Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co.
Supreme Court brief1987
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87-181:
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_
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Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
JUL 20 1987
In The
. JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
Supreme Court of the United Creag
October Term, 1987
SIERRA CLUB,
Petitioner,
¥;
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Respondent.
SIERRA CLUB,
Petitioner,
v.
MONOCHEM, INC.,
Respondent.
SIERRA CLUB,
Petitioner,
V.
COPOLYMER RUBBER AND
CHEMICAL CORP. et al.,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Vv
Michael Osborne James Thornton
Albert H. Meyerhoff*
Osborne, McComiskey &
Richardson-Harp
3420 Prytania Street
New Orleans, LA 70115
(504) 891-4418
* Counsel of Record
Natural Resources
Defense Council
90 New Montgomery St.
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 777-0220
James Simon
Natural Resources
Defense Council
122 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10168
(212) 949-0049
Attorneys for Petitioner
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CoO., (800) 225-6964
or call collect (402) 342-2831
| 3 eee:
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the court below err in holding that a federal court
lacks jurisdiction to hear a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act against a defendant that violated its discharge
permit both before and after commencement of the action,
on the ground that such defendant is not ‘‘in violation’’
of its permit when the action was filed, contrary to the
Fourth Cireuit in Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), and the
First Cireuit in Pawtuaet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy
Corporation, 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986) ?
il
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner and _ plaintiff-appellant below is Sierra
Club, a non-profit corporation organized under the laws
of the State of California.* Respondents and defendart-
appellees below are Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Co.,
Allied Corp., Bercen, Inc., Formosa Plastics Corp., Mono-
chem, Ine., and Shell Oil Co.
* Statement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.1: Petitioner
has no subsidiaries or affiliates.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED |... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv
OPINIONS BELOW
JURISDICTION 2
PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION _. 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 11
I. The Decision Below Directly Conflicts With the
Decisions of the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney
and the First Cireuit in Pawtuwxet Cove. 0. 1t
A. The Interpretation by the Court Below of the
Citizen Suit Provision is Directly Contrary
to those of the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney and
the First Cireuit in Pawtuwet Cove. 0... 13
B. The Court Below Adopted a View of the Role
of the Citizen Suit Provision Contrary to the
Views of the Fourth and First Cireuits. 000... 25
C. The Decision Below Cannot Be Reconciled
With the Decisions of the Fourth and First
Rg RR SESE ae chee Pon eae 27
II. The Question Over Which the Fifth Cireuit Has
Split With the Fourth and First Cireuits is In-
portant and Hecurring. (0 ____ 28
SRE IES ee 29
APPENDIX:
Opinion of Court of Appeals 00 App. 1
Complaint in Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Com-
(ACR ge Oe App. 17
Opinions of District Courts . App. 26
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983) 19
Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
608 F. Supp. 440 (D.Md. 1985) 21
Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
— U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 872 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1987) (No.
|, Rn Eten se. ere oe ae passim
Connecticut Fund for the Environment and Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Job Plating
Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D.Conn. 1985) an
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) 20, 21
Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corp.,
756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir. 1985) passim
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Co., 680 F.2d 473
(7th Cir. 1982) 17
Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562). passim
Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber & Chemical
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1013 (M.D.La. 1985) Sais 26
Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Company, 817 F.2d 1169
(5th Cir. 1987) sonseneeeeP/AS8TM
Student Public Interest Research Group v. Mon-
santo Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985) 00. 22
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
y
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d
TR ae ee See 17, 21
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 paialide reh’g
denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980) . Pee ao
Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
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STATUTES
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Water Quality Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-4,
§§ 313, 314 (1987) . Peder a = 18, 24
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continned
Page
REGULATIONS
45 Fed. Reg. 79318 6
79328 8
79338 10
79341 9
50 Fed. Reg. 30784 .. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10
Lecistative History
S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) —.. §=18
S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) 18, 19, 28
H. R. Rep. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 18
OTHER
United States Environmental Protection
Ageney, Quality Criteria for Water, July
1976 . 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
No.
ra’
Ww
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987
SIERRA CLUB,
Petitioner,
v.
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Respondent.
SIERRA CLUB,
Petitioner,
v.
MONOCHEM, INC.,
Respondent.
SIERRA CLUB,
Petitioner,
v
COPOLYMER RUBBER AND
CHEMICAL CORP. et al.,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner Sierra Club respectfully prays that a writ
of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
entered in the above-captioned proceeding on May 29, 1987.
This Court has granted a writ on the identical question
presented in this petition in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources De-
1
2
fense Council, Inc., No. 86-473. This Court’s decision in
Gwaltney will in all likelihood require the modification of
the opinion below. The requested writ should thus be
granted to keep open the judgment in the six cases consoli-
dated below, so that it can be conformed to the decision
that this Court enters in Gwaltney.
ry.
—— ae
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Cireuit is reported at 817 F.2d 1169 and is reprinted in the
appendix hereto (‘‘App.’’) at 1.
The opinions of the United States District Courts for
the Middle and Eastern Districts of Louisiana are re-
printed at App. 26.
ray
Vw
JURISDICTION
Sierra Club brought suit against the six respondents
for violation of their Clean Water Act discharge permits,
pursuant to the Act’s citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365.
Five of the six cases were brought in the Middle, and
one in the Eastern, District of Louisiana. The actions
against Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Co., Allied Corp.,
Bercen, Inc., and Formosa Plastics were consolidated by
the district court and dismissed on February 7, 1985. The
suit against Monochem, Inc. was dismissed on December
18, 1985. The action against Shell Oil Co. was dismissed on
October 30, 1985.
Sierra Club appealed each ruling, and the cases were
consolidated on appeal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
dismissals on May 29, 1987.
|
of
>
7)
The jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment
the Fifth Cireuit is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1204(1).
PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,
provides:
Citizen Suits
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this see-
tion, any citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the
United States, and (ii) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)
who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship
of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Admini-
strator to perform such act or duty, as the case may
be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalities under
section 1319(d) of this title.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the time Sierra Club filed suit, the respondents
had among the worst records in Louisiana of noncompli-
ance with their Clean Water Act discharge permits
(NPDES permits), as the respondents reported to the En-
vironmental Protection Agency in the discharge monitor-
ing reports (‘‘DMRs’’) that they are required to file un-
der the Act. The permit violations reported by the re-
spondents on their DMRs in the record are as follows.
Copolymer Rubber, in connection with operating a
synthetic rubber manufacturing facility in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, holds NPDES permit LA9000914. The permit
limits Copolymer Rubber’s discharges into the Monte Sano
Bayou. Sierra Club sued Copolymer in April 1984. Be-
tween December 1980 and September 1984, Copolymer re-
ported violating its permit limits at least 78 times, inelud-
ing 5 violations in the five months after the filing of
Sierra Club’s suit.’
'The following table summarizes the permit violations that
Copolymer reported in its discharge monitoring reports from
December 1980 through September 1984.
Parameter Violations
Copper 3
Ammonia 1
Oil and Grease 14
Chemical Oxygen Demand 44
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 1
Total Suspended Solids 1
pH 14
Total 78
Copper and Ammonia are of particular concern because they
are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA has established water
quality criteria intended to protect waters from the effects of
these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784. The remaining parameters
listed above all contribute to the degradation of ambient water
quality and can, of themselves, lead to fish mortality. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Quality Criteria for
Water, July 1976 (‘Quality Criteria’).
Allied Chemical, in conection with operating a chemi-
cal manufacturing plant in Geismar, Louisiana, holds
NPDES permit LA0006181. The permit limits Allied
Chemical’s discharges into the Mississippi River. Sierra
Club sued Allied in April 1984. Between July 1980 and
August 1984, Allied reported violating its permit limits
at least 119 times, including a violation in April 1984, the
month the complaint was filed, and 9 more violations in
the first four months after the filing of Sierra Club’s
suit.?
The following table summarizes the permit violations that
Allied reported in its discharge monitoring reports from July
1980 through August 1984.
Parameter Violations
Ammonia 1
Chromium 2
Zinc 1
Fluoride 24
Total Phosphorus 19
Organic Nitrogen 8
Total Suspended Solids 2
pH 62
Total 119
Ammonia, Chromium and Zinc are of particular concern be-
cause they are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA has es-
tablished water quality criteria for the protection of waters from
the effects of these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784, 45 Fed. Reg.
79318. The remaining parameters listed above all! contribute
to the degradation of ambient water quality and can, of them-
selves, lead to fish mortality. See Quality Criteria, supra note 1.
Bercen, Inc., in connection with operating a specialty
chemical manufacturing plant in Denham Springs, Louisi-
ana, holds NPDES permit LA0048704. The permit limits
Bercen, Ine.’s discharges into Gray’s Creek. Sierra
Club sued Bercen, Ine. in April 1984. Between October
1979 and May 1984, Bercen, Inc. reported 80 violations,
ineluding one violation in April 1984, the month the com-
plaiut was filed, and one additional violation in May 1984,
the month after the filing of Sierra Club’s suit.’
3The following table summarizes the permit violations that
Bercen, Inc. reported in its discharge monitoring reports from
October 1979 through May 1984.
Parameter Violations
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 41
Chemical Oxygen Demand 16
Total Suspended Solids 19
Oil and Grease 4
Total 80
All of the above parameters contribute to the degradation of
ambient water quality and can, of themselves, lead to fish mor-
tality. See Quality Criteria, supra note 1.
Formosa Plastics, in connection with operating a
chemical manufacturing plant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
holds NPDES permit LA0006149. The permit limits For-
mosa Plastic’s discharges into the Mississippi River.
Sierra Club sued Formosa Plastics in April 1984. Be-
tween November 1982 and October 1984, Formosa Plastics
reported 65 violations, including 27 violations in the six
months after the filing of the suit.*
‘The following table summarizes the permit violations that
Formosa Plastics reported in its discharge monitoring reports
from November 1982 through October 1984.
