Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co.

Supreme Court brief1987

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87-181:

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Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

JUL 20 1987

In The

. JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

Supreme Court of the United Creag

October Term, 1987

SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

¥;

SHELL OIL COMPANY,

Respondent.

SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

v.

MONOCHEM, INC.,

Respondent.

SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

V.

COPOLYMER RUBBER AND

CHEMICAL CORP. et al.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Vv

Michael Osborne James Thornton

Albert H. Meyerhoff*

Osborne, McComiskey &

Richardson-Harp

3420 Prytania Street

New Orleans, LA 70115

(504) 891-4418

* Counsel of Record

Natural Resources

Defense Council

90 New Montgomery St.

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 777-0220

James Simon

Natural Resources

Defense Council

122 East 42nd St.

New York, N.Y. 10168

(212) 949-0049

Attorneys for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CoO., (800) 225-6964

or call collect (402) 342-2831

| 3 eee:

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the court below err in holding that a federal court

lacks jurisdiction to hear a citizen suit under the Clean

Water Act against a defendant that violated its discharge

permit both before and after commencement of the action,

on the ground that such defendant is not ‘‘in violation’’

of its permit when the action was filed, contrary to the

Fourth Cireuit in Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Nat-

ural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), and the

First Cireuit in Pawtuaet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy

Corporation, 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986) ?

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner and _ plaintiff-appellant below is Sierra

Club, a non-profit corporation organized under the laws

of the State of California.* Respondents and defendart-

appellees below are Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Co.,

Allied Corp., Bercen, Inc., Formosa Plastics Corp., Mono-

chem, Ine., and Shell Oil Co.

* Statement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.1: Petitioner

has no subsidiaries or affiliates.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED |... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION 2

PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION _. 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 11

I. The Decision Below Directly Conflicts With the

Decisions of the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney

and the First Cireuit in Pawtuwxet Cove. 0. 1t

A. The Interpretation by the Court Below of the

Citizen Suit Provision is Directly Contrary

to those of the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney and

the First Cireuit in Pawtuwet Cove. 0... 13

B. The Court Below Adopted a View of the Role

of the Citizen Suit Provision Contrary to the

Views of the Fourth and First Cireuits. 000... 25

C. The Decision Below Cannot Be Reconciled

With the Decisions of the Fourth and First

Rg RR SESE ae chee Pon eae 27

II. The Question Over Which the Fifth Cireuit Has

Split With the Fourth and First Cireuits is In-

portant and Hecurring. (0 ____ 28

SRE IES ee 29

APPENDIX:

Opinion of Court of Appeals 00 App. 1

Complaint in Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Com-

(ACR ge Oe App. 17

Opinions of District Courts . App. 26

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.

574 (1983) 19

Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

608 F. Supp. 440 (D.Md. 1985) 21

Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,

Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,

— U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 872 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1987) (No.

|, Rn Eten se. ere oe ae passim

Connecticut Fund for the Environment and Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Job Plating

Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D.Conn. 1985) an

EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources

Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) 20, 21

Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corp.,

756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir. 1985) passim

Illinois v. Outboard Marine Co., 680 F.2d 473

(7th Cir. 1982) 17

Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,

807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert.

filed (U.S. March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562). passim

Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber & Chemical

Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1013 (M.D.La. 1985) Sais 26

Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Company, 817 F.2d 1169

(5th Cir. 1987) sonseneeeeP/AS8TM

Student Public Interest Research Group v. Mon-

santo Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985) 00. 22

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

y

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d

TR ae ee See 17, 21

United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 paialide reh’g

denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980) . Pee ao

Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.

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Water Quality Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-4,

§§ 313, 314 (1987) . Peder a = 18, 24

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continned

Page

REGULATIONS

45 Fed. Reg. 79318 6

79328 8

79338 10

79341 9

50 Fed. Reg. 30784 .. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10

Lecistative History

S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) —.. §=18

S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) 18, 19, 28

H. R. Rep. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 18

OTHER

United States Environmental Protection

Ageney, Quality Criteria for Water, July

1976 . 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

No.

ra’

Ww

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

v.

SHELL OIL COMPANY,

Respondent.

SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

v.

MONOCHEM, INC.,

Respondent.

SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

v

COPOLYMER RUBBER AND

CHEMICAL CORP. et al.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner Sierra Club respectfully prays that a writ

of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,

entered in the above-captioned proceeding on May 29, 1987.

This Court has granted a writ on the identical question

presented in this petition in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.

v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources De-

1

2

fense Council, Inc., No. 86-473. This Court’s decision in

Gwaltney will in all likelihood require the modification of

the opinion below. The requested writ should thus be

granted to keep open the judgment in the six cases consoli-

dated below, so that it can be conformed to the decision

that this Court enters in Gwaltney.

ry.

—— ae

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Cireuit is reported at 817 F.2d 1169 and is reprinted in the

appendix hereto (‘‘App.’’) at 1.

The opinions of the United States District Courts for

the Middle and Eastern Districts of Louisiana are re-

printed at App. 26.

ray

Vw

JURISDICTION

Sierra Club brought suit against the six respondents

for violation of their Clean Water Act discharge permits,

pursuant to the Act’s citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365.

Five of the six cases were brought in the Middle, and

one in the Eastern, District of Louisiana. The actions

against Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Co., Allied Corp.,

Bercen, Inc., and Formosa Plastics were consolidated by

the district court and dismissed on February 7, 1985. The

suit against Monochem, Inc. was dismissed on December

18, 1985. The action against Shell Oil Co. was dismissed on

October 30, 1985.

Sierra Club appealed each ruling, and the cases were

consolidated on appeal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the

dismissals on May 29, 1987.

|

of

>

7)

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment

the Fifth Cireuit is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1204(1).

PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,

provides:

Citizen Suits

(a) Authorization; jurisdiction

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this see-

tion, any citizen may commence a civil action on his

own behalf—

(1) against any person (including (i) the

United States, and (ii) any other governmental

instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted

by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)

who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent

standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)

an order issued by the Administrator or a State

with respect to such a standard or limitation, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is

alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform

any act or duty under this chapter which is not

discretionary with the Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without

regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship

of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or

limitation, or such an order, or to order the Admini-

strator to perform such act or duty, as the case may

be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalities under

section 1319(d) of this title.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At the time Sierra Club filed suit, the respondents

had among the worst records in Louisiana of noncompli-

ance with their Clean Water Act discharge permits

(NPDES permits), as the respondents reported to the En-

vironmental Protection Agency in the discharge monitor-

ing reports (‘‘DMRs’’) that they are required to file un-

der the Act. The permit violations reported by the re-

spondents on their DMRs in the record are as follows.

Copolymer Rubber, in connection with operating a

synthetic rubber manufacturing facility in Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, holds NPDES permit LA9000914. The permit

limits Copolymer Rubber’s discharges into the Monte Sano

Bayou. Sierra Club sued Copolymer in April 1984. Be-

tween December 1980 and September 1984, Copolymer re-

ported violating its permit limits at least 78 times, inelud-

ing 5 violations in the five months after the filing of

Sierra Club’s suit.’

'The following table summarizes the permit violations that

Copolymer reported in its discharge monitoring reports from

December 1980 through September 1984.

Parameter Violations

Copper 3

Ammonia 1

Oil and Grease 14

Chemical Oxygen Demand 44

Biochemical Oxygen Demand 1

Total Suspended Solids 1

pH 14

Total 78

Copper and Ammonia are of particular concern because they

are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA has established water

quality criteria intended to protect waters from the effects of

these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784. The remaining parameters

listed above all contribute to the degradation of ambient water

quality and can, of themselves, lead to fish mortality. United

States Environmental Protection Agency, Quality Criteria for

Water, July 1976 (‘Quality Criteria’).

Allied Chemical, in conection with operating a chemi-

cal manufacturing plant in Geismar, Louisiana, holds

NPDES permit LA0006181. The permit limits Allied

Chemical’s discharges into the Mississippi River. Sierra

Club sued Allied in April 1984. Between July 1980 and

August 1984, Allied reported violating its permit limits

at least 119 times, including a violation in April 1984, the

month the complaint was filed, and 9 more violations in

the first four months after the filing of Sierra Club’s

suit.?

The following table summarizes the permit violations that

Allied reported in its discharge monitoring reports from July

1980 through August 1984.

Parameter Violations

Ammonia 1

Chromium 2

Zinc 1

Fluoride 24

Total Phosphorus 19

Organic Nitrogen 8

Total Suspended Solids 2

pH 62

Total 119

Ammonia, Chromium and Zinc are of particular concern be-

cause they are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA has es-

tablished water quality criteria for the protection of waters from

the effects of these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784, 45 Fed. Reg.

79318. The remaining parameters listed above all! contribute

to the degradation of ambient water quality and can, of them-

selves, lead to fish mortality. See Quality Criteria, supra note 1.

Bercen, Inc., in connection with operating a specialty

chemical manufacturing plant in Denham Springs, Louisi-

ana, holds NPDES permit LA0048704. The permit limits

Bercen, Ine.’s discharges into Gray’s Creek. Sierra

Club sued Bercen, Ine. in April 1984. Between October

1979 and May 1984, Bercen, Inc. reported 80 violations,

ineluding one violation in April 1984, the month the com-

plaiut was filed, and one additional violation in May 1984,

the month after the filing of Sierra Club’s suit.’

3The following table summarizes the permit violations that

Bercen, Inc. reported in its discharge monitoring reports from

October 1979 through May 1984.

Parameter Violations

Biochemical Oxygen Demand 41

Chemical Oxygen Demand 16

Total Suspended Solids 19

Oil and Grease 4

Total 80

All of the above parameters contribute to the degradation of

ambient water quality and can, of themselves, lead to fish mor-

tality. See Quality Criteria, supra note 1.

Formosa Plastics, in connection with operating a

chemical manufacturing plant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,

holds NPDES permit LA0006149. The permit limits For-

mosa Plastic’s discharges into the Mississippi River.

Sierra Club sued Formosa Plastics in April 1984. Be-

tween November 1982 and October 1984, Formosa Plastics

reported 65 violations, including 27 violations in the six

months after the filing of the suit.*

‘The following table summarizes the permit violations that

Formosa Plastics reported in its discharge monitoring reports

from November 1982 through October 1984.

