Opposition Brief — Tarala v. Illinois

Supreme Court brief1988

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

: a

| > Supreme Court, 7

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

GREGORY TARALA,

Petitioner,

Vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT CERTIORARI

TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DIVISION

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

NEIL F. HARTIGAN,

Attorney General

State of Illinois

TERENCE M. MADSEN

Assistant Attorney General

188 West Randoiph Street,

Suite 2200

Chicago, Illinois 60601

Attorneys for Respondent.

RICHARD M. DALEY

State's Attorney

County of Cook

500 Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago, Illinois 60602

JOAN S. CHERRY,

KENNETH T. McCURRY,

JOHN A. GASIOROWSKI,

Assistant State's Attorneys

Of Counsel.

*counsel of Record.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Appellate Court of

Illinois correctly found that the trial court

exercised proper judicial discretion in

sentencing petitioner to five years’ for

concealment of a homicidal death, even though

the murderer received 3 years for’ the

concealment of a homicidal death conviction,

where petitioner was the main actor in the

disposal of the victim's body.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question DOGRRRTOE. 6 oe kth ce dsbarnees Kas ena i

Table of Cee Oe. 6 kee bbe eS 6 RES ii

Table of ey hee) rn ener es 343

Opinion 3 Pare a ee eee eee ee ee 1

Bee ee ee re ar er be ree 2

Statement of the CaSe€.....cceceeeecvcves 3

Reason for Denying Writ. .cccccsscccicoes -49

THE APPELLATE COURT OF

ILLINOIS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT

THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED

PROPER JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN

SENTENCING PETITIONER TO FIVE

YEARS FOR CONCEALMENT OF A

HOMICIDAL DEATH, EVEN THOUGH 7

THE MURDERER RECEIVED 3 YEARS

FOR THE CONCEALMENT OF A

HOMICIDAL DEATH CONVICTION,

WHERE PETITIONER WAS THE MAIN

ACTOR IN THE DISPOSAL OF THE

VICTIM'S Des cdawancen be eennse se 25

Ce Ea 3 fs kd ok ieee bh ebes dewrEns 36

nti

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 244,

90 S. Ct. 2018 (1976)...

Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,

104 S. Ct. 32i7 (1964)..

People v. LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482,

431 N.E.2d 344 (1982)...

People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill.

300 Musee BOe CESTT i ce cv ceke

People v. Cox, 82 Ill.

2d 149,

People v. Lambrechts, 69 Ill. 2d 544,

372 M.B.2G GEL (1977) ..ccreees abaes

- People v. Morgan, 59 Ill. 2d 276,

S29 Mee d 764 (IBIS ccd acdicdocoss

People v. Stanley,

2d 268,

Sie Baca DAs Cee caceusicds hve

146 Ill. App. 3d 912,

497 N.E.2d 496 (list Dist. 1986)....

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,

102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (distinguished).. .

Lids

This

Rev.

sec.

Rev.

sec.

Stat. 1983, ch. 38,

1005-8-1(a)(6).....

iii

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

GREGORY TARALA,

Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT CERTIORARI

TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DIVISION

OPINION BELOW

The petitioner was convicted of

concealment of a homicidal death in violation

of Illinois Revised Statutes, 1983, ch. 38,

mac. 9-3.1. Petitioner was sentenced to a

five year term of imprisonment. The judgment

and sentence of the Circuit Court were

affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court,

First Judicial District, Fifth Division,

reported at 153 Ill. App. 3d 199, 505 N.E.2d

128 (lst Dist. 1987) and attached as an

Appendix to petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Certiorari. The Illinois Appellate Court

subsequently denied petitioner's petition for

rehearing in an order which is attached in

the Appendix to petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Certiorari. Petitioner's Petition

for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme

Court was denied on October 7, 1987.

JURISDICTION

Petitioner has filed a timely

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and this

Court's jurisdiction has been properly

invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257(3).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 9, 1983, Thomas Stanley

and Gregory Tarala (petitioner) were arrested

and charged under Information No. 83-C-605473

with three counts of murder, one count of

aggravated kidnapping, one count of unlawful

restraint, and one count of concealment of a

homicidal death. (R. C 157-162) These

charges were’ based on the murder. by

strangulation of Laura Williams. (R. 157-

162) Prior to. trial, a motion’ for

substitution of judges was brought by

petitioner. (R. 17) This motion was granted

and Stanley and petitioner were tried

separately by different judges. (R. 18)

The case against petitioner

proceeded to trial before Circuit Court Judge

Frank Meekins on February 26, 1985. (R. 19)

At trial, the People presented four

witnesses. The testimony of these witnesses

established that the following events

occurred.

