Appendix — Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft v. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill Gmbh.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT * ~~

OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

SCHUBERT & SALZER

MASCHINENFABRIK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

and

SCHUBERT & SALZER MACHINE WORKS, INC.,

Petitioners,

Ve

SPINDELFABRIK SUESSEN-SCHURR,

STAHLECKER & GRILL GmbH,

HANS STAHLECKER AND FRITZ STAHLECKER,

Respondents

APPENDIX

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Allen Kirkpatrick, III

Counsel of Record

For Petitioners

William T. Bullinger

Cushman, Darby & Cushman

Eleventh Floor

1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Telephone (202) 861-3000

Item

: eae

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Appeals Court Opinion, 829 F.2d

1025 (Fed. Cis. BT Vico ee seesees la

Trial Court Opinion (not reported)

incluGing Orders OF: ..ccoccccce - 46a

September 4, 1985.............. 194a

September 30, 1985............. 198a

GCECGBOE 237 L9ES.ccscccccccccce 2018

December 30, 1985...cccccccceee 2058

License Agreement, Schubert and

Murata, ‘0Oll Patent (A-2807 to

SOOT) oc ececresesessececssbeevoccce 213a

Sales Agreement Suessen and Murata,

‘O11 Patent (A-2803 to 2806)..... 220a

Assignment, Murata to Suessen, ‘011

Patent CRM ZEae ccc ccccecevcsceees 226a

Terminal Disclaimer, '946 Patent .

(A-2842 to BORD rece vcceceeseacee 228a

Terminal Disclaimer '01l Patent

(A-2236 to Bese ebennsecsesesneens 233a

NSS SIRES) EL eet ee 238a

indicates reference to lower court

appendix.

tintin: inact

APPENDIX

ITEM 1

Appeals Court Opinion, 829 F.2d 1025

(Fed. Cir. 1987)

yet ea

Spek MOO Mico Cea Pe

la

APPENDIX, ITEM 1

(Appeals Court Opinion)

[829 F.2d 1075]

SPINDELFABRIK SUESSEN-SCHURR

STAHLECKER & GRILL GmbH, et al.,

Appellees,

Vv.

SCHUBERT & SALZER

MASCHINENFABRIK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

and Schubert & Salzer Machine

Works, Inc., Appellants.

Appeal Nos. 86-561, 86-682.

United States Court of Appeals,

Federal Circuit

Sept. 9, 1987

{829 F.2d 1076]

Before BALDWIN and SKELTON, Senior

Circuit Judges, and ARCHER, Circuit Judge.

BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is a consolidation of appeals from

two judgments of the United States District

Court for the District of South Carolina

(district court) (1) declaring U.S. Patent

2a

No. 4,059,946 (the '946 patent) and U.S.

Patent No. 4,175,370 (the '370 patent)

valid and infringed and awarding increased

damages and attorney fees based on a find-

ing of willful infringement of the '946

patent and (2) granting a motion to enjoin

subsequent infringement by a redesign of

the accused device. Appeal was taken on

four questions related to the district

court's infringement determinations. We

affirm the district court's decision with

respect to each of the four questions on

infringement.

Background

In 1983, the three appellees in this

appeal, Hans Stahlecker, Fritz Stahlecker,

and Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr,

Stahlecker and Grill GmbH (collectively

[829 F.2d 1077] and individually

3a

"Suessen"), brought an action in the

district court for infringement of two

patents+ relating to improvements in the

technology of open-end spinning devices,

the '946 patent and the '370 patent. It

was charged that an open-end spinning de-

vice, the Spincomat, produced and marketed

by appellants, Schubert and Salzer

Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft and

Schubert and Salzer Machine Works, Inc.

(collectively and individually

1. Hans Stahlecker and Fritz Stahlecker

are individuals who jointly owned the

patents. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr,

Stahlecker and Grill, GmbH, a West

German corporation, is an exclusive

Licensee of Hans and Fritz Stahlecker.

([N. 1 at 829 F.2d 1076]

4a

"Schubert") , “ infringes claim 18 of the

'946 patent and infringes claims 1-7, 9-13,

and 17-20 of the '370 patent. The district

court rejected the Schubert defenses of

invalidity, unenforceability, non-infringe-

ment, and implied license, and on September

4, 1985, issued its "Order and Opinion In-

cluding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law" declaring the ‘946 and '370 patents

valid and infringed. The district court

awarded increased damages based on willful

and deliberate infringement and attorney

fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) for in-

fringement attributable to the '946

patent.

2. Appellant Schubert and Salzer

Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft is a

West German corporation. Appellant

Schubert and Salzer Machine Works,

Inc., is a United states subsidiary of

Schubert and Salzer Maschinenfabrik

Aktiengesellschaft.

(N. 2, 3, 4, at 829 F.2d 1077]

5a

Six weeks later, on October 28, 1985,

the district court issued an order declar-

ing that, despite Schubert's efforts to

produce a non-infringing modification, the

redesigned version of the Spincomat also

infringes the '946 patent.

A. Standard of Review

We review the four questions raised on

appeal, each related to the district

court's infringement determinations: (1)

whether the district court properly re-

jected an implied license defense to in-

fringement of the '946 patent; (2) whether

there is clear error in the finding of in-

fringement of the '946 patent by the re-

designed Spincomat; (3) whether there is

clear error in the finding of infringement

of the '370 patent by the Spincomat; and

(4) whether there is error or an abuse of

6a

discretion in the award of increased

damages and attorney fees.

In conducting our review, we have the

benefit of the district court's order. Its

factual findings are to be reversed only if

clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous

when, although there is evidence to support

it, the reviewing court on the entire evi-

dence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been commit-

ted. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84

L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985); United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,

3. The district court's determinations on

validity, enforceability and certain

assertions of non-infringement are not

contested on appeal. .iccordingly, we

have not reviewed the district court's

findings with respect to those

issues.

[N. 3 & 4 at 829 F.2d 1077]

ee ee

7a

395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746

(1948).4 "This standard plainly does not

entitle a reviewing court to reverse the

finding of the trier of fact simply because

it is convinced that it would have decided

the case differently." Anderson, 470 U.S.

at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1512.

Where the issue before us is a question

of law, our review is based on whether the

district court erred as matter of law.

Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d

1578, 217 USPQ 977 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Deere

& Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d

1551, 218 USPQ 481 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

4. Notwithstanding Schubert's attack on

the district court for its verbatim

adoption of Suessen's findings, our

review of those findings is governed by

the clearly erroneous standard.

Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp.,

776 F.2d 309, 313, 227 USPQ 776, 768

(Fed. Cir. 1985).

8.0a

B. The Technology

The '946 and '370 patents are directed

to the automation of open-end spinning

(OES), a technology whereby uniformly

twisted yarn is produced from irregular

strands of fiber. The findings of the

district court regarding OES technology and

operation of an OES device are not

contested. [829 F.2d 1078]

ede hee

YARN WITHDRAWAL TUBE

SPINNING ROTOR ORIVE

te BE

\\__-w FIBER FEED TU

\ Fiber

Waist FEEDROLL —c: Sliver

‘) GE mut

OMB

ROLL

Zo

gr

Ni ee y COMBER ROLL DRIVE

TRASH TO WASTE

Above is a diagram of the principal

elements of an OES device. Open-end spin-

ning is performed on such a device in a se-

quence of steps. First, a mass of irreg-

ular strands of fiber is fed into the de-

vice on a feed roll. The feed roll, in

turn, feeds fiber into a high speed, rotat-

ing, toothed comber where the fibers are

separated into individual strands. The

9a

individual strands are then vacuum drawn

into a rotor which is cup-shaped with an

annular groove. A twist is imparted to the

strands while they are under the centrifu-

gal force of the high speed rotor. Once

twisted, the strands become the final pro-

duct, spun yarn. The yarn is pulled from

the rotor through a withdrawal sue and

wound onto a spool.

The '370 and '946 patents relate to a

portion of the OES operation denoted as the

"piecing point." As the yarn is withdrawn

from the rotor, pulled by a pair of "take

off" rolls and wound onto a spool, it is

subject to breakage. Breakage inherently

results in discontinuity in the operation,

requiring reconnection and restarting of

the operation. Automation of an OES device

involves the implementation of a sequence

of automatic steps to restart the device by

cleaning out broken fiber, feeding new

10a

fiber into the rotor and reconnecting the

newly spun yarn. The points of reconnec-

tion after breakage are denoted as "piecing

points." Both of the patents in issue dis-

close improvements which avoid time lapse

for reconnection and minimize nonuniformi-

ties in the yarn at the piecing points.

I. Infringement of the '946 Patent

The '946 patent, entitled "Method and

Apparatus for Start Spinning a Thread on

Open-End Spinning Units" issued on November

29, 1977 to Dieter Boettcher, Heinze Schulz

and Fritz Stahlecker. Hans and Fritz

Stahlecker were subsequently assigned the

patent, and they licensed Suessen as an

exclusive Licensee.

The '946 patent addresses the absence

in the prior art of a method and apparatus

lla

for providing precise control of fiber feed

during piecing. Claim 18° recites an apparat-

Claim 18 is dependent upon claim 17.

Claims 17 and 18 read as follows:

17. Apparatus for thread piecing in

an open-end spinning assembly

comprising:

opening means for opening sliver

being supplied to a spinning rotor

of said spinning assembly, feeding

means for feeding sliver to said

fiber opening means,

piecing means including means for

introducing a thread end back into

said spinning rotor to be pieced

together with a fiber ring formed in

said spinning rotor,

rotor control means for moving said

Spinning rotor from a stop condition

toward an operating spinning speed

to accommodate piecing by said

piecing means,

and fiber supply preparing means for

preparing said spinning assembly for

a piecing operation prior to

movement of said spinning rotor from-

its stopped position, said fiber

supply preparing means including

means for starting and operating

said feeding means for a period of

time and then stopping said feeding

means, said starting and stopping

being accompanied by a continuously

operating opening means, whereby

uniform fiber tufts are arranged at

[N.5 at 829 F.2d 1078-79]

NE BD NO at Mt DS

12a

[829 F.2d 1079]

us for performing a controlled sequence of

steps for automated restart of the spinning

operation, including preparation of the

rotor.

The district court found that claim 18

of the '946 patent reads directly on

Schubert's OES device, the Spincomat.® In

making this finding, the court identified

said sliver feeding means to

accommodate said piecing operation

to be subsequently performed.

18. Apparatus according to claim

17, further comprising means for

supplying a vacuum to said spinning

rotor to remove any fiber supplied

during said preparation of said

spinning assembly by said preparing

means.

6. In addition to rejecting the implied

license defense, the district court

rejected Schubert's argument that the

absence in their device of a "rotor

control means" and "piecing on the

rise" avoided infringement. Only the

implied license defense has been

appealed.

([N. 6 & 7 at 829 F.2d 1079]

13a

an aspect of the Spincomat which corre-

sponds to each of the elements recited in

claim 18. Literal reading of the '946

patent upon Schubert's Spincomat is not

contested in this appeal.

A. The Implied License Defense

Schubert argues that it has an implied

license under the '946 patent. Its argu-

ment involves two agreements.

The first was a license agreement

entered in 1982 between Schubert and Murata

Machinery, Ltd. (Murata). That agreement,

entered into before the filing of this suit

in 1988, in pertinent part reads:

Murata hereby grants to Licensee

[Schubert] a non-exclusive worldwide

license under the Patents to make, use

and sell the patented device only as

part of the open end spinning machines

of the License. The License hereby

granted is a limited license, and

Murata reserves all rights not

expressly granted.

14a

The "Patents" were defined by the agreement

as those listed in an Exhibit. They in-

clude U.S. Patent No. 4,022,011 (‘011

patent) and other patents belonging to

Murata in the name of Hironorai Hirai.

Schubert asserts that, notwithstanding any

infringement of '946, its accused infringe-

ment is merely a practicing of the '01l

invention, which it is licensed to do under

the 1982 agreement.

The second agreement, entered in 1984

after this lawsuit began, involved

Suessen's purchase of the '011l and other

Hirai patents from Murata. The agreement

reads, in pertinent part:

Suessen has been advised by Murata

that a non-exclusive license of the

patents and patent applications men-

tioned under 1. above had been granted

by Murata to Messrs. Schubert & Salzer

AG, Ingolstadt, F.R. Germany (herein-

after called the Licensee). Suessen

hereby agrees to purchase the patents

and patent applications mentioned under

1. above together with the License

Agreement as of 23rd/28th July, 1982,

LS a TT

15a

with the said Licensee and agrees that

you and your business/license concerns

will maintain the licensed rights of

the Licensee under the License Agree-

ment as stipulated during the life of

the patents and patent applications

mentioned under 1. above.

Schubert asserts that, per the 1984 agree-

ment, Suessen "stepped in the shoes of

Murata" and by so "stepping," Suessen

cannot--just as Murata cannot--sue under

the '946 or any other patent for infringe-

ment based on practicing the ‘'01l inven-

tion. To allow such a suit, Schubert

argues, would unfairly take away what it

[829 F.2d 1080] paid for in 1982.

Schubert labels its argument one of “legal

estoppel."

Another part of the agreement refers to

"the assignment of the [1982] License

Agreement." The 1982 license, however,

states that it is "nontransferable,

nonassignable." Our disposition of

this case assumes, arguendo, that there

was a transfer of the 1982 license

agreement which did not violate the

terms of that agreement.

16a

([N. 7 at 829 F.2d 1079]

The district court concluded that

Schubert in 1982 could not have acquired

from Murata any rights greater than those

which Murata had the right to grant and

that Murata had nothing more than a right

to exclude others from using the Hirai

patents. It then concluded, regarding the

1984 agreement:

There is nothing whatsoever in this

agreement about the '946 patent, any

patent corresponding to the '946

patent, or any technology specifically

covered by those patents. Nor is there

any language in the agreement that can

be construed as a grant by Suessen of

any right to practice any particular

technology which might be covered by

other Suessen patent rights. All this

agreement does is to convey to Suessen

the entire right, title and interest in

all of the Hirai patents, with the ex-

press reservation to the effect that a

nonexclusive license under these Hirai

patents had already been granted by

Murata to [Schubert], and with the ex-

press acknowledgments by Suessen that

it would continue to recognize the

existence of that license under the

Hirai patents. While this later ack-

nowledgment might seem redundant from

the viewpoint of the law in this

country (whereby a patent assignee

under normal circumstances would be

|

17a

bound as a matter of law by its

assignor's prior grant to a license to

a third party), it served a clear pur-

pose under German law since, as refer-

red to above [pp. 23-24, supra], the

German High Court had recently handed

down a ruling, the effect of which was

that an existing nonexclusive right

under a German patent could be defeated

by an assignment of the patent by the

owner to a third party.

The net effect of the 1984 agreement, said

the district court, was that Schubert is

"the beneficiary of a guarantee by Suessen

that the nonexclusive rights under the

Hirai patents granted to [Schubert] by

Murata in 1982 could not be taken away by

the new patent owner, Suessen" and that the

enforcement of the '946 patent against

Schubert in this litigation "in no way

affects that guarantee."

The district court then added:

Beyond these two agreements, defendants

offered no further evidence in support

of the existence of any implied

licensee--not even the testimony of de-

fendants to the effect that they ever

even thought they might have an implied

license or that they were led to take

Or ever took any action upon reliance

ioc nnenncimeaiainanieaeianaeiiia

18a

that they had rights under the '946

patents.

In the latter regard, the district court

cited Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire

Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 925, 223 USPQ

982, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and Stickle v.

Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559, 219 -

USPQ 377, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1983), where this

court discussed implied license in the con-

text of equitable estoppel. The district

court concluded that equitable estoppel

could not be a basis for implied license in

this case.

Discussion

The doctrines of legal estoppel and

equitable estoppel have been applied by

courts to imply a license. See, e.g., AMP,

Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 452,

182 Ct.Cl. 86, 156 USPQ 647, 649-50 (1968),

cert. denied, 391 U.S. 964, 88 S.Ct. 2033,

|

19a

20 L.Ed.2d 878 157 USPQ 720 (1968). Under

the facts of this case, there can be no

implied license under an equitable estoppel

theory. Indeed, that theory is not even

argued by Schubert. Instead, Schubert

asserts an implied license based on its

theory of legal estoppel. Though we -

nize that theory in appropriate circumstan-

ces, it does not work for Schubert here.

Legal estoppel "is merely shorthand for

Saying that a grantor of a property right

Or interest cannot derogate from the right

granted by his own subsequent act." AMP v.

United States, 389 F.2d at 453, 156 USPQ at

650-51. The rationale for that is to estop

the grantor from taking back that for which

he received consideration, 389 F.2d at 452,

156 USPQ at 649-50. Here, however, we have

a suit by a third party, Suessen, under a

patent owned by Suessen. The license by

the grantor, Murata, did not purport to,

20a

and indeed could not, protect [829 F.2d

1081] Schubert from a suit by Suessen under

'946. Hence, Suessen, by filing in 1983

and now maintaining its suit under '946,

does not derogate from the rieht given by

Murata in the 1982 license agreement.

Schubert nevertheless urges this three

prong argument: (1) “legal estoppel"

would prevent Murata from suing under the

'946 patent if it were to acquire it;

(2) Suessen "Stepped into" Murata's shoes

in 1984 when Sussen acquired the Hirai

patents and committed to maintain

Schubert's licensed rights; and hence,

(3) just as Murata could not, Suessen

Cannot sue under the '96 patent. We reject

that argument.

As a threshold matter, a patent license

agreement is in essence nothing more than a

promise by the licensor not to sue the

licensee. See, e.g., United States v.

2la

Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d

1122, 1127, 212 USPQ 889, 894 (D.C. Cir.

