Petition for Writ of Certiorari — United Food & Commercial Workers International Union Local 1357 v. National Labor Relations Board
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«} l 9 Supreme Court, U.S,
OBezS FILED
FEB 4 1986
No JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
isis CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Term, 1986
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
Petitioner
vs
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 1357,
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Bernard N. Katz
Basil L. Merenda
MERANZE AND KATZ
12th Floor Lewis Tower Building
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 346-4183
Attorneys for Respondent
PACKARD PRESS LEGAL DIVISION. 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA., PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000 «#28 =
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Where General Counsel of the National Labor Re-
lations Board fails to meet the threshold burden of a
prima facie showing of unlawful discrimination and
where Respondent affirmatively establishes that the
charging party would have been fired for permissible rea-
sons regardless of purported protected activity, can there
be a finding that Respondent’s conduct was violative of
the Act?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED « oi. cs, ee i
TABLE OF CITATOING. 22... 0k ee iv
OPINIONS BELOW...............e0se000:: a
JURISGDNC TION oo hts ee ee 2
STATUTES INVOLVED .........:. poe pheno 3
STATEMENT OF THE CARE. .sca6ee re 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT........ 7
I. The Decision by the Third Circuit is Contrary
to the Decision of this Court.............. Pen
A. Substantial Evidence on the Record as a
Whole Indicates That the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board
Failed to Meet the Threshold Burden of
A Prima Facie Showing that Protected
Conduct was a Motivating Factor in
the Respondent's Decision to Fire the
Crievant.. 66 on cs Oe eee 4
B. Substantial Evidence on the Record Con-
sidered As a Whole Indicates that the Griev-
ant Would Have Been Fired tor Permissible
Reeeeewe .. i... kes St ce ee eee 12
CONCLUSION... ..co eee ee eee 16
APPENDIX “A’. Decision of Administrative Law
Judge Ladwig dated October 27. 1983 finding
that Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac-
ROR. co oe we i ee ia
APPENDIX “B”’. Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board dated December 1-4.
1984. attirming Judge Ladwig’s ruling. ....... 28a
TABLE OF CONTENTS—( Continued }
Page
APPENDIX “C”, Order of the Third Circuit dated
November 6, 1985, enforcing the National La-
bor Relations Board’s Order ................. 33a
APPENDIX “D”, Order of the Third Circuit dated
December 4, 1985, denying Petition for rehear-
mn oy cre Cour in banc ........:.......... , 35a
APPENDIX “E”, Statutory Provisions Involved... .. 36a
APPENDIX “F”, Relevant Testimony
ill
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page
EI. Dupont v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir.
SEY ook ok Ghia aed ee Cee Re te hes
Graham Architectural Products Corp. v. NLRB, 697
P.O O04, SS7 CP Cie. PRE). occ sac knnsce 8
Mt. Healty City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed. 2d
a
SEEN aa eee ee ee ee eS 7
NLRB v. American Art Industries, Inc., 415 F.Supp.
po Se ee ree rer rene wr re 8,9
NLRB v. Craw, 565 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1977)... 8, 12
NLRB v. Electric City Dyeing, 178 F.2d 980 (3d Cir.
PN ea ok Rr ee TERR EN Sires 10
NLRB v. Elias Brothers Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421
PS WEE vane Sareea en uema eae 9
NLRB v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 569 F.2d 357 (Sth
Ce ROME Cain c hk whan e ae aD Cee ee 12
NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835
Pe ee PIDs Co ae Ci a eae en 8
NLRB v. National Fixture, Inc., 574 F.2d 1305 (Sth
Sa SER ea ay ac ee aa ee etacn eee ees 8,13
NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc.,
~ ee By iat Ee A, } rere 8, 12
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103
S.Ct. 2469, 77 L-Ea. 20 G67 CISSS) « . ..4 x... 7
United Dairy Farmer Co-Op Ass’n v. NLRB, 633
Foe Wee Ce CE, BRO ins Saks pak awaits 10
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71
S.Ct. 456, 95 Lifd. 20 456 (9951)... «2.2... 8
Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 105 LRRM
1169 (enforced) 662 F.2d 899 (1980) ........ 7.8
TABLE OF CITATIONS— Continued )
All Writs Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a)..... 3
National Labor Relations Act. as amended. 61 Stat.
136 et seq.. 29 U.S.C. §157, 158(a\1) and
PMR tay Satay we eRe 3
National Labor Relations Act.
Me Gs i UA sess 6 one ken deacancne 3
29 U.S.C. 151, et seqg., §8(ay(1) & (3)........ 2
29 U.S.C. §157, 158(a\(1) & 158(aV3)....... 3
ee Bsa. BD BOING) 5 6.556 bikes ce ee. 3
29 U.S.C. 6151, et seq., §10(e).............. 8
ee Wt SE Ek occ cada swe cn une 3
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Term. 1986
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner
..
UNIPED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 1357.
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union Local 1357, Respondent. respectfully pravs that
this court issue a writ of certiorari to review the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals tor the Third Cir-
cuit entered in the above case on December -}. 1985.
That court denied Respondent's request for rehearing in
banc of a decision by a three judge panel entering a judg-
ment granting the application for enforcement of an or-
der of the National Labor Relations Beard issued against
Respondent and denving Respondent. Local 1357's
cross application tor review of said order. The order in
question found that Respondent. Local 1357. violated
2
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq. by discharging
an employee, Elizabeth Murphy, for engaging in pro-
tected, concerted strike activity.
OPINIONS BELOW
This petition results from a decision by a three judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit which entered a judgment without opinion
granting the application for enforcement of an order of
the National Labor Relations Board issued against Re-
spondent. The decision also denied Respondent, Local
1357's cross application for review of said order which
found that Respondent, violated Sections 8(a)( 1) and (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section
151, et seq. by discharging an emplovee, Elizabeth
Murphy, for engaging in protected, concerted strike ac-
tivity.
The Respondent's cross application for review re-
quested the circuit court to deny enforcement and va-
cate, in whole, said order because the National Labor
Relations Board’s determination that the Respondent
committed an unfair labor practice by dismissing the
charging party was not supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record as a whole. In chronological order.
the relevant orders and decrees by the Third Circuit and
National Labor Relations Board are as follows:
i. An order issued on October 27, 1983 by Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Marion C. Ladwig, finding
that the United Food and Commercial Workers Lo-
cal 1357 engaged in an unfair labor practice in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)1) of the National Labor
Relations Act by discharging Elizabeth Murphy for
engaging in protected, concerted strike activity ( Ap-
pendix A, infra P.la)
2. A decision and order issued on December 14.
1984, by a three member panel of the National Labor
Relations Board, which affirmed the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge Marion C. Ladwig in this
case. (Appendix B, intra P.28a).
3. A judgment order. entered on November 6.
1985, by a three judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which granted
the National Labor Relations Board’s application for
enforcement of the order issued against Respondent.
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1357
and denied Respondent, United Food and Commer-
cial Workers Local 1357's cross application for re-
view of that order. (Appendix C, infra P.33a).
4. An order entered on December 4. 1985 bv the
United States Court of Appeals tor the Third Circuit
which denied Respondent's request for a rehearing
in banc of the above captioned case. (Appendix D.
infra P.35a).
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. Section 1254¢ 1).
In the event this court determines that the issuance
of a writ other than certiorari might better aid the juris-
diction of this court and the administration of justice. the
Respondent also invokes the jurisdiction of this court un-
der the All Writs Act. as amended. 28 U.S.C. Section
165 1a).
STATUTES INVOLVED
This case involves the interpretation and application
of the following statutes: Sections 7. 81a 1) and (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act. as amended. 61 Stat.
136 et seq.. 29 U.S.C. Sections 157. 158(a1) and
158(a\3). (Appendix E. intra P.36a)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition seeks review of a decision by the Third
Circuit entering judgment which granted the applica:
tion for enforcement of the National Labor Relations
Board’s Order charging the Respondent with commit-
ting an unfair labor practice by discharging emplovee.
Elizabeth Murphy.
A complaint was issued on February 10, 1982 and a
hearing was held in this matter before an administrative
law judge on September 16 and 17. 1982. On October
27. 1983. Administrative Law Judge Marion C. Ladwig
issued a decision finding that Ms. Murphy was unlaw-
fully discharged by the Respondent. On December 14.
1984. the National Labor Relations Board decided to at-
firm the Judge's rulings. findings and conclusions and to
adopt the recommended and modified order holding,that
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1357 had
committed the alleged untair labor practice in question.
Thereafter. the National Labor Relations Board
sought entorcement of said order in the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals and Respondent filed a cross applica-
tion for review of said order. On November 6, 1985, a
three judge panel of the Third Circuit entered a judg-
ment, without an opinion, granting the application for
entorcement of the National Labor Relations Board’s or-
der and denving Respondent's cross application for re-
view. On December 4. 1985. Respondent's subsequent
petition for rehearing in banc was denied.
The Respondent submits that in granting the
Board’s application for enforcement, the Third Circuit
failed to adhere to the firmly established standard of re-
view under Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(e) and erroneously ruled that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board’s findings and conclusions
in this matter have a reasonable basis in law and rest on
“substantial evidence on the record as a whole.”
@)
This contention is highlighted by the fact that the
record indicates that the General Counsel's attempt to
meet the threshold burden of making a prima facie
showing of unlawful discrimination rests on the
uncorroborated and unreliable testimony of an interested
witness, namely, the discriminatee herself. who claims
that a hearsay threat of reprisal by her employer was
passed on to her by a supervisor.
In fact, the credited testimony of the discriminatee
on crucial matters in the case is inherently unreasonable
and self-contradictory. Perhaps indicative of this entire
matter are the circumstances surrounding the false ac-
cusations made by the grievant on her worker's compen-
sation form, which the administrative law judge noted in
his opinion. On this point. the administrative law judge
observed that the grievant stated on her claim form that
“her arm was pulled out of the socket affecting her chest
cavity.” (Appendix A, infra P.10a) However. the record is
clear that Ms. Murphy's arm was never pulled out of its
socket at any time — and thus is reflective of the general
distortion and exaggeration characterizing her testi-
mony. Despite this contradiction, the administrative law
judge substantially credited the grievant’s testimony in
this respect. Thus, the false accusations the grievant
submitted on her worker's compensation form, along
with other examples, like Ms. Murphy’s incredible ver-
sion of the June 9th meeting between her and
Respondent's President and the conflicting reasons the
grievant gave for being out of work on sick leave for six
weeks. provide clear proof that the grievant basically
contributed testimony to the case which was unreliable
and uncorroborated. ( Appendix F. infra P.57-59, 65-78a)
The administrative law judge also concludes that the
timing and abruptness of United Food and Commercial
6
Workers Local 1357's action against Ms. Murphy sup-
ports a finding of unlawful motive. However, a more ac-
curate analvsis of this case shows that the timing of these
events are just a mere coincidence which has absolutely
no independent legal significance.
At the same time, the administrative law judge also
attempts to prop up an already non-existent prima facie
case on discriminatory motive by concluding that the
National Labor Relations Board’s finding of unlawful
motive is further supported by the existence of so called
shifting defenses on the part of the Respondent. How-
ever, this contention, too. is not supported by substantial
evidence.
In fact. it is clear that the administrative law judge
incorrectly confused an argument in the Union’s Brief
with respect to “major factors” which supported the
union's decision to take specific action to aid Ms.
Murphy with her apparent need of health care with the
issue of what reasons supported “the discharge of Ms.
Murphy.”
At the same time. Respondent asserts that substan-
tial evidence in the record considered as a whole indi-
cates that the grievant would have been fired for
permissible reasons. Clearly. Ms. Murphy was ultimately
discharged for reasons of insubordination which inter-
relates to her conduct of June 10. 1984 and other bizarre
events in which she was involved. demonstrating her
need for professional mental health care.
However. the administrative law judge ignored the
firmly established evidence on the events surrounding
Ms. Murphy's discharge and made credibility determi-
nations in this regard which were inherently unreason-
able or self-contradictory. The Third Circuit upheld
these unreasonable determinations despite firmly estab-
lished precedential authority instructing it to disregard
this tvpe of determination.
7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Decision by the Third Circuit is Contrary To the
Decision of this Court.
A. Substantial Evidence on the Record as a Whole In-
dicates That the General Counsel of the National La-
bor Relations Board Failed to Meet the Threshold
Burden of a Prima Facie Showing That Protected
Conduct Was a Motivating Factor in_ the
Respondent’s Decision to Fire the Grievant.
In this case, the Board determined that Elizabeth
Murphy was discharged from her employment with Lo-
cal 1357 in retaliation for engaging in protected con-
certed activity. In considering the evidence in a dual
motive discharge case like the one at bar, the Board is
required to follow the Wrightline test approved by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 103 S.Ct. 2469, 77 L.Ed. 2d 667 (1983).
Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 105 LRRM 1169
(enforced) 662 F.2d 899 (1980), articulated a substan-
tive standard and a burden of proof rule for deciding
mixed motive discharge cases. Borrowing from the Su-
preme Courts’ analysis in Mt. Healthy City School Dis-
trict Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,97 S.Ct.
968, 50 L.Ed. 2d 471 (1974), the Board decided that a
mixed motive discharge is not violative of the act when
an emplovee would have been discharged even if he had
not engaged in any protected activity.
Under this analysis, the General Counsel must ini-
tially establish a prima facie case that protected conduct
Was a motivating factor in an emplover’s decision. The
burden then shifts to the emplover to demonstrate that
the decision would have been the same even in the ab-
sence of protected conduct. E.1. Dupont v. NLRB, 724
F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1983). Although the burden shifts
under this approach. the shift does not undermine the
established principle that the General Counsel must still
8
establish an unfair labor practice by a preponderance of
the evidence. Wright Line, supra.
In considering whether the Generai Counsel and the
Board has met its obligations under Wright Line, it is
firmly established that this Court’s scope of review is
confined to a determination of whether substantial evi-
dence on the record as a whole supports the Board’s de-
termination. National Labor Relations Act, §10(e), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. Section 6151 et seq. See Univer-
sal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456,
95 L.Ed. 2d 456 (1951); Graham Architectural Products
Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1983).
Indeed, this is a limited scope of review. However, in
applying this standard, the Third Circuit in NLRB v.
Craw, 565 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1977) points out that the
Supreme Court in Universal Camera, supra did, in fact,
announce that “a Court of Appeals must take into ac-
count the record as a whole, including any evidence de-
tracting from the Board’s view in determining whether
there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s
findings.”
In this regard, the court is usually bound by the cred-
ibility choices of the administrative law judge where
such choices are appropriate. However, the court is able
to disregard credibility determinations that are inher-
ently unreasonable or self-contradictory. NLRB vu.
Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc., 584 F.2d 720
(Sth Cir. 1978); NLRB wv. National Fixtures, Inc., 574
F.2d 1305 (Sth Cir. 1978). Also, the court may disregard
the administrative law judge’s decision to credit the
largely uncorroborated testimony of a discriminatee-em-
plovee and to discredit the testimony of all contrary wit-
nesses. NLRB v. American Art Industries, Inc., 415 F.2d
1223 (Sth Cir. 1969). Finally, it is established that the
reviewing court is not compeiled to respect credibility
choices based on an inadequate reason or no reason at
all. NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835
(5th Cir. 1978).
