Reply Brief — American Mining Congress v. Thomas

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& FILED

4) SEP 3 1986

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

___ aa

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

| Supreme Court, U.S.

———

No. 85-1741

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

AMAX INC.,

ASARCO INCORPORATED,

ST. JOE MINERALS CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S

BRIEF IN OPPOSITICN

JAMES R. WALPOLE*

EDMUND E. HARVEY

JOANNE M. SALVATORE

CHADBOURNE & PARKE

1101 Vermont Ave., N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20005

(292) 289-3000

ROBERT A. EMMETT

REED SMITH SHAW & McCLay

Of Counsel:

DoucLas E. MCALLISTER

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS

1920 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 861-2800

1150 Conn. Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-6100

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

© lnc NNER EIN A NES AY IE LOO ATRIOS I EI RH

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TO CO I a cccnuncnilsctiidideahbinwesebienies ii

1. The Revision Was Substantial ....................ec0eee 1

2. Petitioners Were Not On Notice That A Tech-

nology Other Than Those Specified In The Fed-

eral Register Was Under Consideration ........... 3

3. Petitioners Were Denied The Opportunity To

Challenge EPA’s Final Choice Of A

I iitatncacconacnendieninsitanchapasiicteieenbisiteviisiene 5

4. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Conflicts

With Those Of Other Circuits And Its Own Prior

IE -cecsisesnaindgesccnethlahiansecntunccaeadssncanisesimanclnenrs 6

5. The Petition Raises Significant Legal Issues ... 7

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

American Federation of Labor and Congress of In-

dustrial Organizations v. Donovan, 757 F.2d

$30 (D.C. Gar. TRRR) niin 6

Chocolate Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Block, 755 F.2d

1008 (4h Cir. 19GB cntteinniimiceann 6

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980) 8

National Black Media Coalition, et al. v. Federal

Communications Commission, 791 F.2d 1016

(Bed Che, TDG): svseicsssssscsiatscnancmanneminnaees 3, 7

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d

$78 (D.C. Ge. ION) “cia 5

PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239 (D.C.

Cte. TOBE sccisscssaacnistacteeaeeoee 4

Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA,

706 F.2d S06 (D.C. Cie THE ee 3

STATUTES:

Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No.

89-554, 80 Stat. 383, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551,

Ob BU. ccisanccssenssgemnsteibbsbesessdtiotenteaneaneuamntaaaliiress 3

Clean Air Act, as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-604,

Pub. L. No. 95-95, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401

OE OU. ceacescseinessistssssheticceemameanal 8

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91

Stat. 1567, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 e¢ seg.._.............. 1

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,

Pub. L. No. 94-580, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901

GE DOE, | ccnsecscsenevsvensshssasepesinjenesmaamaeieaminne omnia: 8

Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 42

USC. Gea00 F Ol GE. . cisumcisaincaann 8

RULES AND REGULATIONS:

48 Fed. Rew. FOCT CIGR isccecdikcomene 3

ecren (a1 me «304 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 85-1741

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS, AMAX INC., ASARCO

INCORPORATED, ST. JOE MINERALS CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent’s (‘‘EPA”’) brief in opposition (‘‘Opp.’’)

largely repeats and relies upon the errors of the

court’s decision below. It argues that EPA’s revision

of the proposed rules under the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1251 et seg. (‘‘Act’’) was insubstantial and

one on which Petitioners had adequate notice and the

opportunity to comment. It further contends that the

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit does not conflict with those of

other circuits. Finally, EPA urges that the case is

simply a factual dispute about the adequacy of notice

and consequently raises no significant legal issues.

1. The Revision Was Substantial

EPA attempts to minimize the significance of the

revision to its proposed rules by claiming that

Petitioners’ complaint is not directed to any change

in the effluent limitation standards, but to the ‘‘ad-

dition of a supplemental control technology” which |

industrial dischargers, such as Petitioners, are not |

required to adopt (Opp. p. 6). Such an argument is |

utterly disingenuous, in light of the Act’s require-

ments that effluent limitations be ‘“‘technology-based.’”!

The statutory scheme contemplates the selection by

EPA of an appropriate technology which will permit

dischargers to attain the effluent standards being es-

tablished.

In the instant case EPA proposed certain effluent

standards, the achievability of which were to be based

on the “‘lime precipitation, settle and filter treatment

technology” (LS&F). Comments of Petitioners per-

suaded EPA that the standards being set were un-

achievable under the LS&F technology. It then

adopted a new and different technology - sulfide pre-

cipitation - to support its proposed standards.

