Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Trans International Airlines v. Newsome

Supreme Court brief1986

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Sumame Court, US,

fy)

86-507 | FireD

SEP 24 1986

No. JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

pice.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1986

TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

Petitioner,

vs.

VIRGINIA NEWSOME, et al.,

Respondents.

TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

Petitioner,

VS.

CRAIG A. KUECHEMEISTER, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RALPH S. LaMONTAGNE, JR.* Of Counsel

WILLIAM V. O*CONNOR

HENRY C. DARMSTADTER, III

KERN & WOOLEY

10920 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90024

(213) 824-1777

Attorneys for Petitioner

*Counsel of Record for Petitioner

THOMAS R. ELLIOTT, JR.

LONDON, YANCEY, ALLEN, |

ELLIOTT & LANEY

1250 Park Place Tower

Birmingham, Alabama 35203

Lawyers Brief Service / Legai Publishers / (213) 383-4457 / (714) 720-1510

4

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provide a

cause of action to any passenger for any delay of an

international charter flight — no matter how short or long

the delay might be?

2. Do Civil Aeronautics Board regulations, promulgated

pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and

incorporated into the terms of a contract of carriage,

supplement and define the term “delay” as used in

Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention?

3. Does Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention permit

carriers to condition liability for delay by placing express

provisions into the contract of carriage?

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceedings below were the petitioner

Trans International Airlines, Mabel Forrester (individually

and doing business as Sky III Enterprises, “Ambassadors

Abroad”), the class of plaintiffs represented by Virginia A.

Newsome in the class action captioned Virgina A. Newsome,

et al. v. Trans International Airlines, et al. and the class of

plaintiffs represented by Craig A. Kuechenmeister in the

class action captioned Craig A. Kuechenmeister, et al. y.

Trans International Airlines, et al. Both of the class action

suits were certified and consolidated for trial by the Circuit

Court of Alabama.

Mabel Forrester’s directed verdict was affirmed by the

Alabama Supreme Court and since that issue is not

addressed in this petition, Mabel Forrester is not named as a

party herein.

The petitioner before this Court is Trans International

Airlines,” and the respondents are that class of plaintiffs

represented by Virginia A. Newsome and that class of

plaintiffs represented by Craig A. Kuechenmeister in the

consolidated class action matter.

* For compliance with Rule 28.1 see Appendix p. A-26.

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—ili—

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......eeceecsseetseeeeeteeteetnentnetneetseens i

I BE FEED cecpnccccoccessssvevcosscevscncscvesessovccsccssscscosescosocess il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................ccccccccresccsssccessccssesees Vv

OPINIONS BELOW ..........cccccccccssscccccccscccnsccccesssscssessosscscoosees Z

FEFRRTSDICTION aonccccccccccccccccscccvccccsccsccssccscccccecocessenssecsscccccsccecs 2

TREATY AND FEDERAL STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS INVOLVED ...........ccccsesececesssceeeeseceenenes 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........:ccccccesesssseeeeeeeseeeeeeneneees 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..............208 5

a THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT IN-

CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CAB

TARIFF, INCORPORATED INTO THE

CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE, WAS NOT

INTENDED TO DEFINE AND SUPPLE-

MENT THE TERM “DELAY” AS USED

Ee, ss kebadsatoenensnpenesseceussesavesensceseoences 6

Il. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT IN-

CORRECTLY RULED THAT

ARTICLE 19 WAS NOT INTENDED TO

PERMIT CARRIERS TO CONDITION

THEIR LIABILITY FOR DELAY BY

PLACING EXPRESS LIMITS IN THE

CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. ..........ccccccccrsssscssreee 13

(a) INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 19

TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION .............. 14

CONCLUSION ........ Ftd a saahdabnsbbaesenskesiesenianineaseveseuennenees 21

suiplliatciees

Page

APPENDIX

OPINION AND JUDGMENT OF THE

ALABAMA SUPREME COURT, AND

FINAL JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA ........ A-1

TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION AND

SUBSIDIARIES WITH STATE OF INCOR-

PN EIEN | pesaicinessnsndisiassnnsavencunobasntevosioneraescsibiasns A-26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974

GO4 Fe 11 CH GAR. FRR). cere Serie 9, 10

Air France v. Saks \

— U.S. —, 84 L.Ed.2d 289, 105 S.C.t 1338

EIN sainsichicaanressecepraadipan spars boinc oaeeenaiomnabeadaoa eens oes 14

Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

344 F.Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972)

OIE, SIT FB FOR CR Gr. TED aieccscnsscsscsnccsnsennsens 6

Butler’s Shoe Corp. v. Pan American World

Airways, Inc. 514 F.2d 1283 (Sth Cir. 1975) ......... 12

Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States

Oe Be EE dhiiiidlainsdtaticiiiarinenanisenmnes 14

Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

ae Se Es Te iki ocinsincistctitnoes 9

Jahanger v. Purolator Sky Carriers

615 F.Supp. 29 (B.D. Penn. 1985) ........:.0ccc00006. 13, 14

Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.

BO Fe re Se Ges ED ii ivccisciessssesccinsanipicavsvccens 6

Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States

ee ae es EN aes sore nrisatnicevinientemnmnixesapnays 8

Tishman and Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines

GES FA Pe Ge Ga, FOOD va ceccecenrentssscvcinisiinecivenness 8

Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.

466 U.S. 243, 80 L.Ed.2d 273, 104 S.Ct. 1776

I incicL since civacsinineancbicioeeieinalenelessddsnssssnistasinbicveaaatanesbaaeciarneataien 10

aor a

Page

«

Treaties, Statutes and Regulations

ce. RPC OD vicsnnsiswrccesebeninacinediardtieaaabiibintieieiaress 2

WF ES BK. BE LAE Oo OG. CGI vawicsciticcsissdecassvstctacioenves 2,4, 8

Warsaw Convention, concluded, October 12, 1929,

49 Stat. 3000 T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted

OE Te FR Ce sitvtkctiscsdnccsaceines passim

PE EP DOG. FA) CIGD vcccsnsnscsscsvixinessvepsssnscncosans 7, 10, 11

Miscellaneous

1 L. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law § 11.01(2)

[BP WEE scianuseoassevenessnsvensansbaltswedudioashiaseeeaeshsnnelnnalenalasiennaaasin 9

International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air

Questions, Minutes, Second International

Conference on Private Aeronauiical Law, October

4-12, 1929, Warsaw (R. Horner & d. Legrez Trans.

EWP 7 Sip <<x:esnscsaniunsennnisontieneniendemansidiniaadadaiabslininaenaaiaiaiet tania 15

Jean-Louis Magdelenat, Air Cargo Regulation and

Claims (English Language Edition 1983) ..............c.0 10

Prof. dr. I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduc-

SRG 0G EF EAU TIED ccicicsierpitsasid gaia 10

IN THE

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

October Term, 1986

TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

Petitioner,

VS.

VIRGINIA NEWSOME, et al.,

Respondents.

TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

Petitioner,

VS.

CRAIG A. KUECHEMEISTER, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Trans International Airlines requests that a

writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion

of the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama entered in

this action on March 28, 1986 which, in part, reversed and

remanded for retrial a final judgment of the Circuit Court

of Jefferson County, Alabama.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court, not yet

released for official publication, is reprinted in the appendix

hereto at page la, infra. The final judgments ot the Circuit

Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, which are

unreported, are reprinted at __ a and __ a, infra.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court was

entered on March 28, 1986. A timely application for

rehearing was over-ruled on June 27, 1986. This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

TREATY AND FEDERAL STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This case concerns the construction and purpose of the

Warsaw Convention, concluded October 12, 1929, 49 Stat.

3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 reprinted at 49 U.S.C.

§1502 note, in particular, Article 19 thereof. This case

further concerns the Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. 85-726,

72 Stat. 737 (1958), codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1301

et. seq. and Civil Aeronautics Board regulations promul-

gated pursuant to the authority granted by the Federal

Aviation Act.

- |

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This class action arises as a result of a delay in the

departure of a tour group oa a charter flight from

Birmingham, Alabama to Europe. Respondents are

representatives of the class members of the tour group, and

petitioner TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES

(“TIA”) is the carrier that provided transportation for the

tour group to Europe.

Mabel Forrester, doing business as Sky III Enterprises

and Ambassadors Abroad, a named defendant in the action,

organized the European charter tour for respondents. In

this regard, Forrester contracted with TIA to provide a

roundtrip charter flight for respondents aboard a TIA

aircraft from Birmingham, Alabama to Milan, Italy and on

to Athens, Greece.

