Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Baker

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DEC 23 1985

JOSEPH F. sr SNIOL, UR,

No. 85- eta |

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

: ‘ | Supreme Court, U.S.

7. 11 01, | F I ‘- D

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

BURBANK-GLENDALE-PASADENA

AIRPORT AUTHORITY,

Petitioner,

vs.

KENNETH L. BAKER, et ai.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

a

=

RICHARD K. SIMON

Counsel cf Record

MICHAEL C. KELLEY

JAMES I. Ham

SANDRA E. PURNELL

KaDISON, PFAELZER, WOODARD,

QuINN & RossI

707 Wilshire Blvd.

Fortieth Floor

Los Angeles, California 90017

(213) 688-9000

Attorneys for Burbank-

Glendcie-Pasadena

Airport Authority

Bowne of Los Angeles, Inc., Law Printers (213) 742-6600.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Does state regulation of airport operations to

achieve noise abatement through imposition of repetitive

nuisance liability on proprietors of public airports violate

the supremacy clause as applied by this Court in City of

Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624

(1973)?

2. Does state regulation of airport operations to

achieve noise abatement through imposition of repetitive

nuisance liability on proprietors of publie airports result

in an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of

the commerce clause of the United States Constitution?

PARTIES BELOW

The parties to the proceedings in the California Su-

preme Court from which review is sought are Petitioner

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority* and Re-

spondents Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth L. Baker, Patrick J.

Bigley, William & Jan Biilos, Joe & Angie DeCasper,

Charles & Janet Ludecke, Mr. & Mrs. Frank B. Miller,

Sr., Thomas D. & Irene Pineiro, Gary & Gail Rainwater,

John & Allison Rocke, Herb & Rose Rosen, Michael A.

Rotella, Michael & Irma Taranto and Carl & Doris

Waugh.

*Petitioner Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority is a

joint powers agency created by the cities of Burbank, Glendale and

Pasadena pursuant to California Government Code §§ 6500 ef seq.

and 6546.1.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented For Review ...............

yO Fwerrerer es ore er eee ee

Sens TN aks 5 ae ak cee

So ae ee ar Tek me Prat

Constitutional Provisions And Statutes Involved

co a 8 eens Se er eye

Reasons For Granting The Writ................

I.

State Regulation Of Airport Operations Through

Imposition Of Repetitive Nuisance Liability Vio-

lates The Supremacy Clause As Applied By This

Court In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Termi-

GE, FAR. cn kad edhe snes eee

A. State Regulation Of Aircraft Noise Is Pre-

PPE ry Toe ere ra ree

B. The Imposition Of Perpetual Nuisanee Lia-

bility By State Courts Upon Airport Opera-

tors For Decisions Affecting Aircraft Noise

Is A Prohibited Form Of Regulation......

C. The Holding Below Is Contrary To The Dec!-

sion In City Of Burbank And Inconsistent

With The Only Other Federal Court Deci-

sion On The [enw .. cscs stuns steeeinss

II.

State Regulation Of Airport Operations Through

Imposition Of Repetitive Nuisance Liability On

Airport Proprietors Will Result In An Undue

Burden On Interstate Commerce In Violation Of

The Commeree Clamee. i... cocccsictaunsuunes

~~

J Ww WH DSO — we om, FE

11

11

14

18

ill

Page

A. State Commerce Regulations May Not

Impose An Undue Burden On Interstate

ee nye eeyeeese 21

B. Imposition Of Nuisance Liability On Airport

Proprietors By California Courts Would

Constitute An Undue Burden On Interstate

edi ee kn cas aas ca kae sas 22

Ce, eee pe uauescnseicsec 26

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A. Opinion Of California Supreme

Re cee lake k Seva keeecaceacs A-1l

Appendix B. Opinion Of California Court Of

et ews Lae waesenee sass A-21

Appendix C. Order Of Los Angeles County Supe-

ec. ecu nae ween A-51

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Page

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571

CREE ch GA ash KS KGNS es heebe ke bekes babes eas 17

Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. v.

Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) ....

City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411

U.8. 624 (19738) ......... i, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,

na beak e betes eee 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26

Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), a/ff’d,

GOT Ty Be COD 0k 6 60 own kkh acc dehions 22, 23, 24

Greater Westchester Homeowners Association v.

Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160

Cal.Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820

br rere ares er a er ne tes ae 10, 19

Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 857 (1962) 25

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ......... 11

Luedtke v. County of Miiwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th

CEU nccced nc skaveneaeubeecuneces 3, 10, 20, 26

Northwest Airlines, Ine. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292

fre eerie ee pre ere TT ee ee 9

Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34

Cal.3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal.Rptr. 367

Sc os ais KEa Oak eka wap Ch Reeeeee peewee 24

Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 496

<a CIE 654.046244 K0045 808 ade eee 5

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218

( y Se rr et Penner ery rt ee era. Te 11

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

Page

San Diego Building Trades Council, Local 2020 v.

Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ........... 9, 15, 16,17

Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d 265, 239 P.2d 625

CRE F402 26 bE RACER KR KEL REREN CEA N AE ERS OES; 5

Sperry v. Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S.

err ety ee err oe 17

Southern Pacifie Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761

ho ee ee ret ee re 21, 22, 23, 24

Constitution

United States Constitution, Art. I, See. 8 ........

United States Constitution, Art. VI .............

Statutes

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 85-726,

§ 105, 92 Stat. 1708, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West

. TED 6 6 GA nankenkcGarceuneeeakbact sss 13

Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, November 18,

1976, reprinted in Noise Regulation Reporter

(BNA) Clot. Fide), SRcBOOS . oc cc ccc cccnescsn 12

California Code of Civil Procedure, See. 73la (West

PE ks wa Xess ae b5k One es ee b PES tha ba renee 19

California Government Code, See. 911.2 (West

ME a6 6k 5 bt skh esaens oueked ce bebenees 4

California Public Resources Code, See. 21001 et seq. 13

California Government Code, See. 6500 .......... i

California Government Code, See. 6546.1 ........ i

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726,

§§ 101 et seq., 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301

(WN. BOWE os nAn 6 660m s Gane un es hbase aaes 11

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

STATUTES

Page

Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574,

§ 7(a), 86 Stat. 1234, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1431 (1976) 11

United States Code, Title 28, See. 1257(3) ....... 2

No. 85-

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

BURBANK-GLENDALE-PASADENA

AIRPORT AUTHORITY,

Petitioner,

VS.

KENNETH L. BAKER, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Au-

thority, a California joint powers agency and owner of the

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport, prays that a Writ of

Certiorari issue to the Supreme Court of the State of

California to review that court’s decision in case No.

31869, entitled Baker, et al. v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena

Airport Authority.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of

California, 39 Cal.3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218 Cal.Rptr. 293

2

(1985), is set forth in Appendix A at page A-1l. The

opinions of the Court of Appeal of the State of California,

Second Appellate District, 149 Cal.App.3d 872, 197

Cal.Rptr. 357 (1983) (not officially reported), and the

unreported memorandum opinion of the Superior Court

for the County of Los Angeles are set forth in Appendices

B and C at pages A-21 and A-51, respectively.

In relevant part, the California Supreme Court held

that federal preemption of locai regulation of airport

noise does not bar plaintiffs from bringing successive

nuisance damage actions against California airports for

personal injury, emotional distress aad property damage

until the nuisance created by jet air»raft operations is

abated. Holding that airport operations are continuing,

rather than permanent, nuisances, the court concluded

that such damage actions are not barred by otherwise

applicable statutes of limitation.’

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1257(3). The decision of the California Supreme

Court was entered on September 23, 1985, and this

Petition for Certiorari has been filed less than 90 days

thereafter.

Review by certiorari is sought on the grounds that the

California Supreme Court has decided substantial ques-

tions arising under the United States Constitution and

federal statutes involving the application of this Court's

'The court also held that, notwithstanding California legislation

prohibiting the Airport Authority from exercising the power of

eminent domain to condemn residentiai real property, the Airport

Authority could concurrently be sued for inverse condemnation, a

ruling which is not contested in this Petition.

3

decision in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc..

411 U.S. 624 (1973), in a manner contrary to the princi-

ples announced in that decision and in conflict with the

only federal court that has faced similar issues. See

Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.

1975).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED

Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8,

Clause 3:

“The Congress shall have power to regulate Com-

merce with foreign nations, and among the several

States, and with the Indian Tribes;”

Constitution of the United States, Article VI, Para-

graph 2:

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shali be made in Pursuance thereof; and

all treaties made or which shall be made, under the

authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall

be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Airport Authority, Petitioner here, is the owner

and operator of the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport

(“Burbank Airport”), a major public air transport facil-

ity serving approximately 2.8 million passengers annually

in interstate and intrastate commerce. Burbank Airport

(then known as the Hollywood-Burbank Airport) was the

4

subject of this Court’s decision in City of Burbank v.

Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).

In 1982, twenty-four individuals residing in the vicinity

of Burbank Airport initiated this action against the Air-

port Authority sounding in inverse condemnation and

nuisance.” Plaintiffs alleged that noise and other by-

products created by the operation of jet aircraft using

Burbank Airport had injured them. They sought $100,000

each for personal injuries and emotional distress, and

$106,000 per residence for property damage.

The Airport Authority demurred to plaintiffs’ nuisance

claims on the ground that, on the face of the complaint,

the claims were barred by the statutes of limitation

applicable to persona! injury and property damage claims

against public entities. See Cal. Gov't. Code § 911.2 (West

1980). The trial court sustained the demurrer and plain-

tiffs appealed.

