Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Trans International Airlines v. Newsome
Supreme Court brief1986
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Sumame Court, US,
fy)
86-507 | FireD
SEP 24 1986
No. JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
pice.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1986
TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
VIRGINIA NEWSOME, et al.,
Respondents.
TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,
Petitioner,
VS.
CRAIG A. KUECHEMEISTER, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
RALPH S. LaMONTAGNE, JR.* Of Counsel
WILLIAM V. O*CONNOR
HENRY C. DARMSTADTER, III
KERN & WOOLEY
10920 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90024
(213) 824-1777
Attorneys for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record for Petitioner
THOMAS R. ELLIOTT, JR.
LONDON, YANCEY, ALLEN, |
ELLIOTT & LANEY
1250 Park Place Tower
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Lawyers Brief Service / Legai Publishers / (213) 383-4457 / (714) 720-1510
4
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provide a
cause of action to any passenger for any delay of an
international charter flight — no matter how short or long
the delay might be?
2. Do Civil Aeronautics Board regulations, promulgated
pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and
incorporated into the terms of a contract of carriage,
supplement and define the term “delay” as used in
Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention?
3. Does Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention permit
carriers to condition liability for delay by placing express
provisions into the contract of carriage?
LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to the proceedings below were the petitioner
Trans International Airlines, Mabel Forrester (individually
and doing business as Sky III Enterprises, “Ambassadors
Abroad”), the class of plaintiffs represented by Virginia A.
Newsome in the class action captioned Virgina A. Newsome,
et al. v. Trans International Airlines, et al. and the class of
plaintiffs represented by Craig A. Kuechenmeister in the
class action captioned Craig A. Kuechenmeister, et al. y.
Trans International Airlines, et al. Both of the class action
suits were certified and consolidated for trial by the Circuit
Court of Alabama.
Mabel Forrester’s directed verdict was affirmed by the
Alabama Supreme Court and since that issue is not
addressed in this petition, Mabel Forrester is not named as a
party herein.
The petitioner before this Court is Trans International
Airlines,” and the respondents are that class of plaintiffs
represented by Virginia A. Newsome and that class of
plaintiffs represented by Craig A. Kuechenmeister in the
consolidated class action matter.
* For compliance with Rule 28.1 see Appendix p. A-26.
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—ili—
TOPICAL INDEX
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......eeceecsseetseeeeeteeteetnentnetneetseens i
I BE FEED cecpnccccoccessssvevcosscevscncscvesessovccsccssscscosescosocess il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................ccccccccresccsssccessccssesees Vv
OPINIONS BELOW ..........cccccccccssscccccccscccnsccccesssscssessosscscoosees Z
FEFRRTSDICTION aonccccccccccccccccscccvccccsccsccssccscccccecocessenssecsscccccsccecs 2
TREATY AND FEDERAL STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS INVOLVED ...........ccccsesececesssceeeeseceenenes 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........:ccccccesesssseeeeeeeseeeeeeneneees 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..............208 5
a THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT IN-
CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CAB
TARIFF, INCORPORATED INTO THE
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE, WAS NOT
INTENDED TO DEFINE AND SUPPLE-
MENT THE TERM “DELAY” AS USED
Ee, ss kebadsatoenensnpenesseceussesavesensceseoences 6
Il. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT IN-
CORRECTLY RULED THAT
ARTICLE 19 WAS NOT INTENDED TO
PERMIT CARRIERS TO CONDITION
THEIR LIABILITY FOR DELAY BY
PLACING EXPRESS LIMITS IN THE
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. ..........ccccccccrsssscssreee 13
(a) INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 19
TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION .............. 14
CONCLUSION ........ Ftd a saahdabnsbbaesenskesiesenianineaseveseuennenees 21
suiplliatciees
Page
APPENDIX
OPINION AND JUDGMENT OF THE
ALABAMA SUPREME COURT, AND
FINAL JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA ........ A-1
TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION AND
SUBSIDIARIES WITH STATE OF INCOR-
PN EIEN | pesaicinessnsndisiassnnsavencunobasntevosioneraescsibiasns A-26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974
GO4 Fe 11 CH GAR. FRR). cere Serie 9, 10
Air France v. Saks \
— U.S. —, 84 L.Ed.2d 289, 105 S.C.t 1338
EIN sainsichicaanressecepraadipan spars boinc oaeeenaiomnabeadaoa eens oes 14
Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
344 F.Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
OIE, SIT FB FOR CR Gr. TED aieccscnsscsscsnccsnsennsens 6
Butler’s Shoe Corp. v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc. 514 F.2d 1283 (Sth Cir. 1975) ......... 12
Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States
Oe Be EE dhiiiidlainsdtaticiiiarinenanisenmnes 14
Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
ae Se Es Te iki ocinsincistctitnoes 9
Jahanger v. Purolator Sky Carriers
615 F.Supp. 29 (B.D. Penn. 1985) ........:.0ccc00006. 13, 14
Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
BO Fe re Se Ges ED ii ivccisciessssesccinsanipicavsvccens 6
Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States
ee ae es EN aes sore nrisatnicevinientemnmnixesapnays 8
Tishman and Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines
GES FA Pe Ge Ga, FOOD va ceccecenrentssscvcinisiinecivenness 8
Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.
466 U.S. 243, 80 L.Ed.2d 273, 104 S.Ct. 1776
I incicL since civacsinineancbicioeeieinalenelessddsnssssnistasinbicveaaatanesbaaeciarneataien 10
aor a
Page
«
Treaties, Statutes and Regulations
ce. RPC OD vicsnnsiswrccesebeninacinediardtieaaabiibintieieiaress 2
WF ES BK. BE LAE Oo OG. CGI vawicsciticcsissdecassvstctacioenves 2,4, 8
Warsaw Convention, concluded, October 12, 1929,
49 Stat. 3000 T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted
OE Te FR Ce sitvtkctiscsdnccsaceines passim
PE EP DOG. FA) CIGD vcccsnsnscsscsvixinessvepsssnscncosans 7, 10, 11
Miscellaneous
1 L. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law § 11.01(2)
[BP WEE scianuseoassevenessnsvensansbaltswedudioashiaseeeaeshsnnelnnalenalasiennaaasin 9
International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air
Questions, Minutes, Second International
Conference on Private Aeronauiical Law, October
4-12, 1929, Warsaw (R. Horner & d. Legrez Trans.
EWP 7 Sip <<x:esnscsaniunsennnisontieneniendemansidiniaadadaiabslininaenaaiaiaiet tania 15
Jean-Louis Magdelenat, Air Cargo Regulation and
Claims (English Language Edition 1983) ..............c.0 10
Prof. dr. I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduc-
SRG 0G EF EAU TIED ccicicsierpitsasid gaia 10
IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
October Term, 1986
TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,
Petitioner,
VS.
VIRGINIA NEWSOME, et al.,
Respondents.
TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,
Petitioner,
VS.
CRAIG A. KUECHEMEISTER, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Trans International Airlines requests that a
writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion
of the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama entered in
this action on March 28, 1986 which, in part, reversed and
remanded for retrial a final judgment of the Circuit Court
of Jefferson County, Alabama.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court, not yet
released for official publication, is reprinted in the appendix
hereto at page la, infra. The final judgments ot the Circuit
Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, which are
unreported, are reprinted at __ a and __ a, infra.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court was
entered on March 28, 1986. A timely application for
rehearing was over-ruled on June 27, 1986. This Court’s
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).
TREATY AND FEDERAL STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS INVOLVED
This case concerns the construction and purpose of the
Warsaw Convention, concluded October 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 reprinted at 49 U.S.C.
§1502 note, in particular, Article 19 thereof. This case
further concerns the Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. 85-726,
72 Stat. 737 (1958), codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1301
et. seq. and Civil Aeronautics Board regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the authority granted by the Federal
Aviation Act.
- |
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This class action arises as a result of a delay in the
departure of a tour group oa a charter flight from
Birmingham, Alabama to Europe. Respondents are
representatives of the class members of the tour group, and
petitioner TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
(“TIA”) is the carrier that provided transportation for the
tour group to Europe.
Mabel Forrester, doing business as Sky III Enterprises
and Ambassadors Abroad, a named defendant in the action,
organized the European charter tour for respondents. In
this regard, Forrester contracted with TIA to provide a
roundtrip charter flight for respondents aboard a TIA
aircraft from Birmingham, Alabama to Milan, Italy and on
to Athens, Greece.
On March 11, 1979, as a result of mechanical difficulties,
the scheduled departure of the TIA chartered flight for the
tour group was delayed approximately 32 hours. TIA
provided hotel accommodations, meals and ground
transportation during the delay. Due to this delay, plaintiffs
instituted a class action for breach of contract against TIA
and Mabel Forrester.! This action proceeded to trial and
after the close of plaintiffs’ case, both TIA and Mabel
Forrester moved for directed verdicts which were granted
by the court. Thereafter, plaintiffs appealed the lower
court’s ruling to the Alabama Supreme Court, and on
March 28, 1986, the Alabama Supreme Court, in part,
1 An initial class action was filed on September 13, 1979 by Virginia A.
Newsome and others against TIA and Mabel Forrester. On
September 12, 1979, a second class action was filed with the
Kuechenmeisters as named plaintiffs against TIA and Forrester. Both
actions were consolidated and certified as class actions by court order.
reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for
retrial. TIA’s application for rehearing was overruled on
June 27, 1986.