1981). Even if couched in terms of

"{ljicensee is given the right to make,

use,-or sell X," the agreement cannot con-

vey that absolute right because not even

the patentee of X is given that right. His

right is merely one to exclude others from

making, using or selling X, 35 U.S.C.

§ 154. * Indeed, the patentee of X and his

Licensee, when making, using, or selling X,

can be subject to suit under other

patents. In any event, patent license

agreements can be written to convey dif-

ferent scopes of promises not to sue, e.g.,

a promise not to sue under a specific

patent or, more broadly, a promise not to

sue under any patent the licensor now has

Or may acquire in the future.

As stated previously, the first prong

of Schubert's three part “stepping in the

> te Aina ig res cael

22a

shoes" argument is that legal estoppel

would prevent Murata from suing Schubert

under the '946 patent if Murata were to

acquire that patent. However, even

assuming, arguendo, that such estoppel

against Murata exists, the final two prongs

of Schubert's "stepping in the shoes" argu-

ment would fail. Given the assumption of

estoppel against Murata, the 1982 license

agreement would necessarily be a promise by

Murata not to sue under any patent, includ-

ing those acquired by Murata in the

future. In the 1984 agreement, Suessen

incurred what Murata promised in 1982.

8. Given such a promise, a subsequent suit

by Murata under a hypothetically-

acquired '946 patent would derogate

from what was granted by the license.

Conversely, if the agreement were

merely a promise not to sue under the

listed patents only, there could be no

estoppel against Murata asserting the

"946 patent.

[N. 8 & 9 at 829 F.2d 1081]

23a

Thus, Suessen would be committed to fore-

bear from suit under (1) the transferred

patents and (2) any of Murata's nontrans-

ferred patents and (2) any of Murata's

nontransferred patents (future and

present) .? That commitment does not

include a promise not to sue under

Suessen's own '946 patent.

Regarding the second promise, because

Suessen cannot normally sue under

patents remaining in Murata's hands, a

promise not to sue under such patents

has no realistic effect. Hence, the

second promise would have significance

only for Murata patents not transferred

in the 1982 agreement but acquired by

Suessen from Murata in the future.

Though the district court construed the

1984 agreement as containing only the

first promise, which pertains to the

patents transferred with the 1982

agreement, that construction makes

sense in light of its initial holding

that the 1982 agreement pertains only

to those patents. Our construction of

the 1984 agreement as containing a

second promise arises from our

assumption, arguendo, that the 1982

agreement pertains also to Murata

patents not transferred with the 1982

agreement.

24a

[N. 9 at 829 F.2d 1081]

Schubert's "standing in the shoes"

argument, however, would add to Suessen's

commitment a promise not to sue under

Suessen's separate patents that Murata

never owned. On the facts of this case, we

cannot interpret the 1984 agreement so

broadly, at least not with respect to the

'946 patent.

The district court correctly determined

that there is nothing in the 1984 agreement

about the '946 or other Suessen patent

rights. Schubert points to no extraneous

evidence tending to show any understanding

on the part of either contracting party

that Suessen was to forego rights under the

'946 or any other patent then owned by

Suessen. To the contrary, that a lawsuit

under '946 was ongoing but not mentioned in

the 1984 agreement indicates strongly that

there was not intent by the [829 F.2d 1082]

parties to have Suessen forfeit its rights

25a

under '946. Furthermore, an implied pro-

mise by Suessen to forego its '946 suit is

inconsistent not only with Suessen main-

taining its lawsuit after the 1984 agree-

ment but, also, with the course of events

leading up the 1984 contract./9® In sum, we

agree with the district court's conclusion

that the 1984 aereunese O60 not impose on

Suessen any obligation to stop its ongoing

Suit under the '946 patent.

10. For example, the invention of Suessen's

‘946 patent had a dynamic commercial

impact since its public unveiling in

1975. As early as 1974, Suessen

discussed its new technology with

Schubert. Schubert tried to develop a

comparable version of Suessen's

advancement but was unsuccessful.

Eventually, around June, 1982, Schubert

requested a license from Suessen but

was refused. Three weeks later,

Schubert obtained a license under the

‘011 and other Hirai patents.

Subsequently, this lawsuit was filed.

Those facts show a great value placed

by Suessen on its '946 patent and an

unwillingness to License it to

Schubert.

(N. 10 at 829 F.2d 1082]

26a

Schubert cites no case discussing its

"standing in the shoes" theory. It does,

however, rely on Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.

Giddings & Lewis Mach. Tool Co., 285

F.Supp. 483, 159 USPQ 433 (E.D. Wis.

1968). There, plaintiff sued defendant

under a "Brainard patent." Plaintiff also

owned a "Morgan patent," which was assigned

to it by a third party subject to a pre-

vious license to the defendant. In the

context of denying a summary judgment

motion, the district court discussed a need

at trial to focus on whether the claims of

the Brainard patent had “separate features"

from the Morgan claims. However, the court

did not specifically address the issue dis-

cussed herein, i.e., whether the assignment

to plaintiff of the patent subject to a

license to the defendant affected plain-

tiff's suit against defendant under its

27a

separately-owned patent.11

In any event,

Kearney is not binding precedent on this

court.

Schubert argues that not implying a

license in this case is unfair because

Schubert paid valuable consideration for

the right to practice the '011l invention

but is in danger of losing that right as a

result of doing no more than that for which

it paid. We disagree. The right Schubert

paid for in the 1982 agreement was freedom

from suit by Murata, not Suessen. Indeed,

when Schubert signed the 1982 agreement, it

was aware of possible suit by Suessen, who

ll. On that issue, we note that the

assignment of the Morgan patent in

Kearney seems to have occurred before

plaintiff filed suit under its Brainare

patent. In this case, as expressed

above, the assignment of the ‘'0ll

patent was tiade after Suessen filed

Suit under '946, a fact which cuts

against interpreting the assignment as

foreclosing the suit.

([N. ll & 12 at 829 F.2d 1082]

28a

had previously denied Schubert a license

under the '946 patent. Moreover, Schubert

has not shown us that it has lost any obli-

gation Murata may still owe it under the

1982 license agreement, e.g., not to sue

under any patents Murata still has or may

acquire. To rule that the Suessen acquisi-

tion of the '01l patent somehow bestows on

Schubert an absolute defense to a suit al-

ready filed by Suessen under '946, would

result in an unintended windfall to

Schubert that makes no sense under the

facts of this case.

B. Infringement Of The '946 Patent

By The Redesigned Spincomat

_ On October 16, 1985, Suessen filed an

Emergency Motion for an Order requesting

the district court to enjoin Schubert from

infringing claim 18 of the '946 patent by

exhibiting and demonstrating at the Textile

29a

Hall in Greenville, South Carolina, a modi-

fied, but allegedly still infringing,

Spincomat. The district court determined

that despite Schubert's attempts, this

modification does not avoid infringement of

the '946 patent./}2

Schubert had disengaged electrical re-

lays in order to interrupt control of the

prefeed in the piecing cycle. As modified,

the sliver is prefed for a short period of

time prior to commencing piecing. Schubert

contended that the disengagement of relays

altered control of advance piecing so that

12. The district court issued two orders

enjoining activity related to

infringement by the redesigned

Spincomat. One issued on October 23,

1985 enjoining the infringing

activity. A second order, with

findings, issued on December 24, 1985,

denying a motion to stay the first

order.

[N. 12 829 F.2d 1082]

30a

the device no longer performs the recited

function of a fiber preparation means.

[829 F.2d 1083]

Suessen countered with a video tape

showing that despite the reprogramming to

omit the sliver prefeed from the start of

the piecing sequence, if the piecer is un-

successful on the first try (without a

Sliver prefeed) it would call for a

"repeat," second try with a prefeed. The

district court compared the "repeat"

piecing sequence with claim 18 and deter-

mined that it functions in precisely the

Same sequence to accomplish piecing just as

had the original Spincomat and thus employ-

ed the same fiber supply preparation means

called for in the '946 patent.

The instant "fiber supply preparing

means" is the mechanism for prefeed of the

lead end of the sliver. It was determined

that the Spincomat continued to perform the

3la

function specified in the claim limitation.

Although modified, the device, in accord

with the recitation in claim 18, has a

means for preparing the spinning assembly

including a mechanism for starting and

operating the feeding means for a period of

time and then stopping the feeding imeans.

This, the court found, corresponds exactly

to the function of "fiber supply prepara-

tion means" recited in claim 18.

Schubert argues that the device is not

infringing because it would have to fail

each time in order to have an infringing

prefeed. Otherwise, it is argued, the

modified device merely operates under the

prior art.

We agree, however, with the district

court that claim 18 continues to read upon

the device. We find no error and affirm

the district court's order of January 2,

1986, directing that Schubert cease

32a

manufacture, sale or use of the redesigned

Spincomat.

C. The Direct Court's Award of In-

creased Damages And Attorneys'

Fees Based On A Finding Of Will-

ful And Deliberate Infringement

And Exceptional Circumstances

The district court found infringement

of the '946 patent by the original

Spincomat to be willful and deliberate

based upon two determinations: (1) that

Schubert fully appreciated the great com-

mercial significance of Suessen's apparatus

and Schubert spent six or more years trying

to engineer its own version, and (2) that

Schubert fully appreciated the significance

of the technological aspects of the im-

provement over the prior art represented by

the '946 patent and its key role in the

commercial success of the device. Based on

33a

the finding of willfulness the court im-

posed an award of increased damages under

35 U.S.C. § 284 as to '946 patent infringe-

ment portion of the case. Upon those same

determinations the court adjudged this as

an exceptional case of infringement and

awarded attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C.

§ 285 for the portion of the case related

to infringement of the '946 patent.

The underlying facts are undisputed.

The question before us is whether the

ultimate finding of willful infringement is

clearly erroneous in light of those under-

lying facts and whether the award of in-

creased damages and attorneys' fees was an

abuse of discretion by the district

court. Kloster Speedsteel, AB v. Crucible,

Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580-81, 230 USPQ 81,

91 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 882, 93 L.Ed.2d 836

(1987); Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp. v.

34a

ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582-83, 226 USPQ

821, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Schubert argues clear error in the

trial court's findings of willful infringe-

ment and exceptional circumstances, con-

tending that reasonable reliance upon the

advice of their German in-house counsel,

that bona fide attempts to design around

the patent and the seeking of a license

Support a conclusion of non-willful in-

fringement.

A district court's finding of willful

infringement is a finding of fact, review-

able under the clearly erroneous stan-

dard. CPG Products Corp. v. Pegasus

Luggage Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1015, 227 USPQ

497, 502 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As noted

earlier, the clearly erroneous standard is

satisfied if we are left with the firm con-

viction that mistake has been committed.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

at 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504. When increased

damages are awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 284,

the measure of those damages is committed

to the [829 F.2d 1084] district court's

discretion, the exercise of which will not

be overturned absent a clear showing of

abuse. CPG Products, 776 F.2d at 1015 n.

6, 227 USPQ at 502 n. 6.

It is well settled that a potential in-

fringer having actual notice of another's

patent rights has an affirmative duty of

due care. That affirmative duty will

normally entail the obtaining of competent

legal advice before engaging in any poten-

tially infringing activity or continuing

such activity. ~In Underwater Devices, Inc.

v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d

1380, 1389-90, 219 USPQ 569, 576 (emphasis

in original), this court stated:

Where, as here, a potential infringer

has actual notice of another's patent

rights, he has an affirmative duty to

36a

exercise due care to determine whether

Or not he is infringing. * * * Such an

affirmative duty includes, inter alia,

the duty to seek and obtain competent

legal advice from counsel before the

initiation of any possible infringing

activity.

Schubert did not obtain the advice of

the United States counsel regarding the

possibility of infringement of the ‘946

patent, but proceeded upon the opinion of

German in-house patent counsel that making,

using and selling in the United States the

Spincomat piecing mechanism would be legi-

timate under the '011 patent license.

37a

However, reliance on the advice of counsel

is not determinative in this case.

An appreciation of the technological

and commercial significance of Suessen's

rights, despite legitimate practice under

‘01l patent, put Schubert on notice to

exercise due care prior to initiating any

13. Furthermore in respect of willfulness,

there cannot be hard and fast per se

rules. Rolls Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron

Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109, 231 USPQ

185, 191 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Though it

is an important consideration, not

every failure to seek an opinion of

competent counsel will mandate an

ultimate finding of willfulness.

Kloster Speedsteel, AB v. Crucible,

Inc., 793 F.2d at 1579, 230 USPQ at

88. See also King Instrument Corp. v.

Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867, 226

USPQ 402, 412, (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, U.S.__, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89

L.Ed.2d 312 (1986). Conversely, that

an opinion of counsel was obtained does

not "always and alone" dictate a find-

ing that the infringement was not will-

ful. Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies

and Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656,

225 USPQ 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 230, 88

L.Ed.2d 229 (1985).

(N. 13 at 819 F.2d 1084]

38a

activity which had the possibility of

infringing. Before obtaining the license

under the '01l patent, Schubert attempted

unsuccessfully to obtain a license to the

‘946 patent from Suessen. Suessen's denial

of a license to Schubert supports a con-

clusion that Schubert was explicitly aware

of the possibility of infringement. Under

those circumstances, Schubert must be held

to a high degree of caution to avoid the

possibility of infringement of the '946

patent. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at

1389-90, 219 USPQ at 576.

We have noted a good faith effort to

"design around" as indicating support for a

non-willful finding. Rolls Royce Ltd. v.

GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d at 1109, 231

USPQ at 191. We have also indicated value

in encouraging such efforts. State

Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751

F.2d 1226, 1236, 224 USPQ 418, 424 (Fed.

39a

Cir. 1985). The district court did not,

however, find that Schubert had exerted

good faith efforts to design around the

'946 patent. Rather, it was found that

Schubert, unable to design its own auto-

matic piecing device, knowingly proceeded

to employ technology protected under the

'946 patent. e

The willful and deliberate nature of

Schubert's infringement is not diminished

by its asserted defense of implied

license. The facts related to that asser-

tion arose in the 1984 assignment of the

'01l1 patent to Suessen, long after Schubert

willfully initiated the acts of infringe-

ment. Accordingly, the district court

properly omitted license as negating a

finding of willfulness.

Having considered the Findings of the

district court and all of the arguments

presented on appeal, we find no clear error

40a

in the district court's determination that

infringement of the '946 patent was willful

and deliberate. Nor do we find the imposi-

tion of increased damages under 35 U.S.C.

§ 284 or the award of attorney fees under

35 U.S.C. § 285 abusive of the district

{829 F.2d 1085] court's discretion. Where

a finding of willful and deliberate

infringement and a collateral finding of

exceptional circumstances are premised on

the same basis, this court has found no

abuse of discretion in awarding both

increased damages and attorney fees. S.C.

Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,

Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201, 228 USPQ 367, 368

(Fed. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, we affirm

the district court's awards.

4la

II. Infringement Of The '370 Patent

The ‘370 patent, entitled "Piecing

Apparatus For An Open-End Spinning

Machine," issued on November 27, 1979 in

the name of Fritz Stahlecker and was

assigned to Hans and Fritz Stahlecker. It

was licensed to Suessen. The invention

disclosed in the '370 patent is directed to

the solution of a specific problem encoun-

tered during the automatic piecing cycle:

the maintenance of tension in the yarn

drawn off from the rotor during the piecing

operation. The '370 patent discloses an

apparatus with means of maintaining control

while winding the yarn so that loops or

Slippage do not occur. The apparatus pre-

vents slippage between the yarn winding

package and the drive roll used to accel-

erate the yarn through a means of path

control. A yarn path deflector is also

42a

employed to deflect any slack which may

occur in the yearn.

The claim recitation of an "auxiliary

driven feed means" element is the focus of

this appeal:

auxiliary yarn guide means for guiding

the yarn between the spool and a

yarn outlet of a spinning rotor of

the spinning assembly during piecing

operations, said auxiliary yarn

guide means including auxiliary

driven feed means for said yarn.

A finding of literal infringement of a

claim expressed in terms of a series of

means for performing particular functions

required involves interpreting the claim to

define the recited function. If, as a

threshold matter, the recited functions are

not performed by the accused device, there

can be no literal infringement. On the

other hand, if an accused device is found

to perform the recited functions, one must

determine under § 112 para. 6 whether the

means by which the accused device performs

43a

> A ee a

each function is the same as on equivalent

to the means disclosed in the specification

for performing each function. See Data

Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813

ee Oe ee ee

F.2d 1196, 1201, 1 USPQ 2d 2042, 2055 (Fed.

a ae

Cir. 1987). As held in D.M.I. v. Deere & /

/

Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 USPQ 236, 239

(Fed. Cir. 1985):

In applying the “means plus function"

paragraph of § 112, however, the sole

question is whether the single means in

the accused device which performs the

function stated in the claim is the

Same as Or an equivalent of the corres-

ponding structure described in the

patentee's specification as performing '

that function.

In holding that the Spincomat literally

infringes the claims?4 of the '370 patent

the district court found under § 112, para.

6, that it included an auxiliary driven

14. Schubert is accused of infringing

Claims 1-7, 9-13, and 17-20 of the '370

patent, each requiring an “auxiliary

driven feed means."

[N. 14 at 829 F.2d 1085]

44a

feed “means,” to perform the function of

guiding and drawing off the yarn. It was

determined that the Spincomat's fixed and

movable pressure rolls are the means which

perform the precise function of feeding

yarn by an auxiliary drive.

The Spincomat's rolls were determined

to be equivalent to the “auxiliary driven

feed means” disclosed in the specifica-

tion. In one sense the Spincomat rolls are

not auxiliary, they are located on the

spinning machine. During spinning, the

rolls guide yarn between the rotor and the

spool. But during a piecing operation,

those rolls are “borrowed" as auxiliary

rolls to perform exactly the recited

function of drawing the yarn out of the

withdrawal tube, feeding it into the yarn

package, and guiding the yarn between the

spool and the yarn outlet. It was

determined that the borrowed rolls in their

45a

auxiliary mode are a structural means

equivalent to that disclosed in the

{829 F.2d 1986] specification. See D.M.I.

v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d at 1575, 229 USPQ

at 239.

