Appendix — Haffer v. Action Manufacturing, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1986
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Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
1988
IN THE — cian |
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
EDWARD A. HAFFER,
PETITIONER
Vv.
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
AND BRAWER BROS., INC.,
RESPONDENTS
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STEPHEN E. WEYL, Counsel of Record
EpwarD A. HAFFER
MARILYN L. BUTLER
SHEEHAN, PHINNEY, Bass & GREEN,
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
1000 Elm St., P.O. Box 3701
Manchester, New Hampshire 03105
(603) 668-0300
Counsel for Petitioner
ADDISON C. GETCHELL & SON, INC. - THE LAWYERS’ PRINTER - BOSTON
Table of Contents
Constitution of the United States, Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment
28 U.S.C. § 1927
28 U.S.C. § 2072
Fed. R. Civ. P. &(c)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and (b)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (1938)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (1983)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 (1938)
Local Rule 10(b) (D.C.N.H. 1980)
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 382-A:2-607(3\a)
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 382-A:2-612(a)
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 382-A:2-714(a)
Second Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit (May 14, 1986)
Order of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (May
14, 1986)
First Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
(February 20, 1986)
Opinion of the United States District Court for the District
of New Hampshire (September 29, 1986)
Verified Petition for Rehearing En Banc (March 4, 1986)
Portion of Oral Argument as Transcribed by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit
Pages 4-14 of Brief of Fairhaven Textile Corporation to
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (April 8, 1985)
Pages 8-14 of Brief of Action Manufacturing, Inc. to the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (April 26, 1985)
Reply Brief of Fairhaven Textile Corporation to the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit (May 7, 1985)
aowowaonn F&F WW NY F- F
13
14
19
64
52
64
68
77
83
li TABLE OF CONTENTS
Fairhaven Pretrial Statement
Action Pretrial Statement
Brawer Bros. Pretrial Statement
Final Pretrial Order
85
88
93
97
1
Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment
No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.
28 U.S.C. § 1927. Counsel’s liability for excessive costs.
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vex-
atiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the ex-
cess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
§ 2072. Rules of civil procedure
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals
of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and
maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and pro-
cedure in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of
decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for the judicial
review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies,
boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rules shal! not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law
and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to
Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a
regular session thereof but not later than the first day of May, and
until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus
reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title,
anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way
limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by
the Supreme Court.
2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Generali Rules of Pleading.
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading,
a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, ar-
bitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of considera-
tion, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, pay-
ment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limita-
tions, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a
defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court
on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there
had been a proper designation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings.
(2) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served
or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permit-
ted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be free-
ly given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response
to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to
the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the
amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the
court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the
3
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and
shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy
the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court
may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (1938). Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating
Issues.
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be
by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at
the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the
agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters consid-
ered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of
by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when
entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless
modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its
discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which ac-
tions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may
either confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or
extend it to all actions.
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (1983). Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling;
Management.
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any
unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or con-
ferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case
will not be protracted because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities:
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough
preparation; and
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(b) Scheduling and Planning. Except in categories of actions
exempted by district court rule as inappropriate, the judge, or a
magistrate when authorized by district court rule, shall, after con-
sulting with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented
parties, by a scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or other
suitable means, enter a scheduling order that limits the time
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;
(2) to file and hear motions; and
(3) to complete discovery.
The scheduling order also may include
(4) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final
pretrial conference, and trial; and
(5) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of
the case.
The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more
than 120 days after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall not be
modified except by leave of the judge or a magistrate when
authorized by district court rule upon a showing of good cause.
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The par-
ticipants at any conference under this rule may consider and take
action with respect to
5
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, in-
cluding the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings;
(3) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which wili avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations
regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance rulings
from the court on the admissibility of evidence;
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative
evidence;
(5) the identification of witnesses and documents, the need
and schedule for filing and exchanging pretrial briefs, and the
date or dates for further conferences and for trial;
(6) the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or
master;
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial
procedures to resolve the dispute;
(8) the form and substance of the pretrial order;
(9) the disposition of pending motions;
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve
complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or
unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
At least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any
conference before trial shall have authority to enter into stipula-
tions and to make admissions regarding all matters that the par-
ticipants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed.
(d) Final Pretrial Conference. Any final pretrial conference
shall be held as close to the time of trial as reasonable under the
circumstances. The participants at any such conference shall for-
mulate a plan for trial, including a program for facilitating the ad-
mission of evidence. The conference shall be attended by at least
one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the par-
ties and by any unrepresented parties.
(e) Pretrial Orders. After any conference held pursuant to this
rule, an order shall be entered reciting the action taken. This order
6
shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified
by a subsequent order. The order following a final pretrial con-
ference shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice.
(f) Sanctions. If a party or party’s attorney fails to obey a
scheduling or pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf
of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or
party’s attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or party’s attorney fails to participate in
good faith, the judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may make
such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any
of the orders provided in Rule 37(bX2XB), (C), (D). In lieu of or in
addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party or
the attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable ex-
penses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, in-
cluding attorney’s fees, unless the judge finds that the non-
compliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 (1938). Rules by District Courts.
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof
may from time to time make and amend rules governing its prac-
tice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and amend-
ments so made by any district court shail upon their promulgation
be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In all
cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate
their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
Local Rule 10 (D.C.N.H. 1980). Pretrial Procedure.
(b) FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
A final pretrial conference with the court shall be held at least
seven days and not more than twenty-one days prior to trial. This
conference will be devoted to frank discussion of any problem that
may arise during the trial. Counsel should also be prepared to
discuss settlement.
7
The following material shall be filed not later than fifteen days
after close of discovery:
(1) A complete written stipulation as to all uncontested facts.
(2) A complete written stipulation as to pertinent applicable
law.
(3) A complete written stipulation of contested issues of fact
or, if counsel cannot agree, a separate statement of same by each
party.
(4) A complete written stipulation of disputed issues of law or,
if counsel cannot agree, a separate statement of same by each par-
ty.
(5) A written list of the names and addresses of all witnesses
who may be called by each party.
(6) A list of all depositions to be read, or likely to be read, into
evidence.
(7) A list of all exhibits to be offered in the direct case of each
party, including a brief statement of the reason for the offer.
Counsel are required to bring all exhibits, or exact copies of
them, to the Clerk’s office on the day of the final pretrial so that
they can be examined by all counsel. Counsel will be required to
file prior to trial a written statement setting forth the objections,
including the grounds thereof, to the exhibits being offered.
Failure to file a written objection to an exhibit will be construed as
a waiver of objection to such exhibit.
(8) An itemized statement of special damages.
(9) A statement of plaintiff’s latest demand and defendant’s
latest offer.
(10) Request for view, and designation as to who shall pay the
cost in the first instance.
(11) A written waiver of claims or defenses, if any.
(12) An estimate of the length of trial.
Continuances will not be granted because of the inability of any
witness to be present at the trial. If there is any doubt as to the
availability of a witness, then his deposition shall be taken prior to
trial. No special permission is required for video tape depositions.
8
Requests for Instructions, Findings and Rulings shall be filed at
the start of trial. Additional Requests may be filed at the close of
the evidence.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 382-A: 2-607 Effect of Acceptance; Notice
of Breach; Burden of Establishing Breach After Acceptance;
Notice of Claim or Litigation to Person Answerable Over.
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or
be barred from any remedy....
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 382-A: 2-612 ‘“‘Instaliment Contract’’;
Breach.
(1) An “‘installment contract’? is one which requires or
authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately
accepted, even though the contract contains a clause “each
delivery is a separate contract’’ or its equivalent.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 382-A: 2-714 Buyer’s Damages for Breach
in Regard to Accepted Goods.
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for
any nonconformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary
course of events from the seller’s breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable.
iain
ae
9
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 85-1429 ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 85-1430
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
FAIRBAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellee,
BRAWER BROS., INC.,
Third-Party Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
{Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Coffin, Circuit Judge,
Wisdom* and Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judges.
Edward A. Haffer, with whom Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green,
Professional Association, was on brief for Fairhaven Textile Cor-
poration.
Irving Brawer with whom James J. Barry, Jr., was on brief for
Brawer Bros., Inc.
Peter Karl Marsh with whom Marsh & Segal was on brief for
Action Manufacturing, Inc.
May 14, 1986
* Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
10
Per Curiam. Following our opinion in this case, which we con-
cluded by charging appellant’s counsel personally with attorney’s
fees as costs for making an improper contention, counsel moved
that we withdraw that portion of the opinion, and the assessment,
and, presumably in case we did not, for a rehearing en banc.? Out
of regard for counsel, following their hearing the tape of the oral
argument, we again reviewed it, and the entire record and briefs,
as well as the petition itself. While we do not grant the motion to
withdraw, it may be appropriate further to state our reasoning.
Without repeating the facts in detail contained in the original
opinion, this was an action, tried to the court, for breach of war-
ranty. The court found in favor of plaintiff, appellee. Paragraph
11 of the complaint had alleged, inter alia, due notice of breach.
Paragraph 11 of defendant appellant’s answer denied some of the
other assertions, but admitted notice. The pretrial statement of
disputed issues made no reference to notice, nor did defendant’s
opening; nor was it adverted to at trial.
Defendant was a supplier of materials that went into plaintiff's
product. The complaint sought damages for allegedly defective
materials furnished in the early fall of 1979. Prior to the pretrial
plaintiff expanded its damage claim to include a small amount of
goods supplied the preceding spring. No objection was made by
defendant that this was outside the pleadings, or that there had
been tardy notice. In its post-trial argument, however, defendant
asserted, for the first time, that notice had been late. The court,
without discussion, found proper notice.
On appeal defendant extensively briefed that plaintiff's case
must fail for lack of timely notice. This prompted the judge who
ultimately wrote the opinion to review the record, and, at argu-
ment, he, and a second judge, asked detailed questions why de-
fendant had not raised the issue of notice until after trial. This pro-
duced the response, noted at greater length in our opinion, that
counsel did not want to “‘tip ... our hand.”’
1 Counsel also requested permission to hear the tape of the oral argu-
ment, which we granted, and this thereafter occurred. No further
response followed.
11
On the record, the extent of plaintiff's awareness in the spring
of defects in defendant’s material was so slim that we might
wonder whether there could have been an issue of a duty of earlier
discovery, and of consequent need of notice.? We were disturbed,
however, by quite another matter. As a general principle the
presentation of claims beyond the complaint without objection is
considered an informal amendment of the complaint. See Lynch v.
Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 508 (1st Cir. 1983); F. R. Civ. P. 15(b). In
the absence of notice to the contrary, it may be assumed that
defendant does not choose to amend its answer. Anything else
would be inconsistent with the universal principle that the issues
in a case are to be made known in advance.
Defendant’s claim now is that all that its answer admitted was
due notice as to the fall goods, (‘‘said defects”) and was inap-
plicable to goods supplied earlier. Even taking this at its face value
we would consider such a contention lacking in the necessary can-
dor, but defendant’s position is far more extreme. ‘Actions’
answer to interrogatory [claiming damages for June] put all par-
ties on notice that notice had now become an issue.”’ “‘[D]espite the
timely notice on the September items, Action would be barred for
any remedy,” (viz., for the fall items, as well as the spring’s.) (Em-
phasis in orig.) As a legal proposition, for which, incidentally,
defendant cites no authority, this seems an extraordinary posi-
tion. The spring goods, and the fall goods, were separate orders,
and separate shipments. At the very least, and we cannot em-
phasize this too highly, if notice was considered no longer admit-
ted as to the fall goods, this would be in flat contradiction to an
answer which stood unamended.
In light of the pleadings, and the pretrial silence, it was difficult
to think how defendant’s counsel could have thought his position
with respect to the Septeriber goods so obvious that plaintiff's
counsel were on actual, as distinguished from possible legal, notice
that notice as to these goods was now an issue. We accordingly in-
2 Plaintiff knew it had problems with its own product, but did not
realize they were traceable to defendant’s material.
12
quired as to this during oral argument, and counsel conceded they
maintained silence to avoid tipping their hand, in the hope that
plaintiff would not try to ‘‘fool” them, viz., by offering (false) evi-
dence to meet it. In other words, counsel was hoping to fool the
plaintiff. This method of trying cases has been outlawed in the
federal court by the Rules of Civil Procedure since 1940.
At the least, defendant’s pursuing this matter on appeal must be
characterized as frivolous. Under such circumstances we, and
other circuits, have felt that counsel should be charged, whether
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or F.R.A.P. 38. Good Hope Refineries,
Inc. v. Brashear, 588 F.2d 846, 848 (1st Cir. 1978); Limerick v.
Greenwald, 749 F.2d 97, 102 (ist Cir. 1984); Commonwealth Elec.
Co. v. Woods Hole, etc. Steamship Authority, 754 F.2d 46, 49 (1st
Cir. 1985); United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d
491, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1144 (3 Justices
voting to award respondent damages for frivolous appeal, Sup. Ct.
Rule 49.2); Tedeschi v. Barney, 757 F.2d 465, 466 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 147; Hughes v. Hoffman, 750 F.2d 53, 55
(8th Cir. 1984); McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118-119
(9th Cir. 1981); In re Oximetriz, Inc., 748 F.2d 687, 644 (Fed. Cir.
1984). In Gianfriddo v. Western Union Tel. Co., __. F.2d ___
(1st Cir. 3/21/86), we noted that counsel or client should determine
the responsibility; here it is clearly counsel’s.
Our opinion will stand, subject to pending motion for review en
banc.
MORPH ©
13
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 85-1429 ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellant.
Before
Campbell, Chief Judge,
Coffin, Bownes, Breyer and Torruella,
Circuit Judges.
ORDER OF COURT
Entered: May 14, 1986
Upon consideration of the “Verified Petition For Rehearing En
Banc”’ by appellant. Fairhaven Textile Corporation.
It is ordered that said petition for rehearing en banc be, and the
same hereby is, denied.
By the Court:
Francis P. Scigliano
Clerk.
14
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 85-1429 ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 85-1480 ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appeliee,
v.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellee,
BRAWER BROS., INC.,
Third-Party Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Coffin, Circuit Judge,
Wisdom* and Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judges.
Edward A. Haffer, with whom Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green,
Professional Association, was on brief for Fairhaven Textile Cor-
poration.
Irving Brawer with whom James J. Barry, Jr., was on brief for
Brawer Bros., Inc.
Peter Karl Marsh with whom Marsh & Segal was on brief for
Action Manufacturing, Inc.
February 20, 1986
* Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
15
ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge. In this suit by Action
Manufacturing, Inc., tried to the court, for breach of warranty of
fabrics which were, concededly, “expressly warranted by [defend-
ant] Fairhaven [Textile Corporation] and [third party defendant]
Brawer Bros. [Inc.] to be first quality,” the first ten pages of
Fairhaven’s brief are devoted to a claim of lack of timely notice of
breach. Although, actually, this was a non-issue, it is such a con-
spicuous example of improper advocacy that we, too, will discuss it
at the outset.
Paragraph 11 of the complaint commenced, ‘‘11. Immediately
upon discovery of said defects in the nylon Plaintiff notified
Defendant ....”’ Defendant’s answer read, “ll. As to any
defects, denied. As to notification of a problem, admitted ....”’
This answer was never amended, nor sought to be amended. The
pretrial statement of issues made no mention of notice, let alone
alleged untimeliness. Neither did defendant’s opening to the jury.
During trial evidence was introduced, with relation to another
issue, which, standing alone, might support a contention that
plaintiff's notice of breach was tardy. That issue was not
mentioned, however, until defendant’s post-trial argument and re-
quests. The court’s response was a short rejection. More than half
of Fairhaven’s brief is now devoted to this alleged error.
Passing the fact that the court’s rejection on the merits would
not appear to have been error in any event’, pressing it disregards
the elementary principle that, unless by agreement, actual, or im-
plicit from conduct, a matter once conceded is not later in dispute
simply because some evidence, admitted on another issue, could be
claimed to contradict it. 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1448, p. 466 (1971); see Vargas v. McNamara, 608
F.2d 15, 18 n.3 (1st Cir. 1979); cf. F.R.Civ.P. 15(b). Otherwise an
attempted withdrawal of an admission in the pleadings after the
case has closed is the unfairest kind of surprise, even, perhaps, for
1 Fairhaven’s argument presupposes that plaintiff was engaged in
self-destruction, not an easy contention.