Parameter Violations
Chlerine 19
Chromium 4
1,2-Dichloroethane 9
Lead 5
Total Organic Carbon 18
4
6
Total Suspended Solids |
pH
Total 65
Chlorine, Chromium, 1,2-Dichloroethane and Lead are of par-
ticular concern because they are directly toxic to aquatic life.
The EPA has established water quality criteria for the protection
of waters from the effects of these substances. 50 Fed. Reg.
30784, 45 Fed. Reg. 79328. The remaining substances listed all
contribute to the degradation of ambient water quality and can,
of themselves, lead to fish mortality. See Quality Criteria, supra
note 1.
WlieBserie sr
Monochem, in connection with operating a vinyl chlor-
ide manufacturing facility in Geismar, Louisiana, holds
NPDES permit LA0006220. The permit limits Monochem’s
discharges into the Mississippi River and the New River.
Sierra Club sued Monochem in February 1985. Between
July 1980 and March 1985, Monochem reported violating
its permit limits at least 136 times. Monochem reported
11 violations in February 1985, the month suit was filed,
8 violations in March 1985,° the month after suit was
filed, and another 10 violations in April 1985.°
5The fcllowing table summarizes the permit violations that
Monochem reported in its discharge monitoring reports from
July 1980 through March 1985.
Parameter Violations
Mercury . 18
Copper 2
Chromium 11
Zinc 4
Oil and Grease 8
Total Organic Carbon 11
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 13
Total Suspended Solids 12
Temperature 21
pH 36
Total 136
Mercury, Chromium, Copper and Zinc are of particular con-
cern, because they are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA
has established water quality criteria for the protection of wa-
ters from the effects of these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784,
45 Fed. Reg. 79341. The remaining substances listed all con-
tribute to the degradation of ambient water quality and can,
of themselves, lead to fish mortality. See Quality Criteria, supra
note 1.
6Although jurisdiction does not depend on violations that
occur at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, peti-
tioner will update the record of violations in each case for the
information of the Court should this petition be granted.
10
Shell Oil, in connection with operating a petroleum
refinery in Norco, Louisiana, holds NPDES permit
1L.A0003522. The permit limits Shell’s discharges into the
Mississippi River and Bayou Trepagnier. Sierra Club
sued Shell Oil in July 1984. Between January 1980 and
March 1985, Shell reported violating its permit limits at
least 132 times. Shell reported 11 violations in February
and March 1985, after the suit was filed.’
In sum, each respondent was a chronic violator of the
Clean Water Act over a period of years until sued by
Sierra Club. Each of them continued to violate the Act,
with varying degrees of frequency, after suit was filed.
The district courts had jurisdiction to determine liability
and impose injunctive relief and penalties in each case,
under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 1319(d).
— , *
Vv
7The following table summarizes the permit violations that
Shell Oil reported in its discharge monitoring reports from
January 1980 through March 1985.
Parameter Violations
Chromium, hexavalent 18
Chromium, total 2
Phenols 11
Total Organic Carbon 4
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 28
Chemical Oxygen Demand 3
Total Suspended Solids 60
pH 6
Total 132
Chromium and Phenol are of particular concern because they
are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA has established water
uality criteria for the protection of waters from the effects of
these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784, 45 Fed. Reg. 79338. The
remaining substances listed all contribute to the degradation of
ambient water quality and can, of themselves, lead to fish mor-
tality. See Quality Criteria, supra note 1.
1l
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Decision Below Directly Conflicts With the Deci-
Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove.
On the identical issue presented in this petition, this
Court has granted a writ to review the decision of the
Fourth Cireuit in Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, — U.S.
—, 107 S.Ct. 872 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1987) (No. 86-473). The
briefs in Gwaltney have been submitted and argument is to
be scheduled by the Court.
The Gwaltney case, like the present cases, was a citi-
zen suit brought to enforce a Clean Water Act discharge
permit. In Gwaltney the defendant ceased its violations
while the statutorily required notice of intent to sue was
outstanding but before suit was filed. The district court
held that it had jurisdiction to determine liability and im-
pose penalties payable to the United States Treasury. The
Fourth Cireuit rejected defendant’s claim that it could not
be sued for penalties for ‘‘past’’ violations. The Fourth
Circuit held that ‘‘citizen suits like the one at bar, seeking
civil penalties for permit violations committed entirely in
the past, are permitted under [the citizen suit provision].’’
791 F.2d at 313. This Court granted a writ of certiorari
to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision, No. 86-473. The
United States, 13 states, and several private organizations
have filed briefs urging affirmance.
In Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562), the plaintiff sought penal-
12
ties for past violations of the Clean Water Act, as well as
other relief pursuant to pendant state law claims. The al-
leged Clean Water Act violations were actions in the past
not capable of repetition. The First Circuit held that there
was no jurisdiction in the case because the plaintiff did not
allege that the defendant was ‘‘in violation’’ of the Act
when the complaint was filed. Where such an allegation is
made in good faith, however, the First Cireuit ruled, the
district court has jurisdiction to determine liability on a
strict liability basis and impose penalties even when the
facts later demonstrate that the violations were entirely in
the past. 807 IF'.2d at 1094. The plaintiff in the case has
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
The Fifth Cireuit has taken a position diametrically
opposed to that of either the Fourth or First Cireuits.* In
the opinion below, the court held that the district courts
lacked jurisdiction over citizen suits where the defendants
violated their permits both before and after the complaints
were filed, unless the plaintiff shows that the violations
were ‘‘ongoing’’ or “‘continuing’’,? by proving that the vio-
lations ‘‘were the product of . . . systematic neglect of dis-
charge limitations or of inadequate pollution control facil-
ities.’’ 817 F.2d at 1174, App. at 11."°
8As explained below, at pp. 21 to 22, the way the court
below confused remedy with jurisdiction also brings its hold-
ing inte conflict with Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
*The words “ongoing”, “continuing” and “chronic” are
used interchangeably in the opinion below, 817 F.2d at 1173-
75, and in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corp., 756
F.2d 392, 396-98 (5th Cir. 1985).
In each of the cases below, Sierra Club alleged in its
complaint that the defendant had violated its permit, was con-
(Continued on following page)
13
This Court should grant the writ to resolve the direct
conflict among the circuit courts’ interpretations of the
jurisdictional requirements of the Clean Water Act’s citi-
zen suit provision. In addition, the Fifth Circuit’s decision
conflicts with opinions of this Court. Finally, this Court
should grant the writ because it has already accepted for
review the identical question in Gwaltney, No. 86-473.
A. The Interpretation by the Court Below of the
Citizen Suit Provision is Directly Contrary to
those of the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney and the
First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove.
The jurisdictional language at issue is the phrase ‘‘in
violation’’ in the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water
Act. The provision authorizes the district court to enter-
tain an action by a citizen ‘‘against any person... who is
alleged to be in violation of ... an effluent standard or
limitation’’. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). ‘‘Effluent standard
or limitation’’ is defined to include a permit or condition
thereof. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). Where liability is found, the
district court is authorized to impose penalties payable to
the Treasury and to grant injunctive relief. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1865(a), 1319(d).
In these cases, the Fifth Cireuit panel relied on a pre-
vious Fifth Cireuit decision, Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemical Corp., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985). In Hamker,
the court engrafted onto the statute a requirement that the
alieged violations must be “‘continuing.’’ Under the Ham-
(Continued from previous page)
tinuing and would continue to do so. See, e.g., the complaint
in Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Company, App. at 22. A similar al-
legation was used in each of the six complaints.
l4
ker rule, a defendant is ‘‘in violation’’ of the statute only
if its violations are ‘‘continuing.’’ 756 F.2d at 396-97."
Its violations are not ‘‘continuing”’’ if the violations cease
prior to the filing of the complaint, even if the defendant
has polluted illegally for years. Petitioner believes that
Hamker was wrongly decided. It was explicitly rejected by
the Fourth Cireuit in Gwaltney and in important part by
the First Cireuit in Pawtuxet Cove. The court below, while
purporting to follow Hamker, in fact goes well beyond it to
restrict citizens’ statutory right to enforce the Clean Water
Act. In the present cases, the defendants’ own discharge
monitoring reports demonstrated violations both before and
after the complaints were filed. Yet the court below broad-
ened Hamker to encompass these cases by requiring not
only a ‘‘continuing’’ violation but proof of negligence as a
matter of jurisdictional fact. In so doing, the court made
the conflict between the Fifth Cireuit and the First and
Fourth Circuits sharper than it was after Hamker.
The court below analyzed the minimum jurisdictional
facts that a citizen plaintiff must prove as follows. The
court noted that a single large industrial facility may have
many discharge points from which many different pollu-
it should be noted that Hamker, in which the Fifth Cir-
cuit veered abruptly away from prior law on the regulation of
discharges under the Clean Water Act, did not involve permit
violations. Hamker involved a single accidental oil spill long
in the past, and the relief requested was a variety of state law
damage claims appended to a claim under the Act. It was this
unappealing context that led the Hamker court to fashion a
rationale for dismissing the case before it without examining
the effect of that rationale on the ordinary case—the enforce-
ment of industrial discharge permits. That rationale, expanded
by the court below, directly conflicts with the Act, and would
remove citizen suits as an effective tool of permit enforcement.
15
tants are discharged, each subject to separate limitations
in a single permit. The court observed that where a permit
applies different limitations to different point sources, the
“violation of an effluent limitation at one point source is
not a violation of any parameter at another point source
even if the same pollutant is involved.’’ 817 F.2d at 1173.
817
The court below continued:
The DMR’s submitted to EPA regularly by each of
the appellees and relied on by Sierra Club to evidence
permit violations separately identify effluent dis-
charges at each point source for each parameter. Ap-
pellant’s complaints simply aggregated the possible
violations reflected by the DMR’s at each appellee’s
facility over time, regardless whether [sic] they in-
involved the same substance or the same point source
of discharge. Although given ample opportunity to do
so, Sierra Club did not attempt to demonstrate that
these isolated permit violations were the product of
appellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limitations
or of inadequate pollution control facilities.
