Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Garries v. United States

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In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1986

BRIAN K. GARRIES

AIRMAN First Cuass, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,

PETITIONER,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

Leo L. SERGI

Colonel, Office of the Judge

, Advocate Genera! (OTJAG)

United States Air Force

HQ USAF/JAJD

Bldg 5683

Bolling AFB, DC 20332-6128

(202) 767-1562

Counsel of Record

and

CHARLES E. AMBROSE, JR.,

Major, USAF

Office of The Judge Advocate General

United States Air Force

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether in a capital military court martial an

accused indigent serviceman is entitled to independent

investigative assistance for his defense as a matter of

constitutional and military due process and in accordance

with federal statutes applicable to trials in civilian federal

courts?

2. Whether in a capital military court-martial a mili-

tary trial judge may properly sever an established

attorney-client relationship between an accused and his

chosen civilian counsel, and thereby force the accused to

proceed to trial represented by detailed military defense

counsel?

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EEE SS a CNS 1

Jurisdiction - 0 SS Re ee 2

EE GD SA AE I 2

LES EE LL LDA TE LTE 4

8, ee 11

EELS A eC 11

EES TE ce 15

EY SEES SE a ne 16

ESSELTE SS RE DY ne la

ESSER a 9a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. —__, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84

L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) 14

Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir.

1970) .. 13, 14

People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1982) ------.---- 2,5

United States v. Bruneau, 12 C.M.R. 718 (A.F.B.R.

1953) 12

United States v. Davis, 22 M.J. 829 (N.M.C.M.R. 1986) 14

United States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986). 2, 13

United States v. Hutson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 42 C.M.R.

39 (1970) 12

United States v. Jenkins, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 261, 22 C.M.R.

51 (1956) 12

United States v. Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 47

C.M.R. 402 (1973) 12

United States v. Menoken, 14 M.J. 10 (C.M.A. 1982) _- 15

United States v. Montoya, 13 M.J. 268 (C.M.A. 1982) - 15

United States v. Saenz, 18 M.J. 327 (C.M.A. 1984) ____- 15

Statutes and Rules:

18 U.S.C. 3006A__- 2, 11, 12, 14

(111)

IV

Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969 (Revised Edition):

SIN SII a arrcieciekclnincicheanncnenieemninsaceadcimioneehiiainihembetsias 4,12

RESETS RES CCL ene REST NT 3, 12

Uniform Code of Military Justice:

Te epee ae ae

I a andi aeniiasnaaals 4,15

a eteads ichcualinighih corres 15

REE I eR 5 et NIRS PRET SBN METI ECR SVAN aU 3

ph ER erica aeinnen sa ede cma Com tahe erei rN nowte eRe tee PT 10, 11

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1986

No.

BRIAN K. GARRIES

AIRMAN First CLAss, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,

PETITIONER,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

The petitioner, Brian K. Garries, respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decision of the

United States Court of Military Appeals entered in this

proceeding on August 4, 1986.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Military

Appeals is reported at 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986) (Appen-

- (t)

2

dix A). The decision of the United States Air Force Court

of Military Review is published at 19 M.J. 845

(A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (Appendix B). (The Supreme Court of

Colorado's opinion (affirming the suppression of evidence

in an earlier state proceeding against petitioner) is

reported at 645 P.2d 1306 (People v. Garries, Colo. 1982)).

JURISDICTION

The decision of the United States Court of Military

Appeals was rendered on August 4, 1986. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1259.

STATUTES INVOLVED

At the time of petitioner's trial, federal law provided

that for an indigent defendant being tried in a United

States District Court:

Counsel for a person who is financially unable to

obtain investigative, expert, or other services neces-

sary for an adequate defense may request them in an

ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate

inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services

are necessary and that the person is financially

unable to obtain them, the court, or the United

States magistrate if the services are required in con-

nection with a matter of which he has jurisdiction,

shall authorize counsel to obtain the services.

18 U.S.C. §3006(A)(e)(1).

The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides:

Art. 36. President may prescribe rules

(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures,

including modes of proof, for cases arising under this

chapter triable in courts-martial, military commis-

sions and other military tribunals, and procedures

3

for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the Presi-

dent by regulations which shall, so far as he considers

practicable, apply the principals of law and the rules

of evidence generally recognized in the trial of crimi-

nal cases in the United States district courts, but

which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with

this chapter.

(b) All rules and regulations made under this

article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and

shall be reported to Congress.

U.C.M.J., Art. 36, 10 U.S.C. §836. The Code further

specifies that:

The trial counsel, the defense counsel, and the

court-martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain

witnesses and other evidence in accordance with

such regulation as the President may prescribe.

U.C.M.J., Art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846.

At the time of petitioner's court-martial, the Manual for

Courts-Martial provided:

116. EMPLOYMENT OF EXPERTS. The

provisions of this paragraph are applicable unless

otherwise prescribed by regulations of the Secretary

of a Department. When the employment of an expert

is necessary during a trial by court-martial, the trial

counsel, in advance of the employment, will, on the

order or permission of the military judge or the presi-

dent of a special court-martial without a military

judge, request the convening authority to authorize

the employment and to fix the limit of compensation

to be paid the expert. The request should, if practica-

ble, state the compensation that is recommended by

the prosecution and the defense. When, in advance of

trial, the prosecution or the defense knows that the

4

employment of an expert will be necessary, applica-

tion should be made to the convening authority for

permission to employ the expert, stating the neces-

sity therefor and the probable cost. In the absence of

a previous authorization, only ordinary witness fees

may be paid for the employment of a person as an

expert witness.

M.C.M., 1969 (Rev. ed.), paragraph 116. The Manual

further provided that:

The decision on a request for a witness on the

merits must be made on an individual basis in each

case by weighing the materiality of the testimony and

its relevance to the guilt or innocence of the accused,

together with the relative responsibilities of the par-

ties concerned, against the equities of the situation.

M.C.M., 1969 (Rev. ed.), paragraph 115.

With respect to the rights of a military accused to legal

counsel, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides

that:

The accused has the right to be represented in his

defense . . . by civilian counsel if provided by him.

U.C.M.J., Art. 38(b)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b)(2).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On 15 June 1981, the body of petitioner’s wife, Camille

Garries, was discovered near the Garden of the Gods park

in western Colorado Springs, Colorado. (R. 516-625).

Camille had married the petitioner in 1980. She was an

enlisted member of the Air Force, and held the rank of

Airman First Class. Petitioner was assigned to the

U.S.A.F. Academy, and his wife was assigned to Peterson

Air Force Base, both in Colorado Springs. During the

latter part of 1980, Camille became pregnant.

5

Since the body was found within the city limits of Colo-

rado Springs, the city police started an investigation.

Subsequently, the investigation was turned over to the E]

Paso County Sheriffs Department, on the belief that the

death occurred in the family quarters on the Academy

grounds. (R. 629).

The E] Paso County District Attorney eventually filed a

first-degree murder charge against the petitioner, who

remained in civilian pretrial confinement until September

1981. A trial date was set. However, the E] Paso County

District Court granted a pretrial suppression motion

regarding blood stain evidence found on the basement

steps in the family quarters and in appellant’s car. The

prosecution took an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme

Court of Colorado. That Court affirmed the trial court’s

suppression of the blood stain evidence on June 1, 1982.

People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1982). As a result,

the District Attorney filed a motion for an order of Nolle

Prosequi on 22 July 1982. (Appellate Exhibit XV). The

state court case had not been filed as a capital case, and

the request to terminate the prosecution was granted.

The Air Force then assumed responsibility of the case.

An investigation was opened by the Air Force Office of

Special Investigations (OSI). (Appellate Exhibit X VIII).

Court-martial charges were preferred on 1 September

1982. The investigation pursuant to Article 32, Uniform

Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (U.C.M.J.) was

held on the following two days, 2-3 Septembe 1982. Two

military defense counsel (Major Byassee and Captain

Thomas) were detailed to represent the petitioner at that

proceeding. On 20 October 1982, the Superintendent of

the Air Force Academy referred the charges to a general

court-martial. That convening autherity withdrew that

referral on 3 December 1982, and, on 6 December 1982,

re-referred the modified charge of which petitioner

6

stands convicted. The military judge originally set the

trial date for 13 December 1982, but granted a defense

request to delay until 10 January 1988. (Appellate

Exhibits XVII, XI, X).

On 1 December 1982, the defense requested the con-

vening authority to make $1500 available to use for inde-

pendent investigation by the defense. The primary

intended use for the funds included either securing a copy

of the previously-conducted defense investigation pre-

pared by the investigator who assisted petitioner’s

appointed defense counsel in the previous state proceed-

ings, or for engaging in a new investigation. (Appellate

Exhibit I; Petition for New Trial and supporting docu-

ments, 25 July 1983; post-trial affidavits, (Byassee and

Thomas) 7 Sep 84; (Borchers) 22 October 1984). On 3

December 1983, the convening authority denied that

request. (Appellate Exhibit II). The defense renewed

their request before the detailed military judge and

sought either an order to the convening authority to

provide the $1500 or for the judge to hold an ex parte

hearing with the defense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3006A.

(Appellate Exhibit III). The Government opposed both

motions. (Appellate Exhibit IV). On 14 December 1982,

the military judge issued an order denying the requested

ex parte hearing, and deferring ruling on the order to

produce funds until the initial session convened under

Article 39a, U.C.M.J. (Appellate Exhibit V). That session

convened on 10 January 1983.

At that session (before the petitioner responded to the

military judge’s inquiry, “by whom do you wish to be

defended,”), the defense renewed their motion for funds

for independent defense investigation. (R. 2). In support

of their motion, the defense presented evidence establish-

ing that petitioner was “indigent” as defined by both

federal and Colorado state law, and that independent

7

investigative service is available to indigent accuseds in

each such criminal justice system. (Appellate Exhibits

VI-IX). The prosecution had made available all civilian

and military police investigative reports, but the defense

maintained its need for funds for independent defense

investigative services. (R. 1-27). Upon the military

judge's inquiry as to the the specifics of the need underly-

ing the request, the defense renewed their request for an

ex parte hearing. (R. 5). (The defense had declined an

offer by the Government to make an OSI investigator

available to the defense under a court order which would

have guaranteed confidentiality, as this government

investigator would have been made an “agent” of the

defense team. (R. 5-19, Appellate Exhibit XII).)

The military judge denied the defense request for

$1500, citing the lack of on-the-record specificity of the

defense request (R. 9), and also denied the renewed

request to hold an ex parte hearing where the defense

could make those needs explicit. (R. 10).

The defense then moved for a three-month continuance

to permit appellant sufficient time to save the needed

$1500. The military judge denied the motion. (R. 10).

As a result of the above rulings and with petitioner’s

consent, the detailed defense counsel moved to withdraw

from their assigned representation since they could not

effectively perform their duties without the requested

independent investigative support. Counsel averred on

the record that attorneys from the American Civil Liber-

ties Union (ACLU) had expressed a willingness to under-

take petitioner’s case, and they had the necessary

resources available to do it effectively. (R. 11). The mili-

tary judge denied the request to withdraw.

In response to the military judge’s inquiry of petitioner

regarding his desires as to defense representation, the

petitioner stated that he did not want to be represented

8

by military counsel in light of the trial court’s denial of

independent investigative services. Petitioner stated that

he was not satisfied with his detailed counsel. (R. 14-15).

After directing the trial counsel to relate for the record

that the Government had obtained the presence of four

witnesses from overseas and six from out of state, the

military judge granted a limited continuance to permit

the petitioner to consult with Mr. Borchers, a Denver

lawyer affiliated with the ACLU, with a view toward

retaining his service. (Petition for New Trial, Exhibit A).

At the military judge’s request, petitioner once again

discussed with his detailed military defense counsel their

request to withdraw. As a result, petitioner indicated that

he did want them to remain on the case, since his dissatis-

faction had been removed by the pending presence of

civilian counsel in the case. (R. 23-27).

On 18 January 1983, the Article 39a session recon-

vened. Petitioner was present in court with his detailed

counsel and two civilian counsel: Mr. Richard Borchers

from Denver, and Mr. Greg Walta from Colorado Springs.

(R. 28-29). The record reveals that on Friday, 14 January

1983, trial counsel, detailed defense counsel, and Mr.

Borchers had all appeared in the military judge's office in

Denver. At that time, Mr. Borchers confirmed his and Mr.

Walta’s willingness to represent petitioner contingent on

the trial court’s granting a six-month continuance to per-

mit them time to adequately prepare for this capital

murder trial. (R. 28-29, App. Ex. IV). The military judge

had requested that all parties appear in open court to

entertain the motion for a six month delay.