On March 11, 1979, as a result of mechanical difficulties,

the scheduled departure of the TIA chartered flight for the

tour group was delayed approximately 32 hours. TIA

provided hotel accommodations, meals and ground

transportation during the delay. Due to this delay, plaintiffs

instituted a class action for breach of contract against TIA

and Mabel Forrester.! This action proceeded to trial and

after the close of plaintiffs’ case, both TIA and Mabel

Forrester moved for directed verdicts which were granted

by the court. Thereafter, plaintiffs appealed the lower

court’s ruling to the Alabama Supreme Court, and on

March 28, 1986, the Alabama Supreme Court, in part,

1 An initial class action was filed on September 13, 1979 by Virginia A.

Newsome and others against TIA and Mabel Forrester. On

September 12, 1979, a second class action was filed with the

Kuechenmeisters as named plaintiffs against TIA and Forrester. Both

actions were consolidated and certified as class actions by court order.

reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for

retrial. TIA’s application for rehearing was overruled on

June 27, 1986.

The trial court granted TIA’s motion for directed verdict

based upon the finding that there was no breach of contract

by TIA because of the delay provisions incorporated into

the charter contract. This delay provision, promulgated

pursuant to a Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”)? Regula-

tion, provided that TIA was only obligated to provide

substitute air travel in the case of delays in excess of 48

hours. Therefore, since the delay was 32 hours and since the

contract terms and CAB regulation permitted delays up to

48 hours, the court determined that the contract had not

been breached and no cause of action could be maintained.

The Alabama Supreme Court reversed this decision on

the ground that Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention?

provides a remedy for any delay of an international charter

flight. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the CAB

regulation and charter tariff permitting delays up to 48

hours was not intended to define and supplement the term

“delay” as used in Article 19 of the Convention, and that

Article 19 did not permit a carrier to condition liability for

2 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40, 92

Stat. 1075, 1744 (1978), terminated the Civil Aeronautics Board as

well as some provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,49 U.S.C.

1301 et seq. (1976). The authority of the CAB with respect to foreign

air transportation was transfered to the Department of

Transportation. 49 U.S.C.§ 1551(6)(B) (1981).

3 The Warsaw Convention, formerly titled ‘“‘The Convention for the

Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation

by Air”, was adhered to by the United States in June 1934. The

original Convention was published in French and an English

translation is published at 49 Stat. 3014 (1934) and 49 U.S.C. § 1502

note (1976).

delay by contract.4 In short, the Alabama Supreme Court

held that any international passenger has a cause of action

for breach of contract under Article 19 as long as a flight is

delayed for any amount of time no matter how short that

amount of time may be.°

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Alabama Supreme Court decision interpretes the

Warsaw Convevtion to provide an international air

passenger with an action for delay against the carrier for

any deviation in that carrier’s charter flight. This

interpretation is contrary to the intent of the Convention.

Given the nature of air travel this would run havoc among

all international air carriers. Furthermore, the Alabama

opinion forbids the cognizant federal agency (or the carrier

by contract) from placing reasonable restrictions on this

action for delay.

This decision reflects inaccurate law. In fact, the Warsaw

Convention both permits a signatory state to reasonably

define the term “delay” and allows carriers to condition

4 The ticket jacket, a part of the contract of carriage between TIA and

respondents, stated the flight times for the entire tour, including the

departure from Birmhingham, Alabama. However, on the front of the

jacket, just below the flight times, was specified, “ALL TIMES

SHOWN ARE LOCAL TIMES (issued for informational purposes

only)”.

5 The Alabama Supreme Court also found that the Warsaw Convention

was plaintiff’s exclusive remedy and that all state common law actions

were inapplicable. However, on retrial, in order to employ the liability

limitations of the Convention, TIA must show that the airline tickets

were timely delivered to respondents. Finally, the Supreme Court

upheld Mabel Forrester’s directed verdict because of a hold harmless

clause in her contract with respondents.

liability by contract. The Alabama Court opinion is in

conflict with at least one federal court case, and in effect,

puts carriers in the impossible position of either being

exactly on time or being faced with lawsuits by all the

passengers. Given this decision’s important implications to

international] air travel, it is appropriate and advisable that

the Supreme Court grant certiorari to resolve this issue

under the Warsaw Convention.

THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT INCOR-

RECTLY FOUND THAT THE CAB TARIFF,

INCORPORATED INTO THE CONTRACT

OF CARRIAGE, WAS NOT INTENDED TO

DEFINE AND SUPPLEMENT THE TERM

“DELAY” AS USED IN ARTICLE 19

The contract of carriage between TIA and respondents,

as evidenced by the passenger ticket, incorporated all

applicable tariffs that TIA filed with the CAB.

Once a tariff is filed with the CAB it becomes part of the

contract between the passenger and carrier. Lichten v.

Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 938 (2nd Cir. 1951); Blair v.

Delta Airlines, Inc., 344 F.Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972) aff’d,

477 F.2d 564 (Sth Cir. 1973).

In this regard, TIA had in effect at the time of

respondents’ flight a charter tariff which stated:

Departure flight delays: In the case of flight

delays of more than forty-eight (48) hours beyond

the departure time stated in the charter contract,

TIA, upon request and at the charterer’s option,

nisin “

will provide alternate air transportation at no

additional cost to the charter=r.®

This tariff had been established by TIA in order to meet the

requirements of a CAB regulation set forth at 14 CFR §

208.32(a) (1985).’

6 Rule No. 20(b) of TIA’s charter tariff.

7 14 CFR. §208.32(a) states:

Flight delays and substitute air transportation (foreign). Charter air

carrier shall comply with the following requirernents for passenger

service in foreign air transportation. These requirements shall be

without prejudice, and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of

passengers under applicable law;

(a) Substitute Air Transportation.

(1) On all chartered flights, unless the air carrier causes an

aircraft to finally emplane each passenger and commence the

takeoff procedures at the airport of departure before the 48th

hour following the time scheduled for the departure of such

flight, it shall provide substitute transportation in accordance with

the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) As soon as the air carrier discovers or should have discovered

by the exercise of reasonable prudence and forethought, that the

departure of any such charter flight will be delayed more than 48

hours, such air carrier shal] arrange for and pay the costs of

substitute air transportation for the charter group on another

charter flight, operated by any other carrier or foriegn air carrier.

(3) When neither the charter transportation contracted for nor

substitute transportation has been performed before the expiration

of 48 hours following the scheduled departure time of any such

charter flight, the charter, or his duly authorized agent, may

arrange for substitute air transportation of the member of the

charter group, at economy or tourist class fares, on individually

ticketed flights and the chartered air carrier shall pay the cost of

such air transportation to the substitute air carrier or foreign air

carrier.

CAB Regulations were enacted pursuant to the authority of

the Federal Aviation Set of 1958, 48 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.

(1958), and such regulations promulgated pursuant to

legislative direction have the force and effect of federal law.

Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl.

1961). Tariffs filed with the CAB are conclusive and

exclusive of the rights and liabilities of an airline and its

passenger. Tishman and Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413

F.2d 1401 (2nd Cir. 1969).

Accordingly, the charter tariff provision allowing delays

up to 48 hours was part of the contract between TIA and

respondents, and because it was established by a regulatory

agency pursuant to statute is had the force and effect of

federal law.

The fact that this tariff was incorporated into the terms

of the charter contract as required by federal law was

accepted by the Alabama Supreme Court. The State

Supreme Court, however, found that respondents had a

remedy under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention and

that although the Convention does not define the term

“delay”, the charter tariff delay provision was not intended

to provide an interpretation of that term as used for this

charter flight.

(4) In determining the period of time during which the departure

of a charter flight has been delayed within the purveiw of this

paragraph, periods of delay caused by the probation of flights to

or from the airport of departure because of weather or other

operational conditions affecting such airport shall be excluded if,

and while, the air carrier has available an airworthy aircraft

which is capable of transporting the charter group in a condition

of operational readiness.

The Warsaw Convention was drafted in 1929 when

international air travel was at its inception. Concern

developed that no air carrier could economically survive a

large aircraft disaster. Representatives of several sovereign

states agreed to meet and create a uniform body of law

governing the rights and liabilities of passengers and air

carriers in international transportation. Dunn vy. Trans

World Airlines, Inc. 589 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978); 1 L.

Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law, Section 11.01(2). The

purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to both provide

uniformity in respect to documentation and procedural

matters and to impose limitation on liability for the air

carriers. See In Re Aircrash in Bali, Indonsesia on April 22,

1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the

Warsaw Convention must be read with a view towards

accomplishing those two fold purposes.

In the instant action, the Alabama Supreme: Court

determined that the Warsaw Convention was applicable

because the flight in question from Birmingham to Italy and

Greece was clearly “international” as that term is defined

by Article 1,§ 2 of the Convention.

Article 19 of the Convention is pertinent to any action for

breach of contract caused by delay and states:

The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned

by delay in the transportation by air of passengers,

baggage, or goods.

The carrier’s liability is subject to the defense set forth in

Article 20 which states:

(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that

he and his agents have taken all necessary

measures to avoid the damage or that it was

impossible for them to take such measures.

a =

Nowhere in the Convention is the term “delay” defined

or is liability under Article 19 expounded upon. This United

States treaty provision has not been explained in any U:S.

Supreme Court opinion. It is thus necessary to examine

other sources to determine the meaning of these provisions

of the Convention. Jn Re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on

April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). In one of the

two United States Supreme Court opinions concerning the

Convention, Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.