16
a court that is conducting a bench trial and might wish elucida-
tion,” and particularly unfair to unsuspecting counsel.
This was without excuse. During oral argument a colloquy
revealed that, prior to the pretrial statement of issues, defendant
had discovered grounds for claiming that its admission in its
answer was incorrect, but had concluded to remain silent. Asked
why, counsel said,
“(W]e had a reason for not tipping our hand.”
Court. ‘“You wanted to fool the court?”
Counsel. ‘No, we did not. We did not want to be fooled by the
[plaintiff.]”’
It would be difficult to conceive of a more unabashed piece of
sharpness. Don’t change your pleading, or let the other party
know what he has to meet, or he’ll fool you — with counter-
evidence. Yet Fairhaven would claim that plaintiff's ‘‘implication
of surprise at Fairhaven’s notice argument is ironic and dis-
ingenuous.” This is not even sense, let alone fair.
For defendants to pursue this matter on appeal is not merely
frivolous, it is an imposition on appellee and the court. For such a
severe disregard of counsel’s duty it is appropriate to charge
counsel personally with attorney’s fees as part of appellee’s costs.
28 U.S.C. § 1927; see United States v. Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887,
892 (1st Cir. 1984); Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Brashear, 588
F.2d 846, 848 (1st Cir. 1978).
Turning to the merits, defendants raise two principal psints:
that the court erred in finding their goods faulty, and in overstat-
ing the damages. Here, at least, defendants recognize settled law,
that they must show the findings to have been clearly erroneous.
F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Unfortunately, they adopt the not uncommon
practice of assuming the correctness, or superior quality, of their
own evidence; one cannot read their briefs without a feeling of be-
ing asked to review the case de novo. For example, we are told at
2 See, e.g., in another connection,
The Court: I want to ask you a question, because I can ask ques-
tions. I’m the one that’s going to decide this.
BRIE,
I i ii
17
length how defendants’ expert had higher qualifications than
plaintiff's. This is not the stuff by which “clearly erroneous’’ is
established.
Even worse is the brief of third party Brawer Bros. which, as
the initial actor and party ultimately responsible, took the laboring
oar as to the quality of the material. The principal defective goods
were 70 denier lightweight nylon, finished by Fairhaven and sup-
plied to plaintiff in 1979 as first quality. Plaintiff laminated the
material (glued it to paper) and supplied it to shoe manufacturers,
largely in Europe. When it bubbled, plaintiff, admittedly after
many tests, claimed the material to have been defective. Defend-
ants, in response, charged improper processing by plaintiff.
One of the pretrial tests ultimately conducted invoived Fair-
haven’s 1982 material and a sample of its 1979 material. A witness
for plaintiff having conceded that the later material was first
quality, Brawer asserts that the witness conceded thereby that the
earlier was first, as well. This concession, it says, follows from
Brawer’s testimony that the two materials were the same.
Brawer went even further. In its reply brief it complains
vigorously that plaintiff’s brief wrongly charged it with admitting
the use of second-grade yarn in its 70 denier fabric. Yet Irving
Brawer had testified, “[T]here is no question in my mind whatever
that some fabrics were made out of yarn that was designated by
DuPont as second quality.” His preceding and subsequent testi-
mony made clear that this phraseology was an admission, not a
denial. The admission does not disappear because Brawer testified
that this second-grade yarn was first quality, (with which compare
his testimony, “[E]verything we buy from DuPont is bought
without any warranties on their part except when we specifically
ask for first quality yarn from DuPont to be used in some of our
other operations.’’). Nor was the admission struck by Brawer’s
testimony that it is possible to make first quality goods out of
second-grade yarn.
An appeal so presented does not make necessary our recitation
of the evidence contained in seven volumes of transcript and many
18
exhibits that might be due an appellant who presents supported
representations of manifest error. The significant fact is that
there was ample evidence supporting the court’s findings, both on
liability and damages. Nor did the court make any improper rul-
ings. The court was warranted in concluding that plaintiff suf-
fered more than the dollar loss attributable to the goods directly
involved. A customer who finds the milk turned one day may look
elsewhere for it another.
Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that it would not pursue its
cross appeal of the court’s grant of Fairhaven’s counterclaim. The
judgment is affirmed in all respects, with costs to Action.’
Fairhaven’s counsel is charged personally with attorney’s fees in
the amount of $2,000. This, we may add, is punitive, see Knorr
Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1984); ef
United States v. Nesglo, Inc., ante, 744 F.2d at 892, and not a
business expense. Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
356 U.S. 30 (1958).
Affirmed.
3 Strictly, we would have assessed double costs, but Fairhaven does
prevail on the minor cross-appeal.
19
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Action Manufacturing, Inc.
v. #C80-204-L
Fairhaven Textile Corp., et ai.
Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law
The plaintiff has brought this action alleging that the defend-
ants breached express and implied warranties of merchantability
in the sale of nylon material to the plaintiff in the year of 1979.
RSA 382-A:2-313, RSA 382-A:2-314. The plaintiff corporation
was incorporated in the State of New Hampshire in late 1977.
Lawrence A. Gaffney and John McElroy were the principals who
started the company and each invested the sum of $100,000. In ad-
dition to the $200,000 contributed by these individuais, a Small
Business Administration loan was procured in the sum of
$600,000.
The plaintiff deals mainly with shoe companies both domestical-
ly, such as Brown Shoe Company and European companies. The
plaintiff mainiy deals with what is known as substrates which com-
prise goods to which adhesive material is applied. The plaintiff
claims that the defendant expressly warranted first quality goods.
Material known as 70 denier was sold by the defendant Brawer
Brothers to the defendant Fairhaven Textile Corporation which in
turn sold the product to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s claim is that
the product sold to it was defective. The defendants collectively
blame the problem on the plaintiff's manufacturing process and
the defendant, Fairhaven, has a counterclaim in the agreed upon
sum of $33,543.92. Fairhaven has also brought an indemnification
action against Brawer Brothers. Brawer Brothers owns 50% of
Fairhaven.
The claim of the plaintiff against the defendants are in six areas.
1. for inferior goods, material and labor; 2. that the plaintiff was
20
forced to sell damaged goods as seconds; 3. that the plaintiff was
unable to keep up with orders from purchasers and had to send
goods by means of air freight, thus increasing their cost; 4. in-
cidental damages such as storing defective goods for forty-five
months; 5. lost sales, profits and damage to reputation in Europe
and the United States and 6. the retardation of the development of
its business.
The plaintiff manufactures pressure sensitive tape products,
which are fabrics or other materials which have been coated with
an adhesive substance, and which, when applied with pressure to
another material, will adhere to the latter. The products are !arge-
ly used in the manufacture of shoes, and to a lesser extent in other
manufacturing industries.
There are three principal processes involved in the manufacture
of pressure sensitive tapes. The first is the manufacture of the
adhesive substance, which involves the combining and treatment
of various ingredients in a chemical and mechanical process. Next
is the coating, which involves the spreading of the adhesive on the
fabric or other substrate and the drying of the adhesive as the
coated substrate passes through heated ovens. This material is
then wound onto master roils, which are subsequently subjected to
a slitting process, in which the tape is cut into narrower rolls, with
varying widths.
Brawer sold the material which is the subject of this law suit to
Fairhaven which more or less acted as a conduit in its ultimate sale
to the plaintiff.
Lawrence A. Gaffney of Wolfeboro, New Hampshire from De-
cember, 1977 on was in charge of European sales which is the
main crux of this suit.
Gaffney has a great deal of experience in the business. Prior to
starting his own company, he was employed by Ideal Company
which at one time accounted for approximately seventy percent of
sales of pressure sensitive tape to the shoe industry. Reference is
made to exhibit FUU (1-75) which is the Master’s Report of
Chelsea Industries v. Gaffney and McElroy, Massachusetts Su-
perior Court.
ITNT EI TE OT ENE TNT ATLL RNR 5
Sa ra ahaa
Pee Pt Fe ere
21
The court has read the lengthy report of the Master as evi-
denced by exhibit FUU (1-75) which candidly is not flattering to
Mr. Gaffney or Mr. McElroy.
Ideal Company is a subsidiary of Chelsea Industries. Gaffney
and McElroy incorporated or formed the plaintiff corporation at
the end of 1977. Both Gaffney and McElroy invested $100,000.00
each or a total of $200,000.00 plus a $600,000.00 Small Business
Administration Loan.
The plant was constructed prior to December, 1977. The plain-
tiff corporation was invoived in litigation with a competitor soon
after it commenced doing business and for a period of eight
months was enjoined from manufacturing in the United States.
The plaintiff grossed $24,000.00 in six months during 1978. In De-
cember, 1978 the plaintiff corporation reorganized.
It sold its plant, property and equipment to its largest account in
Europe. This was to Jaeger Brothers of Germany in a sale and
lease back arrangement.
Gaffney stated that plaintiff’s first contact with the defendant,
Fairhaven was through Fairhaven’s agent, Sam Werber. Werber
contacted the plaintiff who provided Werber with samples of yarn
and showed him the plant.
The following was explained to the court that 70 denier is a type
of yarn terminology, such as hand of goods means softness or
hardness of the goods, tensile strength, warp threads, length of
full cross threads, coating, looms, cleaning and textile finisher.
Eventually Gaffney approved the decision to purchase material
from Fairhaven at the same price paid to other suppliers. At this
time there wasn’t any mention of the other co-defendant Brawer.
Gaffney stated that he was not aware of Brawer Brothers until
after suit was instituted. The Fairhaven goods were prepared for
coating and guaranteed first quality goods.
In September, 1979 complaints were received from France
stating bundled rolls had strange configuration.
Photographs 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D were taken at a plant in
Ireland. 1A depicts 8 rolls standing on end. 1B material lying flat,
22
1C bundles of 70 denier rolls showing outside wrinkles and 1D
depicting a rewind machine.
The plaintiff was also called concerning problems in Ireland in-
cluding 200 denier goods.
Efforts were made to ascertain the cause of the problem, ten-
sion machine, laboratory tests including the paper. The nylon
grows larger than the paper because of bubbles. Richard Thomp-
son of the Smith Paper Company was called. Nylon was steamed,
paper given different tension, different temperatures, tried in the
oven. Some sheets were sold to Jaeger.
In the summer of 1980 Schneider and Fairhaven goods were
tested according to Gaffney under the same conditions and Fair-
haven goods were distorted, Schneider goods were not.
Gaffney testified that he kept getting telexes of complaints and
had to send replacement goods by air freight which was fifteen
times more expensive than the usual method of shipping by boat.
Exhibits 12A through N are a series of telexes from the plaintiff
to Jaeger and Jaeger responses concerning problems, complaints,
air freighting of goods and efforts to solve problems with the
goods.
Exhibit 10 A-1-8 dated October 17, 1979 is captioned freight
charges regarding replacements for defective goods. |
Exhibit 10 B-1-17 is captioned October 3, 1979 freight charges
regarding replacements for defective goods.
Gaffney stated that he called Werber a number of times for help.
Six months later a meeting was arranged at the plaintiff’s plant
with two representatives from Fairhaven but nothing was ac-
complished.
Exhibit 28 is a letter dated February 29, 1980 to Mr. Fagan of
Fairhaven claiming that Fairhaven 70 denier nylon was defective
and totalled $37,362.13. 200 denier nylon was defective and
totalled $13,198.54 or a grand total of $50,560.67. In addition
claims were made for loss of sales and air freight to replenish in-
ventories in Europe and loss of customers, sales and profits.
Exhibit 19A is a compilation of sales for the fiscal year 1978-79
totalling $1,023,054.
OE Wr
SER MAIN [ETT és
bes lo
23
Exhibit 19B is a compilation of sales for the fiscal year 1979-80
totalling $1,735,762.
Gaffney testified regarding European sales losses using exhibits
19A and 19B claiming a loss of $713,000. His computation was
based upon five months prior to the problem, five months during
and five months after. He also testified that 30% were the gross
profits on European sales. Based on five months, gross profits
allegedly lost amounted to $60,000.
Gaffney stated that in September and the fall and winter of 1979
goods were returned from Ireland in twenty foot containers which
McElroy inspected and then stored at Gonic Mills for $156.00
monthly. Half the space was used for other purposes so the cost
was $75.00 monthly. Subsequently in 1982 the goods were moved
to plaintiff's plant.
Exhibit 20 A-1 16 dated November 8, 1979 is shipment of
salvage 170 & 175 sheets seconds at reduced price.
Exhibit 20 B1-20 dated Apri! 15, 1981 is shipment of salvage 170
& 175 sheet seconds at reduced prices.
Exhibit 20 C-1-10 is shipment of salvage 170 & 175 sheet
seconds at reduced prices. All of the aforesaid shipments were to
Jaeger in France.
Gaffney stated that the returned goods were isolated and the
employees were told not to use them.
Exhibit 31 is a bulky exhibit of 70 denier nylon used as part of a
test of four different types of nylon. With experts present,
McElroy located an original roll of Fairhaven goods to use in this
test. The test attempted to duplicate the exact conditions.
Reference shall be made in more detail regarding these tests later
on in the opinion.
Gaffney testified that the plaintiff lost $111,000 in the fiscal
years 1979-80, 1980-81. He further claimed that he had to borrow
money in the fall of 1980 in the sum of $80,000 at interest varying
between 19-21%.
Exhibit 30 is a record of lease payments paid to Textile Tape
Corporation apparently a subsidiary of Jaeger, said payments
24
were increased according to the consumer price index in January,
1980, October, 1981 and November, 1982.
Exhibits FX X-1 are material submitted by Gaffney to Boulis and
Fagan showing delamination on February 2, 1980.
FX X-2 is material tie coated September 14, 1977 showing bub-
bling or delamination the same date.
FXX-3 is material showing delamination.
On cross-examination, counsel questioned the witness about the
fairness of the test using three year old material.
Exhibit FUU was also alluded to relative to the plaintiff cor-
poration assuming legal costs of $172,000 because of the alleged
misconduct by principals Gaffney and McElroy in the Massachu-
setts suit by their former employer, Chelsea Industries. The
credibility of both Gaffney and McElroy were attacked by counsel
based on the Master’s Report in exhibit FVV.
Exhibit FDD was introduced with special reference to page 5
where McElroy on October 4, 1978 complained relative to too
many seams in Schneider goods.
The complaints against the co-defendants only pertain to 70 and
200 deniers.
Exhibit FAA is Action business records, relating to purchase
and disposition of Fairhaven products.
Reference is made to John McElroy’s deposition at page 79 on
cross-examination of Gaffney where it was alluded that the
temperature was too high for nylon. McElroy didn’t testify at the
trial.
Co-defendants introduced exhibit FT(1-3) New Hampshire
Supreme Court advance sheets where McElroy sued Gaffney to
recover on a promissory note.
Exhibit GG is a four page memorandum concerning two prob-
lems, tension, loss in width, gain in length. M.D. means machine
direction. 7
Exhibit FEE dated April 29, 1982 is from United States
Testing Company, Inc. who examined a sample from Fairhaven
and one from another supplier. Under remarks is the following.
25
Exhibit FPP are plaintiff’s business records introduced to show
the large turnover in its employees. Forty-two had been ter-
minated or left.
Exhibit FWW are plaintiff's records relating to sales in
September and October, 1979.
Exhibit FU and 22 are the same and relate to credits to
customers.
Gaffney stated that he was not conversant with the formula of
ingredients, but McElroy was. After other tests it was determin-
ed by the plaintiff that the cause of the problem was the nylon by
deducticn.
Exhibit FKK lists possible causes of wrinkling. Defense counsel
on cross-examination alluded to FKK-14 which is an interoffice
memorandum from John McElroy to Larry Gaffney and Dave
Wormwood which states the following.
Lloyd Steves had an idea that makes sense to me. He
thinks that our problem results from the nylon being heat set
at too high temperature.
Gaffney was cross-examined through the use of McElroy’s
deposition. At page 38 of his second deposition, McElroy stated
that he didn’t know what went wrong.
Between the periods June 30, 1978 and January 16, 1980 the
plaintiff purchased 190,000 70 denier and 160,000 200 denier
yards from Fairhaven.
All sales in 1979 were sent to Europe. Some goods were being
air-freighted to Europe prior to the problem.