9
In granting the Board’s application for enforcement.
the Third Circuit failed to adhere to these principles and
erroneously ruled that there is substantial evidence to
support the Board's findings. Accordingly, the case
herein appears to place the Third Circuit in direct con-
flict with this firmly established authority. In order to
remedy this unjust decision in the case at bar and pre-
vent the development of an erroneous precedent, it is
necessary for this Honorable Court to intervene in this
matter.
In the instant case, the General Counsel argues that
only three areas of evidence in the case support the
Board’s findings of unlawful motive in the discharge of
Ms. Murphy: (1) evidence of unlawful motive based on
the alleged threat conveyed to Ms. Murphy by Secretary-
Treasurer Rosmini; (2) the timing and abruptness of Lo-
cal 1357's action against Murphy and finally, (3) the
Board’s finding of unlawful motive is further supported
\by the existence of so called shifting detenses on the part
of Local 1357. However, these conclusions have abso-
lutely no legal nor factual support.
Nn the instant matter, a review of the direct testi-
mony of Mr. Rosmini in which he recalled his entire con-
vergation with Ms. Murphy indicates that at no time was
there any such threat conveyed by him to Ms. Murphy.
In fact. Mr. Rosmini, gave a more credible, detailed ac-
count of that same conversation than Ms. Murphy. The
Judge should have credited Mr. Rosmini since it was
clear\that the threat simply did not occur and was only a
figment of Ms. Murphy's imagination. (Appendix F,
infra P.61-62a). In this regard, testimony of a charging
party standing alone cannot amount to substantial evi-
dence and the Third Circuit should have disregarded the
administrative law judge's decision to credit the largely
uncorroborated tesumony of the discriminatee and dis-
credit the testimony of all contrary witnesses. NLRB vc.
American Art Industries, Inc., supra; NLRB wv. Elias
Brothers Big Boy, Inc.. 327 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1964).
10
Accordingly, the decision in this case appears to place
the Third Circuit in direct conflict with established prec-
edent. Without this court’s intervention, a confusing
split in the circuits could unnecessarily evolve.
Similarly, the General Counsel’s assertion that the
timing and abruptness of Local 1357’s actions against
Ms. Murphy, namely the proximity in time between the
strike and the onset of Ms. Murphy’s discipline, further
supports the Board’s finding of unlawful motive is un-
founded. The undisputed evidence established by the
charging party’s own testimony was that Local 1357 did
not threaten, harass, discipline or in any other manner
reprimand any of Ms. Murphy’s fellow workers who par-
ticipated in the strike either prior to, during, or subse-
quent to the walkout. (Appendix F, infra P.38a)
Undisputed testimony also established that no actions
with respect to Ms. Murphy took place until after the
“heated meeting” of June 9, 1981 in which Ms. Murphy
engaged in personal insults, threats and conduct which
Mr. Young felt were insubordinate and humiliating (Ap-
pendix F, infra P.51-59a). This all clearly indicates that
disciplinary action against Ms. Murphy was not
prompted for retaliatory purposes due to Ms. Murphy’s
strike activity. The fact that the June 9 meeting which
Ms. Murphy initiated occurred three weeks after the
strike was just a coincidence and has absolutely no in-
dependent significance. General Counsel’s attempt to at-
tribute more to this coincidence than what really existed
is simplv misleading, especially since Ms. Murphy init-
ated the encounter. Accordingly, the General Counsel's
assertion that the timing and abruptness of Local 1357's
action against Ms. Murphy further supports the Board’s
finding of unlawful motive is not supported by substan-
tial evidence and General Counsel's reliance on United
Dairy Farmers Co-Op Ass’n. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d
Cir. 1979), NLRB v. Electric City Dyeing, 178 F.2d 980
(3d Cir. 1950) is simplv misplaced.
11
Finally, the General Counsel asserts that the Board’s
findings of unlawful motive are further supported by the
failure of Local 1357’s asserted reasons for discharge to
withstand scrutiny. In an apparent attempt to prop up an
already non-existent prima facie case on discriminatory
motive, the administrative law judge attempts to do the
work of the General Counsel and find discriminatory mo-
tives by relying on Board doctrines which hold that re-
liance on several shifting reasons for an action may give
rise to an inference that the stated reasons are
pretextural and mask another unlawful motive. Al-
though this is a legally permissible approach to discrim-
ination cases like the case at bar, the union’s defenses
were consistent throughout. Three major reasons, as
cited by the Judge, supported the discharge of Ms.
Murphy; namely, her false accusations against Mr.
Young, the property destruction incident of June 10 and
Ms. Murphy’s refusal to submit to a psychiatric evalua-
tion.
With respect to the final reason in support of the dis-
charge, the union brought to the attention of the admin-
istrative law judge and established through competent
testimony instances of Ms. Murphy’s bizarre and erratic
behavior which supported President Young’s and Mr.
Rosmini’s decision that Ms. Murphy needed a psychiat-
ric evaluation. For instance, Ms. Murphy’s suggestion
that the union President was promiscuously involved
with two other women employed by Respondent, also the
fact that she reported off sick for a period of six weeks
and offered contradictory reasons concerning the nature
of her alleged illness, and the union’s apprehension that
Ms. Murphy started a fire in the union’s office were not
specific grounds for discharge but did demonstrate the
union’s good faith in seeking the psychiatric evaluation
as a possible alternative to having to discharge Ms.
Murphy.
Consequently, it is clear that the administrative law
judge incorrectly confused an argument in the union’s
12
brief with respect to “major factors” which supported the
union’s decision to seek a psychiatric evaluation with the
issue of what reasons supported “the discharge of Ms.
Murphy.” These are two entirely separate, though re-
lated, issues. The administrative law judge’s confusion
was incorrectly used by him to support an erroneous
finding that the union engaged in “shifting defenses ” To
the contrary, the Respondent consistently claimed at the
outset of this case and throughout formal proceedings in
this matter that Ms. Murphy was discharged for reasons
of insubordination relating to her conduct of June 10 and
the other bizarre events she was involved in which in-
dicated that she was in need of professional health care.
Thus, there was no substantial evidence of “shifting
defenses” upon which the administrative law judge
could rely in finding a prima facie case of unlawful dis-
crimination.
B. Substantial Evidence on the Record Considered as a
Whole Indicates that the Grievant Was Fired for Per-
missible Reasons
It would seem clear that substantial evidence, on the
record considered as a whole, indicates that the grievant
would have been fired for permissible reasons. Local
1357 asserts that its every action eminated from Ms.
Murphy’s own bizarre misconduct, i.e., Ms. Murphy was
ultimately discharged for reasons of insubordination re-
lating to her conduct of June 10 and the other bizarre
events she was involved in which indicated that she was
in need of professional health care.
The administrative law judge ignored the firmly es-
tablished evidence on the events surrounding Ms.
Murphy’s discharge and made credibility determinations
in this regard which were inherently unreasonable or
self-contradictory. Although established authority under
NLRB ©. Craw, supra; NLRB v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons,
969 F.2d 357 (Sth Cir. 1978): NLRB wv. Randle-Eastern
13
Ambulance Service, Inc., supra; NLRB v. National Fix-
ture, Inc., supra indicates that this type of unreasonable
or self-contradictory credibility determination should be
ignored by a court of review, the Third Circuit in this
case failed to follow this principle in crediting unreliable
testimony which related to the events surrounding Ms.
Murphy’s discharge. Accordingly, the Third Circuit ap-
pears to be in direct conflict with established authority
on this issue too. A focused review of the events sur-
rounding the discharge will clearly bear this out.
For instance, the employer’s actions against Ms.
Murphy did not occur until subsequent to June 9, when
she threatened and humiliated the Respondent’s Chief
Executive Officer during a conference in his office. In
regard to this incident, the administrative law judge re-
lies solely on Ms. Murphy’s incredible version of the con-
versation and concludes that a heated argument ensued
in which Ms. Murphy’s arm was injured while being
ousted from the office. (Appendix A, infra P.4a)
However, on this point, undisputed testimony on the
physical details surrounding the alleged assault indi-
cates that the attack never occurred. The place where
Ms. Murphy was seated at the time of the alleged attack
indicates that she could not have been reached ( Appen-
dix F, infra P.57-59a) Moreover, Mr. Young did indeed
testify emphatically that he never laid a hand on Ms.
Murphy and an actual rendition of Ms. Murphy’s de-
scription of how the injury occurred and piiotographs of
the alleged injuries indicate that the bruises suffered by
Ms. Murphy did not result from the type of grabbing mo-
tion described by her (Appendix F, infra P.75-78a).
In contrast, the General Counsel fails to cite any
physical evidence indicating that the assault did take
place. In fact, its entire case is based on the grievant's
self serving complaints of discomfort with her arm.
Thus, it is clear that Respondent's President could not
have physically attacked Ms. Murphy and the adminis-
trative law judge’s determination to the contrary can be
14
disregarded as inherently unreasonable and contradic-
tory.
In regard to the June 10 property destruction in Lo-
cal 1357’s office, the administrative law judge concluded
that Local 1357 did not have a good faith belief that Ms.
Murphy threw a tantrum and destroyed the office prop-
erty despite the evidence to the contrary. (Appendix A,
infra P.7-lla)
The administrative law judge’s support for this con-
clusion is based on his claim that the investigation con-
ducted by the Local was “perfunctory” and that the
union falsely claimed that it believed the good faith state-
ments of Messrs. Spellane and Miller or the first hand
observation of Mr. Rosmini. (Appendix A, infra P.10a)
However, this conclusion is also an unreasonable deter-
mination which can be disregarded,
For example, the Judge’s conclusion that the inves-
tigation was “perfunctory” is unsupported. As of June 11,
the union had completed a thorough investigation by’
taking statements from every employee who could offer
relevant evidence. Although the grievant had not been
interviewed as of that date, it was established that Mr.
Young's attempts to set up a meeting during which the
grievant could be questioned about the incident were
frustrated by her absence on sick leave and her refusal to
cooperate with her own union to arrange a meeting date.
(Appendix F, infra P.60-61a and 72-73a) In fact, it must
be noted that the administrative law judge does not point
to one additional step that the union could have taken
that was not, in fact, pursued. (Appendix A, infra P.10-
lla)
In a similar vein, the Judge does not explain why he
concluded that the union falsely claimed that it believed
the statements of Spellane and Miller, nor why the union
should not have truly believed these statements which
were forthright, detailed and pointed the finger of guilt
overwhelmingly in the grievant's direction,
15
The union cited in its brief additional reasons why it
thought an evaluation was in order and each of the rea-
sons stated were supported by the record. One such rea-
son was the fact that Ms. Murphy chronically gave
conflicting reasons for her sick leave during the time in
which she was out of work. In fact, the grievant for a
period of approximately six weeks reported off work and
gave conflicting reasons for her absences including inter
alia, alleged gastritis (Appendix F, infra P.47a), alleged
heart trouble (Appendix F, infra P.64-66a), an alleged
stomach tumor (Appendix F, infra P.62-72a) and other
non-specific reports of illness in which Ms. Murphy sim-
ply claimed to be “very sick” or “very weak” (Appendix F,
infra P.62-72a). It was during this time that the union
received a report that Ms. Murphy had been admitted to
JFK Memorial Hospital under the influence of alcohol
and drugs (Appendix F, infra P.72a). Thus, the record
clearly indicates that the grievant would have been fired
for permissible reasons.
Accordingly, the Board’s finding that the Respon-
dent committed an untair labor practice is based on in-
herently unreasonable credibility determinations. This
in turn means that there is absolutely no support by sub-
stantial evidence on the record as a whole for the Third
Circuit decision herein. Thus, the need for intervention
by this court is urgent.
16
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submit-
ted that this petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
MERANZE AND Kk \TZ
wie — QAdeu
BERN, ARD N. KATZ
BASIL L. MERENDA
DATED: February 4. 1986
17
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I BERNARD N. KATZ, ESQUIRE, do hereby cer
tify that a true and correct copy of the attached Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Ap
peals for the Third Circuit was forwarded by first class
mail on this date to
Elliott Moore, Esquire
National Labor Relations Board
lvl?’ Pennsylvania Avenue, N.\W
Washington, DC 20570
\ttn: John Welsh, Esquire
yo— ty
BERNARD N. KATZ
DATED: February 4. 1986
a
a a
APPENDIX
; ee ; q _ <2 :
*
APPENDIX “A”
JD-472-83
Philadelphia, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1357
and Case 4-CA-12427
ELIZABETH MURPHY, an Individual
Charles S. Strickler, Jr., Esq., tor the
General Counsel.
Richard B. Sigmond, Esq., (Meranze, Katz, Spear
& Wilderman ), of Philadelphia, PA, for the
Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
MARION C. LADWIG, Administrative Law Judge.
This case was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Sep-
tember 16-17, 1982. The charge was filed September 24.
1981,! and the complaint was issued February 10, 1982.
An SIU shop steward, representing office employees
of a large local union, led an 11-day strike against the
Union, to the embarrassment of its president. In a heated
meeting after the strike with the steward concerning
strike publicity, as credited evidence shows, the union
president ejected her from his office, seizing her arm,
badly bruising it. After she filed a claim alleging injury
1. All dates are in 1981 unless otherwise indicated.
A-1
A-2
from the assault, the Union suspended her, later re-
quired her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation as a con-
dition of employment, and gave her a formal notice of
termination when she refused.
The primary issues are whether the Union, the Re-
spondent, (a) unlawfully issued the office employees’
steward a warning letter, (b) threatened her with repris-
als because of the strike, (c) made her working condi-
tions more onerous as a reprisal, (d) required her to
undergo a psychiatric and psychological examination as
a condition of employment, to provide a pretext for dis-
charging her, and (e) discharged her for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity during and after the strike, in
violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
On the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Union. |
make the following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent Local 1357, an integral part of a
multistate labor organization, is an unincorporated asso-
ciation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where it annually
receives over $100,000 in dues and fees, and remits over
$25,000 to its International in Washington, D.C. The
Union admits and I find that it is an emplover engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Embarrassing Strike Against Union
Elizabeth “Betty” Murphy, who led the office em-
plovee strike against the Union from May 6 to 16, was a
good employee and, as admitted by Union President
A-3
Wendell Young, a “very good shop steward” (Tr. 367).
She was the telephone operator and receptionist, and did
volunteer work as secretary and loan officer for the credit
union.
She was a member of the Seafarers International
Union’s negotiating committee, which failed to reach an
agreement with the Union without a strike. As the SIU
strike captain, she conducted the picket line in front of
the union offices, causing considerable disruption in the
operations when the officers and business agents hon-
ored the picket line.
The strike was a personal embarrassment to Presi-
dent Young. A May 12 news story in the Philadelphia
Daily News (G.C. Exh. 2), identifying Murphy as a
picket captain and former nun, quoted her as stating that
the major issues in the strike were overtime and a cost-
of-living clause and that her boss, Wendell Young, was a
hypocrite. “How can a man like him run around preach-
ing about contracts and be so hypocritical?”
President Young admittedly was “very upset” with
the “completely one-sided” news article (Tr. 360). He
also revealed his displeasure “over the fact that there was
a strike altogether.” He testified that the “local fellows
could not control the situation. In other words, they lost
control. In fact, I had to go into the negotiations at the
end, and try to sell the package instead of the union of-
ficial doing it. That is how goofed up it was.” (Tr. 375. )
This was an obvious reference to the bargaining position
of the SIU negotiating committee on which Steward
Murphy served.
