, 1984, cited
forty-seven (47) alleged violations of the Act. See App. at
App. 6. Respondent contends that the notice is deficient
because it makes reference to alleged violations of expired
permits and the notice cited twenty-five (25) alleged TSS
violations of a limit which was subsequently increased.
The notice letter on its face did not make any reference
at all to a non-compliance under Shell’s permit in effect
at the time that the Complaint was filed. Only alleged
violations of expired permits were cited.
As stated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Middle-
sex County Sewerage District v. National Sea Clammers
Assn., 433 U.S. 1 (1981) notice is mandatory. Notice of
8
alleged violations relating to expired permits or limita-
tions which are no longer applicable cannot support juris-
diction. The language which prohibits the filing of an
action without giving proper notice has been held to be
jurisdictional in several environmental contexts. City of
Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.), ceri.
denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1975) (Clean Air Act); Massachu-
setts v. United States Veterans Administration, 541 F.2d
119 (1st Cir. 1976) (Clean Water Act); Reeger v. Mill
Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts). The purpose of the notice
provision is to trigger governmental action thereby al-
leviating the need for judicial action. Highland Park,
supra at 691. Recourse to the court is appropriate only
when the administrative action taken is inadequate.
Massachusetts, supra at 121.
The last item referenced by the Sierra Club in its
notice letter is dated April, 1983. See App. at App. 7. On its
face such a notice cannot be sufficient to ‘‘trigger’’ govern-
mental action particularly in view of the reference within
that notice to outdated limitations. The only concern
which can be gleaned from the Sierra Club’s notice is that
the plaintiff was concerned about a problem related to an
expired permit. Plaintiff’s listing of more recent alleged
violations in an appendix to its complaint is of no conse-
quence since the Act requires notice before an action is
filed. As stipulated by the Sierra Club at the time the
complaint was filed, the Sierra Club had no factual evi-
dence of any violations which occurred between March 8,
1984 and July 21, 1984. For the above reasons, the notice
letter of January, 1984, was insufficient and failed to
comply with the requirements of Section 1365(b) of the
Act.
IV. SECTION 1365 OF THE ACT IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL IN THAT IT GRANTS PRIVATE CITI-
ZENS THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE EXECU.
TIVE FUNCTIONS
A. Separation of Powers
The principle of separation of powers between the
various branches of government is embedded in the very
structure of the Constitution. The Constitution divides
the powers of the Federal Government into three categor-
ies, Legislative, Executive and Judicial. [.N.S. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 979, 951 (1983). As noted by the Supreme Court,
the reason for dividing the powers of government was to
‘diffuse power the better to secure liberty.’’ Bowsher v.
Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
B. Executive Function
The Constitution vests the Executive Power of govern-
ment in the President. U.S. Const. Art. II, §1, cl. 1. En-
forcement of the laws is an executive function.
Legislative power, as distinguished from execu-
tive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to
enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the
duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive
functions. Springer v. Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 202 (1928).
The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
struck down provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act providing primary responsibility for conducting civil
litigation in U.S. District Courts to an eight member Fed-
eral Election Commission composed of members appointed
by the President as well as members appointed by the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The Supreme
10
Court based its decision in Buckley on the doctrine of
separation of powers between the branches of government
and the constitutional requirement that only officers of the
United States appointed pursuant to the Constitution may
engage in the enforcement of the public law. Buckley,
supra., pp 118-143.
The authority of the Executive Branch to seek for-
feiture of property to the government highlights the
unique position of the executive in such matters. In Re
Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869), the Supreme Court
considered whether an informer had a vested interest in a
shop seized for violation of laws prohibiting the use of
property to aid, abet or promote insurrection. At the
time, the Act of August 6, 1861, provided that an informer
was entitled to a moiety from the proceeds of a forfeiture.
The court decided that the informer had no vested in-
terest in the subject matter of the action and upheld the
lower courts decision to permit dismissal of the libel in
one instance and the reversal of a decree in favor of the
United States at the request of the Attorney General in
another. The total and complete autonomy of the execu-
tive in these matters has been clearly established.