Gaffney stated that $23,500 was spent trying to correct defec-
tive goods and $16,415 spent on air freight, as well as $2,400 for
75 months of storage charges.
Fairhaven was the only supplier with goods in the finished state.
The plaintiff made direct payments to the finisher.
Exhibit FOO are Fairhaven invoices to the plaintiff and exhibit
FWW are plaintiff's business records relating to sales from April
12,1978 to January 1, 1981. 50,724 yards were sold in that period,
nce
26
PSNR BO
most of it from Fairhaven. Gaffney stated most of Fairhaven
goods kept coming back. Between the period September 18, 1979
and November 7, 1979 14,182 yards of 200 denier nylon were sold.
Exhibit FBBB is a suit filed in the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts by the plaintiff here with Lawrence A. Gaffney and Gerald
R. Graff joined as co-plaintiffs against Chelsea Industries alleging
loss of sales of $1,499,000.00, loss of profits of $1,203,000.00 or a
total of $3,803,000.00. This suit was filed in 1981.
At this point in the trial the defendant was cross-examined by
Attorney Brawer who is also a co-defendant.
Gaffney stated that $700,000 was put up by Jaeger, plaintiff's
landlord.
Attorney Brawer also elicited the evidence that 350,000 linear
yards were sold to the plaintiff by Fairhaven and most of the
Fairhaven goods were shipped to Europe.
Exhibit 34 ID is puckered paper, 33A ID is sample nylon fabric
used in tests at Albany International and when samples were cut
there were experts present from all parties.
Gaffney stated his son who testified later in the trial was in
charge of coating now, but not back in 1979.
Gaffney stated that sales declined in Juiy 1980 which could have
been due to the European holidays and the strong United States
dollar.
Gaffney also stated that Fairhaven goods were not manufac-
tured after September 17, 1979.
Exhibit FWW are the plaintiff's business records pertaining to
sales from April 1, 1978 through April 30, 1979 comprising seven-
teen pages. Tapes of totals are appended to pages 13, 16 and 17 to
various purchasers. See sum of 50,424 yards.
The next witness was Lois Perlman of Brooklyn, New York.
She was employed by the plaintiff from December 1977 until May,
1979. Prior to that she had been employed at Ideal Tape, pricing
and purchasing and also as a Secretary to Mr. Gaffney.
She testified that she had met Sam Werber prior to the summer
of 1978. Products were discussed and sensitive adhesive tape.
27
Exhibit 11 is the Werber note in her writing dated September
13, 1978 which quoted prices per yard in natural and black.
The terminology greige goods as explained to the court means
unfinished.
Exhibit 23A is invoices of Fairport Tape, a Fairhaven product.
Exhibit 25 is a letter dated April 25, 1979 from Lois Perlman to
Sam Werber with the following excerpts from this letter.
The 70 denier goods had broken edges. The goods look as
though they had shrunk and then were pulled out to the re-
quired width.
The 200 denier Oxfords are too soft. The finish is not what
we usualiy receive and even the construction of the goods
seems different. Please make sure that these goods are the
200 denier Oxfords that we order.
I would also request that when Kenyon puts up our goods
they should put 2000 yards on a roll—maximum. We would
also like the rolls properly packaged. They now come in on a
skid, lying down with a piece of cardboard on top and
strapped. The rolls are not compietely covered and the
material gets dirty.
Please advise us what is the difference in the 200 denier Ox-
ford as soon as you get this sample.
Lois Perlman received stock in Action but she returned it when
she leit their employ.
Irving Brawer of Haledon, New Jersey followed Lois Perlman
to the stand. He has a wealth of experience and knowledge of the
texiile industry as evidenced by his testimony on direct and cross-
exam nation.
Brawer dealt with Milliken to weave its goods. See exhibit 35
which s an acceptance order to weave 710,000 yards. Brawer
Brothers was to supply the yarn. ROM Weaving means Run Of
The Mill. It also means no warranty. Brawer explained that denier
relates to length and his major purchases are from Dupont. He ex-
plained some second quality goods purchased from Dupont are as
good as first quality goods, but are classified as second quality
solely because they are shorter. Attorney Brawer also explained
28
many textile terms. Yarn known as tail has as its purpose to tie
one package to another so yarn can continue to be woven.
“Transfer Tail.”’
Nylon is made from oils and chemicals and has to be dryed prop-
erly. .
His firm has been purchasing from Dupont since 1921 and in his
opinion their products are the best in the world. Frayed filaments
are broken filaments.
Exhibit 16 is defendant Brawer Brothers Dupont quality in-
dicator codes.
Exhibit 17 is Dupont’s offer of sale to Brawer Brothers in
March, 19838. The eighth line down shows a purchase of 64,313
pounds, the figure 11 means tails.
When interrogated the witness stated that the price differential
between first and second quality is 5 to 10 cents.
Exhibit 18 A D which is Dupont offers of sale to Brawer
Brothers on the third page line 14 shows a charge of $1.25 for a
different denier i.e. 50.
Brawer also lauded the capabilities of Milliken stating that they
had 92-96% efficiency as weavers.
He also stated that 160,000 of the 350,000 yards sold to the
plaintiff were 200 denier; 190,000 70 denier. The transactions
were done by Milliken weaving Brawer Brothers material, which
were returned to Brawer Brothers, sold to Fairhaven more or less
as a conduit, then sold to the plaintiff. A Mr. Margolis is comp-
troller for both co-defendants.
Exhibit 386A is evidence of charges by Milliken to Brawer
Brothers.
Brawer stated that all goods sent to the plaintiff were first quali-
ty. When Milliken would run short of goods supplied by Brawer
Brothers they would use their own.
Brawer himself did not handle sales to the plaintiff.
Exhibit 37 are invoices from Dupont to Brawer Brothers of sec-
ond grade whites only.
The background concerning the relationship of Brawer Brothers
and Fairhaven is that Fairhaven was a customer until 1966 when
29
it became insolvent. There was a merger. Brawer Brothers owns
50% of Fairhaven. Fairhaven is a textile convertor. Brawer
Brothers is the yarn dealer and supplier. Brawer, subject to objec-
tion testified that his company never had a similar complaint over
the years. He is now seventy-four years of age and has been in-
volved in management for 42 years.
Exhibit 37A-G pertains to some weaving and non-weaving yarn.
Plaintiff's next witness was Adi B. Chehna of Chelmsford, Mas-
sachusetts.
He formed a company in August of this year known as Textile
Services. This involves the testing, investigation and inspection of
fabrics. Chehna has a BA and a Masters degree from Lowell Tex-
tile.
Chehna had been employed at Albany International prior to go-
ing into business for himself. He did senior research there until
August 15, 1983. He started his employ there in 1974. In 1976 he
worked full time on claims and complaints. This was 100% in the
textile field. In the past seven years he has investigated more than
50 cases or claims involving nylon fibers. He claims his success
ratio is 90%.
He stated researching involves the following. What did the
finishing process involve, the state of the fabric before, weaving
size, yarn used in the warp or the length treated with process, oils,
starch removed, dyed or dried.
The witness stated that textile finish adds stability. To have an
even coat he stated an even amount of latex must be applied left to
right. In the production of nylon yarn the raw material or chips
are fed into a hopper and became viscous, it then goes through
holes called spinarettes so called, then solidified which are called
filaments, can be wound or put in draw zone to stretch, i.e. density
or denier.
Chehna explained technical terms such as low module product
which means that the material is less stiff. White yarn will not get
the same shade as yarns which are dyed or a variation of shades.
He also stated that by mixing lot numbers it could cause streaking.
i iis
30
While at Albany International, he analyzed greige and 70 denier
yarn at plaintiff's premises when McElroy asked for help. Chehna
recommended a trial at the plant using Fairhaven and goods from
other companies. Brawer and other experts were present. Prod-
ucts used were Schneider, new Fairhaven, old Fairhaven and Ix’s.
The same roll of papers was used, rolls were cut at 100 yards. The
following day the rolls were laminated on release paper. Speed
was checked, temperatures and amount of tie coat added. This
was in November, 1982. After the plant trial, the parties agreed to
seal the roll and take it to the laboratory. Samples were sent to
Brawer. Exhibit 33 AID is the sample. :
On test modules of yarn, Chehna stated that Schneider, new
Fairhaven and Ix’s were comparable 32.6, 30 grams per denier;
old Fairhaven 17.4 grams per denier which is a significant dif-
ference. Less modules, less stiff and less resistance and lack of
crystals.
Chehna’s opinion was that the cause of the problem was product
failure. The manner it reacted to tensions and the lacking of
stillness.
Chehna then was cross-examined by Brawer who alluded to Ex-
hibit FB3 which are plaintiff’s business records pertaining to the
dispute with Fairhaven. On July 11, 1980 there was evidence that
Ixs good delaminated.
Reference was then made to exhibit FFF and 15A which are
identical exhibits. They are reports from Albany International to
plaintiff's counsel dated August 20, 1982. Subject: Determine the
Cause of Delamination of Woven Nylon Fabric from Release
Paper.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 are incorporated in this opinion.
Sela
Table 1
Results of Greige Fabric Analysis
Fabric Nonfibrous Yarn
Weight Ends/ Picks/ Content Filament Count
Fabric Supplier (oz/yd?) Inch Inch (%) Warp i ‘Filling
Fairhaven 1.67 100 72 3.1 34 34
Schneider 1.63 102 68 1.3 17 34
Glen Raven 3.08 62 50 4.3 68 32
Yarn
Yarn Elongation
Tenacity at Break
Yarn Denier (gms/denier) (%)
Fiber Type Warp Filling Warp’ Filling Warp Filling
Nylon 6,6 74.5 76.4 4.34 4.20 34.0 32.6
Nylon 6,6 75.9 74.9 4.07 3.76 31.4 34.0
Nylon 6,6 215.0 216.0 3.96 4.03 21.2 18.3
iis
32
Table 2
Nonfibrous (Finish) Content of Submitted Finished Fabrics |
Nonfibrous Content
Fabric Supplier (%)
Fairhaven 1.9
Schneider 2.5
Glen Raven 1.4
Table 3
Dimensional Change in Finished Samples
Temperature As-Received Finish Removed
Fabric Supplier (°F) Warp Filling Warp Filling
Fairhaven 250 0.5 0.2 0 0.1
300 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.1
350 2.0 12 0.6 0.4
375 2.1 13 0.8 0.4
Schneider 250 0.3 0.3 0.1 0
300 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1
350 1.8 1.0 0.6 0.2
375 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.5
The recommendation was that Fairhaven, Schneider and Glen
Raven fabrics be processed at plaintiff’s plant at the same time in
the presence of Albany International Research, to obtain lami-
nated supplies for further testing.
Exhibit FEE is a report dated April 28, 1982 from United
States Testing Company to plaintiff’s counsel in which samples of
Fairhaven and goods from another supplier had been submitted to
determine similarities and/or differences in the submitted
samples. Under remarks and other observations is the following.
Pe Re > agers -
33
REMARKS:
The above indicate that both samples are of ‘“‘good quality”’
nylon, and that the warp yarns and the filling yarns in both
samples are probably from the same yarn producer.
OTHER OBSERVATIONS:
Microscopial examinations of specimens from each sample
stained in DuPont identification stain #4 reveals sample #1
has accumulations of the non adhesive coating on the top sur-
face of the fabric in the bubble areas, while sample #2 does
not.
Examinations under ultraviolet light reveals:
a) The adhesive layer of sample 1 is more fluorescent than
that of sample 2.
b) The non adhesive coating (after solvent removal of the
adhesive) of sample 1 is more fluorescent than that of sam-
ple 2.
c) The base fabric of both samples is non fluorescent after
removal of the adhesive and non adhesive coatings.
The remainder of August 22, 1983 commencing at 1:48 P.M.,
with a brief recess and until the court recessed at 4:20 P.M. was
involved in the inspection of the nylon roll and examination by all
counsel in an aura of informality.
Exhibit 15 B ID is a supplementary report of Albany Interna-
tional dated March 25, 1983 which is supplemental to the August
20, 1982 report.
The following is culled from Exhibit 15 B ID.
Storage of Laminated Fabric
The laminated fabric was stored in a closed room at Al
Research laboratories. The ambient air temperature and
humidity, although not specifically controlled, was relatively
stable and not subject to extremes or variations that occur in
other parts of the laboratory.
Inspection of Laminated Fabric
On December 17, 1982, Messrs. Gaffney, McElroy, Marsh,
Brawer, Grant and Panto met to open and inspect each of the
sealed laminated rolls from the November 11, 12, 1982 plant
trial.
34
The rolls were opened and inspected on a Measuregraph
machine. This machine is used in textile plants for the inspec-
tion of fabrics. The first roll inspected contained fabrics made
from 70 denier yarns. A comparison of the condition of the
laminated fabrics showed that the Original Fairhaven goods
(the subject of this dispute) clearly exhibited a delamination
from the release paper, which was described by Mr. Grant as
‘‘wormy.” The other three fabrics in this roll did not show the
“wormy”’ condition. It was noted that the ‘“‘wormy’”’ ap-
pearance exhibited by the Original Fairhaven goods proc-
essed in the recent plant trial was the same as that exhibited
by some of the laminated Fairhaven products submitted
earlier to AI Research by Action Manufacturing as represen-
tative of the problem in products manufactured by Action in
1980.
It was agreed that samples of Original Fairhaven laminated
fabric from the recent plant trial, showing this ‘“wormy’”’ con-
dition, would be forwarded to Mr. Brawer for his further ex-
amination and testing (see AI letter of December 23, 1982,
copy attached).
The second roll inspected contained fabrics made with 200
denier yarn. Both fabrics in this roll showed that delamination
had occurred, however, they did not exhibit the ‘“‘wormy”’ con-
dition noted earlier on Original Fairhaven goods. The
delamination in these fabrics was consistent with the earlier
prediction of Action representatives.
Laboratory Work
Samples of the finished fabrics constructed from 70 denier
yarns and used in the plant run on November 11 and 12, 1982
were submitted to Albany to establish whether they possessed
any important differences in physical/chemical properties
which could account for the ‘‘wormy”’ condition noted on the
laminated Original Fairhaven goods.
Warp yarn specimens from each of the samples were tested
for denier, breaking load and elongation. Additionally, the
tenacity and textile modulus were obtained. The textile
modulus is defined by ASTM as:
Textile Modulus—The ratio of change in stress to change in
strain in the initial straight line portion of a stress-strain
curve following the removal of any crimp. The ratio is calcu-
OT LE INS EST CRTC Un TTR th peter =
+ TEL ETO SES, AERA gE VRE
—
RARE TE BEM Y, Trained =
35
lated from the stress expressed either in force per unit linear
density or force per unit area of the original specimen, and
the strain expressed either as a fraction of the original length
or as percentage elongation.
A comparison of data showed that the warp yarn textile
modulus of the Original Fairhaven product was significantly
lower than that of other submitted finished products. The tex-
tile modulus of warp yarns in the Original Fairhaven product
was determined to be 17.4 grams per denier (gpd), whereas
the textile modulus of warp yarns in New Fairhaven,
Schneider, and Frank Ix products was determined to be 32.6,
30.5, and 30.9 gpd respectively. This finding strongly sug-
gests that the warp yarns in the Original Fairhaven product
possess important morphological differences when compared
to warp yarns in fabrics identified as New Fairhaven,
Schneider or Frank Ix.
As a result of the observed differences in modulus, fabric and
warp yarn specimens from New Fairhaven, Schneider and
Original Fairhaven finished products were subjected to
analysis using Differential Scanning Carorimetry (DSC).
Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) is a thermoanalyti-
cal technique used for the characterization of energy transi-
tions occurring in a polymer (fiber) as a function of
temperature and is used to measure the degree of crystallini-
ty. It is well known that synthetic textile fibers are comprised
of amorphous and crystalline areas, and the degree of crystal-
linity is a significant contributing factor to fiber tensile prop-
erties, such as strength, modulus and elongation.
DSC analysis clearly showed that a 5-10% difference in
crystallinity exists between the Original Fairhaven product
(i.e. warp yarn and fabric), and the other products tested.