Acknowledging his embarrassment from the adverse
publicity, President Young responded to the news story
the same day, stating in a letter to the Daily News that
“In our opinion, the people on strike are trying to em-
barrass us into a very unfair contract” (G.C. Exh. 3).
[t was this response, which was printed in full in the
June issue of the Union’s newspaper, the Dialogue, that
was the subject of Steward Murphy’s heated meeting
A-4
with President Young on June 9 when, as Young admit-
ted, she went to his office “to talk about union business”
(Tr. 410).
B. Assault Upon Shop Steward
On June 9, 3 weeks after the office employee strike
against the Union was settled, SIU Shop Steward
Murphy saw in the Dialogue an article entitled, “The
President Replies to Phila. Daily News,” quoting Presi-
dent Young’s May 12 response to that newspaper’s strike
siory. At 4:15 p.m., she went to Young’s office to give
him the SIU position on the lack of accuracy of a state-
ment in his response about one of the strike issues (Tr.
74-75, 175.) His statement was that “As a result of ex-
tensive days off and lost time due to these programs, over
the past few years there has been an increasingly large
amount of overtime needed to run the office.”
As Murphy credibly testified, she told him she would
like to talk to him about the article, he asked what was
the problem, she handed him the newspaper, and he
started reading the article. “It is in reference to this over-
time. You say that our girls are getting overtime because
they missed so much time during the year, but the truth
of the matter is they are filling in for the secretaries who
are never at their desks . . . and then they have to do
their work at nighttime.” (Tr. 33-34). She insisted on a
retraction (Tr. 79). A heated argument ensued. (Murphy
did not remember the full conversation.) Finally Young
asked, “Are you telling me how to run this office?” She
said, “No, Mr. Young, but I think you should print the
truth.” When asked what then happened, she credibly
testified (Tr. 34)
A. Mr. Young said “Get out of my office. Get
out.” He got up from his chair and he came around.
I don’t think I moved. Then he grabbed my arm and
I pulled away. He grabbed me again, and he pulled
me toward the door.
a
A-5
He opened the door and he dropped my arm, and
I left his office. He threw me out of his office. |Em-
phasis added. |
She returned to her desk “in terrible pain,” spent 3
to 5 minutes closing (Tr. 77), clocked out at 4:32 p.m.
(R. Exh. 1), and met two awaiting friends, one of whom
drove her car (Tr. 35). Her left arm “felt like it was out
of its socket” (Tr. 96). She was holding it and was “teary
eyed” (Tr. 422). When asked what was wrong, she said,
“He threw me out of his office.” (Tr. 426.) The next
morning when she showed oie of the two friends (em-
ployee Sophia Cleary, the SIU shop steward for another
group of the office employees) her “red and swollen” arm
(Tr. 423), she explained, “He gripped my arm” (Tr. 427).
This was the day, June 10, when she came to work
and found two of her pictures broken, as discussed be-
low. With Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini’s permission,
she did litthe work that day and spent most of the time
resting. At quitting time, Rosmini asked her if she was
staying to do some credit union loans and, as she credibly
testified, “I told him no, that I was having. . . a lot of
pain with my arm, and I was going right home.” (Tr.
38-39.) I discredit Rosmini’s denial (Tr. 180) that
Murphy complained about her arm at any time that day.
(By his demeanor on the stand, he appeared more con-
cerned about supporting the Union’s cause on critical
matters than giving an accurate account of what hap-
pened).
Rosmini permitted Murphy to rest much of the time
during the next 2 days, Thursday and Friday, June 11
and 12. About 2:45 p.m. Friday, when she saw President
Young, she told him, “Look at what you did to my arm.”
He looked at it and said, “I know. I know. See your
union.” (Tr. 44, 122.) Before leaving early that day (with
permission from Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini to see a
doctor about her arm (Tr. 128) ), she told Rosmini, “I
just showed Mr. Young my arm and he said he knew he
A-6
did it,” to see her union. Rosmini asked, “Do you mean
he admitted it?” and she suggested that Rosmini ask
him. In his testimony, Rosmini admitted that he saw
Murphy’s arm; that it was “very black and blue” with
“two large black and blue marks” and “four smaller
marks on the other side of her arm”; that he told her
“That doesn’t look good. . . That looks terrible”; that he
told her to talk to Young; and that when she returned,
she said she had showed Young the black and blue
marks and Young “admitted that he did it” (Tr. 188). I
discredit Young’s testimony that he merely told Murphy,
“Come on, get out, go see your union” (Tr. 379).
(Murphy impressed me most favorably by her demeanor
on the stand as an honest, conscientious witness, but
Young appeared to be less than candid. )
That Friday afternoon, upon the suggestion of an at-
torney, Murphy had four color photographs taken of her
injured arm, graphically recording the condition of the
arm as described by Rosmini.
The Union took the position at the beginning of the
trial that Young “never laid a hand on her” (Tr. 20). After
the photographs were introduced into evidence (G.C.
Exh. 6), Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini testified that he
had no information how Murphy’s arm was injured and
admitted having no reason to believe that the bruises
were self-inflicted (Tr. 277-278). Young continued to
deny touching her.
I reject as frivolous the suggestion in the Union’s
brief that there is “a reasonable probability that Ms.
Murphy self-inflicted these bruises while rubbing her
arm after leaving Mr. Young’s office or at some other
time, in some cther way.” In arguing that Young’s grab-
bing her arm as Murphy described would not leave two
large bruises on the front of the arm, the Union ignores
the credited testimony that Young gripped her arm
twice.
After weighing all the evidence and discrediting
President Young’s denials, | find that Young injured SIU
A-7
Steward Murphy’s arm June 9 when ejecting her from
his office.
C. Destruction of Steward’s Personal Property
On Wednesday, June 10, Steward Murphy received
another shock that added to the trauma of the assault of
the afternoon before.
She arrived about 8:30 and office boy Thomas
Spellane opened the door for her. After clocking in at
8:32 (R. Exh. 1), she went to her desk and found the
pictures of her mother and her friend, Sister Gloria Keltz,
lying on the floor with the frames broken. She was “most
upset” (Tr. 37) and.“kind of in total shock” (Tr. 98) upon
seeing “the glass all over the floor” and the broken pic-
tures. She turned and walked out, and asked Spellane for
Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini’s telephone number.
Rosmini had already left home.
As other employees arrived, Spellane opened the
door and let them in. The next employees to arrive were
Renee Kelly and Margaret O’ Brien, followed by Sophia
Cleary, who arived about 8:35, and Kathy Barrett, who
arrived a minute or so later (Tr. 420, 429-430).
As Kelly and O’Brien entered the reception area,
they noticed that the clock on the wall was also broken
and Murphy’s small Irish flag was burned. One of them
commented, “Your flag is burned, too, Betty, and so is
the clock” broken. (Tr. 38.) As Murphy credibly testified,
“it was the pictures that were on my mind, my mother’s
picture and Sister’s picture”; I didn’t know [the clock]
was broken. . .I didn’texamineit. . . . I think part of
[the flag] was burned. I didn’t examine it that well, be-
cause I was very upset about the whole episode” (Tr.
101). She did notice that the wall clock had stopped at
11 p.m. (Tr. 38).
When employees Cleary and Barrett came to the
area, as Cleary credibly testified, “The first thing that I
observed was the clock up on the wall stopped at 11:00.
A-8
. And I turned to Kathy Barrett and said, ‘It happened
at nighttime.’ She said, ‘It would have had to’ ” (Tr. 421,
431).
When Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini arrived about
9:05 or 9:10, he saw Murphy standing at her desk, cry-
ing. “She told me that someone had brokenSister Gloria’s
picture and her mother’s picture.” (Tr. 176.) He cleaned
up the glass and told Murphy to get some tea and relax
Cir. 1G3).
It was at quitting time that day (after Murphy told
Rosmini she was having a lot of pain with her arm and
was going right home) when Rosmini told her to stop in
his office and, as discussed below, gave her a warning
letter for “insubordination or belligerent behavior” and
told her, in an apparently unguarded answer to a ques-
tion, that President Young “said he was going to make an
example of you, that nobody would ever strike against
him again.”
The next day, Thursday, June 11, upon instructions
from Young, Rosmini made a perfunctory investigation,
taking two siatements. (A third employee also gave a
statement to Young's secretary, professing to report what
the office boy had told him.) The statement that Rosmini
took trom office boy Spellane (R. Exh. 5) was obviously
inaccurate. The statement claimed that Spellane “went
upstairs at 8:15 to make the coffee and the bell rang.
Betty Murphy came in. Approximately 8:30 I went down
to wait for the people to come in.” Although Rosmini
never accused Murphy of destroying her own property
and never took a statement from her or any of the other
emplovees who discovered the damage, the Union could
argue from this purported timing that Murphy had 15
minutes to smash the pictures of her own mother and
her nun triend. to set fire to the Hag (ignoring the odor
from the smoke) and, after damaging the wall clock, to
have the presence of mind of somehow reaching the
7-toot-high clock on the wall (Tr. 283) and setting it for-
ward or back several hours. (Except for President
A > 9g
Young's dubious suspicion — that the flag burning and
destruction of property were “to throw the thing off,” or
distract attention from Murphy’s June 9 conduct in his
office (Tr. 377) — nowhere in the evidence is there any
suggestion of a motivation for her to damage the clock
and destroy her own valued property. )
Spellane’s statement also asserted: “In the mean-
time, | came in and she said, ‘Look at all this.’ There was
glass on the floor and the clock said 11 something on it.
I took notice the clock was on the wall.” (Emphasis
added. )
The timing was obviously wrong, because Murphy’s
timecard showed that she clocked in at 8:32 a.m. — not
15 minutes earlier. By the time of trial, the timing was
changed; Spellane testified that he went downstairs
“around 8:30” and let Murphy in the front door (Tr. 308).
(This corrected timing, however, made it even more un-
likely that Murphy would be setting a fire at her desk,
breaking pictures and scattering glass around, and
breaking and resetting a clock in the few minutes before
the other office employees arrived. As found above,
Cleary arrived about 8:35 — about 5 minutes after
Murphy — and both Kelly and O’Brien arrived ahead of
Cleary. )
Also by the time of trial, Spellane had changed an-
other part of his story. Although asserting in his written
statement (which was witnessed by Secretary- Treasurer
Rosmini) that the damaged clock was on the wall, he
claimed at the trial that “The clock was on the floor” (Tr.
310). Rosmini also claimed that the clock was on the
floor (Tr. 176). To the contrary, Murphy and Cleary both
credibly testified that the clock was on the wall when the
damage was discovered. (The Union contends in its
brief: “The clock sits seven feet off the floor on the wall
of the reception area. ... She intentionally damaged her
own property, for what reason we can never be sure, and
apparently pulled the clock down off the wall and set it
at 11:00 o'clock tor obvious reasons.”) | find that
A-10
Spellane and Rosmini fabricated the change in testi-
mony to support the Union's cause—placing the dam-
aged clock in a more accessible place for Murphy to reset
it. (Rosmini claimed, “I concluded that |between 8:30
and 9 o'clock] the clock was moved forward |by Murphy|
to indicate it was done the night before” (Tr. 272-273).
but testified he did not know how to change the time:
“Move the hands, I guess” (Tr. 283).
Because of (a) the obviously inaccurate timing of
Murphy’s arrival in Spellane’s statement, (b) the lack of
any plausible motivation for Murphy to destroy or dam-
age her own and the Union’s property, (c) the implau-
sibility of Murphy’s setting a fire at the reception desk,
destroving valued property, and damaging and resetting
a wall clock at the beginning of the workday as other
employees were arriving, and (d) the failure of the Union
to question Murphy and other employees who discovered
the damage, I deem it most unlikely that the Union ac-
tually believed two other assertions in Spellane’s state-
ment, that “the clock said 10 minutes of 8” and “nothing
was disturbed” when he opened the building that morn-
ing. (At the trial, Spellane first admitted that he would
have to turn his head “almost all around to see the clock”
upon entering the front door, and indicated how far he
would have to turn, but later indicated he would have to
turn only about 90 degrees to the left (Tr. 313-315). He
appeared to be less than candid.) Whether or not it was
Spellane’s own idea to include these assertions in the
typed statement (witnessed by Rosmini and President
Young's secretary, Janice Pinti), | find that the Union
falsely claimed that it believed the assertions.
I tind instead that President Young ordered the per-
functory investigation to discover some pretext for dis-
charging the SIU steward, as discussed below. |
discredit Rosmini’s claim that he planned to “meet with
Ms. Murphy and to discuss |the incident and the state-
ments taken in the investigation] with her.” but that he
never had the occasion (Tr. 227). He later testified that
A-11
“As far as we are concerned, we had all the information
we neeted on the June 10th incident” (Tr. 242). Young,
after testifving that he ordered the investigation, claimed
that “without any evidence at this point... . [| thought
Betty did it herself” (Tr. 375).
The evidence does not reveal who damaged the
union and personal property. The damage was not done
when the office was cleaned between 8 and 8:30 the
evening before, and the night porter was not aware of
anyone else being in the building between then and mid-
night, when he left the building (R. Exh. 4, Tr. 328).
President Young testified: “I thought Betty did it herself
_.. Because I know | did not do it. . . . | Know that it was
not me. And I know that I did not instruct anybody to do
some stupid childish thing like that... . I did not burn
her flag. or instruct anybody to do it. (Tr. 375, 393-394,
412.)
Contrary to the Union's contention in its brief that
the evidence is “overwhelming” that Murphy “commit-
ted the damage herself.” | find both that she did not do
the damage and that the Union did not in good faith be-
lieve that she did when discharging her.
D. Alleged Coercion Against Steward
1. Written warning and threat of reprisal
At quitting time Wednesday, June 10.
Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini called Murphy to his office
and gave her a warning letter signed by President Young
(G.C. Exh. 4), notifving her that “any further display of
insubordination or belligerent behavior ... such as you
exhibited in my office on June 9, 1981, will result in sus-
pension and/or discharge.” She first asked Rosmini hat
Young meant by “insubordination,” and he replied that
he did not know. Then, as she credibly testified (Tr.
40-41),
A-12
A. I said “What seems to be Mr. Young’s prob-
lem? Has he said anything to you?” And he said Mr.
Young said he was going to make an example of you,
that nobody would ever strike against him again.
Rosmini did not specifically deny telling her this. He
claimed that when she asked how she was insubordi-
nate, he explained that she failed to follow Young's in-
structions by not leaving his office and was “loud and
boisterous” (Tr. 180).
The evidence is clear that President Young and
Steward Murphy had a heated argument June 9 in
Young’s office, and that she insisted on a retraction of his
strike publicity statement that the office employees were
“getting overtime because they missed so much time
during the year.” As found above, she credibly testified
that when he asked, “Are you telling me how to run his
office?” she said, “No, Mr. Young, but I think you should
print the truth.” (That was when he ordered her out and
pulled her arm, injuring it.) The evidence is also clear
that she was in the office longer than the 5 minutes she
recalled and that she did not remember the full conver-
sation.