Parameter Violations

Chlerine 19

Chromium 4

1,2-Dichloroethane 9

Lead 5

Total Organic Carbon 18

4

6

Total Suspended Solids |

pH

Total 65

Chlorine, Chromium, 1,2-Dichloroethane and Lead are of par-

ticular concern because they are directly toxic to aquatic life.

The EPA has established water quality criteria for the protection

of waters from the effects of these substances. 50 Fed. Reg.

30784, 45 Fed. Reg. 79328. The remaining substances listed all

contribute to the degradation of ambient water quality and can,

of themselves, lead to fish mortality. See Quality Criteria, supra

note 1.

WlieBserie sr

Monochem, in connection with operating a vinyl chlor-

ide manufacturing facility in Geismar, Louisiana, holds

NPDES permit LA0006220. The permit limits Monochem’s

discharges into the Mississippi River and the New River.

Sierra Club sued Monochem in February 1985. Between

July 1980 and March 1985, Monochem reported violating

its permit limits at least 136 times. Monochem reported

11 violations in February 1985, the month suit was filed,

8 violations in March 1985,° the month after suit was

filed, and another 10 violations in April 1985.°

5The fcllowing table summarizes the permit violations that

Monochem reported in its discharge monitoring reports from

July 1980 through March 1985.

Parameter Violations

Mercury . 18

Copper 2

Chromium 11

Zinc 4

Oil and Grease 8

Total Organic Carbon 11

Biochemical Oxygen Demand 13

Total Suspended Solids 12

Temperature 21

pH 36

Total 136

Mercury, Chromium, Copper and Zinc are of particular con-

cern, because they are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA

has established water quality criteria for the protection of wa-

ters from the effects of these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784,

45 Fed. Reg. 79341. The remaining substances listed all con-

tribute to the degradation of ambient water quality and can,

of themselves, lead to fish mortality. See Quality Criteria, supra

note 1.

6Although jurisdiction does not depend on violations that

occur at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, peti-

tioner will update the record of violations in each case for the

information of the Court should this petition be granted.

10

Shell Oil, in connection with operating a petroleum

refinery in Norco, Louisiana, holds NPDES permit

1L.A0003522. The permit limits Shell’s discharges into the

Mississippi River and Bayou Trepagnier. Sierra Club

sued Shell Oil in July 1984. Between January 1980 and

March 1985, Shell reported violating its permit limits at

least 132 times. Shell reported 11 violations in February

and March 1985, after the suit was filed.’

In sum, each respondent was a chronic violator of the

Clean Water Act over a period of years until sued by

Sierra Club. Each of them continued to violate the Act,

with varying degrees of frequency, after suit was filed.

The district courts had jurisdiction to determine liability

and impose injunctive relief and penalties in each case,

under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 1319(d).

— , *

Vv

7The following table summarizes the permit violations that

Shell Oil reported in its discharge monitoring reports from

January 1980 through March 1985.

Parameter Violations

Chromium, hexavalent 18

Chromium, total 2

Phenols 11

Total Organic Carbon 4

Biochemical Oxygen Demand 28

Chemical Oxygen Demand 3

Total Suspended Solids 60

pH 6

Total 132

Chromium and Phenol are of particular concern because they

are directly toxic to aquatic life. The EPA has established water

uality criteria for the protection of waters from the effects of

these substances. 50 Fed. Reg. 30784, 45 Fed. Reg. 79338. The

remaining substances listed all contribute to the degradation of

ambient water quality and can, of themselves, lead to fish mor-

tality. See Quality Criteria, supra note 1.

1l

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Decision Below Directly Conflicts With the Deci-

Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove.

On the identical issue presented in this petition, this

Court has granted a writ to review the decision of the

Fourth Cireuit in Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,

Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, — U.S.

—, 107 S.Ct. 872 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1987) (No. 86-473). The

briefs in Gwaltney have been submitted and argument is to

be scheduled by the Court.

The Gwaltney case, like the present cases, was a citi-

zen suit brought to enforce a Clean Water Act discharge

permit. In Gwaltney the defendant ceased its violations

while the statutorily required notice of intent to sue was

outstanding but before suit was filed. The district court

held that it had jurisdiction to determine liability and im-

pose penalties payable to the United States Treasury. The

Fourth Cireuit rejected defendant’s claim that it could not

be sued for penalties for ‘‘past’’ violations. The Fourth

Circuit held that ‘‘citizen suits like the one at bar, seeking

civil penalties for permit violations committed entirely in

the past, are permitted under [the citizen suit provision].’’

791 F.2d at 313. This Court granted a writ of certiorari

to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision, No. 86-473. The

United States, 13 states, and several private organizations

have filed briefs urging affirmance.

In Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,

807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed (U.S.

March 17, 1987) (No. 86-1562), the plaintiff sought penal-

12

ties for past violations of the Clean Water Act, as well as

other relief pursuant to pendant state law claims. The al-

leged Clean Water Act violations were actions in the past

not capable of repetition. The First Circuit held that there

was no jurisdiction in the case because the plaintiff did not

allege that the defendant was ‘‘in violation’’ of the Act

when the complaint was filed. Where such an allegation is

made in good faith, however, the First Cireuit ruled, the

district court has jurisdiction to determine liability on a

strict liability basis and impose penalties even when the

facts later demonstrate that the violations were entirely in

the past. 807 IF'.2d at 1094. The plaintiff in the case has

petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.

The Fifth Cireuit has taken a position diametrically

opposed to that of either the Fourth or First Cireuits.* In

the opinion below, the court held that the district courts

lacked jurisdiction over citizen suits where the defendants

violated their permits both before and after the complaints

were filed, unless the plaintiff shows that the violations

were ‘‘ongoing’’ or “‘continuing’’,? by proving that the vio-

lations ‘‘were the product of . . . systematic neglect of dis-

charge limitations or of inadequate pollution control facil-

ities.’’ 817 F.2d at 1174, App. at 11."°

8As explained below, at pp. 21 to 22, the way the court

below confused remedy with jurisdiction also brings its hold-

ing inte conflict with Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,

1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

*The words “ongoing”, “continuing” and “chronic” are

used interchangeably in the opinion below, 817 F.2d at 1173-

75, and in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corp., 756

F.2d 392, 396-98 (5th Cir. 1985).

In each of the cases below, Sierra Club alleged in its

complaint that the defendant had violated its permit, was con-

(Continued on following page)

13

This Court should grant the writ to resolve the direct

conflict among the circuit courts’ interpretations of the

jurisdictional requirements of the Clean Water Act’s citi-

zen suit provision. In addition, the Fifth Circuit’s decision

conflicts with opinions of this Court. Finally, this Court

should grant the writ because it has already accepted for

review the identical question in Gwaltney, No. 86-473.

A. The Interpretation by the Court Below of the

Citizen Suit Provision is Directly Contrary to

those of the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney and the

First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove.

The jurisdictional language at issue is the phrase ‘‘in

violation’’ in the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water

Act. The provision authorizes the district court to enter-

tain an action by a citizen ‘‘against any person... who is

alleged to be in violation of ... an effluent standard or

limitation’’. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). ‘‘Effluent standard

or limitation’’ is defined to include a permit or condition

thereof. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). Where liability is found, the

district court is authorized to impose penalties payable to

the Treasury and to grant injunctive relief. 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1865(a), 1319(d).

In these cases, the Fifth Cireuit panel relied on a pre-

vious Fifth Cireuit decision, Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock

Chemical Corp., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985). In Hamker,

the court engrafted onto the statute a requirement that the

alieged violations must be “‘continuing.’’ Under the Ham-

(Continued from previous page)

tinuing and would continue to do so. See, e.g., the complaint

in Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Company, App. at 22. A similar al-

legation was used in each of the six complaints.

l4

ker rule, a defendant is ‘‘in violation’’ of the statute only

if its violations are ‘‘continuing.’’ 756 F.2d at 396-97."

Its violations are not ‘‘continuing”’’ if the violations cease

prior to the filing of the complaint, even if the defendant

has polluted illegally for years. Petitioner believes that

Hamker was wrongly decided. It was explicitly rejected by

the Fourth Cireuit in Gwaltney and in important part by

the First Cireuit in Pawtuxet Cove. The court below, while

purporting to follow Hamker, in fact goes well beyond it to

restrict citizens’ statutory right to enforce the Clean Water

Act. In the present cases, the defendants’ own discharge

monitoring reports demonstrated violations both before and

after the complaints were filed. Yet the court below broad-

ened Hamker to encompass these cases by requiring not

only a ‘‘continuing’’ violation but proof of negligence as a

matter of jurisdictional fact. In so doing, the court made

the conflict between the Fifth Cireuit and the First and

Fourth Circuits sharper than it was after Hamker.

The court below analyzed the minimum jurisdictional

facts that a citizen plaintiff must prove as follows. The

court noted that a single large industrial facility may have

many discharge points from which many different pollu-

it should be noted that Hamker, in which the Fifth Cir-

cuit veered abruptly away from prior law on the regulation of

discharges under the Clean Water Act, did not involve permit

violations. Hamker involved a single accidental oil spill long

in the past, and the relief requested was a variety of state law

damage claims appended to a claim under the Act. It was this

unappealing context that led the Hamker court to fashion a

rationale for dismissing the case before it without examining

the effect of that rationale on the ordinary case—the enforce-

ment of industrial discharge permits. That rationale, expanded

by the court below, directly conflicts with the Act, and would

remove citizen suits as an effective tool of permit enforcement.

15

tants are discharged, each subject to separate limitations

in a single permit. The court observed that where a permit

applies different limitations to different point sources, the

“violation of an effluent limitation at one point source is

not a violation of any parameter at another point source

even if the same pollutant is involved.’’ 817 F.2d at 1173.