More specifically, the Original Fairhaven product possesses
the least crystallinity; the crystallinities of the New Fair-
haven and Schneider products are higher, and very similar to
one another. Herice, it is clear that significant morphological
differences exist between the Original Fairhaven product and
the New Fairhaven and Schneider products.
Discussion
The original purpose of the collaborative effort was to deter-
mine if the Original Fairhaven goods under dispute behaved
36
differently than other fabrics, when subjected to Action’s
manufacturing process.
The results of the plant trial showed conclusively that the
Original Fairhaven product, after standing for approximately
30 days, behaved differently than others processed at the
same tirne.
Laboratory work to determine the possible cause of the
‘“‘wormy”’ delaminaticn of the original Fairhaven goods from
release paper showed that the textile modulus of warp yarns
in the finished Original Fairhaven fabric was significantly
lower than that of warp yarns in other fabric samples used in
plant trial.
This finding indicates that the Original Fairhaven finished
fabric is “‘less stiff’ or more easily extensible than the remain-
ing fabrics. Consequently, when handled under identical proc-
essing conditions as the other fabrics, it can be expected that
it would behave differently when laminated to release paner
and allowed to remain in storage for a period of time.
The use of Differential Scanning Calorimetry confirmed that
the finished Original Fairhaven product is significantly dif-
ferent in polymer morphology than either the finished new
Fairhaven or Schneider products which did not exhibit the
‘“‘wormy”’ delamination.
Conclusion
Based on the results of the plant trial conducted on November
12, 1982 and the physical testing of finished fabrics, it is con-
cluded that the Original Fairhaven product possesses impor-
tant inherent physical/chemical differences with respect to
modulus and crystallinity. In our opinion, these differences
are causative factors in the failure of that product, which was
the object of the investigation.
Exhibit 38 is work papers of old and new samples of Fairhaven.
Chehna stated that the 70 denier old Fairhaven goods showed
puckering and delamination. He also stated that no way could the
manufacturing process cause the problem. He also discounted the
age factor or humidity factor relative to the old Fairhaven goods.
Lawrence Gaffney of New Durham, New Hampshire, the son of
one of the plaintiffs co-owners next testified. He presently is the
Ne
37
Assistant Plant Manager and is in charge of production. He also
deals in sales one day a week and is also in maintenance.
In January, 1980 he worked the second shift and was in charge
of coating operations. Coating is normally done every day and
there are two coating machines known as 1A and 1B for tie
coating and adhesive coating. Both machines can do the same
operation.
In 1979 he stated that the coating process involved application
by use of a dipper. Tie coating was also called scrape coating. The
knife used could be scaled as low as 1/1000 of an inch and 4/16s of
an ounce to the square yard. If the coat was too heavy it couldn’t
get through the machine. Records were kept of the weight of each
roll as they were run.
Regarding heat controls, Gaffney stated each oven had a sensor
and where the fabric came through it was checked by a thermal
device. He stated problems were incurred initially when the
machinery was installed in 1978. There were giant blisters. Ex-
hibit 33 AID allegedly depicted small non heat blisters. He stated
that no problems were incurred with uneven coating. _
Regarding tension control on substrate, Gaffney stated this was
checked by an air operated brake similar to a disc on a motor vehi-
cle.
He testified that when rolls were returned in 1979 they were
stored at the plant in Sealand containers. Later approximately
107 rolls were moved to a warehouse one mile distant, put aside
and marked. Subsequently, they were moved back to the plant. He
stated that the lot sheet determines the supplier.
The witness also referred to exhibit 3, the April 15, 1983 inven-
tory of returned goods from Jaeger of approximately 108 rolls not
including sheets. He stated 4 rolls were not Fairhaven. He stated
total material costs were $29,829.25 plus $249.38. He also stated
that the sheet inventory was $8,693.59. The court’s figures were
$38,522.64.
He examined the rolls in 1982 to see if they could be unwound on
the machine. He stated none were of first quality.
38
On cross-examination by Brawer, he stated that he saw all the
rolls which were returned from Ireland and he examined the en-
tire roll introduced as exhibit 39, also known as roll 40. Also 18
rolls were rewound.
Attorney Hafer cross-examined relative to exhibits FB and FCC
(1-95) page 4 which relates to, the purchase and disposition of
Fairhaven products.
Attorney Barry cross-examined relative to his past work history
and background. He also elicited the fact that in 1979 there were
approximately 28 different employees involved in the coating
process at the plaintiff’s plant.
The witness also stated that in the 1A oven using a water base
there can be a 1° variation from the setting. Further readings in-
side and out of the oven can be a 5° plus or minus.
The final witness that the plaintiff called was Cushman Colby, a
C.P.A. He helped to form the plaintiff and participated in its
reorganization in the fall of 1978. The record shows why evidence
of business retardation was not permitted to be introduced by the
witness. The plaintiff's offer of proof on the issue is also on the
record.
The plaintiff rested.
Attorney Hafer stated that regardless of the third party com-
plaint of Fairhaven against Brawer Brothers, the goods were first
quality and if defective were due to the manufacturing process.
Attorney Barry also stated that the goods were first quality.
Irving Brawer was recalled as the first witness. Regarding the
test he supplied new goods to Fairhaven — he was present at the
tests in November, 1982 and the inspection of test results on
December 17, 1982. He stated that the 1982 Fairhaven goods
were the same as those supplied in 1979 and were received from
Dupont. Milliken wove with identical looms. The witness also
stressed that old Fairhaven goods were over 3 years old, the new
ones just a few days old.
At the test on November 11, 1982 the goods were tie coated 70
denier, then the 200 denier. Same procedure was used the next
day in the application of adhesive.
39
During early March, 1980 samples as represented by exhibits
FXX1, FXX2 and FXX83 were given to him by Mr. Fagin at his of-
fice. He also snipped portions of exhibits FYY Schneider and FZZ
Glen Haven for tests. He stated that they showed delamination
relative to length and width. The exhibits just alluded to were
given by Gaffney to Fagin. Brawer stated that after two weeks all
the exhibits showed delamination.
Brawer also testified that 70 and 200 denier were forwarded to
plaintiff’s plant for the test trial. He explained that merge means
lot and the practice is not to mix merges. Also, nothing but 70
denier was sent to Milliken, 200 denier was purchased from
Milliken and at the test all the goods looked all right with the ex-
ception of the 200 denier.
Samuel Fagin of Hartsdale, New York was the next witness. He
has been the President of Fairhaven since 1966. His experience in
the textile field commenced in 1938. He verified the fact that he
gave exhibits FXX1, 2 and 3 to Brawer and that he received the
samples from Gaffney on February 29, 1980. He also stated that
two weeks later they had a bubbly delaminated effect.
Braham Norwich of New York, New York was the expert
witness for the defendant.
He has impressive credentials. A 1938 graduate of R.P.I., he
commenced his work career in August, 1938. Norwich was
employed eventually by E! Paso Natura! Gas and Bancroft. He ter-
minated his employment with Bancroft in August, 1978. He is a
mechanical engineer.
His employment was varied in experience. He worked as a
chemist, machine design quality control and as a technical ir.
dividual.
In his employment he made rayon, spun nylon, dyed yarns, was
involved with large weavers, knitting machines and also was in-
volved in laminating.
Norwich has been designated as a fellow, has taught special
courses, seminars and has published in excess of 100 articles
40
In preparation for his testimony in this case he read reports of
Hooper, Albany International and other data. He also examined
the old Fairhaven fabric.
Mr. Norwich prepared a report dated October 14, 1982 which
was sent to Fairhaven, attention of I. Brawer, exhibit FGG (1-3).
Pertinent excerpts from his report are.
Subject: Inspect 100% nylon coated and mounted fabric and
comment on the potential cause of the surface distortion.
Fabric Submitted: 1 sample each
Sunbrite Lot 2063, laminated
Glen Raven 200 denier, laminated
Fairhaven 70 denier, laminated
Fairhaven 70 denier, laminated, (Bristol)
Fairhaven Original fabric, 200 denier
Fairhaven Original fabric, 70 denier
Introduction: TAG was informed that Fairhaven had sold a
100% nylon fabric to Action Manufacturing (Action) to be
used as shoe lining. Action applied a “‘tie coat’’ and subse-
quently an adhesive coat. The fabric was then mounted on a
silicon treated ‘‘release’’ paper. Action claims the fabric
distorts and forms bubbles and ridges. TAG was given
laboratory reports which analyzed several characteristics of
the Fairhaven and other fabrics.
Conclusion: Based upon the laboratory reports, TAG observa-
tions, and TAG experience with fabrics, it is concluded that
the f'airhaven 200 denier fabric is similar to the Glen Raven
200 denier fabric and is similar to parchment finished nylon
fabrics in the market.
It is believed the distorted fabric surface is caused by varia-
tions in the adhesive or its application and from excessive
stretching of the fabric during coating.
Succinetly his opinion was that the problem was in the manufac-
turing process.
At page two of exhibit FHH in regard to the specimens he
stated.
Specimens were cut from a smooth section of each of the
mounted samples. The specimens were heated at approxi-
41
mately 200° F for one minute. This treatment approximately
200° F for one minute. This treatment produces the effect of
aging of the fabric at normal temperature by softening the
adhesive. It was observed that the fabric surfaces bubbled.
The 200 denier specimens were removed from the release
paper and mounted on a soft finish paper. The filling yarns
per inch were observed to have increased. The fabric was
removed from the paper and it was observed that less paper
fiber adhered to the bubbled areas than to the non-bubbled
areas although all areas had been equally pressed to the
paper.
According to Norwich, he wrote the standards for the tests that
Chehna used. This was with reference to the similar exhibits in-
troduced as 15A and FFF C1-51. In his opinion, tables 1, 2 and 3
were all right. He pointed out in table 1 at page 3 of exhibit
FFF(1-5) that Fairhaven yarn 70 denier was significantly better
than Schneider or Glen Raven. Comment was also made on the
age differential of the yarns. Norwich was not very pleased with
the March 25, 1983 tests, see exhibit 15 B ID i.e. using new with
old goods. He stated nylon has age problems.
In explanation he referred to his experience during World War
II with nylon parachutes due to the lack of silk. He stated that
after one year the inventory on nylon parachutes had to be
refinished. According to him, nylon contracts with heat, has a
memory and wants to revert to its original form. Softness may
swell the nylon on variations in temperature and humidity.
Norwich then referred to Exhibit 15B ID especially the follow-
ing. The textile modulus of warp yarns in the original Fairhaven
product was determined to be 17.4 grams per denier (gpd), where-
as the textile modules of warp yarns in New Fairhaven, Schneider
and Frank Ix products were determined to be 32.6, 30.5 and 30.9
gpd respectively.
This finding strongly suggests that the warp yarns in the
Original Fairhaven product possess important morphological
differences when compared to warp yarns in fabrics identified
as New Fairhaven, Schneider or Frank Ix.
42
It was Norwich’s opinion that this was due to aging and in-
evitable the way the machinery was set up. Further that this was
not a respectable test. He further stated that the machinery could
be set up in a different manner when dealing with three year old
nylon.
On cross-examination the witness stated the knife blade is
critical, tension and the amount of adhesive used.
The witness was cross-examined extensively about Exhibit 39
which was a 1979 roll of goods.
He stated that it was rather difficult to accept the fact that the
exhibit was 1979 goods. He further stated that he was astonished
that Exhibit 39 looks as good as it does. He reiterated this on
many occasions even though there was a lot number and date veri-
fying the fact.
Regardless he stated that the nylon contracted due to aging. He
also stated that there was a bad machinery setup.
His opinion was first aging, secondiy humidity and aging; third-
ly, the start-up process and finally the Hooper theory with
reference to exhibit FGG (1-4) is a letter dated September 28, 1979
to John McElroy from A.L. Hooper of 8.D. Warren a Division of
Scott after a visit to plaintiff’s plant. Excerpts from said report
are.
I have developed some opinions on your production prob-
lems from both the data and the visit. They are as follows:
Two problems exist as I see it.
a. Tensions on the fabric are excessively high during the tie
coating operation. The fabric may be stretched during the
coating operation and then bound by the coating which is
dried on the stretched fabric. This effect would cause a loss in
width and a gain in length. The dry tie coating as well as ten-
sion, holds the fabric in this distorted situation. Exposure to
high humidity or steam weakens the coating’s strength allow-
ing the fabric to shrink in the machine direction. Cross direc-
tion expansion probably also takes place at the same time.
This problem may also be caused in the finishing operation,
however, the date available indicates this present problem is
caused in the tie coater operation.
eS SS
43
Isolating the tension in the tie coat section and lowering
tensions in the ovens may solve this problem.
With the previously mentioned problem neutralized, MD
shrinkage should be lessened or eliminated and part of the CD
growth eliminated.
b. Lamination of dry nylon to a more moist and dimensionally
stable release liner is probably causing MD welts. This prob-
lem is typical of lamination operations which laminate
substrates having different moisture levels. The nylon grows
nearly 3 times as much as the release liner when they start at
the same RH.
This explains the immediate MD welt problem off the
coater, on the outside wrap of rolls, as well as the problem of
welts after sheeting when subjected to high % RH. Even be-
ing in contact with higher % RH release liner in the roll form
could, given the time, cause moisture welts.
Adding moisture to the nylon during tie coating and
adhesive coating operations should help the % RH problem.
Moving lamination further away from the adhesive oven exit
would allow remoisturizing with additional! time for expansion
in fabric width before lamination. Steam may be more effec-
tive for remoisturizing as the nylon doesn’t appear to readily
accept moisture in the liquid form. By carefully controlling
both tension and moisture on your coaters, CD tunnels and
MD welts should be less of a problem to you in the future.
Norwich stated that there was excessive tension in the
machinery and no evidence that anything was wrong with the
fabric. It was also his opinion that goods should not be left in a
standing or upright condition.
The witness demonstrated by referring to exhibit 1 D, photo-
graph taken in Ireland of rolls standing up.
Norwich also referred to Exhibit FJJ(1-2) a report dated March
11, 1983 from Robert R. Grant to Irving Brawer who was present
on November 11, 12, 1982 at the Gonic, New Hampshire plant of
Action observing the actual lamination of various nylon goods to
paper. Grant was also present on December 17, 1982 when the
rolls had to be taken to Albany International in Dedham, Massa-
chusetts to be examined. Grant made the following observations.
44
I notice distortion on the product of the manufacturing
processes previously observed on November 12, 1982. There
were various degrees of distortion in the various pieces of
merchandise. On the basis of my examination I have come to
the definite conclusion that the cause of the distortions were
due solely to the methods used in the tie coating, adhesive
coating and laminating operation, and was in no way due to
the nylon material. Briefly, my opinion is based upon the
following:
(a) Tension in the goods which were uneven — resulting in
ridges contributing to uneven coating.
(b) The coating was applied unevenly, resulting in uneven
distribution of the tie coat and adhesive. This allows the
product to usually appear satisfactory at the time of lamina-
tion, but would permit delamination and distortion of the
product (blistering and separation of the nylon cloth from
the paper) after a period of time. In further explanation,
uneven coating would result in the retention of solvent in
those areas having thicker coating. Such thicker coating
would cause either some blistering in the oven or delamina-
tion after a period of time.
(c) Heat not properly controlled during processing would
result in blistering, which was evidenced when the IX goods
were being processed.
Norwich stated that exhibit 33 showed heat blisters because of
excessive temperatures and exhibit 39 shows evidence of uneven
coating.
In examination by Attorney Hafer reference was made to ex-
hibit FXX(1-3), Fairhaven fabric and the witness stated that the
delamination was not caused by the nylon. Referring to exhibits
FYY and FZZ Schneider and Glen Raven fabrics the witness
stated that the adhesive took a little while longer to break down,
tunnels show excessive temperatures and the edge of the paper
didn’t have contact with the adhesive.
Referring to Exhibit DDD plaintiff's manufacturing specifica-
tions dated November 23, 1979 under special instructions is the
following TENSION is critical.
45
Norwich also stated that the wormy patterns on exhibit 9 was
caused by too much tension and adhesive problems not at-
tributable to the fabric. Again, he stated that the testing of the
1979 Fairhaven fabric failure was due to aging of nylon and finish
which affected modules.
In commenting on exhibit FFF the witness stated that it was an
A 1 report, reasonable; nothing therein shows Fairhaven to be at
fault. 15B was not a fair report, the 17.4 grams were due to aging.