Having reviewed the arguments raised on

appeal, we find no clear error by the

district court and affirm the finding of

literal infringement of the '370 patent.

Conclusion

We affirm the decision of the district

court finding infringement by the original

Spincomat of the '946 and '370 patents and

finding infringement of the '946 patent by

the modified Spincomat. The awards of

increased damages and attorney fees based

on findings of willful infringement and

exceptional circumstances are sustained.

AFFIRMED.

uN

APPENDIX

Item 2

Trial Court Opinion {September 4,

1985, not reported), including

Orders of:

September 4,

September 30,

October 23,

December 30,

1985

1985

1985

1985

-

wat eee oe

46a

APPENDIX, ITEM 2.0

(sr. Court enon)

September 4, 1985 _ )

[The District Court's Opinion is

hereinafter called "D.S.C."]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

GREENVILLE DIVISION

SPINDELFABRIK SUESSEN

-~SCHURR, STAHLECKER &

GRILL GmbH., HANS

STAHLECKER, and FRITZ

STAHLECKER,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action

No. 83-2421-3

Vv.

SCHUBERT & SALZER

MASCHINENFABRIK

AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, and

SCHUBERT & SALZER

MACHINE WORKS, INC.,

me ee ee eee ee ee eee

/

Defendants.

foes. 1)

ORDER AND OPINION, INCLUDING

FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Nature of the Action

This is an action for patent infringe-

ment. Both subject matter and in personam

jurisdiction are admitted [Defendants'

amended Answer and Counterclaim]. Trial on

47a

all liability sues commenced on February

18, 1985, and was completed on February 23,

1985. All damage issues have been deferred

pending resolution of the liability

issues.

B. The Parties

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs, Hans Stahlecker and Fritz

Stahlecker, brothers, are citizens of West

Germany and joint owners of the two patents

in suit [PX 350, PX 351]. Plaintiff

Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker &

Grill GmbH. ("Suessen") is a West [D.S.C.

2] German corporation, located in Suessen,

West Germany. Suessen is a licensee of the

patents in suit.

Hans Stahlecker is the chief executive

officer of Suessen. Fritz Stahlecker is

the chief executive officer of another

closely related German company, Wilhelm

PO oe hse I

48a

Stahlecker GmbH ("WST") (not a party to

this litigation), which conducts research,

development and engineering in the field of

open-end spinning for Suessen under a con-

tractual arrangement.

Suessen is in the business of manufac-

turing textile machinery and components

therefor. One of its principal products is

spin boxes for open-end spinning

machines. Suessen's spin boxes are cur-

rently incorporated in the Schlafhorst

Autocoro open-end spinning machine. It is

manufactured by W. Schlafhorst & Co. of

Moenchengladbach, West Germany, a customer

of Suessen and a sublicensee of Suessen

under certain patent rights, including the

patents in suit [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:35-38,

43].

49a

Defendants

Defendant Schubert & Salzer

Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft

(sometimes referred to as "SSI" or

"Ingolstadt") is a West German corporation

located in Ingolstadt, West Germany. It is

in the business of manufacturing and sell-

ing throughout the world textile machinery,

including OES machinery.

Defendant Schubert & Salzer Machine

Works, Inc. is the United States Saies and

Service subsidiary of Schubert & Salzer

(Germany). [D.S.C. 3]

Schubert & Salzer (Germany)

manufactures a broad line of textile

machinery, and, like Suessen, became

involved in the OES field in the early

1960's. It has basically offered two

models of OES machines in the United

States--the RK 10, now obsolete, and the RU

11, which is now offered equipped with the

50a

accused infringing "Spincomat" automatic

piecing device.

The fact of such sales of accused

devices by the defendants in the United

States is admitted by defendants and

therefore not in issue. The quantity of ~

such sales in the United States is not now

relevant, since the issue of damages has

been deferred pending determination of the

liability issues.

C. The Patents in Suit

The '946 Patent

Plaintiffs' United States Letters

Patent No. 4,059,946 ('946) [PX 202] is

entitled "Method and Apparatus for Start-

Spinning a Thread on Open-End Spinning

Units." The patent issued on November 29,

1977, on an apolication, Serial No.

637,050, filed in the United States on

December 2, 1975, in the names of Dieter

5la

Boettcher, Heinz Schultz and plaintiff,

Fritz Stahlecker, all citizens of West

Germany.

On December 2, 1975, pursuant to 35

U.S.C. § 119, the applicants for the '946

patent claimed in connection with their

application the right of priority of West

German patent application, Serial No.

2458042, filed in West Germany on December

7, 1974 [PX 203], and simultaneously there-

with, filed in the [D.S.C. 4] United States

Patent and Trademark Office a certified

copy of the original West German applica-

tion, specification and drawings showing

that the application was duly filed in the

West German Patent Office on December 7,

1974 [DX 2A].

The '946 patent application is a

literal English language translation of

West German Application No. 2458042, the

only difference being a rearrangement in

52a

the form in which the respective texts are

presented [Dauster Tr. 6:18-20]. Accord-

ingly, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 119, the

'946 application is properly considered as

having a U.S. filing date of December 7,

1974 [35 U.S.C. § 119; Witherspoon??-tr.

6:38-39].

The '370 Patent

Plaintiffs' United States Letters

Patent No. 4,175,370 ('370) [PX 213] is

entitled "Piecing Apparatus for an Open-End

Spinning Machine." The patent issued on

November 27, 1979, on an application,

Serial No. 912,418, filed in the United

States on June 5, 1978 in the name of

plaintiff, Fritz Stahlecker.

15. [See Curriculum vitae PX 341].

([N. 15 at D.S.C. 4]

53a

On June 5, 1978, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.

§ 119, the applicant for the '370 patent

claimed in connection with his application

the right of priority of West German patent

application No. 2728003, filed in West

Germany on June 22, 1977 [PX 214], and

Simultaneously therewith filed in the

United States Patent and Trademark Office a

copy of the original West German applica-

tion, specification and drawing with an

appropriate [D.S.C. 5] certification by the

West German Patent Office showing that West

German application No. 2728003 was filed on

June 22, 1977 [PX 213].

Whether the '370 patent is to be

accorded its U.S. filing date, June 5,

1978, or whether it is to be accorded the

benefit of the earlier filing date of

German application No. 2728003 is not in

issue and makes no difference for purposes

of these proceedings.

54a

II. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTIONS

OF THE PATENTS IN SUIT

A. Suessen's Involvement in Open-End

Spinning Machinery and its Role in

Automation thereof

Open-end spinning ("OES") is a rela-

tively new technology which has come into

increasing interest and subsequent use in

the textile industry since the early

1960's. Suessen, which for some time prior

to the 1960's was involved in manufacturing

components for ring spinning machinery,

followed the new trend on OES very early,

and in 1962 began (through WST) its own

development of OES components. Following

this, Suessen began making OES bearing

assemblies and rotors, and later the entire

OES spin box, for sale to manufacturers of

55a

OES machines?® [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:39-

41]. Since their entry into the OES field,

Suessen/WST have made many significant

developments in this technology resulting |

in the granting of hundreds of [D.S.C. 6]

patents worldwide, of which about 70 are

U.S. patents [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:43; F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:97-99; PX 372]. The

ability to consistently achieve a quality

piecing point was among their most signi-

ficant achievements [F. Stahlecker Tr.

1:122].

As early as 1972, Fritz Stahlecker and

others at Suessen/WST foresaw the commer-

cial potential of automated OES. However,

these views were not necessarily shared by

16. Among the spin boxes which Suessen

developed is the spin box for

defendants’ RU 11l- machine [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:40].

17. [Omitted in original Opinion. ]

{(N. 16 at D.S.C. 5]

56a

the OES machine manufacturers?® at that

time. In 1975 Suessen introduced to the

trade at the Milan ITMA textile machinery

trade show its new WST designed

Spincat/Cleancat automation for OES

machines. This automation system basically

involved twin traveling units designed to

travel along an OES machine in tandem and

automatically clean rotors and piece up

broken yarn ends at the numerous spinning

stations, as required.

The reception given by the industry to

Suessen's introduction of its Spincat/

Cleancat OES automation was overwhelmingly

positive [PX 8, PX 10]. Thereafter, in the

late 1970's this technology and Suessen's

underlying patents were licensed to W.

18. Notably, defendant Schubert & Salzer

who expressed extreme skepticism [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:47].

[N. 18 at D.S.C. 6]

57a

Schlafhorst & Co. of Monchengladbach, West

Germany, who began incorporating the

Spincat/Cleancat technology in its

"Autocoro" OES machine [H. Stahlecker Tr.

1:44-47; F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:101-102].

[6.8.¢.. 7}

B. The Invention of the '946 Patent

and its Role in OES automation

Prior to the '946 patent, piecing?!?

made on OES machines by operators, or by

earlier unsuccessful automatic piecers,

suffered from a common problem--namely, the

resultant yarn piecing points were incon-

sistent in size and strength and, as such,

represented a yarn defect which typically

had to be subsequently cut out of the yarn

19. "Piecing" or "piecing point" is a term

used to refer to a location in a length

of yarn where the yarn has been

rejoined after a break.

[w. 19 & 20 at D.S.C. 7]

58a

and replaced with a knot [Lord?9 tr. 2:7-

8]. The invention of the '946 patent has

for its object the provision of a method

and apparatus for providing precise control

of the fiber feed during the restart of the

spinning operation so that the quantity of

fibers fed during the restarting (piecing)

operation can be controlled to thereby

obtain uniform, quality yarn piecing

points--that is, piecing points which

closely match the appearance and strength

of the yarn itself, and which can be re-

peated from piecing point to piecing point

on the same spinning unit and between dif-

ferent spinning units.

In order to better understand the con-

tribution to the art of the invention of

the '946 patent, it is necessary to have

20. [See Lord Curriculum vitae PX 342].

‘8. 20 at D.8.6C. Ti}

59a

basic knowledge of the principles of open-

end spinning. The OES process basically

involves the production of a twisted yarn

directly from sliver (a relatively large,

rope-like strand of fibers). [D.S.C. 8]

The principal elements of the spinning

system of an OES machine are shown schema-

tically in Figure 1:

nae:

CO RSNA LT BE ORCL Bae

60a

3IA1HG T10Y YIsWOI

31isvM OL HSVul

yndu| Zz ‘|

= “ -\

lI) AAS NN IS IAAL

jan. aaa4 uaaia * Wi pS”

{\ 14 30108

4 —<, J

miwmwaAwm ee: YOLOY ININNIdS

JapUIA 0} UIE)

FIGURE 1

6la

Referring to Figure l, sliver is drawn

into the system by means of a feed roll

which, in turn, feeds the sliver to a

comber roll. This comber roll, which is

provided with teeth and adapted to rotate

at high speeds, continuously combs indivi-

dual fibers from the continuously fed

sliver and directs these fibers through a

feed tube into a cup-shaped rotor provided

with an interior annular groove. The rotor

is adapted to rotate at very high speeds

with the result that individual fibers fed

through the feed tube to the interior of

the rotor are directed by centrifugal force

into the rotor [D.S.C. 9] groove where they

form a ring of fibers. During spinning,

twist is continuously inserted into this

ring of fibers which is pulled out of the

rotor groove in the form of twisted yarn,

while at the same time, the incomplete ring

™ eto) OOS OT,

tela

62a ~

is continuously replenished with new fibers

from the feed tube [PX 334, PX 334A].

In order to start this continuous spin-

ning operation, a length of twisted yarn is

inserted down into the yarn withdrawal tube

and into contact with the fiber ring where |

it attaches itself to a point on the fiber

ring and begins to insert twist into the

fiber ring at that point. Upon attachment

(piecing), the inserted twisted yarn end is

then pulled out of the yarn withdrawal

tube, bringing the newly formed twisted

yarn with it, and spinning is restarted.

The area where the yarn end is joined with

the fiber ring is known as the "piecing

point" [PX 334, PX 334A].

The quantity of fibers in the fiber

ring, and thus the size of the fiber ring,

will have a direct influence on the nature

of the "piecing point." If the ring of

fibers is oversized in comparison to its

63a

desired size (which should match the yarn

count) during spinning of the particular

yarn being produced, then the piecing point

will manifest itself as an undesirable

thick place in the yarn. On the other

hand, if the ring of fibers is undersized,

then the piecing point will manifest itself

as a weak, undesirable thin spot in the i

yarn [PX 334, PX 334A; Lord Tr. 2:16,

27). :

In the usual OES system, when a yarn

breaks, yarn break detection means are

provided to immediately stop the [D.S.C.

10] sliver feed roll at that spinning

station, and thus stop the sliver feed.

This is imperative, since otherwise, fibers

would continue to feed into the rotor with-

out being removed in the form of yarn, with

the result that the system would be choked

with fibers being fed into the rotor but

not being removed as yarn. Additionally,

64a

even though the sliver feed is stopped at a

yarn break, the combing roll (for engineer-

ing reasons) continues to rotate. As a re-

sult of these two conditions, the lead end

of the sliver fed into the system at the

moment the sliver feed stops continues to

be combed by the comber roll. This lead

end of the sliver is called the "fiber

beard" or “tuft." The longer the station-

ary fiber beard or tuft is subjected to the

combing action of the continuously rotating

combing roll, the thinner the beard or tuft

will become [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:110, 116-

117; Lord Tr. 2:30].

When a yarn breaks, there is neces-

Sarily a lapse of time between the moment

of the break and the moment at which an

operator or an automatic piecer learns of

the break and begins addressing the problem

of restarting spinning by piecing up. And

this lapse of time necessarily varies

65a

depending upon the whereabouts of the

operator or automatic piecer at the moment

of the break, how long it takes to

recognize the existence of the break,

etc. Thus, because of this unknown time

variable, when the piecing sequence is

begun, the nature of the fiber beard or

tuft is unknown vis-a-vis the amount of

fibers remaining therein versus the amount

i

of [D.S.C. 11] fibers which have been

already combed out by the continuously

operating combing roll after the sliver

feed was stopped. As a result, prior to

the invention of the '946 patent, the

piecing sequence was started each time with |

an unknown, but more importantly, in-

consistent quantity of fibers available to

be fed into the rotor and form the ring of

fibers to be incorporated into the piecing

point. Additionally, as OES machine speeds

have increased in the refinement of the OES

Bie sc. tectum

66a

technology, the coordination of all of the

steps necessary to carry out piecing has

become more and more critical [Lord Tr.

2:7-17; £. Stahlecker Tr. 1:110-112, 117-_

119; PX 300, PX 334, PX 334A, PX 360, PX

361, PX 362, PX 365A, PX 366A, PX 373, PX

375-1 through 375-5].

Recognizing the foregoing problems,

Fritz Stahlecker came to the realization

that in order to get consistency in piecing

points from piecing to piecing at the same

spinning station, and further, consistency

from spinning station to spinning station,

something should be done to gain control

over the quantity of fibers in the fiber

ring at the moment the piecing point is

formed. To this end, stated simply, he

conceived that this could be achieved in

the piecing sequence by first forming a

totally new fiber beard, while eliminating

the old, unknown fiber beard from the

67a

system, and thereafter in a set, known time

period, introducing the yarn end into con-

tact with the fiber ring, which ring would

now have the same quantity of fibers pro-

vided to it from the new, known fiber beard

(D.S.C. 12] every time the piecing sequence

was performed [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:104-110,

114-116; Lord Tr. 2:16,27].

Having realized that this uniformity of

the fiber beard was obtainable with proper

timing during the piecing sequence, it then

became apparent to Fritz Stahlecker and his

WST co~inventors of the '946 patent,

Boettcher and Schulz, that such a properly

timed piecing sequence was readily achiev-

able with an apparatus or automatic piecer

which could (1) always perform the sequence

in the same manner within a consistent,

known time period, and (2) perform the

necessary steps in the coordinated manner

required by higher spinning speeds. Thus,

68a

the Stahlecker et al. concept of achieving

uniform piecings became merged with the

concept of automation, with the result that

the inventors came up with the first tech-

nique of producing consistent piecing

points of acceptable quality in OES

machines, which technique at the same time

readily lent itself to being performed by

an apparatus for automatically accomplish-

ing the technique, even on high speed OES

machines [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:119-120, Lord

Tr. 2:30].

Stated otherwise, the real contribution

of the invention of the '946 patent is not

that it just provides highly successful

automation to the OES piecing process.

Rather, it provides previously unobtainable

consistently uniform, quality piecing

points, which just happened to be achiev-

able with automation of the piecing

69a

sequence [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:104-126;

PX 363, 373, 375]. [D.S.C. 13]

Thus, with the advent of the '946

invention and its resultant uniform,

quality piecing points, the previously

required operation of replacing the random

size, unacceptable piecing point with a

knot was totally eliminated. Moreover, of

course, the knot itself was eliminated,

thereby upgrading the yarn quality

considerably. This was the breakthrough

which led to commercially successful

automation of OES spinning machines [Lord

Tr. 2:15-17; F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:122-125;

PX 363].

The '946 invention was unveiled to the

public in 1975 with the introduction by

ee ee ey ee

Suessen at the ITMA Show in Milan of its “a

"Spincat" and "Cleancat" automated piecing

and rotor cleaning device. From this point

forward, automation of OES machines was

70a

transformed from its pre-Spincat gadget

status to its post-Spincat status as a

commercial necessary for most modern state

of the art high speed OES machines [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:44-45; Lord Tr. 2:15-

19].