817

The court below continued:

The DMR’s submitted to EPA regularly by each of

the appellees and relied on by Sierra Club to evidence

permit violations separately identify effluent dis-

charges at each point source for each parameter. Ap-

pellant’s complaints simply aggregated the possible

violations reflected by the DMR’s at each appellee’s

facility over time, regardless whether [sic] they in-

involved the same substance or the same point source

of discharge. Although given ample opportunity to do

so, Sierra Club did not attempt to demonstrate that

these isolated permit violations were the product of

appellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limitations

or of inadequate pollution control facilities.

F.2d at 1173-74, App. at 10-11 (emphasis added).

Moreover, wrote the court below,

The evidence submitted by appellees demonstrated in

many instances that the alleged ‘‘violations’’ were ap-

proved under EPA ‘‘bypass’’ regulations, were based

on overly restrictive permit terms later liberalized by

EPA, or were related to treatment methods voluntarily

discontinued by the facility. What remained of Sierra

Club’s factual allegations were occasional, minor dis-

charges by the facilities in the face of permit compli-

ance rates exceeding 95% for the balance of the period

in question.

Id. at 1174 (footnotes omitted). For these reasons, the

court below held that the district courts lacked jurisdiction.

16 |

This conclusion is built on five serious errors of law.

Several of these errors, in addition to conflicting with the

Fourth and First Circuits’ positions, contravene decisions

of this Court.

First, the requirement of a ‘‘continuing”’ violation as a

matter of jurisdictional fact is an error, and is in conflict

with Gwaltney and Pawtuxet Cove. The statutory language

authorizing citizen actions is identical to the language

authorizing suits by the government with respect to the

timing of a defendant’s violations. The federal government

is empowered to enforce Clean Water Act permits by Sec-

tion 309(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). That section

states that:

The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil

action for appropriate relief ... for any violation for

which he is authorized to issue a compliance order

under subsection (a) of this section.

According to the subsection (a) referred to, the Ad-

ministrator may issue a compliance order to, and thus may

institute an enforcement action against, anyone who is ‘‘in

violation of any condition or limitation... in a permit... .’’

33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (emphasis added).

Congress used identical language for authorizing citi-

zen suits." Section 505 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, au-

thorizing citizen enforcement suits, provides that:

"The same language is used to authorize the Administrator

to enforce permits issued by states with approved NPDES pro-

grams. See Section 309(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1).

The only exception to the consistent use of the term “in vio-

lation” to trigger federal and citizen enforcement jurisdiction

comes in the language authorizing federal criminal enforcement

actions. There, still in the present tense, the Act authorizes

criminal sanctions against one who “violates” the Act. See Sec-

tion 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).

17

... any citizen may commence a civil action . . . against

any person... who is alleged to be in violation of...

an effluent standard or limitation. .. .

The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to

enforce such an effluent standard or limitation . .. and

to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [Sec-

tion 309(d) of the Act] section 1319(d) of this title.

33 U.S.C. § 1865 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, Congress authorized civil penalties in

§ 309(d) of the Act against any person who ‘‘violates’’ the

Act, without distinguishing between civil enforcement suits

brought by the attorney general or by private attorneys

general. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); see also § 1365(a). The Act

makes no distinction between violations that cease the day

before the complaint is filed and those that continue

through the filing date. Nor is there any distinction in

the Act between citizen and government ability to invoke

federal court jurisdiction with respect to the timing of

such violations.

There is no dispute that the government can sue for

penalties for past violations without proving ‘‘continu-

ous’’ or ‘‘ongoing’’ violations. See, e.g., Illinois v. Out-

board Marine Co., 680 F.2d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1982);

United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375-76

(10th Cir. 1979). The language of the Act therefore com-

pels the conclusion that citizens can bring suit on the same

basis.

By reading the same words differently for govern-

ment suits and citizen suits, the Fifth Cireuit differs from

18

the Fourth and First cireuits.!2 The Fourth Cireuit held

that the language ‘‘in violation’’ does not preclude citizen

suits for ‘‘past violations,’’ 791 F.2d at 313; the First

Circuit held that the good faith allegation of facts that

warrant injunctive relief will support jurisdiction over

exclusively ‘‘past’’ violations, 807 F.2d at 1094.

Congress recently endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s read-

ing of the citizen suit provision when it revisited the Act.

Congress amended Section 309 of the Clean Water Act

to permit the administrative assessment of civil penalties

and expressly used the past tense: the Administrator of

EPA is authorized to assess a civil penalty against ‘‘any

person [who] has violated ... any permit condition or

limitation.’’ § 309(g)(1)(A) and (B), as added by the Wa-

ter Quality Act of 1986, §314(g)(1)(A) and (B); 33

U.S.C. § 1819(g)(1)(A) and (B) (emphasis added). This

new authority focuses on past violations because it supple-

ments the Administrator’s pre-existing authority to issue

compliance orders under Section 309(a)(1) of the Act. See

S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1985); H.R. Rep.

No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-133, 135-136, 1388-139

(1986). Yet, the new subsection explicitly contemplates

that a citizen suit may already have been filed to assess

the same penalty and, in that event, allows it to proceed.

§ 309(g)(6)(B), as added in 1987; 33 U.S.C, § 1819( 2) (6)-

(B). In addition, under this new provision a prior admin-

3As petitioner pointed out below, not only the language of

the statute but the legislative history support the identity of

structure in suits by the attorney general and by private at-

torneys general, once the explicit restrictions on citizen suits,

i.e., 60 days notice and lack of diligent prosecution, are satis-

fied and the citizen suit is commenced. See S. Rep. No. 414,

92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 80 (1971).

19

istrative penalty action precludes a later citizen suit but

only with respect to the identical past violations. § 309(g)-

(6)(A) and (B), as added in 1987; 33 U.S.C. § 1819(g)-

(6)(A) and (B)."4

This new provision demonstrates that Congress be-

lieved existing law authorized citizen suits addressing past

violations that no longer required injunctive remedies.

Although the new provision dealing with administrative

penalties employs the past tense in describing the viola-

tion, Congress saw no need to amend either Section 309(a)

or (b) or Section 505(a)(1) to conform. This cannot have

been mere oversight. The Water Quality Act was elabo-

rately considered for over two years before ultimate en-

actment, affording ample opportunity for noticing and

correcting any deficiency. The natural inference is that

Congress saw the present tense of Sections 309 and 505 as

no limitation on penalty actions in respect of past viola-

tions. Under these circumstances, this is a reliable guide

to the original intent of the Clean Water Act. Cf. Bob

Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-602

(1983), and cases cited at 601.

In a second error, the court below essentially read the

word ‘‘permit’’ out of the statute. Section 505 allows a

citizen to sue anyone alleged to be in violation of an ‘‘ef-

fluent standard or limitation.’’ ‘‘Effluent standard or

limitation’’ is defined to include ‘‘a permit’’. 33 U.S.C.

4The Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 50, supra, at 28 explicitly

states that the preclusive effect of an administrative penalty

action does not apply to a citizen suit “for a past violation of

another pollutant parameter (even one resulting from the same

discharge which is the subject of the administrative civil pen-

alty proceeding).”

20

§ 1865(f) (6). Thus, to violate a permit, without more, is to

violate the Act, as this Court has held. EPA v. California

ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200,

205 (1976).

In looking for a ‘‘continuing’’ violation, the court

below went far beyond looking for a ‘‘continuing’’ permit

violation. The court held that only proof of the continuing

violation of the same specific permit restriction at the

same discharge pipe supports citizen suit jurisdiction. 817

F.2d at 1174; App. at 10-11. Yet a chemical plant, as the

court below suggested, may have one permit under which

it discharges, say, 100 chemicals through 30 discharge

pipes. Under the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, this plant could

exceed its permit restrictions for each chemical at each

pipe, one after another, without incurring liability for a

permit violation because the violations of separate dis-

charge limitations would not be ‘‘continuous’’. This is

the essential holding of the court below and is absurd. To

violate a permit is to violate the act. To keep violating

a variety of restrictions in a permit through time is to

keep violating the permit. By requiring continuous vio-

lations of the same chemical substance at the same dis-

charge pipe for jurisdiction to attach, the court below

reads permits and the requirement to comply with them

out of the Act, and protects permit holders from any real

chance of suit by citizens.

Third, the Court below made a serious error of law

in requiring Sierra Club to demonstrate as a matter of

jurisdiction that the violations alleged ‘‘were the product

of appellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limitations or

of inadequate pollution control facilities.’’ As this Court

21

has held, to violate a permit is to violate the act, EPA v.

California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board,

426 U.S. at 205, and violations can be proved by reliance

on a defendant’s own discharge monitoring reports,

United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-55 (1980), reh’g

denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980). Every court to consider the

question has held that permits are strict liability docu-

ments, and that liability is strictly adjudged by comparing

a defendant’s discharge monitoring reports to its permit.

As the D.C. Cireuit put it in Weyerhaeuser v. Costle,

590 F.2d at 1058, Clean Water Act permit enforcement pro-

ceedings were designed by Congress to be simple and

speedy, suitable for summary judgment. The Weyerhaeu-

ser court pointed out that permits could not be enforced

if enforcement proceedings ‘‘depend[ed] on murky de-

terminations concerning the sequence of events in the

plant, whether those events would have been avoidable if

other equipment had been installed .. .’’ and so on. Id.

The court below disagrees with Weyerhaeuser, and all

prior precedent in other circuits. It has removed the

strict liability measure of permit compliance. Instead, a

citizen plaintiff must make some vaguely defined demon-

stration that permit violations are the ‘‘product of ap-

pellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limitations or of

inadequate pollution control facilities.’’ 817 F.2d at 1173-

74, App. at 11. The court below would have the citizen

1SSee, e.g., United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d

368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); Connecticut Fund for the Environment

and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Job Plating Co.,

623 F. Supp. 207, 218 (D.Conn. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Founda-

tion and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Bethlehem

Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 451-53 (D.Md. 1985).

22

suit become ‘‘a form of inquest into the nature of system

malfunction’’, Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1958, before

jurisdiction attaches. In requiring a citizen plaintiff to

make a demonstration of ‘‘neglect’’ by the defendant in

order to support jurisdiction, the court below has confused

jurisdiction with remedy.