Whether tested, therefore, by the requirements of
the Judiciary Act, or by the usage of the government,
or by the decisions of this court, it is clear that all
such suits, so far as the interests of the United States
are concerned, are subject to the direction and within
the control of the Attorney-General. Confiscation
Cases, at 458-459.
The penalty extracted by the government for violation of
environmental provisions is no different than the penalty
11
of forfeiture imposed for violation of numerous laws estab-
lished by Congress.”
The autonomy of the Executive Branch in matters re-
lated to the criminal enforcement of laws is likewise un-
disputed. In United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th
Cir. 1965) cert. dented, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held in an en bane decision that a
United States Attorney was justified in refusing an order
of a district court to prepare and sign an indictment. In
the Cox case the grand jury had made it clear that they
wanted to bring indictments against certain persons. The
U.S. Attorney refused and could not be ordered by the
court to do so. The importance of this case is that it un-
derscores the exclusive authority of the Executive Branch
in the enforcement of the law to the exclusion of private
citizens even if clothed with the mantle of authority
granted to a grand jury. In matters relating to the en-
forcement of the law, the holdings in Cox and in Confisca-
tion Cases support the proposition that the Executive
Branch has the right to enforce civil laws to the exclusion
of any right by private citizens to collect penalties.
C. Structure of the Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act reflects in part that Congress
worked within the Constitutional requirement providing
that the laws of the United States be enforced by Officers
of the United States in accordance with U.S. Const. Art.
II, 42, el. 2. The Act grants to the administrator of the
2. The CWA was amended on February 4, 1987, to provide
for penalties in the amount of $25,000 per day for each
violation.
12
EPA the authority to administer the Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(d). The Administrator, the head of the Agency, is
appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 C.F.R. 15623
reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. App. at 81 (West Supp. 1986). Un-
der the Act the administrator has broad powers to enforce
the provisions of the law by administrative or judicial ac-
tion. 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Under § 1319(d), the administrator
may seek civil penalties in the amount of $10,000 per day
for violation of permit conditions.’ The Attorney General
of the United States shall at the request of the adminis-
trator appear and represent the United States in civil and
criminal actions filed under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1367.
Officers or employees of the EPA are also authorized to
appear and represent the United States under certain con-
ditions. /d. The Attorney General is the head of the
Department of Justice appointed by the President with
3. Respondent acknowledges the existence of qui tam actions.
Several statutes, such as the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729, as amended provide private citizens with a per-
centage of a recovery of any action for actions brought
against persons who defraud the government. No court
has yet addressed the constitutionality of qui tam actions
in the context of a challenge based on the separation of
powers doctrine. Significant differences exit between the
qui tam statutes and citizen suits. Private citizens do not
obtain an interest in the recovery, i.e., the penalty. The
very essence of standing in environmental cases is predi-
cated on an individualized injury and not based on se-
curing a benefit for the public at large. Additionally, the
need to provide incentives to private individuals is not
present. Unlike the cases involving fraud, there is no need
to encourage informers. All information necessary to file
an action is provided to the government and available to
the public. Qui tam actions do not support the consti-
tutionality of citizen suits simply because the rationale
for their existence is substantially different.
13
the advice and consent of the Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 503. The
Department of Justice is an executive department of the
government. 5 U.S.C. § 502. While the foregoing demon-
strates the constitutional structure established by Congress
to enforee the provisions of the Clean Water Act, Con
gress exceeded the constitutionally permissible limits when
it chose to give private citizens the right to exercise an
executive function: i.e., the right to collect a penalty pre-
sumably destined for the U.S. Treasury.
It is important to note that many environmental sta-
tutes provide for dual enforcement by federal or state gov-
ernments and for a private cause of action by citizens. The
Clean Water Act was enacted in 1970° and has served as a
model for many environmental statutes. The difference
between the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act is that
private citizens may seek monetary penalties in addition
to injunctive relief. This difference is significant because
the Clean Water Act does not directly provide that penal
ties collected are payable to the United States Treasury.’