On December 14, 1983, the California Court of Appeal

held that because, in its view. airports could voluntarily

abate those jet aircraft operations deemed to constitute a

nuisance, plaintiffs could “elect” to treat the nuisance as

“continuing” rather than “permanent”. As a consequence,

airport noise plaintiffs were permitted to sue the airport

repeatedly until the nuisance subsides or is abated and

thus could write their own immunity from the statutes of

limitation.®

2A companion ease, Blaine, et al. v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena

Airport Authority, et al., involving identical claims on behalf of 308

plaintiffs, is also pending against Petitioner.

3Under California law, as under the law of most jurisdictions, if a

nuisance is considered permanent, plaintiffs must collect ali of their

damages, past, present and future, in one action. The statutes of

limitation applicable to such claims begin to run at the inception of

4)

The Airport Authority appealed to the California Su-

preme Court, which granted review on February 16, 1984.

On September 23, 1985, that court followed and expanded

upon the Court of Appeal’s analysis, holding that

“[alirport operations are the quintessential continuing

nuisance,” 39 Cal.3d at 873, entitling persons allegedly

harmed by them to “bring successive # vions for damages

until the nuisance is abated.” Id. at °49.

The California Supreme Court specifically ruled on the

federal preemption issue when it affirmed the holding of

the Court of Appeal. It concluded that while certain

publie utilities must be considered permanent nuisances

because they are privileged to continue to operate despite

their interference with others’ property rights, 39 Cal.3d

at 872, California airports were not such entities and were

not protected by federal preemption:

‘We do not deal with such an extensive privilege.

Federal preemption of local regulation of airport

noise is not absolute. In Greater Westchester, ... 26

Cal.3d 86, we concluded that federal preemption

does not operate to wholly eliminate local responsi-

bility for airport noise control. We based this conclu-

sion, in part, on the distinction drawn by the United

States Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed

Air Terminal, (1973) 411 U.S. 624, between a munici-

pality’s exercise of the police power and its proprie-

tary efforts to reduce airport noise. Federal law

the nuisance. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cai.2d 104, 107,

496 P.2d 480 (1945). In contrast, if a nuisance is deemed continuing,

plaintiffs may bring successive actions to collect damages periodi-

eally for harm suffered during the period specified in the cpplicable

statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d 265,

267-68, 239 P.2d 625 (1952). Consequently, under a continuing

nuisance theory, plaintiffs have a new cause of action for each day

they allege that an activity is a nuisance.

6

preempts only the former. (Jd, at pp. 635-636, fn. 14;

Greater Westchester, ...26 Cal.3d at p. 96. See also

San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco (9th Cir.

1981) 651 F.2d 1306, 1314, cert. den. 455 U.S. 1000.)

The message of City of Burbank and Greater West-

chester is clear: state law damage remedies remain

available against an airport proprietor despite the

fact that federal law precludes interference with

commercial flight patterns and schedules.”

39 Cal.3d at 872.

The California Supreme Court’s ruling in this case was

based squarely upon its interpretation of federal law. The

scope of federal preemption and its effect on local at-

tempts at aircraft noise regulation are clearly federal

questions, decided in part in City of Burbank, 411 U.S.

624 (1973).* In the decision below, the California Su-

preme Court interposed its own restrictive interpretation

of federal preemption and broadened the scope of permit-

ted state intrusion into air transit regulation.

A sensitive issue of national transportation policy such

as the one presented here should properly be decided by

this Court in order to insure uniformity of application

throughout the states and to guarantee that the national

interest in promoting interstate commerce is not thwarted

by parochial state and local concerns.

*City of Burbank left open the question of the scope of a proprie-

tor’s authority to adopt noise control measures. Jd. at 635 n.14. The

seope of a state’s authority to interfere with airport operations

through the judicial imposition of nuisance judgments upon the

airport proprietor was not at issue in that case and has not been

decided by this Court.

7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

By the decision below, the California Supreme Court

has overruled sub silentio this Court’s decision in City of

Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624

(1973), which held that the operation of public airports

accommodating commercial jet aircraft, and the noise by-

products of jet aircraft, were not subject to local regula-

tion. In that ease, this Court found that the delicate

balance between air safety, efficiency and noise abatement

mandated a uniform and exclusive system of federal

regulation of aircraft noise, 411 U.S. at 638-39, and that

local regulation of airport operations aimed at controlling

jet aircraft noise was thus preempted by federai law. 411

U.S. at 633.

The California Supreme Court decision effectively ig-

nores this prohibition against local noise regulation.

While paying lip service to the principle that the state is

powerless to enjoin aircraft operations at the behest of

homeowners in adjacent communities, the court has fash-

ioned a system of perpetual tort liability to achieve the

same result indirectly. Under the California Supreme

Court’s decision, airports have been sentenced to a Hob-

son’s choice of absorbing repeated and costly challenges

to airport operational decisions or submitting to the

parochial demands of local residents to the detriment of

the larger publie good and safety.