Questions of ‘‘neglect,’’ negligence, inadequate treat-

ment, good and bad faith, are irrelevant to a determination

of jurisdiction and liability. They are relevant only to

determining what penalties and injunctive relief are ap-

propriate once liability is strictly adjudged. See, e.g., Stu-

dent Public Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600

F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D.N.J. 1985) ; United States v. Amoco

Oil Company, 580 F. Supp. 1042, 1050 (W.D.Mo. 1984).

In a fourth fundamental error, the court below, in dis-

counting the defendants’ violations, offered excuses for

the defendants contrary to the law of this Court. The

court below discounted ‘‘alleged ‘violations’... [which]

were based on overly restrictive permit terms later liberal-

ized by EPA ... [A]pplication of the less restrictive terms

to the above cited violations [for Shell] would decrease the

number of exceedences over the three year period to ap-

proximately eight.’’ 817 F.2d at 1174 and n.5, App. at

11-12.

This Court has held that a polluter is bound by its

permit, and that even a pending permit application does

not excuse it from complying with the then applicable

terms. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Train v. Na-

tural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 92

(1975) (Clean Air Act), requests for permit variances are

‘‘carried out on the polluter’s time, not the public’s, for

23

during [their] pendency, the original regulations remain

in effect, and the polluter’s failure to comply may subject

him to a variety of enforcement procedures.’’ The willing-

ness of the court below to discount violations of what it

characterized as ‘‘overly restrictive’’ permit terms puts it

in direct conflict with this Court.

In addition, the court below was willing to discount,

for purposes of jurisdiction, any violations that arise

from a cause that the defendant corrects after being sued.’®

Such a consideration may be relevant in determining

remedy, but it would frustrate enforcement to permit a

defendant retroactively to deprive a court of jurisdiction

by coming into compliance after being sued. A more con-

venient rule for avoiding liability could not be crafted.

A polluter, under this scheme, would have no incentive to

comply with the law until being sued.

The court below committed a fifth serious error by

fashioning what seems to be a 95% compliance test for

jurisdiction. The court below wrote that after its other

excuses were applied, the defendants had permit com-

pliance rates ‘‘exceeding 95% for the balance of the period

in question.’’ 817 F.2d at 1174, App. at 12. Once again, to

violate a permit is to violate the Act. The court below

seems to have stated a rule that jurisdiction does not at-

tach if the defendant makes a statistical argument that

it is in compliance 959% of the time. Whatever 95% com-

16The court below found it relevant to jurisdiction that Shell

completed some required chrome treatment system modifica-

tions and had them operational in February 1985, seven months

after the complaint was filed (July 1984). See 817 F.2d at 1174

n.6, App. at 12.

stiieeeretieaaameanieniillll

24

pliance may mean, and it is by no means clear," it is ir-

relevant to jurisdiction, though it may be considered when

fashioning a remedy.

In all of these matters, the court below confused

remedy with jurisdiction, and by doing so read the require-

ment of strict liability for compliance out of the Act."

The court created a variety of restrictions on citizen suits

which, when taken together, effectively read the citizen suit

provision out of the statute.

In the case of the hypothetical chemical plant discharg-

ing pollutants from 30 different point sources, one could comply

with the restrictions at 29 discharge points all of the time, com-

mit massive violations of a cyanide limitation at the remaining

point 100°/o of the time, and still argue one met a “95°/o’’ over-

all compliance test.

'8That the court below confused questions of remedy and

jurisdiction is highlighted by a section added to the Act by the

Water Quality Act of 1986. The new language, added to aid the

district judge in fashioning a remedy, lists the kind of con-

siderations the court should look to in setting a penalty.

FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING PENALTY

AMOUNT.—Section 309(d) is amended by adding at the

end thereof the following: “In determining the amount of

a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of

the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any)

resulting from the vioiation, any history of such violations,

any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable re-

quirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the

violator, and such other matters as justice may require. For

purposes of this subsection, a single operational upset

which leads to simultaneous violations of more than one

pollutant parameter shall be treated as a single violation.”.

Water Qualitv Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 313(c) (1987).

These factors include the kinds of considerations pointed to by

the court below. The error of the court below, again, is to bring

the consideration of these factors up from the remedial to the

jurisdictional stage of the lawsuit.

et tee a

25

B. The Court Below Adopted a View of the Role of

the Citizen Suit Provision Contrary to the Views

of the Fourth and First Circuits.

The Court below took the view that citizen suits are

supplementary to government suits, and so could be etfec-

tively nullified without harming the Congressional enforce-

ment scheme. The Fourth and First Circuits read the Act

and its legislative history very differently.'"? Each of the

latter concluded that citizen suits are an important

mechanism in the enforcement scheme crafted by Con-

gress. For this reason, the Fourth and First Circuits con-

cluded, courts should not create new restrictions on citizen

suits.

The Fourth Circuit, after noting the explicit restric-

tions on citizen suits,” found that Congress specified all

the restrictions it meant, and that citizen suits were in-

tended to be an important enforcement tool. Noting the

identity of language authorizing government and citizen

suits, the Fourth Circuit wrote that ‘‘[i]t can hardly be

questioned that the EPA has authority to bring suit for

civil penalties for purely past violations,’’ and ‘‘the scope

of citizen enforcement powers must, in this important

respect, be viewed as co-extensive with the enforcement

powers of EPA.’’ 791 F.2d at 309-310.

19Neither the Hamker court nor the court below, unlike

the Fourth and First Circuits, examined any legislative history

of the Clean Water Act.

°The statute requires 60 days notice prior to suit, and pre-

cludes citizen action if the state or federal government has filed

a prior action and is diligently prosecuting it. 33 U.S.C. § 1365

(a) and (b).

26

The First Circuit likewise found that citizen suits are

authorized for past violations, as lone as there is an alle-

gation which, if true, would warrant an injunction.2! The

court wrote:

We do not... agree with the reasoning which, ap-

parently, led the Louisiana district court, following the

Hamker decision, to dismiss a number of actions sim-

ply because no violations occurred on the dates the

complaints were filed. See Sierra Club v. Copolymer

Rubber & Chemical Corp., 621 F.Supp. 1013, 1015

(M.D.La. 1985) [one of the cases in this petition]. A

plaintiff who makes allegations warranting injunctive

relief in good faith, judged objectively, may recover a

penalty judgment for past violations even if the in-

junction proves unobtainable.

807 F.2d at 1094.

The court below, to the contrary, read citizen suits

out of the statute, and justified doing so by noting irrele-

vantly that the state and federal governments have en-

forcement powers. The court below found that citizen suits

are supplementary to government suits and drew the un-

founded conclusion that they are supererogatory: ‘‘We

think it unlikely that Congress’s explicit restrictions on the

right to bring private enforcement actions significantly

impair the efficacy of the general regulatory framework,’’

because ‘*‘[bjoth the federal and state governments can

abundantly enforce the Clean Water Act by means of

1Petitioner believes that the Fourth Circuit read the Act

correctly and that insofar as the First Circuit required any al-

legation of continuing violation it was in error. Petitioner has

argued this position in an amicus curiae brief in Gwaltney, No.

86-473.

iii iia

27

criminal and civil actions authorizing monetary or in-

junctive awards.’’ 817 F.2d at 1175, App. at 15.

The court below is correct that the governments could

enforce the law. The citizen suit mechanism, of course,

was designed precisely to fill the gap when governmental

agencies cannot or will not exercise their enforcement au-

thority. The court below is also correct to say that the

restrictions that Congress, as opposed to the court below,

placed on citizen suits do not impair the enforcement

scheme. The adventitious restrictions created by the court

below, however, tend to remove citizen suits from the en-

forcement scheme.

The view of the court below, that the ‘‘efficacy of the

general statutory framework’’ is not impaired by dis-

abling citizen suits, is a view directly contrary to that of

the Fourth and First Circuits.

C. The Decision Below Cannot Be Reconciled With

the Decisions of the Fourth and First Circuits.

The Fifth Cireuit’s prior ruling on citizen suits under

the Act, Hamker, was the case relied on by the petitioners

in Gwaltney to support their argument that there was a

split in the circuits on the question of whether a citizen

suit under the Act could be maintained for a ‘‘past”’ viola-

tion. This Court granted their petition for writ of certio-

rari, No. 86-473.

The opinion below creates an even sharper conflict.

The court below, stating that it was bound by -Hamker,

extended that ruling broadly. While in the Fourth Cir-

cuit, under Gwaltney, a citizen action may be maintained

based on DMRs for violations that ceased prior to the

28

filing of the complaint, and while in the First Cireuit, under

Pawtuxet Cove, a citizen suit may be maintained on the

same facts if the plaintiff alleges ongoing violations in

good faith, the court below requires much more. Saying

that a ‘‘continuing’’ violation is required, the court below

then requires proof of neglect or negligence as a matter

of jurisdiction. The view of the court below is diametrically

opposed to those of the Fourth and First Circuits and

cannot be reconciled with them.

II. The Question Over Which the Fifth Circuit Has Split

With the Fourth and First Circuits is Important and

Recurring.

Congress, in reauthorizing the Clean Water Act this

year, inquired into the way cilizen suits were working. It

noted that ‘*|ijn the past two years, the number of citizen

suits to enforce NPDES permits has surged so that such

suits now constitute a substantial portion of all enforce-

ment actions filed in Federal court under this Act,’’ S. Rep.

No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (1985), and declared itself

well satisfied with the result, id.

Citizens in the Fifth Circuit are now effectively dis-

abled from exercising their statutory right to enforce the

Act, and are permitted to exercise it elsewhere in the

country. Until the errors of the court below are corrected,

polluters in the Fifth Cireuit will enjoy a protection that

Congress did not allow them, and that they do not have else-

where. Moreover, the decision of the court below, until

corrected, will tend to chill the effectiveness of citizen

suits in other areas of the country as well.

29

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, this Court should grant

the writ requested.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael Osborne James Thornton

Osborne, McComiskey & Albert H. Meyerhoff*

Richardson-Harp Natural Resources

3420 Prytania Street Defense Council

New Orleans, LA 70115 90 New Montgomery St.