Private citizens do not fall under the provisions applicable
to custodians of public money who may be removed from
office for failure to promptly deposit public money in the
4. The Act on its face does not require a citizen to deposit
penalties in the Treasury. However, the Supreme Court sug-
gested in a footnote that the penalties collected by private
citizens are payable to the government. Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1,
14 & n.25 (1981).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642.
6 See Generally: Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pol-
lution Central Laws (pts. 1-3). 13 ELR 10309 (Oct. 1983),
14 ELR 10063 (Feb. 1984), 14 ELR 10407 (Nov. 1984).
VI
See footnote 4
14
U.S. Treasury. 33 U.S.C. § 3302. More importantly, pri-
vate citizens have not been appointed by the President to
enforce environmental laws as required by the Constitu-
tion. U.S. Const. Art. Il, § 2, el. 2. The lack of authority
and oversight over the activities of persons who exercise
executive functions means that the Parsident cannot effec-
tively meet his obligation to ‘‘take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’’ U.S. Const. art. LI, §3.°
By enacting a statutory scheme providing aggrieved
citizens the right to sue for relief in connection with the
enforcement of environmental laws, Congress brought the
separation of powers and standing doctrines into con-
sideration.’ In so doing, Congress authorized private citi-
zens to question and circumvent the Executive Branch’s
initiative and prosecutiorial discretion in certain areas.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(2). The concept that highlights
the interplay between the separation of powers doctrine
and congressional mandates for environmental protection
is standing. Indeed, by permitting a broader interpreta-
tion of the constitutional standing requirements, individ-
8. The problem is illustrated by a review conducted of set-
tlements reached in 1983 involving citizen suits which re-
vealed that in 90°/o of the cases environmental organiza-
tions and not the federal government received monetary
payments. See Generally: Lewis, Environmentalist Author-
ity to Sue Industry is Unconstitutional Under Separation
of Powers Doctrine, 16 ELR 10101 (Apr. 1986). In Febru-
ary, 1987, Congress amended the Act to provide that con-
sent decrees must be submitted to the Attorney Genera!
and the Administrator of the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3).
The stated purpose of the provision is to protect the in-
terests of the United States.
9. See Generally: Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing
is an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881 (1983).
15
uals can now bring before the courts a number of issues
previously considered to be committed to the discretion
of other branches of government.’ While the purpose of
the standing requirement has often been stated that it is
‘‘to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens a
presentation of issues,’’ standing nevertheless requires
that an individual have an injury in fact.'' The existence
of a personal stake in the litigation is the essence of stand
ing. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It is the ability to
particularize an injury that serves as a means to insure
that policy decisions by the executive branch of govern
ment are subject to judicial review only when it is neces
sary to address a direct injury to an individual. Permit
ting private citizens to collect monetary penalties merely
encourages interference with the prosecuturial discretion
granted to an executive Branch of government and violates
the delicate governmental balance sought to be established
by the framers of the Constitution.
D. The Citizens Authority To Sue For Penalties Is
Unconstitutional
In light of the Supreme Court’s recently reaffirmed
concerns over the need to maintain a clear separation of
powers between the branches of government, this Court
must concern itself with the question of who may engaye
in the executive function of collecting money for the gov
ernment. Synar, supra.; Chadha, supra. Under the auth-
orities cited in Buckley, supra, executive functions may
be exercised only by officers of the United States subject
10. Id. pp. 885-890.
11. Jd. pp. 890-894.
16
to appointment and control of the President. Delegation
of executive functions to private citizens by Congress is
an unconstitutional act directly contrary to the Appoint-
ments Clause of the Constitution.!”
The Constitution mandates those who enforce the laws
of the United States be appointed by the President and
subject to his direction and control.