The trial court granted TIA’s motion for directed verdict
based upon the finding that there was no breach of contract
by TIA because of the delay provisions incorporated into
the charter contract. This delay provision, promulgated
pursuant to a Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”)? Regula-
tion, provided that TIA was only obligated to provide
substitute air travel in the case of delays in excess of 48
hours. Therefore, since the delay was 32 hours and since the
contract terms and CAB regulation permitted delays up to
48 hours, the court determined that the contract had not
been breached and no cause of action could be maintained.
The Alabama Supreme Court reversed this decision on
the ground that Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention?
provides a remedy for any delay of an international charter
flight. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the CAB
regulation and charter tariff permitting delays up to 48
hours was not intended to define and supplement the term
“delay” as used in Article 19 of the Convention, and that
Article 19 did not permit a carrier to condition liability for
2 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40, 92
Stat. 1075, 1744 (1978), terminated the Civil Aeronautics Board as
well as some provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,49 U.S.C.
1301 et seq. (1976). The authority of the CAB with respect to foreign
air transportation was transfered to the Department of
Transportation. 49 U.S.C.§ 1551(6)(B) (1981).
3 The Warsaw Convention, formerly titled ‘“‘The Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air”, was adhered to by the United States in June 1934. The
original Convention was published in French and an English
translation is published at 49 Stat. 3014 (1934) and 49 U.S.C. § 1502
note (1976).
delay by contract.4 In short, the Alabama Supreme Court
held that any international passenger has a cause of action
for breach of contract under Article 19 as long as a flight is
delayed for any amount of time no matter how short that
amount of time may be.°
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Alabama Supreme Court decision interpretes the
Warsaw Convevtion to provide an international air
passenger with an action for delay against the carrier for
any deviation in that carrier’s charter flight. This
interpretation is contrary to the intent of the Convention.
Given the nature of air travel this would run havoc among
all international air carriers. Furthermore, the Alabama
opinion forbids the cognizant federal agency (or the carrier
by contract) from placing reasonable restrictions on this
action for delay.
This decision reflects inaccurate law. In fact, the Warsaw
Convention both permits a signatory state to reasonably
define the term “delay” and allows carriers to condition
4 The ticket jacket, a part of the contract of carriage between TIA and
respondents, stated the flight times for the entire tour, including the
departure from Birmhingham, Alabama. However, on the front of the
jacket, just below the flight times, was specified, “ALL TIMES
SHOWN ARE LOCAL TIMES (issued for informational purposes
only)”.
5 The Alabama Supreme Court also found that the Warsaw Convention
was plaintiff’s exclusive remedy and that all state common law actions
were inapplicable. However, on retrial, in order to employ the liability
limitations of the Convention, TIA must show that the airline tickets
were timely delivered to respondents. Finally, the Supreme Court
upheld Mabel Forrester’s directed verdict because of a hold harmless
clause in her contract with respondents.
liability by contract. The Alabama Court opinion is in
conflict with at least one federal court case, and in effect,
puts carriers in the impossible position of either being
exactly on time or being faced with lawsuits by all the
passengers. Given this decision’s important implications to
international] air travel, it is appropriate and advisable that
the Supreme Court grant certiorari to resolve this issue
under the Warsaw Convention.
THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT INCOR-
RECTLY FOUND THAT THE CAB TARIFF,
INCORPORATED INTO THE CONTRACT
OF CARRIAGE, WAS NOT INTENDED TO
DEFINE AND SUPPLEMENT THE TERM
“DELAY” AS USED IN ARTICLE 19
The contract of carriage between TIA and respondents,
as evidenced by the passenger ticket, incorporated all
applicable tariffs that TIA filed with the CAB.
Once a tariff is filed with the CAB it becomes part of the
contract between the passenger and carrier. Lichten v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 938 (2nd Cir. 1951); Blair v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 344 F.Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972) aff’d,
477 F.2d 564 (Sth Cir. 1973).
In this regard, TIA had in effect at the time of
respondents’ flight a charter tariff which stated:
Departure flight delays: In the case of flight
delays of more than forty-eight (48) hours beyond
the departure time stated in the charter contract,
TIA, upon request and at the charterer’s option,
nisin “
will provide alternate air transportation at no
additional cost to the charter=r.®
This tariff had been established by TIA in order to meet the
requirements of a CAB regulation set forth at 14 CFR §
208.32(a) (1985).’
6 Rule No. 20(b) of TIA’s charter tariff.
7 14 CFR. §208.32(a) states:
Flight delays and substitute air transportation (foreign). Charter air
carrier shall comply with the following requirernents for passenger
service in foreign air transportation. These requirements shall be
without prejudice, and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of
passengers under applicable law;
(a) Substitute Air Transportation.
(1) On all chartered flights, unless the air carrier causes an
aircraft to finally emplane each passenger and commence the
takeoff procedures at the airport of departure before the 48th
hour following the time scheduled for the departure of such
flight, it shall provide substitute transportation in accordance with
the provisions of this paragraph.
(2) As soon as the air carrier discovers or should have discovered
by the exercise of reasonable prudence and forethought, that the
departure of any such charter flight will be delayed more than 48
hours, such air carrier shal] arrange for and pay the costs of
substitute air transportation for the charter group on another
charter flight, operated by any other carrier or foriegn air carrier.
(3) When neither the charter transportation contracted for nor
substitute transportation has been performed before the expiration
of 48 hours following the scheduled departure time of any such
charter flight, the charter, or his duly authorized agent, may
arrange for substitute air transportation of the member of the
charter group, at economy or tourist class fares, on individually
ticketed flights and the chartered air carrier shall pay the cost of
such air transportation to the substitute air carrier or foreign air
carrier.
CAB Regulations were enacted pursuant to the authority of
the Federal Aviation Set of 1958, 48 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.
(1958), and such regulations promulgated pursuant to
legislative direction have the force and effect of federal law.
Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl.
1961). Tariffs filed with the CAB are conclusive and
exclusive of the rights and liabilities of an airline and its
passenger. Tishman and Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413
F.2d 1401 (2nd Cir. 1969).
Accordingly, the charter tariff provision allowing delays
up to 48 hours was part of the contract between TIA and
respondents, and because it was established by a regulatory
agency pursuant to statute is had the force and effect of
federal law.
The fact that this tariff was incorporated into the terms
of the charter contract as required by federal law was
accepted by the Alabama Supreme Court. The State
Supreme Court, however, found that respondents had a
remedy under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention and
that although the Convention does not define the term
“delay”, the charter tariff delay provision was not intended
to provide an interpretation of that term as used for this
charter flight.
(4) In determining the period of time during which the departure
of a charter flight has been delayed within the purveiw of this
paragraph, periods of delay caused by the probation of flights to
or from the airport of departure because of weather or other
operational conditions affecting such airport shall be excluded if,
and while, the air carrier has available an airworthy aircraft
which is capable of transporting the charter group in a condition
of operational readiness.
The Warsaw Convention was drafted in 1929 when
international air travel was at its inception. Concern
developed that no air carrier could economically survive a
large aircraft disaster. Representatives of several sovereign
states agreed to meet and create a uniform body of law
governing the rights and liabilities of passengers and air
carriers in international transportation. Dunn vy. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. 589 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978); 1 L.
Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law, Section 11.01(2). The
purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to both provide
uniformity in respect to documentation and procedural
matters and to impose limitation on liability for the air
carriers. See In Re Aircrash in Bali, Indonsesia on April 22,
1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the
Warsaw Convention must be read with a view towards
accomplishing those two fold purposes.
In the instant action, the Alabama Supreme: Court
determined that the Warsaw Convention was applicable
because the flight in question from Birmingham to Italy and
Greece was clearly “international” as that term is defined
by Article 1,§ 2 of the Convention.
Article 19 of the Convention is pertinent to any action for
breach of contract caused by delay and states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned
by delay in the transportation by air of passengers,
baggage, or goods.
The carrier’s liability is subject to the defense set forth in
Article 20 which states:
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that
he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for them to take such measures.
a =
Nowhere in the Convention is the term “delay” defined
or is liability under Article 19 expounded upon. This United
States treaty provision has not been explained in any U:S.
Supreme Court opinion. It is thus necessary to examine
other sources to determine the meaning of these provisions
of the Convention. Jn Re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on
April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). In one of the
two United States Supreme Court opinions concerning the
Convention, Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.