In support of the motion at trial on 18 January, the

defense cited the court to the following facts:

(1) that this case had been in the hands of at least two

civilian law enforcement authorities for over thirteen

months before the military assumed responsibility;

9

(2) that the military had opened an additional OSI

investigation that had been on-going for some six months;

(3) that the police investigation files were extensive

(200 pages, 70 witnesses, etc.) (App. Exs. XVI, XVIII);

(4) that detailed defense counsel had been involved in

this case only since the Article 32 investigation on 2-3

September 1982, and that the original trial date had been

scheduled for 13 December 1982, but delayed, over Gov-

ernment objection, until 10 January 1983;

(5) that defense requests for independent inves-

tigative services had been consistently denied before trial

and again at the opening session of trial;

(6) that the two civilian counsel were very experi-

enced in defending criminal cases including capital

murder cases, but they also had extensive trial dockets

and commensurate immediate time demands;

(7) that the two civilian counsel had volunteered to

represent petitioner pro bono, and thus had additional

responsibilities and demands, but also had a clear inten-

tion to zealously, competently and effectively represent

petitioner should they undertake his case, and that their

request for a six-month continuance was the minimum

time necessary to adequately prepare anew for both the

findings and potential sentencing portions of this capital

case.

(R. 29-43, App. Exs. X V-XIX).

The military judge denied counsel's request for a six

month continuance, but granted a continuance for three

months. (R. 43-44). Because they were denied what they

deemed to be minimally adequate time to exercise their

own, independent investigation and preparation, civilian

counsel were compelled to move to withdraw. That motion

was granted, and civilian counsel departed the court-

room. (R. 44-45).

Detailed military counsel'suggested that, in light of the

ruling granting a three-month continuance, trial on the

iU

merits could be held on 18 April 1983. As earlier repre-

sented, such time would permit petitioner adequate time

to save the needed $1500, and that, without such time,

detailed counsel would not be able to adequately repre-

sent petitioner. (R. 46). The military judge stated that the

recently-granted delay was only for the benefit of civilian

counsel. He refused to reconsider that position, and

denied the defense request to continue the case until 18

April 1983. (R. 46). Trial was then set for 28 February

1983.

After a recess, the military judge once again advised

petitioner of his right to individually-requested military

counsel. (R. 48-50). Petitioner repeatedly indicated his

desire to be represented by the ACLU lawyers, Borchers

and Walta, not by military counsel. Without ever receiv-

ing a positive indication from petitioner, the military

judge assumed appellant was satisfied with his detailed

counsel, and granted a three-day delay to permit peti-

tioner to attempt to secure representation. (R. 48-52).

The court-martial reconvened on 21 January 1983. Peti-

tioner did not have the money to hire civilian counsel, and

no other civil agency would agree to take his case. As of

that date, the ACLU remained willing to represent peti-

tioner if they were provided adequate time to prepare. (R.

54, Appellate Exhibit XX). The military judge refused to

reconsider his prior ruling. (R. 55). The petitioner stead-

fastly maintained his desire to be represented by civilian

counsel and his willingness to have his case delayed to

achieve that right. (R. 56).

The military judge responded by setting the trial date

for 28 February 1983, and directing detailed military

counsel to be prepared by then. (R. 56).

Petitioner’s court-martial was held from 28 February

1983 to 17 March 1983. He was convicted of a single

charge of premeditated murder under Article 118 of the

ll

Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §918), and

sentenced to be discharged from the United States Air

Force with a dishonorable discharge, to be confined at

hard labor for life, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to

be reduced to the rank of airman basic. The Air Force

Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sen-

tence on 16 January 1985. The Court of Military Appeals

granted review in petitioner's case!, but agreed with the

Air Force Court of Military Review that 18 U.S.C.

§3006A was inapplicable to military courts-martial. The

decision of the Court of Military Appeals was rendered on

4 August 1985, and the mandate from that Court was

issued on 20 August 1985.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

QUESTION ONE

The first question presented by petitioner raises the

substantial issue of the applicability of statutes, enacted

by Congress to protect the rights of defendants in federal

courts, to military courts-martial and the accused ser-

vicemen and servicewomen brought before these tri-

bunals.

It is clear from a reading of Article 36 of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice that Congress did intend to apply

these statutory safeguards to courts-martial in the

absence of a specific exception created by the President in

the exercise of his executive authority through provisions

of the Manual for Courts-Martial. Even such executive

exceptions were to be subject to Congressional review,

and could not contravene other provisions of the U.C.M.J.

1The Court of Military Appeals did not address the question of

whether petitioner was improperly denied the assistance of his

chosen civilian defense counsel.

12

Article 36, supra.2 The U.C.M.J., through Article 36 and

its history, and subsequent military legal interpretations

of that Code, thus clearly indicate a congressional intent

to conform military practice to that of federal district

courts, to an extent permitted by military exigencies.

In reviewing this issue, both the Court of Military

Appeals and the Air Force Court of Review cited United

States v. Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 47 C.M.R. 402

(1973), and United States v. Hutson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 487,

42 C.M.R. 39 (1970), for the proposition that 18 U.S.C.

3006A was inapplicable in military courts-martial. Nei-

ther of these decisions, however, weighed the

applicability of the statute to the military in light of Arti-

cle 36; both decisions instead simply pointed out that the

statute by its own terms specified that it was applicable to

federal district courts. When read in conjunction with

Article 36, the statute becomes applicable to courts-mar-

tial in the absence of a presidential declaration to the

contrary.

The Courts of Military Appeals and the Air Force Court

of Military Review recognized what they perceived to be

such an exception in paragraphs 115 and 116 of the Manual

for Courts-Martial (1969 Edition, Revised). These para-

graphs, however, merely provide (respectively) for the

equal access of the defense to known witnesses and evi-

dence, at the time of trial, and for the employment (by

either party) of an expert, again “during a trial.” As such,

neither of these Manual provisions represent the specific

2 See, generally: Hearings on H.R. 2498 before a Subcommittee of

the House Armed Services Committee, 81st Congress, Ist Session

(1949), reprinted in Index and Legislative History of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice (1949), at 756-757, 992-993, 1014-1019,

1061-1064; United States v. Jenkins, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 261, 22 C.M.R. 51

(1956).

3 United States v. Bruneau, 12 C.M.R. 718 (A. F.B.R. 1953).

13

exception to the procedures of the federal courts required

by Congress before the request for an investigation to

assist in the preparation of a defense, prior to trial, could

properly be denied.

Both Courts below also appeared to base their decision,

in part, on the fact that petitioner and his counsel declined

an invitation to accept a detailed military investigator in

lieu of the requested funds which would have enabled

petitioner to select and employ an investigator of his own

choosing. The Court of Military Appeals stated, for exam-

ple, that while, “as a matter of military due process, ser-

vicemembers are entitled to investigative or other expert

assistance when necessary for an adequate defense, with-

out regard to indigency . . . the military accused has the

resources of the Government at his disposal.” United

States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288, 290 (C.M.A. 1986). The

Court further stated that, “in the usual case,” these gov-

ernment services were “sufficient to permit the defense to

adequately prepare for trial.” /bid., at 291.

Such a conclusion ignores the fact that an investigator

normally employed by a prosecutorial arm of the govern-

ment, with his career controlled by others within such an

organization, can hardly be expected to render the inde-

pendent and enthusiastic investigative support to a

murder suspect that might be provided by a privately-

contracted expert. At least one federal court has

explicitly recognized this problem, holding that:

Just as an indigent defendant has a right to

appointed counsel to serve him as a loyal advocate he

has a similar right under properly proven circum-

stances to investigative aid that will service him

unfettered by an inescapable conflict of interest.

Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir.

1970).

14

As in Marshall, petitioner sought an ex parte proceed-

ing in accordance with the provisions of section 3006A, so

that he might demonstrate his need for investigative ser-

vices without having to make a “premature disclosure of

his case.” Marshall, supra, at 1318 (and citations

therein). He was denied the right even to make such a

preliminary record of necessity.

As this Honorable Court recently held in Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53

(1985), when the government

.. . brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent

defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take

steps to assure that the defendant has a fair oppor-

tunity to present his defense. This elementary princi-

ple, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental

fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot

be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a

defendant is denied the opportunity to participate

meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his

liberty is at stake.

470 U.S. at __, 105 S.Ct. at __., 84 L.Ed.2d at 61.4

A military accused facing death or life imprisonment at

the hands of a court-martial should be entitled to the same

due process of law and opportunities to protect his life and

liberty as is a defendant on trial in the federal district

courts of this nation. Such was the intent of Congress in

enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A ruling

for the petitioner in this case will insure uniform protec-

tion throughout the military services.

4 This Court’s decision in Ake, supra, has been held applicable to

military courts-martial. United States v. Davis, 22 M.J. 829

(N.M.C.M.R. 1986).

15

QUESTION TWO

Article 38(b), U.C.M.J. provides that an accused may

be represented by civilian counsel if provided by him. Two

civilian counsel appeared in open court and expressed

their willingness to represent petitioner, pro bono. Peti-

tioner had “provided” these counsel and was willing to pay

the “expense” in terms of time to retain them. The Gov-

ernment certainly could have used its alternative methods

to preserve its evidence and testimony by way of deposi-

tion and stipulations.

An accused's right to counsel of choice is not without its

limits. United States v. Montoya, 13 M.J. 268 (C.M.A.

1982); United States v. Saenz, 18 M.J. 327 (C.M.A. 1984).

Clearly, an accused cannot forever delay his trial by use of

this provision. United States v. Menoken, 14 M.J. 10

(C.M.A. 1982). Such, however, did not occur here. Peti-

tioner exercised this statutory right only after the mili-

tary judge denied his detailed counsel the investigative

assistance which they represented was necessary in order

to effectively present a defense. The military judge then

denied military counsel's request to withdraw once they

learned that they would be denied the tools required to

prepare for the defense of this capital case. When the

accused then entered into an attorney-client relationship

with his chosen civilian counsel, the military judge, in

effect, severed this relationship by denying these attor-

neys initial request for a delay which would have afforded

them a minimum of time in which to prepare petitioner's

defense.

Article 40, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. $840, provides that a

request for continuance should be granted upon a showing

of “reasonable cause.” Petitioner had established a rela-

tionship with counsel who were ready and willing to rep-

resent him against a capital murder charge. Their best

professional judgment and experience required them to

16

request six months in order to prepare in light of their

otherwise heavy dockets and the pro bono nature of this

case. The government had had over 19 months to prepare

for this case. Granting the continuance would have

extended the military’s handling of this case to less than

10 months. Detailed counsel stated on the record they

could not effectively represent petitioner. Civilian counsel

appeared and had the resources necessary to properly

undertake petitioner’s defense. Nevertheless, the mili-

tary judge granted a delay of only ninety days. The result

was that petitioner was forced to proceed to trial, repre-

sented by detailed counsel who had gone on record seek-

ing withdrawal due to their own inability to adequately

prepare. This request for civilian counsel was not due to

petitioner’s recalcitrance or procrastination, but rather

due to this military judge’s repeated refusal to provide

detailed counsel's request to enable them to effectively

represent this accused.

Having been denied his statutory right to independent

investigative assistance, petitioner simply sought to exer-

cise another statutory option—his right to civilian coun-

sel—which would have, as a matter of favorable

coincidence, rendered moot the military judge’s first

error. Had civilian counsel been granted a mere six-

months in order to familiarize themselves with an inves-

tigation already three times that old, involving three dif-

ferent investigative agencies, they could have provided

the investigative assistance and civilian representation

which the accused desired, and to which he was entitled

by law. Instead, he was forced to go on trial for his life,

unassisted by either an investigator, or by the counsel he

had lawfully selected to conduct his defense.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner submits that his petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted in order to fully examine the

17

crucial statutory and constitutional questions raised by

his own trial, and to safeguard the similar interests of

other military accuseds facing trial by courts-martial.

Respectfully submitted.

Leo L. SERGI

Colonel, Office of the Judge

Advocate General (OT JAG)

United States Air Force

HQ USAF/JAJD

Bldg 5683

Bolling AFB, DC 20332-6128

(202) 767-1562

Counsel of Record

and

CHARLES E. AMBROSE, JR.,

Major, OTJAG

United States Air Force

APPENDIX A

U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 51769/AF

ACM 24158.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEBR,

v.

BRIAN K. GARRIES, Airman First Class,

U.S. Air Force, APPELLANT.

Aug. 4, 1986

For Appellant: Luther C. West, Esq. (argued): Colonel

Leo L. Sergi and Major Conrad C. Baldwin, Jr. (on brief).

For Appellee: Capiain Joseph S. Kistler (argued);

Colonel Kenneth R. Rengert (on brief); Colonel Andrew J.

Adams, Jr., and Major Robert E. Ferencik.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COX, Judge:

The nude body of appellant’s pregnant wife, Airman

First Class Camille Garries, was discovered on June 15,

1981, in a ditch located in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The victim was in the seventh month of her pregnancy—

her death resulted in the asphyxiation of the female fetus.

A first degree murder charge was filed against appellant

in the El Paso County District Court. The trial court

granted a motion to suppress test results of stains found in

appellant’s car and family quarters at the U.S. Air Force

Academy, Colorado Springs. Upon interlocutory appeal

(la)

2a

by the prosecution, the trial court’s ruling was affirmed by

the Colorado Supreme Court. People v. Garries, 645 P.2d

1306 (Colo. 1982). The prosecution then filed a motion for

an order of Nolle Prosequi, which was granted.

