Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Garries v. United States
Supreme Court brief1986
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In the Supreme Court of the Anited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1986
BRIAN K. GARRIES
AIRMAN First Cuass, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
PETITIONER,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
Leo L. SERGI
Colonel, Office of the Judge
, Advocate Genera! (OTJAG)
United States Air Force
HQ USAF/JAJD
Bldg 5683
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-6128
(202) 767-1562
Counsel of Record
and
CHARLES E. AMBROSE, JR.,
Major, USAF
Office of The Judge Advocate General
United States Air Force
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether in a capital military court martial an
accused indigent serviceman is entitled to independent
investigative assistance for his defense as a matter of
constitutional and military due process and in accordance
with federal statutes applicable to trials in civilian federal
courts?
2. Whether in a capital military court-martial a mili-
tary trial judge may properly sever an established
attorney-client relationship between an accused and his
chosen civilian counsel, and thereby force the accused to
proceed to trial represented by detailed military defense
counsel?
(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EEE SS a CNS 1
Jurisdiction - 0 SS Re ee 2
EE GD SA AE I 2
LES EE LL LDA TE LTE 4
8, ee 11
EELS A eC 11
EES TE ce 15
EY SEES SE a ne 16
ESSELTE SS RE DY ne la
ESSER a 9a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. —__, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84
L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) 14
Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir.
1970) .. 13, 14
People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1982) ------.---- 2,5
United States v. Bruneau, 12 C.M.R. 718 (A.F.B.R.
1953) 12
United States v. Davis, 22 M.J. 829 (N.M.C.M.R. 1986) 14
United States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986). 2, 13
United States v. Hutson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 42 C.M.R.
39 (1970) 12
United States v. Jenkins, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 261, 22 C.M.R.
51 (1956) 12
United States v. Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 47
C.M.R. 402 (1973) 12
United States v. Menoken, 14 M.J. 10 (C.M.A. 1982) _- 15
United States v. Montoya, 13 M.J. 268 (C.M.A. 1982) - 15
United States v. Saenz, 18 M.J. 327 (C.M.A. 1984) ____- 15
Statutes and Rules:
18 U.S.C. 3006A__- 2, 11, 12, 14
(111)
IV
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969 (Revised Edition):
SIN SII a arrcieciekclnincicheanncnenieemninsaceadcimioneehiiainihembetsias 4,12
RESETS RES CCL ene REST NT 3, 12
Uniform Code of Military Justice:
Te epee ae ae
I a andi aeniiasnaaals 4,15
a eteads ichcualinighih corres 15
REE I eR 5 et NIRS PRET SBN METI ECR SVAN aU 3
ph ER erica aeinnen sa ede cma Com tahe erei rN nowte eRe tee PT 10, 11
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1986
No.
BRIAN K. GARRIES
AIRMAN First CLAss, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
PETITIONER,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
The petitioner, Brian K. Garries, respectfully prays
that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decision of the
United States Court of Military Appeals entered in this
proceeding on August 4, 1986.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Military
Appeals is reported at 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986) (Appen-
- (t)
2
dix A). The decision of the United States Air Force Court
of Military Review is published at 19 M.J. 845
(A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (Appendix B). (The Supreme Court of
Colorado's opinion (affirming the suppression of evidence
in an earlier state proceeding against petitioner) is
reported at 645 P.2d 1306 (People v. Garries, Colo. 1982)).
JURISDICTION
The decision of the United States Court of Military
Appeals was rendered on August 4, 1986. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1259.
STATUTES INVOLVED
At the time of petitioner's trial, federal law provided
that for an indigent defendant being tried in a United
States District Court:
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to
obtain investigative, expert, or other services neces-
sary for an adequate defense may request them in an
ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate
inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services
are necessary and that the person is financially
unable to obtain them, the court, or the United
States magistrate if the services are required in con-
nection with a matter of which he has jurisdiction,
shall authorize counsel to obtain the services.
18 U.S.C. §3006(A)(e)(1).
The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides:
Art. 36. President may prescribe rules
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures,
including modes of proof, for cases arising under this
chapter triable in courts-martial, military commis-
sions and other military tribunals, and procedures
3
for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the Presi-
dent by regulations which shall, so far as he considers
practicable, apply the principals of law and the rules
of evidence generally recognized in the trial of crimi-
nal cases in the United States district courts, but
which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with
this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this
article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and
shall be reported to Congress.
U.C.M.J., Art. 36, 10 U.S.C. §836. The Code further
specifies that:
The trial counsel, the defense counsel, and the
court-martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain
witnesses and other evidence in accordance with
such regulation as the President may prescribe.
U.C.M.J., Art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846.
At the time of petitioner's court-martial, the Manual for
Courts-Martial provided:
116. EMPLOYMENT OF EXPERTS. The
provisions of this paragraph are applicable unless
otherwise prescribed by regulations of the Secretary
of a Department. When the employment of an expert
is necessary during a trial by court-martial, the trial
counsel, in advance of the employment, will, on the
order or permission of the military judge or the presi-
dent of a special court-martial without a military
judge, request the convening authority to authorize
the employment and to fix the limit of compensation
to be paid the expert. The request should, if practica-
ble, state the compensation that is recommended by
the prosecution and the defense. When, in advance of
trial, the prosecution or the defense knows that the
4
employment of an expert will be necessary, applica-
tion should be made to the convening authority for
permission to employ the expert, stating the neces-
sity therefor and the probable cost. In the absence of
a previous authorization, only ordinary witness fees
may be paid for the employment of a person as an
expert witness.
M.C.M., 1969 (Rev. ed.), paragraph 116. The Manual
further provided that:
The decision on a request for a witness on the
merits must be made on an individual basis in each
case by weighing the materiality of the testimony and
its relevance to the guilt or innocence of the accused,
together with the relative responsibilities of the par-
ties concerned, against the equities of the situation.
M.C.M., 1969 (Rev. ed.), paragraph 115.
With respect to the rights of a military accused to legal
counsel, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides
that:
The accused has the right to be represented in his
defense . . . by civilian counsel if provided by him.
U.C.M.J., Art. 38(b)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b)(2).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 15 June 1981, the body of petitioner’s wife, Camille
Garries, was discovered near the Garden of the Gods park
in western Colorado Springs, Colorado. (R. 516-625).
Camille had married the petitioner in 1980. She was an
enlisted member of the Air Force, and held the rank of
Airman First Class. Petitioner was assigned to the
U.S.A.F. Academy, and his wife was assigned to Peterson
Air Force Base, both in Colorado Springs. During the
latter part of 1980, Camille became pregnant.
5
Since the body was found within the city limits of Colo-
rado Springs, the city police started an investigation.
Subsequently, the investigation was turned over to the E]
Paso County Sheriffs Department, on the belief that the
death occurred in the family quarters on the Academy
grounds. (R. 629).
The E] Paso County District Attorney eventually filed a
first-degree murder charge against the petitioner, who
remained in civilian pretrial confinement until September
1981. A trial date was set. However, the E] Paso County
District Court granted a pretrial suppression motion
regarding blood stain evidence found on the basement
steps in the family quarters and in appellant’s car. The
prosecution took an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme
Court of Colorado. That Court affirmed the trial court’s
suppression of the blood stain evidence on June 1, 1982.
People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1982). As a result,
the District Attorney filed a motion for an order of Nolle
Prosequi on 22 July 1982. (Appellate Exhibit XV). The
state court case had not been filed as a capital case, and
the request to terminate the prosecution was granted.
The Air Force then assumed responsibility of the case.
An investigation was opened by the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (OSI). (Appellate Exhibit X VIII).
Court-martial charges were preferred on 1 September
1982. The investigation pursuant to Article 32, Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (U.C.M.J.) was
held on the following two days, 2-3 Septembe 1982. Two
military defense counsel (Major Byassee and Captain
Thomas) were detailed to represent the petitioner at that
proceeding. On 20 October 1982, the Superintendent of
the Air Force Academy referred the charges to a general
court-martial. That convening autherity withdrew that
referral on 3 December 1982, and, on 6 December 1982,
re-referred the modified charge of which petitioner
6
stands convicted. The military judge originally set the
trial date for 13 December 1982, but granted a defense
request to delay until 10 January 1988. (Appellate
Exhibits XVII, XI, X).
On 1 December 1982, the defense requested the con-
vening authority to make $1500 available to use for inde-
pendent investigation by the defense. The primary
intended use for the funds included either securing a copy
of the previously-conducted defense investigation pre-
pared by the investigator who assisted petitioner’s
appointed defense counsel in the previous state proceed-
ings, or for engaging in a new investigation. (Appellate
Exhibit I; Petition for New Trial and supporting docu-
ments, 25 July 1983; post-trial affidavits, (Byassee and
Thomas) 7 Sep 84; (Borchers) 22 October 1984). On 3
December 1983, the convening authority denied that
request. (Appellate Exhibit II). The defense renewed
their request before the detailed military judge and
sought either an order to the convening authority to
provide the $1500 or for the judge to hold an ex parte
hearing with the defense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3006A.
(Appellate Exhibit III). The Government opposed both
motions. (Appellate Exhibit IV). On 14 December 1982,
the military judge issued an order denying the requested
ex parte hearing, and deferring ruling on the order to
produce funds until the initial session convened under
Article 39a, U.C.M.J. (Appellate Exhibit V). That session
convened on 10 January 1983.
At that session (before the petitioner responded to the
military judge’s inquiry, “by whom do you wish to be
defended,”), the defense renewed their motion for funds
for independent defense investigation. (R. 2). In support
of their motion, the defense presented evidence establish-
ing that petitioner was “indigent” as defined by both
federal and Colorado state law, and that independent
7
investigative service is available to indigent accuseds in
each such criminal justice system. (Appellate Exhibits
VI-IX). The prosecution had made available all civilian
and military police investigative reports, but the defense
maintained its need for funds for independent defense
investigative services. (R. 1-27). Upon the military
judge's inquiry as to the the specifics of the need underly-
ing the request, the defense renewed their request for an
ex parte hearing. (R. 5). (The defense had declined an
offer by the Government to make an OSI investigator
available to the defense under a court order which would
have guaranteed confidentiality, as this government
investigator would have been made an “agent” of the
defense team. (R. 5-19, Appellate Exhibit XII).)
The military judge denied the defense request for
$1500, citing the lack of on-the-record specificity of the
defense request (R. 9), and also denied the renewed
request to hold an ex parte hearing where the defense
could make those needs explicit. (R. 10).
The defense then moved for a three-month continuance
to permit appellant sufficient time to save the needed
$1500. The military judge denied the motion. (R. 10).
As a result of the above rulings and with petitioner’s
consent, the detailed defense counsel moved to withdraw
from their assigned representation since they could not
effectively perform their duties without the requested
independent investigative support. Counsel averred on
the record that attorneys from the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) had expressed a willingness to under-
take petitioner’s case, and they had the necessary
resources available to do it effectively. (R. 11). The mili-
tary judge denied the request to withdraw.
In response to the military judge’s inquiry of petitioner
regarding his desires as to defense representation, the
petitioner stated that he did not want to be represented
8
by military counsel in light of the trial court’s denial of
independent investigative services. Petitioner stated that
he was not satisfied with his detailed counsel. (R. 14-15).
After directing the trial counsel to relate for the record
that the Government had obtained the presence of four
witnesses from overseas and six from out of state, the
military judge granted a limited continuance to permit
the petitioner to consult with Mr. Borchers, a Denver
lawyer affiliated with the ACLU, with a view toward
retaining his service. (Petition for New Trial, Exhibit A).
At the military judge’s request, petitioner once again
discussed with his detailed military defense counsel their
request to withdraw. As a result, petitioner indicated that
he did want them to remain on the case, since his dissatis-
faction had been removed by the pending presence of
civilian counsel in the case. (R. 23-27).
On 18 January 1983, the Article 39a session recon-
vened. Petitioner was present in court with his detailed
counsel and two civilian counsel: Mr. Richard Borchers
from Denver, and Mr. Greg Walta from Colorado Springs.
(R. 28-29). The record reveals that on Friday, 14 January
1983, trial counsel, detailed defense counsel, and Mr.
Borchers had all appeared in the military judge's office in
Denver. At that time, Mr. Borchers confirmed his and Mr.
Walta’s willingness to represent petitioner contingent on
the trial court’s granting a six-month continuance to per-
mit them time to adequately prepare for this capital
murder trial. (R. 28-29, App. Ex. IV). The military judge
had requested that all parties appear in open court to
entertain the motion for a six month delay.