466 US. 243, 80 L.Ed.2d 273, 104 S.Ct. 1776 (1984), the
Court permitted the CAB to supplement the Convention by
using the last official price of gold as the Convention’s
limits. The Court concluded that the CAB’s decision was
consistent with domestic law and with the Convention itself,
construed in light of its purposes, the understanding of the
signatories, and its international implementation since 1929.
Thus, it has been established that the CAB can reasonably
supplement and provide definitions for terms in the
Convention that would otherwise be ambiguous.
While no United States case law interprets the term
“delay” as used in Article 19, several foreign countries have
defined that term so that a cause of action under Article 19
can be maintained only in instances where the delay is for
an unreasonable period of time. See Prof. dr. I.H. Ph.
Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law (1983),
pp. 61-63; and Jean-Louis Magdelenat, Air Cargo
Regulation and Claims (English Language Edition 1983)
pp. 84-88. These countries obviously believe that the
Convention permits them recourse to domestic law in
regards to Article 19.
Although 14 CFR § 208.32(a) does not expressly state
that it is intended to supplement Article 19, it is clear that
charter air carriers and the CAB considered it to be the
se
remedy for delay of international charter flights. The only
provision in the contract between TIA and respondents that
in any way refers to liability for delay is the charter tariff
which was promulgated pursuant to Section 208.32(a).
Section 208.32(a), itself, is the only CAB regulation that
establishes any rights for delay for passengers of
international charter flights. Thus, the Warsaw Convention
permits domestic law to reasonably supplement and define
“delay” as used in Article 19, and the CAB reasonably did
this with the enactment of Section 208.32(a).
The Alabama Supreme Court found language in Section
208.32(a) to directly refute that it was intended to define
“delay” as used in Article 19. The second sentence of
Section 208.32(a) states:
These requirements shall be without prejudice,
and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of
passengers under applicable law.
Thus, the court found the CAB regulation was not
respondents’ sole remedy for delay. However, this misses
the point. Section 208.32(a) does not supersede or exclude a
remedy otherwise available, but merely defines a term.
Also, defining “delay” to only mean instances where the
time period exceeds 48 hours for charter flights does not
violate the Convention’s prohibitions against a carrier
limiting its liability. Again, Section 208.32(a) does not limit
a carrier’s liability but simply defines the term “delay” as
8 Article 23 of the Warsaw Convention states:
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or
to fix the lower limit in that which is laid down in this
Convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such
provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract,
which shall remain subject to the provision of this
Convention.
a. ae
used in Article 19. See Butler’s Shoe Corp. v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. 514 F.2d 1283 (Sth Cir. 1975) where
the court ruled that a Pan Am tariff requiring that written
notice of loss of goods must be received within 120 days did
not limit a carrier’s liability under Article 23.
Although the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that Section
208.32(a) does not define “delay” under Article 19, it did
not provide an alternate definition for that term. The
Alabama Supreme Court decision, if left standing, would
support the proposition that a passenger has a cause of
action for any delay of any international flight. Given the
nature of air travel, few flights are able to meet to the exact
minute the scheduled departure or arrival times. Thus,
according to the Alabama Supreme Court opinion, a
passenger could sue a carrier for a 5 minute delay in his
arrival time subject only to affirmative defenses and
damage limitations. This is obviously contrary to the intent
of the Warsaw Convention and would run havoc among
Carriers in today’s over-crowded airports.
The Alabama Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the
term “delay” as used in Article 19 was not reasonably
supplemented and defined by 14 CFR § 208.32(a) to
provide actions for delay only in those instances where the
delay was in excess of 48 hours.
|,
II
THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT INCOR-
RECTLY RULED THAT ARTICLE 19 WAS
NOT INTENDED TO PERMIT CARRIERS
TO CONDITION THEIR LIABILITY FOR
DELAY BY PLACING EXPRESS LIMITS IN
THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
While not discussed in the Alabama Supreme Court
opinion, TIA argued that the Warsaw Convention, Article
19 permits carriers to condition their liability for delay by
placing such conditions in the contract. In this case, TIA
had expressly conditioned its liability for delay by providing
in the ticket jacket, a portion of the contract, that the
departure time listed was for informational purposes only?
and by stating that it would supply substitute transportation
for delays in excess of 48 hours. Thus, if a carrier is
permitted to condition its liability for delay under the
Convention, the Alabama Supreme Court decision should
be overruled because TIA pursuant to contract expressly
did condition liability for delay as permitted by the CAB.
In Jahanger v. Purolator Sky Carrier, 615 F.Supp. 29
(E.D. Penn. 1985), plaintiff alleged that he was damaged by
a one day delay in the delivery of an international package.
Plaintiff had a claim against the Iranian government, and
this package contained legal documents that had to be
received by a certain date at the Peace Palace in the Hague
for the claim to be maintained. Plaintiff argued that
defendant was liable because its employees had informed
plaintiff’s attorney that the package would arrive on time.
9 See Note 4, supra.
conics
After determining that the Warsaw Convention applied, the
court held that plaintiff had no cause of action under
Article 19 because of language in the airway bill which
stated ‘“‘due to the nature of the business, Purolator cannot
guarantee delivery by a stipulated date or by a stipulated
time, nor shall Purolator be liable for the consequences of
delay...” While Jahanger concerned delay of a package
instead of passengers, there is no distinguishable difference
in terms of liability under Article 19. The court in Jahanger
found that the airway bill language did not run afoul of
Article 23 prohibition on limiting liability.!° Accordingly, at
least one federal court has found that carriers are permitted
to condition liability for delay under Article 19 by contract.
(a) INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 19 TO
THE WARSAW CONVENTION
In order to understand the meaning of legislation or
treaties, reference should be made to the minutes from the
conference at which the document was drafted. Justice
Sandra O’Connor in a recent United States Supreme Court
Opinion, Air France v. Saks, — U.S. —, 84 L.Ed.2d 289,
105. S.Ct. 1338 (1985), found the meaning of “accident” in
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to be consistent with
the negotiation history of the Convention. Justice O’Connor
acknowledged in interpreting a treaty, it was proper to refer
to the records of its drafting and negotiation, /d., citing,
Choctaw Nation of Indians vy. United States, 318 U.S. 423,
431 (1943).
The treaty that became the Warsaw Convention was first
drafted at an international conference in Paris during 1925.
10 See Note 8, supra.
|
oo
The draft was prepared following the First International
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, the Paris
Conference in October of 1925. A committee was
established at that conference which in the years preceding
the 1929 conference met and drafted the preliminary
document. This committee was entitled Comite Interna-
tionale Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aeriens
(CITEJA)."! |
In the report from the CITEJA committee (Minutes, pp.
251- 255), it was stated that the principal of liability in the
event of delay was maintained so that the carrier was not
free to deliver the goods or have the passenger arriving
according to the “‘carrier’s own pleasure”. This report from
the CITEJA was presented in written form to the delegates
at the Warsaw Conference.
Each country present at the conference had an
opportunity to submit its recommendations and proposed
amendments. Amendments pertinent to liability in the case
of delay, were presented by the British, German, Polish and
Hungarian delegations. These are found in the Warsaw
Minutes, pages 276, 289, 296, 301-303, 307, 315, 319-322.
During the conference in Warsaw, discussions were held in
the General Session meetings, comprised of all of the
'l This preliminary draft was the result of the CITEJA efforts and the
1925 discussions held at the First International Conference in Paris.
Prior to the 1929 Warsaw Conference, this preliminary draft was
submitted to the Conference participants giving them an opportunity
to review the articles and present recommendations. The Second
International Conference then convened in Warsaw in 1929 and
minutes from that conference were translated into English in 1975.
International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions,
Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical
Law, October 4-12, 1929 (R. Horner & D. Legrez trans. 1975).
a, ee
delegates. At the seven general session meetings, questions
and comments were made on each of the articles presented
in the preliminary draft prepared by the CITEJA.
It was in the Seventh Session, the final day of the
conference, that Article 21 was changed, renumbered and
presented as Article 19.
Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
“The carrier shall be liable for damages
occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of
passengers, baggage, or goods.” (Warsaw Minutes
at 207).
As originally presented to the convention in Warsaw,
then Article 21 provided:
“‘The carr.er shall be liable for damages sustained
during carriage:
* * al
(c) in the case of delay suffered by a traveler,
goods, or baggage.” (Warsaw Minutes at pp. 264-
265).
The discussions of damages for delay took place during
the Third Session (Warsaw Minutes pp. 55-58). The
Reporter of the CITEJA committee discussed _ the
difference between the circumstance where the period of
time for carriage was stipulated and where there was no
time period. The Committee retained liability for delay in
Article 21, but it was believed where no period was
stipulated, a reasonable time was to be implied by the judge.