I credit part of Young's testimony about what oc-
curred. He testified that Murphy stated she felt the pub-
lished letter “was against the understanding that we had
after the strike |the amnesty clause attached to the
agreement], that there would be no retaliation.” He gave
her a long explanation about why his strike publicity let-
ter was printed in the Union’s newspaper after the strike
was settled. “And she did not even listen. She just kept
looking up in the air. . . staring at the ceiling.” (Tr. 359).
(This testimony tends to account for her failure to recall
part of the conversation. )
I find, however, that his denials that he even
touched her and his claim that she referred to his mo-
rality in the June 9 meeting were fabricated. According
A-13
to the Union's brief, she suggested “that the Union Pres-
ident was promiscuously involved with two other women
employed by respondent,” by making a remark that
Young interpreted “as a suggestion that he was having
sexual relations with these female employees,” and that
she made another remark that Young interpreted “as a
threat by Ms. Murphy to call his wife and tell her that he
was having an illicit affair with Pat Scarcelli and Jackie
McPeak.” The brief argues that this and other conduct
were “so provocative and improper as to clearly warrant
her dismissal.” Yet the warning letter the next day men-
tioned only her purported “insubordination or belligerent
behavior.” Even if Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini's testi-
mony were credited that on June 10, Rosmini gave
Murphy an explanation of the warning letter, he merely
claimed that he told her she “failed to follow instructions
by not leaving |Young’s} office, and that she was acting
loud and boisterous” (Tr. 180, emphasis added). (The
Union’s brief misstates the record in contending that
Rosmini referred to her loud and “abusive” conduct
toward Young.) Although some of Young’s testimony
was corroborated by his secretary, Janice Pinti (who wit-
n«essed office boy Spellane’s inaccurate statement about
the June 10 property destruction), she did not impress
me as being a credible witness.
Moreover, even assuming that in their June 9 meet-
ing on union business, Steward Murphy made the state-
ments that President Young claimed, I find that the
statements would not have been so opprobrious to be un-
protected. According to him. she stated that “the only
people that you listen to are Pat Scarrelli and Jackie
McPeak .... You hate me because I am Irish .... Is
vour wife going to be home tonight?” (Tr. 361-362. ) (Al-
though Murphy could not remember the entire conver-
sation, she positively and credibly denied making these
statements (Tr. 85-86. )
I note that in falsely denving that he even touched
Murphy (contrary to her credited testimony that he
A-14
gripped her arm twice), he gave testimony that under-
mined his claim that she was insubordinate by failing to
follow instructions to leave the office. He testified (Tr.
362)
I said, “... Come on, get out of the office, go see
your union. We are finished with this conversation.”
I opened the door, and I asked her to leave. And
she got up and left. I did not touch her. And that
whole thing is absolutely ludicrous, those pictures
[of her bruised arm], absolutely ludicrous.
The Union contends in its brief that “Even if this
conversation is deemed to have involved protected activ-
ity, Ms. Murphy’s conduct during that meeting far ex-
ceeded any reasonable bounds of propriety. When she
did not succeed in her demand for a retraction, she be-
rated and humiliated Mr. Young, suggested that he had
a sexual liaison with two other employees, and made a
statement that was interpreted clearly as a threat to call
his wife and relay that false accusation. Under these cir-
cumstances, Mr. Young was justified in issuing the let-
ter of reprimand ... Indeed, he would have been
justified, under the circumstances, in meting out a
much harsher form of discipline.” The Union brief does
not reveal, if these were true facts, why this defense was
reserved for the trial and not even alluded to at the time.
I find that Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini’s June 10
statement to Steward Murphy that President Young
“said he was going to make an example of you, that no-
body would ever strike against him again” was a threat of
reprisals for engaging in the protected concerted strike
activity and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In view of this finding and the above finding that the
defense that Steward Murphy “berated and humilitated”’
the union president was fabricated, I reject the argu-
ment in the Union’s brief that the June 10 warning letter
“obviously had nothing whatsoever to do with the strike”
A-15
and find that it was a reprisal for her leading the strike
against the Union and for her engaging in protected con-
certed activity in the discussion of union business with
President Young in the June 9 meeting, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1).
2. More onerous working conditions
On June 11, the day after Steward Murphy received
the warning letter, Organizing Director Hugo MckKissic
wrote an interoffice communication to secretary Renee
Kelly, informing her that she was not to relieve anyone
on the switchboard or in any other area “unless you get
my personal approval.” On June 12, Murphy, as shop
steward, received a copy of the communication.
The complaint alleges that the Union, through
McKissic, made telephone operator Murphy’s working
conditions more onerous “by refusing to permit other
employees temporarily to relieve her from her duties.”
MckKissic, however, credibly testified that neither
President Young nor Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini was
aware that he was sending the communication and that
it had no relationship to the June 9 and 10 incidents. |
therefore agree with the Union that the communication
was not issued in retaliation for Murphy’s union activi-
ties and that the timing was purely coincidental.
Accordingly, I find that the allegation must be dis-
missed.
I. Discharge of Office Employees’ Steward
1. Her claims for compensation
On Friday, June 12, Steward Murphy began taking
treatments for her arm. On June 15, with
Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini’s permission, she began
taking sick leave (without pay). She took treatments
about every other day (Tr. 46), and she was taking “a lot
of Anacin” for the pain (Tr. 288). Toward the end of
A-16
June, she began having stomach and other problems.
She finally received a doctor's release dated July 20, stat-
ing that she was permitted to return to work July 27 on
a full-time basis. Rosmini admitted that he had a con-
versation with her at least once a week (Tr. 234).
On June 22, one of Murphy’s friends, Sister Gloria,
handed Rosmini Murphy’s workmen’s compensation
claim form that stated that Murphy was injured while
meeting with President Young in his office (Tr. 135,
192). Murphy overheard Rosmini state, “I can’t sign
these. Wendell |Young] would never agree with it” (Tr.
133). According te Rosmini, he said “we” did not agree
that Murphy was injured in Yeung’s office, but said he
told sister Gloria that he would mail the claim to the car-
rier if the doctor filled out his part (Tr. 192). He admit-
tedly advised that Murphy was entitled to file a claim on
the health and welfare fund, which provides compensa-
tion for “two-thirds of pay” (Tr. 196).
On June 26. Rosmini sent Murphy some health and
welfare fund forms. She submitted a disability claim that
same day for “Personal injury sustained |June 9] while
on the job in the President's Office” (G.C. Exh. 14). On
July 2, the claims supervisor, with a copy to President
Young, rejected the claim because it was work related
(SC. Ean. 13).
About August 18 (Tr. 195, 232). Steward Murphy
again submitted a workmen's compensation claim form
which Rosmini this time sent in. On the form Murphy
made the following assertions (G.C. Exh. 15):
During conversation with |Pres.| Young. he became
angry and gripped me by the arm, physically eject-
ing me from his office.
Arm pulled out of socket affecting Chest cavity.
There has been great bitterness against me as shop
steward in Seafarers International Union since a
A-17
strike was launched against Mr. Young’s Local last
May 9, 1981 when our contract expired. The media
attention it gained was a great embarrassment to
him and our conversation that day was concerning a
newspaper article he sent to the Daily News [and
printed in the] Dialogue.
Thus, in all three claims—her June 22 workmen's
compensation claim (which — Secretary-Treasurer
Rosmini refused to send in), her June 26 disability claim,
and her August 18 workmen’s compensation claim
(which she submitted shortly before her August 21 for-
mal notice of termination )—she asserted that her injury
was sustained on the job, in President Young’s office.
Young was most concerned about this assertion
(which I find to be truth). He testified (Tr. 385)
A. One of the problems that we were having is
what Betty was going to put on that form... . we told
the [SIU] ... if she put on the form that |
touched her... I was going to sue her, absolutely
sue her.
And I let that be known. And that is why we did
not get any forms for a while. ... she knew that |
Was Waiting for that report to come in. And I was
immediately going to go down and sue her for that
incident.
But we did not get a form. I called down to health
and welfare. ... and said all | want to do is review
what she puts down for her sickness.
He was referring to the disability claim that she submit-
ted June 26, asserting “Personal injury sustained while
on the job in the President's office.” He did not sue her
but, according to the General Counsel. he in effect dis-
charged her July 14, when he refused to let her work
(although the formal notice of termination was not given
her until August 21).
A-18
2. Her suspension and notice of termination
On Monday, July 13, when Steward Murphy made
her usual Monday morning telephone call to Secretary-
Treasurer Rosmini to report her continued doctor’s treat-
ment, Rosmini told her (as she credibly testified), “Mr.
Young said as soon as you are better — as soon as you get
better, Betty, that you are fired” (Tr. 49, 139-140). Ac-
cording to Rosmini, he told her “she was going to be
suspended” (Tr. 205).
The next day, July 14, in an apparent effort to retain
her job, she reported to work despite her feeling “really
sick” (Tr. 144). She clocked in, opened the switchboard,
and started to work. About 9:15, President Young called
in, recognized her voice, and told her, “Get off the board,
Betty, and do what you are supposed to be doing” (Tr.
49). She left the board, went upstairs, and waited for
Rosmini. When asked “what was I supposed to be
doing,” Rosmini “shook his shoulders” and later told her,
“Get yourself well, Betty, get strong, and get a release
from the doctor” (Tr. 50).
On July 27, Murphy returned to work with a doctor's
release that read: “Ms. Betty Murphy is permitted to re-
turn to work on July 27, 1981, on a full-time basis. Ms.
Murphy will be treated at our facilities during our
evening hours” (G.C. Exh. 7). Rosmini directed her not
to clock in and, after conferring with President Young
(Tr. 211), gave her a letter stating “please be advised that
you are being held out of service until we complete the
appropriate investigation. Your recent absences and the
facts and allegations surrounding them have raised cer-
tain serious questions which indicate that there may be
reason requiring further action on our part” (G.C. Exh.
8). He admittedly refused to give her any explanation
CPE: 8s).
A-19
On August 4, Rosmini sent Murphy a letter, advising
her of an appointment on August 12 with a psychiatrist
and a consulting psychologist. The letter explained (G.C.
Exh. 9)
A thorough consideration of all of the facts has con-
vinced us that in order to make a responsible and
informed decision |concerning her future employ-
ment], it will be necessary for us to receive a full
psychiatric and psychological evaluation. This step
is necessary for us to be advised whether there are
mental health problems which would dictate that
the resolution of your employment question be dealt
with in that sphere.
On August 6, Rosmini wrote Murphy another letter,
stating that the appointment was postponed until August
19. She contacted her union, which advised her to com-
pletely ignore the letters (Tr. 153). Instead, she tele-
phoned the psychiatrist and told him she did not want to
waste his time or the Local’s money. Then on August 11,
Rosmini wrote Murphy another letter, advising her that
the appointment was not for treatment. “It is solely for
the purpose of guiding us in determining what the ap-
propriate action should be in response to your past con-
duct. You are obliged to keep the appointment.” The
letter warned, “A failure to do so will be dealt with as a
deliberate and willful disregard of orders and intentional
insubordinatior.” (G.C. Exh. 11.) The SIU again advised
their steward to ignore the letters, and she did, missing
the appointment.
About August 18, as indicated above, Murphy sub-
mitted her workmen’s compensation claim to the Union,
asserting that President Young “became angry and
gripped me by the arm, physically ejecting me from his
office.” On August 21, Rosmini seni her the formal no-
tice of termination, explaining (G.C. Exh. 12)
A-20
You were specifically instructed to appear for an ex-
amination on Wednesday, August 19, 1981. You
were warned that a failure to appear would result in
disciplinary action. Despite this warning, you did not
appear and this offense coupled to all attendant cir-
cumstances presents just cause for discharge.
3. Shifting defenses
Secretary-Treasurer Rosmini, Steward Murphy’s
immediate supervisor who signed her August 21 termi-
nation notice, positively testified at the trial that there
were three and only three reasons for her discharge. He
listed them as “insubordination” (failure to appear for the
psychiatric examination), her “conduct of June 10th”
(burning the flag and destroying other property), and
“making slanderous statements about Mr. Young”
(claiming, and stating on her August 18 workmen’s com-
pensation form, that the union president on June 9 in-
jured her arm). (Tr. 262-264. )
President Young, the Union’s chief executive officer
for 20 years, stated that he made the final decision to
discharge Murphy (Tr. 353). He testified that his “initial
reaction was to dismiss her because of that | June 10 flag-
burning] incident” (Tr. 413), that he “spent almost lit-
erally the gosh damn summer, at least an hour or so a
day, discussing this damn Betty Murphy situation” (Tr.
394), that the major reasons they had decided to hold her
out of service were the June 10 flag burning and the ac-
cusation that he had injured her arm (Tr. 405), and that
when Murphy did not make the psychiatric appoint-
ment, “that was the final straw that broke the camel’s
back. We notified her that she was dismissed.” (Tr. 396).
Thus at the trial, Rosmini claimed that the accusa-
tion against Young, the June 10 incident, and the refusal
of psycniatric examination were the sole reasons, and
Young claimed they were the primary reasons, for
Murphy’s discharge. Young specifice'ly denied that her
A-21
discharge had “anything at all to do with her functioning
as shop steward” (Tr. 354). Both Rosmini and Young
claimed that the decision to discharge her was not made
until after she refused the psychiatric examination, but
admitted that they had previously decided not to let her
return to work until their “investigation” was completed.
In light of the evidence at the trial, however, these
three purported reasons for the discharge were obviously
suspect. One claim was that the Union was discharging
the office employee shop steward for asserting that the
union president injured her arm when ejecting her from
his office, despite the evidence that her assertion was
true. Another claim was that the Union believed, after a
perfunctory investigation, that the steward herself
burned her own flag and smashed two of her own valued
pictures at starting time, despite the evidence indicating
that the Union did not in good faith have that belief. The
third claim was that the Union discharged the SIU stew-
ard for insubordination when she refused to obey a de-
meaning order to take a psychiatric examination for a
possible mental problem — which the Union contended
it suspected that she had primarily because she asserted
(truthfully, as found above) that the union president in-
jured her arm and because she destroyed her own prop-
erty (something, as found, she did not do).
In its brief, the Union listed other purported “major
factors” involved in the Union's ultimate decision to ter-
minate Murphy’s employment (as well as its decision to
seek a psychiatric evaluation). The first two were pur-
ported reasons that neither Rosmini nor Young claimed
as a basis for the discharge. They were Murphy’s “sug-
vesting that the Union President was promiscuously in-
volved with two other women employed by respondent”
(found above to be a fabrication) and her “threatening to
call the Union President's wife to report on the alleged
illicit affairs if the Union President did not accede to Ms.
Murphy’s demands for a retraction of a newspaper
article” (also found to be a fabrication).
A-22
Some of the other purported “major factors,” con-
tended in the brief but not claimed by either Rosmini or
Young to be a basis for the discharge, were “blaming the
mischief [destroying property June 10] on unspecified
‘others’ in the Union office” (something she did not do);
reporting to work on three consecutive days | June 10-12]
and spending most of her time in the office lying on a
couch in the ladies’ lounge” (failing to point out that she
did so with Rosmini’s permission); and “reporting off
sick for a period of six weeks and offering contradictory
reasons concerning the nature of her alleged illness” (a
clear pretext).