With this successful automation, OES

machine users no longer needed to be con-

cerned about the occurrence of uncontrolled

thick or thin spots in the yarn, with the

result that the necessity for running the

yarn through another process to eliminate

or clear such defects and replace them with

knots was totally eliminated. Moreover,

the occurrence of the knot itself was

eliminated [Lord Tr. 2:15-16].

The elimination of the additional step

of clearing piecing points from OES yarns,

while additionally providing knot-free

yarns, has had a substantial economic

impact in the [D.S.C. 14] U.S. in respect

7la

to the OES yarn market. With this

automation, users of OES machines are now

able to compete effectively in the spun

yarn marketplace with a broader range of

yarns. For example, whereas the user of

nonautomated OES machines is able to

compete effectively in he spun yarn market

in yarns ranging in size from English

cotton count 20s and largers, the user of

automated OES machines can now compete

effectively in yarns ranging in size from

English cotton count 30s and larger. This

represents an estimated additional U.S.

market available to OES machine users of

about $300,000,000 [Lord Tr. 2:17-19; PX

332].

The actual commercial impact to date of

the invention has been dynamic. All

Schalfhorst Autocoro machines are now auto-

mated to produce uniform, quality piecing

points made possible through the use (under

72a

license from plaintiffs) of the invention

of the '946 patent [Strunk Dep. Tr. 10, 13,

17-20; F. stanlesen Tr. 1:158-9; PX

379]. Since 1978, Schlafhorst has sold, or

has on order currently, in the United

States alone about 850 of these automated

machines, representing 163,200 spinning

positions, and is considered the leader,

worldwide, in the field of open-end spin-

ning machinery [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:43;

Jones Dep. Tr. 7-8].

C. The Invention of the '370 Patent

and its Role in OES Automation

The invention of the '370 patent is

directed to the solution of a specific

problem encountered during the automatic

iD.S.C. 15] piecing cycle. More specifi-

cally, the basic form of automatic piecing

apparatus invented and designed by WST for

Suessen takes the general form of a piecing

73a

carriage designed to travel along an OES

machine and automatically piece up broken

yarn ends as required. This traveling unit

is basically equipped with means separate

from the spinning machine itself for

temporarily driving the yarn package and

handling, guiding and feeding the yarn

during the piecing operation--that is,

handling, guiding and feeding the broken

yarn end on the package, which has to be

inserted back into the rotor to be pieced

up with the fiber ring, as well as handl-

ing, guiding and feeding the newly pieced

up yarn which has to be fed back to the

winding package immediately after piec-

ing. As soon as the yarn is connected by

piecing, the relatively small diameter

draw-off rollers begin pulling the yarn out

of the spin box at normal spinning speed,

while at the same time it is necessary to

start driving the yarn take-up package to

74a

wind up the yarn being fed by the draw-off

rollers from the spin box. Since the face

driven yarn package is of relatively larger

diameter than the draw-off rolls, it does

not accelerate as fast as the draw-off

rolls with the result that a large loop

tends to form in the yarn in its path of

travel between the draw-off rolls and the

take-up package. The loop can lead to pro-

blems in that the slack yarn loop, because

the yarn is highly twisted, is difficult to

control and will form into curls or kinks

which will be carried into the winding

[D.S.C. 16] package [F. Stahlecker Tr.

1:144-145; PX 377-1].

To solve the foregoing problem, Fritz

Stahlecker came up with the invention of

the '370 patent. In its broadest terms,

this solution involved adding to the piec-

ing unit some control means for controlling

the course of yarn during this acceleration

75a

phase in such a way as to reduce the ten-

dency of the yarn to form a loop while at

the same time applying a soft tension to

the yarn to prevent the undesirable kinks

from forming in whatever loop may never-

theless be formed. Stahlecker's control

means specifically took the form of yarn

path control at two points--first, a means

to prevent slippage between the yarn wind-

ing package and the face drive roll being

employed to drive (and accelerate) the

package. This aided in the acceleration of

the yarn winding package more quickly to

thereby reduce the tendency of the yarn to

form the uncontrolled slack loop in the

first instance. Second, a yarn path de-

flector in the form of a lever or suction

tube was provided to apply a soft tension

to the yarn in the area where any small un-

controlled slack loop might nevertheless

tend to form in cases where the first means

_. eeentaameal

76a

did not totally eliminate the problem [F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:145-149; PX 377-2, PX 377-

oe

While the invention of the '370 patent

may not, relatively speaking, rise to the

same breakthrough, high level of contribu-

tion to the OES automation art attributable

to the invention of the '946 patent, it

does represent a significant contribution

to the art of automated OES machines in

that it [D.S.C. 17] eliminates a specific

problem which can cause defective yarn

packages.

The invention of the '370 patent is

currently in use by Suessen's licensee,

Schlafhorst, on its highly successful

"Autocoro" automated OES machines [F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:150-153; PX 378].

III. THE DEFENDAN’S' RELEVANT ACTIVITIES

As early as 1974, Fritz Stahlecker

brought up in discussions with Schubert &

Salzer (Germany) (then one of Suessen's OES

spin box customers) the concept of automa-

tion of the piecing operation and demon-

strated the prototype Spincat and Cleancat

to them. At that time, Schubert & Salzer

expressed skepticism about the concept and

its likelihood of acceptance by the textile

industry [H. Stahlecker 1:40, 46-47; F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:149].

Upon Suessen's introduction of its

Spincat/Cleancat automation at the 1975

Milan trade show, and its attendant wide-

spread demonstrated enthusiasm [PX 8, PX

10], Schubert & Salzer immediately recog-

nized that they were now "in a very dif-

ficult position" and had to resolve that

"precarious situation" as fast as possible

[PX 4]. Within one week of the

78a

Spincat/Cleancat introduction, a multi-

person "task force" was commissioned by

defendants on a "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL"

basis to try to develop a Schubert & Salzer

version of an automatic yarn piecing

apparatus [PX 4, PX 5; Canzler Tr.

5:241]. This "task force" operated under

the personal and direct control (D.S.C. 18]

of defendants' Director of Engineering [PX

4]. The "task force" was charged with pro-

viding an expedited solution in six months,

due to the immediate urgency of the situa-

tion, and because they (Schubert & Salzer

were "continuously behind Suessen" [PX 4,

PX 5]. This six-month period came and

passed with no positive results [PX 8, PX

10, PX 13).

Nevertheless, Schubert & Salzer con-

tinued to recognize the critical need for

automation as reflected in its management's

May 1976 memorandum:

I find it absolutely necessary to

use all necessary means for the solu-

tion of the problem [automation] even

though this calls for a delay of other

tasks. [PX 8].

Schubert & Salzer's efforts to provide

automated OES thereafter continued on into

1978 and 1979, during which time they

finally recognized and resigned themselves

to the necessity for (1) removing fibers

fed to the rotor after the sliver feed was

) stopped for a yarn break, (2) accurately

adjusting the sliver feed, and (3) con-

trolling the amount of fibers to be con-

tained in the rotor groove for piecing [PX

105]. Still, no Schubert & Salzer design

for automation was forthcoming.

Unable to solve the problem with its

own expertise, Schubert & Salzer next

turned to outside help and established a

joint venture with the ITR Research

Institute at Reutlingen, Germany, to aid in

developing a piecing apparatus that was

—

lll i re tan A ab as St 0 Me meas one

80a

competitive with the apparatus embodying

Suessen's patented [D.S.C. 19] inventions

[PX 60, PX 63; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 74-75].

Despite even further work, including

Studies of the timing of the sliver pre-

feed, the result of continued combing of

the fiber beard by the opener roll, the

relationship between the amount of fibers

in the rotor and the piecing point formed

therewith [PX 107, PX 108], as well as an

investigation of results being obtained by

Schlafhorst using Suessen's technology [PX

61], defendants were still unable to obtain

quality piecing points.

By April, 1982, Schubert & Salzer had

finally worked out a design for an auto-

matic piecer and had realized the necessity

of incorporating a prefeed of the sliver

(time controlled fiber beard) as taught by

Suessen's '946 patent [PX 33; PX 56A at p.

4]. However, they also realized that the

prefeed concept for making a uniform fiber

beard was a novel and patentable concept

and could cause patent infringement

problems for them [PX 33).

Thus, around June, 1982, in connection

with some discussions relating to the

settlement of other disputes with Suessen,

Schubert & Salzer requested a license under

Suessen's time controlled fiber beard

patent rights which are the subject of the

'946 patent. Suessen refused this request

for a license [H. Stahklecker Tr. 1:47-51;

Canzler Tr. 5:249-250; PX 14, PX 15].

Three weeks after they were denied a

license under Suessen's patent, Schubert &

Salzer obtained a nonexclusive license from

Murata Machinery Ltd., a Japanese company,

under [D.S.C. 20] a group of patents known

as the Hirai patents [Canzler Tr. 5:250].

These Hirai patents and defendants’ act of

taking a license thereunder are the focus

ee ae)

a

82a

of several defenses raised by defendants

which will be dealt with hereinafter.

Apparently, defendants’ act of taking a

license under the Hirai patents was in some

way calculated to justify defendants’

appropriation of plaintiffs' patented time

controlled fiber beard technology. How-

ever, the taking of this license was done

with defendants' full appreciation of the

distinct possibility of plaintiffs'

Superior rights in the '946 technology [Px

33], and was nothing more than a pretext to

a scheme of defendants' willful and delib-

erate infringement of the '946 patent

([Canzler Tr. 5:249-255].

IV. THE HIRAI/MURATA EPISODE

As previously mentioned, in 1971,

Suessen entered into the business of

manufacturing spin boxes based on its WST

developed technology and selling these spin

83a

boxes to manufacturers of OES machinery.

In connection with this effort, in March of

1972, Hans Stahlecker met in Tokyo, Japan,

with representatives of Murata Machinery,

Ltd., a Japanese textile machinery manu-

facturer, and Toymomenka, a Japanese trad-

ing company employed by Suessen to market

Suessen products in Japan. At that time,

Murata was involved in the manufacture of

textile winding machines and was interested

in expanding into the OES machinery market

in which it had no experience [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:51-53]. [D.S.C. 21]

As a result of this 1972 Tokyo meeting,

Suessen and Murata entered into an agree-

ment whereby Murata agreed to pay Suessen

350,000 Deutsche Marks (about $110,000

U.S.) for Suessen's agreement to furnish

Murata with Suessen/WST knowhow and

technical information relating to OES which

would hopefully lead to the ultimate

a

ens Aenea eecsb hitch i ee

84a

development of a commercial Murata OES

machine incorporating Suessen spin boxes

[PX 222]. Thereafter, extensive meetings

were held in Germany and Japan later in

1972 and early 1973 for the purpose of

educating Murata in respect to the

Suessen/WST OE technology. Nothing

commercial came out of this Murata effort,

and around 1975 the OES project was dropped

by Murata. This, of course, terminated the

Murata-Suessen collaboration, and contact

between the two companies essentially

ceased [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:52-55; F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:127-134; Px 225].

In 1979, the previous Murata-Suessen

collaboration was brought into focus again

at Suessen, when it came to the Stahleckers

attention that, during the Suessen

collaboration period Murata had caused to

be filed certain patents throughout the

world in the name of one Hironori

85a

Hirai, a Mura employee. 7+ These patents t

dealt with technology derived ina major

way from Fritz Stahlecker during the 1

earlier Suessen collaboration period, and

thus caused Suessen a great deal of concern

[F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:126-134; 231193 PX

225]. ([D.S.C. 22] Although these patents

make no specific mention of a time con-

trolled fiber beard [Lauschke Tr. 5:4-6],

of concern to Suessen and of particular

relevance here, was Hirai's (Murata's)

claim of origination of the concept of

controlling the sliver feed elements to

create a new fiber beard of undamaged

Soe a pw a take lier ee Net Wa:

fibers during the piecing-up operation.

Apart from the surprisingly surreptitious 4

nature of the act, these Hirai (Murata)

21. Notably, Murata's interest in these

Hirai patents was not evidenced on the

face of the Hirai patents [e.g., PX

210, DX 11].

[N. 21 at D.S.C. 21]

i

3

a

86a

patents appeared to have claims of very

broad scope, and thus the potential of

creating, especially in Germany where

Suessen and its licensee Schlafhorst both

conducted their manufacturing, a cloud over

Suessen's ability to exploit and license

its own OES technology, particularly in

respect to OES Spincat automation [Lauschke

Tr. 5:6]. OES automation had been the

focus of substantial research and develop-

ment effort at WST since at least as early

as 1972, and formed the basis for Suessen's

Spincat/Cleancat product and widely

patented technology used by Suessen and

licensed to Suessen customers (H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:55-56].

Actually, Hirai's patent application

activity had been routinely noted by WST's

patent department as early as August, 1975,

when the publication of the yet to be ex-

amined Hirai German patent application was

87a

recorded in that department's routine

system for monitoring the publication and

issuance of applications and patents by

others in fields of interest to WST. [DX

32; Lauschke Tr. 4:240-247, 263-265, 5:4-

5]. Thereafter, in 1977, this Hirai German

application was noted by the German [D.S.C.

23] Patent Office as a possible prior right

in connection with the prosecution of the

Stahlecker et al. German application, which

forms the basis for the '946 U.S. Patent in

suit, and the decision was made at that

time by the WST patent department to defer

examination of the German Stahlecker appli-

cation until examination of the German

Hirai application was completed and the

claims finally agreed upon by the German

Patent Office. [DX 114, 114A; Lauschke Tr.

4:250-256]. However, it was not until

1979, after changes had been made in the

Hirai German application during its

ti eee ee

a

88a

prosecution, and the claims were finally

formulated, did it become apparent to WST's

patent department that Hirai (Murata) was

going to obtain claims in Germany of a

scope possibly broad enough to cover cer-

tain aspects of Suessen's OES automation

technology. [Lauschke Tr. 5:20-24]. At

this point, the Stahlecker brothers were

informed for the first time of Hirari's

activities and the concern posed by Hirai's

now examined German patent application

which was soon to come into effect as a

German patent. Only at this point did it

then come to light that Hirai (Murata) was

about to obtain patent protection on sub-

ject matter derived from Fritz Stahlecker

during the earlier Suessen-Murata col-

laboration period. [H. Stahlecker Tr.

1:55-56; 68-77; F. Stahlecker Tr. 2:123;

Lauschke Tr. 4:244-259, 5:4-8, 20-24}.

89a

Thus, on August 6, 1979, this concern

led Hans Stahlecker to send a telex [ PX

226, p.- 1] to Mr. Junichi Murata, Murata's

president, (1) complaining of these Murata

acts, (2) reminding Mr. Murata that the

subject matter of Hirai's noted [D.S.C. 24]

patents was essentially derived from

Suessen, and (3) politely requesting (or

demanding) that Mr. Murata assure Suessen

that Murata would not instigate any claims

under these Hirai patents against Suessen

or any Suessen customer [H. Stahlecker Tr.

1:55-56].

On August 8, 1979, Mr. Murata responded

[PX 26, p. 2] (1) with an acknowledgment of

his appreciation of the situation, (2) with

the statement, “Basically your views are

respected," and (3) with the suggestion

that practical details leading to a solu-

tion to the problem be worked out at the

soon to be held 1979 ITMA textile machinery

_ :

90a

show in Hannover, Germany. Following this,

Messrs. Murata and Hans Stahlecker did meet

in Hannover. As a result of this meeting,

Hans Stahlecker became satisfied that

Murata would never assert the Hirai patent

against Suessen or its customers [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:55-61].

Suessen thereafter laid to rest the

matter of Mur..ta's Surreptitiously obtained

Hirai patents until late 1983 when the mat-

ter once again surfaced as a result of a

ruling handed down by the German High

Court. More specifically, in 1983, Hans

Stahlecker was advised that the German

Court handed down a ruling, the effect of

which was that an existing nonexclusive

right under a German patent could be de-

feated by an assignment of the patent by

the owner to a third party. Thus, the

Hirai patents cloud once again appeared.

Murata now had no interest in the OES

9la

field, and if it chose to sell the Hirai

patents to a third party, the new owner

might choose to assert the patents with

their broad claims against [D.S.C. 25]

Suessen or its customers [H. Stahlecker Tr.

1:61].

As a result of the foregoing, Hans

Stahlecker and Junichi Murata met once

again, this time in the fall of 1983 at the

Milan, Italy ITMA machinery show. At this

point, Hans Stahlecker put this matter

completely to rest, once and for all time,

by negotiating the outright purchase from

Murata of the complete portfolio of Hirai

92a

patents [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:61-63].72 The

consideration for the purchase was the

return to Murata of the approximately

$100,000 which Murata had paid to Suessen

for its know-how back in 1972 [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:62]. The agreement [Px

227] was formalized in writing and executed

on February 17, 1984. The net effect of

Suessen's acquisition of these patents was

that the Hirai thorn in Suessen's side was

finally and completely removed [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:61; PX 227].

22. Japanese Patent No. 1 042 051, Swiss

Patent No. 601 512, German Patent

Application No. 25 05 943, French

Patent No. 75 04439, British Patent No.

1 486 161, Italian Patent No. 1 032 236

and U.S. Patent No. 4,022,011 [ PX

aa? fh

(N. 22 & 23 at D.S.C. 25]

93a

In late 1984, Suessen formally dis-

claimed the Hirai U.S. patent [PX 370).23

The reason for this disclaimer was quite

simply that Suessen had consistently taken

the position from the outset that Hirai

derived the invention which is the subject

of his patents from Fritz Stahlecker in the

Suessen/Murata contacts which took place in

late 1972 and 1973 [D.S.C. 26] (described

above), and Suessen was advised that a U.S.

patent based on an invention deried from

another is invalid as a matter of law.

(See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (102(£)74 [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:65].

23. Under 35 U.S.C. §253, a patent owner is

given the right to disclaim or dedicate

to the public the remaining term of a

patent owned by him.