In support of the motion at trial on 18 January, the
defense cited the court to the following facts:
(1) that this case had been in the hands of at least two
civilian law enforcement authorities for over thirteen
months before the military assumed responsibility;
9
(2) that the military had opened an additional OSI
investigation that had been on-going for some six months;
(3) that the police investigation files were extensive
(200 pages, 70 witnesses, etc.) (App. Exs. XVI, XVIII);
(4) that detailed defense counsel had been involved in
this case only since the Article 32 investigation on 2-3
September 1982, and that the original trial date had been
scheduled for 13 December 1982, but delayed, over Gov-
ernment objection, until 10 January 1983;
(5) that defense requests for independent inves-
tigative services had been consistently denied before trial
and again at the opening session of trial;
(6) that the two civilian counsel were very experi-
enced in defending criminal cases including capital
murder cases, but they also had extensive trial dockets
and commensurate immediate time demands;
(7) that the two civilian counsel had volunteered to
represent petitioner pro bono, and thus had additional
responsibilities and demands, but also had a clear inten-
tion to zealously, competently and effectively represent
petitioner should they undertake his case, and that their
request for a six-month continuance was the minimum
time necessary to adequately prepare anew for both the
findings and potential sentencing portions of this capital
case.
(R. 29-43, App. Exs. X V-XIX).
The military judge denied counsel's request for a six
month continuance, but granted a continuance for three
months. (R. 43-44). Because they were denied what they
deemed to be minimally adequate time to exercise their
own, independent investigation and preparation, civilian
counsel were compelled to move to withdraw. That motion
was granted, and civilian counsel departed the court-
room. (R. 44-45).
Detailed military counsel'suggested that, in light of the
ruling granting a three-month continuance, trial on the
iU
merits could be held on 18 April 1983. As earlier repre-
sented, such time would permit petitioner adequate time
to save the needed $1500, and that, without such time,
detailed counsel would not be able to adequately repre-
sent petitioner. (R. 46). The military judge stated that the
recently-granted delay was only for the benefit of civilian
counsel. He refused to reconsider that position, and
denied the defense request to continue the case until 18
April 1983. (R. 46). Trial was then set for 28 February
1983.
After a recess, the military judge once again advised
petitioner of his right to individually-requested military
counsel. (R. 48-50). Petitioner repeatedly indicated his
desire to be represented by the ACLU lawyers, Borchers
and Walta, not by military counsel. Without ever receiv-
ing a positive indication from petitioner, the military
judge assumed appellant was satisfied with his detailed
counsel, and granted a three-day delay to permit peti-
tioner to attempt to secure representation. (R. 48-52).
The court-martial reconvened on 21 January 1983. Peti-
tioner did not have the money to hire civilian counsel, and
no other civil agency would agree to take his case. As of
that date, the ACLU remained willing to represent peti-
tioner if they were provided adequate time to prepare. (R.
54, Appellate Exhibit XX). The military judge refused to
reconsider his prior ruling. (R. 55). The petitioner stead-
fastly maintained his desire to be represented by civilian
counsel and his willingness to have his case delayed to
achieve that right. (R. 56).
The military judge responded by setting the trial date
for 28 February 1983, and directing detailed military
counsel to be prepared by then. (R. 56).
Petitioner’s court-martial was held from 28 February
1983 to 17 March 1983. He was convicted of a single
charge of premeditated murder under Article 118 of the
ll
Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §918), and
sentenced to be discharged from the United States Air
Force with a dishonorable discharge, to be confined at
hard labor for life, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to
be reduced to the rank of airman basic. The Air Force
Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sen-
tence on 16 January 1985. The Court of Military Appeals
granted review in petitioner's case!, but agreed with the
Air Force Court of Military Review that 18 U.S.C.
§3006A was inapplicable to military courts-martial. The
decision of the Court of Military Appeals was rendered on
4 August 1985, and the mandate from that Court was
issued on 20 August 1985.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
QUESTION ONE
The first question presented by petitioner raises the
substantial issue of the applicability of statutes, enacted
by Congress to protect the rights of defendants in federal
courts, to military courts-martial and the accused ser-
vicemen and servicewomen brought before these tri-
bunals.
It is clear from a reading of Article 36 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice that Congress did intend to apply
these statutory safeguards to courts-martial in the
absence of a specific exception created by the President in
the exercise of his executive authority through provisions
of the Manual for Courts-Martial. Even such executive
exceptions were to be subject to Congressional review,
and could not contravene other provisions of the U.C.M.J.
1The Court of Military Appeals did not address the question of
whether petitioner was improperly denied the assistance of his
chosen civilian defense counsel.
12
Article 36, supra.2 The U.C.M.J., through Article 36 and
its history, and subsequent military legal interpretations
of that Code, thus clearly indicate a congressional intent
to conform military practice to that of federal district
courts, to an extent permitted by military exigencies.
In reviewing this issue, both the Court of Military
Appeals and the Air Force Court of Review cited United
States v. Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 47 C.M.R. 402
(1973), and United States v. Hutson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 487,
42 C.M.R. 39 (1970), for the proposition that 18 U.S.C.
3006A was inapplicable in military courts-martial. Nei-
ther of these decisions, however, weighed the
applicability of the statute to the military in light of Arti-
cle 36; both decisions instead simply pointed out that the
statute by its own terms specified that it was applicable to
federal district courts. When read in conjunction with
Article 36, the statute becomes applicable to courts-mar-
tial in the absence of a presidential declaration to the
contrary.
The Courts of Military Appeals and the Air Force Court
of Military Review recognized what they perceived to be
such an exception in paragraphs 115 and 116 of the Manual
for Courts-Martial (1969 Edition, Revised). These para-
graphs, however, merely provide (respectively) for the
equal access of the defense to known witnesses and evi-
dence, at the time of trial, and for the employment (by
either party) of an expert, again “during a trial.” As such,
neither of these Manual provisions represent the specific
2 See, generally: Hearings on H.R. 2498 before a Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee, 81st Congress, Ist Session
(1949), reprinted in Index and Legislative History of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (1949), at 756-757, 992-993, 1014-1019,
1061-1064; United States v. Jenkins, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 261, 22 C.M.R. 51
(1956).
3 United States v. Bruneau, 12 C.M.R. 718 (A. F.B.R. 1953).
13
exception to the procedures of the federal courts required
by Congress before the request for an investigation to
assist in the preparation of a defense, prior to trial, could
properly be denied.
Both Courts below also appeared to base their decision,
in part, on the fact that petitioner and his counsel declined
an invitation to accept a detailed military investigator in
lieu of the requested funds which would have enabled
petitioner to select and employ an investigator of his own
choosing. The Court of Military Appeals stated, for exam-
ple, that while, “as a matter of military due process, ser-
vicemembers are entitled to investigative or other expert
assistance when necessary for an adequate defense, with-
out regard to indigency . . . the military accused has the
resources of the Government at his disposal.” United
States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288, 290 (C.M.A. 1986). The
Court further stated that, “in the usual case,” these gov-
ernment services were “sufficient to permit the defense to
adequately prepare for trial.” /bid., at 291.
Such a conclusion ignores the fact that an investigator
normally employed by a prosecutorial arm of the govern-
ment, with his career controlled by others within such an
organization, can hardly be expected to render the inde-
pendent and enthusiastic investigative support to a
murder suspect that might be provided by a privately-
contracted expert. At least one federal court has
explicitly recognized this problem, holding that:
Just as an indigent defendant has a right to
appointed counsel to serve him as a loyal advocate he
has a similar right under properly proven circum-
stances to investigative aid that will service him
unfettered by an inescapable conflict of interest.
Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir.
1970).
14
As in Marshall, petitioner sought an ex parte proceed-
ing in accordance with the provisions of section 3006A, so
that he might demonstrate his need for investigative ser-
vices without having to make a “premature disclosure of
his case.” Marshall, supra, at 1318 (and citations
therein). He was denied the right even to make such a
preliminary record of necessity.
As this Honorable Court recently held in Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53
(1985), when the government
.. . brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent
defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair oppor-
tunity to present his defense. This elementary princi-
ple, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot
be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake.
470 U.S. at __, 105 S.Ct. at __., 84 L.Ed.2d at 61.4
A military accused facing death or life imprisonment at
the hands of a court-martial should be entitled to the same
due process of law and opportunities to protect his life and
liberty as is a defendant on trial in the federal district
courts of this nation. Such was the intent of Congress in
enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A ruling
for the petitioner in this case will insure uniform protec-
tion throughout the military services.
4 This Court’s decision in Ake, supra, has been held applicable to
military courts-martial. United States v. Davis, 22 M.J. 829
(N.M.C.M.R. 1986).
15
QUESTION TWO
Article 38(b), U.C.M.J. provides that an accused may
be represented by civilian counsel if provided by him. Two
civilian counsel appeared in open court and expressed
their willingness to represent petitioner, pro bono. Peti-
tioner had “provided” these counsel and was willing to pay
the “expense” in terms of time to retain them. The Gov-
ernment certainly could have used its alternative methods
to preserve its evidence and testimony by way of deposi-
tion and stipulations.
An accused's right to counsel of choice is not without its
limits. United States v. Montoya, 13 M.J. 268 (C.M.A.
1982); United States v. Saenz, 18 M.J. 327 (C.M.A. 1984).
Clearly, an accused cannot forever delay his trial by use of
this provision. United States v. Menoken, 14 M.J. 10
(C.M.A. 1982). Such, however, did not occur here. Peti-
tioner exercised this statutory right only after the mili-
tary judge denied his detailed counsel the investigative
assistance which they represented was necessary in order
to effectively present a defense. The military judge then
denied military counsel's request to withdraw once they
learned that they would be denied the tools required to
prepare for the defense of this capital case. When the
accused then entered into an attorney-client relationship
with his chosen civilian counsel, the military judge, in
effect, severed this relationship by denying these attor-
neys initial request for a delay which would have afforded
them a minimum of time in which to prepare petitioner's
defense.
Article 40, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. $840, provides that a
request for continuance should be granted upon a showing
of “reasonable cause.” Petitioner had established a rela-
tionship with counsel who were ready and willing to rep-
resent him against a capital murder charge. Their best
professional judgment and experience required them to
16
request six months in order to prepare in light of their
otherwise heavy dockets and the pro bono nature of this
case. The government had had over 19 months to prepare
for this case. Granting the continuance would have
extended the military’s handling of this case to less than
10 months. Detailed counsel stated on the record they
could not effectively represent petitioner. Civilian counsel
appeared and had the resources necessary to properly
undertake petitioner’s defense. Nevertheless, the mili-
tary judge granted a delay of only ninety days. The result
was that petitioner was forced to proceed to trial, repre-
sented by detailed counsel who had gone on record seek-
ing withdrawal due to their own inability to adequately
prepare. This request for civilian counsel was not due to
petitioner’s recalcitrance or procrastination, but rather
due to this military judge’s repeated refusal to provide
detailed counsel's request to enable them to effectively
represent this accused.
Having been denied his statutory right to independent
investigative assistance, petitioner simply sought to exer-
cise another statutory option—his right to civilian coun-
sel—which would have, as a matter of favorable
coincidence, rendered moot the military judge’s first
error. Had civilian counsel been granted a mere six-
months in order to familiarize themselves with an inves-
tigation already three times that old, involving three dif-
ferent investigative agencies, they could have provided
the investigative assistance and civilian representation
which the accused desired, and to which he was entitled
by law. Instead, he was forced to go on trial for his life,
unassisted by either an investigator, or by the counsel he
had lawfully selected to conduct his defense.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner submits that his petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be granted in order to fully examine the
17
crucial statutory and constitutional questions raised by
his own trial, and to safeguard the similar interests of
other military accuseds facing trial by courts-martial.
Respectfully submitted.
Leo L. SERGI
Colonel, Office of the Judge
Advocate General (OT JAG)
United States Air Force
HQ USAF/JAJD
Bldg 5683
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-6128
(202) 767-1562
Counsel of Record
and
CHARLES E. AMBROSE, JR.,
Major, OTJAG
United States Air Force
APPENDIX A
U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
No. 51769/AF
ACM 24158.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEBR,
v.
BRIAN K. GARRIES, Airman First Class,
U.S. Air Force, APPELLANT.
Aug. 4, 1986
For Appellant: Luther C. West, Esq. (argued): Colonel
Leo L. Sergi and Major Conrad C. Baldwin, Jr. (on brief).
For Appellee: Capiain Joseph S. Kistler (argued);
Colonel Kenneth R. Rengert (on brief); Colonel Andrew J.
Adams, Jr., and Major Robert E. Ferencik.
OPINION OF THE COURT
COX, Judge:
The nude body of appellant’s pregnant wife, Airman
First Class Camille Garries, was discovered on June 15,
1981, in a ditch located in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
The victim was in the seventh month of her pregnancy—
her death resulted in the asphyxiation of the female fetus.
A first degree murder charge was filed against appellant
in the El Paso County District Court. The trial court
granted a motion to suppress test results of stains found in
appellant’s car and family quarters at the U.S. Air Force
Academy, Colorado Springs. Upon interlocutory appeal
(la)
2a
by the prosecution, the trial court’s ruling was affirmed by
the Colorado Supreme Court. People v. Garries, 645 P.2d
1306 (Colo. 1982). The prosecution then filed a motion for
an order of Nolle Prosequi, which was granted.