466 US. 243, 80 L.Ed.2d 273, 104 S.Ct. 1776 (1984), the

Court permitted the CAB to supplement the Convention by

using the last official price of gold as the Convention’s

limits. The Court concluded that the CAB’s decision was

consistent with domestic law and with the Convention itself,

construed in light of its purposes, the understanding of the

signatories, and its international implementation since 1929.

Thus, it has been established that the CAB can reasonably

supplement and provide definitions for terms in the

Convention that would otherwise be ambiguous.

While no United States case law interprets the term

“delay” as used in Article 19, several foreign countries have

defined that term so that a cause of action under Article 19

can be maintained only in instances where the delay is for

an unreasonable period of time. See Prof. dr. I.H. Ph.

Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law (1983),

pp. 61-63; and Jean-Louis Magdelenat, Air Cargo

Regulation and Claims (English Language Edition 1983)

pp. 84-88. These countries obviously believe that the

Convention permits them recourse to domestic law in

regards to Article 19.

Although 14 CFR § 208.32(a) does not expressly state

that it is intended to supplement Article 19, it is clear that

charter air carriers and the CAB considered it to be the

se

remedy for delay of international charter flights. The only

provision in the contract between TIA and respondents that

in any way refers to liability for delay is the charter tariff

which was promulgated pursuant to Section 208.32(a).

Section 208.32(a), itself, is the only CAB regulation that

establishes any rights for delay for passengers of

international charter flights. Thus, the Warsaw Convention

permits domestic law to reasonably supplement and define

“delay” as used in Article 19, and the CAB reasonably did

this with the enactment of Section 208.32(a).

The Alabama Supreme Court found language in Section

208.32(a) to directly refute that it was intended to define

“delay” as used in Article 19. The second sentence of

Section 208.32(a) states:

These requirements shall be without prejudice,

and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of

passengers under applicable law.

Thus, the court found the CAB regulation was not

respondents’ sole remedy for delay. However, this misses

the point. Section 208.32(a) does not supersede or exclude a

remedy otherwise available, but merely defines a term.

Also, defining “delay” to only mean instances where the

time period exceeds 48 hours for charter flights does not

violate the Convention’s prohibitions against a carrier

limiting its liability. Again, Section 208.32(a) does not limit

a carrier’s liability but simply defines the term “delay” as

8 Article 23 of the Warsaw Convention states:

Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or

to fix the lower limit in that which is laid down in this

Convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such

provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract,

which shall remain subject to the provision of this

Convention.

a. ae

used in Article 19. See Butler’s Shoe Corp. v. Pan American

World Airways, Inc. 514 F.2d 1283 (Sth Cir. 1975) where

the court ruled that a Pan Am tariff requiring that written

notice of loss of goods must be received within 120 days did

not limit a carrier’s liability under Article 23.

Although the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that Section

208.32(a) does not define “delay” under Article 19, it did

not provide an alternate definition for that term. The

Alabama Supreme Court decision, if left standing, would

support the proposition that a passenger has a cause of

action for any delay of any international flight. Given the

nature of air travel, few flights are able to meet to the exact

minute the scheduled departure or arrival times. Thus,

according to the Alabama Supreme Court opinion, a

passenger could sue a carrier for a 5 minute delay in his

arrival time subject only to affirmative defenses and

damage limitations. This is obviously contrary to the intent

of the Warsaw Convention and would run havoc among

Carriers in today’s over-crowded airports.

The Alabama Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the

term “delay” as used in Article 19 was not reasonably

supplemented and defined by 14 CFR § 208.32(a) to

provide actions for delay only in those instances where the

delay was in excess of 48 hours.

|,

II

THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT INCOR-

RECTLY RULED THAT ARTICLE 19 WAS

NOT INTENDED TO PERMIT CARRIERS

TO CONDITION THEIR LIABILITY FOR

DELAY BY PLACING EXPRESS LIMITS IN

THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE

While not discussed in the Alabama Supreme Court

opinion, TIA argued that the Warsaw Convention, Article

19 permits carriers to condition their liability for delay by

placing such conditions in the contract. In this case, TIA

had expressly conditioned its liability for delay by providing

in the ticket jacket, a portion of the contract, that the

departure time listed was for informational purposes only?

and by stating that it would supply substitute transportation

for delays in excess of 48 hours. Thus, if a carrier is

permitted to condition its liability for delay under the

Convention, the Alabama Supreme Court decision should

be overruled because TIA pursuant to contract expressly

did condition liability for delay as permitted by the CAB.

In Jahanger v. Purolator Sky Carrier, 615 F.Supp. 29

(E.D. Penn. 1985), plaintiff alleged that he was damaged by

a one day delay in the delivery of an international package.

Plaintiff had a claim against the Iranian government, and

this package contained legal documents that had to be

received by a certain date at the Peace Palace in the Hague

for the claim to be maintained. Plaintiff argued that

defendant was liable because its employees had informed

plaintiff’s attorney that the package would arrive on time.

9 See Note 4, supra.

conics

After determining that the Warsaw Convention applied, the

court held that plaintiff had no cause of action under

Article 19 because of language in the airway bill which

stated ‘“‘due to the nature of the business, Purolator cannot

guarantee delivery by a stipulated date or by a stipulated

time, nor shall Purolator be liable for the consequences of

delay...” While Jahanger concerned delay of a package

instead of passengers, there is no distinguishable difference

in terms of liability under Article 19. The court in Jahanger

found that the airway bill language did not run afoul of

Article 23 prohibition on limiting liability.!° Accordingly, at

least one federal court has found that carriers are permitted

to condition liability for delay under Article 19 by contract.

(a) INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 19 TO

THE WARSAW CONVENTION

In order to understand the meaning of legislation or

treaties, reference should be made to the minutes from the

conference at which the document was drafted. Justice

Sandra O’Connor in a recent United States Supreme Court

Opinion, Air France v. Saks, — U.S. —, 84 L.Ed.2d 289,

105. S.Ct. 1338 (1985), found the meaning of “accident” in

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to be consistent with

the negotiation history of the Convention. Justice O’Connor

acknowledged in interpreting a treaty, it was proper to refer

to the records of its drafting and negotiation, /d., citing,

Choctaw Nation of Indians vy. United States, 318 U.S. 423,

431 (1943).

The treaty that became the Warsaw Convention was first

drafted at an international conference in Paris during 1925.

10 See Note 8, supra.

|

oo

The draft was prepared following the First International

Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, the Paris

Conference in October of 1925. A committee was

established at that conference which in the years preceding

the 1929 conference met and drafted the preliminary

document. This committee was entitled Comite Interna-

tionale Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aeriens

(CITEJA)."! |

In the report from the CITEJA committee (Minutes, pp.

251- 255), it was stated that the principal of liability in the

event of delay was maintained so that the carrier was not

free to deliver the goods or have the passenger arriving

according to the “‘carrier’s own pleasure”. This report from

the CITEJA was presented in written form to the delegates

at the Warsaw Conference.

Each country present at the conference had an

opportunity to submit its recommendations and proposed

amendments. Amendments pertinent to liability in the case

of delay, were presented by the British, German, Polish and

Hungarian delegations. These are found in the Warsaw

Minutes, pages 276, 289, 296, 301-303, 307, 315, 319-322.

During the conference in Warsaw, discussions were held in

the General Session meetings, comprised of all of the

'l This preliminary draft was the result of the CITEJA efforts and the

1925 discussions held at the First International Conference in Paris.

Prior to the 1929 Warsaw Conference, this preliminary draft was

submitted to the Conference participants giving them an opportunity

to review the articles and present recommendations. The Second

International Conference then convened in Warsaw in 1929 and

minutes from that conference were translated into English in 1975.

International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions,

Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical

Law, October 4-12, 1929 (R. Horner & D. Legrez trans. 1975).

a, ee

delegates. At the seven general session meetings, questions

and comments were made on each of the articles presented

in the preliminary draft prepared by the CITEJA.

It was in the Seventh Session, the final day of the

conference, that Article 21 was changed, renumbered and

presented as Article 19.

Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

“The carrier shall be liable for damages

occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of

passengers, baggage, or goods.” (Warsaw Minutes

at 207).

As originally presented to the convention in Warsaw,

then Article 21 provided:

“‘The carr.er shall be liable for damages sustained

during carriage:

* * al

(c) in the case of delay suffered by a traveler,

goods, or baggage.” (Warsaw Minutes at pp. 264-

265).

The discussions of damages for delay took place during

the Third Session (Warsaw Minutes pp. 55-58). The

Reporter of the CITEJA committee discussed _ the

difference between the circumstance where the period of

time for carriage was stipulated and where there was no

time period. The Committee retained liability for delay in

Article 21, but it was believed where no period was

stipulated, a reasonable time was to be implied by the judge.