Based upon what the corrt declared to be an airport

proprietor’s “separate duty to reduce noise,” 39 Cal.3d at

873, the decision below subjects to loeal serutiny (and

thus to the vagaries of local judicial processes) the very

activities that City of Burbank held preempted: takeoff

and landing procedures, runway preferences and modifi-

cations in the number, frequency or scheduling of flights.

The decision below gives local residents, through court

8

action, the right to challenge every decision that might

affect noise levels in their community.”

That such control-through-litigation was a key object of

the decision below is readily acknowledged by the

majority:

“Moreover, we should be particularly cautious not

to enlarge the category of permanent nuisances be-

yond those structures or conditions that truly are

permanent. Where some means of abatement exists,

there is little or no incentive to make remedial efforts

once the nuisance is classified as permanent. Such a

result is at odds with tort law’s philosophy of encour-

aging innovation and repair to decrease future

harm.”

39 Cal.3d at 872.

“Thus, despite the fact that the flights to and from

the airport are privileged, defendant shoulders an

affirmative responsibility to minimize noise levels

through the use of buffers, barriers or other noise

reducing devices.”

39 Cal.3d at 873.°

The predictable consequence of this new right to pun-

ish, and thus regulate, airport operational deci-

*The record below reflects the recent use of collective, repetitive

court actions by homeowners to attempt to force operational changes

at San Franeisco International Airport by “nuisancing the airport to

death.” See Amicus Brief of City and County of San Francisco at

page 2.

*Because the decision below arose from the trial court’s sustaining

of a demurrer to the complaint, the court reached well beyond the

record to opine regarding the Airport Authority’s legal or practical

ability to undertake further noise-reduction measures.

9

sions — irrespective of whether those decisions are

imposed upon airports by the federal government or

initiated by the proprietor — will be a continuous wave of

lawsuits as local residents attempt to pressure airports to

divert noise away from them and onto their neighbors, or

to reduce noise by lessening service.’ Preemption doc-

trine is made no less applicable, however, because the

method of regulation chosen by the state is economic

eoercion through tort lisbilliy. See San Diego Building

Trades Council, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236

(1959).

Thus, the inherent vice of the decision below lies in

both the ends sought and the means selected by the court.

The control and management of aircraft noise is a

uniquely national issue sinee noise and safety (like air-

craft and airports) are inextricably l:aked in a nationwide

matrix. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973),

citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,

303 (1944). The proper balance cannot be struck by a

system that pits airports against homeowners in endless

local serimmages before local juries over the wisdom of

decisions affecting flight operations and, consequently,

noise levels. The inevitable result of such local regulation

is incompatibility in a system requiring consistency.

This Court has left undecided whether states may

impose any nuisance liability on airport proprietors for

"Even before remittitur, the 332 plaintiffs in this and its companion

action filed new damage claims against the Airport Authority pur-

porting to seek an additional $100,000 each for personal injury and

emotional distress, and $100,060 per residence for property damage.

These 332 plaintiffs represent only a fraction of the thousands of

persons residing within comparable distances from Burbank Airport

and a minuscule portion of those living in similar proximity to other

California airports.

10

operational decisions. See Greater Westchester Homeown-

ers Association v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329,

160 Cal.Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820

(1980). The holdings of the lower courts are split. Com-

pare Greater Westchester, supra, with Luedtke v. Cownty of

Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975). The decision

below, however, clearly exceeds all limits which courts

have previously placed on the rights of plaintiffs to seek

damages against airports for noise.

Regardless of what liability may be imposed on airports

for land use or planning decisions having little or no

effect upon aircraft operations, the holding below pur-

ports to impose unlimited and infinite noise liability upon

publie airports for engaging in activity that cannot be

separated from what is condoned, permitted or required

(and clearly preempted) by federal regulation. The deci-

sion below thus extends perpetual liability to new classes

of activity: those which the proprietor is privileged by

federal law to continue and those which cannot be con-

trolled by the proprietor, short of cessation of operations.

Should the new California rule be fellowed in other

jurisdictions, the evils which led this Court to strike down

the Burbank airport curfew in City of Burbank, will

multiply nationwide. The airport which sought protection

in 1973 from parochial legislative polities threatening the

safety and integrity of the national aviation system must

again, in 1985, appeal to this Court to protect air com-

merece from an equally effective and injurious form of

local regulation.

11

I.

STATE REGULATION OF AIRPORT OPERATIONS

THROUGH IMPOSITION OF REPETITIVE NUF-

SANCE LIABILITY VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY

CLAUSE AS APPLIED BY THIS COURT IN CITY

@°OF BURBANK V. LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL,

INC.

A. State Regulation Of Aircraft Noise Is Preempted.

The supremacy of federal law in the regulation of

aircraft noise was established by this Court in City of

Burbank v. Locvckheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624

(1973). In that decision, this Court declared that the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, $§ 101

et seq., T2 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.CLA. § 1301 et seq. (West

1976), supplemented by the Noise Control Act of 1972,

Puh. L. No. 92-574, § 7(a), 86 Stat. 1234, 49 ULS.C.A.