The military assumed investigation of the case and
preferred a charge of premeditated murder. The Article
32, 10 U.S.C. § 832! investigation was conducted on Sep-
tember 2 and 3, 1982. The charge was referred as capital
and trial by general court-martial commenced on January
10, 1983.
Contrary to his pleas, appellant was convicted by a
panel of officer members of premeditated murder, in viola-
tion of Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. §918. The sentence to confinement for life, total
forfeitures, reduction to E-1, and a dishonorable dis-
charge was approved by the convening authority. The
Court of Military Review affirmed. 19 M.J. 845 (1985).
This Court granted review of two issues:
I WHETHER APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY
DENIED INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE ASSIST-
ANCE.
Approximately 6 weeks before trial, detailed defense
counsel made a written request to the convening
authority for $1,500.00 with which to obtain an
“independent defense investigator.” This request was
denied. At the first session of trial, the request for fund-
ing of a defense investigator was renewed. The military
judge elicited from defense counsel that the defense had
been provided with all the investigative reports prepared
by civilian authorities, as well as the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) and the Article 32 Inves-
tigating Officer. Also, the defense had been offered the
1 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 8382.
3a
services of an Air Force investigator who would work
under an order of confidentiality. The defense’s refusal of
this offer was reiterated at trial.
Defense counsel refused to particularize in open court
the need for the requested sum of $1,500.00, asking for an
ex parte hearing. The military judge denied the request
for the $1,500.00, as well as the request for an ex parte
hearing. The defense then requested a continuance of 3
months so appellant could save $1,500.00. This request
was also denied. .
Although the purpose was not revealed at trial, it
became apparent after trial that defense counsel
requested the $1,500.00 to pay for the release of an inves-
tigative report that had already been prepared by a pri-
vate investigator hired by appellant’s attorney in the state
court proceedings. The defense did not know what the
report contained until after trial, when the civilian
attorney who represented appellant post-trial obtained
the investigation.
Appellant contends that the military judge erred in two
respects: by ruling on his request for investigative assist-
ance without first conducting an ex parte hearing as pro-
vided in 18 U.S.C. §3006A(e) and by denying his request
for investigative assistance. We disagree. The provisions
of 18 U.S.C. §3006A concern representation of indigent
defendants in federal district courts and are inapplicable
to the military. United States v. Johnson. 22 U.S.C.M.A.
424, 47 C.M.R. 402 (1973); Hutson v. United States, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 437, 42 C.M.R. 39 (1970).
Nevertheless, as a matter of military due process, ser-
vicemembers are entitled to investigative or other expert
assistance when necessary for an adequate defense, with-
out regard to indigency. Cf United States v. Mustafa, 22
M.J. 165 (C.M.A. 1986) (accused entitled to access to
qualified psychiatrist for purpose of presenting insanity
4a
defense); United States v. Toledo, 15 M.J. 255 (C.M.A.
1983) (accused entitled to transcript of witness’ prior tes-
timony). Unlike the civilian defendant, however, the mili-
tary accused has the resources of the Government at his
disposal. See Art. 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846; para. 116,
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised
edition); R.C.M. 703(d), Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, 1984. In the usual case, the investigative,
medical, and other expert services available in the mili-
tary are sufficient to permit the defense to adequately
prepare for trial.
When an accused applies for the employment of an
expert, he must demonstrate the necessity for the ser-
vices. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 53, 105 S.Ct. 1087,
84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985); United States v. Johnson, supra;
para. 116, Manual, 1969, swpra; R.C.M. 703(d). in this
case, the defense refused to make a showing of necessity
on the record. Furthermore, the offer to trial defense
counsel of the services of an Air Force investigator who
would work under an order of confidentiality may have
been a viable alternative to requiring the convening
authority to fund a private investigator. Cf’ United States
v. Simmons, 44 C.M.R. 804, 811 (A.C.M.R. 1971), pet.
denied, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 628, 44 C.M.R. 940 (1972) (CID
not obligated to investigate for defense); Marshall v.
United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970) (desig-
nation of FBI to investigate for defense poses conflict-of-
interest dilemma).
Appellant had been provided with the voluminous
reports of investigation conducted by civilian authorities,
by the OSI, and by the Article 32 Investigating Officer.
Because appellant’s request for funds to obtain inves-
tigative services did not explain why an investigator was
._ needed, what the investigator would do, and why
appellant’s two detailed defense counsel and their staff
5a
could not perform any additional investigative work
needed, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying the request. See United States v. Goodwin, 770
F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. , 106
S.Ct. 858, 88 L. Ed.2d 897 (1986); United States v. Davis,
582 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99
S.Ct. 2408, 60 L. Ed.2d 1067 (1979); United States v. Har-
ris, 542 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976); U nited States v. Mundt,
508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949,
95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).
Appellant contends that the military judge’s refusal to
grant an ex parte hearing precluded him from establish-
ing the necessity for independent investigative services
without revealing defense tactics to the prosecution.
Even now, however, appellant’s only explanation of why an
investigator was necessary is the generalization that the
case was referred as capital. It is apparent that the
defense was not seeking further investigation, but pay-
ment for a report, contents unknown, that had already
been prepared without prior authorization. In the
absence of previous authorization for an expert, the Man-
ual specifically provides that payment will be made for
“ordinary witness fees” only. Therefore, it is difficult to
visualize how the defense would have benefited from
imparting its true purpose for the $1,500.00 at an ex parte
hearing.
Although appellant has provided no authority for the
use of ex parte proceedings in the military, we recognize
inherent authority in the military judge to permit such a
2 An ex parte proceeding is one requested by one party without
notice or presence of the opposing party.
3 See para. 116, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969
(Revised edition); R.C.M. 703(d), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1984.
6a
procedure in the unusual circumstance where it is neces-
sary to insure a fair trial. By its very nature, however, an
ex parte proceeding may provide undue advantage to one
party. Cf. United States v. Wilkerson, 1 M.J. 56, 57 n.1
(C.M.A. 1975). Use of an ex parte hearing to obtain expert
services would rarely be appropriate in the military con-
text because funding must be provided by the convening
authority and such a procedure would deprive the Govern-
ment of the opportunity to consider and arrange alter-
natives for the requested expert services. See United
States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett,
C.J., concurring in the result).
In any event, the sought-after investigative report was
obtained after trial and discussed in the petition for new
trial and in allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We are convinced that appellant was not prejudiced in
preparing his defense by the lack of this report.
Il WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY
FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENSE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BLOOD STAIN EVIDENCE WHICH WAS
CONSUMED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN TESTING
BEFORE TRIAL WITHOUT ANY PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS TO INSURE INDEPENDENT
DEFENSE TESTING OR VERIFICATION.
At his court-martial, as he did at his trial in state court,
appellant sought to suppress results of laboratory tests
performed on stains found in his on-base quarters and in
his car. The stains were consumed in routine testing con-
ducted at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) labo-
ratory. Mr. Roy Tubergen, the forensic serologist who
performed the testing, testified that one trunk liner was
stained with human blood, identified as type B, enzyme
PGM 2-1.4 The other stains were also found to be human
4 The victim had group B, enzyme type PGM 2-1 blood.
7a
blood, but the stains were of insufficient size to permit
grouping by blood type.
Under prevailing Colorado law, the evidence was ruled
inadmissible because the samples were destroyed in test-
ing for the prosecution without any measure being taken
to permit appellant’s expert to be present or to verify the
results. 645 P.2d at 1308. That state court ruling does not
bind the Government in this case because the United
States was not a party to that proceeding. Cf United
States v. Fuentes, 18 M.J. 41, 51(C.M.A. 1984) (findings in
one trial not binding in another where parties are dif-
ferent).
We believe this case is controlled by California v. Trom-
betta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413
(1984), made applicable to the military by United States v.
Kern, 22 M.J. 49 (C.M.A. 1986). In Trombetta, the
Supreme Court held that breath-analysis tests are
admissible in criminal trials even though the state fails to
preserve the breath samples of suspected drunk drivers
for independent defense testing. The constitutional and
military-due-process duty to preserve evidence is limited
to that which, (1) “possess[es] an exculpatory value that
was apparent before” it “was destroyed, and” (2) is “of
such a nature that the” accused “would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available
means.” 467 U.S. at 489, 104S.Ct. at 2534; 22 M.J. at 51.
The accused has the burden of showing that evidence
which “is not ‘apparently exculpatory’” was of “an
exculpatory value that was or should have been apparent
to the Government before it was . . . destroyed and” that
“comparable evidence” is unavailable. United States v.
Kern, supra at 51-52. Appellant has not met that burden
here.
First, as in Trombetta, there was no hint of bad faith on
the part of the Government. In fact, the military judge
8a
found no evidence of negligence, bad faith, or misconduct
on the part of the laboratory personnel. Second, appellant
had other means available to attack the test results. The
forensic serologist who conducted the tests testified and
was available for full cross-examination. The defense was
free to challenge the test results by attacking the
reliability of the testing procedures and the competence
and credibility of the testing official through cross-exam-
ination and through testimony of its own expert. Finally,
there is no indication that the stains were “apparently
exculpatory” before they were consumed in testing or that
preservation of the stains would have benefited the
defense.® The defense expert conceded the scientific
validity of the tests and did not challenge the decision to
conduct these tests rather than others.
Under Article 46, the defense is entitled to equal access
to all evidence, whether or not it is apparently
exculpatory. United States v. Kern, supra. Thus, the bet-
ter practice is to inform the accused when testing may
consume the only available samples and permit the
defense an opportunity to have a representative present.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, we find no
prejudice.® Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a).
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Military Review is affirmed.
Chief Judge EVERETT concurs.
Judge SULLIVAN did not participate.
5 Prosecution exhibit 8, one of the stair treads, was found to contain
“human blood” with “inconclusive” group B indications by the FBI
testing. At the time of trial, still remaining on the exhibit were
several “very suspicious” stains which the defense expert testified
would lead him to test further “for the presence of blood.”
6 If the testing had been done by the military or at its request, a
different result might be required. In that situation, it would be
difficult to excuse the failure to provide notice to the defense.
EF
9a
APPENDIX B
U.S. AIR FORCE COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW.
ACM 24158.
UNITED STATES
v.
Airman First Class BRIAN K. GARRIES,
FR 093-54-3705, United States
Air Force.
Sentence Adjudged 17 March 1983.
Decided 16 Jan. 1985.
Appellant Counsel for the Accused: Messrs. William
Reynard, Sander Karp and David Miller, Denver, Colo-
rado, Colonel Leo L. Sergi, and Major Conrad C. Bald-
win, Jr.
Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel Ken-
neth R. Rengert, Major Robert E. Ferencik, Jr., and
Major Kevin L. Daugherty.
Before FORAY, SNYDER, and O’HAIR, Appellate
Military Judges.
DECISION AND ORDER
SNYDER, Judge:
During mid morning on 13 June 1981 at the United
States Air Force Academy, the accused observed his next
door neighbor, Sergeant Carstensen, wearing what he
thought to be a very funny hat. The accused prevailed
upon Carstensen to go inside the accused’s quarters so his
wife, Airman Camille Garries, could also see the hat.
Camille Garries was in the bathroom and only her head
10a
was visible to Carstensen as she looked around the bath-
room door and smiled. Other than the accused, Sgt. Car-
stensen was the last known person to see Camille Garries
alive. Her nude body was found on 15 June 1981 ina ditch
near Colorado Springs, Colorado, the victim of blunt force
trauma to her head. She also had superficial stab wounds
which the pathologist opined were used to intentionaly
inflict pain. As a result of her death, the seven month
female fetus with which she was pregnant asphyxiated.
The accused was convicted by general court-martial of
the premeditated murder of his wife, Camille Garries,
and sentenced to life imprisonment and accessory penal-
ties.! Appellate Defense Counsel have submitted 17
assignments of error and a Petition For New Trial for our
consideration. Having scrutinized all assignments of
error, and the evidence at trial, we find no prejudice to the
substantial rights of the accused and affirm.
Because of her pregnancy, the victim planned to sepa-
rate from the Air Force near the end of June 1981. Due to
marital discord, she planned to separate from the accused
and return to her home in Macon, Georgia, where she
would have her baby. Expecting her arrival on 26 June
1981, her father had made an appointment for her with a
local physician. There was evidence that the accused had
voiced his displeasure over these plans. All with whom the
victim frequently associated testified that the victim gave
no indication of an intent to depart the area before 26 June
1981.
On 13 June 1981, however, the victim had simpler plans.
She had an appointment to have her hair done at either
1300 or 1330 hours. She confirmed her appointment via
telephone between 1100 and 1130 hours. During a phone
conversation with a friend, Mrs. B, between 1130 and
1 The charge was referred to trial as a capital offense.
lla
1200 hours, she said she would drop by for a visit after her
hair appointment.