He did agree that Dupont has a high reputation for good nylon in
the industry.
Moving to more specific findings of fact by the court this case
was a complex trial taking nine days including one day involving a
view of the plaintiff's manufacturing plant. There has been a
plethora of paper which includes requests, memorandums, foot-
notes and post-trial memorandum filed with the court’s approval
of approximately seventy-seven pages.
The court finds that the credentials of the defendant’s expert,
Braham Norwich awesome, he is erudite, experienced to a high
degree in textiles, not unduly modest, but in this case testimony is
not very credible. The record amply records this, when one con-
siders the astute cross-examination of plaintiff’s counsel.
On the other side of the coin, the court in evaluating the
testimony of plaintiff’s principal expert, Adi B. Chehna, finds that
his background is not as extensive as Mr. Norwich, but his
testimony was very credible.
Succinctly the court in getting to the crux of the issue in this
case finds that the material supplied by Fairhaven was defective.
The defendant warranted to the plaintiff that the nylon fabric
was of first quality. RSA 382-A:2-313 (2). The court also finds that
there was an implied warranty of fitness. RSA 382-A:2-314.
Irving Brawer admitted that all of the goods purchased by the
plaintiff were first quality goods. The plaintiff was not aware of
the involvement of the third-party defendant until Fairhaven
brought a third party indemnification action. In this regard, the
46
court agrees with plaintiff’s contention that RSA 382-A:2-607 is
not apposite as to the allegation of lack of notice.
The plant trial test in 1982 used old and new Fairhaven goods,
as well as Schneider and ix’s. The court has already made refer-
ence to this test. The court agrees with Mr. Chehna’s conclusion
that the cause of the problems was product failure.
Defendants contend and the expert Norwich testified that this
was not a fair test as the old Fairhaven goods were over three
years of age at the time of the test in November, 1982. Perfect
identity between experimental and actual conditions is neither at-
tainable or required. Hanson v. Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc., 110 N.H.
377, 380 (1970). See Ramseyer v. General Motors Corporation,
417 F.2d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 1969).
Admissibility of evidence depends upon a foundational
showing of substantial similarity between the tests conducted
and actual conditions. See, Skosgen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375
F.2d 692, 704 (8th Cir. 1967); Gillam v. J.C. Penney Co., 341
F.2d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 1965); Larson v. Meyer, 161 N.W. 2d
165 (N.D. 1968); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb.
394, 397, 138 N.W.2d 627 (1944). Perfect identity between ex-
perimental and actual conditions is neither attainable nor re-
quired. Lobel v. American Airlines, 205 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.
1953). Dissimilarities effect the weight of the evidence, not
admissibility. See, Lever Bros. Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co., 131
F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1941). Finally, the decision whether to ad-
mit or exclude evidence of experiments in a particular case
rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge and his deci-
sion will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear showing
of an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Skogen v. Dow Chemical
Co., supra; Ripp v. Riesland, 180 Neb. 205, 141 N.W.2d 840
(1966); Reizenstein v. State, 165 Neb. 865, 87 N.W.2d 560
(1958); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., supra.
The court agrees with plaintiff's counsel’s contention that the
plant trial exhibit was the most probative evidence introduced at
the trial.
Credible evidence was also introduced that fabrics from another
supplier were used without untoward results.
a ee ee ae |
47
The court finds that the plaintiff has sustained its burden of
proof on the issue of liability by a balance of the probabilities. Bu/f-
fum v. Buffum, 89 N.H. 210.
It is also fundamental that the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing its damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff
also has the duty to mitigate damages. Murray v. Boston Main
RR, 107 N.H. 367.
Any undertaking to establish the amount of future gains
prevented is likely to encounter difficulty in satisfying the re-
quirement of reasonable certainty of proof. Restatement of
Contracts, s. 331 and Comments (1932); Salinger v. Salinger,
69 N.H. 589, 591, 45 A. 558, 559 (1899). An established
business can usually provide data from which future pros-
pects can reasonably be projected. Buck v. Mueller, 221 Or.
271, 351 P.2d 61 (1960). Where operations have never com-
menced, evidence of expected profits has generally been con-
sidered incompetent because speculative. 22 Am. Jur. 2d
Damages s. 173 (1965).
The difficulty of determining the sum which will recom-
pense a person for the wrongful act or omission of another is
not ordinarily regarded as a sufficient reason for not allowing
the injured party any damages.”’ Lee v. Dow, 71 N.H. 326,
327, 51 A. 1072, 1073 (1902). “By the weight of authority, and
what we believe to be the better view, uncertainty as to the
amount is no reason for disallowing [recovery] when the
uncertainty is caused by the defendant’s unexcused breach of
the agreement.”” McLaughlin v. Union-Leader, 100 N.H. 367,
369, 127 A.2d 269, 271-72 (1956); see 5 Williston, Contracts,
ss. 1345, 1346 (rev. ed. 1937); 5 Corbin, Contracts s. 1022, at
139, 1433-45 (1964).
Van Hookjdonk v. Langley, 111 N.H. 32, 34, 35 (1971).
The plaintiff has made a claim relative to transportation of
defective goods to European countries. More accurately the ex-
pense of return shipments from Ireland. The sum of $2,457.81 is a
recoverable expense. ‘
Next, the plaintiff seeks recovery for storage of the defective
goods. The goods were initially stored nearby in a rented facility, a
48
short distance from its Gonic, New Hampshire plant. Other
materia! was also stored in the same warehouse. The pro-rata cost
of $75.00 a month for a period of 45 months, totalling $4,375.00 a
month, the court finds to be reasonable and fair.
Due to the return of the defective goods the plaintiff had to ship
replacernent goods by air freight. The total cost of $2,653.43 is
recoverable by the plaintiff.
It is thé court’s finding that the plaintiff has met its burden of
proof of establishing that the material cost represented by the re-
maining inventory of defective goods produced from defendant’s
fabric was the sum of $38,622.40.
The sum of $9,012.00 with respect to the loss on salvage sales of
defective goods is also allowed as an element of damages.
The court now addresses the claim of the plaintiff for lost pro-
fits. Van Hookjdonk v. Langley, supra.
‘In the case of a breach of contract, the goal of compensation is
not the mere restoration to a former position, as in tort, but the
awarding of a sum which is the equivalent of performance of the
bargain — the attempt to place the plaintiff in the position he
would be in if the contract had been fulfilled.’”” C. McCormack,
Law of Damages § 137, at 560-61 (1935). Emery v. Caledonia Sand
& Gravel Co., 117 N.H. 441, 447.
Damages for lost profits for the year 1980 in the sum of
$86,669.97 are awarded.
The plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof for lost prof-
its in the year 1981.
The plaintiff is entitled to a total judgment against the defend-
ant in the sum of $142,790.26.
It has been agreed that Fairhaven in its counterclaim is entitled
to recover the sum of $33,543.92.
Finally, the court addresses the issue of Fairhaven’s requests
for findings of fact and ruling of law not in a mordant or caustic
manner, but hopefully in a remedial sense.
The problem presented is not one of first impression, neither is
it one which the court has not encountered before, and in all proba-
bility will be faced with again in the future.
49
In refusing to rule on these requests, the court has made com-
prehensive rulings of its own in this forty-three page opinion.
Before ruling on Fairhaven’s requests for findings of fact and
rulings of law which at first blush, appear quite reasonable in
number, i.e. 37, a circumspect examination discloses that the ploy
of incorporating four or as many as seventy-six requests in one is
prevalent throughout. For example, request number 1 actually has
5 requests incorporated therein; Request #15, 7; request #23 no
less than 70, more accurately 76. At this point the court has
stopped counting. In addition by not specifying exactly, succinct-
ly, pristinely and concisely some of the requests are correct,
others are not, some necessitate a judge requiring a mnemonic, or
a photographic memory.
Counsel’s attention is directed to Concord General Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Haynes, 110 N.H. 76, 79 (1969) concerning re-
quests.
There are some ambiguities in the findings, and the number
and form of the requests submitted by the parties here invited
ambiguity. The trial Court made rather brief findings of his
own and then stated: ‘‘Further recital is unnecessary, as the
Court has answered the ninety-six requests submitted by
counsel.” This mild comment understated the number of re-
quests and complexity of the task counsel imposed upon the
Court. Concord in many cases included a half dozen or more
requests under a single number. They included requests to
find what parties claimed in their testimony and to make
hypothetical rulings of law. The procedure employed here was
contrary to the design of RSA 491:15 which ‘‘was to provide a
simple and expeditious method of presenting to the law court
the questions of law arising on the facts proven, as distin-
guished from the evidence.” Tilton v. Sharpe, 84 N.H. 393,
396, 151 A. 452; Gowen v. Swain, 90 N.H. 383, 385, 10 A.2d
249.
Reference is also made to R.J. Berke & Co. v. J.P. Griffin, 116
N.H. 760 (1976) and the following comment at page 762.
50
The proceedings, heard by a Judicial Referee (Blandin, J.),
were lengthy resulting in a voluminous record and many ex-
hibits. The parties showed little inclination to reduce this com-
plexity or to assist the trial court. The parties ignored the
design of RSA 491:15 as succinctly set forth in Concord
General Mutual Insurance Company v. Haynes, 110 N.H. 76,
79, 260 A.2d 99, 101 (1969), and the plaintiff filed 177 re-
quests for findings and rulings and the defendant 993 such re-
quests.
Reference is also made to Rule 52(a) R.F.C.P. regarding re-
quests and the following commentary.
Findings of fact aid in the process of judgment and in defin-
ing for future cases the precise limitations of the issues and
the determination thereon. Thus they not only aid the ap-
pellate court on review, Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 1943, 136 F.2d
796, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 66, but they are an important factor in
the proper application of the doctrines of res judicata and
estoppel of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1 F.R.D. 25, 26-27.
United States v. Forness, C.A.A. 2, 1942, 125 F.2d 928, cer-
tiorari denied €2 C. Ct. 1298, 316 U.S. 694, 86 L. Ed. 1764.
These findings should represent the judge’s own determina-
tion and not the long, often argumentative statements of suc-
cessful counsel. United States v. Forness, supra; United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 1944, #945, 65 S. Ct. 254,
323 U.S. 173, 89 L. Ed. 160. Consequently, they should be a
part of the judge’s opinion and decision, either stated therein
or stated separately. Matton Oil Transfer Corp. v. The
Dynamic supra. But the judge need only make brief, definite,
pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested mat-
ters; there is no necessity for over-elaboration of detail or par-
ticularization of facts. United States v. Forness, supra. See
also Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. New York Cen-
tral R. Co., C.C.A. 2d, 1942, 126 F.2d 992; Brown Paper Mili
Co., Inc. v. Irwin, C.C.A. 8, 1948, 1384 F.2d 337; Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 8, I.B.E.W., C.C.A. 2, 1944,
145 F.2d 215, reversed on other grounds 65 S. Ct. 1533, 325
51
U.S. 797; Young v. Murphy, Ohio 1946, 9 Fed. Rules Serv. 52
a. 11, Case 2.
September 29, 1983
Martin F. Loughlin |
U.S. District Judge
Alan Ponn, Esq.
Peter Karl Marsh, Esq.
Edward A. Haffer, Esq. ~
Irving C. Brawer, Esq.
James J. Barry, Jr., Esq.
52
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 85-1429
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.
Plaintiff, Appellee
Vv.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION
Defendant, Appellant
Verified Petition for Rehearing En Banc
WM. S. GREEN -
JAMES E. HIGGINS
EDWARD A. HAFFER
SHEEHAN, PHINNEY, BASS & GREEN
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
1000 Elm Street
Manchester, New Hampshire 03301
(603) 668-0300
53
Respectfully, we submit that the Court, in its severe censure and
fine of Fairhaven’s counsel, has grievously misapprehended facts.
Because of the reputation-shattering effect of this terrible mis-
take, we respectfully request a rehearing before the Court en
bane. Contrary to what the Court apprehended from oral argu-
ment, Fairhaven’s Answer was correct when made and is correct
even now, and its Pretrial Statement was correct when made and
is correct even now. Though the point was not made in oral argu-
ment, when Fairhaven said in its Pretrial Statement, ‘‘All other
facts are contested,’’ the issue on notice was joined, and its duty of
disclosure to Action was discharged. If Action did not understand
that point, then it did not understand its own burden of proof. In
light of these critical facts, we respectfully submit that the Court’s
opinion is mistaken — and given the consequences, tragically
mistaken. Because of the resulting irreparable damage to reputa-
tion, we respectfully request that, pending a decision on the Peti-
tion itself, the Court immediately counteract any steps it may have
taken to give the Opinion wide circulation. Explanations follow.
The governing law is RSA 382-A:2-607(3\a) (a New Hampshire
UCC provision), which provides, “‘Where a tender has been ac-
cepted ... the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy.” We describe below how
this Section operates in this case.
An enlarged statement of the facts appears at pages 1-4 of Fair-
haven’s original brief. Set out here are the pleadings that are at
the root of the Court’s misapprehension. Full context being vital,
here are paragraphs 7-11 of the Complaint (A. at 10) and the cor-
responding paragraphs of the Answer (A. at 14):
7. Pursuant to the contract and agreement set forth in para-
graph 6 above, Plaintiff prepared in New Hampshire and sub-
mitted to Defendant numerous purchase orders for 70 and
200 denure [sic] nylon. Defendant accepted the purchase
orders, proceeded to procure the goods and have them fin-
ished, whereupon they were shipped at various times and
from various locations to Plaintiff’s plant in Rochester, New
54
Hampshire. Plaintiff was billed by Defendant for the goods
subsequent to their arrival in New Hampshire.
7. Admitted.
§. During the summer and early fal! of 1979, pursuant to the
contract and agreements set forth above, Defendant sold 70
and 200 denure [sic] nylon to Plaintiff which was defective
and not fit and suitable for the purpose and use for which it
was intended. Plaintiff was unable, even with reasonable in-
spection, to discover the defects in the goods before they had
been processed and sold to customers in the United States
and Europe.
8. Denied. f
9. Subsequent to the processing and sale of these defective
goods, Plaintiff received complaints and notices from custom-
ers that the goods were defective and could not be used for
their intended purpose.
9. Without sufficient knowledge.
10. Because of these complaints, Plaintiff commenced to in-
vestigate the problem since it did not at that time know the
cause of the defect. As a result of that investigation, Plaintiff
determined that the cause of the defect was the defective
nylon fabric which had been shipped to Plaintiff by the De-
fendant. Said nylon was not fit for its intended use.
10. As to any investigation, without sufficient knowledge.
As to the nylon being defective or unfit, denied.
11. Immediately upon discovery of said defects in the nylon,
Plaintiff notifed Defendant and requested that Defendant
remedy the situation and compensate Plaintiff for the losses
which it sustained as a result of said defective material.
Although Defendant’s agent came to Plaintiff’s plant and per-
sonally inspected the said defective goods, Defendant has
refused to remedy the situation.
11. As to any defects, denied. As to notification of a prob-
lem, admitted. As to Defendant’s agent coming to Plaintiff's
plant to inspect goods, admitted.
Fairhaven’s admission on notice in paragraph 11 was correct
when made and is correct even now. The following paraphrase of
paragraphs 8-11 of the Complaint helps make the point plain:
55
1. “During the summer and early fall of 1979,” Plaintiff
bought defective nylon from Defendant.
2. After the purchase, Plaintiff processed it.
3. After the processing, Plaintiff sold it to customers.
4. After the sales, customers complained.
5. After the complaints, Plaintiff investigated.
6. As a result of the investigation, Plaintiff discovered that
Defendarit’s nylon was, allegedly, defective.
7. Immediately upon discovery of ‘‘said defects,’’ Plaintiff
notified Defendant.
Under the Complaint and Answer, therefore, the “‘said defects”
concerned those items which (1) Defendant had sold to Plaintiff
“(djuring the summer and early fall of 1979,” and (2) had been the
subject of Plaintiff's later investigation. The evidence was that
these items were sold to Action in July and September 1979 (A. a‘
476-78), and that Action discovered the alleged defects in them on
or about September 17, 1979. (T. 2 at 50, 96; T. 3 at 107-08.)