I find that these shifting defenses — particularly the
first two purported “major factors” — detract from rather
than bolster the Union’s defense that it was lawfully mo-
tivated.
4. Concluding findings on discharge
After weighing all the evidence, I find that this is a
bizarre case in which a local union president, seeking a
mechanism to discharge a suspended office employee
shop steward for her protected concerted activity, or-
dered her to submit to a psychiatric evaluation as a con-
dition of employment and discharged her when she
refused to comply with the demeaning order.
In its brief, the Union contends that it could have
discharged SIU Shop Steward Murphy “immediately af-
ter the June 10 property destruction incident” and could
have discharged her “following the false accusation
against [President] Young,” but that “she was a long-
term employee, a virtual fixture in the office,” and al-
though she had engaged in this “serious misconduct,”
the Union deciced it “should first attempt to determine
whether her problem was due to emotional or mental
distress’ by requiring her to take the psychiatric evalu-
ation.
A-23
To the contrary, as found, Murphy did not engage in
the June 10 property destruction, the Union did not have
a good-faith belief that she did and, in fact, ordered the
perfunctory investigation to discover some pretext for
discharging the SIU steward who had embarrassed Pres-
ident Young by her protected concerted strike activity.
Also, as found, Murphy’s accusation against Young was
true; he had injured her arm in the June 9 meeting when
she, as shop steward, was engaging in protected con-
certed activity.
| agree with the General Counsel that before July 14,
when President Young suspended Murphy from work by
ordering her off the switchboard, the Union had already
decided to terminate her “and was only attempting by
further investigation and delay to find some basis or
mechanism — the psychiatric evaluation — to achieve
this end.”
I therefore reject the Union’s contention that “Not
one action taken against [SIU Shop Steward Murphy]
had any relationship to her functioning as shop steward
or her participating in the strike,” and its contention that
even if President Young acted in “retaliation for her
strike activities . . . a discharge would have been proper,
and occurred, even absent such a hostile motivation.” |
find that the Union unlawfully discharged her for en-
gaging in protected concerted activity during and after
the strike in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and
that, as alleged in the complaint, she was in fact dis-
charged July 14, after which the Union refused to permit
her to work. (I find it unnecessary to rule whether the
discharge also violated Section 8(a)(3). )
I also find that the Union required Shop Steward
Murphy to undergo a psychiatric and psychological ex-
amination August 19 as a condition of employment, to
provide a pretext to discharge her for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity, further violating Section
8(a)(1).
A-24
Conclusions of Law
1. By discharging Flizabeth Murphy July 14, 1981,
for engaging in protected concerted activity, the Union
engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. By issuing SIU Shop Steward Murphy a warning
letter in reprisal for her engaging in protected concerted
activity, the Union violated Section 8(a)(1).
3. By threatening the shop steward with reprisals for
engaging in protected concerted strike activity, the
Union violated Section 8(a)( 1).
4. By requiring the shop steward to undergo a psy-
chiatric and psychological examination as a condition of
employment, to provide a pretext to discharge the shop
steward, the Union further violated Section 8(a)(1).
5. The Union did not make the shop steward’s work-
ing conditions more onerous in reprisal for her protected
concerted activity.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, | find it necessary to order
it to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative ac-
tion designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent, having unlawfully discharged an
employee, must offer her reinstatement and make her
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, com-
puted on a quarterly basis from date of discharge to date
of proper offer of reinstatement. less any net interim
earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NRLB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in Florida
Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
A-25
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following
ORDER
The Respondent, United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, Local 1357, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or disciplining any employee tor
engaging in protected concerted activity.
(b) Issuing any employee a warning letter in re-
prisal for engaging in protected concerted activity.
(c) Threatening any employee with reprisals for
engaging in protected concerted strike activity.
(d) Requiring any employee to undergo a psy-
chiatric or psychological examination as a condition
of employment, to provide a pretext for discharging
the employee.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Elizabeth Murphy immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoved, and make _ her
2. If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules. be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
A-26
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suf-
fered as a result of her discharge, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the
unlawful discharge and to the June 10, 1981 warn-
ing letter and notify the employee in writing that this
has been done and that the discharge and warning
letter will not be used against her in any way.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to
the Board or its agents for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its union offices in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.” Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply.
3. If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “POSTED BY OR-
DER OF THRE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD” shall
read “POSTED PURSUANT TOA JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF
IHkE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
A-27
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 27, 1983
Marion C. Ladwig
Administrative Law Judge
A-28
APPENDIX “B”
DZH
273 NLRB No. 44 D—2447
Philadelphia, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR’ RELATIONS
BOARD
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1357
and Case 4—CA— 12427
ELIZABETH MURPHY, an Individual
DECISION AND ORDER
On 27 October 1983 Administrative Law Judge
Marion C. Ladwig issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions and
supporting briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and
the record in light of the exceptions and _ briefs
and has decided to affirm the judge’s_ rulings,!
1. The Respondent excepts to the exclusion of a hospital record
it sought to admit as evidence that Murphy sought medical treat-
ment on 10 July 1981 for intoxication. The Respondent contends
that this record is relevant to the charge that it unlawfully required
Murphy on 4 August 1981 to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. We
find that the preoffered evidence is irrelevant and that the Respon-
dent was not prejudiced by its exclusion. The issue is not the fact of
Murphy’s hospital visit but the Respondent’s motivation in requiring
the psychiatric evaluation. On this issue the Respondent was not
precluded from presenting evidence. The judge permitted the
Respondent's President Young to testify that he had heard of
Murphy’s hospital visit before 4 August and that it was a motivating
factor in the decision to require her to take the psychiatric exami-
nation.
A-29
findings,2 and conclusions as restated below, and to
adopt the recommended Order as modified.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent
Union reprimanded Murphy, required her to take a psy-
chiatric examination, and ultimately discharged her in
reprisal for her activity in support of a May 1981 strike
against the Respondent, we note the prominent and out-
spoken role that Murphy played during that strike. A
shop steward for the Respondent’s office emplovees.
Murphy was a leader of the strike and conducted the
picket line in front of the Respondent’s offices. She was
also quoted in the local newspaper accusing the Respon-
dent Union’s President, Wendell Young, of being a hypo-
crite for not meeting the emplovees’ contract demands.
Additionally, the judge credited Murphy’s testimony that
after the strike, the Respondent's secretary-treasurer
told her that President Young “said he was going to make
an example of you, that nobody would ever strike against
him again.” Based on these findings, we agree with the
2. The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credi-
bility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an
administrative law judge’s credibilit. resolutions unless the clear
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that thes
are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950).
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing the findings. We have further
considered the Respondent’s contention that the judge has evi-
denced bias or at least the appearance of bias in this proceeding. We
have carefully considered the decision and record and find these
charges unsupported and without merit.
The judge found it unnecessary to rule whether the
Respondent's actions against Murphy also violated Sec. 86a) 3) of
the Act. The Generai Counsel contends that the judge’s findings are
clearly sufficient to conclude that the Respondent violated that sec-
tion. We agree and find that the Respondent's actions against
Murphy discouraged union activity in violation of Sec. 8( a3) of the
Act. See Radio Officers v. NLRB. 347 U.S. 17 61954).
A-30
judge’s conclusion that the Respondent’s subsequent ac-
tions against Murphy were in retaliation for her pro-
tected strike activity in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.3
i
ome
3. The judge found that the Respondent’s actions against
Murphy also violated Sec. 8(a)(1) insofar as they were also in re-
prisal for Murphy’s protest to Young after the strike was settled over
an article he had written concerning the strike. The judge found
that Murphy’s protest concerned union business and was therefore
protected concerted activity.
Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter do not adopt this find-
ing for the following reasons. Chairman Dotson would reverse the
judge’s finding. In the Chairman’s view, because Murphy sought
only the retraction of the article and not any change in terms and
conditions of employment, her protest over the article was not pro-
tected activity. See Phase Inc., 263 NLRB 1168, 1170(1982); Cham-
pion Parts Rebuilders, 260 NLRB 731 fn. 3( 1982). Member Hunter
finds it unnecessary to pass on whether Murphy’s protest over
Young’s article was protected concerted activity. Insofar as the
judge found that the Respondent’s defense that Murphy was insub-
ordinate and threatened and humiliated Young during their discus-
sion was a fabrication, Member Hunter would find that it was solely
Murphy’s protected strike activity which motivated the Respondent
to reprimand and ultimately discharge her. Thus, in Member
Hunter’s view, the Respondent's reliance on Murphy’s protest as
justification for her discharge was, likely Murphy’s refusai to take a
psychiatric examination, simply another pretext for discharging her
in retaliation for her protected strike activity.
Accordingly, the judge’s Conclusions of Law and recom-
mended Order are amended to reflect the Chairman's and Member
Hunter’s findings that the Respondent’s actions against Murphy
were due solely to her protected strike activity.
The judge also stated in dictum that even if Murphy had threat-
ened during their discussion to tell Young's wife that he was having
affairs with two of the female office employees, this threat “would
not have been so opprobrius to be unprotected.” Chairman Dotson
does not adopt this dictum. In the chairman’s view, a threat to dis-
close private sexual affairs, in the circumstances here, exceeds the
bounds of protected conduct. C.f. Bell Federal Savings & Loan
Assn., 214 NLRB 75 (1974) (disclosing employer's private tele-
phone calls unprotected ). In view of the judge's finding that Murphy
did not in fact make such a threat, Member Hunter finds it unnec-
essary to pass on the judge’s dictum.
A-31
Conclusions of Law
1. By discharging Elizabeth Murphy on 14 July 1981
for engaging in protected concerted strike activity, the
Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)( 1) and (3)
of the Act.
2. By issuing Murphy a warning letter in reprisal for
her engaging in protected concerted strike activity, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
3. By threatening Murphy with reprisals for engag-
ing in protected concerted strike activity, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By requiring Murphy to undergo a psychiatric and
psychological examination as a condition of employment
to provide a pretext to discharge her, the Respondent vi-
olated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
5. The Respondent’s aforesaid actions are unfair la-
bor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
6. The Respondent did not make Murphy’s working
conditions more onerous in reprisal for her protected
concerted strike activity.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Lo-
cal 1357, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Substitute in paragraph 1(a) the words “protected
concerted strike activity” for the words “protected con-
certed activity.”
Member Zimmerman agrees with the judge’s analysis of
Murphy's actions concerning Young's article and adopts his find-
ings in all respects.
A-32
2. Substitute in paragraph 1(b) the words “protected
concerted strike activity” for the words “protected con-
certed activity.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
Dated, Washington, D.C.
14 December 1984
Donald L. Dotson, Chairman
Don A. Zimmerman, Member
Robert P. Hunter, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
(SEAL) BOARD
A-33
APPENDIX “C”
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 85-3152
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
Petitioner
U~
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1357,
Respondent
(Board Docket No. 4-CA-12427)
ON APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT AND
CROSS-APPLICATION
FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
November 4, 1985
BEFORE: SEITZ, WEIS and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
A-34
JUDGMENT ORDER
After consideration of all contentions raised by peti-
tioner and respondent, it is
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the application
for enforcement of an order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board be 2nd is hereby granted and the
respondent’s cross-application for review of the order is
denied.
Costs taxed against respondent.
By the Court,
ATTEST:
Sally Mrvos, Clerk
A-35
APPENDIX “D”
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 85-3152
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner
v.
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1357,
Respondent
(Board Docket No. 4-CA-12427)
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
PRESENT: ALDISERT, Chief Judge, SEITZ, ADAMS,
GIBBONS, HUNTER, WEIS, GARTH,
HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER, BECKER,
STAPLETON, MANSMANN, and_ RO-
SENN, Circuit Judges.
The petition for rehearing filed by respondent in the
above entitled case having been submitted to the judges
who participated in the decision of this court and to all
the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular
active service, and no judge who concurred in the deci-
sion having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the
circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not
having voted for rehearing by the court en banc, the pe-
tition for rehearing is denied.
By the Court,
Circuit Judge
Dated: Dec. 4, 1985
A-36
APPENDIX “E”
Statutory Provisions
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947,
AS AMENDED, (29 U.S.C.A. §151, et seq.)
§157. Right of employees as to organization, collective
bargaining, etc.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
July 5, 1953, c.372 §7, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947,
c.120, Title I, §101, 61 Stat. 140.
§158. Unfair labor practices
(A) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sec-
tion 157 of this title;
len te ow ft he ee
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this
subchapter, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization (not estab-
lished, maintained, or assisted by any action defined
A-37
in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to re-
quire as a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the be-
ginning of such employment or the effective date of
such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such
labor organization is the representative of the em-
ployees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in
the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by
such agreement when made, and (ii) unless follow-
ing an election held as provided in section 159(e) of
this title within one year preceding the effective date
of such agreement, the Board shall have certified
that at least a majority of the employees eligible to
vote in such election have voted to rescind the au-
thority of such labor organization to make such an
agreement: Provided further, That no employer
shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that such
membership was not available to the employee on
the same terms and conditions generally applicable
to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied
or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender the periodic dues and the ini-
tiation fees uniformly required as a condition of ac-
quiring or retaining membership;
A-38
APPENDIX “F”
RELEVANT TESTIMONY
employee at the Local Union, Renee Kelly, was informed
that she was no longer to relieve Betty Murphy in her
duties on a temporary basis.
I would note that Ms. Murphy worked as the Recep-
tionist and in the past had been relieved from time to
time by Ms. Kelly. On the i2th of June, Ms. Murphy left
work to seek medical care of her arm, which had been
injured when she was removed from Mr. Young’s office.
Ms. Murphy had a number of communications with
the Local Union subsequent to June 12, on which she
informed them of her healtii condition, and the fact that
she was receiving treatments and was informed that she
was excused from work untii she was well enough to
work.
On July 14th, Ms. Murphy did return to work and
was told she was to leave work, was not permitted to
work. On the 27th of July, Ms. Murphy again returned to
work with a doctor’s certificate, indicating she was well
enough to work, and she was given a communication —
a written communication — at that time, indicating that
she was being held out of service pending investigation.
Ms.Murphy inquired as to the meaning of the term
“held out of service” but did not receive any satisfactory
reply at that time. Beginning in early August of that year,
Ms. Murphy received a series of communications indi-
cating that she was being required to have a full-scale
psychological
Q. Ms. Murphy, I may have a wrong date in my
notes. Was it on July 14th or June 14th that you say you
reported for work, when Mr. Young called in and said
“Get off the board, Betty, and do what you are supposed
to be doing” ?
A. Yes, that was a Tuesday. That was July.
Q. That was July?
A-39
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, you say that after Mr. Young — he
was Calling into the office, he had not come to the office
that morning, is that correct?
A. Yes. He called from his house. You see, it is a
dimension (sic) and he dials “O” and it goes right into the
front.
Q. Had you told anybedy you were going to report
fur work that day?
A. Well, when Mr. Rosmini the day before, when |
was really sick, had told me — | was up there for treat-
ment, and here he tells me that when I am better, I am
going to be fired, I figured “Oh well, I may as well ge in
while I was sick”.
Mr. Sigmond, I was very sick.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Rosmini when you talked to him
that day that you could get a clearance from your doctor
to work any old time you want?
A. Never.
Q. Did you tell him that the doctor was willing to
clear you for work —
A. The —
JUDGE LADWIG: Did you finish your answer?