Between approximately 1500 and 1530 hours, 13 June
1981, Lieutenant, then Sergeant, Duke received a cali
from the accused. He related that the victim had left him,
that he was hurting emotionally, and asked Lt Duke to
come over. Upon arrival, the accused stated he had last
seen the victim at 1100 hours when he left to go for a walk
to cool off after an argument between him and the victim.
He said he found a note, the gist of which was, she was
tired of the accused, tired of the Air Force, and she was
leaving. Stating that he had burned the note, the aecused
showed Lt Duke ashes on the stove. After being shown
the bedroom and giving the accused advice on how to
protect himself from a deserting wife, i.e., cancelling
credit cards, etc., Lt Duke departed around 1800 or 1830
hours. Lt Duke also related that he had been in the
accused's basement a few days before the victim’s death.
Duke needed some two-by-fours and the accused had
some which the accused said he could have. Lt Duke
stated that he did not take all of the two-by-fours.
A number of neighborhood residents encountered the
accused during the afternoon of 13 June 1981. To approx-
imately two he related that the victim had left him. When
asked by another how was the victim, he replied simply, “I
haven’t seen her.” To others he asked if they knew of any
secluded areas where he could camp out with an unnamed
woman. He did tell one person he wanted to camp out with
the victim. Everyone he asked recommended either
Stanley Canyon, the Garden Of The Gods, or both.
Around 2330 hours, 13 June 1981, the accused observed
the Carstensens returning home and asked Sgt Car-
stensen to assist him in opening the trunk of his auto-
mobile, for he had lost the key some time ago. His car was
in the carport at the time. Being tired from a full day’s
12a
activities, Carstensen said he would do it the next day.
The accused offered help in carrying the sleeping children
from the car to their bedrooms. Mrs. Carstensen asked
how was the victim and the accused replied, “fine.” At
approximately 0150 hours, 14 June 1981, Mrs. Carstensen
answered a knock at her door. It was the accused, and he
appeared upset and in tears. He asked her if she had seen
the victim, stating that he had looked for her at a local
night club and an apartment house. While at he door, Mrs.
Carstensen noted the accused’s car parked in the parking
island rather than the carport.
At approximately 0900 hours, 14 June 1984, the Car-
stensens were still asleep when the accused knocked on
the door. He wanted Carstensen to help get his car trunk
open. The car was in the carport. Since the victim had
“left him,” the accused wanted to start moving out of his
quarters. After being unsuccessful at entering by remov-
ing the back seat, Carstensen opened the trunk by remov-
ing the lock and inserting a screwdriver and turning it as
if turning a key. He showed the accused how to employ
that method. He then assisted the accused in cleaning out
the trunk, including driving the accused to the auto hobby
shop where they vacuumed out the trunk.? On the return
home, the accused had Carstensen drive over a number of
dirt roads because he was “curious” about them. Upon
arrival at their quarters, the accused ask him to back the
car into the carport. Because they were not successful in
cleaning the trunk thoroughly, the accused asked for
something with which to cover the trunk’s floor. Car-
stensen provided a plastic mattress container/cover from
a single bed mattress.
2The accused knew how to drive an automobile but, for some
reason not disclosed at trial, he did not posses a current license.
13a
At aproximately 0930 hours, 14 June 1981, the accused
saw SSgt Green mowing his lawn. He said he had a prob-
lem and wanted to talk. He asked Green if he knew where
he could hide a body, providing a facetious reason about a
“queer” he was going to “waste” if he did not stop bother-
ing him. Green did not take him seriously. Stating he
wanted to camp out with a young lady, the accused asked
how to get to Stanley Canyon. Despite Green's protesta-
tions of being pressed for time, the accused insisted that
he take him to Stanley Canyon. While at Stanley Canyon
the accused did not appear to be looking for a campsite,
but was always looking down.
During early afternoon, 14 June 1981, another airman
saw the accused walking and gave him a ride. After telling
the accused he was headed to the gym to play basketball,
the accused decided he would come along. After playing
basketball, they went to the noncomissioned Officers
Open Mess for about an hour. While driving the accused
home, the accused asked how to get to the Garden Of The
Gods. The airman gave the accused directions, including
driving out of the Academy’s gates and showing the
accused how to access Interstate Highway 25. The vic-
tim’s body was found not far from Garden Of The Gods
Road.
When he returned home between 1630 and 1700 hours,
Carstensen noticed that the accused’s car was in the car-
port front first and he was washing the car. Believing the
victim to be gone, the Carstensens invited the accused to
have supper with them on 14 June 1981. The accused was
back and forth between his quarters and the Carsten-
sens, and he acted edgy, pacing between the windows.
Stating that he did not want to stay in his quarters with
the victim gone, he asked, and was permitted, to spend
the night with the Carstensens. Interestingly, the victim
had moved out for approximately two weeks in May 1981,
l4a
but the accused never asked the Carstensens if he could
spend the night.
The accused “slept” the entire night of 14 June at the
Carstensens’. However, he called the victim’s father at
approximately 0110 hours (MDT), 15 June 1981, and
asked if he had seen the victim. He told the victim's father
she had left walking at 1100 hours Saturday because he
had taken the car keys from her. He also said that she
wore her jean skirt. Telephone records reflect that this
call was made from the accused's quarters.
Mrs. Carstensen did not hear the sound of a car engine
during the evening of 14 June 1981. However, the drive-
ways from the carports are sloped. The accused came over
between 0730 and 0800 hours on 15 June 1981, to use their
phone because he was late for work. He asked her what
time was the garbage picked up, and she told him on
Monday mornings. Between 1600 and 1630 hours, 15 June
1981, the accused was washing his car again.
On 15 June 1981, the accused filed a missing person
report on the victim. This information was provided to
investigators of the E] Paso County, Colorado Sheriffs
Department, who had assumed investigative jurisdiction
after the victim’s body was found in the interim. The
investigation up to that point had indicated it was unlikely
the victim was slain where she was found. After identi-
fication of the victim by the accused, investigators accom-
panied him to his quarters. The accused related
information to the investigators similar to what he told Lt
Duke, stating the only items victim took with her were
$600.00 which he kept in a drawer for emergency use, and
a favorite denim skirt which presumedly she wore. How-
ever, Mrs. B, Mrs. BT, and the victim’s father, all opined
that victim’s advanced pregnancy precluded her from
wearing that particular skirt.
Investigation of the quarters revealed neither signs of a
forced entry nor a struggle. The master bedroom con-
15a
tained what appeared to be all of victim’s belongings,
including her purse, her military identification card, and
her spectacles, without which she had very poor vision.
Further inquiry revealed what appeared to be blood spat-
ters on some of the basement steps.
While investigators were searching the accused’s quar-
ters, he told Mrs. Carstensen, “You know I didn’t do it
because I was with you all weekend.”
A search of the accused’s automobile revealed an appar-
ent blood stain on the latching device of the trunk. Also
seized was a piece of fibrous material attached to a screw
which had secured the lining to the trunk’s floor. Inves-
tigators also observed that portions of the accused’s car
apparently had been washed, but not the entire car. Also
noted was the fact that the trunk was much cleaner than
the interior.
On 17 June 1981, Carstensen asked accused if he could
have the mattress cover back. The accused said he had
thrown it away in the garbage. While looking for the
mattress cover, Carstensen noticed two items in his trash
can. Responding to his phone call, investigators removed
two pieces of cardboard which appeared to be trunk
liners. The accused’s car did not contain any trunk lining
when it was searched. Although he could not state with
certainty, Carstensen believed the accused’s trunk had
liners when they cleaned it on 14 June 1981. Microscopic
examination of the fibrous material taken from the
accused’s car trunk and one of the cardboard pieces
revealed that they were, at one time, one piece. The trunk
lining contained human blood stains.
I
Appellate Defense Counsel aver that the court-martial
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense, their
primary contention being that the victim was not killed on
16a
the installation. See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S.
355, 91 S.Ct. 649, 28 L.Ed.2d 102 (1971); O’Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1688, 23 L.Ed.2d 291
(1969). The military judge made extensive findings of fact
in his ruling that the court did have jurisdiction. His
findings are more than supported by the evidence of rec-
ord and are fully accepted. The charged offense was
clearly service-connected. Relford v. Commandant,
supra. Additionally, the factfinders were instructed that
one of the elements they had to find beyond a reasonable
doubt was that the victim was killed at the United States
Air Force Academy. Their verdict reflects their factual
finding that the victim was killed on the installation.
Accordingly, the offense was service-connected. Relford
v. Commandant, supra; see United States v. Williams, 17
M.J. 207 (C.M.A.1984).
II
The next assertion of error is that the military judge
erred in directing a reconstruction of the record. We
disagree. During the latter portion of the direct examina-
tion of Sgt Carstensen, the recording equipment malfunc-
tioned for approximately five minutes. As a result the last
portion of his direct testimony and a brief portion of his
cross-examination were not recorded. After being
informed of the malfunction by the court reporter, the
trial judge excused the members for the remainder of the
day. He directed the reporter to transcribe what she had
on tape so that a determination could be made on the
missing testimony. He also directed a reconstruction.
The reconstruction was accomplished by using trial and
defense counsel’s notes?, the testimony which was, in fact,
3 Counsel had not prepared verbatim questions for their respective
examinations, but had outlined the specific areas to be covered Cf.
United States v. Lashley, 14 M.J. 7 (C.M.A. 1982).
17a
recorded, and the assistance of the witness, Sgt Car-
stensen. The trial judge checked the product of counsel's,
the reporter’s, and Carstensen’s efforts against his per-
sonal and copious notes which he had amassed during the
course of the trial to that point. He found that there was
no doubt that the substance of the unrecorded testimony
had been reconstructed if not the exact words. All parties
to the trial concurred with the trial judge’s finding. How-
ever, as a result of his thorough review of the applicable
precedents of this Court and the Court of Military
Appeals, he directed that Carstensen reiterate the por-
tion of his testimony which was lost. notwithstanding
objections by both trial and defense counsel. See United
States v. English, 50 C.M.R. 825 (A.F.C.M.R.1975); cf
United States v. Hensley, 7 M.J. 740 (A.F.C.M.R.1979),
pet. denied, 8 M.J. 42 (1980). He also informed trial
defense counsel that he would not be limited to the bound-
aries of his original cross-examination.
Except where specifically provided, records of trials by
general court-martial are required to be verbatim. Arti-
cle 54(a), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §854(a); Manual for
Courts-Martial, 1969 (Rev.), para. 826. This requirement
has been interpreted to mean substantially verbatim.
United states v. Lashley, 14 M.J. 7 (C.M.A.1982); United
States v. Nelson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 13 C.M.R. 338
(1953). Whether reconstructed testimony impacts the
verbatim nature of the record depends on whether the
omission is substantial or insubstantial. United States v.
Gray, 7 M.J. 296 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Sturdi-
vant, 1 M.J. 256 (C.M.A.1976). Substantial omissions may
be qualitative as well as quantitative. United States v.
Lashley, supra. However, the omitted material may be
sufficiently retrievable so that the record can be salvaged
and pronounced substantially verbatim. United States v.
Eichenlaub, 11 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.1981).
18a
The reconstructed testimony consists of five legal
pages. Sgt Carstensen was, without doubt, a crucial wit-
ness; thus, the omission, albeit brief, is qualitatively sub-
stantial. However, due to the prompt and thorough action
of the trial judge, not the least of which was directing
reiteration of the unrecorded testimony, this record is, in
fact, substantially verbatim, and we so hold. With the
exception of preserved verbatim questions of counsel, the
same unusual combination of factors which preserved the
verbatim nature of the Lashley record also preserved the
record of the instant case. United States v. Lashley;
United States v. Eichenlaub, both supra.
Even were we to find that a presumption of prejudice
arose from the omission, the Government has more than
rebutted the presumption. See United States v. Hensley,
supra. Additionally, we find no prejudice by virtue of the
trial judge directing the witness to reiterate the unre-
corded testimony. Promptly reiteratng unrecorded testi-
mony is no more remarkable than the court’s recalling of a
witness or having the transcript read in lieu of recalling a
witness. 4
III
Appellate Defense Counsel also assert that the accused
was denied his right to civilian counsel. We find as a
matter of fact that he was not. After being advised of his
right to counsel and his options thereunder, United States
4 The trial judge asked trial defense counsel if he concurred that
the unrecorded testimony had been substantially reconstructed
rather than asking the aceused directly. Appellate defense counsel
contend that the requirement of a verbatim record is a personal right
of the accused which only he can waive, as opposed to a statutory
requirement which does not confer individual rights. Our disposition
of this issue renders it unnecessary to address it, although we have
significant doubt as to its validity.
19a
v. Donohew, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 149, 39 C.M.R. 149 (1969),
the accused indicated that he desired representation by
civilian counsel. Detailed military defense counsel
advised that the accused had consulted with a named
civilian counsel associated with the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU), but that he was presently unavailable
for a personal appearance. The trial judge granted a seven
day continuance so that civilian counsel could make a
personal appearance.