(504) 891-4418 San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 777-0220

James Simon

Natural Resources

Defense Council

122 East 42nd St.

New York, N.Y. 10168

(212) 949-0049

* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Petitioner

App. 1

SIERRA CLUB v. SHELL OIL CO.

SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHELL OIL COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District

of Louisiana

SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MONOCHEM, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant.

Vv.

COPOLYMER RUBBER AND

CHEMICAL CORP., et al.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 85-3753, 85-3762, 85-3763.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Cireuit.

May 29, 1987.

Environmental organization brought actions under

Clean Water Act based on multiple, sporadic, and past vio-

lations of various effluent limitations. The United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Pat-

rick E. Carr, J., and the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Louisiana, Frank J. Polozola, J.,

either dismissed cases or awarded summary judgment to

App. 2

defendant. Appeals were taken. The Court of Appeals,

Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge, held that multiple, sporadic,

and past violations of various effluent limitations could

not form basis of citizens’ lawsuits.

Affirmed.

1. Federal Courts 29

Where defendant’s challenge to court’s jurisdiction is

also a challenge to existence of federal cause of action,

proper course is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal

with objection as direct attack on merits of case, and judi-

cial economy further counsels resolution on merits so that

court can avoid duplicative trials of facts essential to both

jurisdiction and merits.

2. Federal Civil Procedure 2481

When plaintiff bringing citizens’ lawsuit under Clean

Water Act has alleged ongoing violation, but fails to dem-

onstrate fact issue about whether defendant is ‘‘in viola-

tion,’’ trial court should grant summary judgment for de-

fendant on merits, instead of dismissing for want of juris-

diction. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1972, § 505(a), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) ;

Fed.Rules Civ. Proc.Rules 12(b)(1), 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

3. Federal Civil Procedure 1781

Although fact-based dismissals of Clean Water Act

actions were contrary to the Fifth Cireuit’s practice of

ruling on the merits, dismissals did not fatally affect dis-

position of cases where orders dismissing for lack of juris-

diction were entered following extensive discovery. Fed-

eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,

App. 3

§§ 101 et seq., 505, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq.,

1365; Fed.Rules Civ. Proe.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.

4. Health and Environment 25.15(4)

Multiple, sporadic, and past violations of various ef-

fluent limitations contained in national pollutant discharge

elimination system permits could not form the basis of

citizens’ lawsuits under Clean Water Act. Federal Water

Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, §§ 101 et seq.,

505, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq., 1365.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Louisiana.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND*, HIGGINBOTHAM,

and JONKS, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

We are here called upon to assess whether multiple,

sporadic, past violations of various effluent limitations

contained in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (‘‘NPDES’’) permits held by the defendants may

form the basis of a citizens’ lawsuit under section 505 of

the Clean Water Act.' 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Bound by our

prior decision in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical

Co., 756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir.1985) and by appellant’s failure

to raise a genuine question of material fact on the critical

* Circuit Judge of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

2 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. are commonly known as

the Clean Water Act.

App. 4

issue, we AFFIRM the decisions of the district courts

which dismissed these cases.”

The underlying lawsuits were filed following a sys-

tematic research program in which the Sierra Club exam-

ined discharge monitoring reports (‘‘DMR’s’’) filed by

every major industrial discharger in Louisiana. The

DMR’s, which are prepared and filed by the defendant

companies with the Environmental Protection Agency

(‘‘KPA’’), may furnish some evidence concerning whether

the discharger is in compliance with the terms of its

NPDES permit for the period of time covered in each

DMR. Having concluded by this research that the instant

defendants were violating the terms of their NPDES per-

mits, Sierra Club delivered the statutory 60-day notices

and then filed separate lawsuits against each defendant.

Each action averred that the defendant had violated vari-

ous terms of its NPDES permit between January 1980 and

June, 1983, and all complaints alleged that the defendant

‘is now violating its permit, and will do so in the future.”’

The complaints requested that civil penalties of up to

$10,000 per day of violation for each violation be imposed,

that an injunction be issued against further violations, and

that Sierra Club recover costs including attorneys, wit-

z Five of the citizens’ enforcement suits were brought by

the Sierra Club in the Middle District of Louisiana. The ac-

tions against Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Co., Allied

Corp., Bercen, Inc., and Formosa Plastics Corp., were con-

solidated by the district court and dismissed on February 7,

1985. Subsequently, Sierra Club filed against Monochem also

in the Middle District. This case was dismissed by the dis-

trict court on December 18, 1985. The sixth of these con-

solidated appeals was filed against Shell Oil Co. in the Eastern

District of Louisiana on July 24, 1984 and was dismissed on

October 30, 1985.

BA etka

tae cel

App. 5

ness and consultant fees, as provided for in 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(d).

During the pendency of the lawsuits, this Court issued

its opinion in Hamker and held that district courts are

without jurisdiction to hear citizens’ suits alleging a single

past pollutant discharge in violation of the Clean Water

Act. Ongoing discovery in these cases became focused on

the application of Hamker. Because Hamker resulted in

a dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for want of juris-

diction, appellees each contested the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, resting on affidavits and considerable docu-

mentary evidence concerning the status of the various

alleged permit violations. In some of the cases, appellant

responded that DMR’s filed for the period after June,

1983 showed that further permit violations had occurred

subsequent to the filing of its lawsuits. The district courts

treated these motions differently. In the four cases con-

solidated under the Copolymer style, see note 2 supra,

the court dismissed pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b) (1)

for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to any state

law claim that might be asserted. 621 F.Supp. 1013. The

Monochem court simply dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1),

while the Shell court awarded a Rule 56 summary judg-

ment to the defendant. These appeals followed.

I.

The Clean Water Act intertwines the jurisdiction of

the district court with the grounds for relief in a citizen

enforcement action. Under the general caption, ‘‘ Citizen

Suits; jurisdiction,’’ it authorizes

any citizen [to] commence a civil action on his own

behalf—(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to

App. 6

be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limita-

tion under this chapter or (B) an order issuéd by the

Administrator or a State with respect to such a stan-

dard or limitation... . ;

3 U.S.C. § 1365(a). Consequently, where the requirement

that the discharger be ‘‘in violation’’ is interpreted to

mean that a violation must be ongoing at the date the suit

is filed, the plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation to

invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

The Court affirmed a dismissal in Hamker for lack

of jurisdiction because the pleadings there alleged a single

oil spill prior to the date of suit and patently excluded

the possibility of the defendant’s being ‘‘in violation’’

thereafter. Hamker’s emphasis on jurisdiction was appro-

priate to that case because a court may determine it lacks

jurisdiction based on pleadings alone. 5 C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1969). Two

of the district courts here, apparently intending to follow

Hamker, dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of juris-

diction based on undisputed facts revealed in discovery

rather than on the pleadings. Such fact-based dismissals

are contrary to this cireuit’s practice of ruling on the mer-

its, but they do not fatally affect the disposition of these

cases.

f1] This Court has held that when, as here, issues of

jurisdictional fact are intermeshed with the merits of a

case, ‘‘the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the

merits, for it is impossible to decide one without the other.’’

McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Commit-

App. 7

tee, 374 F.2d 359, 363 (Sth Cir.1967).2 The purpose of

this rule is to discourage district courts from dismissing

eases on the pleadings for want of jurisdiction unless the

pleadings reveal a clearly insubstantial or frivolous claim.

Compare Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776,

90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). Thus, ‘‘[wlhere the defendant’s chal-

lenge to the court’s jurisdiction is also a challenge to the

existence of a federal cause of action, the proper course

.. 1s to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the ob-

jection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s

ease.’’ Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.

1981). Judicial economy further counsels resolution on

the merits in these instances so that the court can avoid

duplicate trials of facts essential to both jurisdiction and

the merits of the claim. /d. at 415-16.

[2] As a result, when a plaintiff has alleged an on-

going violation for purposes of § 1365(a), but he fails to

demonstrate a fact issue about whether a defendant is ‘‘in

violation,’’ the court should grant summary judgment for

the defendant on the merits under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, in-

stead of dismissing for want of jurisdiction under Fed.R.

Civ.P. 12(b) (1).

[3] Although the letter of McBeath and Williamson

were violated in all but one of these cases, their spirit was

not. None of the cases was cavalierly treated. The or-

ders dismissing for lack of jurisdiction were entered fol-

a This is not to say that for cases in which the jurisdiction

and merits are separable issues, such as whether $10,000 is

actually in controversy in a diversity case, the district court

may not dismiss pursuant to a fact finding rendered under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federa!

Practice and Procedure § 1350 at 556 (1969).

App. 8

lowing extensive discovery in each case. The district courts

strained to afford Sierra Club an opportunity to demon-

strate a fact issue on whether appellees were ‘‘in viola-

tion’’ of their permits when these suits were filed. The

courts’ ultimate determinations rest on a complete and

undisputed factual record. Sierra Club does not contend

that further discovery is necessary to support its position.

Consequently, dismissing some of the cases for lack of

jurisdiction was tantamount to summary judgment against

Sierra Club on the merits of the critical issue of appellees’

being ‘‘in violation’’ when the actions were filed. No re-

versible error follows from this procedural flaw.

Il.

[4] The district courts found that under Hamker,

the appellees in this case were not ‘‘in violation’’ of the

NPDES permits when Sierra Club filed suit. In Hamker,

the panel reasoned that section 1365 does not permit a citi-

zen lawsuit to enforce the Clean Water Act where there

is no ongoing violation of an effluent standard, limitation

or order. Thus, the plaintiff there could not state a cause

of action for a single past oil discharge. Judge Williams,

specially concurring, suggested however that the statutory

language ‘‘in violation’’ is broad enough to cover the

‘‘chronic episodic violator’’ who ‘‘intentionaily turns off

the spigot’’ just before a citizen brings suit. 756 F.2d at

399 (Williams, J., concurring). We need not enter a de-

bate concerning the extent of the Hamker holding because

the uncontradicted evidence in these cases demonstrated

only past, sporadic or largely unconnected permit viola-

tions by each of the appellees. Not only was [sic] none of

the violations ongoing at the date Sierra Club filed suit in

Se ee

App. 9

either a ‘‘chronie episodic’’ or actual sense, but Sierra

Club never attempted to establish, and in fact eschewed

the possibility that there might be any requirement of

demonstrating the ongoing or chronic nature of such vio-

lations. Sierra Club’s proof failed to comport with its

pleadings.