The vesting of the executive power in the Pres-
ident was essentially a grant of the power to execute
the laws. But the President alone and unaided could
not execute the laws. He must execute them by the
assistance of subordinates. ... As he is charged spe-
cifically to take care that they be faithfully executed,
the reasonable implication, even in the absence of ex-
press words, was that as part of his executive power he
should select those who were to act for him under his
direction in the execution of the laws. Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
* * *
12.
Two District Courts have considered a similar constitu-
tional argument in the context of the Clean Water Act
and has ruled against it. Student Public Research Group
of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Company, 600 F. Supp.
1474 (D. N.J. 1985). The District Court in SPIRG, relied on
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) to hold that
Congress may vest enforcement power in whomever it
pleases even if it acts unwisely. Davis held that an indi-
vidual had an implied cause of action for damages under
the Fifth Amendment based on her termination from em-
ployment as a staff member to a congressman for sex dis-
crimination. Davis does not, however, stand for the prop-
osition that Congress may authorize private citizens to
perform the functions granted to the President by the Con-
stitution. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987) the Court
relied on the Monsanto case to approve the use of citizen
suits and also reasoned that the separation of powers argu-
ment was not appropriate because the Legislative Branch
did not retain Executive power for itself, but merely grant-
ed it to private individuals.
17
As stated by the Court in Myers, the President must ap-
point those who enforce the law as part of his constitu-
tional duty to ensure the laws are adequately enforced.
Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the
arguments before stated, is that article 2 grants to the
President the executive power of the government—i.e.,
the laws, including the power of appointment and re-
moval of executive officers—a conclusion confirmed by
his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed ...’’ Id., at pp. 163-164.
Congress may not avoid the Constitutional limitations
of the Appointments Clause merely because it may be pro-
moting a socially beneficial result. The principle of separa-
tion of powers embodied in the Constitution must be ob-
served to insure the proper balance of power between the
various branches of government including well intentioned
but misguided attempts by Congress to relinquish the law
enforcement function of the executive to private citizens.
Therefore, this court must find that 33 U.S.C. § 1365 of the
Clean Water Act is unconstitutional to the extent it seeks
to delegate the exclusive authority of the executive branch
to seek imposition of penalties for violation of environ-
inental laws.
©
CONCLUSION
The writ of certiorari should not be granted in this
case. Respondent submits that the decision by the Fifth
Circuit in this case was correct and consistent with the
First Cireuit in Pawtuxet. Respondent submits that the
Fourth Cireuit’s decision in Gwaltney is incorrect. Addi-
tionally, the decision of the Fifth Circuit may be upheld
18
given the Petitioner’s lack of standing, its failure to give
adequate notice, and the unconstitutionality of the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Act. For the above rea-
sons, Petitioner’s writ of certiorari should not be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Jose A. BERLANGA
Burt BALLANFANT*
Shell Oil Company
Legal Department
4708 One Shell Plaza
P. O. Box 2463
Houston, Texas 77001
(713) 241-2233
Sam A. LeBuano, III
Pau. O. Dicuarry
ApvamMs & REESE
4500 One Shell Square
New Orleans, LA 70139
(504) 581-3234
Attorneys for Respondent
App. 1
APPENDIX
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
AT NEW ORLEANS
SIERRA CLUB,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 84-3583
¥:
SHELL OIL COMPANY, Sect. J MAG 2
Defendant.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff Sierra Club and Defendant Shell Oil Company
(‘‘Shell’’), through their respective undersigned counsel,
hereby agree to the following stipulated facts which shall
be binding upon both parties and their representatives for
the purposes of this action. It is specifically agreed by the
parties that this stipulation is in lieu of the depositions of
Sierra Club personnel and agents noticed by Shell on July
15, 1985, and scheduled pursuant to Magistrate Wynne’s
Minute Entry of July 26, 1985. The parties hereby stipulate
as follows:
1. Shell prepares Discharge Monitoring | Reports
(‘‘DMRs’’) and Non-Compliance Reports (‘‘NCRs’’) and
submits them, as required by federal regulation according
to the terms of its NPDES permit, to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (‘‘EPA’’).