Following the comments by the CITEJA Reporter, Sir
Alfred Dennis, the lead delegate from Great Britain spoke
to the General Session participants. Sir Dennis indicated
agreement with the comments of the Reporter that the
carrier should not have the ability or right to delay
—
passengers at will. Alluding to the liability imposed on
railroads, Sir Dennis stated it was reasonable to impose
certain conditions upon air carriers. Sir Dennis asserted
that even these conditions could be avoided if the carrier
stated ‘‘‘Here is our timetable, but we don’t guarantee that
our aircraft will arrive exactly at the hour indicated there is
herein something which makes sense and if the air carriers
put this condition in the contract, delay is no longer
involved, except, of course, for exceptional and unreason-
able delay.’’ (Emphasis added, Warsaw Minutes p. 55).
As an appendix to the proposal submitted by Great
Britain, the European air carriers, represented by the
International Air Traffic Association, submitted a letter
objecting to the language in the preliminary draft, relating
to this liability for delay. (Warsaw Minutes pp. 301-303). In
this letter, the IATA suggested maritime law granted to
carriers and passengers and/or shippers the right to enter
contractual relationships or transportation and there was no
reason to hold air transportation to a stricter standard. It
also argued there was no reasonable ground for depriving
air carriers of the ability to stipulate special conditions or to
take a special contract covering the question of delay. This
special contract would allow carriers, if they accept the
contract for particular delivery, to thereby take into account
extra costs, and contract for insurance for protection
against losses which might be ‘incurred. The IATA
recommended either the complete elimination of Article
21(c) or requested a decision be made that the clause
related only to cases in which by agreement a stipulation
was inserted into the contract of carriage.
In addition to the comments of Sir Dennis, a British
solicition, comments were made by Mr. Richter, of the
Ministry of Justice in Germany, Mr. Babinski of Poland,
a om
Mr. Rippert, a professor of law in France and Mr. Arendt,
Honorary President of the High Court of Justice in
Luxembourg. These gentlemen were well aware of the legal
consequences for the language found in the Convention.
Following the comments of Sir Dennis, Mr. Richter
concurred that the principal of liability for delay should be
retained though the parties should be permitted to “insert
an exoneration clause”. The Hungarian delegate declared
his agreement with the comments of the German delegation
in demanding that the principal of liability in the case of
delay be retained. However, the Hungarian delegate stated
that the Warsaw Convention should include an express
provision for the mitigation of that liability where the delay
could not have been avoided.
Although the CITEJA committee believed a judge should
have the discretion to determine liability for delay when no
period of time was stipulated, the Polish delegation asserted
this was not appropriate. Instead, the Polish delegate
requested that a different limit of liability be established for
mere delay than for damages because of death or injury to
passengers. Also, the Polish delegate suggested the
elimination of the words “by a traveler” from Article 21(c)
because of problems perceived in “innumerable trials and
difficulties of proof.”
Echoing the comments of Sir Dennis, the Polish delegate
made a comparison to railroads and remarked that there
was no such liability for damages sustained by a delayed
railway traveler. Therefore, there was no reason to create
liability for air carriers.
The final comments on this article came from Mr.
Rippert of France. The Convention was recorded and
conducted in French, and therefore, Rippert’s comments,
particularly in coming immediately before the vote on the
—
adoption of this portion of the article should be accorded
great weight. Mr. Rippert suggested that the question of
delay had not really been understood by air carriers nor the
delegates as indicated in the submitted amendments.
Rippert acknowledged that a convention such as the
Warsaw Convention had to include a provision that the
carrier was liable for delay since air carriage by its very
nature was more rapid than other means of transportation.
Rippert stated that “liability for delay”, was intended for
the circumstance where the air carrier left goods under a
hanger and did not forward them in good time. This was
similar to the liability of ordinary carriers. He emphasized
that air carriers should be held to a similar standard of
liability as other carriers by land or sea. The Convention,
remarked Rippert, says nothing more than that carriers can
stipulate a period of time for carriage, and upon including a
provision forewarning the interested parties, either passen-
gers or shippers, there will be no liability for delay. Rippert
stated:
“‘There is, for the carriers, a very simple means of
never being late: In Article 8 it is indicated that
the carriers are free to stipulate a period of
passage and to insert it in the waybill or on the
ticket. When an air carrier fears not being able to
provide carriage within four or five days, ne need
only add ‘a carriage in such and such days at
most’, and the interested parties are warned. But
what is inadmissable is that a company promise
rapid transport, that it set up a timetable, and that
it not be liable when it has not taken reasonable
measures to avoid this delay.” (Warsaw Minutes
at 57).
= =
It is evident therefore, that each of the delegates making
comments before the Third General Session at the Warsaw
Conference, discussed liability for delay, not in an absolute
sense but in terms of foreseeability and warning to the
passenger or shipper. The carrier had to place in the
contract of carriage any conditions to liability for delay in
transportation, or be subject to liability Article 21, adopted
as Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention.
These explanations and clarifications regarding the
meaning of the language in Article 21(c) on the question of
damages for delay, answered the objections of the delegates.
The article was adopted in the Third Session by a 17 to 2
vote. During the Seventh Session, the present Article 19
language was unanimously adopted. The article was
understood as maintaining the same standard of liability for
common carriers in dealing with air carriers. Accordingly,
air carriers were allowed to provide in the contract of
carriage conditions that were appropriate.
There was no guarantee or contractual promise that the
flight would depart Birmingham at 12:30 p.m. on
March 11. Trans International Airlines provided in the
contract of carriage, the ticket jacket, that the departure
time listed was “for informational purposes only”. This
contract of carriage, including the charter tariff filed with
the CAB and the Charter Agreement, provided that the
carrier was obligated to depart from Birmingham, Alabama
within 48 hours of the scheduled time for departure listed
on the ticket jacket. Undisputed testimony at trial
confirmed that departure took place within 32 or 33 hours
of the scheduled departure time. Therefore, as a matter of
law, the contract of carriage was not breached. The
contract for flight provided there was no delay if departure
occurred within 48 hours of the scheduled departure time.
> “ ‘
at Seal
iin Raat abt areca,
=
As a matter of law, no delay has occurred within the
meaning of Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention.
Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court acted impro-
perly in reversing the lower court’s directed verdict in favor
of Trans International Airlines and against the respondents,
tour participants.
CONCLUSION
Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
RALPH S. LaMONTAGNE, JR.
WILLIAM V. O’CONNOR
HENRY C. DARMSTADTER III
KERN & WOOLEY
Attorneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel
THOMAS R. ELLIOT, JR.
LONDON, YANCEY, ALLEN,
ELLIOTT & LANEY
APPENDIX
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TNT SAREE, GEO GRE Sd,
\
THE STATE OF ALABAMA .------ JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT
THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 1985-86
Virginia Newsome, et al.
84-484 v.
Trans International Airlines, et al.
and
Craig Kuechenmeister, et al.
84-835 v.
Trans International Airlines, et al.
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court
ADAMS, JUSTICE.
These appeals are from a judgment based on directed
verdicis for the defendants in consolidated breach of
contract actions brought as a result of the delay in
departure of an international flight from Birmingham,
Alabama to Europe.
Defendant Mable Forrester, d/b/a Sky III Enterprises
and Ambassadors Abroad, organized a European charter
tour and solicited the plaintiffs’ participation in the tour
through advertisement. As the tour operator, Forrester
contracted with defendant Trans International Airlines
(hereinafter ‘‘TIA”) to provide a round-trip charter flight
for the plaintiffs aboard TIA aircraft from Birmingham,
Alabama, to Milan, Italy, and Athens, Greece.
ae. ee
The flight from Birmingham to Europe was scheduled to
depart from the Birmingham airport at 12:30 p.m.,
March 11, 1979, but, because of mechanical difficulties
with TIA’s original chartered aircraft, as well as with a
replacement aircraft, departure was delayed until approxi-
mately 8:30 p.m., March 12, 1979; a delay of about 32
hours. The flight to the European destinations, as well as
the return flight to the United States, was uneventful.
However, the plaintiffs’ tour of Europe was shortened by
the delay in departure.
As a result of the delay in departure, two separate classes
of plaintiffs brought breach of, contract class action suits
against TIA and Forrester in the Circuit Court of Jefferson
County, Alabama. The Newsome plaintiff class was
originally represented by Virginia Newsome and _ is
composed of the tour participants who were transported to
Italy. The Kuechenmeister plaintiff class is represented by
Craig Kuechenmeister, and is composed of the tour
participants who were transported to Greece, following a
stopover in Italy. The two cases were consolidated for trial
and subsequently certified as class actions on October 6,
1981.
The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages for the
delay of the TIA charter flight, alleging that the delay was
a breach of the charter contract and resulted in the
plaintiffs’ missing valuable portions of their tour and
substantially impaired the tour’s value to them. Forrester
cross-claimed against TIA, alleging that TIA had breached
its contract of carriage with her by failing to furnish the
tour transportation at the time agreed.
The consolidated actions proceeded to trial, and at the
close of the plaintiffs’ case the court granted TIA’s motion
for directed verdict on plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim,
as well as on Forrester’s cross-claim. Forrester’s motion for
directed verdict against the plaintiffs’ claims against her
was also granted by the trial court. Following the trial
court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for new trial, the
plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal to bring this matter
before this Court. Forrester has not appealed the trial
court’s adverse ruling on her cross-claim.