When proceedings resumed, Mr. B advised that he was
willing to represent the accused, but he would require a
continuance of six months. The reasons proffered for
requesting six months were that their prior experience
with capital cases indicated that highly extensive prepa-
ration, including investigation, was required; that they
were involved with other cases and that their prior docket
was inflexible; and, since they would be represerting the
accused pro bono, they needed to generate income via
other cases.
After making detailed findings, the trial judge con-
cluded that:
Civilian counsel cannot with any particularity
explain to this court why one-half a year is the exact
time period needed to accurately prepare for this
case. . . lamalso satisfied that some time period less
than six months will give the four defense counsel
ample opportunity to prepare a defense in this case.
Based on the nature of the charged offense, and with
an attempt to exercise caution in this area, I will
grant a defense requested delay for a period of three
months.
At this point, civilian counsel requested permission to
withdraw from the case, stating they absolutely required
six months. The trial judge granted their request to with-
draw. Pursuant to the accused’s expressed desire to seek
20a
out other civilian counsel who might represent him pro
bono, the trial judge granted an additional three day
continuance. At the next session on 21 January 1983, the
accused stated that the ACLU was still his only recourse
to free civilian counsel. The trial judge considering that
issue resolved, directed that the proceedings resume on
28 February 1983.
A request for a continuance of the proceedings may be
made by either party thereto and should be granted upon
a showing of reasonable cause. Article 40, U.C.M.J., 10
U.S.C. § 840; M.C.M, para. 580. The granting or denial of
a request for a continuance is an interlocutory question.
M.C.M., paras, 57, 58b. As such, the ruling of the trial
judge will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discre-
tion which results in prejudice to the substantial rights of
the accused. United States v. Menoken, 14 M.J. 10
(C.M.A.1982); United States v. Henry, 1 M.J. 533
(A.F.C.M.R.1975).
The military judge is required to weigh whether the
issues are simple or complex, United States v. Abilar, 14
M.J. 733 (A.F.C.M.R.1982), pet. denied, 15 M.J. 324
(1983), and liberally assess their merits in reaching his
decision. United States v. Henry, supra. The trial judge
may also balance the impact of a continuance upon the
availability of witnesses, including the logistics of bring-
ing witnesses from distant locations. United States v.
Lambert, 17 M.J. 773 (A. F.C.M.R.1983), pet. denied, 18
M.J. 127 (1984).
We find and hold that the trial judge in the instant case
did not abuse his broad discretion. He needed no
reminder that the accused was on trial for his life. The
accused’s desires were balanced against the fact that the
offense had occurred almost two years earlier, the Gov-
ernment faced the necessity of bringing witnesses from
other locations, including foreign countries, and the time
21a
and preparatory effort already expended by his two
detailed military defense counsel. After doing so, he
determined that three months constituted a reasonable
continuance for civilian counsel to adequately prepare for
trial.
After reviewing the basis for the trial judge’s decision,
we find no abuse of discretion. His actions were eminently
reasonable. |
IV
The accused next complains that he was improperiy
denied investigative assistance. Trial defense counsel
applied to the convening authority for disbursement of
$1,500.00 with which to retain investigative assistance,
citing Article 46, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 846, as authority.
The request was denied and trial defense counsel renewed
it via a motion at trial. As an alternative to the motion, the
defense requested the trial judge to hold an ex parte
hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. This apparently was an
attempt to bring the proceedings within the parameters
of 18 U.S.C. §3006A. The trial judge denied the motion.
In denying the motion, the trial judge referenced the
fact that 18 U.S.C. §3006A° is inapplicable to trials by
court-martial, and the fact that the defense had received
full access to all governmental investigative reports, ete.
He did not end the matter there, however; for he also
advised the defense that he would direct the assignment
of an Air Force investigator® to the defense who would
518 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) reads in part as follows:
(1) Upon Request. Counsel for a person who is financially unable
to obtain investigative . . . services necessary for an adequate
defense may request them in an ex parte application. .. .
6 Presumably an Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSD
special agent.
22a
work under a court order of confidentiality. The defense
declined the proffer of the Air Force investigator.”
As noted by the trial judge, 18 U.S.C. §3006A is inap-
plicable in trials by court-martial. United States v.
Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 47 C.M.R. 402 (1973);
United States v. Hutson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 42 C.M.R.
39 (1970). However, in an effort to ameliorate this fact,
appellate defense counsel aver that due process compelled
the granting of the motion if not the statutory provision,
as well as M.R.E. 706(a).
During oral argument appellate defense counsel again
argued vigorously for de facto application of 18 U.S.C.
§3006A via the due process route. One facet of their
reasoning is that to be constitutionally effective as
required by the Sixth Amendment, defense counsel must
be independent; and, the ex parte hearing is a means of
preserving that independence by allowing trial defense
counsel to justify requests for an investigator without
divulging potential witnesses or other defense tactics in
the presence of the prosecution. Consequently, appellate
defense counsel argue, the denial of the ex parte hearing
deprived trial defense counsel of that independence and,
in effect, strapped trial defense counsel's hands, thereby
rendering them ineffective. The argument fails, primarily
because of two reasons.
First, courts-martial are creatures of statute. Their
parameters are established by Congress. Ex parte hear-
ings simply are not authorized. See United States v.
7The defense also requested as an alternative, a three month
continuance so that the accused could save $1,500.00 of his personal
funds. It appears that the money was requested for an investigative
report already accomplished rather than for an investigator. A local
private investigator had apparently been retained by the accused
during civilian proceedings, but would not release the report because
of nonpayment of the fee.
23a
Wilkerson, 1 M.J. 56, 57 n. 1; United States v. Dean, 13
M.J. 676 (A. F.C.M.R, 1982). Prior to the Military Justice
Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968), only
limited matters could be handled outside the hearing of
the members, and these were authorized only in general
courts-martial. United States v. Baca, 16 U.S.C.M.A.
311, 36 C.M.R. 467 (1966). The only provision of the
Military Justice Act of 1968 which authorizes out-of-court
hearings is Article 39(a), and it specifically requires the
presence of trial counsel as well as defense counsel and the
accused. Article 39(a), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §839(a);
M.C.M. paras. 53d, 579(2). Since 18 U.S.C. §3006A is
part of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub.L. No.
88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), we must assume that Congress
was well aware of its existence during the revision of the
Military Justice Act of 1950 and easily could have included
a similar provision in the 1968 Act.®
Second, that part of the statute which authorizes funds
for services other than counsel, 7.e., investigative ser-
vices, 18 U.S.C. §3006A(e), is procedural. In fact, its very
terms reflect it to be a matter of legislative grace rather
than a fundamental right. See United States v. Ray, 367
F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 913, 87
S.Ct. 863, 17 L. Ed.2d 785 (1967). Again, we must assume
that had Congress seen fit, it could have included similar
8 During oral argument, appellate defense counsel also relied on
the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Criminal Jus-
tice, Providing Defense Services, Standard 1.5, because some of
those standards have been adopted for Air Force courts-martial.
However, Air Force Manual 111-1 (2 July 1973). Military Justice
Guide, para. 1-11, provides that standards inconsistent with the
U.C.M.J. are not applicable. That is why Standard 1.5 dealing with
supporting services is applicable only in principle. USAF Judiciary
Special Subject Letter No. 49, ABA Standards for The Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice, (JAJ 82-3), 16 February 1982.
24a
provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. One
obvious reason why Congress did not do so is because it
chose other means to protect an accused's access to evi-
dence which may aid in preparing a defense.
Unlike the civilian sector, Congress has specifically
provided that the prosecution and defense have equal
access to witnesses and other evidence. Article 46,
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §846; M.C.M. para. 115. Addi-
tionally, the Article 32, 10 U.S.C. §832 Investigation
exists primarily as a discovery tool for the accused as well
as a barrier against groundless charges. Further, an
accused enjoys extensive rights of discovery under mili-
tary practice. United States v. Franchia, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
315, 32 C.M.R. 315 (1962); M.C.M. para. 115c. The means
to ferret out evidence are clearly provided an accused.
Consequently, military procedures accomplish the same
purpose as 18 U.S.C. §3006A, which is ensuring an
accused is able to prepare for trial.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
the motion. Trial defense counsel offered no cogent rea-
sons why an Air Force investigator working under court
ordered confidentiality could not serve their purposes.
See United States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 40
C.M.R. 39 (1969), and the trial judze’s order therein
which predated M.C.M. para. 121 and M.R.E. 302. The
order of confidentiality would have prevented defense
leads from turning into possible evidence against the
accused. Cf Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315
(10th Cir.1970) (reversible error where trial judge
directed FBI to investigate defense leads and witness
found as a result of defense request eventually testified
against the defendant). In fact, trial defense counsel’s
declination of the Air Force investigator bordered on
waiving the issue for appellate review. See M.R.E. 103(a).
We find that the accused was not denied fair oppor-
tunity to prepare for trial or equal access to evidence and
25a
witnesses. See M.C.M. paras. 115, 116; United States v.
Johnson, supra.
V
Appellate defense counsel also contend that the mili-
tary judge erred in not granting the Motion To Suppress
Blood Samples. The assignment of error has two prongs;
(1) Admitting the blood samples violated the accused's
rights to due process and (2) The samples lacked rele-
vancy to the charged offense.
As mentioned in the facts, El Paso County, Colorado
investigators discovered what appeared to be blood stains
on some of the basement steps of the accused’s quarters,
and on certain areas of the trunk of the accused’s car. The
front portion of the affected steps, called stair treads,
were removed with hammer and chisel. So was the latch-
ing device of the trunk. These items, along with the trunk
liners, the screw and fibrous material, and a sample of the
victim’s blood, were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Laboratory in Washington, District
of Columbia, for analysis.
The stains on all of the items but one stair tread were
consumed by the test procedures employed at the FBI
laboratory. No photographs were taken either of the tests
or the test results. Neither was there any representative
of the accused present.
Criminal proceedings for the victim’s murder were ini-
tially brought in the E] Paso County, Colorado District
Court. However, the Motion To Suppress the blood sam-
ple evidence was granted because the Court ruled that the
Government had destroyed potentially exculpatory evi-
dence via the FBI testing. This ruling was affirmed on
interlocutory appeal by the Colorado Supreme Court. See
People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306 (Col.1982). Con-
sequently, proceedings in the District Court ended via
26a
nolle prosequi. Subsequently, charges were preferred
under the U.C.M.J.
Appellate defense counsel submit various arguments,
including collateral estoppel, to support their contention
that the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court should
have been binding upon the court-martial. The matter
need not detain us. The United States was not a party to
the state proceedings against the accused. Thus, a Colo-
rado court decision thereon is not binding on a military
court.
On the substantive issue, the military judge found spe-
cifically that all tests were conducted in good faith and in
accordance with accepted scientific procedures—a fact
conceded by a defense expert witness—and with no
intent to withhold or destroy potentially exculpatory evi-
dence. The trial judge’s findings are amply supported by
the evidence and are accepted. Therefore, since the FBI
forensic serologist was available for full cross-examina-
- tion, California v. Trombetta, U.S. , 104 S.Ct.
2528, 80 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), and United States v. Frost,
19 M.J. 509 (A.F.C. M.R.1984) are dispositive of the issue.
We turn now to the issue of relevancy.
Doctor B, the forensic pathologist who examined the
victim at the scene of her discovery and performed the
autopsy, concluded that the victim was not slain at the
scene of her discovery. Mr. T, the FBI forensic serologist,
conducted the testing of the items sent to the FBI labora-
tory. His test results revealed the presence of blood stains
on the seven stair treads from the accused’s basement, the
trunk latch, and the trunk liners.
Appellate defense counsel aver that relevancy is lacking
due to the absence of evidence firmly establishing a source
for the stains. The accused elicited evidence at trial which
was intended to show that the stains had no connection
with the victim’s demise; namely, that the accused’s dog
a
27a
fell down the stairs on one occasion and injured itself, and
that the victim suffered from frequent nosebleeds. Lt.
Duke testified that while the accused was explaining
items which investigators found in his quarters, the
accused related that the victim had nosebleeds so severe
that at times “she had to walk around with a bucket.” We
find these assertions unpersuasive.
Mr. T testified that the blood stains were human blood
stains; they could not have come from a dog. Additionally,
Lt. Duke saw the dog shortly after the fall and did not
observe an appreciable amount of blood around the injury.
The crucial issue is the matter of the blood stains’ group-
ing.
The victim’s blood was from the B Group with the
Enzyme PGM type 2-1. The accused blood is from the O
Group. To ascertain a blood sample’s grouping, accepted
testing procedures require two separate tests, the
Absorption Elution Test and the Lattes Crust test. The
Elution Test reveals the antigen present while the Lattes
test reveals the particular antibody. Mr. T advised that in
order to have a positive finding the two tests must concur;
otherwise, his procedures require that his findings be
recorded as inconclusive.