2. In the fall of 1983, the National Resources Defense
Council (‘‘NRDC’’), as representatives of the Sierra Club,
examined and evaluated EPA NPDES discharge permit
compliance files in several states, including Louisiana. The
App. 2
NRDC reviewed information from the files of the EPA
and the State of Louisiana, including DMRs, NCRs, two
Notices of Deficiency dated February 21, 1979 and May 6,
1981, and a letter from Shell to EPA dated December 13,
1982, responding to deficiencies noted by EPA on Novem-
ber 29-30, 1982, a 1980 and a 1981 NPDES permit applica-
tion, NPDES permits dated July 1977, May 1980 and Aug-
ust 1983, correspondence between Shell and EPA, and Lon-
isiana state compliance and inspection reports. On the basis
of the above review, the NRDC determined that Shell Oil
at Norco, Louisiana, was a company with a pattern of per-
mit non-compliance and that no diligent prosecution had
been made by Federal or State authorities. The informa-
tion collected by Sierra Club’s representatives concerning
Shell Oil’s Noreo, Louisiana, facility was forwarded to
Sierra Club’s counsel, the Center for Law in the Public In-
terest, in or around October of 1983. Shell does not concede
the characterization of its permit history.
3. In or around December 1983 or January 1984, the
Sierra Club Executive and Conservation Administration
Committees in San Francisco, California, in consultation
with the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, determined that
Shell Oil, Norco, Louisiana should be notified of the Sierra
Club’s intent to file suit under the Clean Water Act to en-
force the terms of Shell’s NPDES permit, and authorized
its counsel, the Center for Law in the Public Interest, to
do so.
4. At this time, the Executive Committee of the Sierra
Club was composed of Denny Shaffer, Michelle Perrault,
Sandy Tepfer, Phil Hocker and Marty J. Fluharty. The
Conservation Administration Committee of the Sierra Club
was composed of Michael MeCloskey, Phillip Berry and
App. 3
Denny Shaffer. Mr. McClosky is the only member of either
Committee employed by the Sierra Club, and at the time of
the review discussed herein, served as its Executive Direc-
tor. ;
do. On or about January 20, 1984, the Center for Law
in the Public Interest sent a letter to representatives of
Shell to notify Shell of its intent to file suit under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b) to enforce the term of Shell’s NPDES permit at
the Norco, Louisiana refinery. This stipulation does not
waive any objections Shel! may have to the adequacy of
such notice.
6. The Sierra Club’s decision to send the letter de-
scribed in paragraph 5 above was based on a review and
analysis by the NRDC and Sierra Club’s counsel in consul-
tation with the Sierra Ciub Legal Defense Fund described
in paragraph 3 above.
7. In or about April 1984, the Center for Law in the
Public Interest made an FOIA request for all DMRs and
NCRs filed by Shell with EPA since April 1983. In May
1984, the Center for Law in the Public Interest obtained
DMRs covering the period of time from April 1983 to Feb-
ruary 1984, and NCRs covering the period of time from
April 1983 to March 1984. No additional requests for DMRs
and NCRs were made by Sierra Club or its counsel to the
EPA until after the filing of the lawsuit.
8. On or about March 13, 1984, representatives of the
Center for Law in the Public Interest met with William
Caughman, manager of the Environmental Conservation
Department, Shell-Norco refinery, and Shell employees
Charles Bland and Cynthia Graham, for the purpose of dis-
cussing the permit exceedances reflected in the DMRs and
App. 4
the purported justifications therefor reflected in the NCRs.
9. Asa result of this meeting, Sierra Club requested
that they be sent the most recent DMRs and NCRs. On
April 12, 1984, Shell sent to Sierra Club DMRs and NCRs
from April 1983 through February 1984 and a December
1983 Bioassay report.
10. Prior to the filing of this action, the investigation
and inquiry into the Shell-Norco permit exceedances made
by the Sierra Club’s representatives and its counsel was
composed of the review of the records described in para-
graphs 1, 2, 7 and 9 hereof and the meeting described in
paragraph 8 hereof.