The issue to be resolved is whether the trial court erred
by directing verdicts in favor TIA and Forrester on
plaintiffs’ contract claims. We are of the opinion that the
trial court did err by granting a directed verdict for TIA,
and we reverse its judgment as to TIA. We affirm judgment
based on the the directed verdict for Forrester.
2
TIA’S Directed Verdict
The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in
granting TIA’s directed verdict motion based upon the trial
court’s finding that there was no contract breach by TIA
because of an alleged limitation of liability for delay
provision incorporated by reference into the contract
between TIA and the plaintiffs. We agree.
TIA and the plaintiffs are in agreement that the contract
of carriage which is the basis of the plaintiffs’ contract
action against TIA is evidenced by the passenger ticket.!
' Actually, there are three contractual relationships: the relationship
between TIA and Forrester created by the charter agreement; the
relationship between Forrester and the tour participants created by the
various brochures and other documents distributed by Forrester; and the
relationship between TIA and the tour participants, which is evidenced
by the airline ticket. For the resolution of the issues raised in these
Fy
ie
a ue
The passenger tickets issued by TIA for the plaintiffs’ flight
contained the following statement:
To the extent not in conflict with the foregoing,
carriage and other services performed by the
carrier are subject to (1) the provisions contained
in this. ticket, (2) applicable tariffs and
(3) carrier’s Conditions of Carriage and related
regulations which are made part hereof.
Section (2) of that statement incorporates into the
contract by reference applicable tariffs that TIA is required
to file with the Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.).2 See 14
C.F.R.§ 382 et seq. Once a tariff is filed with the C.A.B., it
becomes a part of the contract of carriage. Eastern Airlines
v. Williamson, 382 Ala. 421,211 So. 2d 912 (1968).
Pursuant to C.A.B. requirements, TIA had in effect
certain rules contained in a charter tariff filed with the
C.A.B. and in effect at the time of the plaintiffs’ flight.
Central to the trial court’s decision was Rule No. 20(b) of
TIA’s Charter Tariff, which states:
Departure Flight Delays: In the case of flight
delays of more than forty-eight (48) hours beyond
the departure time stated in the charter contract,
TIA, upon request and at the charterer’s option,
appeals, we are concerned only with the separate relationships between
the tour participants with TIA and with Forrester. We are not
concerned here with the relationship between TIA and Forrester created
by the charter agreement.
2 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40, 92
Stat. 1705, 1744 (1978), terminated the Civil Aeronautics Board as well
as some provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1301
et seq. (1976). The administration of other provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act have been transferred to other federal agencies.
— om
will provide alternative air transportation at no
additional cost to the charterer.
TIA promulgated this tariff to meet requirements of
C.A.B. regulations codified at 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) (1985).
Section 208.32(a) reads in pertinent part:
Flight delays and substitute air transportation
(foreign). Charter air carriers shall comply with
the following requirements for passenger service
in foreign air transportation. These requirements
shall be without prejudice, and in addition, to any
other rights or remedies of passengers under
applicable law:
(a) Substitute air transportation. (1) On all
charter flights, unless the air carrier causes an
aircraft to finally enplane each passenger and
commence the takeoff procedures at the airport
of departure before the 48th hour following the
time scheduled for the departure of such flight, it
shall provide substitute transportation in accord-
ance with the provisions of this paragraph.
(2) As soon as the air carrier discovers, or
should have discovered by the exercise of
reasonable prudence and forethought, that the
departure of any such charter flight will be
delayed more than 48 hours, such air carrier shall
arrange for and pay the costs of substitute air
transportation for the charter group on another
charter flight, operated by any other carrier or
foreign air carrier.
(3) When neither the charter transportation
contracted for nor substitute transportation has
; been performed before the expiration of 48 hours
following the scheduled departure time of any
such charter flight, the charterer, or his duly
authorized agent, may arrange for substitute air
transportation of the members of the charter
group, at economy or tourist class fares, on
individually ticketed flights and the chartered air
carrier shall pay the costs of such air transporta-
tion to the substitute air carrier or foreign air
carrier.
(4) In determining the period of time during
which the departure of a charter flight has been
delayed within the purview of this paragraph,
periods of delay caused by the prohibition of
flights to or from the airport of departure because
of weather or other operational conditions
affecting such airport shall be excluded if, and
while, the air carrier has available an airworthy
aircraft which is capable of transporting the
charter group in a condition of operational
readiness.
TIA contends that once its tariffs are filed with the
C.A.B., the tariffs are the exclusive provisions by which the
rights and liabilities of the carrier and passengers are
governed. See Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 413
F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969).
Based upon the foregoing facts and principles, TIA
argued to the trial court, and argues again here, that TIA’s
tariff, filed pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) and
incorporated into TIA’s contract of carriage, exclusively
limits TIA’s liability for the flight delay experienced by the
plaintiffs in the instant case to providing substitute air
transportation and incidental expenses, if, but only if, the
flight delay is 48 hours or longer. The delay of the TIA
charter at issue here was only about 32 hours, and,
os atte
a s,s
therefore, TIA asserts that there was no breach of the
contract with plaintiffs and that a directed verdict was in
order.
The trial court stated in the record:
The Court’s of the opinion, whether I agree with it
or not, that this is an area that is controlled by the
Federal Regulations because of the commerce
aspect of it and interstate commerce. And that the
regulations, the tariff, and the operation of law
operating together provide that the carrier, in this
case TIA, is not liable for flight delays of
departure as provided by this contract for less that
48 hours under the circumstances that have been
shown here. The motion for directed verdict for
TIA is granted.
The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in its
ruling because (1) the C.A.B. regulation at 14 C.F.R.
§ 208.32(a) is not intended to be the exclusive remedy
afforded to the plaintiffs in this action, but is in addition to
remedies recognized under federal treaty law and state
common law; and (2) 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) cannot be the
exclusive remedy for defendants’ breach of contract claim
because the remedy would be in fatal conflict with the terms
of the Warsaw Convention? — a federal treaty which
3 The Warsaw Convention (“the Convention”), formally titled the
“Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air,” was created on October 12, 1929,
and was adhered to by the United States in June 1934. An English
translation is published at 49 Stat. 3014 (1934), and also reprinted in T.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, and 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1976). The
original Convention is modified by the “Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitation of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol” (‘‘the
Montreal Agreement”), CAB 18900 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), note
following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982).
a se
supersedes any conflicting tariff filed pursuant to C.A.B.
regulations.
A. Exclusivity of Remedy
We are of the opinion that the 48-hour provision of 14
C.F.R. § 208.32(a), which was essentially incorporated by
reference into TIA’s contract of carriage by the tariff
provision filed with the C.A.B., is not the exclusive remedy
afforded to plaintiffs in the instant case, but, rather, that the
provision allows the plaintiffs additional rights that may
arise from federal treaty or state common law. The
provision at 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) was promulgated
pursuant to authority granted by the Federal Aviation Act,
Pub.L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (1958) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976)). A federal administrative
regulation should be construed so as to carry out the intent
of the enacting body. United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703,
cert. denied, 83 S.Ct. 507, 371 U.S. 955, 9 L.Ed 2d 502 (9th
Cir. 1962). Section 1506 of the Federal Aviation Act
provides: ‘‘Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in
addition to such remedies.” 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976). The
Court in Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 541
F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (W.D. Pa. 1982), made the following
observation about § 1506:
While federal regulation of air travel is extensive{,]
it is not exclusive. Quite the contrary|,] federal law
specifically preserves legal remedies for air
travelers beyond those set forth in the Federal
;
:
:
Ltt EGS,
—_ soa
Aviation Act.... [49 U.S.C. § 1506] recognizes
that the statutory scheme established by the
Federal Aviation Act is designed merely to
complement existing statutory and common law
remedies, not to supplant them. Moreover, it is
clear that 49 U.S.C. § 1506 applies to remedies
arising under state law as well as those created by
federal law.
To hold that 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) is an exclusive remedy
for delays in international charter flights would directly
conflict with the clear Congressional intent expressed in
§ 1506. Surely, the C.A.B. in promulgating the regulation
did not intend to create such an obvious conflict. Moreover,
we ure obligated to look to the plain meaning of the
regulation’s language in construing its effect. United States
v. Miller, supra. The second sentence of § 208.32(a)
specifically states:
These requirements shall be without prejudice,
and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of
passengers under applicable law.
We can reach no other conclusion than that the remedy
provided in § 208.32(a) is cumulative to other rights and is
not exclusive.