§ 1431 (1976). constituted a scheme of federal regulation

of aircraft noise so pervasive that Congress left no room

for the states to supplement it. City of Burbank, 411 U.S.

at 633-34, citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.

218, 230 (1947).

The Federal Aviation Administration has ‘full control

over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local control.”

City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633. The complete displace-

ment of traditional state power over noise is mandated by

the complex and intricate interdependence between avia-

tion safety, efficiency, noise control, and management of

air traffic on a nationwide seale. /d., 411 U.S. at 638-39.

Here, as elsewhere, state law which “stands as an obstacle

to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes

and objectives of Congress” must be stricken down. //ines

v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).

12

Since this Court’s decision in City of Burbank, the

scope of federal preemption over the nation’s aviation

system has broadened still further. Three years after City

of Burbank that trend was reflected in the Department of

Transportation's Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, which

stated that the role of the federal government was:

“to control aireraft noise by the regulation of source

emissions, by flight operational procedures, and by

management of the air traffic control system and

navigable airspace in ways that minimize noise im-

pact on residential areas, consistent with the highest

standards of safety.”

Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, November 18, 1976,

reprinted in Voise Regulation Re porter (BNA) (Ref. File),

54:1002.

In contrast, the Noise Abatement Poliey alloeated to

state and local governments a narrowly limited responsi-

bility to provide for land use planning and development,

zoning, and housing regulation that would limit the uses

of land near airports to purposes compatible with airport

operations.” Id.

Additionally, in 1978, Congress expressly denied state

and local governments the right to regulate air carriers in

the wake of airline deregulation:

“{N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no

interstate ageney or other political ageney of two or

more States shail enaet or enforce any law, rule,

“The Noise Abatement Policy also carefully outlined the scope of

an airport proprietor’s ability to take steps to reduce noise. The

Policy expressly excluded steps that would “unjustly diseriminate

against any user, impede the federal interest in safety and manage-

ment of the air navigation system, or unreasonably interfere with

interstate or foreign commerce.” /d.

13

regulation, standard, or other provision having the

foree and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or

services of any air carrier having authority under

iltle IV of this Act to provide interstate air

transportation.”

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 85-726, § 105,

92 Stat. 1708, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West Supp. 1984).

The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has

also recently expressed its view of the broad scope of

federal preemption, taking the position that court action

aimed at reversing operational decisions of airport propri-

etors is preempted. In United States of America v. State of

California, et al., United States District Court, Eastern

District of California, Case No. 85-1600 LKK, filed No-

vember 15, 1985, the FAA has alleged that the State of

California, by suing airport proprietors under the Califor-

nia Environmental Quality Act (Cal. Pub. Res. Code

§ 21001 et seg.) to limit the number and type of commer-

cial aircraft operations at major California airports, is

unlawfully exercising its powers and that such suits are

preempted by federal control of aircraft operations and

aviation noise.

These actions by Congress and the federal agencies

charged with managing the system of commercial aviation

evidence the expansion of federal control over jet aircraft

and their noise by-products since this Court decided City

of Burbank. In the face of this development, the California

Supreme Court’s decision must be struck down.

14

B. The Imposition Of Perpetual Nuisance Liability By

State Courts Upon Airport Operators For Decisions

Affecting Aircraft Noise Is A Prohibited Form Of

Regulation.

The court below found that “[a]irport operations are

the quintessential continuing nuisance,” 39 Cal.3d at 873,

entitling persons allegedly harmed by it to “bring succes-

sive actions for damages until the nuisance is abated.” Jd.

at 869. Although purporting formally to recognize federal

preemption of local regulation (including court-ordered

injunctive relief) of airport noise, id. at 868 n.6, 872, the

court nevertheless ruled that state law damage remedies

premised on nuisance liability are available against air-

port proprietors, and continuing damages recoverable

until the nuisance is abated, “despite the fact that federal

law precludes interference with commercial flight pat-

terns and schedules.” Jd. at 872. In clear effect, the court

held that while the State of California could not directly

interfere with decisions of an airport proprietor affecting

flight operations, it could impose damages upon him until

the desired decisions are implemented “voluntarily”.

For the same reasons that a state cannot impose noise

regulations upon airport proprietors directly through its

police powers or indirectly through court ordered injunc-

tion, a state cannot impose noise regulation indirectly

through the economic coercion of repeated damages ac-

tions. As the court below explicitly acknowledged, the

intended purpose of repeated damages actions is to force

airport proprietors to adopt various measures to reduce

noise. Jd. at 869, 872. Those decisions, however, are solely

within the province of the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion working in conjunction with the airport proprietor,

and may not be the subject of second-guessing by local

residents or local courts.