On April 24, 1983, at approximately

7:30 p.m., Laura Williams, 15, was in her

home at 3801 West 116th Place, in

unincorporated Cook County, where she lived

with her step father, Roy DiGuido, her

mother, her brother and her sister. (R. 35)

At 7:30 p.m., Thomas Stanley arrived at the

Williams’ home and remained there until 8:00

p.m. (R. 36) About 15 minutes after Stanley

left, Laura Williams left her home. and

returned 15 minutes later. (R. 36-37) After

remaining in her home for about 5 minutes,

Laura left again, never again to be " seen

@live by her family. (R. 37)

At approximately 11:00 p.m., on

April 24, 1983, Roy DiGuido, Laura's step

father, called the Cook County Sheriff's

Police to report that his daughter Laura was

missing. (R. 38) From April 24 until May 5,

Roy DiGuido had approximately six

conversations with petitioner as to the

whereabouts of his daughter. (R. 39-40) On

these occasions, petitioner stated that he

had no knowledge or information concerning

the location or health of Laura. (R. 41) Not

until May 5, 1983, did Roy DiGuido discover

the whereabouts of his daughter. (R. 38-39)

At 9:30 p.m., on that day, he viewed her dead

body in the morgue. (R. 39)

Earlier in the evening on May 5,

1983, the body of Laura Williams was found up

against the south side of the Calumet City

Channel in Blue Island, Illinois. (R. 50)

Laura's body, which was found partially

decomposed, was removed from the waterway and

pronounced dead at St. Francis Hospital.

(R.51)

On November 9, 1983, Cook County

Assistant State's Attorney James’ Reilly

interviewed petitioner. (R. 64) At that

time, petitioner made a voluntary and signed

statement as to his involvement in the murder

of Laura Williams. (R. 68) Petitioner's

statement recalled the following events.

On April 24, 1983, at approximately

9:00 p.m., in vicinity of 119th and Central

Park, petitioner was driving his car and saw

‘Thomas Stanley, his brother-in-law. (R. 75)

Petitioner stopped to talk to Stanley, who

told petitioner that "I (Stanley) think I did

something I should not have." (R. 75)

Stanley told petitioner that Stanley and

Laura Williams had engaged in an argument

which resulted in Stanley choking Laura,

possibly to death. (R. C201) Stanley then

took petitioner over to some bushes where

petitioner saw “a female lying on her back

with her sweater or jacket open and her pants

undone." (R. 76) After seeing the girl, who

was later identified as Laura Williams,

petitioner grabbed her by her coat and

Stanley grabbed her by her feet, and they

then put her in the backseat of petitioner's

car. (R. 76) At this time, petitioner

stated that he did not know if she was alive

or dead. (R. 76) Not knowing of Laura's

condition, petitioner attempted to revive her

but did not get a response. (R. 77) After

attempting to revive her, petitioner drove

Stanley to a forest preserve located on

Thornton Blue Island Road. (RR. 77)

Petitioner pulled onto the shoulder of the

road, got out of the car, grabbed Laura by

her coat while Stanley grabbed her. by her

feet, and proceeded to carry Laura into the

woods. (R. 78) After going about 20 feet

into the woods, petitioner told Stanley to

"do something with her," as_ petitioner

returned to his car. (R. 78) Stanley later

told petitioner that he brought Laura a few

more feet and covered her up. (R. 79) The

two then left the scene by car, = and

petitioner went to his mother-in-law's house

after dropping Stanley off at the "Frosty

Mug". (R. 79)

At approximately 1:00 a.m.,

petitioner picked up Stanley and returned to

the woods where they had placed Laura's body.

(R. 80) They returned to the woods in order

to put Laura's body in the water because

petitioner "figured someone would find her

that way." (R. 81) When they arrived at

the forest preserve, petitioner told Stanley

to put Laura's body in the water, and Stanley

returned shortly thereafter, having done so.

