Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Carbone v. New York
Supreme Court brief1986
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILE b
ery 1886
JR.
waacer F. SPANIOL,
sost CLERK
Supreme Court of the Uniti States |
October Term, 1985
CARL CARBONE,
Petitioner,
against
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JOHN J. MAGUIRE
Counsel for Petitioner
LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD HARTMAN
252-00 Horace Harding Expressway
Little Neck, NY 11362
(718) 423-1800
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the New York State statute
under which Petitioner was convicted and
sentenced to a period of incarceration of
six years to life was violative of Peti-
tioner's constitutional right not to be
Subjected to cruel and unusual punishment,
under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
ii
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Counsel of record for CARL CARBONE
certifies that the following parties have
an interest in the outcome of this case.
1. People of the State of New York,
respresented by John J. Santucci, District
Attorney, Queens County, 125-01 Queens
Boulevard, Kew Gardens, New York 11415.
2. Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington D.C. 20530
3. Attorney General
State of New York
State Campus
Albany, N.Y. 12207
st ie tiicintet e
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented for Review. ..
List of Interested Parties ....
Table of Authorities .......
Opinion Below .... «+. + 6 « «
We EROEBGM 6 6 5 8s 0 8 tt 8 ew
Statutory Provision Involved...
Statement of the Case ......
Reasons for Granting the Writ:
The New York State Statute under
which Petitioner was convicted
and sentenced to a period of in-
carceration of six years to life
was violative of Petitioner's
constitutional right not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment, under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution . . « « «© © © © « «
ie. << = & 6 6 6 © & & &
SS Se ee ee ee ee ee
Appendix:
A -- Certificate Denying Leave
to the Court of Appeals . .
ii
iv
11
18
19
la
iv
B -- Order of the Supreme Court
Appellate Division, Second
Judicial Department ...... 3a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
LVeerer «2 © © & 6 —
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(W97SP we se sesese ene ens
People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100
€ii2) rere ae ae ee ee ee
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
a | rere ae ee ee
CONSTITUTION
Sena © « «6 6+ ess 6 &
STATUTES
Penal Law §220.41 ee a a ee
28 U.S.C. SI2Z57(3) 2. « we ew wo ew
fF
18
18
16,
17
18
14,
18
NO.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CARL CARBONE,
Petitioner,
-against-
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, Carl Carbone, prays for a
writ of certiorari to review an order of
the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York, entered in these proceedings on March
25, 1986, which denied Petitioner's motion
for a certificate granting an appeal to
said Court of Appeals, from an order of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Depart-
ment, entered in these proceedings February
3, 1986, which affirmed a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Queens County, which, on July 20, 1984,
convicted him of the crime of Criminal Sale
of a Controlled Substance in the Second
Degree (New York State Penal Law §220.41)
upon his plea of guilty.
OPINION BELOW
The order of the Hon. VITO J. TITONE,
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
of the State of New York, denying
Petitioner's application for a certificate
permitting his appeal from the affirmance
of his conviction by the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, Second Judicial
Department, appears at page la to page 2a
of the attached Appendix. The decision has
been officially reported at 67 N.Y.2d 606
(1986).
The opinion of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, Second Judicial
Department, affirming Petitioner's
conviction in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, Queens County, appears
at page 3a to page 6a of the attached
Appendix. The decision has not as yet been
officially reported.
JURISDICTION
The final order of the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York in this
matter was entered on March 25, 1986.
The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. §$1257(3). This
Court has jurisdiction of the controversy
because it involves a "...title, right
privilege or immunity...specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution, treaties,
statutes of, or commission held or
authority exercised under the United
States." 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Section 220.41 of the Penal Law of
the State of New York provides:
"A person is guilty of criminal sale
of a controlled substance in the second
degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
sells:
1. one or more preparations,
compounds, mixtures or substances of an
aggregate weight of one-half ounce or more
containing a narcotic drug; or
2. one of more preparations,
compounds, mixtures or substances of an
aggregate weight of one-half ounce or more
Containing methamphetamine, its salts,
isomers or salts of isomers; or
3. five grams or more of a
stimulant; or
4. five milligrams or more of
lysergic acid diethylamide; or
5. one hundred twenty-five
milligrams or more of a hallucinogen; or
6. five grams or more of a
hallucinogenic substance; or
7. three hundred and sixty
milligrams or more of methadone.
Criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the second degree is a Class
A-II felony."
STATEMENT CF THE CASE
The Grand Jury of Queens County
indicted Petitioner for two counts of
Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in
the First Degree (Penal Law §220.43), based
upon two alleged sales of cocaine, which
were said to have occurred on October 27,
1983 and November 14, 1983.
On October 27, 1983, Petitioner is
alleged to have sole to a New York City
Police Department Narcotics Division under-
cover officer approximately four ounces of
cocaine in exchange for $7,500.00. The
location of the alleged transaction,
according to police, was a parking lot near
the Whitestone Expressway and Linden Place
in Queens.
On November 14, 1983, Petitioner is
alleged to have sold to the same Narcotics
Division undercover officer approximately
eight ounces of cocaine in exchange for
$13,000.00 at the same location in Queens.
On this occasion, members of the Narcotics
Division placed Petitioner under arrest.
After being duly arraigned, plea
negotiations between counsel for Petitioner
and the District Attorney's office ensued.
The District Attorney's office insisted
that the only appropriate disposition short
of trial was a plea of guilty to Criminal
Sale of a Controlled Substance in the
Second Degree with the imposition of a six
year minimum period of incarceration. Try
though he might, counsel for Petitioner was
unable to convince the District Attorney's
office to reduce the minimum iikeeration.
Ultimately, recognizing that the
likelihood of acquittal after trial was
extremely small, Petitioner entered a plea
of guilty to the Class A-II felony, with
the promised proposed sentence, on June 29,
1984. The matter was adjourned for
sentencing and a probation report was duly
prepared by the Department of Probation.
On July 20, 1984, Petitioner was
sentenced. At the proceedings, counsel for
Petitioner requested the Court intercede in
the proceedings and reduce the minimum
period of incarceration to be imposed upon
Petitioner from six years to three years.
Counsel for Petitioner pointed to the fact
Petitioner received extensive support from
his family, that he was newly married and
that his wife was expecting a child.
Counsel also acknowleged that the
matter was before the Court under a
negotiated plea of guilty, but that counsel
believed that the Court ought reconsider
the negotiated plea and be as lenient as
possible in pronouncing sentence upon
Petitioner. Counsel pointed out that as
far as the law was concerned, there was
little difference between a six year or a
three year incarceration but that to
Petitioner the imposition of a full six
year minimum term as opposed to a reduced
three year eavind would be of significant
impact in destroying prospects for his
eventual rehabilitation.
Petitioner, at sentence, told the
Court that he was sorry for what he had
done and "was willing to pay [his] price."
However, Petitioner thought that the six
year period of incarceration was unduly
harsh and joined his counsel in requesting
the Court to intercede on Petitioner's
behalf.
The Court below, stated that it was
adhering to the recommendation of the
10
District Attorney's office, in spite of the
requests by Petitioner and his counsel.
The Petitioner was then sentenced by the
Court to six years to life.
Petitioner appealed the decision to
the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Appellate Division, Second Judicial
Department. After the filing of briefs and
hearing of oral argument, the Appellate
Division unanimously affirmed the lower
Court. (See Appendix B.)
A motion for leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals of the State of New York
was duly made by Petitioner. The Court of
Appeals denied the Motion on March 25,
1986. (See Appendix A.)