(N. 23 at D.S.C. 25]

24. § 102. A person shall be entitled to a

patent unless-- *

* * *

(£) he did not himself invent the

subject matter sought to be

patented... .

(aadheet ad incite Bill

94a

([N. 24 at D.S.C. 26]

V. INFRINGEMENT

A patent may be infringed either

directly or under the judicially created

doctrine of equivalents. The test for

determining whether a patent is directly

infringed is set forth succinctly in Graver

Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products

Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950), reh'g.

denied, 340 U.S. 845 (1950).

In determining whether an accvsed

device or composition infringes a vaiid

patent, resort must be had in the first

instance to the words of the claim. If

accused matter falls clearly within the

claim, infringement is made out and

that is the end of it. [Emphasis

added].

The test is a simple one, and involves

merely "reading" the claim on an accused

device. It does not entail a comparison of

the drawings in a patent to the accused

device. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp.,

730 F.2d 1476, 1481-1482 (Fed. Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 306 (1984);

95a

Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil

Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709

(1984).

If the defendants escape direct or

literal infringement, the "Doctrine of

Equivalents" then becomes relevant.

([D.S.C. 27] The rationale behind the

doctrine of equivalents is set forth in the

Graver Tank opinion as follows:

But courts have also recognized

that to permit imitation of a patented

invention which does not copy every

literal detail would be to convert the

protection of the patent grant into a

hollow and useless thing. Such a limi-

tation would leave room for--indeed

encourage--the unscrupulous copyist to

make unimportant and insubstantial

changes and substitutions in the patent

which, though adding nothing, would be

enough to take the copied matter out-

side the claim, and hence outside the

reach of law. One who seeks to pirate

an invention, like one who seeks to

pirate a copyrighted book or play, may

be expected to introduce minor vari-

ations to conceal and shelter the

piracy. Outright and forthright dupli-

cation is a dull and very rare type of

infringement. To prohibit no other

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would place the inventor at the mercy

of verbalism and would be subordinating

substance to form. It would deprive

him-of the benefit of his invention and

would foster concealment rather than

disclosure of inventions, which is one

of the primary purposes of the patent

system.

339 U.S. at 607.

The test for determining infringement

under the doctrine involves a comparison of

the claims to the accused device, in view

of the apparatus as disclosed in the

patent. Thereafter, "if [the] two devices

do the same work in substantially the same

way, and accomplish substantially the same

result, they are the same, even though they

differ in name, form or shape." [Emphasis

added]. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v.

Linde Air Products Co., supra, 339 U.S. at

608; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,

717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Radio

Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 731

F.2d 840, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 105 S.Ct. 119 (1984). [D.S.C.

28] The doctrine of equivalents thus

avoids the conversion of the patent grant

into a “hollow and useless thing." 339

U.S. at 608.

The apparatus claims in both patents at

issue utilize "means plus function" lan-

guage. This type of claim is authorized by

paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 which

permits expressing an element as a "means"

for performing a specified function. The

statute further states that such a claim

"shall be construed to cover the

corresponding structure, material, or acts

described in the specification and

equivalents thereof." [35 U.S.C. § 112].

A. The ‘946 Patent

Plaintiffs charge defendants with

infringement of apparatus Claim 18 of the

98a

‘946 patent. This claim depends from Claim

17, and as such, reads as follows:

18. Apparatus according to claim 17,

(17. [a] Apparatus for thread piecing

in an open-end spinning assembly

comprising:

[b] opening means for opening sliver

being supplied to a spinning

rotor of said spinning assembly.

[c] feeding means for feeding sliver

to said fiber opening means,

[d] piecing means including means for

introducing a thread end back

into said spinning rotor to be

pieced together with a fiber

ring formed in said spinning

rotor,

[e] rotor control means for moving

said spinning rotor from a stop

condition toward an operating

Spinning speed to accommodate

piecing by said piecing means,

{D.S.C. 29]

(£] and fiber supply preparing means

for preparing said spinning

assembly for a piecing operation

prior to movement of said spin-

ning rotor from its stopped

position, said fiber supply

preparing means including means

for starting and operating said

feeding means for a period of

time and then stopping said

feeding means, said starting and

stopping being accompanied by a

continuously operating opening

means, whereby uniform fiber

tufts are arranged at said

sliver feeding means to accom-

modate said piecing operation to

be subsequently performed. ]

{g] further comprising means for

supplying a vacuum to said

spinning rotor to remove any

fiber supplied during said

preparation of said spinning

assembly by said preparing means

[PX 202].

The Court finds that Claim 18 reads

literally and directly on defendants’

Spincomat automatic piecer as employed on

defendants' RU 11 OES machine [PX 307,

PX 320, PX 321]. Considering each of the

claim elements [a]-[g]:

[a] The RU 11 is an open-end

spinning assembly, and together with

the Spincomat they piece thread

100a

[Bartlett?> Tr. 3:45; Px 27, PX 27A, PX

56, PX S6A).

(b] The RU 11 is equipped with an

opener roll at each spinning position

which functions to open the sliver

being supplied to the spinning rotor of

the spin box or spinning assembly

(PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56 , PX 56A, PX 301,

PX 302, PX 303; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 46;

Bartlett Tr. 3:45].

c| The RU 1l is equipped with a

S.iwer feed roll at each spinning

+ .om which functions to feed the

Siiver to the opener roll [PX 27,

PX 27A, PX [D.S.C. 30] 56 , PX 56A, PX

25. (See Bartlett Curriculum vitae Px 340].

'N. 25 at D.S.C. 29]

301, PX 302, PX 303; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr.

45; Bartlett Tr. 3:45].

(d] The Spincomat and the RU ll

are equipped with several elements

which function to introduce a thread

end back into the spinning rotor to be

pieced together with the fiber ring

formed in the rotor. These elements

include the feeding unit, package drive

roll, suction tube, centering worm,

thread guide or sickle, and dropping

worm on the Spincomat; and yarn outlet

tube and suction apparatus on the

RU ll. [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,

PX 308, PX 309, PX 310, PX 311; Request

For Admission 29 at Bartlett Tr. 3:41;

Bartlett Tr. 3:45-46].

(e] The RU 1l is equipped with a

rotor cleaning and braking lever

operable by the Spincomat during the

piecing operation to stop the rotor by

102a

disengaging it from a continuous drive

belt and to restart the rotor by re-

engaging it with the drive belt, which

moves it toward an operating spinning

speed to accommodate piecing [PX 27, PX

27A, PX 54, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 305, PX

306, PX 308 ; Request For Admission 31

at Bartlett Tr. 3:38; Parkhurst Tr.

59:128, Beuthien TGr. 4:179; Wulfhorst

Dep. Tr. 48-50; Bartlett Tr. 3:46].

(£] The RU 11 and Spincomat are

equipped with a "Program PC" electrical

control which, together with the sliver

feed roll and opener roll, prepare the

Spinning assembly for a piecing opera-

tion prior to [D.S.C. 31] movement of

the spinning rotor from its stopped

position [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,

PX 304, PX 306; Request for Admission

34 at Bartlett Tr. 3:22; Requests for

Admission 39 and 40 at Bartlett Tr.

103a

3:34; Request for Admission 42 at

Bartlett Tr. 3:35; Requests for Admis-

sion 46 and 47 at Bartlett Tr. 3:40;

Request for Admission 48 at Bartlett

Tr. 3:42; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 49-50;

Bartlett Tr. 3:46-47;|, The "Program

PC" starts and operates the sliver feed

roll for a period of time, and then

stops it, while the opener roll contin-

uously operates [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56,

PX 56A, PX 305, PX 306; Request for

Admission 25 at Bartlett Tr. 3:14;

Request for Admission 33 at Bartlett

Tr. 3:34; Request for Admission 34 at

Bartlett Tr. 3:22; Requests for

Admission 39, 40 and 41 at Bartlett Tr.

3:34; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 46, 57;

Bartlett Tr. 3:46-48]. The timewise

coordination of these elements arranges

uniform fiber tufts at the sliver feed

roll to accommodate the piecing

SUN RARE Da =

104a

operation to be subsequently performed

[Bartlett Tr. 3:46-48; PX 56A at

Section 2.7 (p. 4)].

{g] The RU 1l is equipped with a

vacuum suction channel that is con-

nected to the rotor spin box and sup-

plies a vacuum to the spinning rotor to

remove any fiber supplied during the

preparation of the spinning assembly by

the fiber supply preparing means

[PX 27, {9.8.C. 32] PX Z7A, PX 53 , PX

56, PX 56A, PX 310, PX 311, PX 400;

Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 48, 59; Bartlett Tr.

3:47-48; Request for Admission 42 at

Bartlett Tr. 3:35; Requests for

Admission 46 and 47 at Bartlett Tr.

3:40].

It is defendants' position that the

accused device does not infringe Claim 18

because it does not employ any “rotor

105a

control means" as called for by the

claim. More specifically, they contend

(Parkhurst Tr. 5:36-38] that in the '946

specification it is taught that piecing-up

occurs "on the rise"--that is, during

acceleration of the rotor from its stopped

condition, and before it reaches full

operating speed. Accordingly, they

contend, the "rotor control means" plus the

functional claim terminology must be

limited to a structure which is capable of

accomplishing piecing during acceleration

of the rotor, and which structure is not

present in the Spincomat device wherein

piecing occurs at a time after the rotor is

fully accelerated.

This position of noninfringement is not

sustainable for two independent reasons.

First, as already pointed out, the relevant

langauge of the claim, "rotor control

means, etc." requires only that the rotor

106a

drive stem move towards the operating

Spinning speed, not that it accelerate at a

reduced rate [Bartlett Tr. 3:49], and reads

directly on defendants' structure.

Specifically, the rotor brake controllable

by the Spincomat serves the function of

Stopping the rotor by [D.S.C. 33] moving it

out of engagement with a drive belt and

again starting the rotor by permitting it

to move back into engagement with the drive

belt whereby it accelerates to full operat-

ing speed in approximately 1.2 seconds [Px

305, PX 308; Request for Admission 31 at

Bartlett Tr. 3:38]. As such, defendants’

Structure is the full equivalent for pur-

poses of 35 U.S.C. § 112 of the "rotor con-

trol means" disclosed in the '946 specifi-

cation.

107a

It is well settled that "means plus

function" claim limitations are not to be

limited to particular means set forth ina

patent specification:

To interpret "means plus function"

limitations as limited to a particular

means set forth in the specification

would be to nullify the provision of

[35 U.S.C.] § 112 requiring that the

limitation shall be construed to cover

the structure described in the specifi-

cation and equivalents thereof.

Patentees are required to disclose in

the specification some enabling means

for accomplishing the function set

forth in the "means plus function"

limitation. At the same time, there is

and can be no requirement that appli-

cants describe or predict every pos-

sible means of accomplishing that

function. The statute, §-tit2-6, was

written precisely to avoid a holding

that a means-plus-function limitation

must be read as covering only the means

disclosed in the specification.

[Subject matter in brackets supplied].

D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570,

1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Accord: P.M.

Palumbo, et al v. Don-Joy Co., et al, 762

F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

108a

The fact that the "“rotor.control means" in

the '946 disclosure is more sophisticated

and may perform other functions, in addi-

tion to the function recited in Claim 18 ,

is of no consequence and cannot be used to

avoid infringement. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co.

v. MTD Products, Inc., 731 F.2d 840,

[D.S.C. 34] 848 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 105 S.Ct. 119 (1984); Amstar Corp.

v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1482

(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.

306 (1984).

Second, the "piecing on the rise" limi-

tation sought to be read into Claim 18 is

specifically recited in five other claims

of the '946 patent, 26 making its absence

From Claim 18 both conspicuous and

material. It is well settled that as a

26. Ciains 6, i2;, 13% 16, 19 and 23.

{[N. 26 at 5.8... 34]

109a

general rule limitations should not be read

into patent claims. Moreover, where such a

limitation is contained in other claims,

the rule is manifest.

Where, as here, the limitation

sought to be “read into" a claim

already appears in another claim, the

rule is far more than "general." It is

fixed. It is long and well estab-

lished. It enjoys an immutable and

universally applicable status compara~

tively rare among rules of law. With-

out it, the entire statutory and

regulatory structure governing the

drafting, submission, examination,

allowance, and enforceability of claims

would crumble. This court has con-

firmed the continuing life of the

rule. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech

Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 221 USPQ 649

(Fed. Cir. 1984); Raytheon Co. v. Roper

Corp., supra; Fromson v. Advance Offset

Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 , 219 USPQ

1137 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

D.M.I., inc. v. Deere & Co., Supra at

1574. See also: Palumbo v. Don-Joy,

Supra, at 977.

110a

B. The ‘370 Patent

Plaintiffs charge defendants with

infringement of Claims 1-7, 9-13 and 17-20

of the '370 patent. Claim 1 reads as

follows: [D.S.C. 35]

1. [a] A piecing device for an open-

end spinning machine of the type having a

plurality of spinning assemblies which

each include a rotatable storage spool

for storing yarn as it is spun at said

spinning assembly, spool drive means for

driving said spool during spinning

operations, and yarn guide means for

guiding the yarn between the rotor of the

spinning assembly and the spool during

spinning operations; said piecing device

comprising:

(b] auxiliary spool drive means for

driving the spool at a spinning

assembiy during piecing operations

at said spinning assembly;

(c] auxiliary yarn guide means for

guiding the yarn between the spool

and a yarn outlet of a spinning

rotor of the spinning assembly

during piecing operations, said

auxiliary yarn guide means

including auxiliary driven feed

means for said yarn.

(d] and control means for controlling

the course of the yarn between the

auxiliary driven feed means and

the spool so as to reduce forma-

lila

tion of a loop in the yarn during

acceleration of the drawing off of

the yarn during piecing [PX 213].

The Court finds that Claims 1-7, 9-13

and 17-20 read literally and directly on

defendants' Spincomat automatic piecer as

employed on defendants' RU ll OES machine

[PX 316, PX 320, PX 321]. Considering each

of the claim elements [a]-[d]:

[a] The RU ll has a plurality of

spinning assemblies and is equipped

with the Spincomat for piecing. Each

spinning assembly includes a spool that

stores yarn as it is spun [PX 27,

PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 301, PX 302;

Bartlett Tr. 3:76]; a spool drive for

driving or rotating the spool during

spinning [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,

PX 301, PX 302, PX 400 at Figure 1;

112a

Bartlett Tr. 3:76]; and yarn guides?’

for guiding the [D.S.C. 36] yarn

between the rotor of the spinning

assembly and the spool during spinning

operations [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX

S6A, PX 301, PX 302, PX 400 at Figure

1; Bartlett TR. 3:76].

[b] The Spincomat is equipped

with an auxiliary spool drive for

driving the spool during piecing

operations [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56,

PX 56A, PX 308, PX 309, PX 310, Px Sid,

PX 312, PX 313, PX 314, PX 315, PX 400;

Karl Tr. 4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:76].

[c] The Spincomat is equipped

with yarn guides that guide the yarn

27.

During spinning the yarn is guided by

the navel, yarn delivery tube, movable

and fixed pressure rolls, stationary

yarn guide, traversing yarn guide, and

main spool drive [PX 301].

(N. 27 at D.S.C. 35]

1l3a

between the spool and yarn outlet of

the spinning rotor during piecing,

including an auxiliary driven feed for

the yarn. Specifically, during piecing

this includes the fixed and movable

pressure rolls as moved by the pressure

roll separating lever, feeding unit and

its rollers, suction tube, dropping

worm, thread guide or sickle, and cen-

tering worm, which guide the yarn

between the spool and yarn outlet of

the rotor on the RU ll. The fixed and

movable pressure rolls are "borrowed"

by the Spincomat and operated by it via

the pressure roll separating lever

whereby they are under the control of

the piecing device and function as a

capstan drive for the yarn to provide

the auxiliary driven feed for the yarn

[PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 308,

PX 309, PX 310, PX 311, PX 312, PX 313,

114a

PX 315, PX 316, PX 400; Request for

Admission 50 at Bartlett Tr. [D.S.c.

37] 3:68; Canzler Tr. 5:237; Karl Tr.

4:223; Bartlett Tr. 3:76-78, 4:120].

(d) The Spincomat is equipped

with an auxiliary spool drive, center-

ing worm, dropping worm, vacuum

tensioning tube and package arm lifter

to control the course of the yarn

between the auxiliary driven feed means

and the spool so as to reduce formation

of a loop in the yarn during

acceleration of the drawing off of the

yarn during piecing. More

specifically, the auxiliary spool drive

presses the spool against the main

spool drive and the vacuum tensioner

tube imparts a soft tension to the yarn

(PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX S6A at p. 10;

PX 311, PX 312, PX 313, PX 314, Px 315,

PX 400; Requests for Admissions 5l, 52

115a

and 53 at Bartlett Tr. 3:68-69; Karl

Tr. 4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:78-79].

Claim 2 is literally infringed?®

because the Spincomat includes the fixed

and movable pressure rolls as moved by the

pressure roll separating lever and through

which the yarn passes. The drive for the

feed roll is synchronized with the

auxiliary spool drive by the “Program

pc." [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A;

PX 314, PX 315; Bartlett Tr. 3:84].

Claim 3 is literally infringed because

the auxiliary spool drive on the Spincomat

includes an auxiliary roll that is driven

and engages the spool [PX 27 at pp. 9, 133

PX 56 at [D.S.C. 38] pp. 8, 9, 10 and 16;

PX 308, PX 310, PX 311, PX 312, PX 313, PX

28. Except for Claim 1, all claims are

dependent and incorporate all of the

elements of the claim(s) from which

they depend.

[N. 28 at D.S.C. 37]

1l6a

314, PX 315, PX 320, PX 400; Karl Tr.

4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:84-85].