Following the comments by the CITEJA Reporter, Sir

Alfred Dennis, the lead delegate from Great Britain spoke

to the General Session participants. Sir Dennis indicated

agreement with the comments of the Reporter that the

carrier should not have the ability or right to delay

—

passengers at will. Alluding to the liability imposed on

railroads, Sir Dennis stated it was reasonable to impose

certain conditions upon air carriers. Sir Dennis asserted

that even these conditions could be avoided if the carrier

stated ‘‘‘Here is our timetable, but we don’t guarantee that

our aircraft will arrive exactly at the hour indicated there is

herein something which makes sense and if the air carriers

put this condition in the contract, delay is no longer

involved, except, of course, for exceptional and unreason-

able delay.’’ (Emphasis added, Warsaw Minutes p. 55).

As an appendix to the proposal submitted by Great

Britain, the European air carriers, represented by the

International Air Traffic Association, submitted a letter

objecting to the language in the preliminary draft, relating

to this liability for delay. (Warsaw Minutes pp. 301-303). In

this letter, the IATA suggested maritime law granted to

carriers and passengers and/or shippers the right to enter

contractual relationships or transportation and there was no

reason to hold air transportation to a stricter standard. It

also argued there was no reasonable ground for depriving

air carriers of the ability to stipulate special conditions or to

take a special contract covering the question of delay. This

special contract would allow carriers, if they accept the

contract for particular delivery, to thereby take into account

extra costs, and contract for insurance for protection

against losses which might be ‘incurred. The IATA

recommended either the complete elimination of Article

21(c) or requested a decision be made that the clause

related only to cases in which by agreement a stipulation

was inserted into the contract of carriage.

In addition to the comments of Sir Dennis, a British

solicition, comments were made by Mr. Richter, of the

Ministry of Justice in Germany, Mr. Babinski of Poland,

a om

Mr. Rippert, a professor of law in France and Mr. Arendt,

Honorary President of the High Court of Justice in

Luxembourg. These gentlemen were well aware of the legal

consequences for the language found in the Convention.

Following the comments of Sir Dennis, Mr. Richter

concurred that the principal of liability for delay should be

retained though the parties should be permitted to “insert

an exoneration clause”. The Hungarian delegate declared

his agreement with the comments of the German delegation

in demanding that the principal of liability in the case of

delay be retained. However, the Hungarian delegate stated

that the Warsaw Convention should include an express

provision for the mitigation of that liability where the delay

could not have been avoided.

Although the CITEJA committee believed a judge should

have the discretion to determine liability for delay when no

period of time was stipulated, the Polish delegation asserted

this was not appropriate. Instead, the Polish delegate

requested that a different limit of liability be established for

mere delay than for damages because of death or injury to

passengers. Also, the Polish delegate suggested the

elimination of the words “by a traveler” from Article 21(c)

because of problems perceived in “innumerable trials and

difficulties of proof.”

Echoing the comments of Sir Dennis, the Polish delegate

made a comparison to railroads and remarked that there

was no such liability for damages sustained by a delayed

railway traveler. Therefore, there was no reason to create

liability for air carriers.

The final comments on this article came from Mr.

Rippert of France. The Convention was recorded and

conducted in French, and therefore, Rippert’s comments,

particularly in coming immediately before the vote on the

—

adoption of this portion of the article should be accorded

great weight. Mr. Rippert suggested that the question of

delay had not really been understood by air carriers nor the

delegates as indicated in the submitted amendments.

Rippert acknowledged that a convention such as the

Warsaw Convention had to include a provision that the

carrier was liable for delay since air carriage by its very

nature was more rapid than other means of transportation.

Rippert stated that “liability for delay”, was intended for

the circumstance where the air carrier left goods under a

hanger and did not forward them in good time. This was

similar to the liability of ordinary carriers. He emphasized

that air carriers should be held to a similar standard of

liability as other carriers by land or sea. The Convention,

remarked Rippert, says nothing more than that carriers can

stipulate a period of time for carriage, and upon including a

provision forewarning the interested parties, either passen-

gers or shippers, there will be no liability for delay. Rippert

stated:

“‘There is, for the carriers, a very simple means of

never being late: In Article 8 it is indicated that

the carriers are free to stipulate a period of

passage and to insert it in the waybill or on the

ticket. When an air carrier fears not being able to

provide carriage within four or five days, ne need

only add ‘a carriage in such and such days at

most’, and the interested parties are warned. But

what is inadmissable is that a company promise

rapid transport, that it set up a timetable, and that

it not be liable when it has not taken reasonable

measures to avoid this delay.” (Warsaw Minutes

at 57).

= =

It is evident therefore, that each of the delegates making

comments before the Third General Session at the Warsaw

Conference, discussed liability for delay, not in an absolute

sense but in terms of foreseeability and warning to the

passenger or shipper. The carrier had to place in the

contract of carriage any conditions to liability for delay in

transportation, or be subject to liability Article 21, adopted

as Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention.

These explanations and clarifications regarding the

meaning of the language in Article 21(c) on the question of

damages for delay, answered the objections of the delegates.

The article was adopted in the Third Session by a 17 to 2

vote. During the Seventh Session, the present Article 19

language was unanimously adopted. The article was

understood as maintaining the same standard of liability for

common carriers in dealing with air carriers. Accordingly,

air carriers were allowed to provide in the contract of

carriage conditions that were appropriate.

There was no guarantee or contractual promise that the

flight would depart Birmingham at 12:30 p.m. on

March 11. Trans International Airlines provided in the

contract of carriage, the ticket jacket, that the departure

time listed was “for informational purposes only”. This

contract of carriage, including the charter tariff filed with

the CAB and the Charter Agreement, provided that the

carrier was obligated to depart from Birmingham, Alabama

within 48 hours of the scheduled time for departure listed

on the ticket jacket. Undisputed testimony at trial

confirmed that departure took place within 32 or 33 hours

of the scheduled departure time. Therefore, as a matter of

law, the contract of carriage was not breached. The

contract for flight provided there was no delay if departure

occurred within 48 hours of the scheduled departure time.

> “ ‘

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iin Raat abt areca,

=

As a matter of law, no delay has occurred within the

meaning of Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention.

Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court acted impro-

perly in reversing the lower court’s directed verdict in favor

of Trans International Airlines and against the respondents,

tour participants.

CONCLUSION

Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RALPH S. LaMONTAGNE, JR.

WILLIAM V. O’CONNOR

HENRY C. DARMSTADTER III

KERN & WOOLEY

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel

THOMAS R. ELLIOT, JR.

LONDON, YANCEY, ALLEN,

ELLIOTT & LANEY

APPENDIX

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TNT SAREE, GEO GRE Sd,

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THE STATE OF ALABAMA .------ JUDICIAL

DEPARTMENT

THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 1985-86

Virginia Newsome, et al.

84-484 v.

Trans International Airlines, et al.

and

Craig Kuechenmeister, et al.

84-835 v.

Trans International Airlines, et al.

Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court

ADAMS, JUSTICE.

These appeals are from a judgment based on directed

verdicis for the defendants in consolidated breach of

contract actions brought as a result of the delay in

departure of an international flight from Birmingham,

Alabama to Europe.

Defendant Mable Forrester, d/b/a Sky III Enterprises

and Ambassadors Abroad, organized a European charter

tour and solicited the plaintiffs’ participation in the tour

through advertisement. As the tour operator, Forrester

contracted with defendant Trans International Airlines

(hereinafter ‘‘TIA”) to provide a round-trip charter flight

for the plaintiffs aboard TIA aircraft from Birmingham,

Alabama, to Milan, Italy, and Athens, Greece.

ae. ee

The flight from Birmingham to Europe was scheduled to

depart from the Birmingham airport at 12:30 p.m.,

March 11, 1979, but, because of mechanical difficulties

with TIA’s original chartered aircraft, as well as with a

replacement aircraft, departure was delayed until approxi-

mately 8:30 p.m., March 12, 1979; a delay of about 32

hours. The flight to the European destinations, as well as

the return flight to the United States, was uneventful.

However, the plaintiffs’ tour of Europe was shortened by

the delay in departure.

As a result of the delay in departure, two separate classes

of plaintiffs brought breach of, contract class action suits

against TIA and Forrester in the Circuit Court of Jefferson

County, Alabama. The Newsome plaintiff class was

originally represented by Virginia Newsome and _ is

composed of the tour participants who were transported to

Italy. The Kuechenmeister plaintiff class is represented by

Craig Kuechenmeister, and is composed of the tour

participants who were transported to Greece, following a

stopover in Italy. The two cases were consolidated for trial

and subsequently certified as class actions on October 6,

1981.

The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages for the

delay of the TIA charter flight, alleging that the delay was

a breach of the charter contract and resulted in the

plaintiffs’ missing valuable portions of their tour and

substantially impaired the tour’s value to them. Forrester

cross-claimed against TIA, alleging that TIA had breached

its contract of carriage with her by failing to furnish the

tour transportation at the time agreed.

The consolidated actions proceeded to trial, and at the

close of the plaintiffs’ case the court granted TIA’s motion

for directed verdict on plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim,

as well as on Forrester’s cross-claim. Forrester’s motion for

directed verdict against the plaintiffs’ claims against her

was also granted by the trial court. Following the trial

court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for new trial, the

plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal to bring this matter

before this Court. Forrester has not appealed the trial

court’s adverse ruling on her cross-claim.