In addition, a court, whenever possible, should avoid a
construction of a regulation that would raise doubt as to the
regulation’s validity or hinder its ability to make its
statutory authority operative. Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
O’Malley, 277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960). As will be
discussed below, a holding that the remedy embodied in 14
C.F.R. § 208.32(a) is exclusive would create conflict with
the Warsaw Convention, a duly entered self-executing
federal treaty, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint
Corp., — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1771, 8 L.Ed.2d 273 (1984), that
—A-10—
is, the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI; see also
Butler’s Shoe Corp. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
514 F.2d 1283 (Sth Cir. 1975).
B. Conflict With Warsaw Convention
The application of the Warsaw Convention to interna-
tional flights is governed by the contract of carriage
between the carrier and passenger, and, as previously
mentioned, the contract of carriage between the plaintiffs
and TIA in the instant case is evidenced by the passenger
ticket.4 See In Re Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F.Supp.
1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The passenger tickets in the instant
case expressly incorporated the terms of the Warsaw
Convention by the following language:
WARSAW CONVENTION. Carriage hereunder
is subject to the rules and limitations relating to
liability established by the Warsaw Convention
unless such carriage is not “International Car-
riage”’ as defined by that Convention.
There is no dispute that the plaintiffs’ flight was
‘{nternational,” as that term is defined by Article 1, § 2 of
the Convention. We must now determine what effect the
4 In Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (Sth
Cir. 1967), the court opined that the ticket itself is not the contract
between carrier and passenger, but evidences the contractual relationship
which arises once the carrier promises to transport the passenger and the
passenger consents to the transportation.
Whether the flight comes within the scope of the Convention is
governed by the points of departure and arrival, as explained in
Article 3(2) of the Convention.
Moreover, it is clear from Block that the terms of the Convention
apply regardless of the fact that the transportation is by air charter.
slain ed Salata ais REDE Be
=— <)
application of the Convention has upon the liability
limitations embodied in TIA’s tariffs that were incorpo-
rated by reference into the passenger tickets.°
The plaintiffs contend that the Warsaw Convention
provides a cause of action against TIA and that Article 19
of the Convention makes TIA liable for damages
occasioned by all delays in the transportation of passengers
unless TIA proves that it took all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for the airline to
take such measures, as is provided in Article 20, § 1, of the
convention. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s
5 The following rules and Regulations embodied in ‘Trans
International Airlines, Inc., Charter Tariff No. WW-i,” effective
November 12, 1978, are those relevant portions of the tariff relied upon
by TIA in the instant case:
Rule No. 20(2)(B)
Departure Flight Delays: In the case of flight delays of
more than forty-eight (48) hours beyond the departure time
stated in the charter contract, TIA, upon request and at the
charterer’s option, will provide alternative air transportation
at no additional cost to the charterer.
Rule No. 33
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY - PASSENGERS
(A) General: As between TIA and the charterer, TIA shall
be liable only for direct damage occasioned by its negligence,
or the negligence of its officers, agents, servants or
employees, but shall not be liable for special or consequential
damages including, but not limited to, loss of services, nor in
any event shall TIA be liable to the charterer for any loss or
damage resulting from delays due to mechanical difficulties,
weather or conditions beyond TIA’s control.
© The English translation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Convention
reads as follows:
Article 19
The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by delay in
the transportation by air of passengers, baggage, or goods.
—A-12—
Article 20
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that 1t was impossible for him or them to take
such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier
shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was
occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the
aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he
and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage.
49 U.S.C.§ 1502 note (1976).
Prior to the promulgation of the Montreal Agreement (see note 2 of
this opinion), Article 20 § 1, above, provided a defense to the carrier to
claims arising from the death of, or injury to, passengers. Pursuant to the
Montreal Agreement, a carrier may not avail itself of this defense if it
wishes to be protected by the limitations of liability set forth in the
Montreal Agreement.
We note that the Montreal Agreement was concerned only with
damages related to personal injury and death of passengers and does not
speak to the damages recoverable or the continued applicability of
Article 20(1) as a defense for claims due to flight delays. We therefore
conclude that the original liability limitation of Article 22, below, as well
as the defense available under Article 20(1), continues in effect for
claims for flight delays.
In addition to Articles 19 and 20, we find the following Articles of the
Convention applicable in the case at bar:
Article 22
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of
the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of
125,000 francs [approximately $8,300.00 U.S. dollars].
Article 23
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or
to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this
convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such
provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract,
which shall remain subject to the provisions of this
convention.
4
P ¥
a | a
application of 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) to limit TIA’s liability
for flight delays to providing alternate transportation and
incidental expenses, and, then, only if the original departure
time is delayed by 48 hours or more, was error, because,
they argue, such a limitation of liability flies in the face of
the liability imposed by Article 19 and the prohibition of
liability limitations set out in Article 23 of the Convention.
TIA argues that the remedy embodied in 14 C.F.R.
§ 208.32(a) is not inconsistent with Article 19 of the
Convention, but is a consistent supplementation permitted
by the Convention and envisioned by the Convention
drafters. TIA asserts that the Convention does not define
“delay,” as that term is used in Article 19, and that the
various states that have ratified the Convention are free to
specify and define what constitutes “delay” under Article
19. TIA contends that the C.A.B. has, in effect, through 14
C.F.R. § 208.32(a), defined “delay” to be failure to depart
within 48 hours of the appointed departure time. Therefore,
TIA argues, the reference to 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) in TIA’s
tariff, incorporated into the contract of carriage, precludes
any remedy for its passengers until more than 48 hours has
passed from the scheduled departure times.
Although we agree with TIA that 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a)
is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, we are unable to accept the strained
construction of the regulation put forward by TIA. Neither
the unambiguous language of Article 19 of the Convention
nor the language of the regulation supports TIA’s
Article 24
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to
the conditions and limits set out in this convention.
49 U.S.C.§ 1502 note (1976).
a | ee
contention that 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) can, or that it in fact
does, define “‘delay” so as to, in effect, limit TIA’s liability.
We have carefully analyzed the minutes of the
Convention pertaining to the adoption of Article 19, and the
discussions rendered therein do not lead us to conclude that
the delegates intended that Article 19 be supplanted in the
fashion contemplated by TIA. However, we pretermit a
lengthy and complicated discussion addressed to this point
by simply observing that the clear language of 14 C.F.R.
§ 208.32(a) does not define, nor does it reflect an intention
to define, the term “delay”. As _ previously noted,
§ 208.32(a) states: “These requirements shall be without
prejudice, and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of
passengers under applicable law.”
We have previously concluded that the Warsaw
Convention applies to the facts of the instant case, and,
therefore, we must conclude that the plaintiffs are free to
assert any rights or remedies available to them pursuant to
the Convention or other applicable law, regardless of the
remedy afforded by 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a). The trial court
erred by granting TIA’s directed verdict motion.
C. Preclusion of Common Law Remedies
In light of our determination that the Convention is
applicable in the instant case, what remedies are afforded
plaintiffs by the Convention and by state common law?
Plaintiffs argue that despite the applicability of the
Warsaw Convention and 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) to the case
at bar, these provisions do not preclude the plaintiffs from
asserting a common law cause of action for breach of
contract. We disagree.
-
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The issue here was addressed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Pan American World Airways, 737 F.2d 456, 458 (Sth Cir.
1984). The issue was framed in that case as:
[Whether the Convention provides the exclusive
liability remedy for international air carriers by
providing an independent cause of action, thereby
preempting state law, or whether it merely limits
the amount of recovery for a cause of action
otherwise provided by state or federal law.
The Boehringer court joined the Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits in holding that the
Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action and is the
exclusive remedy. See Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978); Abramson y. Japan Air
Lines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Mexico City
Air Crash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir.
1983). The result of these recent holdings is to make the
theories of recovery and limitations of liability set out in the
Convention exclusive, thereby preempting state common
law causes of action in situations in which the Convention
applies. When the Convention does not apply, liability and
damages limitations are established in accordance with
common law rules. These holdings were predicated upon
the courts’ recognition that the Convention was intended to
be a binding uniform international body of air law and the
conclusion that a uniform and consistent theory of liability
embodied in a cause of action founded upon the Convention
itself is consistent with the Conventions’ goal of uniformity.
We are persuaded by the consistent position taken by the
courts of the several circuits that have addressed this issue,
and, in the absence of any direct holding on this issue by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, we are inclined to
a
follow the decisions of these other four circuits. The
plaintiffs in the instant case have a cause of action derived
exclusively from the Convention, and, therefore, all state
common law causes of action that might otherwise have
been available to plaintiffs are preempted.
D. Delivery of Tickets
Plaintiffs argue that if the Convention is applicable to the
case at bar, TIA should not be able to rely upon the liability
limitations provisions of the Convention because the
plaintiffs’ tickets were not “delivered” to the plaintiffs as
required by Article 3 of the Convention.
If TIA did not deliver a ticket to each plaintiff, recovery
is not restricted by Convention limitations of liabiliity of
Article 22. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 341 F.2d
851 (2d Cir. 1965).
Article 3,§ 2 of the Convention provides:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the
passenger ticket shall not affect the existence
or the validity of the contract of transporta-
tion, which shall none the less be subject to
the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if
the carrier accepts a passenger without a
passenger ticket having been delivered he
shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this convention which exclude
or limit his liability.