As stated above, all items tested revealed the presence
of human blood stains. However, with the exception of one
of the stair treads and the trunk liners, the stains were of
insufficient quantity to facilitate grouping. As for the one
stair tread, the Elution Test revealed the presence of the
B and H antigen, but the Lattes Test did not reveal the
antibody. Therefore, the test was inconclusive as far as
showing that the stain was Type B. However, Mr. T was
still able to state that Type O and A could be excluded as
the source of the stain because of the B antigen. He stated
that since the H antigen is present in all blood groups, it
was possible that the H antigen may have come from an
28a
AB source, and possibly an O source. However, that like-
lihood was highly remote.
The results were similar for one of the trunk liners. The
B antigen was present, but there was insufficient quantity
to find the antibody. Because there were no other anti-
gens present, he could exclude Type A and O individuals
but not AB. The other trunk liner, however, revealed
somewhat more detail. The tests of the other trunk liner
revealed that the blood stain was Type B with the Enzyme
PGM 2-1, the same as the victim’.
Mr. T advised that although there is a somwewhat
higher rate among the Black population, approximately
ten percent of the general population has Type B blood,
and 36% has PGM 2-1. Because the enzymes are
independent of the blood groupings, the statistical occur-
rence of the combination of B PGM 2-1 is approximately
three and six-tenths (3.6) percent of the general popula-
tion.
Appellate defense counsel argue that even if one
assumes that the victim was the source of the blood
stains, there is no evidence that they are the result of
violence, especially recent violence at the hands of the
accused. Ergo, they simply lack relevancy. This argu-
ment, however, views the blood stains in a vacuum.
The forensic pathologist opined that the victim was not
slain at the scene of her discovery. Investigators found
what appeared to be substantially all of the victim’s
belongings in the master bedroom of the accused’s and
victim’s quarters. Detective G testified that the basement
showed signs of a thorough cleaning. The steps had swipe
marks on each side which appeared to have been made by
a mop, and that when a flashlight was held at a certain
angle, cleaning marks could be seen on the floor. Addi-
tionally, since blood spatters were found on the underside
of the step risers as well as the stair treads, it was unlikely
29a
that the blood stains fell from above as if from a nosebleed.
The bathtub showed signs of having been used to clean a
mop or dump a mop bucket. This residue tested negative
for the presence of blood, but Mr. T advised that immers-
ing the mop in water would render the detection of blood
less likely. The master bedroom and the hallway smelled
of fresh paint, and there were drop cloths visible.
Detective Green also testified that the spatters on the
stair treads were not consistent with blood dripping
down. He also opined that the spatters were low and
medium velocity spatters and that they originated from a
frontal impact approximately 45 degrees lower than the
stair treads. The indisputable infer nce is that the blood
spatters resulted from the victim: being struck with a
blunt instrument. Dr. B opined that among other objects,
the victim’s wounds were consistent with being struck
with a two-by-four.
M.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence hav-
ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” When this definition is applied to the state of
the evidence in the instant case, to ask whether the bloo
stain evidence had any tendency to establish whether the
victim was slain in her home begs the question. The
evidence was clearly relevant, and its probative value was
not even remotely outweighed by any possible prejudice.
See M.R.E. 403.
The blood stain evidence was also relevant in another
sense. Mr. Kirk testified that while incarcerated with the
accused, the accused admitted to him that he killed the
victim. We will deal with Mr. Kirk’s testimony in more
detail infra; nonetheless, the blood stain evidence was
highly relevant on the issues of corroborating the
accused’s admission and weighing Mr. Kirk’s credibility.
VI
In a further effort to attack the relevancy of the blood
stain evidence, appellate defense counsel aver that it was
error to allow Detective Green to testify as an expert. His
testimony on the blood stains is set forth above. We find
that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by
qualifying Detective Green as an expert.
The main prerequisite for qualification as an expert is
that the witness be qualified by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education. M.R.E. 702. Detective
Green testified that he received training at Colorado Uni-
versity under the instruction of a nationally recognized
blood spattering expert. The training included flight
characteristics of blood, relative velocities, spatter pat-
terns, directions, and angles, etc. In addition to lectures,
etc., the training also involved numerous laboratory
experiments, and written examinations. His actual expe-
rience extended to 20 to 30 cases. We agree with the
ruling of the trial judge. Detective Green possessed spe-
cial training and skill which could aid the factfinders in
making their determination. The defense was free to
attack the weight to be accorded his testimony.
Vil
The next assignment of error is that the statements of
the deceased were erroneously admitted. The evidence in
questiun is the testimony of witnesses who knew or were
related to the deceased that she intended to obtain a
pregnancy discharge and leave the accused, but not until
near the end of June 1981. Appellate defense counsel
contend that this hearsay evidence was wrongfully admit-
ted to prove the truthfulness of the statements in order to
show the accused had a motive to kill the victim. We
disagree.
3la
The accused told several witnesses that the victim had
left him a note to the effect that she was deserting the Air
Force as well as leaving him. As stated earlier, the
accused claimed to have burned the “note.” Under these
circumstances, the victim’s state of mind or intent con-
cerning her departure date was highly relevant to the
issue of the likely situs of her murder. M.R.E. 402.
M.R.E. 803(e) provides in part as follows: |
The following is not excluded as hearsay: A state-
ment of the declarant’s then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and
bodily health)... .
Under the circumstances, testimony relating to state-
ments made by the victim which reflected her state of
mind concerning when she would depart the area clearly
qualified under M.R.E. 803(3). The prosecution did not
need this evidence to “bootstrap” onto a motive by the
accused. As we will discuss infra, the accused provided
that himself.
Vill
Appellate defense counsel also contend that the testi-
mony of Sgt Burt should not have been allowed. Sgt Burt
testified that he was aware that the accused and the victim
were having marital problems. On four or five occasions
while arguing with the victim, the accused would call Sgt
Burt and ask him to come and get him so they could talk.
The accused would be angry when he called. Sgt Burt
related that these occurrences generally followed the
same scenario during the time frame of April to June
1981. On one occasion when he was attempting to calm the
accused, the accused said to him as follows: “Rob, I swear,
if you don’t come and get me I'll kill her.”
32a
Sgt Burt related that he would take the accused to a
club for a drink and talk things over and then take him
home. He also advised the accused to move into the bar-
racks. He estimated that the last time this occurred was
one week prior to the victim’s death.
Since the statement in question was uttered by the
accused, it is admissible unless excluded by some other
rule of evidence. M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). Appellate defense
counsel contend that this evidence should have been
excluded under M.R.E. 404, and that it did not qualify
under M.R.E. 404(b). Rule 404(b) reads, in part, as fol-
lows:
. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . may
. . . be admissile, for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identify, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent.
Although the comment is premised with a condition,
the utterance of the accused could be liberally construed
as a threat. That need not detain us, however, for we will
assume that the comment and circumstances qualify as a
wrong or act. See United States v. Woodyard, 16 M.J. 715,
716 (A.F.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 17 M.J. 204 (1983).
To say that the evidence established that the accused
and the victim were having marital problems is to engage
in understatement. There was also evidence that the
accused and the victim argued over the victim’s plans to
leave and have the baby in Georgia. Under these circum-
stances, the testimony in question was clearly relevant on
the issues of the accused’s intent and motive. There was a
clear nexus and the acts were certainly not remote. Thus,
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting
the evidence. United States v. Woodyeard, supra; M.R.E.
403.
33a
IX
Appellate defense counsel also aver that the testimony
of Sgt Hinton should have been excluded pursuant to the
Clergy Privilege. M.R.E. 503. This assignment of error
fails both legally and factually.
This assignment of error arises somewhat by happen-
stance; namely, the accused’s question for information vis
a vis counselling. The accused and Sgt Hinton were neigh-
bors and apparently attended the same off-base church.
During late May 1981, the accused appeared at Sgt Hin-
ton’s quarters. The accused was upset over the victim’s
pending departure. He asked Hinton if he knew the
whereabouts of the pastor, and Hinton informed him the
pastor was out of town. The accused then asked Hinton to
the accused’s car so they could talk.
Sgt Hinton was an ordained minister at the time of the
trial. However, on the evening in question, he was a Dea-
con of his church. Hinton related that in his church’s
hierarchy the pastor, the assistant pastor, and the associ-
ate ministers, were above the deacons. He related that the
deacons counselled only on biblical matters, but even then
only when the pastors were otherwise occupied. Hinton
stated specifically that he was not given responsibility to
do spiritual counseling, for that was the pastor's job. His
minister’s license is dated 14 June 1981 and he was not
ordained until 8 August 1982. Hinton advised that one
cannot perform any substantive pastoral duties until after
ordination.
On the evening in question, Hinton was neither licensed
nor ordained. Additionally, he testified that he never held
himself out to the accused or anyone else as a minister, but
only a friend. He added that the accused never asked that
their conversations be considered confidential. Sgt Hin-
ton testified that, had he felt he was acting as a minister on
34a
the night in question, he would never have disclosed the
conversation to investigators or be testifying.
First, we hold that Sgt Hinton was not a person who
could act as a clergyman. M.R.E. 503(b)(1). Second, we
find that the accused did not reasonably believe that Hin-
ton was a clergyman. Third, we find that the conversation
between Hinton and the accused was not under circum-
stances amounting to a privileged communication.
M.R.E. 503(b)(2). Therefore, we find that the trial judge
properly allowed Hinton’s testimony. See generally,
Annot. 71 A.L.R.3d 794 (1976); M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A),
404(b), 403.
As mentioned above, Sgt Hinton related that the
accused was upset over the victim’s pending departure
when the accused arrived at his quarters. While sitting in
the accused’s car and talking, the accused said, “I can’t
take it anymore;” and then while striking the car’s dash-
board with both fists, the accused said, “J should bust her
in the face.” Hinton stated that the accused struck the
dash with sufficient force to break it.
X
Although the Government adroitly pieced together
many separate and distinct items of circumstantial evi-
dence, it was a jailhouse admission which was the
accused's undoing. Thus, we now come to our most crucial
factual determination; the credibility of Mr. Kirk. Tne
accused made Kirk’s acquaintance while they were incar-
cerated in the El Peso County, Colorado jail. Upon the
accused’s arrival in jail, Kirk had been confined for six
months for receiving a stolen shotgun. He had received a
suspended sentence, but during the time frame of the
accused's trial, he was facing probation revocation as well
as a charge for auto theft. In sum, Kirk faced a possible
sentence of 11 years for his travails. Kirk’s extracurricular
Pe ee eee ae ee Te eee ees ee
35a
activities were not confined to the civilian sector. While
serving in the Army he was convicted by special court-
martial for assaulting an officer. In exchange for his truth-
ful testimony, state officials agreed that the probation
revocation and the auto theft charge would be dropped.
Kirk was the Ward Representative of the jail, and the
accused was placed in his ward. Their initial contact was
merely Kirk’s asking him his name and introducing him to
the other inmates. The accused told Kirk he was confined
for “hitting a cop’s car.” At that time, or perhaps later,
Kirk had, in fact, associated the newspaper accounts of
the victim’s murder with the accused’s name, but he did
not challenge the accused’s statement of why he was
jailed.
Approximately two weeks later, the accused was appar-
ently on the short end of “The Dozens”? with another
inmate, and kirk had to break up a physical altercation
between them. Later that day, the accused entered Kirk's
cell and talked about hitting the police car. No one else
was present. Kirk rebuked the accused for lying and
informed him that he knew the real reason for the
accused’s confinement. When the accused challenged his
knowledge, Kirk told him and he looked very surprised.
Later that day in another conversation, Kirk told the
accused not to worry about anyone else finding out. Since
he was first in the ward to see the daily paper, Kirk told
the accused he would screen the paper from the other
inmates. Apparently the accused’s temper frequently
embroiled him with other inmates, for Kirk’s con-
versations with him flowed from Kirk calming him down.
Kirk stated that he advised the accused to stay calm for he
9“The Dozens” consist of the participants verbally deriding one
another as contemptuously as possible. The subject matter normally
extends to one’s parents and spouse as well as the participants
personally.
36a
was already in enough trouble without adding to his prob-
lems.
On another occasion the accused and Kirk engaged in
an argument. Apparently, the question of who was the
father of the victim’s child was at least partially responsi-
ble for the argument, for the accused had expressed
doubts as to his being the father. Kirk and the accused
were talking after the argument when the accused stated
that there had been an argument between him and the
victim and he hit her. The accused told Kirk that before he
realized it, the victim was dead. He also said that he
stabbed her.
Kirk stated that the accused told him the murder
occurred in the living room and that he put the body in the
trunk of the car and took it to the Garden of The Gods
Road and dumped it. The accused said he dumped the
knife with which he stabbed the victim near a 7-Eleven
store, and he carried the clothes the victim was wearing
toa different spot. Kirk said the victim was wearing a thin
night gown at the time.