Defendant admitted receiving timely notice on these September
items, and without any equivocation whatsoever still admits
receiving timely notice on the September items. As we explain
below, however, under Section 2-607 (aX3), the timely notice on
these items became immaterial when it was later revealed that
there had been a failure of notice on earlier, June items. (T. 3 at
158-72; A. at 260 and 292.)
In the simplest form, the sequence of events leading to litigation
was as follows. In early June 1979, Action discovered problems
with Fairhaven items that had been purchased before June (the
“June items’’); on these, it never gave Fairhaven notice. In
September 1979, it discovered problems with Fairhaven items
that had been purchased in July and September (the “September
items’’); on these, it gave Fairhaven timely notice. By operation of
Section 2-607(3\a), despite the timely notice on the September
items, Action would be barred from any remedy, because it had
not given timely notice on the earlier, June items. The rationale is
that if Action had given timely notice on the Jane items — whether
or not it later claimed damages on them — Fairhaven could have
ee
Ae oe ae well
56
then taken steps to avert any later problem. See pages 4-14 of
Fairhaven’s original brief.
As for the sequence of events during litigation, for the first 2-3/4
years of the case, notice was not an issue. However, just 2 months
before Pretrial Statements were filed, Action made it one. It did
so by answering an interrogatory on how it calculated its
damages. (T. 3 at 162-72.) Action answered that it had suffered
losses in June 1979, when customers began returning Action prod-
ucts made with Fairhaven nylon. Never before had the June items
been disclosed to Fairhaven, despite extensive discovery. In rais-
ing the issue of June items, Action necessarily raised also the issue
of notice on the June items. Neither had been raised in its Com-
plaint. Action’s answer to interrogatory therefore put all parties
on notice that notice had now become an issue.
The misapprehension of Fairhaven’s Pretrial Statement follows
from the misapprehension of its Answer. By the time the Pretrial
Statement was filed, the uncontested fact of timely notice on the
September items had become immaterial. What had become
material instead — specifically in terms of the bar against ‘‘any”’
remedy under Section 2-607 (aX8) — was whether Action had in
fact given timely notice on the June items. If it had not, it would
then be barred from “‘any’”’ remedy, despite the uncontested fact
of timely notice on the September items. In its Pretrial Statement
under “‘Uncontested Facts’’ (A. at 26-27), Fairhaven summarized
the essence of the material facts it believed uncontested; it said
nothing about timeliness of notice because that was a fact it was
going to contest. Under ‘‘Contested Facts’ (A. at 28), it said, “‘All
other facts are contested.’”’ (Emphasis added.) With that statement,
the issue on notice was joined, and Fairhaven’s duty of disclosure
to Action was discharged. If Action did not understand that point,
then it did not understand its own burden of proof.
Fairhaven did not specifically tell Action that its own answer to
interrogatory on damages had made notice an issue. Its legal
reason was that it had no duty to do so. “‘Nottfication under sec-
|
57
tion 2-607 is an integral part of a buyer’s cause of action and is not
an affirmative defense of the seller. Therefore, the buyer must both
plead and prove that the notice requirement has been complied
with.”’ Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532
F.2d 957, 970 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). Royal Type-
writer Co. v. Xerographic Supplies, 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (11th Cir.
1983); K & M Joint Venture v. Smith International, Inc., 669 F.2d
1106, 1111 (6th Cir. 1982); Standard Alliance Ind. v. Black
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 823 (6th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 441
U.S. 923 (1979). Here, therefore, the burden of proof was on Ac-
tion, not Fairhaven. If Action did not understand its burden — in
particular, its burden of proving timely notice on the June items —
Fairhaven should not be punished for it. And under no circum-
stances should Fairhaven’s counsel be excoriated and fined.
It is inconceivable, moreover, that Action — having itself gone
outside its Complaint to raise the issue of the June items, and
necessarily to raise also the issue of notice on the June items —
could have ben unfairly prejudiced by being met with them at
trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended
and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of
the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon
the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence.
Having itself raised the June issues, Action could not have fairly
objected to them at trial. As it was, it made no objection anyway.
58
It did not object to the evidence showing June discovery (T. 3 at
158-72), nor to the closing argument of Fairhaven’s counsel on the
legal significance of that evidence (T. 8 at 132-37). Nor did it re-
quest a continuance to meet that evidence. Indeed, most stunning-
ly of all, Action itself put into evidence a list of June credits to
customers on the June items. (Compare A. at 260 and 292, and see
T. 3 at 158-61, all set out in the Appendix at the rear of this Peti-
tion.) The fact that in mid-trial Action professed to ‘‘reconcep-
tualize” (T. 3 at 304) its claim for damages, dropping the claim on
the credits, does not negate the operation of Section 2-607(a\3).
Our statement from page 5 bears repeating here: ‘“‘By operation of
Section 2-607(aX3), despite the timely notice on the September
items, Action would be barred from any remedy, because it had
never given notice on the earlier, June items. The rationale is that
if Action had given timely notice on the June items — whether or
not it later claimed damages on them — Fairhaven could have then
taken steps to avert any later problem. See pages 4-14 of Fair-
haven’s original brief.’’ Again, if Action did not appreciate the full
import of Section 2-607(a\3) and, therefore, did not understand its
own burden of proof, Fairhaven should not be punished for it, and
its counsel should not be humiliated.
In suggesting on page 4 of its Opinion that Fairhaven had ‘‘con-
ceded”’ timely notice on the June items, the Court is mistaken.
Fairhaven never did. Its only concession concerned the September
items, the only ones covered by the Complaint. To repeat, so that
there is absolutely no mistake about it: Fairhaven admitted and
continues to admit that as a matter of fact it received timely notice
on the September items; however, as a matter of law under Section
2-607(a\3), the timely notice on these items became immaterial
when it was later revealed that there had been a failure of notice
on the June items. Again, see pages 4-14 of Fairhaven’s original
brief.
Likewise, the Court is mistaken on page 4 in suggesting that
Fairhaven attempted after the close of the case (or at any other
time) to withdraw its admission to paragraph 11 of the Complaint.
Here is what Fairhaven’s counsel argued to the trial court:
mer we! 4 co cde cet
59
Without going into the details of the interrogatories read
into the record, but it’s there and I’ll assure the Court that it’s
there [see T. 3 at 162-72], we found out that Action claims in
answers to interrogatories read into the record that its losses
it actually calculated from June of 1979, not September of
1979, after which it gave notice. And I believe Mr. Brawer in-
dicated the only evidence on relatively precise date of notice
was sometime in October or November that Fairhaven was
told there was a problem.
But the answers to Fairhaven’s interrogatories read into
the record indicates that Fairhaven — or that Action, rather,
had customers return goods in June of 1979, not September.
In June of 1979. And it indicated that for Blue Ribbon Sports,
for Dori Shoes and for the Oncor [sic] Shoe Corporation. June
of 1979 was when customers started returning the defective
products.
And that meshes perfectly with Exhibit FU. Exhibit FU is
the list of credits that Action now disavows any interest in
terms of damages. That’s fine. That’s beside the point.
Exhibit FU is still significant, because it shows that, in con-
junction with the testimony of Mr. Gaffney, that these were
the credits that Action issued to customers upon the return of
goods that were defectively made with Fairhaven products.
That is emphatically the state of the record.
And if that is so, and indeed it is so, it’s uncontroverted,
there was an obligation under RSA 382-A:2-607(3) to give rea-
sonable notice of those returned goods for which credits have
been given and for which Action said the defect was caused by
Fairhaven. No such notice was given.
Some time after September 17th notice 1s given. And Exhibit
FU shows that there were I believe eight credits issued in
June, the earliest of which was June 6, 1979. There were also
credits on June 7, 1979 to Jaeger.
No notice. Fairhaven is led down the primrose path. I don’t
known whether the foot bone wasn’t connected to the head
bone in Action or what, but there was no notice sent to
Fairhaven until some time after September 17, 1979.
What happens between June and September 17, 1979?
First, no notice.
Second, Action buys on July 24, 1979 and September 10,
1979, September 13, 1979, 202,000 yards of Fairhaven prod-
ucts. [T. 8 at 134-36 (emphasis added). ]
60
At pages 4-5 of its Opinion, the Court says, ‘‘During oral argu-
ment a colloquy revealed that, prior to the pretrial statement of
issues, defendant had discovered grounds for claiming that its ad-
mission in its answer was incorrect, but had concluded to remain
silent. Asked why, counsel said,
“(We had a reason for not tipping our hand.”
Court. ‘“You wanted to fool the court?’ |
Counsel. “‘No, we did not. We did not want to be fooled by the
[plaintiff.]’’
The Court’s description does not have counsel saying that the ad-
mission in Fairhaven’s Answer was incorrect, and counsel does
not know what he actually said. See the accompanying Motion to
Hear Tape. If he said what the Court describes, he was wrong. See
pages 2-5 and 10-11 of this Petition. Counsel answered the Court’s
questions extemporaneously. He had not examined Fairhaven’s
Answer of Pretrial Statement either in preparation for argument
or during it. Though his preparation on the law and the
voluminous exhibits and transcripts had been extensive, he had
not in his wildest imagination anticipated any question on the
Answer, then 5 years old, or the Pretrial Statement, then 212
years old. Counsel profoundly regrets that his oral argument con-
tributed to the misapprehension of both. However, the fact re-
mains that both the Answer and the Pretrial Statement were cor-
rect when made and are correct even now.
Fairhaven’s reason for not “‘tipping its hand”’ to Action — i.e.,
not specifically telling Action that its own answer to interrogatory
on damages had made notice an issue — was part legal and part
factual. The legal part was that it had no duty to do so. See pages
6-7 of this Petition. The factual part was distrust. Obviously, if
there had been a legal duty, distrust would have been no excuse
for nonperformance. Here, however, no duty existed: Action, not
Fairhaven, had injected the notice issue into the case by claiming
damages on the June items, of which Fairhaven had had no prior
knowledge; Action, not Fairhaven, had the burden of proof on this
injected issue; and Fairhaven had joined the issue by the “‘Con-
asa a
rls eum
ee ne a, ee
nan aA ath ah it nie nce
61
tested Facts” statement of its Pretrial Statement — itself a com-
plete tip of the hand to an opponent that understood its own
burden of proof. Though the distrust had many elements (see
Fairhaven’s original and reply briefs), the heart of it was that Ac-
tion’s president had submitted false evidence in prior litigation.
Put in evidence at trial was a 1979 Report of the Master of the Suf-
folk County (Mass.) Superior Court in an action brought against
the president by his former employer (A. at 373-448; T. 3 at 90-95).
The Master found among other things that the president had: (1)
caused a false invoice to be placed in evidence, unbeknownst to his
counsel; (2) directed the payment of bribes or kickbacks; (3) lied to
his former employer; (4) given compietely incredible testimony;
and (5) committed at least thirteen separate breaches of fiduciary
duty. Fairhaven’s counsel feared falsification again; and having no
duty to school Action on the implications of its damages claims or
its burden of proof, he honored his duty, completely within the law
and in conflict with no other, to protect his own client against an
opponent with such a past.
Even if the Court disagrees with the merits of counsel’s legal
arguments, he has discharged all his duties in absolute good faith
and with close attention to what he believes to be the law. The
stinging rebuke and public humiliation inflicted on him is, there-
fore, as mystifying as it is painful.
It is worth noting that the Trial Court, who saw and heard all
the evidence and all the arguments, closed the trial saying:
I'd just like to make one comment before I leave the bench.
And I’m sorry Mr. Brawer isn’t here.
And that is, that I commented during the trial in chambers
to my personnel that this case has been very well tried by all
parties. Counsel did a lot of work and it’s a very intricate, dif-
ficult case to decide, you know that, but you made it a lot
easier by the way you presented it and the time you put into
it, the exhibits, the way everything went in, and you’ re to be
commended.
And I’m sorry Mr. Brawer isn’t here to hear what I have to
say. And maybe you could get that part of the record for him.
[T. 8 at'166-67.]
62
If allowed to stand, the effect of the mistake in the Appellate
Court’s Opinion would be ravaging. Terrible damage has already
been inflicted. With every respect, we request that:
1. pending a decision on the Petition itself, and because of ir-
reparable damage to reputation, the Court immediately counter-
act any steps it may have taken to give the Opinion wide circula-
tion;
2. pending a decision on the Petition itself, and because of ir-
reparable damage to reputation, the Court withdraw the Opinion;
3. the Court grant a rehearing en banc on the characterization
of counsel;
4. the Court grant a rehearing en banc on the notice issue, and
on any other issue the Court might see fit to hear; and
5. the Court grant such further relief as it deems just.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: March 4, 1986
Wm. S. Green
James E. Higgins
Edward A. Haffer
Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green
Professional Association
1000 Elm Street
Manchester, NH 03101
(603) 668-0300
I, Edward A. Haffer, affirm under oath that the facts stated in
this Verified Petition are true to the best of my knowledge and
belief.
Edward A. Haffer
63
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March, 1986.
Justice of the Peace
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of this Verified Petition have
been sent to Peter Karl Marsh, Esq., Irving Brawer, Esq., and
James J. Barry, Jr., Esq.
Wm. S. Green
vv Exhibits omitted.
64
UNITED STATES COURT OF APP®ALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 85-1429.
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
Vv.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellant.
ORDER OF COURT
Entered: March 7, 1986
Before writing the opinion the court had transcribed the portion
of the tape relevant to the present question. A copy of this tran-
scription is hereto attached. This has been re-checked against the
tape, and there are few, very slight, but entirely inconsequential
errors. The court does not normally make tapes available, but will
do so in this case on further request.
By the Court:
FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO,
CLERK.
[cc: Messrs. Haffer and Marsh. ]
badet ill
i
65
H. From Fairhaven’s view there are two simple but key points.
One as a matter of law Action not give timely notice is therefore
barred under section 2-607 of the UCC.
BA. I didn’t see any evidence addressed to that point. Was
there?
H. Yes, your honor, there was. In the first place there was evi-
dence that initially Action had claimed to have discovered the
defects on September 17, 1979 and that after that it said it had
notified Fairhaven. Later, and when this evidence was introduced
at trial, two and half years later in the course of discovery it was
revealed that Action had actually discovered there were defects in
the products in June of 1979 and that it gave customers credits for
those defects involving some 2,000 yards and some $3500 dollars.
That evidence was put in at trial showing that as early as June and
not September as Action had originally alleged as early as June
Action was aware that there were defects in its products.
BA. Where in your pretrial statement did you raise that point?
H. We did not specifically raise it your honor.
BA. Not only did you not specifically but the answer says just
the opposite — that you admit due notification. You might have
changed your mind from the time that you answered. But you cer-
tainly didn’t change it on the pretrial memorandum that was
before the court.
H. Your honor, I believe in the answer to the complaint we
denied any defects and further the point is, your honor—
BA. I’m sorry perhaps this bothers me too much but it does.
Paragraph 11 of the complaint ‘immediately upon discovery of
said defects in the nylon plaintiff notified defendant that etc.”
Answer to paragraph 11, “‘as to any defects, denied; as to notifica-
tion of the problem admitted.
H. At that point we did admit it —
BA. Ok, then you didn’t change it and that’s where we went
back to where I started, you didn’t put it in the pretrial memoran-
dum that you had changed it.
H. It was a matter of evidence before the court and we discov-
ered that —
66
BA. I’m not interested in a review in court as to what the evi-
dence was until I see what the court thought what the evidence
was, and related to, and the court thinks about a pretrial
memorandum.
H. Your honor, we put in — we discovered 21 years after we
filed that answer —
BA. After you filed the pretrial memorandum?
H. No your honor, before that.
BA. That was the time, wasn’t it?
H. Yes your honor, we did discover, —
BA. All right, go on to your next point.
H. All right your honor —
BA. As far I’m concerned you’re dead on this one.
H. Well, if I may, part of the reason for the evidence that was
put in, it was shown that in June of 1979. —
BA. So it was, but the court looks at a pretrial memorandum.
I’ve sat on the district court off and on for 30 years and I shall con-
tinue to do it that same way and so do all district judges.
H. Your honor, we submit the court should make its decision on
the basis of the evidence and there was evidence put —
BA. On the basis of the evidence and the issues presented that
that evidence relates to. [Emphasis supplied in the Court’s
transcript. ]
H. Your honor, the matter of notice is a matter of burden of
proof on the plaintiff —
BA. It is if you raise it! Now let’s move on.