The instant petition for a writ of
certiorari ensued,
11
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI
THE NEW YORK STATE STATUTE UNDER
WHICH PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED
AND SENTENCED TO A PERIOD OF IN-
CARCERATION OF SIX YEARS TO LIFE
WAS VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE
SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT, UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION,
Petitioner entered the plea of guilty
to Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance
in the Second Degree to one count in the
indictment in satisfaction of the entire
indictment, because he was factually guilty
of the offenses described there. Peti-
tioner admitted his guilt with candor.
12
Petitioner also stood prepared to accept
and serve the sentence ultimately imposed
upon him.
However, it is submitted that,
under the circumstances present, the
interest of justice would not be served by
such a harsh sentence, with its extensive
minimum period of incarceration.
Petitioner acted perhaps out of immaturity
or a lack of judgment. However, certain
factors such as the fact that he admitted
his guilt, his general background of strong
family support, his disability, and
indications that he was not a major dealer
of narcotics, give support to his
contention on appeal that, as to him, a
sentence of incarceration is inappropriate
to the point of being unconstitutional.
The probation report indicated that
Petitioner came from a strong and loving
13
family background. It would appear that
Petitioner fell into bad company, which
unduly negatively influenced him.
Certainly, the amputation of his left
index finger in an industrial accident with
its resultant severe disabling features was
yet another factor which had a negative
influence upon Petitioner. The monetary
settlement, although quite large, can never
really make up the loss of the finger.
As the Courts of the State of New
York have declined to grant Petitioner the
relief he requested, Petitioner turns to
this Court and asks that his present
application be granted, as he submits that
the imposition of the lengthy sentence of
incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
14
Recognizing that various parts of the
State of New York faced, and still continue
to face, a very serious law enforcement
problem in the area of narcotics control,
in September, 1973, the Legislature of the
State passed a series of drug laws which
were, at the time of passage, the most
severe laws of this type in the United
States. Although the laws were somewhat
modified in 1979, it would be fair to state
that the New York drug laws are the most
severe such statutes in the nation.
Their constitutionality with respect
to the Eighth Amendment were upheld in
People v. Brodie, 37 N.Y.2d 100 (1975). It
should be noted that the appellant in
Broadie sought further review in this Court
but his petition for certiorari was denied.
Broadie v. New York, 423 U.S. 950 (1975).
15
Generally, in its decision in
Broadie, the New York State Court of
Appeals held that sentences under the
narcotics section, Article 220 of the Penal
Law of the State of New York, were not
grossly disporportionate under constitu-
tional analysis, because the Legislature of
the State had the power to distinguish
among the ills of society which require
criminal sanction and prescribe appropriate
punishment. The State Legislature had the
power to make a finding that unlawful sales
of narcotics were symptoms of a widespread
and dangerous phenomenom. The Legislature
was entitled to classify sales of certain
narcotics as being equivalent to the most
violent of crimes.
In the case, the Court of Appeals
analyzed the circumstances of each of eight
defendants, before the Court, who had been
16
sentenced under Article 220. It was found
that in each case, the defendants had been
previously convicted of at least street
sales of heroin or cocaine or had been
found in possession of large amounts of
narcotics.
However, in dicta, the Court stated
that in certain rare cases upon particular
facts, imposition an A felony type of
sentence under the statute might constitute
an unconstitutional sentence.
Here, it is submitted that an
analysis of the factual background leads to
the conclusion that the imposition of a
sentence of incarceration for from six
years to life is harsh and excessive to the
point of being unconstitutional as applied
to Petitioner. It is, in short, a
Candidate for the rare case referred to in
Broadie.
_ ST A A li in 3
17
Petitioner suggests that the sentence
imposed upon him constituted an Eighth
Amendment violation of his rights. See
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1978);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910).