THE WITNESS: Yes. Did you mean the 14th?
BY MR. SIGMOND: —
Q. The 13th.
A. The 13th on the phone? I didn’t understand.
Q. Yes.
A Is this on the phone? No. Mr. Rosmini told me
that Mr. Young said when I get better, | am going to be
fired. I said to him “Why are you telling me that now
when [| am so sick?”
He said “Wendell said to tell you”, and that was the
end of the conversation. | had treatment that morning.
The next morning was Tuesday, the 14th of July. | went
to work very sick. I wasn't even feeling — I was feeling
terrible.
A-40
I opened the switchboard and I was answering the
phones. Mr. Young dialed, and he said “Betty, get off the
phone and do what you are supposed to be doing”.
Q. Did you ask him what he meant by that?
A. No I didn't.
Q. Now, you went to see Mr. Rosmini —
A. I waited for Mr. Rosmini to come in.
Q. And you informed him of your conversation with
Mr. Young?
A. Yes. lasked Mr. Rosmini what was I supposed to
be doing, and he just shrugged his shoulders because he
didn’t know.
Q. What did he say to you, Betty?
A. He just shrugged his shoulders, but he was
called to the phone. Mr. Young’s secretary called him to
the phone and he went to Mr. Young’s office. And I
called the Seafarers Union.
They told me to fill in a grievance form and they
would be up — William Holmes.
Q. For what? What were you going to grieve?
A. Well, I don’t know. You see, I just called to report
— you know, | was told to get off the phone and do what
I was supposed to be doing.
Q. You hadn't yet received a doctor’s certification
that you were able to return to work, is that correct?
A. No I didn't.
Q. You hadn’t delivered anything to the Union from
your doctor yet, had you?
A. No, Sir, but Mr. Sigmond, if you let me finish.
Mr. Rosmini then came back and told me to get well and
vet a release from the doctor and come back to work. He
also told me to get strong.
Q. I take you back in time to the time you went to
see Dr. Abrams and Nemerof for the first time—
A. Um-huh.
Q. —the first time after the June 9th incident.
A. Yes.
A-41
Q. Did they refer you at any point to Parkview for
tests to determine whether you had any vascular disor-
ders or heart trouble?
A. Yes. I went to—the first time I went was 6-12 and
I saw Dr. Nemerof. That was that Friday. | went back
Monday for treatment and I had chest pain and I believe
it was Dr. Gerber, maybe, of Parkview—he is a Heart
Specialist—and I had some tests run.
Q. What tests were performed?
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, I am going to object
to this line of questioning.
JUDGE LADWIG: What is the objection?
MR. STRICKLER: The objection is that the Re-
spondent has alleged that Ms. Murphy has psychiatric
problems apparently or something related to that and a
failure to see a psychiatrist is the basis of this termina-
tion.
Whatever her particular physical ailments were or
what tests she received, or what doctors she went to, |
don’t believe they have any relevancy, given the termi-
nation letter and the other documents which have been
presented.
JUDGE LADWIG: It appears to me that Counsel for
the Union is helping to build your case. Maybe you
should not object to this.
MR. STRICKLER: Well, that is a possible interpre-
tation, Your Honor.
JUDGE LADWIG: I will overrule the objection.
MR. STRICKLER: Okay.
MR. SIGMOND.: [assure Your Honor that I am not.
| believe that the relevance, just to speak to Mr.
Strickler’s objection, goes to the bruises on the arm, not
the other matters.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. What tests were performed?
A. I had chest tests. | had trouble with breathing:
pains in my chest. And I went to the Heart Doctor. I don’t
A-42
know his name. The report was sent into the Union of-
fice.
Q. Was it Parkview Hospital?
A. It was Parkview Hospital.
Q. From the time that you returned to work after the
strike, May 16th, 1981, through this meeting with Mr.
Young of June 9th, you didn’t receive any reprimand or
discipline did you, Betty?
A. No, Sir, I didn’t.
Q. And in the days leading up to the strike, you easy.
But she worked the switchboard, too.
Q. Did you see her throughout the day—
A. Oh, yes, sure.
Q. —and have occasion to talk to her?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she complain to you about her arm at any
time during that day?
A. No.
Q. But she was given permission by you to take
some time off from her job that day?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us what occurred next that day?
A. Well, later on that afternoon the letter of warning
was typed and I brought Betty into the office and gave
her the letter of warning.
Q. And had you called her early in the day and asked
her to stop by to see you after she clocked out?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, was there a conversation when you handed
her the letter?
A. She opened he letter and read it. She asked why
she was—what areas was she insubordinate in. I ex-
plained to her that at the meeting with Mr. Young, that
she failed to follow his instructions by not leaving his
office, and that she was acting loud and boisterous, and
this is the reason why she was placed on record.
Q. And what did Ms. Murphy say?
A-43
A. She said she didn’t understand that. That she
would like to talk to Mr. Young.
Q. And what did you do?
A. | left; went into Mr. Young’s office and told him
I had Betty in my office; | had given her the letter of
record, and tnat she wanted to talk to him.
Mr. Young informed me to tell her to call her Union
Representative and set up a grievance meeting.
Q. Did you communicate that to Betty?
A. Yes.
Q. What occurred the following day, on June 11th,
1981?
A. On June 11th, Betty came in to work, clocked in
around 12:00, and I heard she came in. I went down. She
was down in the Business Agent’s office talking to a
friend of hers who works for us by the name of Marie
Adler.
I asked her what had happened, and she said she
was sick that morning, was very upset about that letter.
I said what time are you going to start today, and she said
“T will start at 1:00”.
Q. Now, had she called in that morning to let any-
body know she would be late?
A. On that Thursday morning?
Q. To your knowledge?
did it”.
Q. So she said to you that he admitted it?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she tell you his exact words, or did she just
characterize it that way?
A. Exactly what I said.
Q. What did you say to her?
A. I said—I didn’t say anything to her. She contin-
ued by saying “You should ask him”. I said “I will” and
I hung up and went into his office.
Q. Was Mr. Young there?
A. Yes he was. He had just come in.
A-44
Q. What did you say to him and what did he say to
you?
A. I said “Wendell, I just talked to Betty. Betty tells
me that you admitted grabbing her arm and causing the
black and blue marks”. He said “That’s nensense. |
never said that to her”.
Q. Did you have any other communication with
Betty that day, June 12?
A. No.
Q. On Sunday evening, June 14, did you have oc-
casion to talk to Betty Murphy?
A. Yes I did.
Q. Tell us what occurred, Mr. Rosmini?
A. She called my home and told me she would be
out a few days and she was going to go to Dr. Nemerof.
Q. By the way, on June 12, did she inform you when
she asked permission to leave at 3:00, that she was going
to see a lawyer?
A. No.
Q. What specifically did she tell you in that regard?
A. That she was going to go to the doctor’s. “Can I
get off to go to the doctor’s?” and I said “Yes”.
Q. Okay. Now, would you tell us the conversation
that occurred on June 14? I may have cut you off on that.
A. I told her to get to the doctor's and I hoped she
was feeling well.
Q. I believe you testified about this, but let’s make it
clear: she told you that she would be off for a few days?
A. Yes.
Q. That was your testimony? Did she tell you what
was wrong with her in that conversation?
A. No.
Q. Did you ask?
A. No.
Q. Why didn’t you ask?
A. Well, I knew she was upset on Wednesday. She
was upset on Thursday. She was upset on Friday, and |
A-45
just felt she was going to go to the doctor's to get her
nerves straightened out.
took her to the hospital, and that she was going to go to
the doctor’s to find out what was wrong. She had been
released by the hospital, and she had gone to Parkwood.
I think it is Parkway or Parkwood.
Q. Parkview?
A. Parkview. It’s right down the street from our of-
fice.
Q. Do you recall your next communication with Ms.
Murphy?
A. On July 13, 81.
Q. When did that occur?
A. She called me at home at 8:00, or round about
that time. She told me that she was going to Dr. Nemerot
and Abrams’ office. That she had gotten very sick over
the weekend.
She was very, very weak, and that she wanted to
come to work that day. | told her that if she is going to be
released by her doctor, that I was going to tell her at that
time that she was going to be suspended, pending the
investigation of her case and the incidents involving her
statements.
She then said “Well, how can you suspend me when
I am still out on sick leave?” I said “Are you going to be
released or aren't you going to be released?” I said “Upon
your release, give me a call”.
Q. Did you say anything to her about her being
fired—
A. No.
Q. —as soon as she is off sick leave?
A. No.
Q. Did vou use the word “fire” at all?
A. Never.
Q. Why was she being suspended at that point?
A-46
A. Well, we had agreed upon her termination of sick
benefits, we were going to suspend her, pending the in-
vestigation.
Q. Of what?
A. The entire matter.
Q. What do you mean by “the entire matter” ?
A. Of the statements, misconduct, the statements
made about Mr. Young, the slander statements made on
the Health and Welfare forms that went down to Dela-
ware Valley, and some of the statements that were float-
ing around the office that Mr. Young allegedly beat up on
her.
Q. Did the property destruction have anything to do
with it?
A. Well,—
MR. STRICKLER Your Honor, I think that Counsel
is again leading the witness, suggesting reasons for
which particular actions were taken that this witness
hasn't suggested, and really that is not appropriated.
answer you gave?
A. Yes.
Q. As of the date of this conversation with Sister
Gloria, had the Union in fact received a letter from Mr.
Gerson?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you — you began to testify about this con-
versation with Sister Gloria. | am not sure whether you
completed it because I injected a few questions. Would
you go ahead if there was more to that conversation?
A. Basice’ y that was what it was.
Q. When was the next time you saw Ms. Murphy?
A. The next time I heard from Betty Murphy, after
the 14th of July, was on July 20, 1981. My recollection is
she called me and told me she was going to see Dr.
Nemerof and Abrams.
She was having stomach problems and she felt she
had a tumor.
A-47
Q. She said she thought she had a tumor?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you say to her?
A. I told her to make sure she gets there and make
sure she does what they tell them to do.
Q. When was the next conversation you had with
Betty Murphy?
A. On July 22, of 81, she called me and toid me she
was.
A. Yes.
Q. Would you like to review the letter before I ask
you some questions?
A. Not really.
Q. Okay. Prior to sending this letter, were there any
discussions — let me ask you why the letter was sent?
Tell me what occurred as a result of this letter.
A. After Mr. Young and I sat down and had dis-
cussed it, it was agreed that we felt that Betty’s actions
in this whole matter were irrational, and that in her best
interest that we feel she should see a psychiatrist and if
there was any problem with her, she could get treatment,
and after treatment, return to work.
We do this with our own members.
Q. You say that you felt that Betty was irrational —
JUDGE LADWIG: What do you mean you do this
with your own members?
THE WITNESS: We have a program that is called
“Info Now” and when a person has a pattern of emotional
problems or has a pattern of absenteeism or lateness or
things like that, we get him into a program where they
see a psychologist for evaluation, and sometimes we put
them out — we get them out on sick leave, and upon
their return, maybe they would get treatment by a psy-
chologist or a psychiatrist.
JUDGE LADWIG: Are you talking about employees
of.
A-48
that it is leading here. The objection is sustained.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. After the June 26th conversation with Ms.
Murphy, when was the next time, if you can recall the
date, you received any specific communication from
her?
A. July 6.
Q. What occured on that date?
A. She called my home and talked to my wife Cass.
Told her she was still out sick —
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | object, hearsay.
JUDGE LADWIG: Sustained.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Did she leave a message with your wife?
A. Yes.
Q. Did your wife communicate the message to you?
A. Yes.
Q. What was communicated to you by your wife,
and to avoid an objection, I am not offering it for the
truth of what was said, but only for the fact of the com-
munication of this message to Mr. Rosmini?
A. She told my wife to tell me that she had been
rushed to the hospital that morning. | guess that was
going into Monday morning at 3:00 a.m., with an attack
of gastritis.
In fact, my neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Adler.
the slanderous remarks on the health and welfare form
and “statements Ms. Murphy had made around the
office,” is that correct?
A. Yes. It goes a little further than that.
Q. Tell us about it.
A. The whole bizarre situation involving the filing
for workmen’s compensation, the not filing for work-
men’s compensation; the filing for health and welfare;
the incident on the 10th; the statements allegedly being
made by her about Mr. Young. We wanted her to get
A-49
released from her doctor, we wanted to gather all the
evidence and all the documentation and make an eval-
uation.
Q. Mr. Rosmini, I'll be frank. I don’t understand
your position on this in that —
MR. SIGMOND.: I object to this kind of statement by
counsel.
JUDGE LADWIG: Sustained.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (Resuming)
Q. As of July 13th, what was prohibiting the inves-
tigation of the June 10th incident?
A. Because we didn’t know where she was coming
from. We didn’t know what she was doing.
Q. Why didn’t you investigate it to your heart’s con-
tent?
A. Because we didn’t know whether she was going
to file for workmen’s comp, health and welfare. We
wanted her to
Q. What I am saying is you said on July 13th, you
made a decision, when she has done her sick leave, we
are going to put her on suspension pending investiga-
tion. One of the things you wanted to investigate was the
June 10th incident.
My question is you had a month to investigate that.
You had statements from the employees on the 12th of
June. Why did you have to hold her out of service a
month later for something that could have been inves-
tigated for a month?
A. We wanted to wait until she returned to work.
We wanted to wait until she was released by her doctor.
We wanted to get all the documentation together and
make an evaluation of what happened.
JUDGE LADWIG: What further investigation did
you plan to make concerning the destruction of her own
property ?
THE WITNESS: None.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (Resuming)
A-50
Q. Why was it necessary to suspend her while you
investigated further?
A. That wasn’t the only thing we were investigating.
Q. We will lay that one aside. You said you wanted
to investigate the statements that she may have made
around the office about Mr. Young. She had not been at
work for a month. Wasn’t a month ample opportunity to
investigate those statements?
A. We talked about that and we felt that possibly
that accumulation of the case, of the bizarre things that
went on over the course of June 9th on.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (resuming)
Q. My question is very specific. You stated that you
wished to investigate the statements made by Ms.
Murphy on the health and welfare form and I have
shown you the form. I want to know what investigation
you were contemplating which required holding Ms.
Murphy out of service?
A. We had already concluded that she meant the
President had grabbed her arm from this statement.
Q. What were you going to do in this investigation?
A. My earlier statement was we were going to ac-
cumulate all the facts and make an evaluation of what to
do, get all the documentation together and make an eval-
uation of what to do. We didn’t want to do that until she
was officially released by her doctor.
JUDGE LADWIG: Are you testifying that there was
nothing further to investigate concerning that particular
document?
THE WITNESS: That’s true; yes.
JUDGE LADWIG: Could that be identified and of-
fered into evidence?
MR. STRICKLER: Yes. I will offer that into evi-
dence, Your Honor, as General Counsel Exhibit No. GO-
1-. It is a document entitled “Retail Clerks Tri-State
A-5]
Health and Welfare Fund” signed at the bottom by
Elizabeth Murphy, dated 6-26-81.
A. It was an ongoing discussion with the case but
we wanted to get all the documentation together and
make a decision on what to do.
Q. You had all the documentation. You already told
us that.