F.2d at 1173-74, App. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
Moreover, wrote the court below,
The evidence submitted by appellees demonstrated in
many instances that the alleged ‘‘violations’’ were ap-
proved under EPA ‘‘bypass’’ regulations, were based
on overly restrictive permit terms later liberalized by
EPA, or were related to treatment methods voluntarily
discontinued by the facility. What remained of Sierra
Club’s factual allegations were occasional, minor dis-
charges by the facilities in the face of permit compli-
ance rates exceeding 95% for the balance of the period
in question.
Id. at 1174 (footnotes omitted). For these reasons, the
court below held that the district courts lacked jurisdiction.
16 |
This conclusion is built on five serious errors of law.
Several of these errors, in addition to conflicting with the
Fourth and First Circuits’ positions, contravene decisions
of this Court.
First, the requirement of a ‘‘continuing”’ violation as a
matter of jurisdictional fact is an error, and is in conflict
with Gwaltney and Pawtuxet Cove. The statutory language
authorizing citizen actions is identical to the language
authorizing suits by the government with respect to the
timing of a defendant’s violations. The federal government
is empowered to enforce Clean Water Act permits by Sec-
tion 309(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). That section
states that:
The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil
action for appropriate relief ... for any violation for
which he is authorized to issue a compliance order
under subsection (a) of this section.
According to the subsection (a) referred to, the Ad-
ministrator may issue a compliance order to, and thus may
institute an enforcement action against, anyone who is ‘‘in
violation of any condition or limitation... in a permit... .’’
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (emphasis added).
Congress used identical language for authorizing citi-
zen suits." Section 505 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, au-
thorizing citizen enforcement suits, provides that:
"The same language is used to authorize the Administrator
to enforce permits issued by states with approved NPDES pro-
grams. See Section 309(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1).
The only exception to the consistent use of the term “in vio-
lation” to trigger federal and citizen enforcement jurisdiction
comes in the language authorizing federal criminal enforcement
actions. There, still in the present tense, the Act authorizes
criminal sanctions against one who “violates” the Act. See Sec-
tion 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
17
... any citizen may commence a civil action . . . against
any person... who is alleged to be in violation of...
an effluent standard or limitation. .. .
The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to
enforce such an effluent standard or limitation . .. and
to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [Sec-
tion 309(d) of the Act] section 1319(d) of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1865 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, Congress authorized civil penalties in
§ 309(d) of the Act against any person who ‘‘violates’’ the
Act, without distinguishing between civil enforcement suits
brought by the attorney general or by private attorneys
general. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); see also § 1365(a). The Act
makes no distinction between violations that cease the day
before the complaint is filed and those that continue
through the filing date. Nor is there any distinction in
the Act between citizen and government ability to invoke
federal court jurisdiction with respect to the timing of
such violations.
There is no dispute that the government can sue for
penalties for past violations without proving ‘‘continu-
ous’’ or ‘‘ongoing’’ violations. See, e.g., Illinois v. Out-
board Marine Co., 680 F.2d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375-76
(10th Cir. 1979). The language of the Act therefore com-
pels the conclusion that citizens can bring suit on the same
basis.
By reading the same words differently for govern-
ment suits and citizen suits, the Fifth Cireuit differs from
18
the Fourth and First cireuits.!2 The Fourth Cireuit held
that the language ‘‘in violation’’ does not preclude citizen
suits for ‘‘past violations,’’ 791 F.2d at 313; the First
Circuit held that the good faith allegation of facts that
warrant injunctive relief will support jurisdiction over
exclusively ‘‘past’’ violations, 807 F.2d at 1094.
Congress recently endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s read-
ing of the citizen suit provision when it revisited the Act.
Congress amended Section 309 of the Clean Water Act
to permit the administrative assessment of civil penalties
and expressly used the past tense: the Administrator of
EPA is authorized to assess a civil penalty against ‘‘any
person [who] has violated ... any permit condition or
limitation.’’ § 309(g)(1)(A) and (B), as added by the Wa-
ter Quality Act of 1986, §314(g)(1)(A) and (B); 33
U.S.C. § 1819(g)(1)(A) and (B) (emphasis added). This
new authority focuses on past violations because it supple-
ments the Administrator’s pre-existing authority to issue
compliance orders under Section 309(a)(1) of the Act. See
S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1985); H.R. Rep.
No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-133, 135-136, 1388-139
(1986). Yet, the new subsection explicitly contemplates
that a citizen suit may already have been filed to assess
the same penalty and, in that event, allows it to proceed.
§ 309(g)(6)(B), as added in 1987; 33 U.S.C, § 1819( 2) (6)-
(B). In addition, under this new provision a prior admin-
3As petitioner pointed out below, not only the language of
the statute but the legislative history support the identity of
structure in suits by the attorney general and by private at-
torneys general, once the explicit restrictions on citizen suits,
i.e., 60 days notice and lack of diligent prosecution, are satis-
fied and the citizen suit is commenced. See S. Rep. No. 414,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 80 (1971).
19
istrative penalty action precludes a later citizen suit but
only with respect to the identical past violations. § 309(g)-
(6)(A) and (B), as added in 1987; 33 U.S.C. § 1819(g)-
(6)(A) and (B)."4
This new provision demonstrates that Congress be-
lieved existing law authorized citizen suits addressing past
violations that no longer required injunctive remedies.
Although the new provision dealing with administrative
penalties employs the past tense in describing the viola-
tion, Congress saw no need to amend either Section 309(a)
or (b) or Section 505(a)(1) to conform. This cannot have
been mere oversight. The Water Quality Act was elabo-
rately considered for over two years before ultimate en-
actment, affording ample opportunity for noticing and
correcting any deficiency. The natural inference is that
Congress saw the present tense of Sections 309 and 505 as
no limitation on penalty actions in respect of past viola-
tions. Under these circumstances, this is a reliable guide
to the original intent of the Clean Water Act. Cf. Bob
Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-602
(1983), and cases cited at 601.
In a second error, the court below essentially read the
word ‘‘permit’’ out of the statute. Section 505 allows a
citizen to sue anyone alleged to be in violation of an ‘‘ef-
fluent standard or limitation.’’ ‘‘Effluent standard or
limitation’’ is defined to include ‘‘a permit’’. 33 U.S.C.
4The Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 50, supra, at 28 explicitly
states that the preclusive effect of an administrative penalty
action does not apply to a citizen suit “for a past violation of
another pollutant parameter (even one resulting from the same
discharge which is the subject of the administrative civil pen-
alty proceeding).”
20
§ 1865(f) (6). Thus, to violate a permit, without more, is to
violate the Act, as this Court has held. EPA v. California
ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200,
205 (1976).
In looking for a ‘‘continuing’’ violation, the court
below went far beyond looking for a ‘‘continuing’’ permit
violation. The court held that only proof of the continuing
violation of the same specific permit restriction at the
same discharge pipe supports citizen suit jurisdiction. 817
F.2d at 1174; App. at 10-11. Yet a chemical plant, as the
court below suggested, may have one permit under which
it discharges, say, 100 chemicals through 30 discharge
pipes. Under the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, this plant could
exceed its permit restrictions for each chemical at each
pipe, one after another, without incurring liability for a
permit violation because the violations of separate dis-
charge limitations would not be ‘‘continuous’’. This is
the essential holding of the court below and is absurd. To
violate a permit is to violate the act. To keep violating
a variety of restrictions in a permit through time is to
keep violating the permit. By requiring continuous vio-
lations of the same chemical substance at the same dis-
charge pipe for jurisdiction to attach, the court below
reads permits and the requirement to comply with them
out of the Act, and protects permit holders from any real
chance of suit by citizens.
Third, the Court below made a serious error of law
in requiring Sierra Club to demonstrate as a matter of
jurisdiction that the violations alleged ‘‘were the product
of appellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limitations or
of inadequate pollution control facilities.’’ As this Court
21
has held, to violate a permit is to violate the act, EPA v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board,
426 U.S. at 205, and violations can be proved by reliance
on a defendant’s own discharge monitoring reports,
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-55 (1980), reh’g
denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980). Every court to consider the
question has held that permits are strict liability docu-
ments, and that liability is strictly adjudged by comparing
a defendant’s discharge monitoring reports to its permit.
As the D.C. Cireuit put it in Weyerhaeuser v. Costle,
590 F.2d at 1058, Clean Water Act permit enforcement pro-
ceedings were designed by Congress to be simple and
speedy, suitable for summary judgment. The Weyerhaeu-
ser court pointed out that permits could not be enforced
if enforcement proceedings ‘‘depend[ed] on murky de-
terminations concerning the sequence of events in the
plant, whether those events would have been avoidable if
other equipment had been installed .. .’’ and so on. Id.
The court below disagrees with Weyerhaeuser, and all
prior precedent in other circuits. It has removed the
strict liability measure of permit compliance. Instead, a
citizen plaintiff must make some vaguely defined demon-
stration that permit violations are the ‘‘product of ap-
pellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limitations or of
inadequate pollution control facilities.’’ 817 F.2d at 1173-
74, App. at 11. The court below would have the citizen
1SSee, e.g., United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d
368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); Connecticut Fund for the Environment
and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Job Plating Co.,
623 F. Supp. 207, 218 (D.Conn. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 451-53 (D.Md. 1985).
22
suit become ‘‘a form of inquest into the nature of system
malfunction’’, Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1958, before
jurisdiction attaches. In requiring a citizen plaintiff to
make a demonstration of ‘‘neglect’’ by the defendant in
order to support jurisdiction, the court below has confused
jurisdiction with remedy.
Questions of ‘‘neglect,’’ negligence, inadequate treat-
ment, good and bad faith, are irrelevant to a determination
of jurisdiction and liability. They are relevant only to
determining what penalties and injunctive relief are ap-
propriate once liability is strictly adjudged. See, e.g., Stu-
dent Public Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600
F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D.N.J. 1985) ; United States v. Amoco
Oil Company, 580 F. Supp. 1042, 1050 (W.D.Mo. 1984).