The issue to be resolved is whether the trial court erred

by directing verdicts in favor TIA and Forrester on

plaintiffs’ contract claims. We are of the opinion that the

trial court did err by granting a directed verdict for TIA,

and we reverse its judgment as to TIA. We affirm judgment

based on the the directed verdict for Forrester.

2

TIA’S Directed Verdict

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in

granting TIA’s directed verdict motion based upon the trial

court’s finding that there was no contract breach by TIA

because of an alleged limitation of liability for delay

provision incorporated by reference into the contract

between TIA and the plaintiffs. We agree.

TIA and the plaintiffs are in agreement that the contract

of carriage which is the basis of the plaintiffs’ contract

action against TIA is evidenced by the passenger ticket.!

' Actually, there are three contractual relationships: the relationship

between TIA and Forrester created by the charter agreement; the

relationship between Forrester and the tour participants created by the

various brochures and other documents distributed by Forrester; and the

relationship between TIA and the tour participants, which is evidenced

by the airline ticket. For the resolution of the issues raised in these

Fy

ie

a ue

The passenger tickets issued by TIA for the plaintiffs’ flight

contained the following statement:

To the extent not in conflict with the foregoing,

carriage and other services performed by the

carrier are subject to (1) the provisions contained

in this. ticket, (2) applicable tariffs and

(3) carrier’s Conditions of Carriage and related

regulations which are made part hereof.

Section (2) of that statement incorporates into the

contract by reference applicable tariffs that TIA is required

to file with the Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.).2 See 14

C.F.R.§ 382 et seq. Once a tariff is filed with the C.A.B., it

becomes a part of the contract of carriage. Eastern Airlines

v. Williamson, 382 Ala. 421,211 So. 2d 912 (1968).

Pursuant to C.A.B. requirements, TIA had in effect

certain rules contained in a charter tariff filed with the

C.A.B. and in effect at the time of the plaintiffs’ flight.

Central to the trial court’s decision was Rule No. 20(b) of

TIA’s Charter Tariff, which states:

Departure Flight Delays: In the case of flight

delays of more than forty-eight (48) hours beyond

the departure time stated in the charter contract,

TIA, upon request and at the charterer’s option,

appeals, we are concerned only with the separate relationships between

the tour participants with TIA and with Forrester. We are not

concerned here with the relationship between TIA and Forrester created

by the charter agreement.

2 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40, 92

Stat. 1705, 1744 (1978), terminated the Civil Aeronautics Board as well

as some provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1301

et seq. (1976). The administration of other provisions of the Federal

Aviation Act have been transferred to other federal agencies.

— om

will provide alternative air transportation at no

additional cost to the charterer.

TIA promulgated this tariff to meet requirements of

C.A.B. regulations codified at 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) (1985).

Section 208.32(a) reads in pertinent part:

Flight delays and substitute air transportation

(foreign). Charter air carriers shall comply with

the following requirements for passenger service

in foreign air transportation. These requirements

shall be without prejudice, and in addition, to any

other rights or remedies of passengers under

applicable law:

(a) Substitute air transportation. (1) On all

charter flights, unless the air carrier causes an

aircraft to finally enplane each passenger and

commence the takeoff procedures at the airport

of departure before the 48th hour following the

time scheduled for the departure of such flight, it

shall provide substitute transportation in accord-

ance with the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) As soon as the air carrier discovers, or

should have discovered by the exercise of

reasonable prudence and forethought, that the

departure of any such charter flight will be

delayed more than 48 hours, such air carrier shall

arrange for and pay the costs of substitute air

transportation for the charter group on another

charter flight, operated by any other carrier or

foreign air carrier.

(3) When neither the charter transportation

contracted for nor substitute transportation has

; been performed before the expiration of 48 hours

following the scheduled departure time of any

such charter flight, the charterer, or his duly

authorized agent, may arrange for substitute air

transportation of the members of the charter

group, at economy or tourist class fares, on

individually ticketed flights and the chartered air

carrier shall pay the costs of such air transporta-

tion to the substitute air carrier or foreign air

carrier.

(4) In determining the period of time during

which the departure of a charter flight has been

delayed within the purview of this paragraph,

periods of delay caused by the prohibition of

flights to or from the airport of departure because

of weather or other operational conditions

affecting such airport shall be excluded if, and

while, the air carrier has available an airworthy

aircraft which is capable of transporting the

charter group in a condition of operational

readiness.

TIA contends that once its tariffs are filed with the

C.A.B., the tariffs are the exclusive provisions by which the

rights and liabilities of the carrier and passengers are

governed. See Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 413

F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969).

Based upon the foregoing facts and principles, TIA

argued to the trial court, and argues again here, that TIA’s

tariff, filed pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) and

incorporated into TIA’s contract of carriage, exclusively

limits TIA’s liability for the flight delay experienced by the

plaintiffs in the instant case to providing substitute air

transportation and incidental expenses, if, but only if, the

flight delay is 48 hours or longer. The delay of the TIA

charter at issue here was only about 32 hours, and,

os atte

a s,s

therefore, TIA asserts that there was no breach of the

contract with plaintiffs and that a directed verdict was in

order.

The trial court stated in the record:

The Court’s of the opinion, whether I agree with it

or not, that this is an area that is controlled by the

Federal Regulations because of the commerce

aspect of it and interstate commerce. And that the

regulations, the tariff, and the operation of law

operating together provide that the carrier, in this

case TIA, is not liable for flight delays of

departure as provided by this contract for less that

48 hours under the circumstances that have been

shown here. The motion for directed verdict for

TIA is granted.

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in its

ruling because (1) the C.A.B. regulation at 14 C.F.R.

§ 208.32(a) is not intended to be the exclusive remedy

afforded to the plaintiffs in this action, but is in addition to

remedies recognized under federal treaty law and state

common law; and (2) 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) cannot be the

exclusive remedy for defendants’ breach of contract claim

because the remedy would be in fatal conflict with the terms

of the Warsaw Convention? — a federal treaty which

3 The Warsaw Convention (“the Convention”), formally titled the

“Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air,” was created on October 12, 1929,

and was adhered to by the United States in June 1934. An English

translation is published at 49 Stat. 3014 (1934), and also reprinted in T.S.

No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, and 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1976). The

original Convention is modified by the “Agreement Relating to Liability

Limitation of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol” (‘‘the

Montreal Agreement”), CAB 18900 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), note

following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982).

a se

supersedes any conflicting tariff filed pursuant to C.A.B.

regulations.

A. Exclusivity of Remedy

We are of the opinion that the 48-hour provision of 14

C.F.R. § 208.32(a), which was essentially incorporated by

reference into TIA’s contract of carriage by the tariff

provision filed with the C.A.B., is not the exclusive remedy

afforded to plaintiffs in the instant case, but, rather, that the

provision allows the plaintiffs additional rights that may

arise from federal treaty or state common law. The

provision at 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) was promulgated

pursuant to authority granted by the Federal Aviation Act,

Pub.L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (1958) (codified as amended at

49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976)). A federal administrative

regulation should be construed so as to carry out the intent

of the enacting body. United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703,

cert. denied, 83 S.Ct. 507, 371 U.S. 955, 9 L.Ed 2d 502 (9th

Cir. 1962). Section 1506 of the Federal Aviation Act

provides: ‘‘Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any

way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common

law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in

addition to such remedies.” 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976). The

Court in Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 541

F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (W.D. Pa. 1982), made the following

observation about § 1506:

While federal regulation of air travel is extensive{,]

it is not exclusive. Quite the contrary|,] federal law

specifically preserves legal remedies for air

travelers beyond those set forth in the Federal

;

:

:

Ltt EGS,

—_ soa

Aviation Act.... [49 U.S.C. § 1506] recognizes

that the statutory scheme established by the

Federal Aviation Act is designed merely to

complement existing statutory and common law

remedies, not to supplant them. Moreover, it is

clear that 49 U.S.C. § 1506 applies to remedies

arising under state law as well as those created by

federal law.

To hold that 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) is an exclusive remedy

for delays in international charter flights would directly

conflict with the clear Congressional intent expressed in

§ 1506. Surely, the C.A.B. in promulgating the regulation

did not intend to create such an obvious conflict. Moreover,

we ure obligated to look to the plain meaning of the

regulation’s language in construing its effect. United States

v. Miller, supra. The second sentence of § 208.32(a)

specifically states:

These requirements shall be without prejudice,

and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of

passengers under applicable law.

We can reach no other conclusion than that the remedy

provided in § 208.32(a) is cumulative to other rights and is

not exclusive.

In addition, a court, whenever possible, should avoid a

construction of a regulation that would raise doubt as to the

regulation’s validity or hinder its ability to make its

statutory authority operative. Northern Natural Gas Co. v.