Kirk related that the accused told him “To beat the case
... he wrote a note saying that Camille had left and all
this here and got some other friend of his to say that him
and Brian was together, you know, to make it look like
that he didn’t have nothing to do with it all.”
He also stated that the accused expressed concern over
what a young lady he was with would say to police.
According to Kirk, the accused also worried about what a
next door neighbor had seen or heard and whether he
would testify, and whether he had gotten all the blood off
the carpet, rugs, and stairs.
As a result of the accused’s concern, Kirk asked two
other inmates how blood could be removed without leav-
ing detectable traces. Kirk said that the accused never
indicated whether the steps “were up or downstairs,” only
Se ee ae ae a oe es
37a
his concern over whether he had successfully removed all
of the blood. Kirk testified that the accused inquired of
ways “to get rid of stuff that he had and was [the way he
had done it] the smart way.” He added that the accused
also asked him “some bits about the law.” The accused
asked him about state law and how “he could beat it and all
this here.” Kirk related that “we got together and tried to
help him as much as we could.”
During Kirk’s cross-examination, the defense homed in
on some key inconsistencies. Prior to trial, and appar-
ently prior to his going to Florida, Kirk had been inter-
viewed by Detective Brown. At this interview Kirk
claimed that the accused said he dumped the body by the
Broadmoor. Kirk stated that at that point he was just
telling Brown something to get rid of him because he did
not think the accused would be tried after beating it at the
state level.
Brown's Florida interview of Kirk was taped. The tran-
script of that interview reflects that when Brown asked
about blood in the basement, Kirk never mentioned blood
being on steps or the accused claiming to have found a
note from the victim. Kirk explained the discrepancy by
stating that Brown’s tape recorder was turned off when he
mentioned the blood on the steps. That was also his expla-
nation for not having mentioned the note. He also stated
that the note was mentioned in a conversation separate
from the one where the accused admitted killing the vic-
tim. He admitted that he had collected newspapers both
prior to and after the accused’s arrival.
Kirk testified that it was hard to state a reason why he
was testifying, but the agreement between him and state
officials was not the real incentive. He stated that he did
not want his son to suffer because he refused to testify.
However, Kirk admitted that he plans to send for his son
and his mother after he sets up a home in Florida.
38a
Kirk insisted that he never approached anyone with his
information. However, he must have told his attorneys,
for he stated they attempted to use his information to his
benefit when he told them to forget it. That was it until
Detective Brown approached him. He said that Brown
offered to drop his probatien, but he just did not want to
testify.
Now we will trace the investigators’ trail to Kirk, for we
believe it bears on his credibility. Detective Brown testi-
fied that he learned of Kirk through an inmate named
Leipoldt. Brown contacted Kirk in Florida where he was
residing. He stated that Kirk never approached him, and
Kirk did not know he was coming to Florida to interview
him. He said that Kirk never requested anything.
Trial defense counsel's position was that Kirk had used
newspaper clippings to fabricate his testimony so that he
could work out a deal very much to his benefit. After
testifying against the accused he would be a free man
instead of facing a possible 8 years in addition to the three
that were previously suspended. Thus, Kirk’s interest or
bias was obvious.
Kirk’s testimony was sketchy. Additionally, the
accused's carpet and living room rug tested negative for
the presence of blood stains. It must be remembered,
however, that Kirk claimed only to be relating what the
accused told him, not necessarily how the murder
occurred; ergo, it is certainly conceivable that the accused
did not tell all that he knew or the precise details.
Only a couple of the newspaper articles pertaining to
the case are attached as appellate exhibits, but they were
written over one year after the victim’s death. Con-
sequently, we are unable to compare the content of Kirk’s
testimony with those of the articles. However, the
defense’s theory requires extreme shrewdness and
patience on the part of Kirk. It also indicates a considera-
39a
ble gamble. It would assume that Kirk told his attorneys
of the accused’s admissions to him and then patiently
waited for the system to come to him rather than his
approaching investigators. This theory is negated by the
fact that Detective Brown learned of Kirk’s possible
knowledge from Leipoldt, another inmate. Kirk, of
course, could have worked the same method via Leipoldt.
It would also indicate that Kirk played the role until the
last possible instant, for the prosecution was not certain
that he would testify until the evening before he appeared
as a witness.
We find very interesting, Kirk’s reference to the
accused's concern over a young lady he was with. The only
person to whom Kirk could be referring was Sgt Johnson.
Johnson was a divorcee and a neighbor. She testified that
the accused dropped by her quarters the afternoon of the
victim’s murder. During their conversation, she related
some of her personal problems and the accused related
some of his marital problems. The accused stated tnat he
suspected the victim of infidelity. The next day, 14 June
1981, she telephoned for the victim and the accused
answered. The accused said the victim was not home and
he did not know where she was. The accused made no
mention of a note from the victim. However, Kirk did not
relate any details concerning the “young lady.” We doubt
that he learned of her via the newspaper.
We do not underestimate Mr. Kirk’s shrewdness; and,
as set forth above, his possible bias was obvious. How-
ever, applying our worldly experience, and realizing that
the factfinders both saw and heard Mr. Kirk, we believe
his testimony to have been credible.
When Mr. Kirk’s testimony is added to the wealth of
circumstantial evidence establishing the accused’s motive
and opportunity to kill the victim, and the blood stains
and their location, there is no other hypothesis but that of
40a
guilt. During closing argument, trial defense counsel bril-
liantly offered possible explanations for practically all of
the victim’s belongings being in the home and the
accused's suspicious actions and inconsistent statements
to his neighbors on the day of the victim's death, and after-
wards. However, it would simply require far too many
innocent coincidences to remove the aura of guilt from the
accused's actions. As were the factfinders at the trial, we
are also convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
accused's guilt.
XI
We now turn to the contention that the accused was
denied the effective assistance of counsel.!° Appellate
defense counsel have launched a broadside attack against
the accused’s trial defense counsel.
The specific grounds stated in the assignment of error
are as follows: (1) That trial defense counsel’s pretrial
preparation was totally inadequate as evidenced by their
surprise over Kirk being called as a witness, and their
failure to uncover false testimony by Mrs. Brice. Also
part of this allegation is the alleged failure of trial defense
counsel to communicate with a private investigator
retained by the accused's initial civilian counsel; (2) That
trial defense counsel’s cross-examination of Kirk, and Dr.
Bowerman was inadequate, and the absence of any cross-
examination of Mrs. Brice; (3) The failure to call certain
witnesses who could have provided exculpatory evidence;
and (4) That trial defense counsel were basically deficient
in ferreting out evidence which would have negated the
prosecution's evidence against the accused.
10 Appellate Government and Defense Counsel’s Motions For
Leave To File Affidavits are hereby GRANTED.
Se teen A Nee At Al le ON ion
a oe i
4la
We recently had occasion to review the latest tests to be
applied when an accused claims that ineffective represen-
tation of counsel fall short of constitutional requirements.
Quoting from Strickland v. Washington, _ U.S. —_,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we stated that to
require reversal of a conviction or a death sentence, coun-
sel’s assistance must be defective in two essentials. They
are:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's per-
formance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defend-
ant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the
result unreliable. [Emphasis Added]
United States v. Garcia, 18 M.J. 716, 719 (A.F.C.M.R.
1984). To make this determination, we must consider the
totality of the evidence before the factfinder. United
States v. Garcia, supra.
Trial defense counsel have responded to appellate
defense counsel’s contention in a detailed affidavit. They
catalog their many efforts at obtaining the private inves-
tigator’s report, including beseeching organizations such
as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for assistance. They
relate that at one point they were able to obtain $500.00
due the accused in back Bachelor Allowance for Quarters,
but the accused—at the last minute—refused to make any
payment to the investigator. They also add that the
accused expressly prohibited them from approaching his
42a
parents for financial assistance. These facts notwith-
standing, however, trial defense counsel state: “Even
though we never saw this report, we were convinced that
our independent investigation had revealed all essential
facts.”
As regards Mr. Kirk, trial defense counsel advise that
they interviewed him in the presence of his counsel on 15
December 1982, and that they also looked into his back-
ground. They insist they were fully prepared for his testi-
mony. Trial defense counsel state they learned early on
that another inmate could corroborate some of Kirk’s tes-
timony as well as recal! independent admissions of the
accused. Consequently, they “made a tactical decision to
stay away from the accused's fellow inmates. . . to avoid
leading the prosecution to such potentially devastating
evidence. . . .” Trial defense counsel also deny receiving
information from civilian appellate defense counsel about
an alleged recantation of testimony by Kirk.
Trial defense counsel state that they determined at trial
that the testimony of Mrs. Brice was unremarkable and
had little impact on the case. They also advised that their
pretrial preparation on the pathology aspect of the case
was painstaking, including the issue of whether there was
a struggle between the victim and her assailant. They
concluded that there were no fingernail scrapings taken
and that there was no credible evidence of a struggle.
Trial defense counsel also detailed the civilian blood
spatter pattern experts with whom they consulted prior
to trial, including the FBI serologist who testified at trial.
Their conclusion was that there was no reasonable basis
on which to attack the test procedures employed by the
FBI laboratory. Although trial defense counsel called Dr.
Kier as a witness during the 39(a) session on motions,
they did not call him during the defense case in chief
because “he had not one scintilla of evidence . . . which
43a
would have challenged Mr. Tubergen’s conclusions.” Dur-
ing oral argument, appellate defense counsel assailed trial
defense counsel's decision not to attack the FBI serologist
without first getting other expert opinion. This assertion
appears rebutted by trial defense counsel's detailing of
the experts with whom they consulted. We find it more
than reasonable to infer that they based their tactical
decision on the results of those interviews.
Trial defense counsel also state they were fully aware of
the accused’s and victim’s bank records. They state they
considered that evidence and discussed its evidentiary
value with the accused at great length before concluding
that the bank records did not substantially rebut the
prosecution’s evidence of the victim’s intent to remain in
the area until late June 1981.
On the sentencing portion of trial, counsel address the
propriety of the accused not making an unsworn state-
ment to the members. Trial defense counsel advise that
the decision was left solely to the accused. They also state
that “the value of other possible evidence was far out-
weighed by the rebuttal which we knew the government
had ready.”
Civilian appellate defense counsel have submitted an
affidavit basically in response to trial defense counsel's
affidavit wherein they dispute some of trial defense coun-
sel’s statements, i.e., that there was, in fact, evidence of a
struggle, and reasserting their claim that there was inad-
equate pre-trial investigation. We will address these in
more detail infra when we address the petition for new
trial.
It is axiomatic that an accused is entitled to be repre-
sented by effective counsel, and he is entitled to compe-
tent representation throughout the trial. United States v.
Jefferson, 138 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v.
Rivas, 3 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 1977). Another fundamental
44a
rule is that strategic or tactical decisions made by trial
defense counsel will not be second guessed on appeal.
United States v. Rivas, supra.
The first thing which is apparent from reading the
affidavit of trial defense counsel is that they were fully
aware of the issues which appellate defense counsel aver
should have been more vigorously pursued. It is quite
evident that trial defense counsel were faced with numer-
ous tactical decisions throughout this trial. Their affidavit
reflects that they made their decisions on various tactics
only after weighing the potential impact and benefit to
their client, the accused.
As is evident from the sections of this opinion supra as
well as infra, trial defense counsel left no stone unturned
via the numerous motions litigated on behalf of the
accused during the 39(a) session on motions. Their
motions were well conceived and were supported by writ-
ten briefs. The briefs are concise and thorough, and pre-
sent reasoned advocacy. In fact, trial defense counsel's
oral advocacy during the trial turned what were patently
open and shut matters into closely contested issues of law.
This is especially so on the issues of the laboratory testing
having consumed all but one of the suspected blood stains
and the disposal of the accused’s automobile.
During the trial on the merits, trial defense counsel's
cross-examinations were designed to elicit and highlight
the exculpatory aspects of the prosecution’s evidence,
thereby attempting to lessen the inculpatory inferences.
As mentioned in Part X, supra, trial defense counsel’s
closing arguments were outstanding.
When the assignment of error is reduced to its essence,
the gist of appellate defense counsel’s averment is that
they would have tried the case differently. This is an
historical complaint. We reaffirmed a long standing rule in
United States v. Cohen, 2 M.J. 350 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976),
pet. denied, 3 M.J. 88 (1977), where we stated as follows:
45a
. Many records reflect examples of doubtful trial
tactics but counsel cannot be censured [sic] for not
adopting the best. It must be remembered that
appellate counsel and this Court have the advantage
of viewing the record after the findings and verdict,
and when the decisions made in the conduct of the
trial may be distorted by our lack of knowledge pos-
sessed by trial counsel. It is all too easy for a losing
litigant to complain on appeal of too few conferences,
failure to call witnesses, lack of cross-examination
and other items too numerous to mention. . . and too
much cross-examination is often more damaging than
too little.
United States v. Cohen, supra at 352, quoting from
United States v. Hunter, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 37, 41, 6C.M.R.