The military assumed investigation of the case and

preferred a charge of premeditated murder. The Article

32, 10 U.S.C. § 832! investigation was conducted on Sep-

tember 2 and 3, 1982. The charge was referred as capital

and trial by general court-martial commenced on January

10, 1983.

Contrary to his pleas, appellant was convicted by a

panel of officer members of premeditated murder, in viola-

tion of Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10

U.S.C. §918. The sentence to confinement for life, total

forfeitures, reduction to E-1, and a dishonorable dis-

charge was approved by the convening authority. The

Court of Military Review affirmed. 19 M.J. 845 (1985).

This Court granted review of two issues:

I WHETHER APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY

DENIED INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE ASSIST-

ANCE.

Approximately 6 weeks before trial, detailed defense

counsel made a written request to the convening

authority for $1,500.00 with which to obtain an

“independent defense investigator.” This request was

denied. At the first session of trial, the request for fund-

ing of a defense investigator was renewed. The military

judge elicited from defense counsel that the defense had

been provided with all the investigative reports prepared

by civilian authorities, as well as the Air Force Office of

Special Investigations (OSI) and the Article 32 Inves-

tigating Officer. Also, the defense had been offered the

1 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 8382.

3a

services of an Air Force investigator who would work

under an order of confidentiality. The defense’s refusal of

this offer was reiterated at trial.

Defense counsel refused to particularize in open court

the need for the requested sum of $1,500.00, asking for an

ex parte hearing. The military judge denied the request

for the $1,500.00, as well as the request for an ex parte

hearing. The defense then requested a continuance of 3

months so appellant could save $1,500.00. This request

was also denied. .

Although the purpose was not revealed at trial, it

became apparent after trial that defense counsel

requested the $1,500.00 to pay for the release of an inves-

tigative report that had already been prepared by a pri-

vate investigator hired by appellant’s attorney in the state

court proceedings. The defense did not know what the

report contained until after trial, when the civilian

attorney who represented appellant post-trial obtained

the investigation.

Appellant contends that the military judge erred in two

respects: by ruling on his request for investigative assist-

ance without first conducting an ex parte hearing as pro-

vided in 18 U.S.C. §3006A(e) and by denying his request

for investigative assistance. We disagree. The provisions

of 18 U.S.C. §3006A concern representation of indigent

defendants in federal district courts and are inapplicable

to the military. United States v. Johnson. 22 U.S.C.M.A.

424, 47 C.M.R. 402 (1973); Hutson v. United States, 19

U.S.C.M.A. 437, 42 C.M.R. 39 (1970).

Nevertheless, as a matter of military due process, ser-

vicemembers are entitled to investigative or other expert

assistance when necessary for an adequate defense, with-

out regard to indigency. Cf United States v. Mustafa, 22

M.J. 165 (C.M.A. 1986) (accused entitled to access to

qualified psychiatrist for purpose of presenting insanity

4a

defense); United States v. Toledo, 15 M.J. 255 (C.M.A.

1983) (accused entitled to transcript of witness’ prior tes-

timony). Unlike the civilian defendant, however, the mili-

tary accused has the resources of the Government at his

disposal. See Art. 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846; para. 116,

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised

edition); R.C.M. 703(d), Manual for Courts-Martial,

United States, 1984. In the usual case, the investigative,

medical, and other expert services available in the mili-

tary are sufficient to permit the defense to adequately

prepare for trial.

When an accused applies for the employment of an

expert, he must demonstrate the necessity for the ser-

vices. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 53, 105 S.Ct. 1087,

84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985); United States v. Johnson, supra;

para. 116, Manual, 1969, swpra; R.C.M. 703(d). in this

case, the defense refused to make a showing of necessity

on the record. Furthermore, the offer to trial defense

counsel of the services of an Air Force investigator who

would work under an order of confidentiality may have

been a viable alternative to requiring the convening

authority to fund a private investigator. Cf’ United States

v. Simmons, 44 C.M.R. 804, 811 (A.C.M.R. 1971), pet.

denied, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 628, 44 C.M.R. 940 (1972) (CID

not obligated to investigate for defense); Marshall v.

United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970) (desig-

nation of FBI to investigate for defense poses conflict-of-

interest dilemma).

Appellant had been provided with the voluminous

reports of investigation conducted by civilian authorities,

by the OSI, and by the Article 32 Investigating Officer.

Because appellant’s request for funds to obtain inves-

tigative services did not explain why an investigator was

._ needed, what the investigator would do, and why

appellant’s two detailed defense counsel and their staff

5a

could not perform any additional investigative work

needed, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in

denying the request. See United States v. Goodwin, 770

F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. , 106

S.Ct. 858, 88 L. Ed.2d 897 (1986); United States v. Davis,

582 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99

S.Ct. 2408, 60 L. Ed.2d 1067 (1979); United States v. Har-

ris, 542 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976); U nited States v. Mundt,

508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949,

95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).

Appellant contends that the military judge’s refusal to

grant an ex parte hearing precluded him from establish-

ing the necessity for independent investigative services

without revealing defense tactics to the prosecution.

Even now, however, appellant’s only explanation of why an

investigator was necessary is the generalization that the

case was referred as capital. It is apparent that the

defense was not seeking further investigation, but pay-

ment for a report, contents unknown, that had already

been prepared without prior authorization. In the

absence of previous authorization for an expert, the Man-

ual specifically provides that payment will be made for

“ordinary witness fees” only. Therefore, it is difficult to

visualize how the defense would have benefited from

imparting its true purpose for the $1,500.00 at an ex parte

hearing.

Although appellant has provided no authority for the

use of ex parte proceedings in the military, we recognize

inherent authority in the military judge to permit such a

2 An ex parte proceeding is one requested by one party without

notice or presence of the opposing party.

3 See para. 116, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969

(Revised edition); R.C.M. 703(d), Manual for Courts-Martial, United

States, 1984.

6a

procedure in the unusual circumstance where it is neces-

sary to insure a fair trial. By its very nature, however, an

ex parte proceeding may provide undue advantage to one

party. Cf. United States v. Wilkerson, 1 M.J. 56, 57 n.1

(C.M.A. 1975). Use of an ex parte hearing to obtain expert

services would rarely be appropriate in the military con-

text because funding must be provided by the convening

authority and such a procedure would deprive the Govern-

ment of the opportunity to consider and arrange alter-

natives for the requested expert services. See United

States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett,

C.J., concurring in the result).

In any event, the sought-after investigative report was

obtained after trial and discussed in the petition for new

trial and in allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

We are convinced that appellant was not prejudiced in

preparing his defense by the lack of this report.

Il WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY

FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENSE MOTION TO

SUPPRESS BLOOD STAIN EVIDENCE WHICH WAS

CONSUMED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN TESTING

BEFORE TRIAL WITHOUT ANY PROCEDURAL

SAFEGUARDS TO INSURE INDEPENDENT

DEFENSE TESTING OR VERIFICATION.

At his court-martial, as he did at his trial in state court,

appellant sought to suppress results of laboratory tests

performed on stains found in his on-base quarters and in

his car. The stains were consumed in routine testing con-

ducted at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) labo-

ratory. Mr. Roy Tubergen, the forensic serologist who

performed the testing, testified that one trunk liner was

stained with human blood, identified as type B, enzyme

PGM 2-1.4 The other stains were also found to be human

4 The victim had group B, enzyme type PGM 2-1 blood.

7a

blood, but the stains were of insufficient size to permit

grouping by blood type.

Under prevailing Colorado law, the evidence was ruled

inadmissible because the samples were destroyed in test-

ing for the prosecution without any measure being taken

to permit appellant’s expert to be present or to verify the

results. 645 P.2d at 1308. That state court ruling does not

bind the Government in this case because the United

States was not a party to that proceeding. Cf United

States v. Fuentes, 18 M.J. 41, 51(C.M.A. 1984) (findings in

one trial not binding in another where parties are dif-

ferent).

We believe this case is controlled by California v. Trom-

betta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413

(1984), made applicable to the military by United States v.

Kern, 22 M.J. 49 (C.M.A. 1986). In Trombetta, the

Supreme Court held that breath-analysis tests are

admissible in criminal trials even though the state fails to

preserve the breath samples of suspected drunk drivers

for independent defense testing. The constitutional and

military-due-process duty to preserve evidence is limited

to that which, (1) “possess[es] an exculpatory value that

was apparent before” it “was destroyed, and” (2) is “of

such a nature that the” accused “would be unable to obtain

comparable evidence by other reasonably available

means.” 467 U.S. at 489, 104S.Ct. at 2534; 22 M.J. at 51.

The accused has the burden of showing that evidence

which “is not ‘apparently exculpatory’” was of “an

exculpatory value that was or should have been apparent

to the Government before it was . . . destroyed and” that

“comparable evidence” is unavailable. United States v.

Kern, supra at 51-52. Appellant has not met that burden

here.

First, as in Trombetta, there was no hint of bad faith on

the part of the Government. In fact, the military judge

8a

found no evidence of negligence, bad faith, or misconduct

on the part of the laboratory personnel. Second, appellant

had other means available to attack the test results. The

forensic serologist who conducted the tests testified and

was available for full cross-examination. The defense was

free to challenge the test results by attacking the

reliability of the testing procedures and the competence

and credibility of the testing official through cross-exam-

ination and through testimony of its own expert. Finally,

there is no indication that the stains were “apparently

exculpatory” before they were consumed in testing or that

preservation of the stains would have benefited the

defense.® The defense expert conceded the scientific

validity of the tests and did not challenge the decision to

conduct these tests rather than others.

Under Article 46, the defense is entitled to equal access

to all evidence, whether or not it is apparently

exculpatory. United States v. Kern, supra. Thus, the bet-

ter practice is to inform the accused when testing may

consume the only available samples and permit the

defense an opportunity to have a representative present.

Under the circumstances of this case, however, we find no

prejudice.® Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a).

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of

Military Review is affirmed.

Chief Judge EVERETT concurs.

Judge SULLIVAN did not participate.

5 Prosecution exhibit 8, one of the stair treads, was found to contain

“human blood” with “inconclusive” group B indications by the FBI

testing. At the time of trial, still remaining on the exhibit were

several “very suspicious” stains which the defense expert testified

would lead him to test further “for the presence of blood.”

6 If the testing had been done by the military or at its request, a

different result might be required. In that situation, it would be

difficult to excuse the failure to provide notice to the defense.

EF

9a

APPENDIX B

U.S. AIR FORCE COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW.

ACM 24158.

UNITED STATES

v.

Airman First Class BRIAN K. GARRIES,

FR 093-54-3705, United States

Air Force.

Sentence Adjudged 17 March 1983.

Decided 16 Jan. 1985.

Appellant Counsel for the Accused: Messrs. William

Reynard, Sander Karp and David Miller, Denver, Colo-

rado, Colonel Leo L. Sergi, and Major Conrad C. Bald-

win, Jr.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel Ken-

neth R. Rengert, Major Robert E. Ferencik, Jr., and

Major Kevin L. Daugherty.

Before FORAY, SNYDER, and O’HAIR, Appellate

Military Judges.

DECISION AND ORDER

SNYDER, Judge:

During mid morning on 13 June 1981 at the United

States Air Force Academy, the accused observed his next

door neighbor, Sergeant Carstensen, wearing what he

thought to be a very funny hat. The accused prevailed

upon Carstensen to go inside the accused’s quarters so his

wife, Airman Camille Garries, could also see the hat.

Camille Garries was in the bathroom and only her head

10a

was visible to Carstensen as she looked around the bath-

room door and smiled. Other than the accused, Sgt. Car-

stensen was the last known person to see Camille Garries

alive. Her nude body was found on 15 June 1981 ina ditch

near Colorado Springs, Colorado, the victim of blunt force

trauma to her head. She also had superficial stab wounds

which the pathologist opined were used to intentionaly

inflict pain. As a result of her death, the seven month

female fetus with which she was pregnant asphyxiated.

The accused was convicted by general court-martial of

the premeditated murder of his wife, Camille Garries,

and sentenced to life imprisonment and accessory penal-

ties.! Appellate Defense Counsel have submitted 17

assignments of error and a Petition For New Trial for our

consideration. Having scrutinized all assignments of

error, and the evidence at trial, we find no prejudice to the

substantial rights of the accused and affirm.

Because of her pregnancy, the victim planned to sepa-

rate from the Air Force near the end of June 1981. Due to

marital discord, she planned to separate from the accused

and return to her home in Macon, Georgia, where she

would have her baby. Expecting her arrival on 26 June

1981, her father had made an appointment for her with a

local physician. There was evidence that the accused had

voiced his displeasure over these plans. All with whom the

victim frequently associated testified that the victim gave

no indication of an intent to depart the area before 26 June

1981.

On 13 June 1981, however, the victim had simpler plans.

She had an appointment to have her hair done at either

1300 or 1330 hours. She confirmed her appointment via

telephone between 1100 and 1130 hours. During a phone

conversation with a friend, Mrs. B, between 1130 and

1 The charge was referred to trial as a capital offense.

lla

1200 hours, she said she would drop by for a visit after her

hair appointment.