In a fourth fundamental error, the court below, in dis-
counting the defendants’ violations, offered excuses for
the defendants contrary to the law of this Court. The
court below discounted ‘‘alleged ‘violations’... [which]
were based on overly restrictive permit terms later liberal-
ized by EPA ... [A]pplication of the less restrictive terms
to the above cited violations [for Shell] would decrease the
number of exceedences over the three year period to ap-
proximately eight.’’ 817 F.2d at 1174 and n.5, App. at
11-12.
This Court has held that a polluter is bound by its
permit, and that even a pending permit application does
not excuse it from complying with the then applicable
terms. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Train v. Na-
tural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 92
(1975) (Clean Air Act), requests for permit variances are
‘‘carried out on the polluter’s time, not the public’s, for
23
during [their] pendency, the original regulations remain
in effect, and the polluter’s failure to comply may subject
him to a variety of enforcement procedures.’’ The willing-
ness of the court below to discount violations of what it
characterized as ‘‘overly restrictive’’ permit terms puts it
in direct conflict with this Court.
In addition, the court below was willing to discount,
for purposes of jurisdiction, any violations that arise
from a cause that the defendant corrects after being sued.’®
Such a consideration may be relevant in determining
remedy, but it would frustrate enforcement to permit a
defendant retroactively to deprive a court of jurisdiction
by coming into compliance after being sued. A more con-
venient rule for avoiding liability could not be crafted.
A polluter, under this scheme, would have no incentive to
comply with the law until being sued.
The court below committed a fifth serious error by
fashioning what seems to be a 95% compliance test for
jurisdiction. The court below wrote that after its other
excuses were applied, the defendants had permit com-
pliance rates ‘‘exceeding 95% for the balance of the period
in question.’’ 817 F.2d at 1174, App. at 12. Once again, to
violate a permit is to violate the Act. The court below
seems to have stated a rule that jurisdiction does not at-
tach if the defendant makes a statistical argument that
it is in compliance 959% of the time. Whatever 95% com-
16The court below found it relevant to jurisdiction that Shell
completed some required chrome treatment system modifica-
tions and had them operational in February 1985, seven months
after the complaint was filed (July 1984). See 817 F.2d at 1174
n.6, App. at 12.
stiieeeretieaaameanieniillll
24
pliance may mean, and it is by no means clear," it is ir-
relevant to jurisdiction, though it may be considered when
fashioning a remedy.
In all of these matters, the court below confused
remedy with jurisdiction, and by doing so read the require-
ment of strict liability for compliance out of the Act."
The court created a variety of restrictions on citizen suits
which, when taken together, effectively read the citizen suit
provision out of the statute.
In the case of the hypothetical chemical plant discharg-
ing pollutants from 30 different point sources, one could comply
with the restrictions at 29 discharge points all of the time, com-
mit massive violations of a cyanide limitation at the remaining
point 100°/o of the time, and still argue one met a “95°/o’’ over-
all compliance test.
'8That the court below confused questions of remedy and
jurisdiction is highlighted by a section added to the Act by the
Water Quality Act of 1986. The new language, added to aid the
district judge in fashioning a remedy, lists the kind of con-
siderations the court should look to in setting a penalty.
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING PENALTY
AMOUNT.—Section 309(d) is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following: “In determining the amount of
a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of
the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any)
resulting from the vioiation, any history of such violations,
any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable re-
quirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the
violator, and such other matters as justice may require. For
purposes of this subsection, a single operational upset
which leads to simultaneous violations of more than one
pollutant parameter shall be treated as a single violation.”.
Water Qualitv Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 313(c) (1987).
These factors include the kinds of considerations pointed to by
the court below. The error of the court below, again, is to bring
the consideration of these factors up from the remedial to the
jurisdictional stage of the lawsuit.
et tee a
25
B. The Court Below Adopted a View of the Role of
the Citizen Suit Provision Contrary to the Views
of the Fourth and First Circuits.
The Court below took the view that citizen suits are
supplementary to government suits, and so could be etfec-
tively nullified without harming the Congressional enforce-
ment scheme. The Fourth and First Circuits read the Act
and its legislative history very differently.'"? Each of the
latter concluded that citizen suits are an important
mechanism in the enforcement scheme crafted by Con-
gress. For this reason, the Fourth and First Circuits con-
cluded, courts should not create new restrictions on citizen
suits.
The Fourth Circuit, after noting the explicit restric-
tions on citizen suits,” found that Congress specified all
the restrictions it meant, and that citizen suits were in-
tended to be an important enforcement tool. Noting the
identity of language authorizing government and citizen
suits, the Fourth Circuit wrote that ‘‘[i]t can hardly be
questioned that the EPA has authority to bring suit for
civil penalties for purely past violations,’’ and ‘‘the scope
of citizen enforcement powers must, in this important
respect, be viewed as co-extensive with the enforcement
powers of EPA.’’ 791 F.2d at 309-310.
19Neither the Hamker court nor the court below, unlike
the Fourth and First Circuits, examined any legislative history
of the Clean Water Act.
°The statute requires 60 days notice prior to suit, and pre-
cludes citizen action if the state or federal government has filed
a prior action and is diligently prosecuting it. 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(a) and (b).
26
The First Circuit likewise found that citizen suits are
authorized for past violations, as lone as there is an alle-
gation which, if true, would warrant an injunction.2! The
court wrote:
We do not... agree with the reasoning which, ap-
parently, led the Louisiana district court, following the
Hamker decision, to dismiss a number of actions sim-
ply because no violations occurred on the dates the
complaints were filed. See Sierra Club v. Copolymer
Rubber & Chemical Corp., 621 F.Supp. 1013, 1015
(M.D.La. 1985) [one of the cases in this petition]. A
plaintiff who makes allegations warranting injunctive
relief in good faith, judged objectively, may recover a
penalty judgment for past violations even if the in-
junction proves unobtainable.
807 F.2d at 1094.
The court below, to the contrary, read citizen suits
out of the statute, and justified doing so by noting irrele-
vantly that the state and federal governments have en-
forcement powers. The court below found that citizen suits
are supplementary to government suits and drew the un-
founded conclusion that they are supererogatory: ‘‘We
think it unlikely that Congress’s explicit restrictions on the
right to bring private enforcement actions significantly
impair the efficacy of the general regulatory framework,’’
because ‘*‘[bjoth the federal and state governments can
abundantly enforce the Clean Water Act by means of
1Petitioner believes that the Fourth Circuit read the Act
correctly and that insofar as the First Circuit required any al-
legation of continuing violation it was in error. Petitioner has
argued this position in an amicus curiae brief in Gwaltney, No.
86-473.
iii iia
27
criminal and civil actions authorizing monetary or in-
junctive awards.’’ 817 F.2d at 1175, App. at 15.
The court below is correct that the governments could
enforce the law. The citizen suit mechanism, of course,
was designed precisely to fill the gap when governmental
agencies cannot or will not exercise their enforcement au-
thority. The court below is also correct to say that the
restrictions that Congress, as opposed to the court below,
placed on citizen suits do not impair the enforcement
scheme. The adventitious restrictions created by the court
below, however, tend to remove citizen suits from the en-
forcement scheme.
The view of the court below, that the ‘‘efficacy of the
general statutory framework’’ is not impaired by dis-
abling citizen suits, is a view directly contrary to that of
the Fourth and First Circuits.
C. The Decision Below Cannot Be Reconciled With
the Decisions of the Fourth and First Circuits.
The Fifth Cireuit’s prior ruling on citizen suits under
the Act, Hamker, was the case relied on by the petitioners
in Gwaltney to support their argument that there was a
split in the circuits on the question of whether a citizen
suit under the Act could be maintained for a ‘‘past”’ viola-
tion. This Court granted their petition for writ of certio-
rari, No. 86-473.
The opinion below creates an even sharper conflict.
The court below, stating that it was bound by -Hamker,
extended that ruling broadly. While in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, under Gwaltney, a citizen action may be maintained
based on DMRs for violations that ceased prior to the
28
filing of the complaint, and while in the First Cireuit, under
Pawtuxet Cove, a citizen suit may be maintained on the
same facts if the plaintiff alleges ongoing violations in
good faith, the court below requires much more. Saying
that a ‘‘continuing’’ violation is required, the court below
then requires proof of neglect or negligence as a matter
of jurisdiction. The view of the court below is diametrically
opposed to those of the Fourth and First Circuits and
cannot be reconciled with them.
II. The Question Over Which the Fifth Circuit Has Split
With the Fourth and First Circuits is Important and
Recurring.
Congress, in reauthorizing the Clean Water Act this
year, inquired into the way cilizen suits were working. It
noted that ‘*|ijn the past two years, the number of citizen
suits to enforce NPDES permits has surged so that such
suits now constitute a substantial portion of all enforce-
ment actions filed in Federal court under this Act,’’ S. Rep.
No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (1985), and declared itself
well satisfied with the result, id.
Citizens in the Fifth Circuit are now effectively dis-
abled from exercising their statutory right to enforce the
Act, and are permitted to exercise it elsewhere in the
country. Until the errors of the court below are corrected,
polluters in the Fifth Cireuit will enjoy a protection that
Congress did not allow them, and that they do not have else-
where. Moreover, the decision of the court below, until
corrected, will tend to chill the effectiveness of citizen
suits in other areas of the country as well.
29
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, this Court should grant
the writ requested.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael Osborne James Thornton
Osborne, McComiskey & Albert H. Meyerhoff*
Richardson-Harp Natural Resources
3420 Prytania Street Defense Council
New Orleans, LA 70115 90 New Montgomery St.
(504) 891-4418 San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 777-0220
James Simon
Natural Resources
Defense Council
122 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10168
(212) 949-0049
* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Petitioner
App. 1
SIERRA CLUB v. SHELL OIL CO.
SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana
SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MONOCHEM, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant.
Vv.