(R. 81)

After presenting the evidence of

petitioner's statement, the People presented

a witness by way of stipulation. The

Stipulation concerned the testimony of Dr.

Beamer, a Cook County Medical Examiner. He

had performed an autopsy on Laura. (R. 87)

As a result of the autopsy, he determined

that the cause of death was by "asphyxiation

consistent with drowning or choking. He

could not rule out one more in favor of

another." (R. 87)

At the close of the People's case,

petitioner moved for a directed verdict on

the three murder counts, the aggravated

kidnapping count and the unlawful restraint

count. (R. 97) The trial court entered a

finding of not guilty on those counts. (R.

97) As to count six (the concealment count),

petitioner did not make a motion, and rested.

Each side waived closing arguments and the

court found petitioner guilty of concealment

of a homicidal death. (R. 98)

On May 24, 1985, a sentencing

hearing was held before Judge Meekins. In

aggravation, the People presented the

stipulated testimony of Chicago Police

Officer J. Nolan. (R. 109) Officer Nolan

testified that on January 1, 1985, the

petitioner, while he was on bond for awaiting

trial for the murder and the other charges in

this case, was arrested and charged with

gambling. The arrest grew out of the

execution of a search warrant by Chicago

Police Officers. (R. 108) In executing the

warrant, the officers recovered gambling

paraphernalia from the premises. (R. 110)

Petitioner, who was on the premises at the

time of the search, was searched and gambling

wagers commingled with United States Currency

were recovered from petitioner's wallet. (R.

109-111) In mitigation, the petitioner

presented the testimony of Suzaenne Griffen,

an aunt of Thomas Stanley, and Donna Stanley,

who is Stanley's mother and petitioner's

mother-in-law. Upon hearing this evidence in

aggravation and mitigation, the court

sentenced petitioner to 5 years imprisonment.

In making its decision, the trial

judge "considered many factors in determining

what a fair sentence is and attempt(ed) to

strike a balance between the _- possible

rehabilitative potential of a defendant and

the debt of society for the offense which he

committed." (R. 136) As to the factors in

aggravation, the judge based his decision on

the factors listed in Section 1005-5-3.2 of

the Unified Code of Corrections. Ill. Rev.

Stat. ch. 38, sec. 1005-5-3.2. (R. 136)

First, the judge considered whether

the petitioner's conduct caused or threatened

serious harm. (R, 436) Examining this

factor, the judge said, "there is no question

in this Court's mind that that factor is

overwhelmingly present in this case." The

judge explained that this crime was very

serious due to the petitioner's state of

mind. (R. 138) The judge further emphasized

his point by stating:

Again in his statement to

Assistant State's Attorney

Reilly he mentioned that at

the time they put the body in

the car he did not know if she

was dead or alive. It is not

that unreasonable an inference

that possibly he could have

saved that young lady's life

by taking her to a hospital or

calling paramedics, or

whatever. It seems totally

inconsistent to this Court --

And I acknowledge the fine

argument made by Defense

Counsel -- To believe that as

a man who possesses’ remorse

and compassion and concern in

that if you believe he gave

mouth to mouth resuscitation -

- Because if you believe that,

why wouldn't his first

thoughts be of whatever he

could do for that little girl

to possibly save her life

Since he indicated he didn't

know if she was dead or alive.

So the crime in that

respect in this Court's

opinion is more serious

because of his state of mind

than if he had been

categorically guaranteed that

Laura was dead at the time.

(R. 138)

Second, the judge considered the

prior delinquency or criminal behavior of

the petitioner as a factor both in

aggravation and mitigation. (R. 137) As to

this factor, the judge stated that although

petitioner had no prior criminal record, the

judge did not believe that petitioner

possessed rehabilitative potential because

while he was out on bond for this murder

case, the petitioner engaged in _ illegal

conduct, namely gambling. (R. 109-111)

Third, the judge considered whether

the sentence was necessary to deter others

from committing the same crime. Concerning

this factor, the judge stated,

Well in this Court's

humble opinion there is_ no

question that you have to

impose a strict sentence to

get a message to society that

we cannot go around concealing

homicidal deaths because

despite what I have heard here

today, common sense in this

Court's opinion dictates that

the motivation behind that

factor is to isolate the

individual who caused the

death so that he shall never

be apprehended for

prosecution. And society

cannot stand for’ potential

murderers going loose because

someone else is successful in

isolating him. And people

must learn that. (R. 137-138)

Fourth, the judge, noting the

"reviewing court's attitudes towards victim

impact," considered two aspects of victim

impact in this case. (R. 139) The judge

considered the impact of petitioner's actions

on the victim, Laura Williams, and the impact

of petitioner's actions on her parents. (R.