Petitioners were denied the opportunity of addressing

whether the standards were achievable under the sul-

fide precipitation technology.’

Since it is the technology that determines the final

standards, any change in the technology obviously has

a material impact upon the standards being proposed

and constitutes a fundamental change in the proposed

rules. It is true that the Act does not expressly direct

a discharger to adopt a particular technology, but if

no technology exists to support the standards, such

1 EPA notes correctly in its Opposition that under the Act,

“Congress authorized EPA to establish technology-based effluent

limitations and standards for categories of industrial dischar-

gers’ (Emphasis added) (Opp. p. 2).

2 See Appendix pp. 40a-45a.

standards cannot be met;? and their adoption by the

EPA is unlawful.

2. Petitioners Were Not On Notice That A Technology

Other Than Those Specified In The Federal Register

Was Under Consideration

EPA does not dispute the fact that the sulfide pre-

cipitation technology was not one of those specifically

identified in the Federal Register as being relied upon

for the proposed rules and upon which public com-

ments were sought. Instead, it argues that since the

Federal Register alerted the public that chemical pre-

cipitation, which includes sulfide precipitation, was

under consideration and EPA sought comments on

other effective treatment technologies, adequate no-

tice had been given (Opp. p. 6). Chemical precipitation

is far too general a term, including as it does many

technologies,‘ to satisfy the ‘‘reasonable specificity”’

requirements of Section 4 of the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, et seg. (“‘APA’’). Small

Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705

F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Similarly, the general

invitation to submit other proposals or technologies

did not afford Petitioners the requisite notice that the

specifically identified technologies would be changed

to sulfide precipitation. National Black Media Coali-

’ This procedure, which violates the Clean Water Act, of se-

lecting the limits before determining the proper technology was

used by EPA in establishing all the 40 C.F.R. Part 421 Subpart

E, G, H and I regulations. The Fourth Circuit refused to con-

sider this issue which was raised by Petitioners in the court

below. See Petition, p. 7, n. 7.

* Chemical precipitation was not included in the Federal Reg-

ister list of six technologies being considered by EPA in this

rulemaking. See 48 Fed. Reg. 7047 (1983).

tion v. Federal Communications Commission, 791

F.2d 1016, 1022-1023 (2nd Cir. 1986). And the lack

of notice is emphasized by the absence in the volu-

minous comments of any suggestions that sulfide pre-

cipitation should be considered as an alternative

treatment technology. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle,

659 F.2d 1239, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

EPA relies heavily upon its discussion of sulfide

precipitation in the draft Development Document ac-

companying the proposed rules as satisfaction of the

notice requirements of the APA (Opp. pp. 6-7). If

sulfide precipitation were so important and reliable a

technology as EPA now attempts to portray, why was

it not identified as being one of the six technologies

specifically listed in the Federal Register as being

considered under the proposed rule? Its absence from

the proposed rule and the specifically identified list

of six technologies, like that of twenty other tech-

nologies discussed in the 2100 page Development Doc-

ument, clearly caused Petitioners to believe that it

was not regarded by EPA as one of the technologies

upon which effluent standards would be based.

EPA suggests that even if sulfide precipitation were

not specifically identified in the proposed rule pub-

lished in the Federal Register, Petitioners’ comments

on the draft Development Document reveal they were

on actual notice of sulfide precipitation as a possible

alternative technology (Opp. p. 7). Petitioners’ com-

ments, however, were limited to the draft Develop-

ment Document’s discussion of the six technologies

identified in the proposed rule. The limited nature of

Petitioners’ comments highlight their lack of actual

notice and why a Development Document is not a

Oat Ana ecmnend! semanas saey

substitute for notice in the Federal Register.

3. Petitioners Were Denied The Opportunity To Chal-

lenge EPA’s Final Choice Of A Technology

EPA contends that Petitioners were not denied an

opportunity to challenge EPA’s adoption of sulfide

precipitation as a technology since the court of appeals

considered their objections to that control method

(Opp. p. 8). EPA’s argument places the cart before

the horse. It is the agency with its expertise, and not

a reviewing court that must first consider and rule

upon objections to a proposed regulation. Indeed, ob-

jections must first be raised with the agency before

a court will even consider them. Portland Cement

Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir.

1973). The statutory rulemaking scheme is predicated

on the initial evaluation by the agency of public com-

ments and objections. Without such an administrative

record a reviewing court is not in a position to make

a reasoned and informed judgment on agency action.