18
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is
respectfully requested that the petition
for a writ of certiorari be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN J. MAGUIRE
Counsel for Petitioner
LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD HARTMAN
252-00 Horace Harding Expressway
Little Neck, New York 11362
(178) 423-1800
L9
CERTIFICATE
John J. Maguire hereby certifies that
he is a member of the bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States and states that
three copies of the Petition for a Write of
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York were mailed by postpaid
First Class Mail to the following:
1. John J. Santucci, Esq.
District Attorney, Queens County
125-01 Queens Boulevard
Kew Gardens, N.Y. 11415
2. Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
3. Attorney General
State of New York
State Campus
Albany, N.Y. 12207
by depositing same in a United States Post
Office with first class postage prepaid and
that forty copies were deposited in a
United States Post Office with first class
postage prepaid and properly addressed to
The Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Supreme Court Building, One
First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20543.
JOHN J. MAGUIRE
Sworn to before me
this //¥- = day of
June, 1986
Roland W. Johnson
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 4502705
Qualified in Delaware County
Commission Expires March 30, 1987
la
APPENDIX A
STATE OF NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS
BEFORE: HON. VITO J. TITONE Associate Judge
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Respondent
against
CAR CARBONE,
Appellant.
I, VITO J. TITONE, Associate Judge of
the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York, do hereby certify that, upon applica-
tion timely made by the above-named
appellant for a certificate pursuant to CPL
460.20 and upon the record and proceedings
herein,* there is no question of law
presented which ought to be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals and permission to appeal
is hereby denied.
Dated at Albany, New York
March 25, 1986
/s/
Associate Judge
2a
Appendix A
*Description of Order:
Order of the Appellate Division, Second
Department dated February 3, 1986,
affirming a judgment of Supreme Court,
Queens County, rendered July 20, 1984.
3a
APPENDIX B
Order of the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Second Judicial Department
At a Term of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme
Court of the State of New
York, Second Judicial
Department, held in Kings
County on February 3, 1986.
HON. LEON D. LAZER, Justice Presiding,
HON. GUY J. MANGANO, )
HON. RICHARD A. BROWN, ) Associate Justices
HON. SYBIL HART KOOPER )
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondent,
CARL CARBONE,
Appellant.
In the above entitled action, the
above named Carl Carbone, defendant in this
action, having appealed to this court from
a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens
County, rendered July 20, 1984, convicting
him of criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the second degree, upon his
plea of guilty, and sentencing him to an
indeterminate term of six years to life
4a
Appendix B
imprisonment; and the said appeal having
been argued by Raymond E. Kerno, Esq., of
counsel for the appellant and submitted by
Alexander P. Schlinger, Esq., of counsel
for the respondent, and due deliberation
having been had thereof; and upon this
court's opinion and decision slip hereto-
fore filed and made a part hereof, it is:
ORDERED that the judgment appealed
from is hereby unanimously affirmed.
ENTER
IRVING N. SELKIN
Clerk of the Appellate Division
5a
Appendix B
2768}
Z/jc
LEON D. LAZER, J.P.
GUY J. MANGANO
RICHARD A. BROWN
SYBIL HART KOOPER, JJ.
AD2d A- December 16, 1985
3076 E The People, etc., respondent,
v. Carl Carbone, appellant.
(Ind. No. 4121/83)
Richard Hartman, Little Neck, N.Y.
(Raymond E. Kerno of counsel), for
appellant.
John J. Santucci, District Attorney,
Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Alexander P.
Schlinger of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment
of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Naro,
J.), rendered July 20, 1984, convicting him
of criminal sale of a controlled substance
in the second degree, upon his plea of
guilty, and sentencing him to an indetermi-
nate term of six years to life imprisonment.
Judgment affirmed.
The sentence imposed upon defendant
was within the statutory limits and those
limits were not unconstitutionally
excessive as applied to this defendant
(see, People v. Broadie, 37 NY2d 100, cert
denied 423 US 950).
6a
Appendix B
Defendant knowingly, freely and
voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charged
offense and has no basis now to complain
that the sentence was excessive. Defendant
received precisely the sentence he
bargained for (see, People v. Kazepis, 101
A.2d 816).
LAZER, J.P., MANGANO, BROWN and KOOPER, JJ.
concur.
February 3, 1986 PEOPLE V. CARBONE, CARL
3076 E
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