15

Invalidation of state tort laws imposing liability in

fields where the federal government has preempted state

interference with decisions of the putative tortfeasor is

not novel. Decisions of this Court recognize that the form

of state action — whether legislative or judicial, or pre-

mised upon general tort or specific regulatory law — is

not a litmus test of its propriety. Rather, the rule long

established by this Court is that state tort liability that

breaches a preemptive federal policy is as repugnant to

the supremacy clause as direct regulation. Chicago and

North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,

450 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1981) (“Kalo Brick”); San Diego

Building Trades Council, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S.

236, 244 (1951).

In the Kalo Brick case, a railroad was given permission

by the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) to

abandon a route serving piaintiff’s business. Plaintiff

subsequently sued the railroad in tort for the harm

caused his business by the cessation of rail service. This

Court found that ICC review and approval of the rail-

road’s abandonment application preempted the state

court from imposing tort liability on the railroad for the

decision. Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 328-29.

The rationale expressed by the court below for impos-

ing nuisance liability on the Airport Authority notwith-

standing the preemptive effect of federal regulation is

that such liability does not conflict with federal law

because it is predicated upon a proprietor’s right

voluntarily to control airport operations. 39 Cal.3d at 872-

73. Plaintiff in Kalo Brick made the same argument —

that state ‘crt liability would be consistent with and

“eomplem. i::tary” to federal regulation of railroad service

— but this Court flatly dismissed that notion as inconsis-

tent with the authority vested in the ICC:

16

“The judgment as to what constitutes reasonableness

belongs exclusively to the Commission. Cf. Purcell v.

U ‘ates, 315 U.S., at 384-385, 62 S.Ct., at 710-

va would vitiate the overarching congressional

intent of creating ‘an efficient and nationally inte-

grated railroad system,’ JCC v. Railway Labor Execu-

tives Assn., 315 U.S. 373, 376-377, 62 S.Ct. 717, 719-

720, 86 L.Ed. 904 (1942), to permit the State of lowa

to use the threat of damages to require a carrier to do

exactly what the Commissioner is empowered to

excuse. A system under which each State could,

through its courts, impose on railroad carriers its

own version of reasonable service requirements could

hardly be more at odds with the uniformity contem-

plated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Com-

merece Act.”

Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 325-326.

As in Kalo Brick, the purpose of California’s imposition

of repetitive nuisance liability here is to control indirectly

the diseretion of an enterprise engaged in interstate

transportation. Also as in Kalo Brick, the effect of tolerat-

ing such liability rules would be to foster interference

with federal policy for, as City of Burbank pointed out, the

interdependence of noise, safety and efficiency “requires

a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if

the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Avia-

tion Act are to be fulfilled.” City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at

639.

State court damage remedies were also held to be

preempted in San Diego Building Trades Council, Local

2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, an

employer brought a state tort action against several

unions attempting to organize plant employees. Plaintiff

argued that the union’s activities were neither protected

ee

17

nor prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act. Jd. at

246.

This Court held in Garmon that the state could not

assume jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims unless the Na-

tional Labor Relations Board declared that it lacked

jurisdiction over the issues, noting that “[t]he governing

consideration is that to allow the States to control activi-

ties that are potentially subject to federal regulation

involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor

policy.” 7d. at 246 (footnote omitted).

The Court made it clear that the imposition of damages

by a state court was as intrusive as overt state regulation

or judicial injunction:

“Nor is it significant that California asserted its

power to give damages rather than to enjoin what the

Board may restrain though it could not compensate.

Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct

which must be free from state regulation if national

policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can

be as effectively exerted through an award of dam-

ages as through some form of preventative relief.”

Id, at 246-247.

Other cases decided by this Court also embrace the rule

that imposition of damages by the state violates the

supremacy clause if direct regulation of the underlying

conduct would also be preempted. See Arkansas Louisiana

Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 581-82, 584 (1981) (imposi-

tion of contract damages based on a finding that the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission would have

found a higher sales price reasonable is a usurpation of

federal authority tantamount to direct regulation);

Sperry v. Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379,

403 (1963) (patent agent not subject to rules relating to

18

the unauthorized practice of law since “the authority of

Congress is no less when the state power which it dis-

places would otherwise have been exercised by the state

judiciary rather than by the state legislature’).

C. The Holding Below Is Contrary To The Decision In

City Of Burbank And Inconsistent With The Only

Other Federal Court Decision On The Issue.

The decision below reasoned that “[f]ederal preemp-

tion of local reguiation of airport noise is not absolute”

because preemption extends only to a municipality’s exer-

cise of the police power and not to an airport proprietor’s

own efforts to reduce noise. 39 Cal.3d at 872. Having

created this basis for a proprietor’s “separate duty to

reduce noise’, id. at 873, the court allowed residents in

communities adjacent to airports to bring successive

actions for damages, premised on a continuing nuisance

theory, until the proprietor abates the noise. Jd. at 869.