11. Prior to the filing of the Complaint, the informa-
tion and documents described in paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9
were reviewed and analyzed by Sierra Club’s counsel. At
the time the Complaint was filed, neither the Sierra Club
nor its counsel had any factual evidence of any violation of
Shell’s NPDES Permit (1A0003522) other than the infor-
mation reflected in the DMRs, NCRs and Notices of De-
ficiency described in paragraphs 1, 2, 7 and 9 hereof.
12. At the time the complaint was filed, the Sierra
Club had no factual evidence of any violation which oc-
curred between March 8, 1984 and July 21, 1984, other than
as stated in paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9.
13. At the date of these stipulations, the Sierra Club
has no evidence of any violation occurring between the
dates of March 8, 1984 and July 21, 1984.
et ent Se
1 bes lai 4
aint het
App. 5
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Susan B. Bovee
Burton H. Finkelstein
Susan B. Bovee
FINKELSTEIN, THOMPSON,
LEVENSON & LEWIS
2828 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 337-8000
/s/ Katherine P. Ransel
ADVOCATES FOR THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
1575 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 650
Washington, D.C. 20005-1105
(202) 371-0199
/s/ Michael Osborne
OSBORNE, McCOMISKY &
RICHARDSON-HARP
3420 Prytania Street
New Orleans, LA 70115
(504) 891-4418
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sierra Club
APPROVED AND SO
ORDERED:
/s/ Jose A. Berlanga
SHELL OIL COMPANY
4708 One Shell Plaza
Houston, TX 70001
(713) 241-2233
/s/ Paul O. Dicharry
Sam A. LeBlanc, III
Paul O. Dicharry
ADAMS AND REESE
4500 One Shell Square
New Orleans, LA 70139
(504) 581-3234
Attorneys for Defendant
Shell Oil Company
UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE
App. 6
CENTER FOR LAW
In The Public Interest
1575 Eye Street, NW
Suite 650
Washington, D.C. 20005-1105
Telephone (202) 371-0199
Legal Staff Los Angeles Office
Nancy C. Crisman . 3; ’ |
Carlyle W. Hall, Jr.* 10951 West Pico Boulevard |
; Third Floor
i ohn B. Phillipe’ Los Angeles, California |
i 90064-2166
Katherine F. Ransel -
Joel R. Reynolds* Telephone: (213) 470-3000
Marilyn O. Tesauro*
Fredric D. Woocher*
Nicholas C. Yost
Of Counsel
Robert Blake*
Geoffrey Cowan
Administrative Officer
Marsha H. Kwalwasser
Visiting Fellows
Lawrence A. Goldberg
Jocelyn D. Larkin
Cynthia D Robbins
Ethan P. Schulman
*Admitted In Calif.
Not D.C.
January 20, 1984
W. L. Caughman, Jr.
Manager, Environmental Conservation
Shell Oil Company
P. O. Box 10
Noreo, LA 70079
en oF
App. 7
Dear Mr. Caughman:
Section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act (‘‘the Act’’), 33
U.S.C. § 1865(b), requires that sixty (60) days prior to the
filing of a citizens suit in federal district court under § 505
(a) of the Act, an alleged violator, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the State in which the alleged violations
occur must be given notice of the alleged violations.