COPOLYMER RUBBER AND
CHEMICAL CORP., et al.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 85-3753, 85-3762, 85-3763.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Cireuit.
May 29, 1987.
Environmental organization brought actions under
Clean Water Act based on multiple, sporadic, and past vio-
lations of various effluent limitations. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Pat-
rick E. Carr, J., and the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Louisiana, Frank J. Polozola, J.,
either dismissed cases or awarded summary judgment to
App. 2
defendant. Appeals were taken. The Court of Appeals,
Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge, held that multiple, sporadic,
and past violations of various effluent limitations could
not form basis of citizens’ lawsuits.
Affirmed.
1. Federal Courts 29
Where defendant’s challenge to court’s jurisdiction is
also a challenge to existence of federal cause of action,
proper course is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal
with objection as direct attack on merits of case, and judi-
cial economy further counsels resolution on merits so that
court can avoid duplicative trials of facts essential to both
jurisdiction and merits.
2. Federal Civil Procedure 2481
When plaintiff bringing citizens’ lawsuit under Clean
Water Act has alleged ongoing violation, but fails to dem-
onstrate fact issue about whether defendant is ‘‘in viola-
tion,’’ trial court should grant summary judgment for de-
fendant on merits, instead of dismissing for want of juris-
diction. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, § 505(a), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) ;
Fed.Rules Civ. Proc.Rules 12(b)(1), 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure 1781
Although fact-based dismissals of Clean Water Act
actions were contrary to the Fifth Cireuit’s practice of
ruling on the merits, dismissals did not fatally affect dis-
position of cases where orders dismissing for lack of juris-
diction were entered following extensive discovery. Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
App. 3
§§ 101 et seq., 505, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq.,
1365; Fed.Rules Civ. Proe.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Health and Environment 25.15(4)
Multiple, sporadic, and past violations of various ef-
fluent limitations contained in national pollutant discharge
elimination system permits could not form the basis of
citizens’ lawsuits under Clean Water Act. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, §§ 101 et seq.,
505, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq., 1365.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana.
Before VAN GRAAFEILAND*, HIGGINBOTHAM,
and JONKS, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
We are here called upon to assess whether multiple,
sporadic, past violations of various effluent limitations
contained in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (‘‘NPDES’’) permits held by the defendants may
form the basis of a citizens’ lawsuit under section 505 of
the Clean Water Act.' 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Bound by our
prior decision in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical
Co., 756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir.1985) and by appellant’s failure
to raise a genuine question of material fact on the critical
* Circuit Judge of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
2 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. are commonly known as
the Clean Water Act.
App. 4
issue, we AFFIRM the decisions of the district courts
which dismissed these cases.”
The underlying lawsuits were filed following a sys-
tematic research program in which the Sierra Club exam-
ined discharge monitoring reports (‘‘DMR’s’’) filed by
every major industrial discharger in Louisiana. The
DMR’s, which are prepared and filed by the defendant
companies with the Environmental Protection Agency
(‘‘KPA’’), may furnish some evidence concerning whether
the discharger is in compliance with the terms of its
NPDES permit for the period of time covered in each
DMR. Having concluded by this research that the instant
defendants were violating the terms of their NPDES per-
mits, Sierra Club delivered the statutory 60-day notices
and then filed separate lawsuits against each defendant.
Each action averred that the defendant had violated vari-
ous terms of its NPDES permit between January 1980 and
June, 1983, and all complaints alleged that the defendant
‘is now violating its permit, and will do so in the future.”’
The complaints requested that civil penalties of up to
$10,000 per day of violation for each violation be imposed,
that an injunction be issued against further violations, and
that Sierra Club recover costs including attorneys, wit-
z Five of the citizens’ enforcement suits were brought by
the Sierra Club in the Middle District of Louisiana. The ac-
tions against Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Co., Allied
Corp., Bercen, Inc., and Formosa Plastics Corp., were con-
solidated by the district court and dismissed on February 7,
1985. Subsequently, Sierra Club filed against Monochem also
in the Middle District. This case was dismissed by the dis-
trict court on December 18, 1985. The sixth of these con-
solidated appeals was filed against Shell Oil Co. in the Eastern
District of Louisiana on July 24, 1984 and was dismissed on
October 30, 1985.
BA etka
tae cel
App. 5
ness and consultant fees, as provided for in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d).
During the pendency of the lawsuits, this Court issued
its opinion in Hamker and held that district courts are
without jurisdiction to hear citizens’ suits alleging a single
past pollutant discharge in violation of the Clean Water
Act. Ongoing discovery in these cases became focused on
the application of Hamker. Because Hamker resulted in
a dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for want of juris-
diction, appellees each contested the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, resting on affidavits and considerable docu-
mentary evidence concerning the status of the various
alleged permit violations. In some of the cases, appellant
responded that DMR’s filed for the period after June,
1983 showed that further permit violations had occurred
subsequent to the filing of its lawsuits. The district courts
treated these motions differently. In the four cases con-
solidated under the Copolymer style, see note 2 supra,
the court dismissed pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b) (1)
for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to any state
law claim that might be asserted. 621 F.Supp. 1013. The
Monochem court simply dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1),
while the Shell court awarded a Rule 56 summary judg-
ment to the defendant. These appeals followed.
I.
The Clean Water Act intertwines the jurisdiction of
the district court with the grounds for relief in a citizen
enforcement action. Under the general caption, ‘‘ Citizen
Suits; jurisdiction,’’ it authorizes
any citizen [to] commence a civil action on his own
behalf—(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to
App. 6
be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limita-
tion under this chapter or (B) an order issuéd by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a stan-
dard or limitation... . ;
3 U.S.C. § 1365(a). Consequently, where the requirement
that the discharger be ‘‘in violation’’ is interpreted to
mean that a violation must be ongoing at the date the suit
is filed, the plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation to
invoke the court’s jurisdiction.
The Court affirmed a dismissal in Hamker for lack
of jurisdiction because the pleadings there alleged a single
oil spill prior to the date of suit and patently excluded
the possibility of the defendant’s being ‘‘in violation’’
thereafter. Hamker’s emphasis on jurisdiction was appro-
priate to that case because a court may determine it lacks
jurisdiction based on pleadings alone. 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1969). Two
of the district courts here, apparently intending to follow
Hamker, dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of juris-
diction based on undisputed facts revealed in discovery
rather than on the pleadings. Such fact-based dismissals
are contrary to this cireuit’s practice of ruling on the mer-
its, but they do not fatally affect the disposition of these
cases.
f1] This Court has held that when, as here, issues of
jurisdictional fact are intermeshed with the merits of a
case, ‘‘the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the
merits, for it is impossible to decide one without the other.’’
McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Commit-
App. 7
tee, 374 F.2d 359, 363 (Sth Cir.1967).2 The purpose of
this rule is to discourage district courts from dismissing
eases on the pleadings for want of jurisdiction unless the
pleadings reveal a clearly insubstantial or frivolous claim.
Compare Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776,
90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). Thus, ‘‘[wlhere the defendant’s chal-
lenge to the court’s jurisdiction is also a challenge to the
existence of a federal cause of action, the proper course
.. 1s to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the ob-
jection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s
ease.’’ Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.
1981). Judicial economy further counsels resolution on
the merits in these instances so that the court can avoid
duplicate trials of facts essential to both jurisdiction and
the merits of the claim. /d. at 415-16.
[2] As a result, when a plaintiff has alleged an on-
going violation for purposes of § 1365(a), but he fails to
demonstrate a fact issue about whether a defendant is ‘‘in
violation,’’ the court should grant summary judgment for
the defendant on the merits under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, in-
stead of dismissing for want of jurisdiction under Fed.R.
Civ.P. 12(b) (1).
[3] Although the letter of McBeath and Williamson
were violated in all but one of these cases, their spirit was
not. None of the cases was cavalierly treated. The or-
ders dismissing for lack of jurisdiction were entered fol-
a This is not to say that for cases in which the jurisdiction
and merits are separable issues, such as whether $10,000 is
actually in controversy in a diversity case, the district court
may not dismiss pursuant to a fact finding rendered under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federa!
Practice and Procedure § 1350 at 556 (1969).
App. 8
lowing extensive discovery in each case. The district courts
strained to afford Sierra Club an opportunity to demon-
strate a fact issue on whether appellees were ‘‘in viola-
tion’’ of their permits when these suits were filed. The
courts’ ultimate determinations rest on a complete and
undisputed factual record. Sierra Club does not contend
that further discovery is necessary to support its position.
Consequently, dismissing some of the cases for lack of
jurisdiction was tantamount to summary judgment against
Sierra Club on the merits of the critical issue of appellees’
being ‘‘in violation’’ when the actions were filed. No re-
versible error follows from this procedural flaw.
Il.
[4] The district courts found that under Hamker,
the appellees in this case were not ‘‘in violation’’ of the
NPDES permits when Sierra Club filed suit. In Hamker,
the panel reasoned that section 1365 does not permit a citi-
zen lawsuit to enforce the Clean Water Act where there
is no ongoing violation of an effluent standard, limitation
or order. Thus, the plaintiff there could not state a cause
of action for a single past oil discharge. Judge Williams,
specially concurring, suggested however that the statutory
language ‘‘in violation’’ is broad enough to cover the
‘‘chronic episodic violator’’ who ‘‘intentionaily turns off
the spigot’’ just before a citizen brings suit. 756 F.2d at
399 (Williams, J., concurring). We need not enter a de-
bate concerning the extent of the Hamker holding because
the uncontradicted evidence in these cases demonstrated
only past, sporadic or largely unconnected permit viola-
tions by each of the appellees. Not only was [sic] none of
the violations ongoing at the date Sierra Club filed suit in
Se ee
App. 9
either a ‘‘chronie episodic’’ or actual sense, but Sierra
Club never attempted to establish, and in fact eschewed
the possibility that there might be any requirement of
demonstrating the ongoing or chronic nature of such vio-
lations. Sierra Club’s proof failed to comport with its
pleadings.