Between approximately 1500 and 1530 hours, 13 June

1981, Lieutenant, then Sergeant, Duke received a cali

from the accused. He related that the victim had left him,

that he was hurting emotionally, and asked Lt Duke to

come over. Upon arrival, the accused stated he had last

seen the victim at 1100 hours when he left to go for a walk

to cool off after an argument between him and the victim.

He said he found a note, the gist of which was, she was

tired of the accused, tired of the Air Force, and she was

leaving. Stating that he had burned the note, the aecused

showed Lt Duke ashes on the stove. After being shown

the bedroom and giving the accused advice on how to

protect himself from a deserting wife, i.e., cancelling

credit cards, etc., Lt Duke departed around 1800 or 1830

hours. Lt Duke also related that he had been in the

accused's basement a few days before the victim’s death.

Duke needed some two-by-fours and the accused had

some which the accused said he could have. Lt Duke

stated that he did not take all of the two-by-fours.

A number of neighborhood residents encountered the

accused during the afternoon of 13 June 1981. To approx-

imately two he related that the victim had left him. When

asked by another how was the victim, he replied simply, “I

haven’t seen her.” To others he asked if they knew of any

secluded areas where he could camp out with an unnamed

woman. He did tell one person he wanted to camp out with

the victim. Everyone he asked recommended either

Stanley Canyon, the Garden Of The Gods, or both.

Around 2330 hours, 13 June 1981, the accused observed

the Carstensens returning home and asked Sgt Car-

stensen to assist him in opening the trunk of his auto-

mobile, for he had lost the key some time ago. His car was

in the carport at the time. Being tired from a full day’s

12a

activities, Carstensen said he would do it the next day.

The accused offered help in carrying the sleeping children

from the car to their bedrooms. Mrs. Carstensen asked

how was the victim and the accused replied, “fine.” At

approximately 0150 hours, 14 June 1981, Mrs. Carstensen

answered a knock at her door. It was the accused, and he

appeared upset and in tears. He asked her if she had seen

the victim, stating that he had looked for her at a local

night club and an apartment house. While at he door, Mrs.

Carstensen noted the accused’s car parked in the parking

island rather than the carport.

At approximately 0900 hours, 14 June 1984, the Car-

stensens were still asleep when the accused knocked on

the door. He wanted Carstensen to help get his car trunk

open. The car was in the carport. Since the victim had

“left him,” the accused wanted to start moving out of his

quarters. After being unsuccessful at entering by remov-

ing the back seat, Carstensen opened the trunk by remov-

ing the lock and inserting a screwdriver and turning it as

if turning a key. He showed the accused how to employ

that method. He then assisted the accused in cleaning out

the trunk, including driving the accused to the auto hobby

shop where they vacuumed out the trunk.? On the return

home, the accused had Carstensen drive over a number of

dirt roads because he was “curious” about them. Upon

arrival at their quarters, the accused ask him to back the

car into the carport. Because they were not successful in

cleaning the trunk thoroughly, the accused asked for

something with which to cover the trunk’s floor. Car-

stensen provided a plastic mattress container/cover from

a single bed mattress.

2The accused knew how to drive an automobile but, for some

reason not disclosed at trial, he did not posses a current license.

13a

At aproximately 0930 hours, 14 June 1981, the accused

saw SSgt Green mowing his lawn. He said he had a prob-

lem and wanted to talk. He asked Green if he knew where

he could hide a body, providing a facetious reason about a

“queer” he was going to “waste” if he did not stop bother-

ing him. Green did not take him seriously. Stating he

wanted to camp out with a young lady, the accused asked

how to get to Stanley Canyon. Despite Green's protesta-

tions of being pressed for time, the accused insisted that

he take him to Stanley Canyon. While at Stanley Canyon

the accused did not appear to be looking for a campsite,

but was always looking down.

During early afternoon, 14 June 1981, another airman

saw the accused walking and gave him a ride. After telling

the accused he was headed to the gym to play basketball,

the accused decided he would come along. After playing

basketball, they went to the noncomissioned Officers

Open Mess for about an hour. While driving the accused

home, the accused asked how to get to the Garden Of The

Gods. The airman gave the accused directions, including

driving out of the Academy’s gates and showing the

accused how to access Interstate Highway 25. The vic-

tim’s body was found not far from Garden Of The Gods

Road.

When he returned home between 1630 and 1700 hours,

Carstensen noticed that the accused’s car was in the car-

port front first and he was washing the car. Believing the

victim to be gone, the Carstensens invited the accused to

have supper with them on 14 June 1981. The accused was

back and forth between his quarters and the Carsten-

sens, and he acted edgy, pacing between the windows.

Stating that he did not want to stay in his quarters with

the victim gone, he asked, and was permitted, to spend

the night with the Carstensens. Interestingly, the victim

had moved out for approximately two weeks in May 1981,

l4a

but the accused never asked the Carstensens if he could

spend the night.

The accused “slept” the entire night of 14 June at the

Carstensens’. However, he called the victim’s father at

approximately 0110 hours (MDT), 15 June 1981, and

asked if he had seen the victim. He told the victim's father

she had left walking at 1100 hours Saturday because he

had taken the car keys from her. He also said that she

wore her jean skirt. Telephone records reflect that this

call was made from the accused's quarters.

Mrs. Carstensen did not hear the sound of a car engine

during the evening of 14 June 1981. However, the drive-

ways from the carports are sloped. The accused came over

between 0730 and 0800 hours on 15 June 1981, to use their

phone because he was late for work. He asked her what

time was the garbage picked up, and she told him on

Monday mornings. Between 1600 and 1630 hours, 15 June

1981, the accused was washing his car again.

On 15 June 1981, the accused filed a missing person

report on the victim. This information was provided to

investigators of the E] Paso County, Colorado Sheriffs

Department, who had assumed investigative jurisdiction

after the victim’s body was found in the interim. The

investigation up to that point had indicated it was unlikely

the victim was slain where she was found. After identi-

fication of the victim by the accused, investigators accom-

panied him to his quarters. The accused related

information to the investigators similar to what he told Lt

Duke, stating the only items victim took with her were

$600.00 which he kept in a drawer for emergency use, and

a favorite denim skirt which presumedly she wore. How-

ever, Mrs. B, Mrs. BT, and the victim’s father, all opined

that victim’s advanced pregnancy precluded her from

wearing that particular skirt.

Investigation of the quarters revealed neither signs of a

forced entry nor a struggle. The master bedroom con-

15a

tained what appeared to be all of victim’s belongings,

including her purse, her military identification card, and

her spectacles, without which she had very poor vision.

Further inquiry revealed what appeared to be blood spat-

ters on some of the basement steps.

While investigators were searching the accused’s quar-

ters, he told Mrs. Carstensen, “You know I didn’t do it

because I was with you all weekend.”

A search of the accused’s automobile revealed an appar-

ent blood stain on the latching device of the trunk. Also

seized was a piece of fibrous material attached to a screw

which had secured the lining to the trunk’s floor. Inves-

tigators also observed that portions of the accused’s car

apparently had been washed, but not the entire car. Also

noted was the fact that the trunk was much cleaner than

the interior.

On 17 June 1981, Carstensen asked accused if he could

have the mattress cover back. The accused said he had

thrown it away in the garbage. While looking for the

mattress cover, Carstensen noticed two items in his trash

can. Responding to his phone call, investigators removed

two pieces of cardboard which appeared to be trunk

liners. The accused’s car did not contain any trunk lining

when it was searched. Although he could not state with

certainty, Carstensen believed the accused’s trunk had

liners when they cleaned it on 14 June 1981. Microscopic

examination of the fibrous material taken from the

accused’s car trunk and one of the cardboard pieces

revealed that they were, at one time, one piece. The trunk

lining contained human blood stains.

I

Appellate Defense Counsel aver that the court-martial

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense, their

primary contention being that the victim was not killed on

16a

the installation. See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S.

355, 91 S.Ct. 649, 28 L.Ed.2d 102 (1971); O’Callahan v.

Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1688, 23 L.Ed.2d 291

(1969). The military judge made extensive findings of fact

in his ruling that the court did have jurisdiction. His

findings are more than supported by the evidence of rec-

ord and are fully accepted. The charged offense was

clearly service-connected. Relford v. Commandant,

supra. Additionally, the factfinders were instructed that

one of the elements they had to find beyond a reasonable

doubt was that the victim was killed at the United States

Air Force Academy. Their verdict reflects their factual

finding that the victim was killed on the installation.

Accordingly, the offense was service-connected. Relford

v. Commandant, supra; see United States v. Williams, 17

M.J. 207 (C.M.A.1984).

II

The next assertion of error is that the military judge

erred in directing a reconstruction of the record. We

disagree. During the latter portion of the direct examina-

tion of Sgt Carstensen, the recording equipment malfunc-

tioned for approximately five minutes. As a result the last

portion of his direct testimony and a brief portion of his

cross-examination were not recorded. After being

informed of the malfunction by the court reporter, the

trial judge excused the members for the remainder of the

day. He directed the reporter to transcribe what she had

on tape so that a determination could be made on the

missing testimony. He also directed a reconstruction.

The reconstruction was accomplished by using trial and

defense counsel’s notes?, the testimony which was, in fact,

3 Counsel had not prepared verbatim questions for their respective

examinations, but had outlined the specific areas to be covered Cf.

United States v. Lashley, 14 M.J. 7 (C.M.A. 1982).

17a

recorded, and the assistance of the witness, Sgt Car-

stensen. The trial judge checked the product of counsel's,

the reporter’s, and Carstensen’s efforts against his per-

sonal and copious notes which he had amassed during the

course of the trial to that point. He found that there was

no doubt that the substance of the unrecorded testimony

had been reconstructed if not the exact words. All parties

to the trial concurred with the trial judge’s finding. How-

ever, as a result of his thorough review of the applicable

precedents of this Court and the Court of Military

Appeals, he directed that Carstensen reiterate the por-

tion of his testimony which was lost. notwithstanding

objections by both trial and defense counsel. See United

States v. English, 50 C.M.R. 825 (A.F.C.M.R.1975); cf

United States v. Hensley, 7 M.J. 740 (A.F.C.M.R.1979),

pet. denied, 8 M.J. 42 (1980). He also informed trial

defense counsel that he would not be limited to the bound-

aries of his original cross-examination.

Except where specifically provided, records of trials by

general court-martial are required to be verbatim. Arti-

cle 54(a), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §854(a); Manual for

Courts-Martial, 1969 (Rev.), para. 826. This requirement

has been interpreted to mean substantially verbatim.

United states v. Lashley, 14 M.J. 7 (C.M.A.1982); United

States v. Nelson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 13 C.M.R. 338

(1953). Whether reconstructed testimony impacts the

verbatim nature of the record depends on whether the

omission is substantial or insubstantial. United States v.

Gray, 7 M.J. 296 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Sturdi-

vant, 1 M.J. 256 (C.M.A.1976). Substantial omissions may

be qualitative as well as quantitative. United States v.

Lashley, supra. However, the omitted material may be

sufficiently retrievable so that the record can be salvaged

and pronounced substantially verbatim. United States v.

Eichenlaub, 11 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.1981).

18a

The reconstructed testimony consists of five legal

pages. Sgt Carstensen was, without doubt, a crucial wit-

ness; thus, the omission, albeit brief, is qualitatively sub-

stantial. However, due to the prompt and thorough action

of the trial judge, not the least of which was directing

reiteration of the unrecorded testimony, this record is, in

fact, substantially verbatim, and we so hold. With the

exception of preserved verbatim questions of counsel, the

same unusual combination of factors which preserved the

verbatim nature of the Lashley record also preserved the

record of the instant case. United States v. Lashley;

United States v. Eichenlaub, both supra.

Even were we to find that a presumption of prejudice

arose from the omission, the Government has more than

rebutted the presumption. See United States v. Hensley,

supra. Additionally, we find no prejudice by virtue of the

trial judge directing the witness to reiterate the unre-

corded testimony. Promptly reiteratng unrecorded testi-

mony is no more remarkable than the court’s recalling of a

witness or having the transcript read in lieu of recalling a

witness. 4

III

Appellate Defense Counsel also assert that the accused

was denied his right to civilian counsel. We find as a

matter of fact that he was not. After being advised of his

right to counsel and his options thereunder, United States

4 The trial judge asked trial defense counsel if he concurred that

the unrecorded testimony had been substantially reconstructed

rather than asking the aceused directly. Appellate defense counsel

contend that the requirement of a verbatim record is a personal right

of the accused which only he can waive, as opposed to a statutory

requirement which does not confer individual rights. Our disposition

of this issue renders it unnecessary to address it, although we have

significant doubt as to its validity.

19a

v. Donohew, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 149, 39 C.M.R. 149 (1969),

the accused indicated that he desired representation by

civilian counsel. Detailed military defense counsel

advised that the accused had consulted with a named

civilian counsel associated with the American Civil Liber-

ties Union (ACLU), but that he was presently unavailable

for a personal appearance. The trial judge granted a seven

day continuance so that civilian counsel could make a

personal appearance.