H. Well, your honor, if I may, I respectfully differ with Judge
Aldrich on that point —
BA. I understand you —
H. But it is a key point. We put in evidence which we discovered
22 years after we filed the answer that the defects in Fairhaven’s
goods were discovered in June and not September as we had
originally —
FC. Why wasn’t this, if the pretrial memo was filed after that
why didn’t the pretrial memo say something? Instead of saying ap-
parently that you admitted due notification.
67
BA. That was in the answer.
H. That was not in the pretrial memo.
BA. The pretrial memorandum stated what the issue would be
and said nothing about this issue.
H. It did not —*
BA. I read them with some care.
H. It did not specify notice, your honor, that is correct.
BA. All right, that’s the case you tried and that is the case that is
before us.
H. And if I may, we had a reason for not tipping our hand before
that; one, we —
BA. You wanted to fool the court?
H. No, we did not. We did not want to be fooled by the plaintiff,
because we also put into evidence that the president of Action —
BA. In other words, you wanted to fool the plaintiff by telling
him the issue was X and then fool him and come around and say
haha, it was Y.
H. No, your honor, we did not. We were deceived from the start
when we were told that notice had occurred to, to, that discovery
had been made by Action in September. 24 years after we gave
our answer admitting that we discovered through extensive docu-
ment discovery which we had to make repeatedly that they had ac-
tually discovered the defects in June. At trial, as a matter of fact,
in cross examination, we uncovered evidence which had not been
presented to us in discovery that they had discovered the defects
the previous March. There was a ais of deceit i in Action’s —
FC. Your time is running out .
* Although the Court’s transcription of the tape put a period here in-
stead of a dash, the tape itself, which counsel ae sey : mitted to copy
after receiving the transcription, shows that counse ot completed
his sentence. He completed it in the next entry shown for him.
68
UNITED sYATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 83-1961
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.
Plaintiff, Appellee,
Vv.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT, APPELLANT
* * *
Argument
I. Action’s CLAIM Is BARRED BecAuSE AcTION Dip Nort GIvE
TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED BREACH.
Action says that it did not become aware of the latent defect in
its products until September 17, 1979; that on the same date it
began an investigation; that “[a]s a result of the investigation”’ it
determined that the cause of the defect was, allegedly, an underly-
ing defect in Fairhaven’s fabric; and that on making that deter-
mination it notified Fairhaven. Fairhaven received the notice in
October or November 1979. Yet beginning on June 6, 1979 —
more than 3 months before September 17 — Action was giving
credits to customers who were returning defective Action prod-
ucts allegedly made from Fairhaven fabric. (A. at 292; T. 3 at 164-
69
72.) It was in early June, therefore, that Action discovered the
defects or should have discovered them.
Indeed, it is possible to date Action’s discovery (actual or im-
putable) to as early as March 1979, 6 months before September 17.
During cross-examination at trial, Mr. Gaffney, Jr., Action’s plant
engineer and the son of Action’s president, produced his notes and
testified to the following excerpt from them: ‘‘Need original spec.
for 170 w/1 [70 denier fabric] in use during period March through
November 1979. This was the period we had bad production using
Fairhaven.” (T. 6 at 117-18 [emphasis added].)
Whether March or June, however, the legal effect is one and the
same: the post-September 17 notice was fatally late. RSA
382-A:2-607(3)® provides in relevant part: ‘‘Where a tender has
been accepted ... the buyer must within the reasonable time after
he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller
of breach or be barred from any remedy ....’’ [Emphasis added. |
Moreover, for a merchant buyer, like Action, the time for notify-
ing is sooner than it is for a consumer buyer. Comment 4 to Sec-
tion 2-607 provides:
The time of notification is to be determined by applying
commercial standards to a merchant buyer. “‘A reasonable
time”’ for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged
by different standards so that in his case it will be extended,
for the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat com-
mercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his
remedy.
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to
let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome
and must be watched. There is no reason to require that the
notification which saves the buyer’s rights under this section
must include a clear statement of all the objections that will be
relied on by the buyer. ... Nor is there a reason for requiring
the notification to be a claim for damages or of any threatened
litigation or other resort to a remedy. The notification which
3 RSA 382-A is the Uniform Commercial Code. Unless stated other-
wise, all further statutory references will be to that chapter but will cite
only the sections — e.g., Section 2-316, rather than RSA 382-A:2-316.
70
saves the buyer’s rights under this Article need only be such
as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve
a breach, and thus opens the way for normal settlement
through negotiation. [Emphasis added. |
The first paragraph of the Comment, stressing particularly
prompt notice by a merchant buyer, is consistent with Section
2-103(1\b), which provides, ‘‘ ‘Good faith’ in the case of a mer-
chant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.’’ See also Sec-
tion 1-203, which imposes an obligation of good faith in the perfor-
mance of every duty. See also Comment 19 to Section 1-201.
‘An action is taken ‘seasonably’ when it is taken at or within the
time agreed or if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time
period.” Section 1-204(3). Action and Fairhaven agreed, indeed
repeatedly agreed, that ten days was the time within which notice
of defects had to be given. Placed in evidence were all the invoices
sent by Fairhaven to Action. (A. at 315-56.) Each and every one of
them accompanied a delivery of Fairhaven goods; and each and
every one of them had at its very bottom, beneath inches of white
space, the following: ‘““NOTICE: Any dispute or claim on this mer-
chandise must be made in writing within ten working days after
receipt of this invoice which represents a contract therefor, and no
claims or allowances for such goods shall be made after they have
been cut or processed.”’ Fairhaven does not argue that this provi-
sion should be enforced literally in every particular. To do so, e.g.,
with goods alleged to have had defects that were latent would be
‘“‘manifestly unreasonable,”’ and thus unenforceable under Section
1-204(1). Rather, Fairhaven asserts that once Action became
aware of a problem — specifically, a problem alleged to have been
originally latent — it then had ten days to notify Fairhaven. So ap-
plied, the ten-day provision promotes commercially reasonable
diligence and good faith.
The notice requirement of Section 2-607(8) is both sensible and
fair. Consider the facts here in the simplest form: Buyer buys
fabric from Seller; Buyer coats it and then sells it; when sold, the
71
coated product has latent defects; Buyer’s customers start return-
ing the coated product because its latent defects have become pat-
ent; Buyer gives credits to the customers; Buyer says nothing
about this trouble to Seller; time passes; Buyer actually increases
its orders from Seller — indeed, greatly increases them; after
ordering much more fabric and after receiving much more custom-
er complaint, Buyer finally claims to Seller that the fabric is defec-
tive. To say that Seller has been caught unawares is understate-
ment. More aptly described, Seller has been hit blind side. While
the damages were growing and growing, Seller — unlike Buyer —
did not even know that there had been any damage in the first
place. Seller was never given a chance either to investigate the
trouble or to cap its exposure, e.g., by simply ending sales to
Buyer. Part of the wisdom of Section 2-607(3) is that it shields
Seller from such blind side hits. Sensibly and fairly, and wisely, it
requires Buyer to give prompt notice of the trouble. If Buyer does
not, the trouble is then its own responsibility. It is barred from
blaming Seller. See p. 9 hereof, discussing causation.
Consider next the facts in their numerical detail. Specifically,
note closely Exhibit FU (an Action business record, A. at 292) and
Exhibit FWW20-22 (an affidavit of Mr. Gaffney, Sr., Action’s
president, A. at 476-78). Compilations from those exhibits show |
the following:
YARDADE RETURNED
(Exh. FU)
1. Yardage Returned from Customers 2,080 linear yards
to Action for Month of June 1979 of 45-inch-wide fabric
(beginning June 7, 1979 and ending (which equals 2,601
June 27, 1979) square yards of fabric)
2. Yardage Returned from Customers 16,090 linear yards of
to Action After June 1979 (begin- 45-inch-wide fabric
ning September 17, 1979 and (which equals 20,112
ending January 31, 1981) square yards of fabric)
72
3. Total Yardage Returned (1 + 2) 18,170 linear yards of
45-inch-wide fabric
(which equals 22,713
square yards of fabric)
* * *
CREDITS
(Exh. FU)
1. Credits on Returned Yardage for $3,514.31
Month of June 1979 (beginning
June 7, 1979 and ending June 27,
1979)
2. Credits on Returned Yardage for $26,974.59
Time after June 1979 (beginning
September 17, 1979 and ending
January 31, 1981)
3. Total Credits on Returned Yardage
(1+2) $30,488.90
YARDAGE ORDERED
(Exh. FWW 20-22)
Yardage Ordered by Action from 202,000 linear yards
Fairhaven after June returns and
credits but before September 17,
1979
Thus, roughly 10% of ail the returns and credits occurred in June
1979 (between the 6th and 27th), and involved 2,080 linear yards.
The latent defects had by then become patent, and in amounts cer-
tainly big enough to warrant Action’s attention (yet also small
enough to be inexpensively corrected). However, ignoring the law,
Action gave Fairhaven no notice of this trouble. To the contrary,
73
its next significant approaches to Fairhaven suggested enormous
satisfaction: in July and early September, Action ordered from
Fairhaven another 202,000 linear yards. Action’s failure to give
notice was bad enough; but to compound that failure by
geometrically increasing Fairhaven’s exposure was outrageous. It
was conduct for which the law has no tolerance. Section 2-607(3),
to repeat, shields a seller from such blind side hits. It tells the
buyer: give your seller prompt notice of the trouble, or be barred
from blaming him at all.
That message, moveover, accords perfectly with the UCC law
on intervening cause: ‘‘Of course if the buyer discovers the defect
and uses the goods anyway, or if he unreasonably fails to examine
the goods before he uses them, resulting inyuries may be found to
result from his own action rather than proximately from a breach
of warranty.’’ Comment 8 to Section 2-316 [emphasis added]. See
also Comment 5 to Section 2-715: If the buyer should have
discovered or “‘did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the
injury would not proximately result from the breach of warranty.”’
|Emphasis added]. See also Comment 13 to Section 2-314.
Reinforcing the decisive bar of Section 2-607(3) is the precondi-
tion of Section 2-714(1), which provides:
Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for
any nonconformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary
course of events from the seller’s breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable. [Emphasis added.]
Comment 1 to that section states in part: ‘The buyer’s failure to
notify of his claim under the section on effects of acceptance [Sec-
tion 2-607], however, operates to bar his remedies under either
that section or the present section.”” [Emphasis added. ]
The leading cases support Fairhaven. See, e.g., Standard
Alliance Ind. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978):
[T]he burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that notice
was given within a reasonable time. [At 823.]
74
... If the evidence is clear ... a court can rule as a matter
of law that a party failed to give proper notice. [Jd.]
* * *
An examination of the policy reasons which underlie 2-607
further support our view. Notice of the breach serves two
distinct purposes. First, express notice opens the way for set-
tlement through negotiation between the parties... . Second,
proper notice minimizes the possibility of prejudice to the
seller by giving him “ample opportunity to cure the defect, in-
spect the goods, investigate the claim or do whatever may be
necessary to properly defend himself or minimize damages
while the facts are fresh in the minds of the parties.” [At 826
(emphasis added). }
We do not know whether this lengthy, acrimonious lawsuit
could have been settled beforehand. We do know that Standard
Alliance’s failure to give notice precluded the possibility of
compromise. [Id. (emphasis added).]
* *
... Whatever the degree of prejudice to Black Clawson,
UCC 2-607’s notice requirement is designed to forestall the
very difficulties which developed here.... [W]e think that
this case demonstrates the wisdom of section 2-607’s require-
ment of prompt notice. [At 827.]
+ +
These events further demonstrate the merit in those cases
which hold merchants to higher standards of good faith than
consumers. ... A new car buyer can be excused for failing, in
ignorance and exasperation, to notify a car dealer of an ob-
vious breach after persistent repair efforts have ended in
failure. A merchant like Standard Alliance cannot be so ex-
cused, it should have met sections 2-607’s non-rigorous notice
requirements. [Id. (emphasis added). ]
See also T. J. Stevenson & Co., Inc. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629
F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1980) reh. den. 651 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Section ‘‘2-607(3Xa) notice must be evaluated from the perspec-
tive of the policy which it seeks to encourage: compromise by the
parties; and conduct within the bounds of commercial good faith.”’
At 361); Mariner Water Etc. v. Aqua Purification Etc., 665 F.2d
75
1066 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The time interval elapsing between the
discovery of this breach of warranty and Mariner’s alleged
notification of appellees ... was ... in the neighborhood of 5 to 8
weeks. Given these facts, we can hardly say that the District
Court’s finding that this time lapse exceeded the bounds of
reasonableness was clearly erroneous, especially in light of the
high standards by which transactions between merchants are
measured under the Uniform Commercial Code.”’ At 1069); K & M
Joint Venture v. Smith International Inc., 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir.
1982) (“The fact that K & M continued to order repair and replace-
ment parts from Caldwell and to pay for them as billed without
protest throughout the period when problems were being ex-
perienced is inconsistent with the claim that K & M considered
Caldwell liable.”” At 1114); Eastern Airlines Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976) (‘““Eastern’s commer-
cial good faith is subject to further challenge because it continued
to negotiate new contracts and amend old ones throughout the
period in which the ... [problems] occurred.” At 979; Kopper Glo
Fuel Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Tenn.
1977) (“Many factors are relevant to the question of commercial
good faith, but of particular importance is evidence showing that
the buyer continued to negotiate contracts after the alleged
breach occurred....” At 96); Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114
Ariz. 271, 560 P.2d 789 (1977) (‘[N]otice ... was not, as a matter
of law, made within a reasonable time after Pace discovered or
should have discovered the breach... . [A] customer who had pur-
chased some of the lumber complained to Pace that it was defec-
tive, thereby putting Pace on notice that problems may have ex-
isted with the lumber. This occurred between one to two months
prior to the filing of this suit [the means by which notice was
given].”’ At 792); G & D Poultry Farms Inc. v. Long Island Butter
& Egg Co., 306 N.Y.S.2d 243, 33 A.D.2d 685 (1969) (“Not only was
the delay in asserting said claim unreasonable as a matter of law
but, despite knowledge of alleged defects, defendant continued to
order additional goods and pay for same without once indicating to
76
plaintiff that it was dissatisfied with the quality of the merchan-
dise....’’ At 244); Donnell & Mudge, Inc. v. Bonita Leather
Fashions, Inc., 8 UCC Rep. 699 (NY Sup. Ct., App. Term 1971)
(‘This was acceptance of the goods ... so as to cast on defendant
the burden of establishing notification to the plaintiff of the al-
leged breach ... within a reasonable time after discovery. ... On
all the evidence, including the printed requirement on back of each
invoice for notice in writing within ten days, it cannot be said that
defendant sustained its burden.’’).
77
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 83-1960
‘ No. 83-1961
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.
Plaintiff, Appellee,
Vv.
i FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION
: Defendant, Appellant.
BRAWER BROS. INC.
Third-Party Defendant, Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, APPELLEE
* * *
Argument
I. Tue Tria Courr’s Finding THAT ActTiON NOTIFIED FAtk-
HAVEN OF ITS BREACH IN A TIMELY MANNER Was Nor
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Extensive discovery was undertaken in this case over a three
year period. Fairhaven and Brawe;y filed a multitude of pre-trial
motions, including a motion to dismiss. The first time that either
complained of the adequacy of Action’s notice of breach under §
2-607(3), however, was during Fairhaven’s closing argument (T. 8
|
78
at 132-137). The trial court considered Fairhaven’s claims and
found that, under all the circumstances presented by this case, Ac-
tion’s notice to Fairhaven was reasonable and timely. The Court’s
finding was amply supported by the trial record and should not be
set aside. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a).
Evidence adduced at trial established that in mid-September of
1979, while in Europe attending a shoe-industry tradeshow, Ac-
tion’s chief executive officer, Lawrence A. Gaffney, was advised
by its chief customer that substantial quantities of its laminated
nylon products had delaminated from their release paper (T. 2 at
50-54). Gaffney immediately contacted others responsible for Ac-
tion’s management (T. 2 at 54) and initiated an extensive in-
vestigation designated to identify the cause of the delamination
(please see summary of investigation and production trials at A.