O’Malley, 277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960). As will be

discussed below, a holding that the remedy embodied in 14

C.F.R. § 208.32(a) is exclusive would create conflict with

the Warsaw Convention, a duly entered self-executing

federal treaty, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint

Corp., — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1771, 8 L.Ed.2d 273 (1984), that

—A-10—

is, the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI; see also

Butler’s Shoe Corp. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,

514 F.2d 1283 (Sth Cir. 1975).

B. Conflict With Warsaw Convention

The application of the Warsaw Convention to interna-

tional flights is governed by the contract of carriage

between the carrier and passenger, and, as previously

mentioned, the contract of carriage between the plaintiffs

and TIA in the instant case is evidenced by the passenger

ticket.4 See In Re Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F.Supp.

1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The passenger tickets in the instant

case expressly incorporated the terms of the Warsaw

Convention by the following language:

WARSAW CONVENTION. Carriage hereunder

is subject to the rules and limitations relating to

liability established by the Warsaw Convention

unless such carriage is not “International Car-

riage”’ as defined by that Convention.

There is no dispute that the plaintiffs’ flight was

‘{nternational,” as that term is defined by Article 1, § 2 of

the Convention. We must now determine what effect the

4 In Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (Sth

Cir. 1967), the court opined that the ticket itself is not the contract

between carrier and passenger, but evidences the contractual relationship

which arises once the carrier promises to transport the passenger and the

passenger consents to the transportation.

Whether the flight comes within the scope of the Convention is

governed by the points of departure and arrival, as explained in

Article 3(2) of the Convention.

Moreover, it is clear from Block that the terms of the Convention

apply regardless of the fact that the transportation is by air charter.

slain ed Salata ais REDE Be

=— <)

application of the Convention has upon the liability

limitations embodied in TIA’s tariffs that were incorpo-

rated by reference into the passenger tickets.°

The plaintiffs contend that the Warsaw Convention

provides a cause of action against TIA and that Article 19

of the Convention makes TIA liable for damages

occasioned by all delays in the transportation of passengers

unless TIA proves that it took all necessary measures to

avoid the damage or that it was impossible for the airline to

take such measures, as is provided in Article 20, § 1, of the

convention. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s

5 The following rules and Regulations embodied in ‘Trans

International Airlines, Inc., Charter Tariff No. WW-i,” effective

November 12, 1978, are those relevant portions of the tariff relied upon

by TIA in the instant case:

Rule No. 20(2)(B)

Departure Flight Delays: In the case of flight delays of

more than forty-eight (48) hours beyond the departure time

stated in the charter contract, TIA, upon request and at the

charterer’s option, will provide alternative air transportation

at no additional cost to the charterer.

Rule No. 33

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY - PASSENGERS

(A) General: As between TIA and the charterer, TIA shall

be liable only for direct damage occasioned by its negligence,

or the negligence of its officers, agents, servants or

employees, but shall not be liable for special or consequential

damages including, but not limited to, loss of services, nor in

any event shall TIA be liable to the charterer for any loss or

damage resulting from delays due to mechanical difficulties,

weather or conditions beyond TIA’s control.

© The English translation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Convention

reads as follows:

Article 19

The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by delay in

the transportation by air of passengers, baggage, or goods.

—A-12—

Article 20

(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his

agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the

damage or that 1t was impossible for him or them to take

such measures.

(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier

shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was

occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the

aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he

and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the

damage.

49 U.S.C.§ 1502 note (1976).

Prior to the promulgation of the Montreal Agreement (see note 2 of

this opinion), Article 20 § 1, above, provided a defense to the carrier to

claims arising from the death of, or injury to, passengers. Pursuant to the

Montreal Agreement, a carrier may not avail itself of this defense if it

wishes to be protected by the limitations of liability set forth in the

Montreal Agreement.

We note that the Montreal Agreement was concerned only with

damages related to personal injury and death of passengers and does not

speak to the damages recoverable or the continued applicability of

Article 20(1) as a defense for claims due to flight delays. We therefore

conclude that the original liability limitation of Article 22, below, as well

as the defense available under Article 20(1), continues in effect for

claims for flight delays.

In addition to Articles 19 and 20, we find the following Articles of the

Convention applicable in the case at bar:

Article 22

(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of

the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of

125,000 francs [approximately $8,300.00 U.S. dollars].

Article 23

Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or

to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this

convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such

provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract,

which shall remain subject to the provisions of this

convention.

4

P ¥

a | a

application of 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) to limit TIA’s liability

for flight delays to providing alternate transportation and

incidental expenses, and, then, only if the original departure

time is delayed by 48 hours or more, was error, because,

they argue, such a limitation of liability flies in the face of

the liability imposed by Article 19 and the prohibition of

liability limitations set out in Article 23 of the Convention.

TIA argues that the remedy embodied in 14 C.F.R.

§ 208.32(a) is not inconsistent with Article 19 of the

Convention, but is a consistent supplementation permitted

by the Convention and envisioned by the Convention

drafters. TIA asserts that the Convention does not define

“delay,” as that term is used in Article 19, and that the

various states that have ratified the Convention are free to

specify and define what constitutes “delay” under Article

19. TIA contends that the C.A.B. has, in effect, through 14

C.F.R. § 208.32(a), defined “delay” to be failure to depart

within 48 hours of the appointed departure time. Therefore,

TIA argues, the reference to 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) in TIA’s

tariff, incorporated into the contract of carriage, precludes

any remedy for its passengers until more than 48 hours has

passed from the scheduled departure times.

Although we agree with TIA that 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a)

is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Warsaw

Convention, we are unable to accept the strained

construction of the regulation put forward by TIA. Neither

the unambiguous language of Article 19 of the Convention

nor the language of the regulation supports TIA’s

Article 24

(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for

damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to

the conditions and limits set out in this convention.

49 U.S.C.§ 1502 note (1976).

a | ee

contention that 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) can, or that it in fact

does, define “‘delay” so as to, in effect, limit TIA’s liability.

We have carefully analyzed the minutes of the

Convention pertaining to the adoption of Article 19, and the

discussions rendered therein do not lead us to conclude that

the delegates intended that Article 19 be supplanted in the

fashion contemplated by TIA. However, we pretermit a

lengthy and complicated discussion addressed to this point

by simply observing that the clear language of 14 C.F.R.

§ 208.32(a) does not define, nor does it reflect an intention

to define, the term “delay”. As _ previously noted,

§ 208.32(a) states: “These requirements shall be without

prejudice, and in addition, to any other rights or remedies of

passengers under applicable law.”

We have previously concluded that the Warsaw

Convention applies to the facts of the instant case, and,

therefore, we must conclude that the plaintiffs are free to

assert any rights or remedies available to them pursuant to

the Convention or other applicable law, regardless of the

remedy afforded by 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a). The trial court

erred by granting TIA’s directed verdict motion.

C. Preclusion of Common Law Remedies

In light of our determination that the Convention is

applicable in the instant case, what remedies are afforded

plaintiffs by the Convention and by state common law?

Plaintiffs argue that despite the applicability of the

Warsaw Convention and 14 C.F.R. § 208.32(a) to the case

at bar, these provisions do not preclude the plaintiffs from

asserting a common law cause of action for breach of

contract. We disagree.

-

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The issue here was addressed by the Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals in Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v.

Pan American World Airways, 737 F.2d 456, 458 (Sth Cir.

1984). The issue was framed in that case as:

[Whether the Convention provides the exclusive

liability remedy for international air carriers by

providing an independent cause of action, thereby

preempting state law, or whether it merely limits

the amount of recovery for a cause of action

otherwise provided by state or federal law.

The Boehringer court joined the Courts of Appeals for

the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits in holding that the

Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action and is the

exclusive remedy. See Benjamins v. British European

Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978); Abramson y. Japan Air

Lines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Mexico City

Air Crash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir.

1983). The result of these recent holdings is to make the

theories of recovery and limitations of liability set out in the

Convention exclusive, thereby preempting state common

law causes of action in situations in which the Convention

applies. When the Convention does not apply, liability and

damages limitations are established in accordance with

common law rules. These holdings were predicated upon

the courts’ recognition that the Convention was intended to

be a binding uniform international body of air law and the

conclusion that a uniform and consistent theory of liability

embodied in a cause of action founded upon the Convention

itself is consistent with the Conventions’ goal of uniformity.

We are persuaded by the consistent position taken by the

courts of the several circuits that have addressed this issue,

and, in the absence of any direct holding on this issue by the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, we are inclined to

a

follow the decisions of these other four circuits. The

plaintiffs in the instant case have a cause of action derived

exclusively from the Convention, and, therefore, all state

common law causes of action that might otherwise have

been available to plaintiffs are preempted.

D. Delivery of Tickets

Plaintiffs argue that if the Convention is applicable to the

case at bar, TIA should not be able to rely upon the liability

limitations provisions of the Convention because the

plaintiffs’ tickets were not “delivered” to the plaintiffs as

required by Article 3 of the Convention.

If TIA did not deliver a ticket to each plaintiff, recovery

is not restricted by Convention limitations of liabiliity of

Article 22. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 341 F.2d

851 (2d Cir. 1965).

Article 3,§ 2 of the Convention provides:

The absence, irregularity, or loss of the

passenger ticket shall not affect the existence

or the validity of the contract of transporta-

tion, which shall none the less be subject to

the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if

the carrier accepts a passenger without a

passenger ticket having been delivered he

shall not be entitled to avail himself of the

provisions of this convention which exclude

or limit his liability.