When proceedings resumed, Mr. B advised that he was

willing to represent the accused, but he would require a

continuance of six months. The reasons proffered for

requesting six months were that their prior experience

with capital cases indicated that highly extensive prepa-

ration, including investigation, was required; that they

were involved with other cases and that their prior docket

was inflexible; and, since they would be represerting the

accused pro bono, they needed to generate income via

other cases.

After making detailed findings, the trial judge con-

cluded that:

Civilian counsel cannot with any particularity

explain to this court why one-half a year is the exact

time period needed to accurately prepare for this

case. . . lamalso satisfied that some time period less

than six months will give the four defense counsel

ample opportunity to prepare a defense in this case.

Based on the nature of the charged offense, and with

an attempt to exercise caution in this area, I will

grant a defense requested delay for a period of three

months.

At this point, civilian counsel requested permission to

withdraw from the case, stating they absolutely required

six months. The trial judge granted their request to with-

draw. Pursuant to the accused’s expressed desire to seek

20a

out other civilian counsel who might represent him pro

bono, the trial judge granted an additional three day

continuance. At the next session on 21 January 1983, the

accused stated that the ACLU was still his only recourse

to free civilian counsel. The trial judge considering that

issue resolved, directed that the proceedings resume on

28 February 1983.

A request for a continuance of the proceedings may be

made by either party thereto and should be granted upon

a showing of reasonable cause. Article 40, U.C.M.J., 10

U.S.C. § 840; M.C.M, para. 580. The granting or denial of

a request for a continuance is an interlocutory question.

M.C.M., paras, 57, 58b. As such, the ruling of the trial

judge will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discre-

tion which results in prejudice to the substantial rights of

the accused. United States v. Menoken, 14 M.J. 10

(C.M.A.1982); United States v. Henry, 1 M.J. 533

(A.F.C.M.R.1975).

The military judge is required to weigh whether the

issues are simple or complex, United States v. Abilar, 14

M.J. 733 (A.F.C.M.R.1982), pet. denied, 15 M.J. 324

(1983), and liberally assess their merits in reaching his

decision. United States v. Henry, supra. The trial judge

may also balance the impact of a continuance upon the

availability of witnesses, including the logistics of bring-

ing witnesses from distant locations. United States v.

Lambert, 17 M.J. 773 (A. F.C.M.R.1983), pet. denied, 18

M.J. 127 (1984).

We find and hold that the trial judge in the instant case

did not abuse his broad discretion. He needed no

reminder that the accused was on trial for his life. The

accused’s desires were balanced against the fact that the

offense had occurred almost two years earlier, the Gov-

ernment faced the necessity of bringing witnesses from

other locations, including foreign countries, and the time

21a

and preparatory effort already expended by his two

detailed military defense counsel. After doing so, he

determined that three months constituted a reasonable

continuance for civilian counsel to adequately prepare for

trial.

After reviewing the basis for the trial judge’s decision,

we find no abuse of discretion. His actions were eminently

reasonable. |

IV

The accused next complains that he was improperiy

denied investigative assistance. Trial defense counsel

applied to the convening authority for disbursement of

$1,500.00 with which to retain investigative assistance,

citing Article 46, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 846, as authority.

The request was denied and trial defense counsel renewed

it via a motion at trial. As an alternative to the motion, the

defense requested the trial judge to hold an ex parte

hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. This apparently was an

attempt to bring the proceedings within the parameters

of 18 U.S.C. §3006A. The trial judge denied the motion.

In denying the motion, the trial judge referenced the

fact that 18 U.S.C. §3006A° is inapplicable to trials by

court-martial, and the fact that the defense had received

full access to all governmental investigative reports, ete.

He did not end the matter there, however; for he also

advised the defense that he would direct the assignment

of an Air Force investigator® to the defense who would

518 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) reads in part as follows:

(1) Upon Request. Counsel for a person who is financially unable

to obtain investigative . . . services necessary for an adequate

defense may request them in an ex parte application. .. .

6 Presumably an Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSD

special agent.

22a

work under a court order of confidentiality. The defense

declined the proffer of the Air Force investigator.”

As noted by the trial judge, 18 U.S.C. §3006A is inap-

plicable in trials by court-martial. United States v.

Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 47 C.M.R. 402 (1973);

United States v. Hutson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 42 C.M.R.

39 (1970). However, in an effort to ameliorate this fact,

appellate defense counsel aver that due process compelled

the granting of the motion if not the statutory provision,

as well as M.R.E. 706(a).

During oral argument appellate defense counsel again

argued vigorously for de facto application of 18 U.S.C.

§3006A via the due process route. One facet of their

reasoning is that to be constitutionally effective as

required by the Sixth Amendment, defense counsel must

be independent; and, the ex parte hearing is a means of

preserving that independence by allowing trial defense

counsel to justify requests for an investigator without

divulging potential witnesses or other defense tactics in

the presence of the prosecution. Consequently, appellate

defense counsel argue, the denial of the ex parte hearing

deprived trial defense counsel of that independence and,

in effect, strapped trial defense counsel's hands, thereby

rendering them ineffective. The argument fails, primarily

because of two reasons.

First, courts-martial are creatures of statute. Their

parameters are established by Congress. Ex parte hear-

ings simply are not authorized. See United States v.

7The defense also requested as an alternative, a three month

continuance so that the accused could save $1,500.00 of his personal

funds. It appears that the money was requested for an investigative

report already accomplished rather than for an investigator. A local

private investigator had apparently been retained by the accused

during civilian proceedings, but would not release the report because

of nonpayment of the fee.

23a

Wilkerson, 1 M.J. 56, 57 n. 1; United States v. Dean, 13

M.J. 676 (A. F.C.M.R, 1982). Prior to the Military Justice

Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968), only

limited matters could be handled outside the hearing of

the members, and these were authorized only in general

courts-martial. United States v. Baca, 16 U.S.C.M.A.

311, 36 C.M.R. 467 (1966). The only provision of the

Military Justice Act of 1968 which authorizes out-of-court

hearings is Article 39(a), and it specifically requires the

presence of trial counsel as well as defense counsel and the

accused. Article 39(a), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §839(a);

M.C.M. paras. 53d, 579(2). Since 18 U.S.C. §3006A is

part of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub.L. No.

88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), we must assume that Congress

was well aware of its existence during the revision of the

Military Justice Act of 1950 and easily could have included

a similar provision in the 1968 Act.®

Second, that part of the statute which authorizes funds

for services other than counsel, 7.e., investigative ser-

vices, 18 U.S.C. §3006A(e), is procedural. In fact, its very

terms reflect it to be a matter of legislative grace rather

than a fundamental right. See United States v. Ray, 367

F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 913, 87

S.Ct. 863, 17 L. Ed.2d 785 (1967). Again, we must assume

that had Congress seen fit, it could have included similar

8 During oral argument, appellate defense counsel also relied on

the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Criminal Jus-

tice, Providing Defense Services, Standard 1.5, because some of

those standards have been adopted for Air Force courts-martial.

However, Air Force Manual 111-1 (2 July 1973). Military Justice

Guide, para. 1-11, provides that standards inconsistent with the

U.C.M.J. are not applicable. That is why Standard 1.5 dealing with

supporting services is applicable only in principle. USAF Judiciary

Special Subject Letter No. 49, ABA Standards for The Administra-

tion of Criminal Justice, (JAJ 82-3), 16 February 1982.

24a

provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. One

obvious reason why Congress did not do so is because it

chose other means to protect an accused's access to evi-

dence which may aid in preparing a defense.

Unlike the civilian sector, Congress has specifically

provided that the prosecution and defense have equal

access to witnesses and other evidence. Article 46,

U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §846; M.C.M. para. 115. Addi-

tionally, the Article 32, 10 U.S.C. §832 Investigation

exists primarily as a discovery tool for the accused as well

as a barrier against groundless charges. Further, an

accused enjoys extensive rights of discovery under mili-

tary practice. United States v. Franchia, 13 U.S.C.M.A.

315, 32 C.M.R. 315 (1962); M.C.M. para. 115c. The means

to ferret out evidence are clearly provided an accused.

Consequently, military procedures accomplish the same

purpose as 18 U.S.C. §3006A, which is ensuring an

accused is able to prepare for trial.

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying

the motion. Trial defense counsel offered no cogent rea-

sons why an Air Force investigator working under court

ordered confidentiality could not serve their purposes.

See United States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 40

C.M.R. 39 (1969), and the trial judze’s order therein

which predated M.C.M. para. 121 and M.R.E. 302. The

order of confidentiality would have prevented defense

leads from turning into possible evidence against the

accused. Cf Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315

(10th Cir.1970) (reversible error where trial judge

directed FBI to investigate defense leads and witness

found as a result of defense request eventually testified

against the defendant). In fact, trial defense counsel’s

declination of the Air Force investigator bordered on

waiving the issue for appellate review. See M.R.E. 103(a).

We find that the accused was not denied fair oppor-

tunity to prepare for trial or equal access to evidence and

25a

witnesses. See M.C.M. paras. 115, 116; United States v.

Johnson, supra.

V

Appellate defense counsel also contend that the mili-

tary judge erred in not granting the Motion To Suppress

Blood Samples. The assignment of error has two prongs;

(1) Admitting the blood samples violated the accused's

rights to due process and (2) The samples lacked rele-

vancy to the charged offense.

As mentioned in the facts, El Paso County, Colorado

investigators discovered what appeared to be blood stains

on some of the basement steps of the accused’s quarters,

and on certain areas of the trunk of the accused’s car. The

front portion of the affected steps, called stair treads,

were removed with hammer and chisel. So was the latch-

ing device of the trunk. These items, along with the trunk

liners, the screw and fibrous material, and a sample of the

victim’s blood, were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) Laboratory in Washington, District

of Columbia, for analysis.

The stains on all of the items but one stair tread were

consumed by the test procedures employed at the FBI

laboratory. No photographs were taken either of the tests

or the test results. Neither was there any representative

of the accused present.

Criminal proceedings for the victim’s murder were ini-

tially brought in the E] Paso County, Colorado District

Court. However, the Motion To Suppress the blood sam-

ple evidence was granted because the Court ruled that the

Government had destroyed potentially exculpatory evi-

dence via the FBI testing. This ruling was affirmed on

interlocutory appeal by the Colorado Supreme Court. See

People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306 (Col.1982). Con-

sequently, proceedings in the District Court ended via

26a

nolle prosequi. Subsequently, charges were preferred

under the U.C.M.J.

Appellate defense counsel submit various arguments,

including collateral estoppel, to support their contention

that the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court should

have been binding upon the court-martial. The matter

need not detain us. The United States was not a party to

the state proceedings against the accused. Thus, a Colo-

rado court decision thereon is not binding on a military

court.

On the substantive issue, the military judge found spe-

cifically that all tests were conducted in good faith and in

accordance with accepted scientific procedures—a fact

conceded by a defense expert witness—and with no

intent to withhold or destroy potentially exculpatory evi-

dence. The trial judge’s findings are amply supported by

the evidence and are accepted. Therefore, since the FBI

forensic serologist was available for full cross-examina-

- tion, California v. Trombetta, U.S. , 104 S.Ct.

2528, 80 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), and United States v. Frost,

19 M.J. 509 (A.F.C. M.R.1984) are dispositive of the issue.

We turn now to the issue of relevancy.

Doctor B, the forensic pathologist who examined the

victim at the scene of her discovery and performed the

autopsy, concluded that the victim was not slain at the

scene of her discovery. Mr. T, the FBI forensic serologist,

conducted the testing of the items sent to the FBI labora-

tory. His test results revealed the presence of blood stains

on the seven stair treads from the accused’s basement, the

trunk latch, and the trunk liners.

Appellate defense counsel aver that relevancy is lacking

due to the absence of evidence firmly establishing a source

for the stains. The accused elicited evidence at trial which

was intended to show that the stains had no connection

with the victim’s demise; namely, that the accused’s dog

a

27a

fell down the stairs on one occasion and injured itself, and

that the victim suffered from frequent nosebleeds. Lt.

Duke testified that while the accused was explaining

items which investigators found in his quarters, the

accused related that the victim had nosebleeds so severe

that at times “she had to walk around with a bucket.” We

find these assertions unpersuasive.

Mr. T testified that the blood stains were human blood

stains; they could not have come from a dog. Additionally,

Lt. Duke saw the dog shortly after the fall and did not

observe an appreciable amount of blood around the injury.

The crucial issue is the matter of the blood stains’ group-

ing.

The victim’s blood was from the B Group with the

Enzyme PGM type 2-1. The accused blood is from the O

Group. To ascertain a blood sample’s grouping, accepted

testing procedures require two separate tests, the

Absorption Elution Test and the Lattes Crust test. The

Elution Test reveals the antigen present while the Lattes

test reveals the particular antibody. Mr. T advised that in

order to have a positive finding the two tests must concur;

otherwise, his procedures require that his findings be

recorded as inconclusive.