139) As to the impact of petitioner's acts

on Laura, the judge stated, "Laura, a victim

possibly road [sic] around in a car suffering

beyond belief because she still had embers of

life within her." (R. 139)

Finally, the judge commented on

petitioner's claim of remorse and compassion.

The judge rejected any belief that petitioner

exhibited any of these qualities. The court

stated:

As far as remorse and

compassion, Mr. Aprati has

argued that Mr. Tarala did

everything he could to help

the girl. I think that flies

in the face of logic, and

flies in the face of the

testimony in this case.

He also said he did what

he could do to mitigate his

wrong. And I guess the only

‘thing that stands for that

proposition is that he put her

in the water after they stuck

her in the woods. And God

knows I search my heart to

find how that was mitigating,

and I can't. (R. 140)

As to mitigation, the trial court

considered the facts set forth in section

1005-5-3.1 of the Unified Code of

Corrections. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, sec.

1005-5-3.1. (R. 140) The court found that

factor one, that petitioner's criminal

conduct neither caused or threatened serious

physical harm to another, was not present.

(R. 140) The court found that the factor

two, that petitioner did not contemplate that

his criminal conduct would cause or threaten

serious physical harm to another, was not

present. (R. 141) The court found that

factor three, that petitioner acted under a

strong provocation, was totally missing. (R.

142) Likewise, the court found that factor

four, that there were grounds tending to

excuse or justify the conduct, was not

present. (R. 141) Additionally, the court

found that factor five, that petitioner's

criminal conduct was induced or facilitated

by someone other than the petitioner, was not

present. (R. 141) Finally, the court found

that there was a prior history of

delinquency, noting that his comments in

aggravation explained this factor. (R. 141)

As to the factor that petitioner's

criminal conduct was the result of

circumstances unlikely to reoccur, the court

stated:

I don't think that is present

‘here. It isn't a question of

@ man panicking in this

Situation. It's a question in

this Court's opinion of true

malice aforethought once he

discovered the _ body. He

knowingly and intentionally

Gid what he wanted to do. I

think if faced with a similar

Situation -- If he did that to

someone allegedly so close to

him, why would he not do it

again to someone not so close.

The fact that he even engaged

in criminal activity while out

on bail on a murder’ case

certainly indicates that

apparently the law does not

scare him that much. (R.

142)

As to petitioner's character and

attitudes--demonstrating his unlikeliness to

commit another crime, the court commented

that petitioner's two character witnesses

were not completely credible. The court

stated, "I would expect them to say nothing

less than what they did. And I suppose I

respect them for that. But the weight to be

given to that evidence is questionable.” (R.

142)

Finally, the judge considered that

the petitioner was eligible, under’ the

statute, for probation. (R. 142) The judge

noted that the "case law is quite clear that

eligiblity for probation should be considered

strongly by a court unless there is something

that dictates strongly against it. To deny

probation when probation is presumed

eligible, the court must enter, or come to a

finding that in fact to grant probation would

totally deprecate the seriousness of the

offense and be inconsistant with the ends of

justice." (R. 142-143) In applying the law,

the court stated:

And unfortunately for Mr.

Tarala, I find that that is

100 percent the case in this

case; that this offense is

very serious. .

So to send a message to

the People of the State of

Illinois that you can conceal

a homicidal death aand_= get

probetion would totally

deprecate the seriousness of

the offense. And I can in no

manner see how it can ever be

consistent with the ends of

justice. (R. 143)

After explaining how he perceived

all the factors and facts in aggravation and

mitigation, the judge made his decision. The

judge sentenced petitioner to a term of

incarceration in the Illinois Department of

Corrections for 5 years.”