The several courts that have interpreted this provision have

generally concluded that “delivery” requires that passen-

gers be afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the

ticket far enough in advance of departure to be able to be

apprised of the limitations of the Convention and to be able

—A-17—

to take measures to protect themselves from the limitations.

See, e.g., Warren v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 352 F.2d 494

(2d Cir. 1965); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 341 F.2d

851 (2d Cir. 1965); DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch

Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978); Domanque y. Eastern

Airlines, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. La. 1981).’? Whether a

ticket has been delivered, as required by the Convention, is a

question to be answered by the jury based upon the factual

circumstances of each case as gleaned from the evidence.

Mertens, supra. The record in the case before us reflects a

disputed factual issue regarding the timely delivery of

tickets to the plaintiffs. The determination of this issue is

for the jury.

II. Forrester’s Directed Verdict

The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Forrester,

relying upon language contained in the tour brochures

issued to the plaintiffs. The relevant language reads as

follows:

RESPONSIBILITY: SKY III ENTERPRISES,

the tour operator and/or the selling agent, their

representatives (designated Tour Leaders and

Faculty), act only as agent for the tour members in

making arrangements for hotels, transportation,

sightseeing, restaurant or any other services in

connection with this itinerary and they will

exercise reasonable care in making such arrange-

7 Although the delivery issue raised in the above cited cases was dealt

with in relation to claims based on personal injury or death of passengers

arising under Article 17 of the Convention, we see no bases for not

applying the requirement of delivery under Article 3, § 2, to the

provisions of Article 19 concerning delay.

—A-18—

ments. However, they do not assume any liability

whatsoever, for any injury, damage, loss, accident

or delay to person or property due to any act or

default of any hotel, carrier, restaurant, company

or person rendering any of the services included

in the tour program. ... Sky III Enterprises, the

Tour Leaders and/or instructors and the tour

operator(s) and any selling agent shall be rendered

faultless and not responsible for any type of injury

whatsoever, and will accept no responsibility for

any damage or delay due to sickness, pilferage,

labor disputes, machinery breakdown, quarantine,

government restraints, weather or any other cause

beyond their personal control. The right is

reserved to cancel or change itineraries. . . . In the

event that services and accommodations set forth

in the brochure cannot be supplied due to delays,

acts, omissions, or other causes beyond its control,

the operator shall use its best efforts to supply

comparable service and accommodations.

INSURANCE; In view of statutory or contractu-

al limitations which may apply to personal injury

or property damage losses, the PURCHASE OF

ACCIDENT AND BAGGAGE INSURANCE

is strongly recommended. Details may be obtained

from your Tour leader.

There was no evidence at trial that any plaintiff failed to

receive documents including this provision.

Plaintiffs do not contend that this language was not a

part of their contract with Forrester, but assert that the

language is ambiguous and misleading. Plaintiffs also assert

that the language constitutes an unconscionable exculpa-

—A-19—

tory provision which should be denied effect by this Court.

We do not agree.

An exculpatory contract provision is one that tends to

excuse a defendant from alleged fault. See Taylor v. Leedy

& Co. 412 So. 2d 763 (Ala. 1982). In Alabama, a party

generally may not contract against the harm caused by his

or her own negligence, with certain exception not applicable

in the instant case. See Alabama Great Southern R. Co. y.

Sumter Plywood Corp, 359 So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 1978).

However, the plain language of the disputed contract

provision here does not constitute an exculpatory provision.

We are of the opinion that the clear and unambiguous

wording of the provision merely holds Forrester harmless

for certain circumstances, including delay occasioned by

machinery breakdowns, beyond her personal control. The

language does not purport to relieve Forrester for damages

to the plaintiffs brought upon by her actions or by events

within her personal control.’ Accordingly, we conclude that

8 14 C.F.R.§ 378.1 et seg., revoked and reserved effective January 1,

1979, by amendment No. 22, 43 Fed.Reg. 36, 603 (1978) but applicable

to plaintiffs’ tour, required Forrester to furnish a surety bond for the

protection of the tour members. Forrester met this requirement. TIA

argued at trial that plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was against Forrester on

her bond, pursuant to § 378, but the provisions of 14 C.F.R.§ 378.17 do

not support this argument, nor does this section support plaintiffs’

contention that the disputed liability limitation provision promulgated by

Forrester is unconscionable. 14 C.F.R.§ 378.17(h) provides in regard to

the contract between the tour operator and tour participants:

That the tour operator is the principal and is responsible to

the participants in making the arrangements for all tour

services and accommodations offered as constituting the

tour: Provided, however, that this requirement shall not

preclude the tour operator from expressly providing in such

contract that, in the absence of negligence on the part of the

—20—

there is no basis for holding the disputed contract language

unconscionable.

Having made a thorough examination of the record

before us, we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs failed to

provide a scintilla of evidence that Forrester breached the

contract provision set out above. The record contains ample

evidence that the delay of the plaintiffs’ charter flight was

due to mechanical breakdowns of TIA’s aircraft. The

plaintiffs have failed to direct us to any evidence within the

record that tends to show that Forrester was responsible for

the delay of the TIA charter flight or that preventing or

shortening the delay was within her personal control. In

fact, two class representatives called as witnesses at trial

testified that they were not aware of anything Forrester

could have done to expedite the departure. Both Forrester

and Lee Francis, TIA’s regional manager, testified that

shortly after the initial delay, Forrester requested that

alternative transportation be supplied by TIA. Based upon

this evidence and the terms of plaintiffs’ contract with

Forrester, we conclude that the trial court properly directed

a verdict in favor of Forrester and against the plaintiffs on

their breach of contract claim.

tour operator, he is not responsible for personal injury or

property damage arising out of the act or negligence of any

direct air carrier, hotel or other person rendering any of the

services or accommodations being offered in such tour.

Clearly, Forrester was permitted by the above regulation to include

the exact provision in the tour contract that the plaintiffs object to in the

instant case. Also, this provision reflects a clear intent that the remedies

afforded under § 378 not preclude claims against air carriers for their

negligence.

—A-21—

We affirm that portion of the trial court’s judgment in

favor of Forrester, but as to that portion in favor of TIA we

reverse and remand.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;

AND REMANDED.

Torbert, C.J.,. Maddox, Faulkner, Jones, Almon, Shores,

and Beatty, JJ., concur.

;

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setechbeinntiamenuiniis tented ee Galen

—A-22—

CIRCUIT COURT, TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

OF ALABAMA EQUITY DIVISION

FILED IN OPEN COURT

This 2%h day of Oct 1984

. oem “

Pe hy ies car as he

VIRGINIA A. NEWSOME, et al., REGISTER

By sé E.R.

Plaintiffs, Se eS

VS. CASE NO. CV 79 504-800 WAT

TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

a Transamerica Company; MABEL

FORRESTER, individually and d/b/a

SKY III ENTERPRISES, “AMBASSADORS

ABROAD”; et al.,

Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial after notice thereof and was

submitted on the pleading, orders of the Court heretofore

entered, and testimony and evidence presented in open

court.

At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court

granted the motion of the Defendant Trans International

Airlines for a directed verdict on the claims of the Plaintiffs

and the class of persons they represent.

At the close of the evidence of the Defendant Mabel

Forrester, the Court granted the motion for directed verdict

of the Defendant Trans International Airlines asserted to

the crossclaim of the Defendant Mabel Forrester.

PA a ae OP Pe TT ee eee hy ee eS

At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court

granted the motion for directed verdict of the Defendant

Mabel Forrester on the claims of the Plaintiffs and the class

of persons they represent.

Upon consideration of the matters presented and the

rulings of the Court in respect to the said motions, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court

as follows:

1. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendants Trans

International Airlines and Mabel Forrester individually and

d/b/a Sky III Enterprises, ‘Ambassadors Abroad,” on the

claims of the Plaintiffs and the class of persons they

represent. The said class is composed of the persons named

on Exhibit A attached hereto.

2. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendant Trans

International Airlines and against the Defendant Mabel

Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III Enterprises,

‘Ambassadors Abroad,” on the crossclaim of the

Defendant Mabel Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III

Enterprises, “Ambassadors Abroad.”

3. The costs of this action are taxed two thirds (2/3) to

the Plaintiffs and one third (1/3) to the Defendant Mabel

Forrester.

DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October 1984.

William A. Thompson

CIRCUIT JUDGE

| oe

CIRCUIT COURT, TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

OF ALABAMA EQUITY DIVISION

FILED IN OPEN COURT

This 29h day of Oct 1984

VIRGINIA A. NEWSOME, et al., REGISTER

By Be ER.

Plaintiffs, BOD, ee BR.

VS. CASE NO. CV 79 504-961 WAT

TRANS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

a Transamerica Company; MABEL

FORRESTER, individually and d/b/a

SKY III ENTERPRISES, “AMBASSADORS

ABROAD”; et al.,

Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial after notice thereof and was

submitted on the pleading, orders of the Court heretofore

entered, and testimony and evidence presented in open

court.