The conflict between this decision and City of Burbank

is readily apparent: the decision below purports to expose

airport proprietors to continuing nuisance liability for the

full panoply of aircraft operations which produce noise,

even though most aspects of aircraft operational decisions

ean neither be controlled by the airport proprietor nor

enjoined by a court. The airport proprietor is thus left

with the choice of ceasing all operations, absorbing con-

tinuing liability or submitting to a state court’s judgment

of what noise abatement procedures are reasonable.

The use of continuous damages liability to coerce enact-

ment of noise control measures desired by local residents

(and which the state could not otherwise mandate) can-

not be sanctioned through resort to a fiction that the state

is doing something other than regulating aircraft opera-

tions. Conducting nuisance trials will inexorably lead

PED.

19

courts and juries to rule on the reasonableness of traffic

patterns, aircraft operational procedures, or curfews, all

of which were held preempted from state regulation in

City of Burbank. 411 U.S. at 639.”

The authorities cited in the opinion below provide no

basis for excepting local regulation of airport proprietors’

operational decisions from the scope of federal preemp-

tion. The only authority found by the court below was its

own decision in Greater Westchester Homeowners Associa-

tion v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 108, 603 P.2d 1329, 160

Cal.Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980)

(holding that the decision of the proprietor of Los Ange-

les International Airport to build new runways would

subject the proprietor to nuisance liability). However, the

eourt in Greater Westchester justified such liability by

noting that City of Burbank had expressly reserved the

issue of a proprietor’s powers to enact noise control

measures.’” Greater Westchester, 26 Cal.3d at 95-98.

Nothing in City of Burbank suggests that nuisance

liability is not a form of state regulation. The case clearly

°The inevitability of an inquiry into the reasonableness of aircraft

operations and noise control measures results from the nature of an

action for nuisance and the defenses available to the airport proprie-

tor. Under California law, an airport cannot be deemed a nuisance

without evidence of the employment of unnecessary and injurious

methods of operation. See Cal. Civ. Proe. Code § 75la (West 1980).

Furthermore, the California Supreme Court in Greater Westches-

ter confined its holding to liability arising out of airport planning,

design, and land use decisions over which the airport proprietor

retained “substantial proprietary control”. 26 Cai.3d at 97. The

decision below embodies no such limitations, suggesting that a

proprietor will be liable in nuisance regardless of whether it is within

the power of the proprietor to control the noise complained of without

interfering with operational procedures within the exclusive control

of the federal government.

20

held that the state quc regulator was preempted from

imposing noise regulations on airport proprietors. City of

Burbank, 411 U.S. at 640. City of Burbank thus provides

no justification for the imposition of continuous nuisance

liability on airport operators since the decision below

imposes such liability as state regulator, not as airport

proprietor.

This Court has held that decisions concerning flight

patterns, takeoff and landing procedures, curfews and

modifications in the number, frequency or scheduling of

flights, among others, cannot be the subject of parochial

regulations. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 686-39. The

decision below clearly permits (and is predicated on the

expectation of) state interference with such activities

through the imposition of nuisance liability. The effective-

ness of this mode of state regulation is undeniable. In

order to avoid the continuous expense of litigation and

damage awards, airport proprietors will be forced to

enact the very measures this Court declared would upset

the delicate balance between safety and efficiency that

mandated the exclusion of locally imposed noise

regulation.

The decision of the California Supreme Court is also

inconsistent with the only federal appeals court decision

applying the holding of City of Burbank to a nuisance

action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-

enth Cireuit, in Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d

387, 391 (7th Cir. 1975), held that state-imposed nuisance

liability was preempted by City of Burbank. The court in

Luedtke found that an airport proprietor could not be held

liable for negligence or for creating a nuisance if airport

operations were in compliance with federal laws and

regulations. 521 F.2d at 391. Thus, Lwedtke held unlawful

the exact regulatory scheme the California Supreme

MIR oe

21

Court has established. Such a decisive split over the scope

of City of Burbank’s preemption ruling should not be

allowed to fester.

II.

STATE REGULATION OF AIRPORT OPERATIONS

THROUGH IMPOSITION OF REPETITIVE NUI-

SANCE LIABILITY ON AIRPORT PROPRIETORS

WILL RESULT IN AN UNDUE BURDEN ON IN-

TERSTATE COMMERCE IN VIOLATION OF THE

COMMERCE CLAUSE

A. State Commerce Regulations May Not Impose An

Undue Burden On Interstate Commerce.

The commerce clause of the Constitution vests in Con-

gress the power to regulate commerce between the states.

State regulations are precluded even where Congress has

not acted if they are deemed to interfere with interstate

ecommerce. Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S.