As stated above, all items tested revealed the presence

of human blood stains. However, with the exception of one

of the stair treads and the trunk liners, the stains were of

insufficient quantity to facilitate grouping. As for the one

stair tread, the Elution Test revealed the presence of the

B and H antigen, but the Lattes Test did not reveal the

antibody. Therefore, the test was inconclusive as far as

showing that the stain was Type B. However, Mr. T was

still able to state that Type O and A could be excluded as

the source of the stain because of the B antigen. He stated

that since the H antigen is present in all blood groups, it

was possible that the H antigen may have come from an

28a

AB source, and possibly an O source. However, that like-

lihood was highly remote.

The results were similar for one of the trunk liners. The

B antigen was present, but there was insufficient quantity

to find the antibody. Because there were no other anti-

gens present, he could exclude Type A and O individuals

but not AB. The other trunk liner, however, revealed

somewhat more detail. The tests of the other trunk liner

revealed that the blood stain was Type B with the Enzyme

PGM 2-1, the same as the victim’.

Mr. T advised that although there is a somwewhat

higher rate among the Black population, approximately

ten percent of the general population has Type B blood,

and 36% has PGM 2-1. Because the enzymes are

independent of the blood groupings, the statistical occur-

rence of the combination of B PGM 2-1 is approximately

three and six-tenths (3.6) percent of the general popula-

tion.

Appellate defense counsel argue that even if one

assumes that the victim was the source of the blood

stains, there is no evidence that they are the result of

violence, especially recent violence at the hands of the

accused. Ergo, they simply lack relevancy. This argu-

ment, however, views the blood stains in a vacuum.

The forensic pathologist opined that the victim was not

slain at the scene of her discovery. Investigators found

what appeared to be substantially all of the victim’s

belongings in the master bedroom of the accused’s and

victim’s quarters. Detective G testified that the basement

showed signs of a thorough cleaning. The steps had swipe

marks on each side which appeared to have been made by

a mop, and that when a flashlight was held at a certain

angle, cleaning marks could be seen on the floor. Addi-

tionally, since blood spatters were found on the underside

of the step risers as well as the stair treads, it was unlikely

29a

that the blood stains fell from above as if from a nosebleed.

The bathtub showed signs of having been used to clean a

mop or dump a mop bucket. This residue tested negative

for the presence of blood, but Mr. T advised that immers-

ing the mop in water would render the detection of blood

less likely. The master bedroom and the hallway smelled

of fresh paint, and there were drop cloths visible.

Detective Green also testified that the spatters on the

stair treads were not consistent with blood dripping

down. He also opined that the spatters were low and

medium velocity spatters and that they originated from a

frontal impact approximately 45 degrees lower than the

stair treads. The indisputable infer nce is that the blood

spatters resulted from the victim: being struck with a

blunt instrument. Dr. B opined that among other objects,

the victim’s wounds were consistent with being struck

with a two-by-four.

M.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence hav-

ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is

of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” When this definition is applied to the state of

the evidence in the instant case, to ask whether the bloo

stain evidence had any tendency to establish whether the

victim was slain in her home begs the question. The

evidence was clearly relevant, and its probative value was

not even remotely outweighed by any possible prejudice.

See M.R.E. 403.

The blood stain evidence was also relevant in another

sense. Mr. Kirk testified that while incarcerated with the

accused, the accused admitted to him that he killed the

victim. We will deal with Mr. Kirk’s testimony in more

detail infra; nonetheless, the blood stain evidence was

highly relevant on the issues of corroborating the

accused’s admission and weighing Mr. Kirk’s credibility.

VI

In a further effort to attack the relevancy of the blood

stain evidence, appellate defense counsel aver that it was

error to allow Detective Green to testify as an expert. His

testimony on the blood stains is set forth above. We find

that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by

qualifying Detective Green as an expert.

The main prerequisite for qualification as an expert is

that the witness be qualified by knowledge, skill, experi-

ence, training, or education. M.R.E. 702. Detective

Green testified that he received training at Colorado Uni-

versity under the instruction of a nationally recognized

blood spattering expert. The training included flight

characteristics of blood, relative velocities, spatter pat-

terns, directions, and angles, etc. In addition to lectures,

etc., the training also involved numerous laboratory

experiments, and written examinations. His actual expe-

rience extended to 20 to 30 cases. We agree with the

ruling of the trial judge. Detective Green possessed spe-

cial training and skill which could aid the factfinders in

making their determination. The defense was free to

attack the weight to be accorded his testimony.

Vil

The next assignment of error is that the statements of

the deceased were erroneously admitted. The evidence in

questiun is the testimony of witnesses who knew or were

related to the deceased that she intended to obtain a

pregnancy discharge and leave the accused, but not until

near the end of June 1981. Appellate defense counsel

contend that this hearsay evidence was wrongfully admit-

ted to prove the truthfulness of the statements in order to

show the accused had a motive to kill the victim. We

disagree.

3la

The accused told several witnesses that the victim had

left him a note to the effect that she was deserting the Air

Force as well as leaving him. As stated earlier, the

accused claimed to have burned the “note.” Under these

circumstances, the victim’s state of mind or intent con-

cerning her departure date was highly relevant to the

issue of the likely situs of her murder. M.R.E. 402.

M.R.E. 803(e) provides in part as follows: |

The following is not excluded as hearsay: A state-

ment of the declarant’s then existing state of mind,

emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as

intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and

bodily health)... .

Under the circumstances, testimony relating to state-

ments made by the victim which reflected her state of

mind concerning when she would depart the area clearly

qualified under M.R.E. 803(3). The prosecution did not

need this evidence to “bootstrap” onto a motive by the

accused. As we will discuss infra, the accused provided

that himself.

Vill

Appellate defense counsel also contend that the testi-

mony of Sgt Burt should not have been allowed. Sgt Burt

testified that he was aware that the accused and the victim

were having marital problems. On four or five occasions

while arguing with the victim, the accused would call Sgt

Burt and ask him to come and get him so they could talk.

The accused would be angry when he called. Sgt Burt

related that these occurrences generally followed the

same scenario during the time frame of April to June

1981. On one occasion when he was attempting to calm the

accused, the accused said to him as follows: “Rob, I swear,

if you don’t come and get me I'll kill her.”

32a

Sgt Burt related that he would take the accused to a

club for a drink and talk things over and then take him

home. He also advised the accused to move into the bar-

racks. He estimated that the last time this occurred was

one week prior to the victim’s death.

Since the statement in question was uttered by the

accused, it is admissible unless excluded by some other

rule of evidence. M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). Appellate defense

counsel contend that this evidence should have been

excluded under M.R.E. 404, and that it did not qualify

under M.R.E. 404(b). Rule 404(b) reads, in part, as fol-

lows:

. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . may

. . . be admissile, for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identify, or absence of mistake or acci-

dent.

Although the comment is premised with a condition,

the utterance of the accused could be liberally construed

as a threat. That need not detain us, however, for we will

assume that the comment and circumstances qualify as a

wrong or act. See United States v. Woodyard, 16 M.J. 715,

716 (A.F.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 17 M.J. 204 (1983).

To say that the evidence established that the accused

and the victim were having marital problems is to engage

in understatement. There was also evidence that the

accused and the victim argued over the victim’s plans to

leave and have the baby in Georgia. Under these circum-

stances, the testimony in question was clearly relevant on

the issues of the accused’s intent and motive. There was a

clear nexus and the acts were certainly not remote. Thus,

the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting

the evidence. United States v. Woodyeard, supra; M.R.E.

403.

33a

IX

Appellate defense counsel also aver that the testimony

of Sgt Hinton should have been excluded pursuant to the

Clergy Privilege. M.R.E. 503. This assignment of error

fails both legally and factually.

This assignment of error arises somewhat by happen-

stance; namely, the accused’s question for information vis

a vis counselling. The accused and Sgt Hinton were neigh-

bors and apparently attended the same off-base church.

During late May 1981, the accused appeared at Sgt Hin-

ton’s quarters. The accused was upset over the victim’s

pending departure. He asked Hinton if he knew the

whereabouts of the pastor, and Hinton informed him the

pastor was out of town. The accused then asked Hinton to

the accused’s car so they could talk.

Sgt Hinton was an ordained minister at the time of the

trial. However, on the evening in question, he was a Dea-

con of his church. Hinton related that in his church’s

hierarchy the pastor, the assistant pastor, and the associ-

ate ministers, were above the deacons. He related that the

deacons counselled only on biblical matters, but even then

only when the pastors were otherwise occupied. Hinton

stated specifically that he was not given responsibility to

do spiritual counseling, for that was the pastor's job. His

minister’s license is dated 14 June 1981 and he was not

ordained until 8 August 1982. Hinton advised that one

cannot perform any substantive pastoral duties until after

ordination.

On the evening in question, Hinton was neither licensed

nor ordained. Additionally, he testified that he never held

himself out to the accused or anyone else as a minister, but

only a friend. He added that the accused never asked that

their conversations be considered confidential. Sgt Hin-

ton testified that, had he felt he was acting as a minister on

34a

the night in question, he would never have disclosed the

conversation to investigators or be testifying.

First, we hold that Sgt Hinton was not a person who

could act as a clergyman. M.R.E. 503(b)(1). Second, we

find that the accused did not reasonably believe that Hin-

ton was a clergyman. Third, we find that the conversation

between Hinton and the accused was not under circum-

stances amounting to a privileged communication.

M.R.E. 503(b)(2). Therefore, we find that the trial judge

properly allowed Hinton’s testimony. See generally,

Annot. 71 A.L.R.3d 794 (1976); M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A),

404(b), 403.

As mentioned above, Sgt Hinton related that the

accused was upset over the victim’s pending departure

when the accused arrived at his quarters. While sitting in

the accused’s car and talking, the accused said, “I can’t

take it anymore;” and then while striking the car’s dash-

board with both fists, the accused said, “J should bust her

in the face.” Hinton stated that the accused struck the

dash with sufficient force to break it.

X

Although the Government adroitly pieced together

many separate and distinct items of circumstantial evi-

dence, it was a jailhouse admission which was the

accused's undoing. Thus, we now come to our most crucial

factual determination; the credibility of Mr. Kirk. Tne

accused made Kirk’s acquaintance while they were incar-

cerated in the El Peso County, Colorado jail. Upon the

accused’s arrival in jail, Kirk had been confined for six

months for receiving a stolen shotgun. He had received a

suspended sentence, but during the time frame of the

accused's trial, he was facing probation revocation as well

as a charge for auto theft. In sum, Kirk faced a possible

sentence of 11 years for his travails. Kirk’s extracurricular

Pe ee eee ae ee Te eee ees ee

35a

activities were not confined to the civilian sector. While

serving in the Army he was convicted by special court-

martial for assaulting an officer. In exchange for his truth-

ful testimony, state officials agreed that the probation

revocation and the auto theft charge would be dropped.

Kirk was the Ward Representative of the jail, and the

accused was placed in his ward. Their initial contact was

merely Kirk’s asking him his name and introducing him to

the other inmates. The accused told Kirk he was confined

for “hitting a cop’s car.” At that time, or perhaps later,

Kirk had, in fact, associated the newspaper accounts of

the victim’s murder with the accused’s name, but he did

not challenge the accused’s statement of why he was

jailed.

Approximately two weeks later, the accused was appar-

ently on the short end of “The Dozens”? with another

inmate, and kirk had to break up a physical altercation

between them. Later that day, the accused entered Kirk's

cell and talked about hitting the police car. No one else

was present. Kirk rebuked the accused for lying and

informed him that he knew the real reason for the

accused’s confinement. When the accused challenged his

knowledge, Kirk told him and he looked very surprised.

Later that day in another conversation, Kirk told the

accused not to worry about anyone else finding out. Since

he was first in the ward to see the daily paper, Kirk told

the accused he would screen the paper from the other

inmates. Apparently the accused’s temper frequently

embroiled him with other inmates, for Kirk’s con-

versations with him flowed from Kirk calming him down.

Kirk stated that he advised the accused to stay calm for he

9“The Dozens” consist of the participants verbally deriding one

another as contemptuously as possible. The subject matter normally

extends to one’s parents and spouse as well as the participants

personally.

36a

was already in enough trouble without adding to his prob-

lems.

On another occasion the accused and Kirk engaged in

an argument. Apparently, the question of who was the

father of the victim’s child was at least partially responsi-

ble for the argument, for the accused had expressed

doubts as to his being the father. Kirk and the accused

were talking after the argument when the accused stated

that there had been an argument between him and the

victim and he hit her. The accused told Kirk that before he

realized it, the victim was dead. He also said that he

stabbed her.

Kirk stated that the accused told him the murder

occurred in the living room and that he put the body in the

trunk of the car and took it to the Garden of The Gods

Road and dumped it. The accused said he dumped the

knife with which he stabbed the victim near a 7-Eleven

store, and he carried the clothes the victim was wearing

toa different spot. Kirk said the victim was wearing a thin

night gown at the time.