A. We wanted to wait until Ms. Murphy was re-
leased by her doctor. That was the decision we had made.
We didn’t want to do anything while she was in treat-
ment with the doctors.
JUDGE LADWIG: Is this a correct summary of your
testimony? As of July 27th, you had all the documenta-
tion, that you wanted to wait until after she was released
by the doctor before you and Mr. Young decided what to
do?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
JUDGE LADWIG: Thank you.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (Resuming)
Q. On July 30th, Mr. Lennon requested workmen's
compensation forms; is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. When did you make a decision to send her the
August 4th letter suggesting the appointment to see the
two doctors?
A. That was sometime after July 27th.
Q. Do you know when?
A. No, I don’t know the exact date in time.
Q. Who made the decision?
A. Wendell and I; Mr. Young and I.
Q. Why did you make that decision?
June 9, 1981?
A. Yes. When I came into the office my secretary,
Janice Pinti, had told me that Betty requested a meeting.
Q. Okay, let me just stop you there, because she was
identified as Janice Mangini in the record. Is that her
name?
A-52
A. She got married.
Q. Okay, that is the same as Janice Pinti?
A. Yes.
Q. Go ahead.
JUDGE LADWIG: Could you speak a little louder,
please?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I can. She got married.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Go ahead. She told you that—-
A. Sol said okay, set it up for 4:15. And that is what
we did. By the time that I had the meeting, I knew what
the topic was going to be, because of the old grapevine
that goes around the office. And Betty arrived at 4:15.
And the frame of mind that she was in—
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, I object, I do not
think that this witness should be testifying as to someone
else’s state of mind. He should testify about things that
he observed. But I do not think that a statement as to
another person’s state of mind is really probative.
BY MR. SIGMOND.:
Q. Let me draw you back.
A. She was very emotional.
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | have an objection
on the record. I think it should be ruled on.
JUDGE. LADWIG: Objection sustained. Would you
tell us what you say and heard, please.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q@. Let me first—
A. She was very excited.
A. That is okay, we will come back to this. Let me
backtrack for a moment. You said that you knew through
the grapevine what the discussion would be about.
What did you mean by that?
A. I was told that when the newspaper hit that day,
that she was very upset about what was in ihe news-
paper.
Q. And who told you that?
ee
A-53
A. A number of people, I guess. I do not know spe-
cifically. Just that | was made aware of it, but I don’t
know who exactly.
Q. Okay, now go ahead. She now arrives at vour of-
fice. And would you describe her mannerisms, and what
you observed, her attitude?
A. I do not know how to do it.
Q. Go ahead.
A. She was very—she walked in, and she had her
newspaper there. She was very matter of fact, very ag-
gressive. She walked into the office. I sat her down. The
way that she described the seating arrangement yester-
day was not the way it was.
Q. Would you describe the seating arrangement?
A. Yes. Can I get up and show?
JUDGE LADWIG: Please.
THE WITNESS: This is my table. She said that she
was sitting here, and I was sitting there. Actually, she
was sitting here, and I was sitting there. This is a wall.
JUDGE LADWIG: She was sitting across from the
table, instead of both of you sitting on either end of the
table?
THE WITNESS: Right. That is very important. Be-
cause where she was describing where she was sitting at
that end is very close to the door. And if I did all of these
things that I was supposed to have done, I could not have
possibly have done them with her sitting there.
I would have had to lean over the table. And the table
is about as wide as that. There is no way that I could have
touched her. So that is very important, the way that she
described where we sat, and where she actually sat.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. The seat that she was sitting in across from you
had its back to a wall?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Right.
A-54
Q. And how much room was there between the
edge of the table and the wall?
A. See that table and that wall. I would say another
four or five inches of that. The end of this table to that
wall, about another four or five inches.
JUDGE LADWIG: Is that twelve or fifteen inches
from the wall?
THE WITNESS: Something in that area. Not much
further in distance that that is.
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | would say that
that distance is two feet.
JUDGE LADWIG: Are you talking about the table or
the chair?
THE WITNESS: It is almost, | would say, another
six inches more than this.
JUDGE LADWIG: How far would you say that is?
MR. STRICKLER: Two and a half feet.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Give your best estimate, Mr. Young, not Mr.
Strickler’s estimate.
A. I would say he is right.
Q. Okay, fine.
She was sitting in the seat between the table and the
wall, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When she entered the room, did you say anything
to her initially?
A. I said hello, you know, or whatever the salutation.
And she sat down, and I said what is on your mind. And
right away, she started in a very high pitched voice de-
scribing what she felt was very, very wrong what I did
about the letter that was published in the newspaper,
and that it was against the understanding that we had
after the strike, that there would be no retaliation.
And | said Betty, | am going to tell you what hap-
pened on that letter, but you are not even going to listen
to me. And I started to describe why that letter was pub-
lished. And she did not even listen. She just kept looking
A-55
up in the air. And I said well, I have to go through this
process.
Q. Well, the record will not be able to see what you
just did, Mr. Young.
A. She was staring at the ceiling with her arms
folded, and just staring at the ceiling. And she stared
down here, not looking at me, like rejecting what I was
saying.
Q. This was while you were explaining to her what
had happened which resulted in the publication of the
letter?
A. Right. I said that there was a reason for why we
did that.
Q. Would you explain what you told her?
A. What happened was this. During the strike —
JUDGE LADWIG: Pardon me, is this what you told
her?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
JUDGE LADWIG: Would you try to recall just what
you told her on that occasion?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
JUDGE LADWIG: Without explaining what hap-
pened during the strike.
THE WITNESS: Well, this is what I said. I said dur-
ing the strike, there was an article in the Daily News that
was completely one-sided. And I was very upset with
that. I said I don’t care what you said representing your
people. But I was upset that they published in the Daily
News that the union was unavailable for comment.
when in fact | was the one who told the Daily News who
to contact from the office employees to get their com-
ment.
I had written the Daily News criticizing them for not
quoting me, and saying in fact that I was unavailable for
comment. I wrote this complete letter. They had agreed
to publicize the letter, but they never did. So
simultaneoulsy when the newspaper came out that day,
A-56
which you have, also simultaneously the Daily News
publishes a revised letter.
So from her point of mind, she thought everything
was coming down on her.
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | do not think that
Mr. Young should be testifving as to Ms. Murphy’s state
of mind.
JUDGE LADWIG: Sustained. Would you just say
what was — tell us what was said by both of you on that
occasion.
THE WITNESS: So I described what I just de-
scribed, explaining why I did it, and it did not even make
an indent. Then she started going into the issue of what
the letter was about. She said that letter was a lie, an
absolute lie. And she stated the girls’ in the office over-
time, and the fact that they had to work overtime, was
due to the fact that my secretary, and Peter Mark’s sec-
retary, when they go to lunch, they had a replacement.
And I said “I don’t even want to discuss it with you,
Betty, that is not the issue.” And she said “That is the
issue, and I demand a retraction.” And she screamed it,
“| demand a retraction.” I said “Betty, forget it. | am not
going to carry on anymore of this conversation. Call your
union.”
“| demand it,” she started screaming at the top of her
lungs, “I demand it. The only time that vou listen to me
is if | have to get dirty. And the only people that you listen
to are Pat Scarrelli and Jackie McPeak.” And I just sat
back. I started to respond loudly myself, like | am doing
now, and I caught myself.
I said. “Look, go see your union, go see your union.”
| must have said that ten times. And then she screamed
at the top of her lungs, “You hate me because | am Irish.”
She said, “Is your wife going to be home tonight?” I said.
“What does that have to do with the price of beans in
Puerto Rico?” She said. “Is your wife going to be home
tonight?” | said. “What does that have to do with it?
A-57
Come on, get out of the office, go see your union. We are
finished with this conversation.”
I opened the door, and I asked her to leave. And she
got up and left. I did not touch her. And that whole thing
is absolutely ludricous, those pictures, absolutely ludi-
crous.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Did you in any way, shape, or form lay a hand on
her even inadvertently?
A. No.
Q. Where were you when you walked up to go to the
door?
A. I was — well, I went from where the lawyer is
sitting, I was a little further in the middle. I walked over
to the side around the table, and opened the door. |
Q. When you say around the table, the record cannot
follow your finger as pointing, and we do not want this
misunderstood.
A. I walked from the middle of the table, walked over
to the entrance of the door, and opened the door.
Q. You did not do a complete circle of the table, did
you?
A. No.
Q. Where was Ms. Murphy?
A. Betty was sitting in the middle there. And when
she started to scream and yell, she was not sitting down
like she testified yesterday. She was actually standing
pounding on the table, pounding on the table, “I demand
this. | demand that .” [ thought to myself, this is ridic-
ulous, am I going to take this. I said this is absolutely
ridiculous. | am thinking to myself.
Q. How did you interpret the remarks about Pat
Scareili and Jackie McPeak?
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | object. I do not
care how he interpreted them.
JUDGE LADWIG: Sustained.
A-58
MR. SIGMOND.: I think, Your Honor, that this is
important with respect to the motivation concerning
events that occurred later. |
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, I would state that
the witness is capable of testifying as to things that he
hears and sees. But as to his state of mind, a very sub-
jective form of testimony has been found by the Board to
be inherently unreliable, and generally is not admitted
under whatever circumstances.
And | think that he should testify as to what he saw
and heard. And if counsel wishes to argue that some in-
ference could have been drawn from that, or was drawn
from that, that is fine. But that he should testify only as
to what he saw and heard, and not as to inferences that
he drew.
MR. SIGMOND: This man is on trial for his
thoughts and motivations. And he is certainly entitled to
testify as to what his interpretation of remarks were.
JUDGE LADWIG: Just a minute. I will reverse my
ruling, overruled.
MR. SIGMOND.: Your Honor will permit the ques-
tion?
JUDGE LADWIG: Yes.
MR SIGMOND.: Thank you, sir.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Mr. Young, how did you interpret the remarks
concerning Pat Scarelli and Jackie McPeak?
A. It was meant for me to absorb, the way I felt was
I went to bed with them.
Q. How did you interpret the remarks, and what
went through your mind, when she was saying in that
context, “Is your wife going to be home tonight?”
A. She implied, she said she was going to call my
home that night, if my wife was home. Actually she said.
“Is your wife going to be home tonight?” And I said,
“What does that have to do with anything?” I said, “What
does that have to do with the price of beans in Puerto
Rico?” That is exactly what I said.
A-59
Q. Would you describe the tone of voice exhibited
by Betty Murphy throughout the conversation?
A. Screaming, screaming, very loud.
Q. Did you observe Betty Murphy’s testimony in the
courtroom yesterday?
A. Nothing like that, nothing at all. Nothing what-
soever like that.
Q. Answer yes or no.
A. Did I observe it?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And how would you describe her testimony in
the courtroom yesterday in terms of voice?
A. It was nothing like the way she was in my office.
Q. Describe the tone of voice she used in the court-
room yesterday. Mr. Young.
A. Very subdued.
Q. Have you have other meetings and conversations
prior to June 9, 1981 with Betty Murphy?
MR. STRICKLER: Objection, Your Honor, rele-
vancy.
JUDGE LADWIG: How is it relevant?
MR. SIGMOND.: It is meant to demonstrate that the
Charging Party’s personality was frequently of the na-
ture that was exhibited on June 9, 1981. and not of the
demure, sweet, littke nature that was exhibited in this
courtroom.
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, I would say that |
am not
BY MR. STRICKLER:
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you find it so extraordinary that she
should show up for work, and be on the phones on July
14th?
A. Are you serious?
A-60
Q. I am serious. She is an employee. She works on
the phones.
A. You mean—
Q. Why should she not be there?
JUDGE LADWIG: Pardon me. Can you answer the
question directly.
THE WITNESS: Yes. It was extraordinary because
of everything that I just finished stating.
BY MR. STRICKLER:
Q. Had anyone ever indicated to her that she was
not an employee in good standing, and to come to work
when she was able to come to work?
A. Nobody could get in touch with her, only when
she wanted to get in touch with people. And you just do
not walk in with all of these things that we were trving
to get in touch with her, you just do not walk in.
Q. But if you are an employee, and nobody has ever
told you that you are suspended, discharged, or anything
else, and you want to come to work, can’t you come to
work?
A. Nobody could get in touch with her.
JUDGE LADWIG: Is that your only answer?
THE WITNESS: That is my only answer; ves, sir.
BY MR. STRICKLER:
Q. Is it your testimony that you had no knowledge
that Mr. Rosmini had been in contact with her?
A. Mr. Rosmini was in contact with her as she was
contacting Mr. Rosmini. We many times could not get in
touch with her.
Q@. But he was in contact with her. If the under-
standing was that you are not to come to work, why had
he not told her that? Was she suspended at that time?
A. Because at that time she was stating that she was
sick.
Q. Soshe shows up to work, and says that I am well.
What is so wrong when you call up, and find an em-
ployee of yours doing her job; why shouldn’t she be doing
it?
A-61
A. Because we were investigating it. She had not
submitted a form. She had submitted a form for what her
sickness was. And there were things that were surround-
ing the incident.
Q. Had you sent her a suspension letter?
A. Had I sent her a suspension letter?
Q. Yes.
MR. SIGMOND: When?
BY MR. STRICKLER:
Q. As of July i4th.
A. Did I send her a suspension letter, no.
easy. But she worked the switchboard, too.
Q. Did you see her throughout the day—
A. Oh, yes, sure.
Q. —and have occasion to talk to her?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she complain to you about her arm at any
time during that day?
A. No.
Q. But she was given permission by you to take
some time off from her job that day?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us what occurred next that day?
A. Well, later on that afternoon the letter of warning
was typed and | brought Betty into the office and gave
her the letter of warning.
Q. And had you called her early in the day and asked
her to stop by to see you after she clocked out?
A. Yes.
Q. Now. was there a conversation when you handed
her the letter?
A. She opened the letter and read it. She asked why
she was—what areas was she,insubordinate in. I ex-
plained to her that at the eeotie with Mr. Young, that
she failed to follow his instructions by not leaving his
office, and that she was acting loud and boisterous, and
this is the reason why she was placed on record.
Q. And what did Ms. Murphy say?
A-62
A. She said she didn’t understand that. That she
would like to talk to Mr. Young.
Q. And what did you do?
A. I left; went into Mr. Young’s office and told him
I had Betty in my office; I had given her the letter of
record, and that she wanted to talk to him.
Mr Young informed me to tell her to call her Union
Representative and set up a grievance meeting.
Q. Did you communicate that to Betty?
A. Yes.
Q. What occurred the following day, on June 11th,
1981?
A. On June 11th, Betty came in to work, clocked in
around 12:00, and I heard she came in. I went down. She
was down in the Business Agent’s office talking to a
friend of hers who works for us by the name of Marie
Adler.
I asked her what had happened, and she said she
was sick that morning, was very upset about that letter.
I said what time are you going to start today, and she said
“T will start at 1:00”.
Q. Now, had she cailed in that morning to let any-
body know she would be late?
A. On that Thursday morning?
Q. To your knowledge?
Q. Ms. Murphy, I may have a wrong date in my
notes. Was it on July 14th or June 14th that you say you
reported for work, when Mr. Young called in and said
“Get off the board, Betty, and do what you are supposed
to be doing”?