To demonstrate the failure of Sierra Club’s proof, it
is necessary to explain how the Clean Water Act affects
industrial dischargers. The objective of the Clean Water
Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the nation’s waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(a). This objective was to be achieved by the application
of increasingly more stringent ‘‘effluent limitations’’ de-
signed to reduce gradually the amount of pollutants dis-
charged into waterways. These effluent limitations are
to be technologically based, meaning that dischargers must
reduce the amount of pollutants by using specific tech-
nologies or their equivalents. ‘‘Effluent limitations’’
promulgated by the EPA are the actual restrictions on
discharges which limit quantities, rates and concentrations
of substances that may be discharged from point sources.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). Effluent limitations are usually ex-
pressed numericaliy (e.g., the number of pounds per day
or the concentration of a pollutant discharged). Effluent
limitations are to be applied to all point sources of dis-
charge at a facility. A ‘‘point source’’ means the point of
discharge of the pollutant-containing effluent. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14). Effluent limitations, which were developed
for entire industrial categories or subcategories, are trans-
formed into limitations on individual plants within the
category or subcategory by incorporation into the terms
and conditions of NPDES discharge permits. 33 U.S.C.
App. 10
§1342. If a discharger is in compliance with the effluent
limitations contained in its NPDES permit, it is deemed
to be in compliance with the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(k).
One industrial facility may have numerous point
sources of discharge. These point sources may serve a
single process unit, multiple units, single or multiple treat-
ment facilities, or may only carry storm water runoff. To
borrow appellees’ example, a single site may contain an
herbicide manufacturing plant, a chlorinated solvent manu-
facturing plant, and a plastics manufacturing plant, all
of which are completely unrelated and belong to different
industrial subeategories having different effluent limita-
tions. Each plant might in turn maintain its own waste
water treatment system and have several point sources
for the effluents from its facilities. Due to the unique
process and treatment arrangements at each plant, when
incorporating effluent limitations into NPDES permits,
EPA developed separate conditions for each pollutant at
each separate point source. This is necessary to make
effluent limitations technology-based. Also, because the
treatment system for each point source may be unrelated
to the treatment system for any other point source, a
violation of an effluent limitation (a ‘‘parameter’’) at
one point suurce is not a violation of any parameter at
another point source even if the same pollutant is involved.
Consequently, when determining whether a permit-holder
has violated an effluent limitation, one must look at each
parameter within each point source independently.
The DMR’s submitted to EPA regularly by each of
the appellees and relied on by Sierra Club to evidence
ON re ae eres
Annee ing Lath Cessna Sb ce otic RES anit Saal
i
g
5
%
App. 11
permit violations separately identify effluent discharges
at each point source for each parameter. Appellant’s
complaints simply aggregated the possible violation re-
flected by the DMR’s at each appellee’s facility over time,
regardless whether they involved the same substance or
the same point source of discharge. Although given ample
opportunity to do so, Sierra Club did not attempt to dem-
onstrate that these isolated permit violations were the
product of appellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limi-
tations or of inadequate pollution control facilities. We
have thoroughly reviewed the record in each of these cases.
The evidence submitted by appellees demonstrated in many
instances that the alleged ‘‘violations’’ were approved
under EPA ‘‘bypass’’ regulations,* were based on overly
restrictive permit terms later liberalized by HPA®, or were
4. In its notice to Allied and as part of its complaint filed
in district court, Sierra Club claimed 21 effluent limitations
“exceedences” on point source 003 from January, 1983 to
May, 1983 at Allied’s Geismar, Louisiana chemical complex.
It is apparently undisputed, however, that these ‘‘exceed-
ences” were a direct result of ‘bypass’ discharges approved
by the EPA. Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.60 (1982) (superseded)
Allied sought and obtained EPA approval of anticipated ‘‘by-
pass” resulting in diversion of water from its ‘‘treatment facil-
ity’ and discharge into the Mississippi River. According to
the terms of the administrative order allowing “bypass”, the
EPA found that Allied “anticipates the need to discharge pro-
cess wastewater from the Clearwell of the water recirculation
system because the Company claims that precipitation events
and lack of production will cause the process wastewater level
to rise into surge capacity of the Clearwell.” Thus, on Jan-
uary 21, 1983 the EPA approved the requested discharge of
wastewater until May 31, 1983.
5. For example, Sierra Club’s assertions of “chronic episodic’
violations is demonstrated most readily from its claim that
Shell exceeded its daily maximum effluent -limitations of
(Continued on following page)
App. 12
related to treatment methods voluntarily discontinued by
the facility.© What remained of Sierra Club’s factual alle-
gations were occasional, minor discharges by the facilities
in the face of permit compliance rates exceeding 95% for
the balance of the period in question.
(Continued from previous page)
Total Suspended Solids (“TSS”) on outfall 002 at its Norco,
Louisiana petroleum refinery approximately 46 times between
April 1980 and June 1983. Recognizing the technical diffi-
culties in complying with its then current NPDES permit re-
quirements, the EPA liberalized Shell’s TSS effluent limita-
tions for outfall 002 in August 1983. While the new permit
had no retroactive effect, application of the less restrictive
terms to the above cited violations would decrease the num-
ber of exceedences over the three year period to approxi-
mately eight.
The NPDES permit limitations were similarly liberalized
for Formosa Plastics Corp.’s Geismar, Louisiana chemical man-
ufacturing plant. The EPA increased effluent limitations for
total organic carbon (“TOC”) because the plant’s previous
TOC limitations were found to be unnecessarily restrictive.
Finally, the EPA itself promulgated rules in 1982 reducing
the generally required “pH” excursion compliance rate from
100°/o to only 99°/o compliance. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.17 (1986).
The EPA determined that adjusting the standard “will estab-
lish a standard that well-operated and well-maintained plants
could realistically achieve and will reserve the resources of
both EPA and permittees for those instances when substan-
tial pH control problems exist.” 47 Fed.Reg. 24,534, 24,535
(1982). It is apparently undisputed that of Allied Chemical’s
62 alleged pH “excursions’—incidents whereby the pH value
of discharge wastewater exceeds applicable effluent ranges—
the maioritv would not have violated current EPA guidelines,
bringing compliance within the 99°/o requirement.
6. In an effort to ensure compliance with EPA hexavalent
and total chromium effluent limitations, Shell’s Norco refinery
implemented a conversion to a non-chromate corrosion con-
trol system. As of February, 1985 this conversion has evidently
been comnleted. The record reveals that Shell’s last violation
of nermit limitations for chromium occurred on March 7. 1984.
TTL ee ah ln ty NN eh A ta iy, nl tak Ne as etl, th ae Resta SOS ah
ee ee ee aoe Ty
App. 13
III.
Sierra Club first argues that Hamker is distinguish-
able because it did not involve an NPDES permit. The
statute belies any such distinction, for the citizen suit pro-
vision uses the term ‘‘effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter’’ to include both permit and non-permit based
violations of effluent standards found in the Clean Water
Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). This argument poses the
classie distinction without a difference. Sierra Club has
never explained why, beyond the fact that it is more likely
to be a plaintiff, different standards for a facility’s being
‘tin violation’’ should obtain depending on whether an
NPDES permit is in foree. Appellant’s unarticulated
assumption may be that the mere aggregation of past per-
mit violations or ‘‘exceedences’’ distinguishes these cases
from Hamker. We disagree. Hamker explicitly rejected
the applicability of the citizen suit provision to isolated
past pollution discharges. Hamker was grounded firmly
in the language of the statute, which uses the present tense
formulation ‘‘in violation’’ to authorize citizen enforce-
ment actions. Whether a defendant has engaged in one
or ten discrete instances of impermissible effluent dis-
charge cannot convert those actions from past to present
conduct for purposes of the statute. The Fourth Circuit,
which rejected Hamker’s construction of the citizen suit
provision, hesitated to do so on the distinction between
a NPDES permit violation case and a non-permit case.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithville,
Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir.1986), cert. granted, —
U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 872, 93 L.Ed.2d 827 (1987).
The balance of Sierra Club’s briefs is devoted to dem-
onstrating that Hamker is incorrect and represents an
App. 14
unworkable approach to enforcement of the Clean Water
Act.’ Even if Hamker were erroneously decided, our panel
could not overrule a prior controlling decision in this Cir-
cuit. Only the en bane court has that authority. We are
unpersuaded, however, that Hamker was wrongly decided.
The First Cireuit recently cited Hamker with approval
in a factually similar single-discharge case. Pawtuxet
Cove Marina Ine. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st
Cir.1987). The court concluded that ‘‘the words ‘is . .
in violation’ should be sufficiently liberally construed to
comport with the injunctive purpose of the Act—conduct
indicative of continuing or renewed violations justifying
an injunction, as distinguished from matters over and
apparently done with, that would not warrant one.’’ /d.
at 1093. In so doing, the First Circuit rejected the Fourth
Circuit’s construction of section 1365(a) rendered in Ches-
apeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney. There the court
found the language ‘‘to be in violation’’ ambiguous and
concluded that a citizen suit could be predicated upon past
violations of the terms of an NPDES permit. 791 F.2d
at 309. Gwaltney is the only circuit court that differs with
the construction of section 1365(a) approved by Hamker.
We further disagree with Sierra Club’s assertion that
the Clean Water Act’s enforcement provisions are ren-
dered ‘‘unworkable’’ by construing ‘‘in violation’’ in its
grammatically natural sense to require some kind of on-
7. Sierra Club is seriously hampered in arguing Hamker’s
distinction from the present cases because Sierra Club's
amicus brief in Hamker, asserting the arguments made here,
was obviously rejected by our prior panel.