Kirk related that the accused told him “To beat the case

... he wrote a note saying that Camille had left and all

this here and got some other friend of his to say that him

and Brian was together, you know, to make it look like

that he didn’t have nothing to do with it all.”

He also stated that the accused expressed concern over

what a young lady he was with would say to police.

According to Kirk, the accused also worried about what a

next door neighbor had seen or heard and whether he

would testify, and whether he had gotten all the blood off

the carpet, rugs, and stairs.

As a result of the accused’s concern, Kirk asked two

other inmates how blood could be removed without leav-

ing detectable traces. Kirk said that the accused never

indicated whether the steps “were up or downstairs,” only

Se ee ae ae a oe es

37a

his concern over whether he had successfully removed all

of the blood. Kirk testified that the accused inquired of

ways “to get rid of stuff that he had and was [the way he

had done it] the smart way.” He added that the accused

also asked him “some bits about the law.” The accused

asked him about state law and how “he could beat it and all

this here.” Kirk related that “we got together and tried to

help him as much as we could.”

During Kirk’s cross-examination, the defense homed in

on some key inconsistencies. Prior to trial, and appar-

ently prior to his going to Florida, Kirk had been inter-

viewed by Detective Brown. At this interview Kirk

claimed that the accused said he dumped the body by the

Broadmoor. Kirk stated that at that point he was just

telling Brown something to get rid of him because he did

not think the accused would be tried after beating it at the

state level.

Brown's Florida interview of Kirk was taped. The tran-

script of that interview reflects that when Brown asked

about blood in the basement, Kirk never mentioned blood

being on steps or the accused claiming to have found a

note from the victim. Kirk explained the discrepancy by

stating that Brown’s tape recorder was turned off when he

mentioned the blood on the steps. That was also his expla-

nation for not having mentioned the note. He also stated

that the note was mentioned in a conversation separate

from the one where the accused admitted killing the vic-

tim. He admitted that he had collected newspapers both

prior to and after the accused’s arrival.

Kirk testified that it was hard to state a reason why he

was testifying, but the agreement between him and state

officials was not the real incentive. He stated that he did

not want his son to suffer because he refused to testify.

However, Kirk admitted that he plans to send for his son

and his mother after he sets up a home in Florida.

38a

Kirk insisted that he never approached anyone with his

information. However, he must have told his attorneys,

for he stated they attempted to use his information to his

benefit when he told them to forget it. That was it until

Detective Brown approached him. He said that Brown

offered to drop his probatien, but he just did not want to

testify.

Now we will trace the investigators’ trail to Kirk, for we

believe it bears on his credibility. Detective Brown testi-

fied that he learned of Kirk through an inmate named

Leipoldt. Brown contacted Kirk in Florida where he was

residing. He stated that Kirk never approached him, and

Kirk did not know he was coming to Florida to interview

him. He said that Kirk never requested anything.

Trial defense counsel's position was that Kirk had used

newspaper clippings to fabricate his testimony so that he

could work out a deal very much to his benefit. After

testifying against the accused he would be a free man

instead of facing a possible 8 years in addition to the three

that were previously suspended. Thus, Kirk’s interest or

bias was obvious.

Kirk’s testimony was sketchy. Additionally, the

accused's carpet and living room rug tested negative for

the presence of blood stains. It must be remembered,

however, that Kirk claimed only to be relating what the

accused told him, not necessarily how the murder

occurred; ergo, it is certainly conceivable that the accused

did not tell all that he knew or the precise details.

Only a couple of the newspaper articles pertaining to

the case are attached as appellate exhibits, but they were

written over one year after the victim’s death. Con-

sequently, we are unable to compare the content of Kirk’s

testimony with those of the articles. However, the

defense’s theory requires extreme shrewdness and

patience on the part of Kirk. It also indicates a considera-

39a

ble gamble. It would assume that Kirk told his attorneys

of the accused’s admissions to him and then patiently

waited for the system to come to him rather than his

approaching investigators. This theory is negated by the

fact that Detective Brown learned of Kirk’s possible

knowledge from Leipoldt, another inmate. Kirk, of

course, could have worked the same method via Leipoldt.

It would also indicate that Kirk played the role until the

last possible instant, for the prosecution was not certain

that he would testify until the evening before he appeared

as a witness.

We find very interesting, Kirk’s reference to the

accused's concern over a young lady he was with. The only

person to whom Kirk could be referring was Sgt Johnson.

Johnson was a divorcee and a neighbor. She testified that

the accused dropped by her quarters the afternoon of the

victim’s murder. During their conversation, she related

some of her personal problems and the accused related

some of his marital problems. The accused stated tnat he

suspected the victim of infidelity. The next day, 14 June

1981, she telephoned for the victim and the accused

answered. The accused said the victim was not home and

he did not know where she was. The accused made no

mention of a note from the victim. However, Kirk did not

relate any details concerning the “young lady.” We doubt

that he learned of her via the newspaper.

We do not underestimate Mr. Kirk’s shrewdness; and,

as set forth above, his possible bias was obvious. How-

ever, applying our worldly experience, and realizing that

the factfinders both saw and heard Mr. Kirk, we believe

his testimony to have been credible.

When Mr. Kirk’s testimony is added to the wealth of

circumstantial evidence establishing the accused’s motive

and opportunity to kill the victim, and the blood stains

and their location, there is no other hypothesis but that of

40a

guilt. During closing argument, trial defense counsel bril-

liantly offered possible explanations for practically all of

the victim’s belongings being in the home and the

accused's suspicious actions and inconsistent statements

to his neighbors on the day of the victim's death, and after-

wards. However, it would simply require far too many

innocent coincidences to remove the aura of guilt from the

accused's actions. As were the factfinders at the trial, we

are also convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the

accused's guilt.

XI

We now turn to the contention that the accused was

denied the effective assistance of counsel.!° Appellate

defense counsel have launched a broadside attack against

the accused’s trial defense counsel.

The specific grounds stated in the assignment of error

are as follows: (1) That trial defense counsel’s pretrial

preparation was totally inadequate as evidenced by their

surprise over Kirk being called as a witness, and their

failure to uncover false testimony by Mrs. Brice. Also

part of this allegation is the alleged failure of trial defense

counsel to communicate with a private investigator

retained by the accused's initial civilian counsel; (2) That

trial defense counsel’s cross-examination of Kirk, and Dr.

Bowerman was inadequate, and the absence of any cross-

examination of Mrs. Brice; (3) The failure to call certain

witnesses who could have provided exculpatory evidence;

and (4) That trial defense counsel were basically deficient

in ferreting out evidence which would have negated the

prosecution's evidence against the accused.

10 Appellate Government and Defense Counsel’s Motions For

Leave To File Affidavits are hereby GRANTED.

Se teen A Nee At Al le ON ion

a oe i

4la

We recently had occasion to review the latest tests to be

applied when an accused claims that ineffective represen-

tation of counsel fall short of constitutional requirements.

Quoting from Strickland v. Washington, _ U.S. —_,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we stated that to

require reversal of a conviction or a death sentence, coun-

sel’s assistance must be defective in two essentials. They

are:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's per-

formance was deficient. This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defend-

ant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant

must show that the deficient performance prejudiced

the defense. This requires showing that counsel's

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of

a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a

defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said

that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a

breakdown in the adversary process that renders the

result unreliable. [Emphasis Added]

United States v. Garcia, 18 M.J. 716, 719 (A.F.C.M.R.

1984). To make this determination, we must consider the

totality of the evidence before the factfinder. United

States v. Garcia, supra.

Trial defense counsel have responded to appellate

defense counsel’s contention in a detailed affidavit. They

catalog their many efforts at obtaining the private inves-

tigator’s report, including beseeching organizations such

as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for assistance. They

relate that at one point they were able to obtain $500.00

due the accused in back Bachelor Allowance for Quarters,

but the accused—at the last minute—refused to make any

payment to the investigator. They also add that the

accused expressly prohibited them from approaching his

42a

parents for financial assistance. These facts notwith-

standing, however, trial defense counsel state: “Even

though we never saw this report, we were convinced that

our independent investigation had revealed all essential

facts.”

As regards Mr. Kirk, trial defense counsel advise that

they interviewed him in the presence of his counsel on 15

December 1982, and that they also looked into his back-

ground. They insist they were fully prepared for his testi-

mony. Trial defense counsel state they learned early on

that another inmate could corroborate some of Kirk’s tes-

timony as well as recal! independent admissions of the

accused. Consequently, they “made a tactical decision to

stay away from the accused's fellow inmates. . . to avoid

leading the prosecution to such potentially devastating

evidence. . . .” Trial defense counsel also deny receiving

information from civilian appellate defense counsel about

an alleged recantation of testimony by Kirk.

Trial defense counsel state that they determined at trial

that the testimony of Mrs. Brice was unremarkable and

had little impact on the case. They also advised that their

pretrial preparation on the pathology aspect of the case

was painstaking, including the issue of whether there was

a struggle between the victim and her assailant. They

concluded that there were no fingernail scrapings taken

and that there was no credible evidence of a struggle.

Trial defense counsel also detailed the civilian blood

spatter pattern experts with whom they consulted prior

to trial, including the FBI serologist who testified at trial.

Their conclusion was that there was no reasonable basis

on which to attack the test procedures employed by the

FBI laboratory. Although trial defense counsel called Dr.

Kier as a witness during the 39(a) session on motions,

they did not call him during the defense case in chief

because “he had not one scintilla of evidence . . . which

43a

would have challenged Mr. Tubergen’s conclusions.” Dur-

ing oral argument, appellate defense counsel assailed trial

defense counsel's decision not to attack the FBI serologist

without first getting other expert opinion. This assertion

appears rebutted by trial defense counsel's detailing of

the experts with whom they consulted. We find it more

than reasonable to infer that they based their tactical

decision on the results of those interviews.

Trial defense counsel also state they were fully aware of

the accused’s and victim’s bank records. They state they

considered that evidence and discussed its evidentiary

value with the accused at great length before concluding

that the bank records did not substantially rebut the

prosecution’s evidence of the victim’s intent to remain in

the area until late June 1981.

On the sentencing portion of trial, counsel address the

propriety of the accused not making an unsworn state-

ment to the members. Trial defense counsel advise that

the decision was left solely to the accused. They also state

that “the value of other possible evidence was far out-

weighed by the rebuttal which we knew the government

had ready.”

Civilian appellate defense counsel have submitted an

affidavit basically in response to trial defense counsel's

affidavit wherein they dispute some of trial defense coun-

sel’s statements, i.e., that there was, in fact, evidence of a

struggle, and reasserting their claim that there was inad-

equate pre-trial investigation. We will address these in

more detail infra when we address the petition for new

trial.

It is axiomatic that an accused is entitled to be repre-

sented by effective counsel, and he is entitled to compe-

tent representation throughout the trial. United States v.

Jefferson, 138 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v.

Rivas, 3 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 1977). Another fundamental

44a

rule is that strategic or tactical decisions made by trial

defense counsel will not be second guessed on appeal.

United States v. Rivas, supra.

The first thing which is apparent from reading the

affidavit of trial defense counsel is that they were fully

aware of the issues which appellate defense counsel aver

should have been more vigorously pursued. It is quite

evident that trial defense counsel were faced with numer-

ous tactical decisions throughout this trial. Their affidavit

reflects that they made their decisions on various tactics

only after weighing the potential impact and benefit to

their client, the accused.

As is evident from the sections of this opinion supra as

well as infra, trial defense counsel left no stone unturned

via the numerous motions litigated on behalf of the

accused during the 39(a) session on motions. Their

motions were well conceived and were supported by writ-

ten briefs. The briefs are concise and thorough, and pre-

sent reasoned advocacy. In fact, trial defense counsel's

oral advocacy during the trial turned what were patently

open and shut matters into closely contested issues of law.

This is especially so on the issues of the laboratory testing

having consumed all but one of the suspected blood stains

and the disposal of the accused’s automobile.

During the trial on the merits, trial defense counsel's

cross-examinations were designed to elicit and highlight

the exculpatory aspects of the prosecution’s evidence,

thereby attempting to lessen the inculpatory inferences.

As mentioned in Part X, supra, trial defense counsel’s

closing arguments were outstanding.

When the assignment of error is reduced to its essence,

the gist of appellate defense counsel’s averment is that

they would have tried the case differently. This is an

historical complaint. We reaffirmed a long standing rule in

United States v. Cohen, 2 M.J. 350 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976),

pet. denied, 3 M.J. 88 (1977), where we stated as follows:

45a

. Many records reflect examples of doubtful trial

tactics but counsel cannot be censured [sic] for not

adopting the best. It must be remembered that

appellate counsel and this Court have the advantage

of viewing the record after the findings and verdict,

and when the decisions made in the conduct of the

trial may be distorted by our lack of knowledge pos-

sessed by trial counsel. It is all too easy for a losing

litigant to complain on appeal of too few conferences,

failure to call witnesses, lack of cross-examination

and other items too numerous to mention. . . and too

much cross-examination is often more damaging than

too little.