A. Yes, that was a Tuesday. That was July.
Q. That was July?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, you say that after Mr. Young—he
was Calling into the office, he had not come to the office
that morning, is that correct?
A-63
A. Yes. He called from his house. You see, it is a
dimension (sic) and he dials “O” and it goes right into the
front.
Q. Had you told anybody you were going to report
for work that day?
A. Well, when Mr. Rosmini the day before. when I
was really sick, had told me—I was up there for treat-
ment, and here he tells me that when I am better, I am
going to be fired, I figured “Oh well, I may as well go in
while I was sick”.
Mr. Sigmond, I was very sick.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Rosmini when you talked to him
that day that you could get a clearance from your doctor
to work any old time you want?
A. Never.
Q. Did you tell him that the doctor was willing to
clear you for work—
A. The—
JUDGE LADWIG: Did you finish your answer?
THE WITNESS: Yes. Did you mean the 14th?
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. The 13th.
A. The 13th on the phone? I didn’t understand.
Q. Yes.
A. Is this on the phone? No. Mr. Rosmini told me
that Mr. Young said when I get better, | am going to be
fired. I said to him “Why are you telling me that now
when I am so sick?”
He said “Wendell said to tell you”, and that was the
end of the conversation. I had treatment that morning.
The next morning was Tuesday, the 14th of July. I went
to work very sick. I wasn’t even feeling—I was feeling
terrible.
I opened the switchboard and I was answering the
phones. Mr. Young dialed, and he said “Betty, get off the
phone and do what you are supposed to be doing”’.
Q. Did you ask him what he meant by that?
A. No I didn't.
A-64
Q. Now, you went to see Mr. Rosmini—
A. I waited for Mr. Rosmini to come in.
Q. And you informed him of your conversation with
Mr. Young?
A. Yes. | asked Mr. Rosmini what was I supposed to
be doing, and he just shrugged his shoulders because he
didn’t know.
Q. What did he say to you, Betty?
A. He just shrugged his shoulders, but he was
called to the phone. Mr. Young’s secretary called him to
the phone and he went to Mr. Young’s office. And |
called the Seafarers Union.
They told me to fill in a grievance form and they
would be up—William Holmes.
Q. For what? What were you going to grieve?
A. Well, I don’t know. You see, | just called to re-
port—your know, I was told to get off the phone and do
what I was supposed to be doing.
Q. You hadn't yet received a doctor’s certification
that you were able to return to work, is that correct?
A. No I didn’t.
Q. You hadn’t delivered anything to the Union from
your doctor yet, had you?
A. No, Sir, but Mr. Sigmond, if you let me finish.
Mr. Rosmini then came back and told me to get well and
get a release from the doctor and come back to work. He
also told me to get strong.
Q. I take you back in time to the time you went to
see Dr. Abrams and Nemerof for the first time—
A. Um-huh.
Q. —the first time after the June 9th incident.
A. Yes.
Q. Did they refer you at any point to Parkview for
tests to determine whether you had any vascular disor-
ders or heart trouble?
A, Yes. I went to—the first time I went was 6-12 and
I saw Dr. Nemerof. That was that Friday. I went back
A-65
Monday for treatment and I had chest pain and I believe
it was Dr. Gerber, maybe, of Parkview—he is a Heart
Specialist—and I had some tests run.
Q. What tests were performed?
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | am going to object
to this line of questioning.
JUDGE LADWIG: What is the objection?
MR. STRICKLER: The objection is that the Respon-
dent has alleged that Ms. Murphy has psychiatric prob-
lems apparently or something related to that and a failure
to see a psychiatrist is the basis of this termination.
Whatever her particular physical ailments were or
what tests she received, or what doctors she went to, |
don’t believe they have any relevancy, given the termi-
nation letter and the other documents which have been
presented.
JUDGE LADWIG: It appears to me that Counsel for
the Union is helping to build your case. Maybe you
should not object to this.
MR. STRICKLER: Well, that is a possible interpre-
tation, Your Honor.
JUDGE LADWIG: I will overrule the objection.
MR. STRICKLER: Okay.
MR. SIGMOND: | assure Your Honor that I am not.
I believe that the relevance, just to speak to Mr.
Strickler’s objection, goes to the bruises on the arm, not
the other matters.
BY MR. SIGMOND.:
Q. What tests were performed?
A. I had chest tests. I had trouble with breathing;
pains in my chest. And I went to the Heart Doctor. I don’t
know his name. The report was sent into the Union of-
fice.
Q. Was it Parkview Hospital?
A. It was Parkview Hospital.
Q. From the time that you returned to work after the
strike, May 16th, 1981, through this meeting with Mr.
A-66
Young of June 9th, you didn’t receive any reprimand or
discipline, did you, Betty?
A. No, Sir, I didn't.
Q. And in the days leading up to the strike, you
that it is leading here. The objection is sustained.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. After the June 26th conversation with Ms.
Murphy, when was the next time, if you can recall the
date, you received any specific communication from
her?
A. July 6.
Q. What occured on that date?
A. She called my home and talked to my wife Cass.
Told her she was still out sick—
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | object, hearsay.
JUDGE LADWIG: Sustained.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Did she leave a message with your wife?
A. Yes.
Q. Did your wife communicate the message to you?
A. Yes.
Q. What was communicated to you by your wife,
and to avoid an objection, I am not offering it for the
truth of what was said, but only for the fact of the com-
munication of this message to Mr. Rosmini.
A. She told my wife to tell me that she had been
rushed to the hospital that morning. I guess that was
going into Monday morning at 3:00 a.m., with an attack
of gastritis.
In fact, my neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Adler,
took her to the hospital, and that she was going to go to
the doctor’s to find out what was wrong. She had been
released by the hospital, and she had gone to Parkwood.
I think it is Parkway or Parkwood.
Q. Parkview?
A. Parkview. It’s right down the street from our of-
fice.
A-67
Q. Do you recall your next communication with Ms.
Murphy?
A. On July 13, ’81.
Q. When did that occur?
A. She called me at home at 8:00, or round about
that time. She told me that she was going to Dr. Nemerot
and Abrams’ office. That she had gotten very sick over
the weekend.
She was very, very weak, and that she wanted to
come to work that day. I told her that if she is going to be
released by her doctor, that | was going to tell her at that
time that she was going to be suspended, pending the
investigation of her case and the incidents involving her
statements.
She then said “Well, how can you suspend me when
I arm still out on sick leave?” | said “Are you going to be
released or aren’t you going to be released?” | said “Upon
your release, give me a call”.
Q. Did you say anything to her about her being
fired—
A. No.
@. —as soon as she is off sick leave?
A. No.
Q. Did you use the word “fire” at all?
A. Never.
Q. Why was she being suspended at that point?
A. Well, we had agreed upon her termination of sick
benefits, we were going to suspend her, pending the in-
vestigation.
Q. Of what?
A. The entire matter.
Q. What do v nean by “the entire matter’?
A. Of the stateraents, misconduct, the statements
made about Mr. Young, the slander statements made on
the Health and Welfare forms that went down to Dela-
ware Valley, and some of the statements that were float-
ing around the office that Mr. Young allegedly beat up on
her.
A-68
Q. Did the property destruction have anything to do
with it?
A. Well,—
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | think that counsel
is again leading the witness, suggesting reasons for
which particular actions were taken that this witness
hasn’t suggested, and really that is not appropriate.
answer you gave?
A. Yes.
Q. As of the date of this conversation with Sister
Gloria, had the Union in fact received a letter from Mr.
Gerson?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you — you began to testify about this con-
versation with Sister Gloria. | am not sure whether you
completed it because I injected a few questions. Would
you go ahead if there was more to that conversation?
A. Basically that was what it was.
Q. When was the next time you saw Ms. Murphy?
A. The next time | heard from Betty Murphy, after
the 14th of July, was on July 20, 1981. My recollection is
she called me and told me she was going to see Dr.
Nemerof and Abrams.
She was having stomach problems and she felt she
had a tumor.
Q. She said she thought she had a tumor?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you say to her?
A. I told her to make sure she gets there and make
sure she does what they tell them to do.
Q. When was the next conversation you had with
Betty Murphy?
A. On july 22 of °81, she called me and told me she
was
the slanderous remarks on the health and welfare form
A-69
and “statements Ms. Murphy had made around the
office,” is that correct?
A. Yes. It goes a little further than that.
Q. Tell us about it.
A. The whole bizarre situation involving the filing for
workmen’s compensation, the not filing for workmen’s
compensation; the filing for health and welfare; the in-
cident on the 10th; the statements allegedly being made
by her about Mr. Young. We wanted her to get released
from her doctor, we wanted to gather all the evidence
and all the documentation and make an evaluation.
Q. Mr. Rosmini, I'll be frank. I don’t understand your
position on this in that —
MR. SIGMOND.: I object to this kind of statement by
counsel.
JUDGE LADWIG: Sustained.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (Resuming)
Q. As of July 13th, what was prohibiting the inves-
tigation of the June 10th incident?
A. Because we didn’t know where she was coming
from. We didn’t know what she was doing.
Q. Why didn’t you investigate it to your heart’s con-
tent?
A. Because we didn’t know whether she was going to
file for workmen’s comp, health and welfare. We wanted
her to
Q. What I am saying is you said on July 13th, you
made a decision, when she has done her sick leave, we
are going to put her on suspension pending investiga-
tion. One of the things you wanted to investigate was the
June 10th incident.
My question is you had a month to investigate that.
You had statements from the employees on the 12th of
June. Why did you have to hold her out of service a
month later for something that could have been inves-
tigated for a month?
a
A-70
A. We wanted to wait until she returned to work. We
wanted to wait until she was released by her doctor. We
wanted to get all the documentation together and make
an evaluation of what happened.
JUDGE LADWIG: What further investigation did
you plan to make concerning the destruction of her own
property ?
THE WITNESS: None.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (Resuming)
Q. Why was it necessary to suspend her while you
investigated further?
A. That wasn’t the only thing we were investigating.
Q. We will lay that one aside. You said you wanted to
investigate the statements that she may have made
around the office about Mr. Young. She had not been at
work for a month. Wasn’t a month ample opportunity to
investigate those statements?
A. We talked about that and we felt that possibly
that
accumulation of the case, of the bizarre things that went
on over the course of June 9th on.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (Resuming)
Q. My question is very specific. You stated that you
wished to investigate the statements made by Ms.
Murphy on the health and welfare form and I have
shown you the form. I want to know what investigation
you were contemplating which required holding Ms.
Murphy out of service?
A. We had already concluded that she meant the
President had grabbed her arm from this statement.
Q. What were you going to do in this investigation?
A. My earlier statement was we were going to accu-
mulate all the facts and make an evaluation of what to do,
get all the documentation together and make an evalu-
ation of what to do. We didn’t want to do that until she
was Officially released by her doctor.
A-7]
JUDGE LADWIG: Are you testifying that there was
nothing further to investigate concerning that particular
document?
THE WITNESS: That’s true; yes.
JUDGE LADWIG: Could that be identified and of-
fered into evidence?
MR. STRICKER: Yes. I will offer that into evidence,
Your Honor, as General Counsel Exhibit No. GC-14. It is
a document entitled “Retail Clerks Tri-State Health and
Welfare Fund” signed at the bottom by Elizabeth
Murphy, dated 6-26-81.
A. It was an ongoing discussion with the case but we
wanted to get all the documentation together and make
a decision on what to do.
Q. You had all the documentation. You already told
us that.
A. We wanted to wait until Ms. Murphy was released
by her doctor. That was the decision we had made. We
didn’t want to do anything while she was in treatment
with the doctors.
JUDGE LADWIG: Is this a correct summary of your
testimony? As of July 27th, you had all the documenta-
tion, that you wanted to wait until after she was released
by the doctor before you and Mr. Young decided what to
do?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
JUDGE LADWIG: Thank you.
BY MR. STRICKLER: (Resuming)
Q. On July 30th, Mr. Lennon requested workmen’s
compensation forms; is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. When did you make a decision to send her the
August 4th letter suggesting the appointment to see the
two doctors?
A. That was sometime after July 27th.
Q. Do you know when?
A. No. I don’t know the exact date in time.
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Q. Who made the decision?
A. Wendell and I; Mr. Young and I.
Q. Why did you make that decision?
BY MR. SIGMOND.
Q. Go ahead?
A. Ronnie informed me that she was taken to the
hospital in the middle of the night by one of our other
employees. And that was one incident.
Q. Were you told anything about why she was taken
to the hospital?
MR. SFRICKLER: Your Honor, | have difficuity
that this is not being admitted for the truth of the matter
stated.
JUDGE LADWIG: It is offered for the truth. There-
fore your objection is overruled.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Go ahead, Mr. Young.
A. In the incident of the hospital, I was told — I
would have to agree with him almost. It was secondhand
— I was told that it was drugs, and pills, and liquor. That
is secondhand.
Q. About when did you receive that, was at or about
the time when you heard that she was taken to the hos-
pital?
Did | receive that?
Yes.
At the same time, yes.
Did that concern you?
Yes. As I told you before, I really feel sorry for her.
How many years had vou known Betty Murphy?
OD OFO>O>
Go ahead.
A. My opinion is that when | went down to the busi-
ness agents to tell about the suspension, when I went
down to tell about the suspension, one of the business
agents called her to tell her what was going to happen —
and this is my opinion — and that this precipitated this
other incident to throw the thing off. Just like this whole
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hearing is precipitating — it is my opinion — it threw the
thing off, to lay off it.
Then when I talked to John McKeon that Thursday,
and told him exactly the whole thing, what | thought,
what statements I had, he savs, “Wendell. don’t do
anvthing.” He says, “Let me get a meeting with Betty
Murphy, vou, and I.” He savs. “How are you the 16th and
17th, how are you —” W ednesday or Thursday, I think
it was, or Tuesday or Wednesday. I| said, “Fine, fine.
okay.”
He says, “I will call vou.” He called me back — I was
supposed to call him back. He called her, and went over
the whole thing with Betty including the incident about
the Irish thing. That is when the hand thing came into
play. Because he knew that I was very upset about this,
and that —
MR. STRICKLER: Your Honor, | think that Mr.
Young should not be testifving about conversations be-
tween Mr. McKeon and Ms. Murphy. He was obviously
not a party to that conversation, and he should not be
testifving about some conversation between two other
people.
JUDGE LADWIG: Sustained.
BY MR. SIGMOND:
Q. Did Mr. McKeon inform you that he had spoken
to Ms. Murphy?
A. Yes, ves, he told me. When I called him Friday,
he said that he would talk to Betty Murphy, and would |
be willing to have a meeting, and that he would set it up.
Because he could not make it. but he advised me that he
was going to send another gentleman in to set up the
meeting.
Q. Prior to the time that vou spoke to Mr. McKeon,
had Ms. Murphy complained about her arm at all?
A. No, I never heard anything. I never heard a word.
Q. Did vou hear anything about any allegation that
vou had assaulted her, and caused the bruises?
A. Nope, nope.
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Q. Go ahead.
A. That happened Friday. I mean that was the next
thing. | come walking in the office. | am walking up this
corridor. And she was like perching for you. She ran over
to me and says, “Look, see what you did to my arm. You
see what you did to my arm.”
MR. SIGMOND: The record should indicate that
Mr. Young is pointing.
THE WITNESS: I was pointing.
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.