To demonstrate the failure of Sierra Club’s proof, it

is necessary to explain how the Clean Water Act affects

industrial dischargers. The objective of the Clean Water

Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and

biological integrity of the nation’s waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251

(a). This objective was to be achieved by the application

of increasingly more stringent ‘‘effluent limitations’’ de-

signed to reduce gradually the amount of pollutants dis-

charged into waterways. These effluent limitations are

to be technologically based, meaning that dischargers must

reduce the amount of pollutants by using specific tech-

nologies or their equivalents. ‘‘Effluent limitations’’

promulgated by the EPA are the actual restrictions on

discharges which limit quantities, rates and concentrations

of substances that may be discharged from point sources.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). Effluent limitations are usually ex-

pressed numericaliy (e.g., the number of pounds per day

or the concentration of a pollutant discharged). Effluent

limitations are to be applied to all point sources of dis-

charge at a facility. A ‘‘point source’’ means the point of

discharge of the pollutant-containing effluent. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14). Effluent limitations, which were developed

for entire industrial categories or subcategories, are trans-

formed into limitations on individual plants within the

category or subcategory by incorporation into the terms

and conditions of NPDES discharge permits. 33 U.S.C.

App. 10

§1342. If a discharger is in compliance with the effluent

limitations contained in its NPDES permit, it is deemed

to be in compliance with the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(k).

One industrial facility may have numerous point

sources of discharge. These point sources may serve a

single process unit, multiple units, single or multiple treat-

ment facilities, or may only carry storm water runoff. To

borrow appellees’ example, a single site may contain an

herbicide manufacturing plant, a chlorinated solvent manu-

facturing plant, and a plastics manufacturing plant, all

of which are completely unrelated and belong to different

industrial subeategories having different effluent limita-

tions. Each plant might in turn maintain its own waste

water treatment system and have several point sources

for the effluents from its facilities. Due to the unique

process and treatment arrangements at each plant, when

incorporating effluent limitations into NPDES permits,

EPA developed separate conditions for each pollutant at

each separate point source. This is necessary to make

effluent limitations technology-based. Also, because the

treatment system for each point source may be unrelated

to the treatment system for any other point source, a

violation of an effluent limitation (a ‘‘parameter’’) at

one point suurce is not a violation of any parameter at

another point source even if the same pollutant is involved.

Consequently, when determining whether a permit-holder

has violated an effluent limitation, one must look at each

parameter within each point source independently.

The DMR’s submitted to EPA regularly by each of

the appellees and relied on by Sierra Club to evidence

ON re ae eres

Annee ing Lath Cessna Sb ce otic RES anit Saal

i

g

5

%

App. 11

permit violations separately identify effluent discharges

at each point source for each parameter. Appellant’s

complaints simply aggregated the possible violation re-

flected by the DMR’s at each appellee’s facility over time,

regardless whether they involved the same substance or

the same point source of discharge. Although given ample

opportunity to do so, Sierra Club did not attempt to dem-

onstrate that these isolated permit violations were the

product of appellees’ systematic neglect of discharge limi-

tations or of inadequate pollution control facilities. We

have thoroughly reviewed the record in each of these cases.

The evidence submitted by appellees demonstrated in many

instances that the alleged ‘‘violations’’ were approved

under EPA ‘‘bypass’’ regulations,* were based on overly

restrictive permit terms later liberalized by HPA®, or were

4. In its notice to Allied and as part of its complaint filed

in district court, Sierra Club claimed 21 effluent limitations

“exceedences” on point source 003 from January, 1983 to

May, 1983 at Allied’s Geismar, Louisiana chemical complex.

It is apparently undisputed, however, that these ‘‘exceed-

ences” were a direct result of ‘bypass’ discharges approved

by the EPA. Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.60 (1982) (superseded)

Allied sought and obtained EPA approval of anticipated ‘‘by-

pass” resulting in diversion of water from its ‘‘treatment facil-

ity’ and discharge into the Mississippi River. According to

the terms of the administrative order allowing “bypass”, the

EPA found that Allied “anticipates the need to discharge pro-

cess wastewater from the Clearwell of the water recirculation

system because the Company claims that precipitation events

and lack of production will cause the process wastewater level

to rise into surge capacity of the Clearwell.” Thus, on Jan-

uary 21, 1983 the EPA approved the requested discharge of

wastewater until May 31, 1983.

5. For example, Sierra Club’s assertions of “chronic episodic’

violations is demonstrated most readily from its claim that

Shell exceeded its daily maximum effluent -limitations of

(Continued on following page)

App. 12

related to treatment methods voluntarily discontinued by

the facility.© What remained of Sierra Club’s factual alle-

gations were occasional, minor discharges by the facilities

in the face of permit compliance rates exceeding 95% for

the balance of the period in question.

(Continued from previous page)

Total Suspended Solids (“TSS”) on outfall 002 at its Norco,

Louisiana petroleum refinery approximately 46 times between

April 1980 and June 1983. Recognizing the technical diffi-

culties in complying with its then current NPDES permit re-

quirements, the EPA liberalized Shell’s TSS effluent limita-

tions for outfall 002 in August 1983. While the new permit

had no retroactive effect, application of the less restrictive

terms to the above cited violations would decrease the num-

ber of exceedences over the three year period to approxi-

mately eight.

The NPDES permit limitations were similarly liberalized

for Formosa Plastics Corp.’s Geismar, Louisiana chemical man-

ufacturing plant. The EPA increased effluent limitations for

total organic carbon (“TOC”) because the plant’s previous

TOC limitations were found to be unnecessarily restrictive.

Finally, the EPA itself promulgated rules in 1982 reducing

the generally required “pH” excursion compliance rate from

100°/o to only 99°/o compliance. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.17 (1986).

The EPA determined that adjusting the standard “will estab-

lish a standard that well-operated and well-maintained plants

could realistically achieve and will reserve the resources of

both EPA and permittees for those instances when substan-

tial pH control problems exist.” 47 Fed.Reg. 24,534, 24,535

(1982). It is apparently undisputed that of Allied Chemical’s

62 alleged pH “excursions’—incidents whereby the pH value

of discharge wastewater exceeds applicable effluent ranges—

the maioritv would not have violated current EPA guidelines,

bringing compliance within the 99°/o requirement.

6. In an effort to ensure compliance with EPA hexavalent

and total chromium effluent limitations, Shell’s Norco refinery

implemented a conversion to a non-chromate corrosion con-

trol system. As of February, 1985 this conversion has evidently

been comnleted. The record reveals that Shell’s last violation

of nermit limitations for chromium occurred on March 7. 1984.

TTL ee ah ln ty NN eh A ta iy, nl tak Ne as etl, th ae Resta SOS ah

ee ee ee aoe Ty

App. 13

III.

Sierra Club first argues that Hamker is distinguish-

able because it did not involve an NPDES permit. The

statute belies any such distinction, for the citizen suit pro-

vision uses the term ‘‘effluent standard or limitation under

this chapter’’ to include both permit and non-permit based

violations of effluent standards found in the Clean Water

Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). This argument poses the

classie distinction without a difference. Sierra Club has

never explained why, beyond the fact that it is more likely

to be a plaintiff, different standards for a facility’s being

‘tin violation’’ should obtain depending on whether an

NPDES permit is in foree. Appellant’s unarticulated

assumption may be that the mere aggregation of past per-

mit violations or ‘‘exceedences’’ distinguishes these cases

from Hamker. We disagree. Hamker explicitly rejected

the applicability of the citizen suit provision to isolated

past pollution discharges. Hamker was grounded firmly

in the language of the statute, which uses the present tense

formulation ‘‘in violation’’ to authorize citizen enforce-

ment actions. Whether a defendant has engaged in one

or ten discrete instances of impermissible effluent dis-

charge cannot convert those actions from past to present

conduct for purposes of the statute. The Fourth Circuit,

which rejected Hamker’s construction of the citizen suit

provision, hesitated to do so on the distinction between

a NPDES permit violation case and a non-permit case.

Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithville,

Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir.1986), cert. granted, —

U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 872, 93 L.Ed.2d 827 (1987).

The balance of Sierra Club’s briefs is devoted to dem-

onstrating that Hamker is incorrect and represents an

App. 14

unworkable approach to enforcement of the Clean Water

Act.’ Even if Hamker were erroneously decided, our panel

could not overrule a prior controlling decision in this Cir-

cuit. Only the en bane court has that authority. We are

unpersuaded, however, that Hamker was wrongly decided.

The First Cireuit recently cited Hamker with approval

in a factually similar single-discharge case. Pawtuxet

Cove Marina Ine. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st

Cir.1987). The court concluded that ‘‘the words ‘is . .

in violation’ should be sufficiently liberally construed to

comport with the injunctive purpose of the Act—conduct

indicative of continuing or renewed violations justifying

an injunction, as distinguished from matters over and

apparently done with, that would not warrant one.’’ /d.

at 1093. In so doing, the First Circuit rejected the Fourth

Circuit’s construction of section 1365(a) rendered in Ches-

apeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney. There the court

found the language ‘‘to be in violation’’ ambiguous and

concluded that a citizen suit could be predicated upon past

violations of the terms of an NPDES permit. 791 F.2d

at 309. Gwaltney is the only circuit court that differs with

the construction of section 1365(a) approved by Hamker.

We further disagree with Sierra Club’s assertion that

the Clean Water Act’s enforcement provisions are ren-

dered ‘‘unworkable’’ by construing ‘‘in violation’’ in its

grammatically natural sense to require some kind of on-

7. Sierra Club is seriously hampered in arguing Hamker’s

distinction from the present cases because Sierra Club's

amicus brief in Hamker, asserting the arguments made here,

was obviously rejected by our prior panel.