The several courts that have interpreted this provision have
generally concluded that “delivery” requires that passen-
gers be afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the
ticket far enough in advance of departure to be able to be
apprised of the limitations of the Convention and to be able
—A-17—
to take measures to protect themselves from the limitations.
See, e.g., Warren v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 352 F.2d 494
(2d Cir. 1965); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 341 F.2d
851 (2d Cir. 1965); DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978); Domanque y. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. La. 1981).’? Whether a
ticket has been delivered, as required by the Convention, is a
question to be answered by the jury based upon the factual
circumstances of each case as gleaned from the evidence.
Mertens, supra. The record in the case before us reflects a
disputed factual issue regarding the timely delivery of
tickets to the plaintiffs. The determination of this issue is
for the jury.
II. Forrester’s Directed Verdict
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Forrester,
relying upon language contained in the tour brochures
issued to the plaintiffs. The relevant language reads as
follows:
RESPONSIBILITY: SKY III ENTERPRISES,
the tour operator and/or the selling agent, their
representatives (designated Tour Leaders and
Faculty), act only as agent for the tour members in
making arrangements for hotels, transportation,
sightseeing, restaurant or any other services in
connection with this itinerary and they will
exercise reasonable care in making such arrange-
7 Although the delivery issue raised in the above cited cases was dealt
with in relation to claims based on personal injury or death of passengers
arising under Article 17 of the Convention, we see no bases for not
applying the requirement of delivery under Article 3, § 2, to the
provisions of Article 19 concerning delay.
—A-18—
ments. However, they do not assume any liability
whatsoever, for any injury, damage, loss, accident
or delay to person or property due to any act or
default of any hotel, carrier, restaurant, company
or person rendering any of the services included
in the tour program. ... Sky III Enterprises, the
Tour Leaders and/or instructors and the tour
operator(s) and any selling agent shall be rendered
faultless and not responsible for any type of injury
whatsoever, and will accept no responsibility for
any damage or delay due to sickness, pilferage,
labor disputes, machinery breakdown, quarantine,
government restraints, weather or any other cause
beyond their personal control. The right is
reserved to cancel or change itineraries. . . . In the
event that services and accommodations set forth
in the brochure cannot be supplied due to delays,
acts, omissions, or other causes beyond its control,
the operator shall use its best efforts to supply
comparable service and accommodations.
INSURANCE; In view of statutory or contractu-
al limitations which may apply to personal injury
or property damage losses, the PURCHASE OF
ACCIDENT AND BAGGAGE INSURANCE
is strongly recommended. Details may be obtained
from your Tour leader.
There was no evidence at trial that any plaintiff failed to
receive documents including this provision.
Plaintiffs do not contend that this language was not a
part of their contract with Forrester, but assert that the
language is ambiguous and misleading. Plaintiffs also assert
that the language constitutes an unconscionable exculpa-
—A-19—
tory provision which should be denied effect by this Court.
We do not agree.
An exculpatory contract provision is one that tends to
excuse a defendant from alleged fault. See Taylor v. Leedy
& Co. 412 So. 2d 763 (Ala. 1982). In Alabama, a party
generally may not contract against the harm caused by his
or her own negligence, with certain exception not applicable
in the instant case. See Alabama Great Southern R. Co. y.
Sumter Plywood Corp, 359 So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 1978).
However, the plain language of the disputed contract
provision here does not constitute an exculpatory provision.
We are of the opinion that the clear and unambiguous
wording of the provision merely holds Forrester harmless
for certain circumstances, including delay occasioned by
machinery breakdowns, beyond her personal control. The
language does not purport to relieve Forrester for damages
to the plaintiffs brought upon by her actions or by events
within her personal control.’ Accordingly, we conclude that
8 14 C.F.R.§ 378.1 et seg., revoked and reserved effective January 1,
1979, by amendment No. 22, 43 Fed.Reg. 36, 603 (1978) but applicable
to plaintiffs’ tour, required Forrester to furnish a surety bond for the
protection of the tour members. Forrester met this requirement. TIA
argued at trial that plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was against Forrester on
her bond, pursuant to § 378, but the provisions of 14 C.F.R.§ 378.17 do
not support this argument, nor does this section support plaintiffs’
contention that the disputed liability limitation provision promulgated by
Forrester is unconscionable. 14 C.F.R.§ 378.17(h) provides in regard to
the contract between the tour operator and tour participants:
That the tour operator is the principal and is responsible to
the participants in making the arrangements for all tour
services and accommodations offered as constituting the
tour: Provided, however, that this requirement shall not
preclude the tour operator from expressly providing in such
contract that, in the absence of negligence on the part of the
—20—
there is no basis for holding the disputed contract language
unconscionable.
Having made a thorough examination of the record
before us, we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs failed to
provide a scintilla of evidence that Forrester breached the
contract provision set out above. The record contains ample
evidence that the delay of the plaintiffs’ charter flight was
due to mechanical breakdowns of TIA’s aircraft. The
plaintiffs have failed to direct us to any evidence within the
record that tends to show that Forrester was responsible for
the delay of the TIA charter flight or that preventing or
shortening the delay was within her personal control. In
fact, two class representatives called as witnesses at trial
testified that they were not aware of anything Forrester
could have done to expedite the departure. Both Forrester
and Lee Francis, TIA’s regional manager, testified that
shortly after the initial delay, Forrester requested that
alternative transportation be supplied by TIA. Based upon
this evidence and the terms of plaintiffs’ contract with
Forrester, we conclude that the trial court properly directed
a verdict in favor of Forrester and against the plaintiffs on
their breach of contract claim.
tour operator, he is not responsible for personal injury or
property damage arising out of the act or negligence of any
direct air carrier, hotel or other person rendering any of the
services or accommodations being offered in such tour.
Clearly, Forrester was permitted by the above regulation to include
the exact provision in the tour contract that the plaintiffs object to in the
instant case. Also, this provision reflects a clear intent that the remedies
afforded under § 378 not preclude claims against air carriers for their
negligence.
—A-21—
We affirm that portion of the trial court’s judgment in
favor of Forrester, but as to that portion in favor of TIA we
reverse and remand.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
AND REMANDED.
Torbert, C.J.,. Maddox, Faulkner, Jones, Almon, Shores,
and Beatty, JJ., concur.
;
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setechbeinntiamenuiniis tented ee Galen
—A-22—
CIRCUIT COURT, TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF ALABAMA EQUITY DIVISION
FILED IN OPEN COURT
This 2%h day of Oct 1984
. oem “
Pe hy ies car as he
VIRGINIA A. NEWSOME, et al., REGISTER
By sé E.R.
Plaintiffs, Se eS
VS. CASE NO. CV 79 504-800 WAT
TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,
a Transamerica Company; MABEL
FORRESTER, individually and d/b/a
SKY III ENTERPRISES, “AMBASSADORS
ABROAD”; et al.,
Defendants.
FINAL JUDGMENT
This action came on for trial after notice thereof and was
submitted on the pleading, orders of the Court heretofore
entered, and testimony and evidence presented in open
court.
At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court
granted the motion of the Defendant Trans International
Airlines for a directed verdict on the claims of the Plaintiffs
and the class of persons they represent.
At the close of the evidence of the Defendant Mabel
Forrester, the Court granted the motion for directed verdict
of the Defendant Trans International Airlines asserted to
the crossclaim of the Defendant Mabel Forrester.
PA a ae OP Pe TT ee eee hy ee eS
At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court
granted the motion for directed verdict of the Defendant
Mabel Forrester on the claims of the Plaintiffs and the class
of persons they represent.
Upon consideration of the matters presented and the
rulings of the Court in respect to the said motions, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court
as follows:
1. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendants Trans
International Airlines and Mabel Forrester individually and
d/b/a Sky III Enterprises, ‘Ambassadors Abroad,” on the
claims of the Plaintiffs and the class of persons they
represent. The said class is composed of the persons named
on Exhibit A attached hereto.
2. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendant Trans
International Airlines and against the Defendant Mabel
Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III Enterprises,
‘Ambassadors Abroad,” on the crossclaim of the
Defendant Mabel Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III
Enterprises, “Ambassadors Abroad.”
3. The costs of this action are taxed two thirds (2/3) to
the Plaintiffs and one third (1/3) to the Defendant Mabel
Forrester.
DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October 1984.
William A. Thompson
CIRCUIT JUDGE
| oe
CIRCUIT COURT, TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF ALABAMA EQUITY DIVISION
FILED IN OPEN COURT
This 29h day of Oct 1984
VIRGINIA A. NEWSOME, et al., REGISTER
By Be ER.
Plaintiffs, BOD, ee BR.
VS. CASE NO. CV 79 504-961 WAT
TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,
a Transamerica Company; MABEL
FORRESTER, individually and d/b/a
SKY III ENTERPRISES, “AMBASSADORS
ABROAD”; et al.,
Defendants.
FINAL JUDGMENT
This action came on for trial after notice thereof and was
submitted on the pleading, orders of the Court heretofore
entered, and testimony and evidence presented in open
court.