Claim 4 is literally infringed because

the Spincomat is mobile and is selectively

operable to perform piecing operations at

respective individual spinning assemblies

of the spinning machine [PX 27, Px 27A,

PX 56, PX S6A, PX 320; Bartlett Tr. 3:85].

Claims 5 and 17 are literally infringed

because the Spincomat includes a vacuum

tensioner tube which takes up yarn that is

delivered during the running-up phase and

not wound, in case of differences between

the feed velocity and winding speed. The

vacuum tensioner tube is disposed between

the pair of feed rolls and the auxiliary

roll or auxiliary spool drive (PX 27,

PX 27A at pp. 14, 17 and 43, PX 56, PX S6A

at drawing 22; PX 313, PX 314 ; Bartlett

Tr. 3:85-86, 92-93).

ll7a

Claims 6 and 19 are literally infringed

because the Spincomat includes a vacuum

tensioner tube which produces a deflection

of the course of the yarn by drawing the

yarn toward it or into it, and which guides

the yarn with maintenance of a given ten-

sion [PX 27, PX 27A at pp. 14, 17 and 43,

PX 56, PX 56A at drawing 22, PX 313,

PX 314; Bartlett Tr. 3:86-87, 93-94].

Claims 7 and 20 are literally infringed

because the Spincomat includes a vacuum

tensioner tube with an open nozzle end that

acts as a deflecting element [PX 27,

PX 27A, at pp. 14 , 17 [D.S.C. 39] and 43,

PX 56, PX 56A at drawing 22, PX 313, PX

314; Bartlett Tr. 3:87, 94].

Claim 9 is literally infringed because

the Spincomat control means includes

several elements that influence the running

path of the yarn in the zone between the

feed rolls and the spool. Specifically,

118a

this includes the auxiliary spool drive,

centering worm, dropping worm, vacuum

tensioning tube and package arm lifter.

[PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A at drawing

22, PX 313, PX 314; Bartlett Tr. 3:87].

Claim 10 is literally infringed because

the Spincomat elements that make up the

control means include an auxiliary spool

drive which influences the winding speed of

the spool [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,

PX 313, PX 314, PX 315 , PX 400; Karl Tr.

4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:87-88].

Claim 11 is literally infringed because

the Spincomat elements that make up the

control means are connected to a "Program

PC" that controls the work sequence of the

piecing device and determines the time of

switching in and/or the duration of the

switching in. [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56,

PX 56A, PX 315, PX 400; Bartlett Tr.

3:88-90].

119a

Claim 12 is literally infringed because

the auxiliary spool drive, which is one of

the Spincomat elements that make up the

control means, is spring loaded to press

together the spool and the auxiliary spool

drive during the running-up phase. The

spool is held in position by the package

arm lifter [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,

PX 311, PX 313, PX 315, PX 400; Bartlett

Tr. 3:90-91]. [D.S.C. 40]

Claim 13 is literally infringed because

the Spincomat elements that make up the

control means are connected to a "Program

PC" that controls the duration of the

loading of the auxiliary spool drive

[PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 315;

Bartlett Tr. 3:91-92].

Claim 18 is literally infringed because

the Spincomat elements that make up the

control means are connected to a "Program

PC" that controls the duration of the

120a

Switching in the yarn storage [PX 27,

PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 315; Bartlett Tr.

3:93].

Defendants contend that the accused de-

vice does not infringe any of the claims of

the '370 patent because the piecing device

does not include "auxiliary driven feed

means" for the yarn [Parkhurst Tr. 5:86-87,

197]. This is based on the assertion that

the fixed and movable pressure rolls are on

the spinning machine and that they do not

feed the yarn.

Defendants' position is not sustainable

from a factual or legal standpoint.

Factually, defendants' expert admitted

(a) that the fixed pressure roll and mov-

able pressure roll are indeed borrowed by

the Spincomat piecing device from the spin-

ning machine, (b) that during the yarn

take-up after piecing these borrowed rolls

draw the yarn out of the tube and feed it

l2la

onto the package, *9 and (c) that the

borrowed rolls perform different functions

when they are borrowed than they do when

they [D.S.C. 41] are not [Parkhurst Tr.

5:198-199]. Furthermore, defendants' own

in-house patent agent conceded that the

fixed pressure roll and movable pressure

roll on the accused device perform the same

function during piecing (i.e., drawing off

of the yarn) as would a separate set of

rollers located on the piecing device

[Canzler Tr. 5:237; PX 25A, PX 25B]. In

other words, the movable and fixed pressure

rolls guide the yarn between the rotor of

the spinning assembly and the spool during

spinning operations, but during piecing

29. This is consistent with the testimony

of plaintiffs' expert regarding the

effectiveness of a capstan drive for

feeding yarn [Bartlett Tr. 3:65, 4:100-

101).

(N. 29 at D.S.C. 40]

122a

operations their operation is controlled by

the piecing device to guide the yarn

between the spool and a yarn outlet of a

Spinning rotor of the spinning assembly.

Legally, the case law is clear that a

Single element that performs two different

functions at different times can be

included twice in a means plus function

Claim. In re Hebberling, 357 F.2d 1001,

1007 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Phillips v. Lynch,

367 F.2d 601, 607, n. 5 (C.C.P.A. 1966).

Thus, the Court finds that defendants'

structure is the full equivalent for

purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112 of the

"auxiliary yarn guide means ... including

auxiliary driven feed means" disclosed in

the '370 specification, and that the

relevant claims of the '370 patent are

literally infringed.

Furthermore, even if the claims were

not literally infringed, the accused device

123a

does the same work in substantially the

same way and accomplishes the same result

as the apparatus of the '370 claims and is

therefore a full equivalent of the claimed

subject matter and an infringement under

the doctrine of equivalents, as set forth

in Graver Tank, supra. [D.S.C. 42]

Defendants further contend that the

doctrine of file wrapper estoppel results

in a finding of noninfringement of the

claims of the '370 patent. The doctrine of

file wrapper estoppel is available only if

there is an absence of literal infringement

and only if the patentee narrowed the scope

of its claims during prosecution in the

Patent Office in response to a rejection

based on prior art that relates to the

patentable merit of the invention.

Specifically, defendants contend that the

doctrine of file wrapper estoppel requires

the presence of two elements in order for

124a

the claims to read on the accused device,

based upon the addition of the word

"auxiliary" during the prosecution of the

application in response to a rejection by

the Patent Office under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for

indefiniteness [Parkhurst Tr. 5:90-92].

This contention cannot be sustained for

two reasons. First, there is literal in-

fringement of the '370 claims, rendering

the doctrine inapplicable. Graver Tank &

Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co.,

supra, 339 U.S. at 607. Second, even if

there is not literal infringement, requir-

ing resort to the doctrine of equivalents,

the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel is

not applicable in this case under the con-

trolling legal precedents.

The application which matured into

United States Patent No. 4,175,379 was

rejected only once by an Official Action

dated December 6, 1978. The rejection was

125a

based solely on 35 U.S.C. § 112 because the

Examiner viewed the originally presented

claims as “indefinite-incomplete" and it

did not pertain [D.S.C. 43] to the

“auxiliary driven feed means." Indeed, in

this same action, the Examiner specifically

stated, "None of the claims appears to be

anticipated by the prior art." Thereafter,

amendments were made to claims to meet the

Examiner's indefiniteness rejection. 29

And, the Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit has twice recently

addressed the issue of file wrapper

estoppel vis-a-vis claim amendments to cure

Section 112 indefiniteness rejections.

30. Defendants' patent law expert conceded

that the rejection defendants were

relying upon was purely a Section 112

rejection based on indefiniteness and

not based upon prior art, and that such

a rejection does not give rise to file

wrapper estoppel. [Parkhurst Tr.

5:203-206].

[m. 30 at D.S.C. 43]

126a

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A.,

714 F.2d 1110, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1983);

Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil

Co. Of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 709 (1984).

These cases make it quite clear that claim

amendments and remarks directed only to

cure a Section 112 rejection do not give

rise to file wrapper estoppel since, in

effect, they are being used to cure a

technical rejection rather than a rejection

directed to the patentable merit of the

invention.

VI. VALIDITY OF THE PATENTS IN SUIT

A. The '946 Patent

Defendants contend that Claim 18 of the

'946 patent is invalid on three separate

grounds: (1) invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102

for anticipation in view of Hirai U.S.

Patent No. 4,022,011; [D.S.C. 44]

127a

(2) invalid for double patenting in view of

Hirai U.S. Patent No. 4,022,011; and

(3) invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 for

anticipation in view of defendants' own

prior art RK 10 machine, or under 35 U.S.C.

§ 103 in view of the latter when combined

with the teachings of plaintiffs' earlier

filed U.S. Patent No. 3,987,610.

The statutory presumption of patent

validity created by 35 U.S.C. § 282 places

on defendants the burden of proving in-

validity by clear and convincing evi-

dence. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v.

Sowa & Sons, Inc. , 725 F.2d 1350, 1358-60

(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.

95 (1984).

The Hirai Patent Defense

The threshold consideration underlying

the viability of any Section 102 (or

Section 103) invalidity defense involving

128a

the Hirai patent is whether that patent can

be considered as prior art to the '946

patent. The Court finds that the Hirai

patent cannot be otnnitecet as prior art

for the following reasons.

As indicated above (pp. 3-4, supra),

under 35 U.S.C. § 119, the '946 patent is

properly considered as having a U.S. filing

date of December 7, 1974. The application

for the Hirai U.S. patent, on the other

hand, was filed in the United States some

two months later on February 10, 1975.

Under ordinary circumstances, the fore-

going application filing sequences would

present a clear-cut case to the effect that

Hirai is to be totally ignored for purposes

of validity of the '946 patent. However,

there is one additional fact which can tend

to lead to confusion--this being that Hirai

also [D.S.C. 45] claims for himself the

priority under Section 119 of three earlier

12c°a

filed Japanese applications filed in Japan

in the period February-April, 1974,31 and

therefore before the '946 German priority

application_was filed in Germany. This

added fact, on its face, would seemingly

raise the anomalous question of whether

Hirai is therefore to be considered for

'946 reference purposes as carrying the

reference date of its U.S. filing date,

February 10, 1975 (which is subsequent to

the '946 priority date of December 7,

1974), or to be considered as prior art

because of its claimed Japanese priority

filing dates, February-April, 1974 (which

is prior to the '946 priority date).

This anomaly did in fact cause con-

siderable confusion in U.S. Patent Office _

31. The fact that Hirai bases his priority

on three Japanese applications simply

means that he combined three Japanese

applications into one U.S. application.

(R. 31 & 32 at D.S.C. 4S)

130a

practice in the 1960's and 1970's until the

U.S. Court of Customs and Appeals (the pre-

decessor of the Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit) resolved the matter in a

trilogy of landmark decisions--In re

Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966)

(Hilmer I), In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108

(C.C.P.A. 1970) (Hilmer II), and In re

McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324 (C.C.P.A. 1976).?2

Hilmer I involved an appeal froma

Patent Ofice decision rejecting Hilmer's

application. The issue before the [D.S.C.

46] Hilmer I court was whether a U.S.

patent to Habicht (filed in the U.S. on

January 23, 1958, and entitled to priority

as of its Swiss filing date of January 24,

1957) was prior art as to the Hilmer appli-

32. Accord: Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH

v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315,

1337 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 1014 (1980); In re Grasselli, 713

F.2d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

l3la

cation (filed in the U.S. on July 25, 1958,

and entitled to priority as of its German

filing date of July 31, 1957). As can be

seen, Hilmer's date of invention (i.e., his

German filing date under Section 119) was

prior to Habicht's U.S. filing date, but

after Habicht's foreign (Swiss) priority

date.

The pivotal holding of the court in

Hilmer I was that "section 119 does not

modify the express provision of section

102(e)33 that a reference patent is

effective as of the date the application

33. 35 U.S.C. §102(e) in effect bars the

issuance of a patent where "the

invention was described in a patent

granted on an application for patent

filed in the United States before the

invention thereof by the applicant for

patent or on an international applica-

tion by another who has fulfilled the

requirements of paragraphs (1), (2) and

(4) of Section 37l(c) of this title

before the invention thereof by the

applicant for patent."

(N. 33 at D.S.C. 46]

132a

for it was 'filed in the United States'."

359 F.2d at 861. Therefore, for prior art

purposes, the Habicht patent was to be

considered as having a date subsequent to

Hilmer, and therefore not a part of the

prior art.

As can be seen, the factual relevant

filing sequences presented in Hilmer I are

identical to those presented here by Hirai

and '946, and accordingly, under Hilmer I,

Hirai is not prior art under Section

102(e). [D.S.C. 47]

In 1970, the Hilmer case came before

the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals

once again (Hilmer II). As background to .-

Hilmer I, an interference had been declared

between the Habicht and Hilmer applica-

tions, and Habicht had prevailed as to the

count (claim) which was the subject of the

interference. Hilmer I had then decided

that all of the disclosures of the Habicht

133a

interfering patent were not prior art as to

Hilmer under Section 102(e). Hilmer II

involved an appeal from a further rejection

on another ground by the Patent Ofice after

the Hilmer I remand. The issue in Hilmer

II was whether the subject matter of the

claim lost to Habicht in the interference

was prior art as to the Hilmer application

under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).24

The Patent Office had reasoned that the

Claim lost in the interference was prior

art by virtue of being "prior invention"

under Section 102(g), and Section 119

altered the "in this country" limitation of

Section 102(g). The court disagreed. As

in the case of Hilmer I and Section 102(e),

34. Section 102(g) in effect bars the

issuance of a patent where “before the

applicant's invention thereof the

invention was made in this country by

another. .. ." [Emphasis added].

[N. 34 at D.S.C. 47]

134a

the Hilmer II court stated "§ 119 does not

remove the limitation of § 102(g) found in

the phrase ‘in this country'." 424 F.2d at

1112.

The last case in the trilogy, McKellin,

put the entire prior art issue to rest,

once and for all. McKellin had lost an in-

terference with a patent to Maltha under

facts similar to those in Hilmer I and

Hilmer II. Thereafter, [D.S.C. 48]

McKellin inserted into his application new

Claims which the Patent Office viewed as

"either fall[{ing] within the scope of the

invention defined by the [lost inter-

ference] counts or obvious variations

thereof." 529 F.2d at 1326. Thus, the

Patent Office was now taking the position

that even though a Habicht-type (Hirai-

type) patent was not prior art under

Section 102(e) (Hilmer I), or under Section

102(g) (Hilmer II), the lost interference

135a

count could be used under Section 103

(obviousness) to bar issuance of claims in

the loser's application directed to obvious

variants of the lost count. Once again,

the Patent Office's attempt to use a

Habicht-type (Hirai-type) reference as

prior art in respect to the patentability

of claims in a Hilmer-type ('946-type)

application was rejected by the Court of

Customs and Patent Appeals, and the

McKellin court made it clear that a

Habicht-type (Hirai-type) reference could

not be considered prior art for any pur-

pose. tus. the Court finally made it

absolutely clear that a Habicht~-type

(Hirai-type) reference must be considered

as a reference only as of its U.S. filing

date.

Applying this trilogy of cases to the

case at bar, this Court concludes that

Hirai is not prior art for purposes of

136a

Section 102(e) (Hilmer I); nor Section

102{g) (Hilmer II); nor Section 103; nor

for any other purpose under the facts

presented here (McKellin). Moreover,

Squarely in accordance with this trilogy,

even if there had been an interference

between Hirai and '94635 involving only

claims of Hirai as interference counts,

[D.S.C. 49] and even if priority based upon

effective dates had been awarded to Hirai,

such award of priority would not have

raised Hirai to the status of prior art in

respect to the '946 claims not involved in

such interference. McKellin, supra.

Conceding the applicability of the

Hilmer I and II, McKellin trilogy under

circumstances where the '946 patent is en-

35. Which there was not, but which

defendants argue that there should have

been.

[N. 35 at D.S.C. 48]

137a

titled to its December 7, 1974 German

priority date under Section 119 [Parkhurst

Tr. 5:131-132], defendants nevertheless

urge that Hirai is an invalidating prior

art reference against the '946 patent

because the two patents contain

“interfering” claims directed to the same

invention, and that by electing not to

invoke an interference, plaintiffs have

elected Hirai as the patent entitled to the

priority as between the two patents.

In support of their argument that

Claims of the patents “interfere,” defen-

dants point to method Claim 1 of Hirai and

urge that this claim claims the same inven-

tion as that claimed in apparatus Claim 18

of '946 (the only ‘946 claim in issue), as

well as method Claims 7 and 12 (not in

issue) [Parkhurst Tr. 5:40-53].

The evidence does not support this

proposition. In the first place, Hirai

138a

Claim 1 specifically calls for the step of

“removing the fiber thus supplied from

inside of the rotor together with the dust

and dirt collected in the rotor." [Dx

10). It is well known in the OES art that

dust and dirt tend to collect in the groove

of the rotor with such tenacity that it is

not necessarily removed by the normal

vacuum [D.S.C. 50] currents utilized for

the yarn forming operation [PX 334, PX 334A

at pp. 16-17]. To cope with this collected

dust and dirt, Hirai teaches that this

cleaning can be accomplished by "positively

cleaning the inside of the rotor,” [DX 10

at col. l, line 68-col. 2, line 2] by

injecting a jet of compressed air into the

rotor groove to clean the same during the

piecing sequence [F. Stahlecker Tr.