On May 24, 1985, petitioner filed

his notice of appeal to the Appeliate Court

of Illinois, First Judicial District. On

March 13, 1987, the Appellate Court of

Illinois, First Judicial District, Fifth

Division, affirmed defendant's sentence, with

one justice dissenting. (See, Appendix to

Petitioner's Petition at 1-22.) Petitioner's

Petition for Rehearing was denied on April

10, 1987. (See, Appendix to Petitioner's

Petition at 23). On October 7, 1987,

petitioner's Petition for Leave to Appeal to

the Supreme Court of Illinois was denied.

*Thomas Stanley was found guilty of

murder, aggravated kidnapping, concealment of

a homicidal death and unlawful restraint.

Stanley was sentenced to concurrent terms of

30 years for murder and 3 years’ for

(footnote continued)

concealment of a homicidal death. Stanley's

and petitioner's cases were not heard before

the same judge nor were they sentenced by the

same judge. However, their convictions and

sentences were both affirmed by the Fifth

Division of the First Judicial District of

the Illinois Appellate Court. People _ v.

Stanley, 146 Ill. App. 3d 912, 497 N.E.2d 496

(lst Dist. 1986).

REASON FOR DENYING THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THE APPELLATE COURT OF

ILLINOIS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT

THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED

PROPER JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN

SENTENCING PETITIONER TO FIVE

YEARS FOR CONCEALMENT OF A

HOMICIDAL DEATH, EVEN THOUGH

THE MURDERER RECEIVED 3 YEARS

FOR THE CONCEALMENT OF A

HOMICIDAL DEATH CONVICTION,

WHERE PETITIONER WAS THE MAIN

ACTOR IN THE DISPOSAL OF THE

VICTIM'S BODY.

After his convictions were affirmed

by the Illinois Appellate Court and his

petition for leave to appeal was denied by

the Illinois Supreme Court, petitioner filed

the instant. petition for a Writ of

Certiorari. Herein, petitioner contends that

in this case the Illinois Appellate Court

established the rule that "a less culpable

person may receive a greater sentence for the

same offense than the more culpable person

for whose conduct petitioner was found

accountable." (Petitioner's Petition at 14)

The State of Illinois maintains’ that

petitioner's interpretation of the facts in

the case at hand is incorrect and maintains

that the Illinois Appellate Court correctly

found that the trial court exercised proper

judicial discretion in sentencing defendant

to five years imprisonment for concealment of

a homicidal death.

In Illinois, concealment of a

homicidal death is a Class 3 felony. This

Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, sec. 9-3.l(c). A

Class 3 felony is punishable by not less than

2 years and not more than 2 years

imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983; ch. 38,

sec. 1005-8-1(a) (6)

This Honorable Court has held that

sentencing judges are vested with wide

discretion in the exceedingly difficult task

of determining the appropriate punishment in

the countless variety of situations’ that

appear. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 244,

90 S. Ct. 2018, 2023 (1970) Wasman v. United

States, 466 U.S. 559, 104 &. Ct. 3217, 3220

(1984). The Constitution permits qualitative

differences in meting out punishment and

“there is no requirement that two persons

convicted of the same offense receive

identical sentences. Williams v. Illinois,

399 U.S. 244, 90 &. Ct. 2016, 2023 (1970).

Furthermore, Illinois Courts have

likewise long held that a trial court's

decision with respect to sentencing is

entitled to great deference and _ weight.

People v. LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431

N.E.2d 344 (1982). It is a well settled

principle of law that absent an abuse of

discretion by the trial court, a sentence may

not be altered upon review. People v.

Perruquet, 68 I1l1. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 682

(1977). Such is the case due to the trial

court's "superior position from which to

determine an appropriate disposition."

People v. Lambrechts, 69 I1l. 2d 544, 559,

372 N.E.2d 641, 649 (1977). Rather than

having merely a "cold record” on appeal to

base the imposition of its sentence, the

trial court is afforded a better opportunity

to consider the many factors from which an

appropriate sentence may be deduced. People

v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2a 149, i254, 368

N.E.2d 882, 884. Such factors include

defendant's credibility, demeanor, general

moral character, mentality, social

environment, habits and age. Id. at 154. An

additional and most important factor is the

seriousness of defendant's crime. People v.