United States v. Cohen, supra at 352, quoting from

United States v. Hunter, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 37, 41, 6C.M.R.

37, 41 (1952). The latest standards set forth in United

States v. Garcia, supra, do not negate this principle. The

fact that appellate defense counsel can show how the case

may have been tried differently does not equate to ineffec-

tive representation at the trial level.

Our review of the record fails to support a finding that

trial defense counsel's performance was deficient. Strick-

land v. Washington; United States v. Jefferson; United

States v. Rivas, all supra. Accordingly we find this assign-

ment of error to be without merit.

XII

We will dispose of the remaining assignments of error

summarily.

The accused asserts that the Challenge for Cause of Lt

Col J should have been granted. This assignment of error

is without merit. Trial defense counsel stated specifically

that his challenge was based on Lt Col J not being candid

in answering questions on his access to newspaper arti-

cles on the case. He interposed no disagreement with Lt

46a

Col J’s ability to be impartial. Trial defense counsel

declined the trial judge’s invitation to recall Lt Col J for

additional voir dire. The military judge did not abuse his

discretion by refusing to rule that Lt Col J had willfully

withheld information and by refusing the challenge.

United States v. Mason, 16 M.J. 455 (C.M.A. 1983);

United States v. Harris, 13 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1982);

United States v. Boyd, 7 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 1982).

Also asserted is that the search of the accused’s vehicle

should have been suppressed. This is also without merit.

The evidence establishing the accused’s voluntary consent

is compelling. Part of the accused’s alibi was that he had

nothing to hide as evidenced by full cooperation with

investigators. Additionally, the accused consented to the

search of his automobile notwithstanding his First Ser-

geant advising him not to be so rash in waiving his rights.

The search was clearly consensual. M.R.E. 314(e).

Another assignment of error related to the automobile

is that the disposal of the automobile by the El] Paso

County, Colorado Sheriffs Department rendered any evi-

dence seized from it inadmissible. This is without merit.

Investigators were emphatic that nothing of evidentiary

value remained in the vehicle or it would have been

retained. The accused had ample opportunity to reclaim

possession of the automobile before it was disposed of.

California v. Trombetta, U.S. , 104 8.Ct. 2528,

80 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).

The military judge did not abuse his discretion by sus-

taining the objection to the testimony of Mr. H. The

proffered testimony was not relevant to the issue of guilt

or innocence. See United States v. Ferguson, 15 M.J. 12

(C.M.A. 1983); M.R.E. 401, 402, 104(a).

The military judge did not abuse his discretion by allow-

ing the pathologist, Dr. B, to testify that in his opinion the

stab wounds were consistent with the intentional inflic-

rant, Lan SUP i

47a

tion of injury. Dr. B had been properly qualified as an

expert, M.R.E. 702, and there was a factual basis for his

opinion. M.R.E. 703. Thus the testimony went to the

issue of premeditation as well as aggravation. United

States v. Vickers, 13 M.J. 403 (1982); United States v.

Woodyard, 16 M.J. 715(A.F.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 17 M.J.

204 (1983). The trial judge exercised his discretion with

sensitivity, as evidenced by his ruling prohibiting Dr. B

from stating the victim was tortured prior to her death.

M.R.E. 408.

XIII

We now turn to the petition for new trial. Appellate

defense counsel request a new trial on the basis of both

newly discovered evidence and fraud upon the trial court.

The proffered “new” evidence is as follows: A traffic cita-

tion purportedly issued to the victim with a notation that

she was not wearing glasses; the opinion of an expert

consulted after trial who is of the opinion that the blood

spatter patterns on the stairs are inconsistent with the

injuries suffered by the victim and that she did not die in

the basement; that infrared photographs taken of the

walls of the accused’s quarters were negative for the pres-

ence of blood that this exculpatory evidence was not dis-

closed to the defense; that financial records reflected that

the victim controlled the family finances and that she had

purchased furniture in May 1981 for delivery to her and

the accused’s quarters on the installation; that “tissue,

skin and blood” under the fingernails of the victim indicate

that she fought with her assailant, and that a physical

examination of the accused did not reveal any scratches,

etc.; and, information reflecting wrongdoing by Kirk

other than that disclosed in open court.

The test for whether a new trial will be granted on the

basis of newly discovered evidence is well settled: The

48a

evidence must be newly discovered since trial, and it is not

such that it would have been discovered by the petitioner

at the time of trial in the exercise of due diligence; and, if

considered by a court-martial in the light of all other

pertinent evidence, it would probably produce a substan-

tially more favorable result for the accused. M.C.M.,

para. 109d(2). The petitioner must also affirmatively show

that an injustice resulted from the findings. United States

v. Bacon, 12 M.J. 489 (1982), and cases cited therein. The

burden on the petitioner is heavier than that normally

borne during appellate review, and motions for new trial

on the grounds of newly discovered evidence are not

regarded with favor. Such motions should be granted only

with great caution. United States v. Bacon, supra.

Applying these criteria to the instant case, the accused

fails to carry his burden. First, the traffic citation was

clearly discoverable prior to trial. However, even if it were

truly newly discovered, it would not produce a sustan-

tially more favorable result. By arguing the likelihood

that the victim owned more than one pair of glasses, trial

defense counsel vigorously attacked the significance of

the victim’s glasses being found in the master bedroom.

Additionally, trial defense counsel used the presence of

the glasses to support a rather weak theory of the victim

being abducted from the home. Nonetheless, in view of

practically all of the victim’s possessions being in the

home, including her purse and military identification

card, we are convinced that this “new” evidence would not

have changed the result at trial.

As regards the opinion of the blood spatter expert,

again this is not new evidence. His opinions were known

to trial defense counsel. Additionally, as pointed out in

appellate government’s brief, his opinion concurs with

Detective Green ona very important point. His memoran-

dum to appellate defense counsel states, “Some type of

49a

beating occurred directly in front of the staircase in the

basement.” He also agreed that the point of origin could

be discerned from the spatters’ directionality with accu-

rate measurements. Under these circumstances, one can-

not fault trial defense counsel for not calling him as a

witness. We are convinced that this opinion would not

produce a more favorable result.

We must reach the same conclusion on the infrared

photographs. Trial defense counsel had access to all inves-

tigative files, etc., so, unless the taking of the pho-

tographs was not recorded, they should have known of

their existence. However, this point need not detain us,

for trial defense counsel used other evidence at trial to

demonstrate that there was no evidence that the accused

had painted over potentially incriminating blood stains.

He did so via the testimony of Lt Duke who was in the

home the afternoon of 13 June 1981. Lt Duke testified that

he did not observe or smell any paint in the upstairs area

of the accused’s home. Additionally, during the cross-

examination of Detective Green, trial defense counsel

established that there were methods of detecting blood

stains which had been painted over. This was stressed

during closing argument when trial defense counsel

reminded the members that a suspicious stain on an

upstairs wall turned out to be a beverage similar to

KoolAid.

As indicated in Part XI, supra, trial defense counsel

were aware of the financial records and the autopsy

report; therefore, these items are not newly discovered

evidence. As for the autopsy report, it does not state that

skin, etc., was taken from the victim. The report states

that fingernail clippings were taken from the victim for

laboratory analysis. The laboratory report reflects human

blood stains on the fingernails, but not skin or tissue.

Thus, this is not evidence of a struggle.

50a

The last item of new evidence is additional evidence of

wrongful conduct by Kirk. One of the offenses apparently

occurred during the accused’s trial, but the others were

clearly discoverable prior to trial. At any rate, this “new”

evidence pertaining to Kirk’s credibility is not likely to

have produced a more favorable result. The factfinders

were clearly aware of Kirk’s unsavory character, and we _

must infer that they weighed his testimony with great

caution.

We conclude that the accused has not met his burden of

producing new evidence which would produce a more

favorable result. United States v. Bacon, supra.

The accused also requests a new trial on the ground that

fraud was perpetrated upon the court-martial via per-

jured testimony. He avers that Mrs. Brice and Kirk pre-

sented false testimony. We will first review the assertion

on Mrs. Brice.

During her preliminary questions, Mrs. Brice stated

her occupation was registered nurse. Appellate defense

counsel has presented documentation which they contend

shows that Mrs. Brice lied when she stated she was a

registered nurse. The specific documentation is simply a

private investigator’s report that there is no record of

Mrs. Brice ever being licensed in Colorado as a registered

nurse.

Even where a fraud is perpetrated upon the trial court,

it must have had a substantial contributing effect upon the

findings in order to merit a new trial. M.C.M., para.

109d(3); United States v. Bacon, supra. Applying this

standard, the allegation falls far short. First, the absence

of a license in Colorado does not preclude her being

licensed in another state. Second, it could be that Mrs.

Brice had worked as a registered nurse at an earlier point

of her life. Third, and most important, her occupation was

irrelevant to her testimony, for she did not give medical

ee eee

5la

testimony. Her testimony was that she was a friend and

confidant of the victim; ergo, if the victim had been suffer-

ing from nosebleeds the victim would have told her. Their

friendship would have motivated the revelation, not her

occupation. At any rate, there was expert testimony that

the blood stains/spatters were inconsistent with blood

dripping from above, i.e., a nosebleed. Therefore, even if

Mrs. Brice is not, or never was, a registered nurse, that

part of her testimony had no substantial contributing

effect on the result.

The main fraud alleged is that Kirk fabricated his testi-

mony at trial and that he recanted his testimony after

trial. As support, appellate defense counsel has submit-

ted affidavits from a fellow inmate, David Lee, and Kirk.

Lee claims that the district attorney was putting pres-

sure on Kirk to tesify, so Kirk made up his testimony from

newspaper clippings and from conversations “We had in

El Paso County jail.” Lee defines “we” as “We being

Michael Kirk, Brian Garries and myself David S. Lee.”

Since Kirk does not recant his testimony, Lee’s claim to

the contrary presents a factual issue. We resolve the issue

against the accused. Lee claims to have no knowledge of

the accused’s case, but yet he says that Kirk got his

information, in part, from conversations with the accused

at which he, Lee was present. Secondly, although the

conversations did not necessarily reveal incriminating

statements, Lee’s affidavit corroborates Kirk’s claim that

they discussed the accused's case. The only issue in dis-

pute is the content of those conversations.

Contrary to appellate defense counsel's assertion, Kirk

does not recant his testimony. The relevant portion of

Kirk’s post-trial affidavit reads as follows:

[A]s far as my testimony in court was I told the truth,

far as believing it I couldn’t say I’m not a judge of

people.

52a

It requires a strained interpretation to conclude that the

quoted portion equates to a recantation of testimony. All

Kirk is saying, albeit inarticulately, is that he has no

opinion as to whether the accused’s revelations to him

were true, for that was for others to decide; however, he

testified truthfully and accurately as to what the accused

told him.

In their affidavit, trial defense counsel stated they had

reason to believe that another inmate, Leipoldt, could

corroborate Kirk in addition to knowing of independent

admissions by the accused. We are also mindful of the

affidavit of the private investigator, Mr. Pubanz, who

claims that Leipoldt disputed this assertion. Under these

circumstances, the accused has not met his burden of

showing that a fraud was perpetrated on the court via

perjured testimony. United States v. Bacon, supra;

United States v. Morris, 13 M.J. 666 (A.F.C.M.R..), pet.

denied, 14 M.J. 446 (1982).

Additionally, the argument that Kirk had fabricated his

testimony from newspaper clippings was fully presented

to the factfinders for their consideration.

The last items of claimed fraud are that the investiga-

tion was slanted and fabricated to build a case against the

accused rather than the actual perpetrator; and, that the

court-martial was not presented with ail of the available

evidence. The latter contention is tied in with the asser-

tion that trial defense counsel committed a fraud upon the

court “in providing no defense to the charge.” The evi-

dence presented in support is an affidavit by a private

investigator that Detective Green told him that he was

concerned that the Sheriffs Department's investigation

had not been done properly and was not thorough enough;

that he was pulled out of the accused’s residence pre-

maturely; and, that certain witnesses had been pressured

to testify.

|

;

53a

Detective Green’s first alleged comment on the appro-

priateness of the investigation is subject to several inter-

pretations. He may have been referring to the fact that

following better procedures would have prevented the

Colorado courts from suppressing the blood stain evi-

dence. At any rate, he testified to the contrary on cross-

examination. In response to trial defense counsel's ques-

tions, he stated that his investigation of the residence had

been thorough, and that it was equally advantageous to

exonerate a suspect, for they could then focus their efforts

in other directions. Further, this information is similar to

a recantation of testimony, and we must view it with

disfavor. United States v. Morris, supra. Finally, it did

not require much deductive reasoning to conclude that

Kirk was persuaded to testify. His own testimony sug-

gested as much.

As for the assertion that trial defense counsel perpe-

trated a fraud upon the court via ineptness, it does not

merit comment.

XIV

Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence are

AFFIRMED.

XV

The Petition for New Trial having been fully consid-

ered, it is hereby

DENIED.

FORAY, Senior Judge, and O’HAIR, Judge, concurr.

Ww U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1986 163883 42001

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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