2:128]. This positive cleaning step to

remove the dust and dirt, which is explicit

in the above-quoted Hirai claim, is nowhere

139a

mentioned or taught in the '946 patent as.

an integral step in the piecing operation,

and is nowhere recited in Claim 18 of

‘946. Further, Claim 18 of '946 calls for

means for supplying a vacuum to the spin-

ning rotor prior to starting the rotor to

remove fiber supplied to the rotor up to

that time. Hirai Claim 1 is totally silent

on this score, and moreover, if Figure 3 of

Hirai is to be interpreted as a timing

sequence, as defendants urge it should be

[Parkhurst Tr. 5:167], then there is posi-

tive pressure (rather than vacuum) present

in Hirai's rotor until after his rotor

reaches a speed of about one-third (20,000

rpm) of its operating speed (60,000 rpm)

[DX 10 at col. 2, lines 3-7, and FIG. 3].

Under these conditions (i.e., the vacuum is

not effective until the rotor reaches a

speed of 20,000 rpm), such vacuum would not

remove the fiber supplied up to that time,

140a

as required in '946 Claims 7, 12 and 18,

because of the centrifugal forces exerted _

on the fibers by the rotating rotor which

would hold the fibers in the rotor with a

stronger force than that exerted by the

vacuum [Parkhurst Tr. 5:167-172; F.

Stahlecker Tr. 2:127-131; PX 380, PX 381,

PX 382]. [D.S.C. 51]

As to defendants' contention that Hirai

Claim 1 also “interferes” with '946 method

Claims 7 and 12, these claims differ from

Hirai Claim 1 for essentially the same

reasons as outlined above in respect to

apparatus Claim 18 [Parkhurst Tr. 5:161].

Further, the base claims (Claims 6 and 11)

from which these claims respectively depend

contain preambles which include the phrase,

"comprising the sequential steps of"

{underlining added; PX 202, col. 8, lines

19-20 and lines 59-60]. Such phraseology

imbues these claims with a limited scope

14la

not contemplated by Hirai Claim 1 in that

the method steps thereafter recited in the

claims must be carried out in the sequence

exactly as recited [Witherspoon Tr. 6:41l-

42). |

Secondly, a close analysis of the whole

of the Hirai and '946 patents shows a clear

difference in the inventions contemplated

by the respective patent disclosures. 26

More specifically, while both patents deal

with piecing up on OES machines, and both

disclose starting and stopping the sliver

feed during the piecing sequence, the

Similarity ends there. In Hirai, the pro-

blem posed, and purportedly solved, by the

36. While certainly not binding on this

Court, it is worth noting that the

German Patent Office has recognized the

difference also, by granting the German

version of the '946 patent over the

German version of Hirai [Dauster Tr.

6:14-17; PX 402A, PX 402B).

([N. 36 at D.S.C. 51]

142a

inventor is the elimination of shortened or

damaged fibers being carried into the yarn

piecing point when a new piecing is made,

Since such fibers have a "density and

length" different from those supplied

during normal spinning operations, and as

such "will result in failure [{D.S.C. 52] or

formation of an uneven joint in the spun

yarn.” [(DX 10 at col. 1, lines 36-37). In

order to avoid this problem, Hirai teaches

that the piecing sequence should always in-

volve a removal of the shortened or damaged

fibers from the system, and that this can

be accomplished by feeding new sliver into

the system at the start of the piecing

sequence which, in turn, will cause the

shortened or damaged fibers to go into the

rotor where they will be discharged there-

from by a compressed air stream [ibid.,

col. 1, lines 38-65]. Thus, Hirai's con-

cern is one of the quality of the fibers to

143a

be carried into the piecing point--i.e.,

the absence of shortened or damaged

fibers.

In contrast, the '946 patent is con-

cerned with the overall uniformity of the

piecing points at both the same spinning

position and between different spinning

positions [PX 202 at col. l, lines 52-56],

and the stated key to the invention is "the

realization that the sliver feed can only

actually be precisely controlled if it can

be assumed that the fiber tuft offered to

the opener roller at the beginning of the

Sliver feed prior to the start-spinning

operation is always the same" [ibid., col.

2, lines 9-12]. fo this end, the '946

patent teaches that the same quantity of

fiber should always be fed in each piecing

sequence, and that this can be accomplished

by producing, prior to every start-spinning

operation "a precisely defined fiber tuft”

144a

[ibid., col. 2, line 28] which will, with

controlled timing, permit precise control

of the quantity of fibers fed to the rotor

to form the ring of [D.S.C. 53] fibers

therein. ~As a result, "The ring of fibers

on which the return end of the thread is

placed is thus formed only by the fibers

supplied in the controlled sliver feed

Operation" [emphasis supplied] [ibid., col.

4, lines 22-25; PX 376-1, PX 376-2; F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:137-142]. These distinc-

tions in '946 over the Hirai patent go to

the heart of the true merit of the '946

invention in that they provide the key to

achieving uniform piecing points and thus

the key to practical and commercially

successful automated piecing.

Thirdly, the file wrappers of both the

Hirai [PX 403] and '946 [DX 2a] patents

show that the Patent Office Examiners

handling the respective applications each

145a

conducted an interference search prior to

issuance of the patents. In so doing, the

Hirai Examiner conducted a search for

pending interfering applications or patents

in the area where the '946 application was

pending, and the '946 Examiner at a later

point in time conducted a similar search in

the area where the Hirai patent (by then

issued) was classified. Moreover, the '946

file wrapper [DX 2a] shows that, after com-

pletion of the examination by the Patent

Examiner, the application was selected for

review, reviewed, and approved, by a group

in the Patent Office whose responsibility

it is to review on a random basis the

quality of examination by the Patent

Examiner [Witherspoon Tr. 6:40-41]. While

not conclusive, the foregoing evidence of

the completeness in the examining procedure

is certainly suggestive of a positive

determination by the Patent Office that

146a

Hirai and 946 do not interfere. [D.S.C.

54]

In summary, the Court finds that the

inventions described respectively in the

'946 and Hirai patents are significantly

different, and that Claims 7, 12 and 18 of

'946 are patentably distinct from, and do

not "interfere" with, Claim 1, or any other

claim, of the Hirai patent.

With the appropriateness of an inter-

ference out of the picture, defendants,

theory of "election" becomes moot. How-

ever, even if the two patents could have

been drawn into interference, thereby giv-

ing rise to the opportunity for plaintiffs

to elect Hirai for priority purposes, the

evidence does not support any finding that

plaintiffs elected Hirai or committed any

acts tantamount to such an election. In-

deed, defendants' relevant actions have

been quite consistent in the position that

147a

Hirai was not the first inventor of the

subject matter claimed in his patent. For

example, when the plaintiffs, Hans and

Fritz Stahlecker, first learned of the

Hirai patenting activity, Hans Stahlecker

immediately sent a telex [PX 226, p. 1] to

Hirai's employer, Murata, complaining of

this action and pointing out that the rele-

vant idea of starting and stopping the

sliver feed during piecing originated with

Fritz Stahlecker, not Hirai. This position

was tacitly, if not explicitly, confirmed

by Murata's response [PX 226, p. 2] which

said, in effect, that Hans Stahlecker's

views were "respected." Additionally,

after plaintiffs acquired the Hirai patent

in 1984, they disclaimed the patent [PX

370] -- an act totally inconsistent with

any election of the Hirai patent as having

the priority. [D.S.C. 55]

148a

The Double Patenting Defense

The doctrine of double patenting deals

with attempts by patentees (or common

assignees) to claim the same subject matter

in more than one patent. The primary pur-

pose of this judicially created doctrine is

to prevent a timewise extension of the

statutory period of monopoly that would

occur if successive patents were allowed on

the same invention to the same inventors or

patent owners. 3 Chisum, Patents § 9.01.

Since the doctrine is applicable to

Situations involving issuance of patents to

common inventors or assignees, neither of

which was the case at the time of issuance

of the Hirai and '946 patent, it is

questionable whether it has any applic-

ability whatsoever to this case. However,

defendants urge that a double patenting

Situation arose when plaintiffs, as owners

of the '946 patent, acquired the Hirai

149a

patent in 1984, some seven years after the

two patents issued. Whether there is, or

should be, a doctrine of "retroactive"

double patenting is an issue which need not

be addressed here, since for reasons here-

inafter stated, there is no viable double

patenting defense in this case.

In a line of cases beginning in 1964,’

the United States Court of Customs and

Patent Appeals developed a [D.S.C. 56]

distinction between two types of double

patenting. The first type (Type I) arises

in situations where an applicant seeks a

second patent for the same invention

37. In re Avery, 518 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A.

1975); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438

(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re White, 405 F.2d

904 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Eckel, 393

F.2d 848 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re

Braithwaite, 379 F.2d 594 (C.C.P.A.

1967); In re Kaye, 332 F.2d 816

(C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Robeson, 331

F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1964).

(N. 37 at D.S.C. 55]

150a

claimed in his first patent. Under this

type of double patenting, the rationale is

that the second patent cannot issue because

of the express language of 35 U.S.C.

§ 101. The second type of double patenting

(Type II) arises in situations where the

applicant seeks a second patent for a

different invention which invention is

nothing more than an obvious variant or

modification of what is claimed in the

first patent. 3 Chisum, Patents

§ 9.03[3]. In Type I double patenting,

"same invention" means identically the same

invention, In re Eckel, 393 F.2d 848

(C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438,

441 (C.C.P.A. 1970), and defendants con-

cede, and the Court so finds, that there is

no such claim identity in the Hirai and

'946 patents, and that Type I double

patenting is not applicable here [Parkhurst

15la

Tr. 5:160-162; see also generally,

Witherspoon Tr. 6:42-46],

Defendants nevertheless urge that the

asserted Claim 18 of the '946 patent, as

well as Claims 7 and 12 which have not been

asserted, claim an obvious variant of Claim

1 of Hirai, and that '946 is therefore in-

valid because of Type II double patent-

ing. The Court disagrees. In the first

place, there is no factual basis for such a

finding--both '946 method Claims 7 and 12,

as well as apparatus Claim 18, call for

supplying a vacuum to spinning rotor prior

to starting the rotor to remove any unknown

quantity of fiber supplied up to [D.S.C.

57] that time during the piecing

sequence. This concept is one of the keys

to obtaining piecing points of consistent

quality in the invention of the '946 patent

in that the removal of the unknown quantity

of fiber in the system is a prerequisite to

ht Nb eae dae

152a

establishing control over the quantity of

fibers in the fiber ring to be incorporated

into the new piecing point [F. Stahlecker

1:137-141]. In the second place, there is

no legal basis for such a finding, since

the Hirai and '946 patents now contain the

same expiration date due to the terminal

disclaimer [DX 35] filed in respect to the

'946 patent disclaiming the remaining term

of that patent beyond May 10, 1994, the

date of expiration of the Hirai patent.

This terminal disclaimer totally eliminates

the timewise -extension of any monopoly, and

therefore obviates Type II double patent-

ing. In re Vogel supra, at 441-2; see

also: In re Bowers, 359 F.2d 886 (C.C.P.A.

1966) (Terminal disclaimer successfully

used in a common assignee situation).

Defendants argue that a terminal dis-

claimer in commonly owned patents cannot

cure a Type II double patenting situation.

ee

153a

In support of their position they rely upon

§ 804.03 of the Manual of Patent Examining

Procedure of the United States Patent and

Trademark Office. As recently held by the

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,

this position is "meritless":

Appellants respond to this

suggested use of a disclaimer by citing

MPEP [Manual of Patent Examining

Procedure] § 804.03 for the proposition

that terminal disclaimers are not

(D.S.C. 58] applicable to commonly-

owned applications made by different

inventive entities. The Solicitor also

candidly points us to the related Com-

missioner's Notice on Double Patenting

(834 0.G. 1615, January 9, 1967) which

states in relevant portion:

The term "double patenting" is

properly applicable only to cases

involving two or more applications

and/or patents of the same inven-

tive entity and should not be

applied to situations involving

commonly owned cases of different

inventive entities.

Appellants argue, therefore, that a

terminal disclaimer would be ineffec-

tive. However, this court has never

approved this guideline, and such a

requirement is inconsistent with many

of our predecessor's decisions. See,

e.g. In re Rogers, 394 F.2d at 567, n.

154a

4, 55 C.C.P.A. at 1094, n. 4, 157 USPQ

at 571 (citations omitted); and In re

Frilette, 412 F.2d 269, 56 C.C.P.A.

1262, 162 USPQ 163 (1969). In fact,

the examiner here invited appellants'

assignee, which declined, to file a

terminal disclaimer in order to over-

come the rejection. We have held that

the Double Patenting Notice, supra, is

only a procedural memorandum which

merely sets forth guidelines for the

Patent and Trademark Office, and that

were those guidelines are not even

applied, as in the instant case, they

can have no bearing on the outcome. In

re Newton, 414 F.2d 1400, 56 C.C.P.A.

1463, 163 USPQ 351 (1969). In short,

appellants' argument in this regard is

meritless. [Footnote omitted].

In re Longi, et al 759 F.2d 887, 894 (Fed.

Cir. 1985).

Other Section 102 and Section

103 Invalidity Defenses

Defendants' remaining § 102 (anti-

Cipation) and § 103 (obviousness)

invalidity defenses in respect to Claim 18

of the '946 patent focus on (1) defendants'

own prior art RK i0 OES machine and (2)

155a

plaintiffs' own earlier U.S. Patent No.

3,987,610.

(D.8.C. $9]

Defendants' RK 10 machine is a conven-

tional OES machine of the type in use prior

to the effective date of the '946 patent.

Defendants, however, urge that it incorpo-

rated one added feature which makes the

machine additionally pertinent to the '946

patent--namely, a red feed button located

on the cover of the spin box and opera-

tively connected to the sliver feed mecha-

nism for activating the sliver feed at

will. The purpose of this red button,

according to defendants' RK 10 operation

manual [PX 28] is to permit the operator to

operate the sliver feed when initially

starting up a spinning position to feed a

new end of sliver through the feed rolls

and to the combing roll, and there is

nothing in this manual to suggest the use

156a

of the button to prefeed the sliver during

the piecing operation [Beuthien Tr. 4:171l-

172; PX 33}. However, in practice, there

is testimony that when the RK 10 machines

were introduced into the United States in

June 1973 toa customer, Har-Ray Mills,

Schubert & Salzer personnel instructed the

operators at Har-Ray to press the feed

button for a period of between one-half and

one second during the hand-piecing sequence

{[Beuthien Tr. 4:143-144, 166]. The stated

purpose of this procedure, according to

defendants' witness was (1) to remove

damaged fibers and (2) to ensure that the

sliver was not choked in the opening roller

housing [Beuthien Tr. 4:144-145].

Defendants further offered the testimony of

two operators to the effect that it was

their practice at Har-Ray Mills in Grover,

North Carolina, commencing in June of 1973,

[D.S.C. 60] to piece up ends in a commer-

157a

cial operation in this recommended manner.

Actual demonstrations of the procedure were

recreated by these operators on RK 10

machines located at Auburn University, at

Auburn, Alabama, which demonstrations were

recorded on videotape and received in

evidence [DX 88; see also PX 365A, PX 365B,

PX 366A, PX 366B; Lord TR. 2:9-17].

Accepting as prior art this Har-Ray

hand-piecing procedure, the Court finds

that it does not anticipate Claim 18 of the

'946 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102. In

order for a single item of prior art to

anticipate, it must be established that it

alone discloses expressly, or inherently,

each and every element of the claimed

invention. Furthermore, where the elements

of the claimed -invention are expressed in

terms of a means plus function, the re-

ference (here, the hand-piecing procedure

and RK 10 machine being operated) must

158a

~

involve structure which is capable of

performing the functional limitation of the

recited means. RCA Corp. v. Applied

Digital Data Systems, Inc., et al, 730 F.2d

1440, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.

dismissed sub nom.,Hazeltine Corp. v. RCA

Corp., 105 S.Ct. 32 (1984). See also:

Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American

Hoist and Derrick Company, et al, 730 F.2d

1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Moreover, an-

ticipation requires a teaching with respect

to the "entirety of the claimed invention"

in a Single reference, and it is not shown

even if the differences between the claim

and the prior art reference are "insubstan-

tial," and the missing elements could

[D.S.C. 61] be supplied by the knowledge of

one skilled in the art. Structural Rubber

Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d

707 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

159a

The "entirety" of the invention as set

forth in Claim 18 of the '946 patent is an

apparatus for thread piecing including a

combination of means plus recited Functions

for such means. While some of the claimed |

means with their claimed functions?® are .

present in the RK 10 machine, such machine

with its operator is not "an apparatus for

threadpiecing," as called for in the pre-

amble of the claim. Moreover, nowhere is

there to be found the following claimed

means plus function.

fiber supply preparing means for pre-

paring said spinning assembly for a

piecing operation prior to movement of

said spinning rotor from its stopped

position, said fiber supply preparing

means including means for starting and

operating said feeding means for a

period of time and then stopping said

feeding means, said starting and stop-

ping being accompanied by a contin-

uously operating opening means, whereby

38. E.g., the opening means, feeding means

and rotor control means.

(N. 38 at D.S.C. 61]

160a

uniform fiber tufts are arranged at

said sliver feeding means to accommo-

date said piecing operating to be

subsequently performed.

The above-quoted language from Claim 18

clearly calls for some mechanism capsbie in

and of itself of preparing the spinning

assembly for piecing so that consistency

can be achieved and maintained to form

uniform fiber tufts. The recognition and

realization by the '946 inventors that the

formation of uni-[D.S.C. 62]form fiber

tufts in an apparatus environment which can

provide a consistently timed sequence of

events leading to piecing is the most

Significant aspect of the invention and its

advance over the prior art--the key to

obtaining piecing point uniformity. Piec-

ing point uniformity is not in any way

achieved on the RK 10 where the piecing

operation, including the use of the feed

button, is carried out by hand. This is

l6la

Clearly demonstrated in comparative piec-

ings made on the RK 10 by the Har-Ray

operators [PX 365A, PX 366A] versus piec-

ings made on the infringing apparatus

embodying the claimed invention [PX 364A;

Lord Tr. 2:9-17).