At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court

granted the motion of the Defendant Trans International

Airlines for a directed verdict on the claims of the Plaintiffs

and the class of persons they represent.

At the close of the evidence of the Defendant Mabel

Forrester, the Court granted the motion for directed verdict

of the Defendant Trans International Airlines asserted to

the crossclaim of the Defendant Mabel Forrester.

—A-25—

At the close of the evidence of the Plaintiffs the Court

granted the motion for directed verdict of the Defendant

Mabel Forrester on the claims of the Plaintiffs and the class

of persons they represent.

Upon consideration of the matters presented and the

rulings of the Court in respect to the said motions, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court

as follows:

1. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendants Trans

International Airlines and Mabel Forrester individually and

d/b/a Sky III Enterprises, “Ambassadors Abroad,” on the

claims of the Plaintiffs and the class of persons they

represent. The said class is composed of the persons named

on Exhibit A attached hereto.

2. Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendant Trans

International Airlines and against the Defendant Mabel

Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III Enterprises,

“Ambassadors Abroad,” on the crossclaim of the

Defendant Mabel Forrester individually and d/b/a Sky III

Enterprises, ‘““Ambassadors Abroad.”

3. The costs of this action are taxed two thirds (2/3) to

the Plaintiffs and one third (1/3) to the Defendant Mabel

Forrester.

DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October 1984.

William A. Thompson

CIRCUIT JUDGE

—A-26—

TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION AND

SUBSIDIARIES WITH STATE OF

INCORPORATION

Transamerica Corporation

Budget Rent a Car Corporation - Illinois

Budget Rent a Car Systems, Inc. - Delaware

Budget Florida Holding (1984), Inc. - Florida

Budget Rent a Car of Broward, Inc. - Florida

Budget Rent a Car Company of Florida, Inc. -

Florida

Budget Rent a Car of Tampa, Inc. - Florida

Budget Rent a Car Distributors, Inc. - Florida

‘Budget Rent a Car Sales, Inc. - Florida

LMDH, Inc. - Florida

Budget Rent a Car of Nashville, Inc. - Tennessee

Chicago Budget Rental a Car Corporation - Delaware

Deplane Corporation - California

Traverse Corporation - California

Budget Rent a Car International, Inc. - Delaware

Budget Rent a Car (U.K.) Limited - United Kingdom

Budget Rent a Car Southern Africa (pty.) Limited -

South Africa

Budget Rent a Car Espana, S.A. - Spain

Budget Rent a Car Italia, Inc - Italy

Budget Rent a Car of Canada Limited - Canada

Budget Leasing Corporation - Delaware

Compass Computer Services Inc. (50% owned by >

Hilton Hotels) - Delaware

Control Risk Corporation - Illinois

Philip Jacobs Insurance Agency, Inc. - California

Transamerica Reinsurance Company Limeted -

' Bermuda

—A-27—

*Coast Service Company - California

*Inter-America Corporation - California

James Wigham Poland Holdings Limited - Delaware

JT Management Company, Inc. - Delaware

*LMS Co. - California

*Mortgage Corporation of America - California

Pyramid Insurance Company of Bermuda, Ltd. -

Bermuda

*TAFEX Systems Corporation - Delaware

*TCS Inc. - Delaware

Trans International Entities Inc. - Delaware

Trans International Airlines, Inc. - Kentucky

Transamerica Airlines, Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica Travel, Inc. - Delaware

*Transamerica Corporation (Oregon) - Oregon

Transamerica Delaval Inc. - Delaware

AHU Corporation - Texas

Berkely Pump Company International - Delaware

De Laval-Stork V.O.F. (50% owned by Transamerica

Delaval Inc.) - Netherlands

Delaval Turbine Canada Ltd. - Canada

De Laval Turbine Gmbh - West Germany

Delaval Turbine International Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica Instruments Gmbh - West Germany

Transamerica Instruments Limited - United Kingdom

Data Laboratories Limited - United Kingdom

Transamerica Instruments S.P.A. - Italy

Transamerica S.A.R.L. - France

Tait, Inc. - Ohio

Berkeley Pump Company - Delaware

Pumptron Industries Inc. - Canada

—A-28—

Transamerica Delaval Electronic Systems Inc. -

Delaware

WEKA, A.G. - Switzerland

AB.T. Burship - Switzerland

Del Sales Company - Virgin Islands

Transamerica Equiptment Leasing Company, Inc. -

Delaware

Transamerica Financial Corporation - Delaware

Pacific Agency, Inc. - Indiana

Pacific Finance Loans - California

Consumer Discount Company -

Transamerica

Pennsylvania

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Transamerica

Delaware

Transamerica

Transamerica

California

Transamerica

Transamerica

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Financial

Corporation - Nevada

Services - California

Services - Wyoming

Services Company - Ohio

Services, Inc.

Inc.

Services, Inc.

Services, Inc.

Inc.

Services,

Services,

Alabama

Arizona

Kansas

New Jersey

Texas

Services (Inc.) - Oklahoma

Services of Dover, Inc. -

Industrial Loan Company - Washington

Savings and Loan Association -

Title Insurance Company - California

Real Estate Tax Service - California

Transamerica Homes, Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica Informationm Services Corporation

Transamerica Insurance Corporation of California -

California

—A-29—

Arbor Life Insurance Company - Arizona

Crown Valley Insurance Agency, Inc. - California

Plaza Insurance Sales, Inc. - California

Transamerica Advisors, Inc. - California

Transamerica Annunity Service Corporation - New

Mexico

Transamerica Assurance Company - California

Transamerica Consultants, Inc. - California

Transamerica Financial Resources, Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica Financial Systems & Concepts, Inc. -

California

Transamerica Insurance Company - California

The Canadian Surety Company - Canada

Countrywide Corporation - Texas

Industrial County Mutual Insurance Company - Texas

Transamerica Indemnity Company - California

Transamerica Insurance Company of Texas - Texas

Transamerica Insurance Company of Michigan -

Michigan

Transamerica Insurance Company of New York - New

York

Transamerica Insurance Corporation of America -

Michigan

Transamerica Premier Insurance Company - California

Automotive Insurance Company - California

Countrywide Insurance Company - California

Transamerica International Management, Inc. -

California

Transamerica Lloyds Insurance Company - Texas

Transamerica Insurance Management, Inc. - California

Transamerica Insurance Securities Sales Corporation -

Maryland

Transamerica International Insurance Services, Inc. -

Delaware

—%-30—

Occidental International Holdings N.V. - Netherlands

Regency Life Assurance Company Limited - United

Kingdom

Occidental Life Assurance Company of Australia,

Limited - Austrialia

Transamerica Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance

Comapny - California

First Transamerica Insurance Company - New York

*Lireas Holdings Limited - South America

Transamerica International Insurance Services, Inc. -

California

Transamerica Life Insurance and Annuity - California

Transamerica Life Insurance Company of Canada -

Canada

Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance, Company of

Illinois - Illinois

Transamerica Products, Inc. - California

Transamerica Products I, Inc. - California

Transamerica International Holdings, Inc. - Delaware

*Transamerica International Limited - Canada

Transamerica Interway Inc. - Delaware

Schanno Transportation, Inc. - Minnesota

Terminal Maintenance, Inc. - Minnesota

Transamerica Distribution Services, Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica ICS Inc. - Delaware

I.C.S. Freight Services Inc. - Delaware

ICS Traffic Services, Inc. - Delaware

Intermodal Equiptment Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica ICS N.V. - Belgium

Transamerica ICS Srl. - Italy

Transamerica I.C.S. do Brazil s/c Ltda. - Brazil

Transamerica ICS Gmbh - West Germany

Transamerica ICS (HK) Ltd. - Hong Kong

—A-31—

Transamerica ICS Limited - United Kingdom

ICS Terminals (U.K.) Limited - United Kingdom

Transamerica ICS Pty. Ltd. - Australia

Transamerica Interway Container Service (Pty) Limited

- South Africa

Transamerica Terminal Services Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica Rail Services Corp. - Delaware

Transamerica Trailer Services Inc. - New Jersey

Ambey Corp. - New Jersey

Transamerica Transport Inc. - New Jersey

Transamerica Transportation Services Inc. - Delaware

I/W Leasing, Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica Intermodal Maintenance Services of

Florida, Inc. - Florida

Transamerica Investment Services, Inc. - Delaware

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. (managed by T.IS.) -

Maryland

Transamerica Income Shares, Inc. (managed by T.I.S.)

- Maryland

*Transamerica Land Capital, Inc. - California

*Bankers Mortgage Company of California - California

Transamerica Overseas Finance Corporation N.V. -

Netherlands Antilles

Transamerica Realty Services, Inc. - Delaware

*The Gilwell Company - California

Pyramid Investment Corporation - Delaware

Transamerica Development Company - California

Transamerica Minerals Company - California

Transamerica Real Estate Management Company -

California

Transamerica Oakmont Corporation -

*Transmerica Systems Operation

*Designates INACTIVE COMPANIES

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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