App. 15

going effluent violation by the discharger.’ The court in

Hamker carefully explained the distinction between citi-

zen suits and enforcement actions brought by govern-

mental authorities. Both the federal and state govern-

ments can abundantly enforce the Clean Water Act by

means of criminal and civil actions authorizing monetary

or injunctive awards. 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Governmental

actions were envisaged to be the central enforcement arm

under the Act. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395. The private

enforcement action, on the other hand, is supplementary

to the scheme of the statute overall. As noted in H/amker,

the required 60 days’ prior notice of a plaintiff's intent

to file suit under the citizen provisions may encourage

a defendant who is violating effluent limitations to ‘‘clean

up his act’’ before suit is filed. /d. at 396. Moreover,

where a government action is being diligently prosecuted,

the citizen is barred from bringing suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365

(b)(1)(B). We think it unlikely that Congress’s explicit

restrictions on the right to bring private enforcement ac-

tions significantly impair the efficacy of the general regu-

latory framework.

In affirming the judgments of the district courts on

the foregoing grounds, we are not required to decide other

issues presented by this appeal. Specifically, we need not

determine whether Sierra Club has standing to prosecute

the instant actions, whether private lawsuits may be filed

8. The First Circuit noted how easy it would have been

for Congress to authorize citizens suits against any party

alleged “to have violated” the Clean Water Act. Pawtuxet

Cove, 807 F.2d at 1092.

App. 16

only for violations of NPDES permits currently in force,’

or whether the citizen suit section of the statute unconsti-

tutionally confers powers of the executive branch of gov-

ernment upon citizens.

Sierra Club finally argues that the district court

abused its discretion in awarding costs of suit be [sic] in

favor of Shell Oil Company, one of the appellees herein.

Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d), the court is permitted to

award costs of litigation, including attorney and expert

witness fees, to any party whenever the court determines

such award is appropriate. Sierra Club suggests no basis

for finding an abuse of discretion, and we perceive none.

The judgments of the district courts are AFFIRMED.

9. Construing § 1365(f), which allows private enforcement

actions to enforce a “permit or condition thereof ... which

is in effect under this chapter’, the court in Pawtuxet Cove

held that no private enforcement action could be brought

for violations of a permit under which the defendant had

ceased operating. 807 F.2d at 1094.

Siw 2 rea, be ater Soe) ae

App. 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AT NEW ORLEANS

SIERRA CLUB )

530 Bush Street )

San Francisco, California 94108 ) Civil Action No.

) $4-3983

Plaintiffs, )

v. ) SECT. J MAG. 2

)

SHELL OIL COMPANY )

One Shell Plaza ) COMPLAINT

Post Office Box 10 )

Noreo, Louisiana 70079 )

)

Defendant. )

)

INTRODUCTION

1. This action is a citizens’ suit brought under Sec-

tion 505 of the Clean Water Act (‘‘the Act’’), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,

the imposition of civil penalties, and the award of costs,

including attorneys’ aud expert witness’ fees, for Defen-

dant’s repeated violations of the terms and provisions

of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(““NPDES’’) permit number LA0003522 in violation of

§ 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

the claims set forth in this Complaint wnder Section

505(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 13865(a) (1).

App. 18

3. On January 20, 1984, Plaintiff gave notice of the

violations and of its intent to file this suit to the Adminis-

trator of the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (‘‘EPA’’), to the Louisiana Department of Natural

Resourees (““DNR’’), Water Pollution Control Division,

and to the Defendant, as required by Section 505(b) (1) (A)

of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). A copy of the

notice is attached as Appendix A and is incorporated

herein.

4. More than sixty days have passed since notice was

served and neituer EPA nor DNR has commenced and

diligently prosecuted a civil or criminal action in a court

of the United States or in a court of the State of Louisiana

to redress these violations.

5. Venue is appropriate in the Eastern District of

Louisiana pursuant to Section 505(¢)(1) of the Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1865(¢)(1), since the source of the violations is

located within this District.

PARTIES

Plaintiffs

6. Plaintiff Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation

organized under the laws of the State of California with

its principal place of business at 530 Bush Street, San

Francisco, California 94108, and with other offices located

throughout the country. The Sierra Club is a national

conservation organization having over 200,000 members,

approximately 2,000 of whom reside in Louisiana and are

members of its Delta Chapter. The Sierra Club was or-

ganized to study, protect, enhance, and enjoy natural and

scenic resources, including the nation’s navigable waters.

App. 19

Through participation in numerous legislative, adminis-

trative and judicial proceedings, the Sierra Club has demon-

strated its strong interest in the effective conservation

and enhancement of the nation’s waters and in the proper

enforcement of laws designed to protect those waters.

7. Members of the Sierra Club, Delta Chapter, reside

in, or own property in, or recreate in the vicinity of Bayou

Trepagnier, part of Louisiana’s Scenic Rivers System.

There is a New Orleans Group of the Delta Chapter. These

members use and enjoy the resources in, around and down-

stream of Bayou Trepagnier and in and around Lake

Pontchartrain into which the Bayou Trepagnier flows for

boating, hunting, fishing, camping, wildlife viewing, pho-

tography, and general aesthetic and spiritual enjoyment.

The quality of the waters of the State of Louisiana inelud-

ing the waters impacted by Defendant’s illegal discharge

directly affects these interests of Sierra Club members.

Plaintiff and its members have been, are being, and wil!

be adversely affected and irreparably harmed by Defen-

dant’s failure to comply with its NPDES permit require-

ments.

Defendant

8. Defendant Shell Oil Company is organized under

the laws of the State of Delaware. Defendant operates a

petroleum refinery in Norco, Louisiana.

BACKGROUND

9. Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. $13811(a),

prohibits the discharge of pollutants from a point source

into navigable waters of the United States if such dis-

charges are not authorized by or are in violation of the

App. 20

terms of an NPDES permit issued pursuant to Section 402

of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

10. EPA is responsible for issuance of NPDES per-

mits pursuant to 33 U.S.C. ¢ 1342 to dischargers in Louisi-

ana since the Administrator has not approved a state per-

mitting program for Louisiana pursuant to 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b).

11. EPA, pursuant to Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342, issued to Defendant NPDES permit number

LA0003522 effective on July 23, 1977, authorizing the De-

fendant to discharge specified amounts of pollutants from

its Noreo facility into the Mississippi River and Bayou

Trepagnier, which are navigable waters of the United

States.

12. Section 308 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1318, requires

each NPDES permitee to establish and maintain records;

to install, use, and maintain monitoring equipment; to sam-

ple effluent and report on a regular basis to the permit

issuing Agency regarding the facility’s discharge of pol-

lutants. The reports consist of Discharge Monitoring Re-

ports (“‘DMRs’’) and Non-Compliance Reports (‘‘NCRs’’).

In these reports the permittee must state on a periodic

basis whether it is in compliance with the terms of its

permit.

13. Representatives of Plaintiff and other citizens’

environmental organizations have examined and evaluated

EPA NPDES discharge permit compliance files on a com-

prehensive basis for several states including Louisiana.

In this research these organizations looked for those com-

panies where they appeared to be persistent and historic

patterns or permit non-compliance and where there had

App. 21

been no diligent prosecution by Federal or State authori-

ties. Defendant is such a company. Thereafter ‘‘60 day

notices,’’ such as the one described in paragraph 3 above,

were sent to the Defendant and other companies as re-

quired by the Act, with copies to EPA and the State. These

notices serve as final notices to the Federal and State

agencies to enforce the law, while giving the company an

opportunity to correct any misunderstandings as to viola-

tions of the law or to reach dispositions short of litigation,

which satisfy the purposes of the Act.

14. The specific violations of permit limits identified

in Appendices A and B to this Complaint were taken di-

rectly from the noncompliance and discharge monitoring

reports (NCRs and DMRs) submitted to EPA by the De-

fendant pursuant to the reporting requirements established

by Federal law and reflected in Defendant’s NPDES

permit.*

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

15. Defendant operates a petroleum refinery in Norco,

Louisiana. It discharges treated wastes through four

point sources into the Mississippi River and Bayou Tre-

pagnier pursuant to NPDES permit number LA0003522.

16. Defendant has submitted DMRs and NCRs to

EPA covering at least the periods shown in Appendices

A and B, which publicly disclose a pattern of substantial

non-compliance with the Clean Water Act.

* Plaintiffs made four typographical errors in transferring

this information to the Notice Letters. Those errors and

their corrections are listed in Appendix C hereto.

App. 22

17. Defendant’s record of noncompliance with

NPDES permit number LA0003522 appears in detail in

Appendices A and B.

18. Defendant’s violations have been numerous and

repeated. In general, between March 1980 and March

1984, Defendant has violated its permit limitations for

Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biological Oxygen Demand

(BOD), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), Hexavalent

Chromium, Total Chromium, Phenols, Total Organic Car-

bon and pH at least 120 times.

19. On information and belief, Plaintiff further al-

leges that Defendant has violated the permit limitations

subsequent to the violations listed in Appendices A and

B and continues to be in violation of the Act.

20 Plaintiff alleges that there has been no diligent

prosecution of Defendant through civil or criminal court

action by the EPA or the DNR concerning the specific

charged violations.

21. Because of the extensive history of violations of

the effluent standards imposed by NPDES permit number

LA0003522, Plaintiff believes and alleges that without im-

position of appropriate civil penalties and the issuance of

an injunction, Shell Oil Company will continue to violate

its NPDES permit creating further injury to the environ-

ment and others.

CLAIMS

22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference

herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 21 and

Appendices A and B to this Complaint.

App. 23

23. Defendant’s wastewater discharges identified in

Appendices A and B are discharges from point sources

into navigable waters of the United States within the

meaning of Section 301 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.

24. Defendant’s wastewater discharges from Outfalls

002 and 004 as listed in Appendices A and B to the Com-

plaint, and those which have been committed subsequent

to those listed in Appendices A and B, are violations of its

permit limitations for the pollutants listed in paragraph

18 above, and constitute violations of Sections 301(a) and

402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a) and 1342.