Morgan, 59 Ill. 2a 276, 319 N.E.2d 764

(1974). The trial court is faced with the

difficult task cf striking a balance between

the protection of society and rehabilitation

of the offender based on these _ factors.

People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d

541 (1980).

In the case at hand, the trial

court exercised proper judicial discretion

when it sentenced petitioner to five years

for concealment of a homicidal death. As the

Appellate Court stated:

Here, the trial court

commented upon the

circumstances surrounding the

facts in this case and the

impact upon the social

environment in the community.

Further, although the

defendant had no prior record,

the court could properly

consider his arrest for

gambling charges. We do not

find that the sentence imposed

was an abuse of discretion and

therefore we will not disturb

the sentence on appeal. (Cite

omitted) People v. Tarala,

505 N.E.2d at 1286.

Clearly, the trial court extensively examined

the record and, in exercising its discretion,

determined that the five year sentence was

appropriate. Such decision should be

entitled to great deference and let to stand.

In his petition, petitioner now

alleges that his sentence was not _ proper

claiming that "(t)he rule of this case is

that petitioner, a less culpable person, may

receive a greater sentence for the same

offense than the more culpable person for

whose conduct petitioner was found

‘accountable.* (Petitioner's Petition at 4).

However, the respondent maintains that based

on a clear examination of the record, it is

obvious that petitioner was the more culpable

person and the principle actor, thus

petitioner's claim to the contrary belies the

record.

*Petitioner did not raise the issue

of disparate sentencing in his appeal to the

Appellate Court of Illinois. Thus,

respondent maintains that petitioner should

be foreclosed from now raising it before this

Honorable Court and his petition should be

dismissed.

In the case at hand, the evidence

presented clearly established that petitioner

was more culpable than Thomas Stanley for the

crime in which nothétonae was convicted, that

is, concealment of a homicidal death.

Although Stanley murdered Laura Williams,

petitioner was the main actor in_ the

concealment and disposal of her body. The

evidence established that when petitioner

found that Stanley had strangled Laura during

an argument, petitioner grabbed her by her

coat and Stanley by her feet and put Laura in

the backseat of petitioner's car. (R. 76)

Petitioner then drove to a forest preserve,

grabbed Laura by her coat, while Stanley

grabbed her by her feet, and proceeded to

carry her 20 feet into the woods. (R. 78)

Although Stanley then carried Laura deeper

ints the woods, such act was done pursuant to

petitioner's command to "do something with

her." (R. 78)

The evidence also established that

a 1:00 a.m. that morning, petitioner left his

mother-in-law's house and drove Stanley to

the woods where petitioner and Stanley had

originally disposed of Laura's body. (R. 80)

Petitioner and Stanley returned to the woods

to put her (Laura) in the water since

petitioner “figured someone would find her

that way." (R. 81) Once at the woods,

petitioner ordered Stanley "to take the body

"and put it in the water.” (R. 81)

The evidence clearly showed that

although Thomas Stanley strangled Laura

Williams, petitioner was the main actor in

the disposal of the _ body. Petitioner

directed Stanley as to how the body should be

disposed and Stanley followed petitioner's

directions. Clearly petitioner's claim that

petitioner only had a "peripheral

involvement" in the crime is belied by the

record.

Additionally, there is no evidence

that petitioner was anything but the

principal actor behind the disposing of

Laura's body. There is nothing in the record

that would indicate that the trial court

found petitioner guilty of concealment of a

homicidal death based on the theory of

accountability. Thus, there is no merit to

petitioner's claim that he was “found

accountable for the conduct of Stanley"

(Petitioner's petition at 6) and petitioner's

reliance on this Court's decision in Enmund

v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368

(1982) is misplaced.

In sum, it is clear that the

Appellate Court of Illinois correctly found

that the trial court exercised proper

judicial discretion in sentencing petitioner

to five yeers imprisonment for concealment of

a homicidal death. Petitioner's claim that

such sentence was not proper since Thomas

Stanley, the murderer, only received a

sentence of three years imprisonment for the

concealment offense is meritless since

petitioner was clearly more accountable in

the disposal of the victim's body. Thus,

petitioner's petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

Respondent respectfully prays that this

Honorable Court deny the instant petition for

Writ of Certiorari.

—

Respectfully submitted,