App. 15
going effluent violation by the discharger.’ The court in
Hamker carefully explained the distinction between citi-
zen suits and enforcement actions brought by govern-
mental authorities. Both the federal and state govern-
ments can abundantly enforce the Clean Water Act by
means of criminal and civil actions authorizing monetary
or injunctive awards. 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Governmental
actions were envisaged to be the central enforcement arm
under the Act. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395. The private
enforcement action, on the other hand, is supplementary
to the scheme of the statute overall. As noted in H/amker,
the required 60 days’ prior notice of a plaintiff's intent
to file suit under the citizen provisions may encourage
a defendant who is violating effluent limitations to ‘‘clean
up his act’’ before suit is filed. /d. at 396. Moreover,
where a government action is being diligently prosecuted,
the citizen is barred from bringing suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(b)(1)(B). We think it unlikely that Congress’s explicit
restrictions on the right to bring private enforcement ac-
tions significantly impair the efficacy of the general regu-
latory framework.
In affirming the judgments of the district courts on
the foregoing grounds, we are not required to decide other
issues presented by this appeal. Specifically, we need not
determine whether Sierra Club has standing to prosecute
the instant actions, whether private lawsuits may be filed
8. The First Circuit noted how easy it would have been
for Congress to authorize citizens suits against any party
alleged “to have violated” the Clean Water Act. Pawtuxet
Cove, 807 F.2d at 1092.
App. 16
only for violations of NPDES permits currently in force,’
or whether the citizen suit section of the statute unconsti-
tutionally confers powers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment upon citizens.
Sierra Club finally argues that the district court
abused its discretion in awarding costs of suit be [sic] in
favor of Shell Oil Company, one of the appellees herein.
Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d), the court is permitted to
award costs of litigation, including attorney and expert
witness fees, to any party whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate. Sierra Club suggests no basis
for finding an abuse of discretion, and we perceive none.
The judgments of the district courts are AFFIRMED.
9. Construing § 1365(f), which allows private enforcement
actions to enforce a “permit or condition thereof ... which
is in effect under this chapter’, the court in Pawtuxet Cove
held that no private enforcement action could be brought
for violations of a permit under which the defendant had
ceased operating. 807 F.2d at 1094.
Siw 2 rea, be ater Soe) ae
App. 17
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
AT NEW ORLEANS
SIERRA CLUB )
530 Bush Street )
San Francisco, California 94108 ) Civil Action No.
) $4-3983
Plaintiffs, )
v. ) SECT. J MAG. 2
)
SHELL OIL COMPANY )
One Shell Plaza ) COMPLAINT
Post Office Box 10 )
Noreo, Louisiana 70079 )
)
Defendant. )
)
INTRODUCTION
1. This action is a citizens’ suit brought under Sec-
tion 505 of the Clean Water Act (‘‘the Act’’), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
the imposition of civil penalties, and the award of costs,
including attorneys’ aud expert witness’ fees, for Defen-
dant’s repeated violations of the terms and provisions
of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(““NPDES’’) permit number LA0003522 in violation of
§ 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
the claims set forth in this Complaint wnder Section
505(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 13865(a) (1).
App. 18
3. On January 20, 1984, Plaintiff gave notice of the
violations and of its intent to file this suit to the Adminis-
trator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (‘‘EPA’’), to the Louisiana Department of Natural
Resourees (““DNR’’), Water Pollution Control Division,
and to the Defendant, as required by Section 505(b) (1) (A)
of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). A copy of the
notice is attached as Appendix A and is incorporated
herein.
4. More than sixty days have passed since notice was
served and neituer EPA nor DNR has commenced and
diligently prosecuted a civil or criminal action in a court
of the United States or in a court of the State of Louisiana
to redress these violations.
5. Venue is appropriate in the Eastern District of
Louisiana pursuant to Section 505(¢)(1) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1865(¢)(1), since the source of the violations is
located within this District.
PARTIES
Plaintiffs
6. Plaintiff Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation
organized under the laws of the State of California with
its principal place of business at 530 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California 94108, and with other offices located
throughout the country. The Sierra Club is a national
conservation organization having over 200,000 members,
approximately 2,000 of whom reside in Louisiana and are
members of its Delta Chapter. The Sierra Club was or-
ganized to study, protect, enhance, and enjoy natural and
scenic resources, including the nation’s navigable waters.
App. 19
Through participation in numerous legislative, adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings, the Sierra Club has demon-
strated its strong interest in the effective conservation
and enhancement of the nation’s waters and in the proper
enforcement of laws designed to protect those waters.
7. Members of the Sierra Club, Delta Chapter, reside
in, or own property in, or recreate in the vicinity of Bayou
Trepagnier, part of Louisiana’s Scenic Rivers System.
There is a New Orleans Group of the Delta Chapter. These
members use and enjoy the resources in, around and down-
stream of Bayou Trepagnier and in and around Lake
Pontchartrain into which the Bayou Trepagnier flows for
boating, hunting, fishing, camping, wildlife viewing, pho-
tography, and general aesthetic and spiritual enjoyment.
The quality of the waters of the State of Louisiana inelud-
ing the waters impacted by Defendant’s illegal discharge
directly affects these interests of Sierra Club members.
Plaintiff and its members have been, are being, and wil!
be adversely affected and irreparably harmed by Defen-
dant’s failure to comply with its NPDES permit require-
ments.
Defendant
8. Defendant Shell Oil Company is organized under
the laws of the State of Delaware. Defendant operates a
petroleum refinery in Norco, Louisiana.
BACKGROUND
9. Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. $13811(a),
prohibits the discharge of pollutants from a point source
into navigable waters of the United States if such dis-
charges are not authorized by or are in violation of the
App. 20
terms of an NPDES permit issued pursuant to Section 402
of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
10. EPA is responsible for issuance of NPDES per-
mits pursuant to 33 U.S.C. ¢ 1342 to dischargers in Louisi-
ana since the Administrator has not approved a state per-
mitting program for Louisiana pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b).
11. EPA, pursuant to Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342, issued to Defendant NPDES permit number
LA0003522 effective on July 23, 1977, authorizing the De-
fendant to discharge specified amounts of pollutants from
its Noreo facility into the Mississippi River and Bayou
Trepagnier, which are navigable waters of the United
States.
12. Section 308 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1318, requires
each NPDES permitee to establish and maintain records;
to install, use, and maintain monitoring equipment; to sam-
ple effluent and report on a regular basis to the permit
issuing Agency regarding the facility’s discharge of pol-
lutants. The reports consist of Discharge Monitoring Re-
ports (“‘DMRs’’) and Non-Compliance Reports (‘‘NCRs’’).
In these reports the permittee must state on a periodic
basis whether it is in compliance with the terms of its
permit.
13. Representatives of Plaintiff and other citizens’
environmental organizations have examined and evaluated
EPA NPDES discharge permit compliance files on a com-
prehensive basis for several states including Louisiana.
In this research these organizations looked for those com-
panies where they appeared to be persistent and historic
patterns or permit non-compliance and where there had
App. 21
been no diligent prosecution by Federal or State authori-
ties. Defendant is such a company. Thereafter ‘‘60 day
notices,’’ such as the one described in paragraph 3 above,
were sent to the Defendant and other companies as re-
quired by the Act, with copies to EPA and the State. These
notices serve as final notices to the Federal and State
agencies to enforce the law, while giving the company an
opportunity to correct any misunderstandings as to viola-
tions of the law or to reach dispositions short of litigation,
which satisfy the purposes of the Act.
14. The specific violations of permit limits identified
in Appendices A and B to this Complaint were taken di-
rectly from the noncompliance and discharge monitoring
reports (NCRs and DMRs) submitted to EPA by the De-
fendant pursuant to the reporting requirements established
by Federal law and reflected in Defendant’s NPDES
permit.*
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
15. Defendant operates a petroleum refinery in Norco,
Louisiana. It discharges treated wastes through four
point sources into the Mississippi River and Bayou Tre-
pagnier pursuant to NPDES permit number LA0003522.
16. Defendant has submitted DMRs and NCRs to
EPA covering at least the periods shown in Appendices
A and B, which publicly disclose a pattern of substantial
non-compliance with the Clean Water Act.
* Plaintiffs made four typographical errors in transferring
this information to the Notice Letters. Those errors and
their corrections are listed in Appendix C hereto.
App. 22
17. Defendant’s record of noncompliance with
NPDES permit number LA0003522 appears in detail in
Appendices A and B.
18. Defendant’s violations have been numerous and
repeated. In general, between March 1980 and March
1984, Defendant has violated its permit limitations for
Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biological Oxygen Demand
(BOD), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), Hexavalent
Chromium, Total Chromium, Phenols, Total Organic Car-
bon and pH at least 120 times.
19. On information and belief, Plaintiff further al-
leges that Defendant has violated the permit limitations
subsequent to the violations listed in Appendices A and
B and continues to be in violation of the Act.
20 Plaintiff alleges that there has been no diligent
prosecution of Defendant through civil or criminal court
action by the EPA or the DNR concerning the specific
charged violations.
21. Because of the extensive history of violations of
the effluent standards imposed by NPDES permit number
LA0003522, Plaintiff believes and alleges that without im-
position of appropriate civil penalties and the issuance of
an injunction, Shell Oil Company will continue to violate
its NPDES permit creating further injury to the environ-
ment and others.
CLAIMS
22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference
herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 21 and
Appendices A and B to this Complaint.
App. 23
23. Defendant’s wastewater discharges identified in
Appendices A and B are discharges from point sources
into navigable waters of the United States within the
meaning of Section 301 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
24. Defendant’s wastewater discharges from Outfalls
002 and 004 as listed in Appendices A and B to the Com-
plaint, and those which have been committed subsequent
to those listed in Appendices A and B, are violations of its
permit limitations for the pollutants listed in paragraph
18 above, and constitute violations of Sections 301(a) and
402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a) and 1342.