RELIEF

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court

to grant the following relief:

A. Declare Defendant Shell Oil Company to have

violated and to be in violation of Sections 301 and 402 of

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1811 and 1342;

B. Enjoin the Defendant from operating its facility

in Noreo, Louisiana in such a manner as will result in the

further violation of the defendant’s NPDES permit num-

ber L.A0003522;

C. Authorize Plaintiff for the period beginning on

the date of the Court’s order and running for one year

after Defendant achieve compliance with all of the limi-

tations in its NPDES permit, to sample or to arrange

sampling of any discharge of pollutants from Defendant’s

facility with the cost of the sampling to be borne by De-

fendant;

App. 24

D. Order Defendant to provide Plaintiff, for the

period beginning on the date of the Court’s order and run-

ning for one year after Defendant achieves compliance

with all of the limitations of its NPDES permit, with a

copy of all reports and other documents which Defendant

submits to the Federal or State government regarding De-

fendant’s NPDES permit, to be submitted at the time it is

submitted to these authorities;

EK. Order Defendant to pay civil penalties of $10,000

per day of violation for each violation pursuant to Sections

309(d) and 505(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d) and

1365(a), ineluding those listed in Appendices A and B

and violations committed subsequent to those listed in Ap-

pendices A and B;

F. Award Plaintiff its costs, including reasonable at-

torneys’ and expert witness’ fees, as authorized by Sec-

tion 505(d) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(d) ; and

G. Award such other and further relief as this Court

deems appropriate.

(i aaa en

MICHAEL OSBORNE

Osborne, MeComiskey and

Richardson-Harp

3420 Prytania Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70115

504/891-4418

Loeal Counsel for Plaintiff

App. 25

Respectfully submitted,

KATHERINE P. RANSEL*

NANCY C. CRISMAN

NICHOLAS C. YOST

JOHN VANCE HUGHES

Center for Law in the

Public Interest

1575 Eye Street, N.W.

Suite 650

Washington, D.C. 20005-1105

202/371-0199

Counsel for Plaintiff

*Trial Attorney for Plaintiff

App. 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER 84-407-B

COPOLYMER RUBBER AND

CHEMICAL CORPORATION

SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NU MBER 84-408-B

ALLIED CHEMICAL CORPORATION

SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER 84-409-B

BERCEN SOUTHERN DIVISION OF

BERCEN INCORPORATED

SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER 84-410-B

FORMOSA PLASTICS CORPORATION

FRANK J. POLOZOLA, District Judge:

These consolidated cases! were filed by Sierra Club

under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. 1365(a). In each of these cases, Sierra Club con-

tends the defendants have violated Section 301(a) of the

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a).

‘The Sierra Club filed separate suits against Copolymer

Rubber and Chemical Corporation (‘Copolymer’) (CA 84-407-

B), Allied Chemical Corporation (“Allied’’) (CA 84-408-B), Ber-

cen Southern Division of Bercen Incorporated (“Bercen’’) (CA

84-409-B), and Formosa Plastics Corporation (‘Formosa’) (CA

84-410-B). Because the same jurisdictional issue is involved in

each cases, the Court has consolidated the cases in the interest

of judicial economy.

App. 27

I Procedural History of the Cases

After these suits were filed, the standing of the Sierra

Club to bring these suits became an issue in this case. In

order to determine the legal standard to be applied by the

Court on the standing issue, the Court stayed discovery on

all issues except standing and ordered the parties to file

briefs on the issue. After the Court denied plaintiff’s

motion for partial summary judgment on the standing is-

sue, the Fifth Cirenit Court of Appeals rendered its deci-

sion in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company,

756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir. 1985). Thereafter, the Court or-

dered the parties to file briefs on whether the Court had

jurisdiction in these cases under the Hamker decision. In

addition, Copolymer filed a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? Briefs

were filed, oral argument was held on two occasions and

the matter was submitted to the Court.

II The Court’s Jurisdiction

It is well settled that a federal court is empowered to

bear only such cases as are within the judicial power of the

United States, as defined in the Constitution, and have

been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by Con-

gress.2 It is also equally settled that a federal court has

an obligation to notice want of subject matter jurisdiction

2After oral argument was held on the Hamker jurisdiction

issue and the matter was submitted to the Court, Sierra Club

filed another motion for partial summary judgment on the is-

sues of standing and liability.

313 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-

cedure Jurisdiction § 3522.

App. 28

on its own motion. Where the subject matter jurisdiction

of the Court has been challenged, the burden is on the party

claiming jurisdiction to demonstrate that jurisdiction of

subject matter exists.° Thus, the burden is upon the Sierra

Club to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exist

in these cases.

Ill The Hamaker Decision

Hamaker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company,

756 F.2d 392, involved the very same issue as that pre-

sented to this Court—does Section 1365(a) permit a citizen

suit for past violations, or must the defendant be ‘‘in vio-

lation’’ of relevant standards, limitations and orders on

the date the citizen suit is filed? After thoroughly dis-

eussing the history, meaning and purposes of Section

1365(a)® as it relates to the other provisions of the Clean

Water Act, the Fifth Cirenit Court of Appeals concluded:

To summarize, the ordinary meaning of the words of

the statute and its prior Supreme Court interpretation

indicate that Section 1365 does not authorize citizens

suits seeking either injunctive relief or the imposition

of civil penalties where the defendant is not alleged to

be in violation of an effluent standard, limitation or

order. The section ‘‘authorizes only prospective re-

*Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 764,

769 n. 2, 66 L.Ed. 722 (1981); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley,

211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908); and Cameron v.

Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 8 S.Ct. 1154, 32 L.Ed. 132 (1888).

‘McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178,

56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1935); Diefenthal v. Civil Aeronau-

tics Board, 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 US.

1107, 103 S.Ct. 732, 74 L.Ed. 2d 956 (1983); Ortego v. Wein-

berger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975).

633 U.S.C. 1365(a) provides in pertinent part that “any citi-

zen may commence a civil action . . . against any person .. .

who is alleged to be in violation of” the relevant standards,

limitations, or orders. (Emphasis supplied.)

App. 29

lief’? even though ‘‘civil penalties . .. may be ordered

by the court.’’ 756 F.2d at 396’

The Sierra Club argues that the Tamker ease is wrong

and that the appellate judges misinterpreted the provisions

of the Clean Water Act.’

This Court is not only bound by the Tamker decision,

but the Court must note that it fully agrees with the inter-

pretation placed on § 1365 in the majority opinion?

IV The Court Has No Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Since the Court and Copolymer have questioned the

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Sierra Club must

affirmatively show that the Court has subject matter jur-

isdiction. Sierra Club has failed to demonstrate that the

Court has subject matter jurisdiction in these cases. In

each of the cases, the Sierra Club alleges that the defen-

dants are in violation of an effluent standard, limitation

or order at the time the suits were filed.'° Since this al-

legation has been challenged by each of the defendants, the

7judge Jolly, in his opinion, emphasized on at least twenty

separate occasions that the defendant must be “in violation’

at the time the suit is filed in order for a citizen to file a suit

under § 1365(a).

8On oral argument, counsel for Sierra Club stated that the

same argument the Sierra Club was making to this Court was

made to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in an amicus brief

on rehearing in the Hamker case. The Hamker Court obviously

rejected these areuments.

%The Court does not believe that it is bound by the lan-

guage in the concurring opinion regarding a suit filed against

a “chronic episodic violator,” 756 F.2d at 399, but even if this

language apnlies, the facts as presented in the case sub judice

fail to support the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court.

The allegations are set forth in paragraph 19 of each com-

plaint filed in these cases.

App. 30

Sierra Club must present proof that the defendants were

‘‘in violation’’ at the time the suits were filed. However,

the evidence" presented in these cases clearly and unequi-

vocally shows that none of the defendants were in violation

at the time the suits were filed.”

IV [sic] Conclusion

The Court finds that the defendants were not in

violation of any standard, limitation or order at the time

the suits were filed herein. Therefore, the Sierra Club is

precluded from filing a citizens suit against the defendants

under Section 1365(a) of the Act. Since the Court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff’s suits shall

be dismissed.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, November 7, 1985.

The parties have filed numerous affidavits and exhibits

into the record on the jurisdiction issue.

12During oral argument, the Court unsuccessfully attempted

on numerous occasions to have counsel for the Sierra Club

point out any violations of any defendant which were pending

on the date the suits were filed. Not only did plaintiff fail to

set forth these violations during oral argument, but the record

clearly demonstrates there were no violations on the dates the

suits were filed herein.

3The Court's dismissal will be without prejudice. As noted

in Hamker, the plaintiff may have a state damage claim which

may be brought in a state court. Hamker v. Diamond Sham-

rock Chemical Company, 756 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1985).

The Court expresses no opinion as to the validity of such a

claim.

App. 31

NOTICE MAILED TO:

DATE 11/8 BY PJ

Mr. Osborne

Byrd

Harburt

Cruilj

Lt

JG(6)

/s/ Frank J. Polozola

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MINUTE ENTRY:

NOVEMBER 8, 1985

POLOZOLA, Pi

SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER 85-147-B

MONOCHEM, INCORPORATED

(Received November 21, 1985)

This matter is before the court on the motion of the

defendant Monochem, Incorporated (‘‘Monochein’’), to

dismiss this case for lack of subject matter Jurisdiction.

A review of the record, including affidavits and ex-

hibits. reveal that Monochem was not ‘‘in violation’’ of

an effluent standard, limitation or order at the time the

present suit was filed. Therefore, for the reasons set forth

in Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber and Chemical Com-

pany, et al, — F.Supp. — (M.D. La. 1985), this suit must

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pur-

suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1).

App. 32

Therefore:

IT IS ORDERED that the motion of the defendant,

Monochem, Incorporated, to dismiss the present suit for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction be, and it is hereby

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s suit be

dismissed without prejudice.

/s/ Frank J. Polozola

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NOTICE MAILED TO:

DATED 11/8 BY PJ

Osborne

Hallo

(6) Philip

LT.

JG.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SIERRA CLUB CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 84-3583

SHELL OIL COMPANY SECTION ‘‘J”’

JUDGMENT

(Filed November 4, 1985)

The Court having previously granted the motion of

defendant to dismiss.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that there be judgment in favor of defendant, Shell Oil

Company, against plaintiff, Sierra Club, dismissing said

plaintiff’s suit, with costs.

App. 33

Dated at New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of

November, 1985.

/s/ Patrick E. Carr

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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