288). That investigation ultimately took more than ten weeks and
involved virtually non-stop testing and production trials (T. 2 at
56-66). When, for the first time in the course of the trials, fabric
from a second supplier was substituted as a substrate in the place
of fabric supplied by Fairhaven, the delamination problem with
the nylon laminate was resolved (T. 6 at 47).
Fairhaven admits that it was notified by Action very early in the
course of its production trials. Mr. Brawer testified that
Fairhaven was notified sometime in October or November but
reliable evidence adduced at trial showed that Action notified
Fairhaven of the delamination problems at about the same time it
became aware of them. On October 2, 1979 John McElroy, an Ac-
tion vice-president, wrote to Fairhaven’s sales representative and
impatiently complained about Fairhaven’s failure to respond to his
earlier request for technical assistance in dealing with the delami-
nation problem (A. 263-264). Indeed, correspondence dating from
this period that was a trial exhibit indicates that because of its
reduced inventory of finished nylon, Action was in ‘‘almost daily
contact” with Fairhaven during this period (A. 262).
Fairhaven complains, however, that Action received small quan-
tities of returned nylon products three months earlier from Ameri-
79
can accounts and should have undertaken an investigation to
determine the source of the delamination problem. The trial
record established that these earlier returns were quite insubstan-
tial compared to the returns that occurred in the fall and as a re-
sult it did not make economic sense for Action to interrupt produc-
tion to conduct the extensive and expensive plant trials in a matter
that had become primarily academic, for it was quickly able to re-
place the returned goods with first-quality products (A. 457-459).
Indeed if the massive returns from Europe had not occurred in the
fall, it is unlikely that Action would even have brought forward a
claim against Fairhaven. It certainly did not do so in the three-
month period from June to September.
Fairhaven suggests that Action’s failure to undertake extensive
testing in June and to notify Fairhaven thereof was the product of
Action’s bad faith attempt to inflate its damages. Such a claim is
nonsensical and contrary to the evidence adduced at trial. As soon
as it learned of substantial quality problems with its nylon
laminated products, in September, Action incurred great expense
in its increasingly urgent attempts to correct the problems that it
was encountering in processing Fairhaven-supplied goods (T. 2 at
56-66).! It did not exclude Fairhaven from this process.” On the
1 Please see Action’s Exhibit 12-D A 9/28/79 telex in which Gaffney
wrote to Action’s European distributor: ‘I know that our problem has
been costly to you from the point of view of lost sales. It has also been
costly to us in terms of materials wasted and machine time spent on at-
tempting to rectify the problem here.” (A. 213) And Action’s Exhibit
12F-a 10/5/79 telex in which Gaffney wrote: ‘The situation is very
serious. I have tried for two weeks to identify our problem, without suc-
cess ... I am so completely frustrated it is hard to express to you ...
We must find the problem and correct it. I understand your feelings and
accept them. I only ask that you give me some time. I have put my every
effort and ail my time and money into Action and we had just reached
the point of sustained growth when the nylon problem developed. I am
positive we can correct the problem — I just need time and some expert
helv.”’ (A. 215)
2 Nor was Action reluctant to discuss a negotiated settlement of its
claims, prior to bringing forward litigation, although Fairhaven sug-
gests the contrary in its brief (p. 11). Action kept the returned goods at
80
contrary, Action pleaded with Fairhaven to provide it information
as to the lineage of the 70-denier fabric and to secure technical
assistance from Milliken, the textile mill from whom it mistakenly
believed Fairhaven had purchased the materials (A. 263). While
Action received assistance from many others in the trade (A. 288
at paragraphs 8-9), Fairhaven did not respond (2T.-93).
As Fairhaven suggests, the touchstone for analysis of the provi-
sions of § 2-607(8) is the parties obligation to deal in good faith,
Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp. et al., 19 F.2d
1092, 1102 (11th Cir. 1983). The record shows that the overwhelm-
ing majority of damages suffered by Action as a result of the
defective nylon supplied by Fairhaven occurred in the period im-
mediately after Action asked Fairhaven point-blank if the
70-denier goods it had supplied were first-quality goods purchased
from Milliken, as it had represented (A. 263). When Fairhaven did
not advise Action that these fabrics had been woven from off-
quality yarn supplied by Brawer, Action looked to other possible
sources of the delamination problem. Indeed Fairhaven did not
even have to disclose Brawer’s involvement in order to avoid the
damages Action was to sustain. It could merely have purchased
first-quality 70-denier fabric from Milliken, as it claims it did with
respect to 200-denier nylon fabric supplied to Action. Whether out
of feelings of guilt or greed or for some other reason, the record is
clear that it chose not to do so.’
its plant and on February 19, 1980 Gaffney wrote to Samuel Fagin, Fair-
haven’s President:
The first step should be your inspection of these goods and
prompt issuance of a credit on our account.
Second, we can discuss a reasonable method of settling the other
damages of lost sales and profits that resulted from the defective
nylon. As I told you, I am willing to work with you in arriving at a
fair agreement. (A. 252-257).
As late as the time when pre-trial statements were filed in this case, on
the other hand, Brawer continued to insist that settlement could only be
reached were Action to pay Fairhaven the full amout of its counter-claim
(A. 38, 46-27).
3 Indeed, Fairhaven shielded Brawer’s involvement from disclosure to
Action for an additional eighteen months. Although the Brawer family
81
Although Fairhaven complains that Action’s failure to under-
take extensive testing in June to determine the source of the
delamination problem deprived it of the ability to cure the defect
or to undertake its own investigation in order to protect itself or to
minimize damages (Fairhaven’s brief at p. 11), the actions it ac-
tually took in September upon receiving notice of Action’s in-
vestigation show the hollowness of this claim. Not only did it fail to
cure the defect by advising Action of the off-quality yarn used to
make the 70 denier fabric or even to provide new fabric made from
first-quality yarn, it continued to solicit Action’s purchase of
fabric made from Brawer-supplied yarn. Incredibly, as late as Jan-
uary 16, 1980 (A. 356) Fairhaven supplied Action with 70 denier
fabric, not on a Net 60 day credit arrangement as had previously
been the case, but according to a memo billing arrangement
whereby Action would not have to pay for the goods if it did not
find them satisfactory. That Fairhaven was continuing to palm off
goods made from Brawer supplied yarn is clear in that this sample
was later used in the plant trial and found to be defective. (A.
234-238).
Fairhaven’s claims of untimely notice of breach were fully
argued before the trial judge and the Court agreed with Action
that Action provided timely notice of Fairhaven’s breach and that
any bad-faith non-disclosure in this case is attributable to
Fairhaven. (Please see Courts findings at A. 121 and Action’s
post-trial memorandum at A. 56.) It is well settled that issues con-
cerning the timeliness or adequacy of notice are questions of fact
owns 50% of Fairhaven (T. 4 at 103) and had apparently agreed to dem-
nify Fairhaven for losses resulting from its sale of 70 denier nylon fabric
to Action, no representative of Brawer attended a February 29, 1980 in-
spection of the defective goods (T. 2 at 94). Indeed at its own peril,
Fairhaven did not file its indemnification action within the period in
which it could have done so as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 14(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but defered doing so for more than
a year after it filed its Answer in this case, at a time when the source of
the 70 denier nylon yarn used to weave the 70-denier nyion yarn used to
weave the 70-denier fabric supplied to Action had become a focus of
discovery in the case.
82
for the trier of fact to decide. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic
Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (11th Cir. 1983); Mariner
Water Renaturalizer of Washington, Inc. v. Aqua Purification
Systems, Inc., 665 F.2d 1066, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Standard
Alliance Industries Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 823
(6th Cir. 1978); Eastern Airlines Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
532 F.2d 957, 962 (5th Cir. 1970). Findings as to a party’s good
faith -- or the lack thereof — are also purley factual findings. Col-
umbia Standard Corp. v. Rancher’s Exploration and Development
Inc., 468 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1972); Plack v. Baumer, 121 F.2d
676, 678 (8rd Cir. 1941). As such, the role of this Court is not to
reweigh the evidence in a trial de novo, but rather to scrutinize the
evidence to ascertain if it affords some reasonable basis for the
result achieved. Evans v. United States, 319 F.2d 751, 753 (1st
Cir. 1963). And when, as here, the findings of the trial court are
made in light of the Court’s assessment of the credibility of the
respective parties, the court’s findings are virtually unassailable,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a); Obolevsky v.
Saldana Schmier, 409 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1969). As long as there
appears to be some reasonable and discernible basis for the
Court’s finding — as here when the evidence establishes that Ac-
tion immediately notified Fairhaven of the problems it experi-
enced in processing Fairhaven goods in the attempt to secure its
assistance in identifying the problem — the trial court’s finding
that timely notice was provided must stand. Evans v. United
States, 319 F. Supp. 751, 756 (1st Cir. 1963).
83
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
No. 83-1961
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.,
PLAINTIFF, APPELLEE,
v.
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
DEFENDANT, APPELLANT.
Fairhaven’s Reply Brief
Action’s implication of surprise at Fairhaven’s notice argument
is ironic and disingenuous. (Action’s Brief at 8.) Action always
knew the facts on the lateness of the notice; Fairhaven was forced
to discover them — or uncover them — in layers. On May 1, 1980
Action sued, alleging that “‘during the summer and early fall of
1979” (A. 10) it had received Fairhaven goods which it “[s]ubse-
quent[ly]’’ discovered to be defective, and that “‘[ijmmediately
upon discovery of said defects’ it notified Fairhaven (id.). In 1981
Action received an interrogatory specifically asking on what date
it had discovered the alleged defects; it answered, ‘On or about
September 17, 1979.” (T. 3 at 107-08.) On January 22, 1983 —
about 2-3 years after filing suit — Action answered another inter-
rogatory by revealing for the first time that it had discovered the
alleged defects more than three months before September 17,
1979 — specifically, in early June 1979. (T. 3 at 163-172.) On Au-
gust 23, 1983, during cross-examination of Action’s plant
manager at trial, evidence surfaced for the first time suggesting
that Action had discovered the alleged defects as early as 6 months
84
before September 17, 1979 — specifically in March 1979. (T. 6 at
117-18). See also pp. 8-10 of Fairhaven’s original brief, discussing
how Action had ordered more than 200,000 yards of Fairhaven
fabric after it had discovered the June problems but before it had
notified Fairhaven.
Respectfully submitted,
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION
By Its Attorneys,
SHEEHAN, PHINNEY, BASS & GREEN
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
Date: May 7, 1985 By
Edward A. Haffer
1000 Elm Street
Manchester, NH 03101
(603) 627-8115
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that two copies of this Reply Brief have been
sent to Peter Karl Marsh, Esq., Irving Brawer, Esq., and James J.
Barry, Jr., Esq.
Edward A. Haffer
85
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Action Manufacturing, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action
No. C80-204-L
Fairhaven Textile Corporation,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Vv.
Brawer Bros., Inc.,
Third-Party Defendant.
FAIRHAVEN’S PRETRIAL STATEMENT
1. UNCONTESTED FACTS. During 1978 and 1979, Action
(Plaintiff) bought nylon from Fairhaven (Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff) and at least one other supplier. Fairhaven had bought its
nylon in an unfinished state from Brawer Bros. (Third-Party
Defendant). In accordance with Action’s instructions, Fairhaven
had the nylon finished by another company and then had it
delivered to Action. On receipt of the nylon, Action put it through
manufacturing processes, called tie-coating and adhesive coating,
to make pressure sensitive sheets (essentially, nylon laminated to
paper) and pressure sensitive tape (essentially, nylon rolls
resembling masking tape). Action sold the sheets and tape to
customers connected with the shoe industry. Its principal
customers were European companies, all controlled by the Jaeger
Brothers of West Germany. Through corporate form, the Jaeger
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Brothers had and have a substantial interest in Action, owning Ac-
tion stock, owning the reai estate on which Action does business,
and owning the machinery with which Action does business.
Action claims that in September 1979 it received customer com-
plaints, principally from the Jaeger Brothers, that its product was
defective. Action claims that the nylon was lifting up or
‘bubbling’ from the sheets. Action further claims, but both
Fairhaven and Brawer Bros. deny, that Fairhaven nylon caused
the problem. Action has sued Fairhaven for breach of implied war-
ranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose;
Fairhaven denies any breach.
Action has not paid for certain nylon supplied by Fairhaven. Ac-
tion admits that, if it does not prevail in its claim against Fair-
haven, it owes Fairhaven $33,543.92. Fairhaven claims, but Ac-
tion denies, that the amount owed is $37,585.42; and Fairhaven
has counterclaimed against Action for breach of contract.
Although Fairhaven and Brawer Bros. assert that Fairhaven
nylon did not cause the problem of which Action complains,
Fairhaven has brought a third-party suit against Brawer Bros., as
Fairhaven’s supplier of nylon, for indemnification in the event
that Action prevails.
2. APPLICABLE LAW. RSA 382-A:2 (the Sales Article of the
Uniform Commercial Code). New Hampshire common law on con-
tracts and indemnification.
3. CONTESTED FACTS. All other facts are contested.
4. DISPUTED LEGAL ISSUES. Other than obvious disagree-
ment over whether the evidence supports the various claims,
Fairhaven is not aware of any disputed legal issues.
5. WITNESSES. [Omitted.]
6. DEPOSITIONS. As of now Fairhaven does not know
whether it will be necessary to read any depositions into evidence,
but it reserves the right to do so.
7. EXHIBITS (Omitted. ]
8. SPECIAL DAMAGES. Fairhaven claims damages of
$37,585.42 plus costs, interest, and counsel fees against Action
87
for breach of contract. Fairhaven claims damages against Brawer
Bros. only for indemnification should Action prevail.
9. DEMAND AND OFFER. None pending now, although the
parties reserve the right to continue to discuss the possibility of
settlement.
10. VIEW. Fairhaven requests a view of Action’s premises in
Gonic, New Hampshire, and will pay the cost in the first instance.
11. WAIVERS. Fairhaven waives no claims or defenses.
12. TRIAL LENGTH. Two-three weeks.
Respectfully submitted,
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION
By its Attorneys,
SHEEHAN, PHINNEY, BASS & GREEN
PROF. ASS’N
Dated: March 28, 1983
By:
Edward A. Haffer
1000 Elm Street
Manchester, New Hampshire 03101
(608) 668-0300
88
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
ACTION MANUFACTURING, INC.
Plaintiff,
v. No. C80-204-L
FAIRHAVEN TEXTILE CORPORATION,
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,
Vv.
BRAWER BROS., INC.,
Defendant.
PRETRIAL STATEMENT
NOW COMES the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, Ac-
tion Manufacturing, Inc., through counsel, and respectfully sub-
mits the following pretrial statement in accordance with the provi-
sions of Rule 10 of the Court Rules of the United States District
Court for the District of New Hampshire:
(1). (a). It is uncontested that Plaintiff is a N.H. corporation
with a principal place of business in Gonic, N.H. and that
Plaintiff manufactures pressure-sensitive adhesive materials
for primary sale to manufacturers in the shoe industry. It is
further uncontested that some of the products manufactured
by Plaintiff involve raw materials which include 70-denier and
200-denier nylon fabric.
(b). It is uncontested that Defendant is a New Jersey cor-
poration with a principal place of business in Haledon, N.J.
and that Defendant purchases unfinished or greige textile
products and arranges to have said products processed or
finished for sale to others.
89
(c). It is uncontested that Third-Party Defendant is a New
Jersey corporation with a principal place of business in
Haledon, N.J. and that Third-Party Defendant is engaged in
various aspects of the textile business including the purchase
and sale of man-made yarns, the purchase and sale of fabrics
in the unfinished (greige) state, and the arrangement for
processing of yarn by others, such as weavers.
(d). It is uncontested that between June 30, 1978 and
January 16, 1980 Defendant sold Plaintiff more than 190,000
yards of finished 70-denier nylon fabric and more than
160,000 yards of finished 200-denier nylon fabric.
(e). It is uncontested that Defendant initially contacted
Plaintiff through a call from Defendant’s salesman, Samuel
Werber, to Plaintiff's purchasing agent in 1978 and that
Defendant’s salesman visited Plaintiffs office in Gonic, N.H.
on at least four occasions in 1978 and 1979.
(f). It is uncontested that the 70-denier and 200-denier
nylon fabric which is the subject matter of this litigation was
sold in the greige or unfinished state by Third-
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