RELIEF
Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court
to grant the following relief:
A. Declare Defendant Shell Oil Company to have
violated and to be in violation of Sections 301 and 402 of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1811 and 1342;
B. Enjoin the Defendant from operating its facility
in Noreo, Louisiana in such a manner as will result in the
further violation of the defendant’s NPDES permit num-
ber L.A0003522;
C. Authorize Plaintiff for the period beginning on
the date of the Court’s order and running for one year
after Defendant achieve compliance with all of the limi-
tations in its NPDES permit, to sample or to arrange
sampling of any discharge of pollutants from Defendant’s
facility with the cost of the sampling to be borne by De-
fendant;
App. 24
D. Order Defendant to provide Plaintiff, for the
period beginning on the date of the Court’s order and run-
ning for one year after Defendant achieves compliance
with all of the limitations of its NPDES permit, with a
copy of all reports and other documents which Defendant
submits to the Federal or State government regarding De-
fendant’s NPDES permit, to be submitted at the time it is
submitted to these authorities;
EK. Order Defendant to pay civil penalties of $10,000
per day of violation for each violation pursuant to Sections
309(d) and 505(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d) and
1365(a), ineluding those listed in Appendices A and B
and violations committed subsequent to those listed in Ap-
pendices A and B;
F. Award Plaintiff its costs, including reasonable at-
torneys’ and expert witness’ fees, as authorized by Sec-
tion 505(d) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(d) ; and
G. Award such other and further relief as this Court
deems appropriate.
(i aaa en
MICHAEL OSBORNE
Osborne, MeComiskey and
Richardson-Harp
3420 Prytania Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70115
504/891-4418
Loeal Counsel for Plaintiff
App. 25
Respectfully submitted,
KATHERINE P. RANSEL*
NANCY C. CRISMAN
NICHOLAS C. YOST
JOHN VANCE HUGHES
Center for Law in the
Public Interest
1575 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 650
Washington, D.C. 20005-1105
202/371-0199
Counsel for Plaintiff
*Trial Attorney for Plaintiff
App. 26
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER 84-407-B
COPOLYMER RUBBER AND
CHEMICAL CORPORATION
SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NU MBER 84-408-B
ALLIED CHEMICAL CORPORATION
SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER 84-409-B
BERCEN SOUTHERN DIVISION OF
BERCEN INCORPORATED
SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER 84-410-B
FORMOSA PLASTICS CORPORATION
FRANK J. POLOZOLA, District Judge:
These consolidated cases! were filed by Sierra Club
under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. 1365(a). In each of these cases, Sierra Club con-
tends the defendants have violated Section 301(a) of the
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a).
‘The Sierra Club filed separate suits against Copolymer
Rubber and Chemical Corporation (‘Copolymer’) (CA 84-407-
B), Allied Chemical Corporation (“Allied’’) (CA 84-408-B), Ber-
cen Southern Division of Bercen Incorporated (“Bercen’’) (CA
84-409-B), and Formosa Plastics Corporation (‘Formosa’) (CA
84-410-B). Because the same jurisdictional issue is involved in
each cases, the Court has consolidated the cases in the interest
of judicial economy.
App. 27
I Procedural History of the Cases
After these suits were filed, the standing of the Sierra
Club to bring these suits became an issue in this case. In
order to determine the legal standard to be applied by the
Court on the standing issue, the Court stayed discovery on
all issues except standing and ordered the parties to file
briefs on the issue. After the Court denied plaintiff’s
motion for partial summary judgment on the standing is-
sue, the Fifth Cirenit Court of Appeals rendered its deci-
sion in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company,
756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir. 1985). Thereafter, the Court or-
dered the parties to file briefs on whether the Court had
jurisdiction in these cases under the Hamker decision. In
addition, Copolymer filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? Briefs
were filed, oral argument was held on two occasions and
the matter was submitted to the Court.
II The Court’s Jurisdiction
It is well settled that a federal court is empowered to
bear only such cases as are within the judicial power of the
United States, as defined in the Constitution, and have
been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by Con-
gress.2 It is also equally settled that a federal court has
an obligation to notice want of subject matter jurisdiction
2After oral argument was held on the Hamker jurisdiction
issue and the matter was submitted to the Court, Sierra Club
filed another motion for partial summary judgment on the is-
sues of standing and liability.
313 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure Jurisdiction § 3522.
App. 28
on its own motion. Where the subject matter jurisdiction
of the Court has been challenged, the burden is on the party
claiming jurisdiction to demonstrate that jurisdiction of
subject matter exists.° Thus, the burden is upon the Sierra
Club to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exist
in these cases.
Ill The Hamaker Decision
Hamaker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company,
756 F.2d 392, involved the very same issue as that pre-
sented to this Court—does Section 1365(a) permit a citizen
suit for past violations, or must the defendant be ‘‘in vio-
lation’’ of relevant standards, limitations and orders on
the date the citizen suit is filed? After thoroughly dis-
eussing the history, meaning and purposes of Section
1365(a)® as it relates to the other provisions of the Clean
Water Act, the Fifth Cirenit Court of Appeals concluded:
To summarize, the ordinary meaning of the words of
the statute and its prior Supreme Court interpretation
indicate that Section 1365 does not authorize citizens
suits seeking either injunctive relief or the imposition
of civil penalties where the defendant is not alleged to
be in violation of an effluent standard, limitation or
order. The section ‘‘authorizes only prospective re-
*Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 764,
769 n. 2, 66 L.Ed. 722 (1981); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908); and Cameron v.
Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 8 S.Ct. 1154, 32 L.Ed. 132 (1888).
‘McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178,
56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1935); Diefenthal v. Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 US.
1107, 103 S.Ct. 732, 74 L.Ed. 2d 956 (1983); Ortego v. Wein-
berger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975).
633 U.S.C. 1365(a) provides in pertinent part that “any citi-
zen may commence a civil action . . . against any person .. .
who is alleged to be in violation of” the relevant standards,
limitations, or orders. (Emphasis supplied.)
App. 29
lief’? even though ‘‘civil penalties . .. may be ordered
by the court.’’ 756 F.2d at 396’
The Sierra Club argues that the Tamker ease is wrong
and that the appellate judges misinterpreted the provisions
of the Clean Water Act.’
This Court is not only bound by the Tamker decision,
but the Court must note that it fully agrees with the inter-
pretation placed on § 1365 in the majority opinion?
IV The Court Has No Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Since the Court and Copolymer have questioned the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Sierra Club must
affirmatively show that the Court has subject matter jur-
isdiction. Sierra Club has failed to demonstrate that the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction in these cases. In
each of the cases, the Sierra Club alleges that the defen-
dants are in violation of an effluent standard, limitation
or order at the time the suits were filed.'° Since this al-
legation has been challenged by each of the defendants, the
7judge Jolly, in his opinion, emphasized on at least twenty
separate occasions that the defendant must be “in violation’
at the time the suit is filed in order for a citizen to file a suit
under § 1365(a).
8On oral argument, counsel for Sierra Club stated that the
same argument the Sierra Club was making to this Court was
made to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in an amicus brief
on rehearing in the Hamker case. The Hamker Court obviously
rejected these areuments.
%The Court does not believe that it is bound by the lan-
guage in the concurring opinion regarding a suit filed against
a “chronic episodic violator,” 756 F.2d at 399, but even if this
language apnlies, the facts as presented in the case sub judice
fail to support the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court.
The allegations are set forth in paragraph 19 of each com-
plaint filed in these cases.
App. 30
Sierra Club must present proof that the defendants were
‘‘in violation’’ at the time the suits were filed. However,
the evidence" presented in these cases clearly and unequi-
vocally shows that none of the defendants were in violation
at the time the suits were filed.”
IV [sic] Conclusion
The Court finds that the defendants were not in
violation of any standard, limitation or order at the time
the suits were filed herein. Therefore, the Sierra Club is
precluded from filing a citizens suit against the defendants
under Section 1365(a) of the Act. Since the Court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff’s suits shall
be dismissed.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, November 7, 1985.
The parties have filed numerous affidavits and exhibits
into the record on the jurisdiction issue.
12During oral argument, the Court unsuccessfully attempted
on numerous occasions to have counsel for the Sierra Club
point out any violations of any defendant which were pending
on the date the suits were filed. Not only did plaintiff fail to
set forth these violations during oral argument, but the record
clearly demonstrates there were no violations on the dates the
suits were filed herein.
3The Court's dismissal will be without prejudice. As noted
in Hamker, the plaintiff may have a state damage claim which
may be brought in a state court. Hamker v. Diamond Sham-
rock Chemical Company, 756 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1985).
The Court expresses no opinion as to the validity of such a
claim.
App. 31
NOTICE MAILED TO:
DATE 11/8 BY PJ
Mr. Osborne
Byrd
Harburt
Cruilj
Lt
JG(6)
/s/ Frank J. Polozola
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MINUTE ENTRY:
NOVEMBER 8, 1985
POLOZOLA, Pi
SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER 85-147-B
MONOCHEM, INCORPORATED
(Received November 21, 1985)
This matter is before the court on the motion of the
defendant Monochem, Incorporated (‘‘Monochein’’), to
dismiss this case for lack of subject matter Jurisdiction.
A review of the record, including affidavits and ex-
hibits. reveal that Monochem was not ‘‘in violation’’ of
an effluent standard, limitation or order at the time the
present suit was filed. Therefore, for the reasons set forth
in Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber and Chemical Com-
pany, et al, — F.Supp. — (M.D. La. 1985), this suit must
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1).
App. 32
Therefore:
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of the defendant,
Monochem, Incorporated, to dismiss the present suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction be, and it is hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s suit be
dismissed without prejudice.
/s/ Frank J. Polozola
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NOTICE MAILED TO:
DATED 11/8 BY PJ
Osborne
Hallo
(6) Philip
LT.
JG.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 84-3583
SHELL OIL COMPANY SECTION ‘‘J”’
JUDGMENT
(Filed November 4, 1985)
The Court having previously granted the motion of
defendant to dismiss.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that there be judgment in favor of defendant, Shell Oil
Company, against plaintiff, Sierra Club, dismissing said
plaintiff’s suit, with costs.
App. 33
Dated at New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of
November, 1985.
/s/ Patrick E. Carr
United States District Judge
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