The basis for defendants' obviousness

defense under § 103 is similar to that of

their § 102 defense, except they add to the

prior art equation the teachings of plain-

tiffs' own U.S. Patent No. 3,987,610. The

"610 patent >? is directed to the same

general automatic piecing apparatus of the

type disclosed in the '946 patent, except

that there is no teaching of providing a

"fiber supply preparing means," with its

39. The relevant subject matter of which is

disclosed in the '946 specification at

col. 1, line 44 by reference to one of

the inventors' German priority

applications [F. Stahlecker Tr. 2:133].

[N. 39 at D.S.C. 62]

162a

attendant claimed function, and no recog-

nition whatsoever that with such means,

uniform fiber tufts can be obtained and

thereby lead to uniform piecing points [F.

Stahlecker Tr. 2:96, 98; Bartlett Tr.

4:43]. As stated previously, the other

prior art reference (RK 10 as operated at

Har-Ray) does not supply this [D.S.C. 63]

missing teaching [See Bartlett Tr. 3:103;

F. Stahlecker Tr. 2:99]. Accordingly, the

Court finds that these combined teachings

do not teach, suggest or render obvious the

'946 invention.

Moreover, the record is replete with

objective evidence of nonobviousness.

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. l

(1966); Environmental Designs, Ltd. v.

Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 695

40. [N. 40 omitted from the final court

Opinion. ]

163a

(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct.

709 (1984); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.

Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 894

(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.

187 (1984). For example, the claimed

apparatus produces new and unexpected

results--to wit: quality piecing points

heretofore unobtainable in prior art

apparatus or by prior art methods. The

piecing points obtained in the Auburn trial

re-creating the Har-Ray RK 10 method [PX

365A, PX 366A] are in no sense uniform, and

for quality purposes would have to be re-

moved from the yarn and replaced with

knots. In contrast, the piecing points

obtained with apparatus incorporating the

'946 invention are, by comparison, quite

uniform and acceptable for quality

164a

purposes. 42 See: Lindemann

Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist and

Derrick Company, et al, 730 F.2d 1452, 1461

(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("evidence of unexpected

results may be strong support for a

conclusion of nonobviousness"). [D.S.C.

64] .

Additionally, the already noted

commercial success of, and fulfillment of,

a long-felt need by Suessen's Spincat/

Cleancat development cannot be ignored.

The world's leading manufacturer of OES

machines, Schlafhorst, uses the invention

on its machines, of which it has sold over

850 (163,200 spindles) in the United States

alone [supra at p. 14]. See: Simmons

Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works,

41. From Schlafhorst machines [PX 363, F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:123-126] as well as

defendants’ infringing Spincomat

machines [PX 364A; Lord Tr. 2:9-17].

([N. 41 at D.S.C. 63]

165a

Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-1576 (Fed. Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2138 (1985)

(Even a prima facie case of obviousness

outweighed by strong evidence of commercial

success).

Further, defendants' already noted own

contemporaneous actions constitute mute

testimony of their own recognition of the

nonobviousness of the '946 invention--

initial skepticism at first, followed by

the formation of a task force and six years

of active, but futile, effort to develop

successful automation, the seeking of out-

side help from the textile institute at

Reutlingen, and, ultimately, the adoption

and copying of plaintiffs' invention [supra

at pp. 17-20]. See: United States v.

Finally, although defendants, who bear

the burden of proof with respect to

obviousness, offered no evidence with

re ee ee ee ee

166a

respect to the standard of skill which

should be applied to the “person of

Ordinary skill" under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the

reaction to automated piecing of those who

actually toiled in the prior art making

hand piecings is noteworthy. The two

witnesses proffered at trial to demonstrate

the prior art, as practiced at Har-Ray

(D.S.C. 65], both testified that they did

not even know what the term "fiber tuft" or

"fiber beard" meant; that they never knew

how much fiber was in the rotor during the

piecing sequence; that their reason for

pushing the red button was to make sure

that the sliver was not choked or lapped;

and that their first impression of an

automatic piecer (the defendants' accused

infringing Spincomat) was that it was

"amazing." [Jennings Tr. 4:201; Robinson

Tr. 4:203, 205, 210-211).

167a

To imbue one of ordinary skill in

the art with knowledge of the invention

in suit, when no prior art reference or

references of record convey or suggest

that knowledge, is to fall victim to

the insidious effect of a hindsight

syndrome wherein that which only the

inventor taught is used against its

teacher.

It is difficult but necessary that

the decision-maker forget what he or

she has been taught at trial about the

claimed invention and cast the mind

back to the time the invention was made

(often as here many years), to occupy

the mind of one skilled in the art who

is presented only with the references,

and who is normally guided by the then-

accepted wisdom in the art. Had that

been here done the inventions set forth

in the claims 3 and 19 of the '566

patent could only have been held non-

obvious to those skilled in the art at

the time those claimed inventions were

made.

W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock,

Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983),

cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 172 (1984).

In conclusion, defendants have failed

to carry their burden of demonstrating that

Claim 18 of the '946 patent is invalid,

eke Lin, ete eee

168a

either for anticipation under 35 U.S.C.

§ 102, or for being obvious to a person of

ordinary skill in the art at the time the

invention was made under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

[D.S.C. 66]

B. The '370 Patent

Defendants argue that all of the

asserted claims of the '370 patent 42 are

invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102

(anticipation) or 103 (obviousness),

because all of the elements of each one of

the claims are shown in the prior art--in

many instances in a single reference--

namely, U.S. Patent No. 4,107,957. As to

those claims which do not respond exactly

to the elements shown in the ':57 patent,

they urge that there is simply a

42. Independent Claim 1 and dependent

Claims 2-7, 9-13 and 18-20.

([N. 42 at D.S.C. 66]

169a

substitution of another type of deflection

element as shown in one or more of U.S.

Patents Nos. 3,987,610; 3,950,926;

3,842,579; 4,125,989 and 4,083,171

(Parkhurst Tr. $:113-114; DX 107].

The evidence does not support the

proposition that all the elements of any

‘370 claim are shown in the prior art '957

patent. This patent is directed to a

mobile piecing device for an OES machine

and is a Fritz Stahlecker predecessor of

his '370 patent in suit. While it does

show, in combination with an OES machine, a

piecing device having (1) auxiliary spool

drive means for driving the spool on the

OES machine during piecing operations, and

(2) auxiliary yarn guide means for guiding

the yarn between the spool and the yarn

outlet of the spinning assembly during

piecing, and while it further recognizes

that a speed differential is created in the

170a

yarn immediately after piecing between the

yarn outlet and the yarn package take-up

(D.S.C. 67], the similarity between this

prior art reference and the '370 claimed

invention ends there. In the '957 patent,

it is suggested that any excess yarn in the

yarn path (1) be accommodated by deflecting

the yarn path with a separate deflection

lever to form a loop in the yarn, or (2) be

eliminated by driving the yarn package roll

PP edb shat incites

more rapidly. [DX 69 at col. 7, lines 45-

( 55]. This first solution proposed in '957

patent for solving the problem--accommoda-

tion by deflection to form a loop--is

4 totally different from the claimed inven-

tion of the '370 patent which is directed

q to reducing the formation of the loop [F.

Stahlecker Tr. 2:50, 54-59]. This second

proposed solution--driving the package

drive roll more rapidly--would only produce

more slippage and in no way solve the

l7la

problem addressed by the '370 patent [F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:149].

The remaining prior art references

relied upon defendants to show obviousness

under 35 U.S.C. § 103 [DX 107] are merely

duplicative of the teachings of the '957

patent in that they do not teach the con-

cept of reducing the formation of a loop,

but show only other forms of yarn deflec-

tion means to accommodate a yarn loop

formed during a piecing operation

[Parkhurst 5:206-218].

Central to the teachings of the '370

patent in suit is the revelation that,

because of the existence of twist in the

yarn, kinks tend to form in any excess yarn

loops, and these kinks create problems when

they are wound up onto the yarn package.

Thus, in order to avoid the risk of forming

these [D.S.C. 68] kinks, the patent teaches

that the kink problem can be solved by the

L72a

provision of means to reduce the formation

of the excess yarn loop which is the causal

factor in the undesirable kink problem [F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:144-145]. The technique

specifically proposed in the '370 patent

for achieving this reduction in loop forma-

tion is the provision of means for reducing

slippage between the auxiliary spool drive

roll and the spool itself, along with means

to add a soft tension to the yarn so as to

prevent any kinks from forming in any small

yarn loop which may nevertheless be formed

during the yarn acceleration phase due to

the fact that the means for reducing the

slippage might not be totally effective [PX

213 at col. 6, lines 3-21; F. Stahlecker

Tr. 13145-1473; Bartiett Tr. 3:52). This

technique manifests itself in all of the

'370 claims in the means plus function

recitation in the base Claim 1:

173a

- « « control means for controlling the

course of the yarn between the

auxiliary driven feed means and the

spool so as to reduce formation of a

loop in the yarn during acceleration of

the drawing off of the yarn during

piecing. [Emphasis added].

There is no evidence in the record

presented here that any of the devices of

the prior art relied upon by defendants

contain any structure for functioning to

reduce formation of a loop and preventing

the undesirable curling or kinking of the

yarn during the acceleration phase. CE£.,

RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Systems,

Inc., et al, Supra, at p. 1444. At most,

defendants' expert, with the full benefit

of the [D.S.C. 69] hindsight afforded by

the teachings of the '370 patent, could

only speculate that "They might have that

effect." [Parkhurst Tr. 5:100]. Mani-

festly, the prior art must be read without

the benefit of the patentee's own invention

disclosure. In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578,

174a

585 (C.C.P.A. 1969); W..L. Gore &

Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., supra,

at p. 1553.

Lacking such evidence, defendants have

failed to carry their burden under 35

U.S.C. § 282 of proving invalidity of the

claims of the '370 patent, a burden "made

heavier" by the fact that the '957 patent,

touted by defendants as a full anticipa-

tion, and accordingly, the most pertinent

prior art [Parkhurst Tr. 5:102], was con-

sidered by the Patent Office during the

examination of the '370 patent [Parkhurst

Tr. 5:93, 115]. Fromson v. Advance Offset

; Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. cir.

1985).

VII. THE '946 AND '370

i UNENFORCEABILITY DEFENSES

Defendants contend that both patents in

Suit are unenforceable because of "fraud on

175a

the Patent Office," or as more recently

termed by the Coure of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, “inequitable conduct."

J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd.,

Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir.

1984). Specifically, they urge that plan-

tiffs failed to bring to the attention of

the Patent Office material prior art known

to them during the prosecution of the

applications for the patents in suit.

(D.S.C. 70}

The material prior art alleged to have

been withheld is, with respect to the '946

patent, (1) the hand piecing operation

carried out on defendants' RK 10 OES

machine (as re-created at Auburn University

by Har-Ray employees, and recorded on

videotape) [Parkhurst Tr. 5:77-78], and

(2) U.S. Patent No. 3,987,610 [Parkhurst

Tr. 5:83]. The allegedly withheld prior

art with respect to the '370 patent is

alii

Pe ae ae ee Oe ee ee ee

Se RET IS Te EE AREAS Ea

176a

(1) U.S. Patent No. 3,987,610 [Parkhurst

Tr. 5:114], (2) certain language in cited

U.S. Patent No. 4,107,957 [Parkhurst Tr.

5:114-115], (3) U.S. Patent No. 3,950,926

{Parkhurst Tr. 5:115], (4) U.S. Patent No.

3,842,579 [Parkhurst Tr. 5:117]; (5) U.S.

Patent No. 4,125,989 [Parkhurst Tr. 5:117=

118], and (6) U.S. Patent No. 4,083,171

{Parkhurst Tr. 5:118].

As to the hand piecing operation used

on the RK 10 machine, there is no evidence

that any of the '946 patentees or their

attorneys had any prior knowledge of such

operation. There is no relevant testimony

on thie point from any one of that group,

except Fritz Stahlecker, who testified

that, while he did see the RK 10 machine

briefly from a distance at a trade show in

Paris, he did not see its internal mecha-

nisms or the red button for starting and

stopping the sliver feed [F. Stahlecker Tr.

177a

2:63, 66, 126]. And, there is not even a

Tee ae

suggestion in the record that any of the

inventors saw or knew about the RK 10

piecing operation as practiced at Har-Ray

Mills.

As to U.S. Patent No. 3,987,610, vis-a-

vis the '946 patent in suit, this is

another

Fritz Stahlecker patent. Its |

{[D.S.C. 71] subject matter is actually

referred to in the '946 specification at

column 1, lines 39-56 [PX 202], and the

application number of one of the German

priority applications is given. This fact

alone establishes a complete lack of intent

the

to withhold information. Moreover,

'610 application was handled by the same

Examiner (Donald Watkins)

'946 application [Cf£., DX

202, p. 1], and therefore

assumed that the Examiner

See, Kimberly-Clark Corp.

as the copending

5, p. 1 and PX

it should be

knew about it.

v. Johnson &

178a

Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1457 (Fed. Cir.

1984).

As to U. S. Patent No. 3,987,610 vis-a-

vis the '370 patent, '610 was actually

cited and made of record by the Examiner

during the prosecution of the '370 patent

application, and there is no evidence to

indicate that the Examiner misunderstood

its teachings as a reference. Lacking any

such evidence, there was no duty on the

patentee to recall '610 to the Examiner's

attention after the Examiner had already

ruled that the application patentably

distinguished over the reference, since

such reference would not have then been

"material" within the meaning of 37 C.F.R.

§ 1.56 (Rule 56 of the Rules of Practice of

the Patent and Trademark Office).

As to U.S. Patent No. 4,107,957,

another Fritz Stahlecker patent, it was

likewise cited by the Examiner during the

179a

prosecution of the '370 patent application,

and defendants acknowledge this. However,

defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to

call the Examiner's attention to some

[D.S.C. 72] specific language of particular

relevance appearing in column 7 of '957.

It must be assumed that the Examiner is

qualified to perform his duties, and, once

again, there is no evidence that he misun- |

derstood the teachings of this patent re-

ference. Accordingly, there was no duty to

recall it to the Examiner's attention after

he had once cited it.

As to U.S. Patent No. 3,950,926, an-

other Fritz Stahlecker patent, defendants'

position is that this patent is material,

but they admit that it is merely cumulative

of the teachings of the '610 patent of re-

cord in the prosecution of the '370 patent

{Parkhurst Tr. 5:115]. A merely cumulative

reference is not a "material" reference for

180a

purposes of an unenforceability defense.

J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd.,

Inc., supra, at pp. 1559-1560.

Lastly, Patents Nos. 3,842,579,

4,125,989 and 4,083,171 are asserted to

give rise to an inequitable conduct defense

because they were known to the inventor or

his attorneys. Each such patent is urged

to contain examples of the well-known use

of suction tubes to control tension and

excess yarn in open-end spinning nachines

just before the take-up. And since that is

specifically claimed in certain claims,

defendants say that the references would

have been material to the examination.

[Parkhurst Tr. 5:116]. This position is

not sustainable. Although the ‘370

specification does show in a specific

embodiment the use of a suction nozzle as a

yarn deflecting element, and although the

Examiner cited no’ prior art references

FA

18la

specifically [D.S.C. 73] showing suction

nozzles, the key issues of materiality and

intent, for purposes of an inequitable con-

duct defense, are to be decided with re-

ference to the claims of the ‘370 patent.

Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,

supra, at 1457. And defendants "have not

shown that non-disclosure of [this] prior

art would have had any effect on their

allowance." Ibid. Only two of the twenty-

one claims of the '370 patent even mention

a suction nozzle, dependent Claims 7 and

20, and the nozzle is claimed in those

claims as one type of a deflecting element,

which in turn, is claimed in broader claims

as only one element of the "control means

plus function" recited in the base Claim

l. As already mentioned above, the Ex-

aminer did cite prior art showing deflect-

ing elements (e.g., Patent No. 4,107,957),

and ruled that the "370 claims were

a eee ee ee eee ee

ee a ee ont ee

182a

patentable over such prior art. Therefore,

further prior art showing nozzles as

deflecting elements would have been merely

cumulative of the prior art teachings

already before the Examiner.

Additionally, even if the reference

were to be deemed to have some materiality

to the examination, such materiality is

slight and not significant enough to carry

defendants' burden of proving the required

showing of threshold intent on the part of

plaintiffs to withhold information material

to the overall examination. J.P. Stevens &

tee,

Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., supra.

There is no evidence of any intent on the

part of the inventors or their attorneys to

purposely withhold these patents from

AL et WD SS AR! EBL det lL

scrutiny by the Examiner, and "simple

negligence, [D.S.C. 74] oversight, or an

erroneous judgment made in good faith, is

Lai aaa

183a

insufficient" to establish inequitable

conduct. Ibid. at 1560.

In conclusion, defendants have not

established by the evidence the necessarily

threshoids of materiality and intent re-

quired to "determine as a matter of law

whether the scales tilt to a conclusion

that inequitable conduct occurred." Ibid.

at 1560.

VIII. THE '946 IMPLIED LICENSE DEFENSE

Defendants contend that they have an

implied license under the '946 patent in

Suit. Such license arises, they say, out

of the facts (1) that they acquired an ex-

press paid-up license in 1982 from Murata

under the Hirai patents, and (2) that the

Suessen 1984 agreement with Murata [DX 27]

to purchase the Hirai patents recognized

defendants' right to practice the

184a

technology embraced by the Hirai patents

without interference from Suessen.

Analyzing this defense first from the

standpoint of what rights defendants ac-

quired from Murata in 1982 when they took a

license under the Hirai patents, it is

fundamental that defendants could not have

acquired from Murata any rights greater

than those which Murata had the right to

grant. And Murata had nothing more than

title to the Hirai pate

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