Not only did EPA refuse to permit Petitioners to

comment upon the sulfide precipitation technology

during the rulemaking process,> but it successfully

opposed Petitioners’ attempt to supplement the re-

cord and address such control method in their briefs

to the court of appeals (App. pp. 52a; 55a-56a).° With-

5 When the final regulations were issued March 8, 1984,

Petitioners had not received a copy of crucial analytical data

from EPA. The information was not obtained until months after

the regulations were issued, and then after a Freedom of In-

formation Act request was filed (App. pp. 47a-49a).

§ Petitioners sought to place before the court of appeals data

from the same foreign plant relied upon by EPA which would

(footnote continued)

out the benefit of Petitioners’ comments on sulfide

precipitation before the EPA or the supplemental data

they sought to bring to the court’s attention, the

court below was in no position to determine the rea-

sonableness and legality of EPA’s prescribed effluent

standards.

4. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Conflicts With

These Of Other Circuits And Its Own Prior Decision

EPA attempts to distinguish the cases cited by

Petitioners which show that the decision below con-

flicts with decisions of other circuits and one of its

own decisions.” The Agency argues that, unlike those

decisions, the revision in issue here did not funda-

mentally alter the proposed rule. But as demonstrated

above, EPA did in fact make a basic and substantial

change in the rule by adopting a technology that was

never subject to notice and comment.

EPA also claims that notice of sulfide precipitation

was not supplied by a comment, but by notice in the

Federal Register and draft Development Document,

and thus its adoption as a technology was a “‘logical

outgrowth” of the original proposal. However, as

noted above sulfide precipitation was not identified

as one of the technologies under consideration in the

Federal Register; and reference to a large number of

demonstrate that sulfide precipitation could not achieve the pre-

scribed standards. They were also prepared to show that EPA

had been informed during the rulemaking that the samples at

the foreign plant were not representative of long-term perform-

ance.

7 American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial

Organizations v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) and

Chocolate Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir.

1985).

“ ee ey er eee oT ae ee

additional technologies in a draft Development Doc-

ument without any indication they were being con-

sidered as possible alternative control methods does

not meet the requirements of the APA.

Furthermore, while the comments did not mention

sulfide precipitation - a clear indication of lack of

notice to Petitioners - they clearly did trigger EPA’s

adoption of a seventh and new technology, as both

the court below found (App. p. 15a) and EPA con-

cedes (Opp. p. 9). If courts do not allow agencies to

escape the notice requirements of the APA by basing

a revised rule on the substantive contents of com-

ments, then a fortiori an agency cannot claim notice

where the comments do not even discuss the tech-

nology subsequently adopted, but cause the agency to

take different action than initially proposed.

In addition to the cases cited in the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, the decision be’ow is also in con-

flict with a more recent decision of the Second Circuit

- National Black Media Coalition et al. v. Federal

Communications Commission, 791 F.2d 1016 (2nd Cir.

1986). There, in circumstances very similar to those

here, the court held that an invitation to ‘‘submit

other proposals’ and “‘the comments of other inter-

ested parties’ did not provide adequate notice when

the final rule differed significantly from the proposed

rule, and was based on information not available to

the public (td. at 1022-1023).

5. The Petition Raises Significant Legal Issues

EPA attempts to dismiss this case as one involving

only a factual dispute on the adequacy of notice and

not any significant legal issues. The issues in this

case, however, transcend the particulars of the rule-

making proceeding under challenge, for they raise the

recurring question of what obligation an agency has

under Section 4 of the APA to give notice and op-

portunity for comment on a rule that substantially

differs from what was originally proposed. The ques-

tion ‘‘will ultimately require interpretation of impor-

tant statutory language by this Court” Eli Lilly &

Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096, 1098 (1980) (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting). And the question is an especially im-

portant one in the Environmental Law area where

the statutory schemes rely heavily upon meaningful

participation in rulemaking proceedings and usually —

provide little or no opportunity for adjudicatory hear-

ings, e.g. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 e¢ seq.,

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 6901 et seg., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et

seq., and Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300

F et seq.

For the foregoing reasons and those presented in

the petition, it is respectfully submitted that the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

ce eee

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES R. WALPOLE

EDMUND E. HARVEY

JOANNE M. SALVATORE

CHADBOURNE & PARKE

1101 Vermont Ave., N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20005

Of Counsel: (202) 289-3000

DouGLAS E. MCALLISTER ROBERT A. EMMETT

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS REED SMITH SHAW & MCCLAY

1920 N Street, N.W. 1150 Conn. Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 861-2800 (202) 457-6100

Attorneys for Petitioners

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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