At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court
granted the motion of the Defendant Trans International
Airlines for a directed verdict on the claims of the Plaintiffs
and the class of persons they represent.
At the close of the evidence of the Defendant Mabel
Forrester, the Court granted the motion for directed verdict
of the Defendant Trans International Airlines asserted to
the crossclaim of the Defendant Mabel Forrester.
—A-25—
At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court
granted the motion for directed verdict of the Defendant
Mabel Forrester on the claims of the Plaintiffs and the class
of persons they represent.
Upon consideration of the matters presented and the
rulings of the Court in respect to the said motions, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court
as follows:
1. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendants Trans
International Airlines and Mabel Forrester individually and
d/b/a Sky III Enterprises, “Ambassadors Abroad,” on the
claims of the Plaintiffs and the class of persons they
represent. The said class is composed of the persons named
on Exhibit A attached hereto.
2. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendant Trans
International Airlines and against the Defendant Mabel
Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III Enterprises,
“Ambassadors Abroad,” on the crossclaim of the
Defendant Mabel Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III
Enterprises, ‘““Ambassadors Abroad.”
3. The costs of this action are taxed two thirds (2/3) to
the Plaintiffs and one third (1/3) to the Defendant Mabel
Forrester.
DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October 1984.
William A. Thompson
CIRCUIT JUDGE
—A-26—
TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION AND
SUBSIDIARIES WITH STATE OF
INCORPORATION
Transamerica Corporation
Budget Rent a Car Corporation - Illinois
Budget Rent a Car Systems, Inc. - Delaware
Budget Florida Holding (1984), Inc. - Florida
Budget Rent a Car of Broward, Inc. - Florida
Budget Rent a Car Company of Florida, Inc. -
Florida
Budget Rent a Car of Tampa, Inc. - Florida
Budget Rent a Car Distributors, Inc. - Florida
‘Budget Rent a Car Sales, Inc. - Florida
LMDH, Inc. - Florida
Budget Rent a Car of Nashville, Inc. - Tennessee
Chicago Budget Rental a Car Corporation - Delaware
Deplane Corporation - California
Traverse Corporation - California
Budget Rent a Car International, Inc. - Delaware
Budget Rent a Car (U.K.) Limited - United Kingdom
Budget Rent a Car Southern Africa (pty.) Limited -
South Africa
Budget Rent a Car Espana, S.A. - Spain
Budget Rent a Car Italia, Inc - Italy
Budget Rent a Car of Canada Limited - Canada
Budget Leasing Corporation - Delaware
Compass Computer Services Inc. (50% owned by >
Hilton Hotels) - Delaware
Control Risk Corporation - Illinois
Philip Jacobs Insurance Agency, Inc. - California
Transamerica Reinsurance Company Limeted -
' Bermuda
—A-27—
*Coast Service Company - California
*Inter-America Corporation - California
James Wigham Poland Holdings Limited - Delaware
JT Management Company, Inc. - Delaware
*LMS Co. - California
*Mortgage Corporation of America - California
Pyramid Insurance Company of Bermuda, Ltd. -
Bermuda
*TAFEX Systems Corporation - Delaware
*TCS Inc. - Delaware
Trans International Entities Inc. - Delaware
Trans International Airlines, Inc. - Kentucky
Transamerica Airlines, Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica Travel, Inc. - Delaware
*Transamerica Corporation (Oregon) - Oregon
Transamerica Delaval Inc. - Delaware
AHU Corporation - Texas
Berkely Pump Company International - Delaware
De Laval-Stork V.O.F. (50% owned by Transamerica
Delaval Inc.) - Netherlands
Delaval Turbine Canada Ltd. - Canada
De Laval Turbine Gmbh - West Germany
Delaval Turbine International Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica Instruments Gmbh - West Germany
Transamerica Instruments Limited - United Kingdom
Data Laboratories Limited - United Kingdom
Transamerica Instruments S.P.A. - Italy
Transamerica S.A.R.L. - France
Tait, Inc. - Ohio
Berkeley Pump Company - Delaware
Pumptron Industries Inc. - Canada
—A-28—
Transamerica Delaval Electronic Systems Inc. -
Delaware
WEKA, A.G. - Switzerland
AB.T. Burship - Switzerland
Del Sales Company - Virgin Islands
Transamerica Equiptment Leasing Company, Inc. -
Delaware
Transamerica Financial Corporation - Delaware
Pacific Agency, Inc. - Indiana
Pacific Finance Loans - California
Consumer Discount Company -
Transamerica
Pennsylvania
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Transamerica
Delaware
Transamerica
Transamerica
California
Transamerica
Transamerica
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Corporation - Nevada
Services - California
Services - Wyoming
Services Company - Ohio
Services, Inc.
Inc.
Services, Inc.
Services, Inc.
Inc.
Services,
Services,
Alabama
Arizona
Kansas
New Jersey
Texas
Services (Inc.) - Oklahoma
Services of Dover, Inc. -
Industrial Loan Company - Washington
Savings and Loan Association -
Title Insurance Company - California
Real Estate Tax Service - California
Transamerica Homes, Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica Informationm Services Corporation
Transamerica Insurance Corporation of California -
California
—A-29—
Arbor Life Insurance Company - Arizona
Crown Valley Insurance Agency, Inc. - California
Plaza Insurance Sales, Inc. - California
Transamerica Advisors, Inc. - California
Transamerica Annunity Service Corporation - New
Mexico
Transamerica Assurance Company - California
Transamerica Consultants, Inc. - California
Transamerica Financial Resources, Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica Financial Systems & Concepts, Inc. -
California
Transamerica Insurance Company - California
The Canadian Surety Company - Canada
Countrywide Corporation - Texas
Industrial County Mutual Insurance Company - Texas
Transamerica Indemnity Company - California
Transamerica Insurance Company of Texas - Texas
Transamerica Insurance Company of Michigan -
Michigan
Transamerica Insurance Company of New York - New
York
Transamerica Insurance Corporation of America -
Michigan
Transamerica Premier Insurance Company - California
Automotive Insurance Company - California
Countrywide Insurance Company - California
Transamerica International Management, Inc. -
California
Transamerica Lloyds Insurance Company - Texas
Transamerica Insurance Management, Inc. - California
Transamerica Insurance Securities Sales Corporation -
Maryland
Transamerica International Insurance Services, Inc. -
Delaware
—%-30—
Occidental International Holdings N.V. - Netherlands
Regency Life Assurance Company Limited - United
Kingdom
Occidental Life Assurance Company of Australia,
Limited - Austrialia
Transamerica Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance
Comapny - California
First Transamerica Insurance Company - New York
*Lireas Holdings Limited - South America
Transamerica International Insurance Services, Inc. -
California
Transamerica Life Insurance and Annuity - California
Transamerica Life Insurance Company of Canada -
Canada
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance, Company of
Illinois - Illinois
Transamerica Products, Inc. - California
Transamerica Products I, Inc. - California
Transamerica International Holdings, Inc. - Delaware
*Transamerica International Limited - Canada
Transamerica Interway Inc. - Delaware
Schanno Transportation, Inc. - Minnesota
Terminal Maintenance, Inc. - Minnesota
Transamerica Distribution Services, Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica ICS Inc. - Delaware
I.C.S. Freight Services Inc. - Delaware
ICS Traffic Services, Inc. - Delaware
Intermodal Equiptment Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica ICS N.V. - Belgium
Transamerica ICS Srl. - Italy
Transamerica I.C.S. do Brazil s/c Ltda. - Brazil
Transamerica ICS Gmbh - West Germany
Transamerica ICS (HK) Ltd. - Hong Kong
—A-31—
Transamerica ICS Limited - United Kingdom
ICS Terminals (U.K.) Limited - United Kingdom
Transamerica ICS Pty. Ltd. - Australia
Transamerica Interway Container Service (Pty) Limited
- South Africa
Transamerica Terminal Services Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica Rail Services Corp. - Delaware
Transamerica Trailer Services Inc. - New Jersey
Ambey Corp. - New Jersey
Transamerica Transport Inc. - New Jersey
Transamerica Transportation Services Inc. - Delaware
I/W Leasing, Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica Intermodal Maintenance Services of
Florida, Inc. - Florida
Transamerica Investment Services, Inc. - Delaware
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. (managed by T.IS.) -
Maryland
Transamerica Income Shares, Inc. (managed by T.I.S.)
- Maryland
*Transamerica Land Capital, Inc. - California
*Bankers Mortgage Company of California - California
Transamerica Overseas Finance Corporation N.V. -
Netherlands Antilles
Transamerica Realty Services, Inc. - Delaware
*The Gilwell Company - California
Pyramid Investment Corporation - Delaware
Transamerica Development Company - California
Transamerica Minerals Company - California
Transamerica Real Estate Management Company -
California
Transamerica Oakmont Corporation -
*Transmerica Systems Operation
*Designates INACTIVE COMPANIES
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.