37, 41 (1952). The latest standards set forth in United
States v. Garcia, supra, do not negate this principle. The
fact that appellate defense counsel can show how the case
may have been tried differently does not equate to ineffec-
tive representation at the trial level.
Our review of the record fails to support a finding that
trial defense counsel's performance was deficient. Strick-
land v. Washington; United States v. Jefferson; United
States v. Rivas, all supra. Accordingly we find this assign-
ment of error to be without merit.
XII
We will dispose of the remaining assignments of error
summarily.
The accused asserts that the Challenge for Cause of Lt
Col J should have been granted. This assignment of error
is without merit. Trial defense counsel stated specifically
that his challenge was based on Lt Col J not being candid
in answering questions on his access to newspaper arti-
cles on the case. He interposed no disagreement with Lt
46a
Col J’s ability to be impartial. Trial defense counsel
declined the trial judge’s invitation to recall Lt Col J for
additional voir dire. The military judge did not abuse his
discretion by refusing to rule that Lt Col J had willfully
withheld information and by refusing the challenge.
United States v. Mason, 16 M.J. 455 (C.M.A. 1983);
United States v. Harris, 13 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1982);
United States v. Boyd, 7 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 1982).
Also asserted is that the search of the accused’s vehicle
should have been suppressed. This is also without merit.
The evidence establishing the accused’s voluntary consent
is compelling. Part of the accused’s alibi was that he had
nothing to hide as evidenced by full cooperation with
investigators. Additionally, the accused consented to the
search of his automobile notwithstanding his First Ser-
geant advising him not to be so rash in waiving his rights.
The search was clearly consensual. M.R.E. 314(e).
Another assignment of error related to the automobile
is that the disposal of the automobile by the El] Paso
County, Colorado Sheriffs Department rendered any evi-
dence seized from it inadmissible. This is without merit.
Investigators were emphatic that nothing of evidentiary
value remained in the vehicle or it would have been
retained. The accused had ample opportunity to reclaim
possession of the automobile before it was disposed of.
California v. Trombetta, U.S. , 104 8.Ct. 2528,
80 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).
The military judge did not abuse his discretion by sus-
taining the objection to the testimony of Mr. H. The
proffered testimony was not relevant to the issue of guilt
or innocence. See United States v. Ferguson, 15 M.J. 12
(C.M.A. 1983); M.R.E. 401, 402, 104(a).
The military judge did not abuse his discretion by allow-
ing the pathologist, Dr. B, to testify that in his opinion the
stab wounds were consistent with the intentional inflic-
rant, Lan SUP i
47a
tion of injury. Dr. B had been properly qualified as an
expert, M.R.E. 702, and there was a factual basis for his
opinion. M.R.E. 703. Thus the testimony went to the
issue of premeditation as well as aggravation. United
States v. Vickers, 13 M.J. 403 (1982); United States v.
Woodyard, 16 M.J. 715(A.F.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 17 M.J.
204 (1983). The trial judge exercised his discretion with
sensitivity, as evidenced by his ruling prohibiting Dr. B
from stating the victim was tortured prior to her death.
M.R.E. 408.
XIII
We now turn to the petition for new trial. Appellate
defense counsel request a new trial on the basis of both
newly discovered evidence and fraud upon the trial court.
The proffered “new” evidence is as follows: A traffic cita-
tion purportedly issued to the victim with a notation that
she was not wearing glasses; the opinion of an expert
consulted after trial who is of the opinion that the blood
spatter patterns on the stairs are inconsistent with the
injuries suffered by the victim and that she did not die in
the basement; that infrared photographs taken of the
walls of the accused’s quarters were negative for the pres-
ence of blood that this exculpatory evidence was not dis-
closed to the defense; that financial records reflected that
the victim controlled the family finances and that she had
purchased furniture in May 1981 for delivery to her and
the accused’s quarters on the installation; that “tissue,
skin and blood” under the fingernails of the victim indicate
that she fought with her assailant, and that a physical
examination of the accused did not reveal any scratches,
etc.; and, information reflecting wrongdoing by Kirk
other than that disclosed in open court.
The test for whether a new trial will be granted on the
basis of newly discovered evidence is well settled: The
48a
evidence must be newly discovered since trial, and it is not
such that it would have been discovered by the petitioner
at the time of trial in the exercise of due diligence; and, if
considered by a court-martial in the light of all other
pertinent evidence, it would probably produce a substan-
tially more favorable result for the accused. M.C.M.,
para. 109d(2). The petitioner must also affirmatively show
that an injustice resulted from the findings. United States
v. Bacon, 12 M.J. 489 (1982), and cases cited therein. The
burden on the petitioner is heavier than that normally
borne during appellate review, and motions for new trial
on the grounds of newly discovered evidence are not
regarded with favor. Such motions should be granted only
with great caution. United States v. Bacon, supra.
Applying these criteria to the instant case, the accused
fails to carry his burden. First, the traffic citation was
clearly discoverable prior to trial. However, even if it were
truly newly discovered, it would not produce a sustan-
tially more favorable result. By arguing the likelihood
that the victim owned more than one pair of glasses, trial
defense counsel vigorously attacked the significance of
the victim’s glasses being found in the master bedroom.
Additionally, trial defense counsel used the presence of
the glasses to support a rather weak theory of the victim
being abducted from the home. Nonetheless, in view of
practically all of the victim’s possessions being in the
home, including her purse and military identification
card, we are convinced that this “new” evidence would not
have changed the result at trial.
As regards the opinion of the blood spatter expert,
again this is not new evidence. His opinions were known
to trial defense counsel. Additionally, as pointed out in
appellate government’s brief, his opinion concurs with
Detective Green ona very important point. His memoran-
dum to appellate defense counsel states, “Some type of
49a
beating occurred directly in front of the staircase in the
basement.” He also agreed that the point of origin could
be discerned from the spatters’ directionality with accu-
rate measurements. Under these circumstances, one can-
not fault trial defense counsel for not calling him as a
witness. We are convinced that this opinion would not
produce a more favorable result.
We must reach the same conclusion on the infrared
photographs. Trial defense counsel had access to all inves-
tigative files, etc., so, unless the taking of the pho-
tographs was not recorded, they should have known of
their existence. However, this point need not detain us,
for trial defense counsel used other evidence at trial to
demonstrate that there was no evidence that the accused
had painted over potentially incriminating blood stains.
He did so via the testimony of Lt Duke who was in the
home the afternoon of 13 June 1981. Lt Duke testified that
he did not observe or smell any paint in the upstairs area
of the accused’s home. Additionally, during the cross-
examination of Detective Green, trial defense counsel
established that there were methods of detecting blood
stains which had been painted over. This was stressed
during closing argument when trial defense counsel
reminded the members that a suspicious stain on an
upstairs wall turned out to be a beverage similar to
KoolAid.
As indicated in Part XI, supra, trial defense counsel
were aware of the financial records and the autopsy
report; therefore, these items are not newly discovered
evidence. As for the autopsy report, it does not state that
skin, etc., was taken from the victim. The report states
that fingernail clippings were taken from the victim for
laboratory analysis. The laboratory report reflects human
blood stains on the fingernails, but not skin or tissue.
Thus, this is not evidence of a struggle.
50a
The last item of new evidence is additional evidence of
wrongful conduct by Kirk. One of the offenses apparently
occurred during the accused’s trial, but the others were
clearly discoverable prior to trial. At any rate, this “new”
evidence pertaining to Kirk’s credibility is not likely to
have produced a more favorable result. The factfinders
were clearly aware of Kirk’s unsavory character, and we _
must infer that they weighed his testimony with great
caution.
We conclude that the accused has not met his burden of
producing new evidence which would produce a more
favorable result. United States v. Bacon, supra.
The accused also requests a new trial on the ground that
fraud was perpetrated upon the court-martial via per-
jured testimony. He avers that Mrs. Brice and Kirk pre-
sented false testimony. We will first review the assertion
on Mrs. Brice.
During her preliminary questions, Mrs. Brice stated
her occupation was registered nurse. Appellate defense
counsel has presented documentation which they contend
shows that Mrs. Brice lied when she stated she was a
registered nurse. The specific documentation is simply a
private investigator’s report that there is no record of
Mrs. Brice ever being licensed in Colorado as a registered
nurse.
Even where a fraud is perpetrated upon the trial court,
it must have had a substantial contributing effect upon the
findings in order to merit a new trial. M.C.M., para.
109d(3); United States v. Bacon, supra. Applying this
standard, the allegation falls far short. First, the absence
of a license in Colorado does not preclude her being
licensed in another state. Second, it could be that Mrs.
Brice had worked as a registered nurse at an earlier point
of her life. Third, and most important, her occupation was
irrelevant to her testimony, for she did not give medical
ee eee
5la
testimony. Her testimony was that she was a friend and
confidant of the victim; ergo, if the victim had been suffer-
ing from nosebleeds the victim would have told her. Their
friendship would have motivated the revelation, not her
occupation. At any rate, there was expert testimony that
the blood stains/spatters were inconsistent with blood
dripping from above, i.e., a nosebleed. Therefore, even if
Mrs. Brice is not, or never was, a registered nurse, that
part of her testimony had no substantial contributing
effect on the result.
The main fraud alleged is that Kirk fabricated his testi-
mony at trial and that he recanted his testimony after
trial. As support, appellate defense counsel has submit-
ted affidavits from a fellow inmate, David Lee, and Kirk.
Lee claims that the district attorney was putting pres-
sure on Kirk to tesify, so Kirk made up his testimony from
newspaper clippings and from conversations “We had in
El Paso County jail.” Lee defines “we” as “We being
Michael Kirk, Brian Garries and myself David S. Lee.”
Since Kirk does not recant his testimony, Lee’s claim to
the contrary presents a factual issue. We resolve the issue
against the accused. Lee claims to have no knowledge of
the accused’s case, but yet he says that Kirk got his
information, in part, from conversations with the accused
at which he, Lee was present. Secondly, although the
conversations did not necessarily reveal incriminating
statements, Lee’s affidavit corroborates Kirk’s claim that
they discussed the accused's case. The only issue in dis-
pute is the content of those conversations.
Contrary to appellate defense counsel's assertion, Kirk
does not recant his testimony. The relevant portion of
Kirk’s post-trial affidavit reads as follows:
[A]s far as my testimony in court was I told the truth,
far as believing it I couldn’t say I’m not a judge of
people.
52a
It requires a strained interpretation to conclude that the
quoted portion equates to a recantation of testimony. All
Kirk is saying, albeit inarticulately, is that he has no
opinion as to whether the accused’s revelations to him
were true, for that was for others to decide; however, he
testified truthfully and accurately as to what the accused
told him.
In their affidavit, trial defense counsel stated they had
reason to believe that another inmate, Leipoldt, could
corroborate Kirk in addition to knowing of independent
admissions by the accused. We are also mindful of the
affidavit of the private investigator, Mr. Pubanz, who
claims that Leipoldt disputed this assertion. Under these
circumstances, the accused has not met his burden of
showing that a fraud was perpetrated on the court via
perjured testimony. United States v. Bacon, supra;
United States v. Morris, 13 M.J. 666 (A.F.C.M.R..), pet.
denied, 14 M.J. 446 (1982).
Additionally, the argument that Kirk had fabricated his
testimony from newspaper clippings was fully presented
to the factfinders for their consideration.
The last items of claimed fraud are that the investiga-
tion was slanted and fabricated to build a case against the
accused rather than the actual perpetrator; and, that the
court-martial was not presented with ail of the available
evidence. The latter contention is tied in with the asser-
tion that trial defense counsel committed a fraud upon the
court “in providing no defense to the charge.” The evi-
dence presented in support is an affidavit by a private
investigator that Detective Green told him that he was
concerned that the Sheriffs Department's investigation
had not been done properly and was not thorough enough;
that he was pulled out of the accused’s residence pre-
maturely; and, that certain witnesses had been pressured
to testify.
|
;
53a
Detective Green’s first alleged comment on the appro-
priateness of the investigation is subject to several inter-
pretations. He may have been referring to the fact that
following better procedures would have prevented the
Colorado courts from suppressing the blood stain evi-
dence. At any rate, he testified to the contrary on cross-
examination. In response to trial defense counsel's ques-
tions, he stated that his investigation of the residence had
been thorough, and that it was equally advantageous to
exonerate a suspect, for they could then focus their efforts
in other directions. Further, this information is similar to
a recantation of testimony, and we must view it with
disfavor. United States v. Morris, supra. Finally, it did
not require much deductive reasoning to conclude that
Kirk was persuaded to testify. His own testimony sug-
gested as much.
As for the assertion that trial defense counsel perpe-
trated a fraud upon the court via ineptness, it does not
merit comment.
XIV
Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence are
AFFIRMED.
XV
The Petition for New Trial having been fully consid-
ered, it is hereby
DENIED.
FORAY, Senior Judge, and O’HAIR, Judge, concurr.
Ww U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1986 163883 42001
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