The Sierra Club hereby places you on notice, pursuant
to 33 U.S.C. § 1865(b), that a review of your discharge
monitoring reports indicates that, Shell Oil Co., Norco Re-
finery has violated and continues to violate ‘‘an effluent
standard or limitation’’ under § 505(a)(1)(A) of the Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(A), by failing to comply with
NPDES/SPDES (‘‘Section 402’’) permit number LA0O00-
3522, in the following respects:
Permit
Outfall Date Limitation Violation
002 Jan. 1981 Hexavalent Chromium
avg. 1.9 Ibs/day 7.3 lbs/day
002 Jan. 1980 Hexavalent Chromium
max. 4.1 Ibs/day 27.4 |lbs/day
002 Dec. 1980 Hexavalent Chromium
max. 3.7 Ibs/day 5.2 lbs/day
002 Feb. 1981 Hexavalent Chromium
max. 3.7 |Ibs/day 4.7 |bs/day
002 Jan. 1983 Hexavalent Chromium
max. 3.7 Ibs/d 5.0 lbs/d
002 March 1983 Hexavalent Chromium
max. 3.7 Ibs/d 4.0 Ibs/d
002 April 1983 Chromium max. 46 Ilbs/d 50 |bs/d
002 Nov. 1980 pH max. 9.0 std units 9.8 s.u.
002 May 1981 pH max. 9.0 std units 9.6 S.u.
002 luly 1981 pH max. 9.0 std units 11.0 s.u.
002 Jupe 1982 pH max. 9.0 std units 9.7 s.u.
002 June 1981 Phenols avg. 11.0 lbs/d 227.0 Ibs/d
002 June 1981 Phenols avg. 22.7/d 1,338 lbs/d
002 Aug. 1980 BOD® max. 3,436 Ibs/d 3,561 Ibs/d
002 July 1981 BOD? max 3,436 Ibs/d 6,140 Ibs/d
App. 8
Permit
Outfall Date Limitation Violation
002 Jan. 1982 BOD* max. 3,436 Ibs/d 4,930 Ibs/d
002 Aug. 1982 BOD* max. 3,436 Ibs/d 3,690 Ibs/d
002 June 1981 COD avg. 13,370 Ibs/d 28,600 Ibs/d
002 April 1983 COD max. 25,792 Ibs/d 36,500 Ibs/d
002 April 1980 TSS avg. 1,661 Ibs/d 2,240 Ibs/d
002 May 1980 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,600 Ibs/d
002 July 1980 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,700 Ibs/d
002 Aug. 1980 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,880 Ibs/d
002 Feb. 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 2,124 Ibs/d
002 April 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,600 Ibs/d
002 May 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 2,100 Ibs/d
002 June 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 2,700 Ibs/d
002 July 1981 TSS avg. 1,519 Ibs/d 1,800 Ibs/d
002 March 1980 TSS max. 2,598 Ibs/d 890 Ibs/d
002 April 1980 TSS max. 2,598 Ibs/d 6,680 Ibs/d
002 May 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 4,090 Ibs/d
002 July 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 2,600 Ibs/d
002 Aug. 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,200 Ibs/d
002 Oct. 1980 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 2,480 Ibs/d
002 Feb. 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 8,400 Ibs/d
002 May 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,100 Ibs/d
002 June 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 6,900 Ibs/d
002 July 1981 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 6,000 Ibs/d
002 Aug. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 lbs/d 2,400 Ibs/d
002 Sept. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,301 Ibs/d
002. Oct. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,200 Ibs/d
002 Nov. 1982 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 2,700 Ibs/d )
002 Feb. 1983 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 3,900 Ibs/d
002 April 1983 TSS max. 2,376 Ibs/d 6,600 Ibs/d |
004 April 1982 TOC max. 5 mg/! 6.0 mg/!
004 June 1982 TOC max. 5 mg/I 9.0 mg/l
004 Aug. 1982 TOC max. 5 mg/I 9.0 mg/l
App. 9
We believe this NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE suf-
ficiently states the grounds for complaint. If, however, you
have any questions or wish to discuss the matter, please
contact us.
Sincerely,
/s/ Signature illegible
Nicholas C. Yost
Nancy C. Crisman
Katherine P. Ransel
Center for Law in the
Public Interest
1575 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 650
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 371-0199
Counsel for the Sierra Club
ec: Honorable William D. Ruckelshaus
Dick Wittington
Dale Givens
bee: Michael Osborne, Esq.
Buck Parker
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.