761, 769 (1945). State regulations are evaluated on the

basis of a balancing test weighing the “legitimate !ocal

publie interest” underlying them against the burden they

impose on interstate commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church,

397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (striking down an Arizona

restriction barring the shipment of uncrated cantaloupes

out of that state). Bruce Church indicates the kind of

interest balancing that goes into commerce clause

decisions:

‘Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effec-

tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects

on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be

upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce

is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

venefits. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362

22

U.S. 440, 443, 80 S.Ct. 813, 816, 4 L.Ed.2d 852. If a

legitimate local purpose is found, then the question

becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden

that will be tolerated will of course depend on the

nature of the local interest involved, and on whether

it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on

interstate activities.”

397 U.S. at 142.

B. Imposition Of Nuisance Liability On Airport Pro-

prietors By California Courts Would Constitute An

Undue Burden On Interstate Commerce.

As the court below readily acknowledges, the purpose

of imposing continuing nuisance liability on California

airport proprietors is not simply to compensate residents

for damages, but also to encourage the imposition of

‘remedial’ noise control measures. 39 Cal.3d at 872. The

pernicious effects on interstate commerce of the avowedly

regulatory component of the decision below closely resem-

ble the effects found to violate the commerce clause in key

decisions of this Court. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. 761;

Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407

U.S. 258 (1972).

In the Southern Pacific decision, Arizona’s regulations

limiting the length of trains for the purpose of increased

rail safety were struck down. The regulations at issue in

Southern Pacific required that trains passing through

Arizona be broken up and reformed, which had the practi-

eal effect of applying Arizona’s train length limitation.

throughout the southwest rail corridor. 325 U.S. at 774-

75. This Court noted that if each state could impose

length limitations on trains, rail carriers would be re-

quired either to break up and reform their trains at each

state border or conform their operations to the most

23

stringent length restriction imposed along the route. Id.

at 773. Either alternative was unacceptable because of the

possibility of states enacting conflicting regulations

where uniformity was essential and because of the burden

imposed on interstate commerce by the Arizona regula-

tions. Jd. at 773-75.

Just as the train length limitation struck down in

Southern Pacific was held to burden interstate commerce

because of the prospect that other states would adopt

similar regulations, California’s attempt to regulate local

airport noise through the imposition of nuisance liability

creates a burden on interstate air transportation. Also, as

in Southern Pacific, the commerce that California has

attempted to regulate through the decision below is essen-

tially interstate in nature and i. accordingly entitled to

protection from overreaching state regulation.

Air carriers, required to comply with noise rules

adopted by Burbank Airport (or at any of the other major

airports in California) in order to avoid or mitigate

nuisanee liability, will have to make adjustments in their

schedules, equipment or operating procedures that will

have effects throughout their interstate route structure.

The impact on interstate commerce from such regulation

will esealate exponentially should other states follow

California’s example in using the erude instrument of

nuisance liability to foree airport proprietors to reduce

noise.

The faet that California has eschewed a more direct

approach at regulation in favor of imposing nuisance

liability on airport operators does not change the com-

meree clause analysis. See Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264

(2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In Flood, a

baseball player challenged the structure of national major

league baseball, asserting state antitrust and common law

24

causes of action. The claims were dismissed because such

actions would place an undue burden on interstate com-

merce. 443 F.2d at 268. This Court reasoned that awards

of monetary damages under state antitrust and common

law theories against the baseball league would result in

enforcement of the “strictest standard of several states”

and have an extra-territorial effect “considerably more

far-reaching than that in Southern Pacific.” Id. at 268.

Accord, Partee v. San Diego Chargers Footuc.! Co., 34

Cal.3d 378, 385, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal.Rptr. 367 (1983)

(commerce clause prohibits imposition of state antitrust

damages on professional football team due to the need for

national uniformity in player-team-league relationships).

Flood teaches that enforcement of state laws imposing

damages are as violative of the commerce clause as direct

regulation where the effect of the damages award will be

to burden interstate commerce unreasonably. Commercial

aircraft operations are, a fortiori, activity in interstate

ecommerce. Regulation at one point within the network of

air transportation will affect the entire system. To permit

nuisance liability for jet aircraft noise in one state is to

permit that state’s noise rule to govern air commerce in

the other states. As Southern Pacific and Flood illustrate,

such regulation is consistently struck down as unduly

burdensome on interstate commerce.

While imposition of nuisance damages would constitute

a serious burden on interstate commerce, the State of

California can claim no significant countervailing interest

justifying the intrusion. In Southern Pacific, the state’s

safety claims were of doubtful validity. 325 U.S. at 775-76.

In Flood, the court considered enforcement of state anti-

trust laws to be of little comparative importance. 443 F.2¢c

at 268. In the present case, the state interest is to

compensate landowners for damages resulting from the

|

abe MB tse

25

exposure of their property to the by-products of commer-

cial jet aircraft operations and to reduce the effects of

noise on airport neighbors. It is well established, however,

that the state has little permissible interest in the regula-

tion of aircraft noise. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639-40.

Moreover, any interest the state may have in providing a

eontinuing nuisance remedy to its residents is extremely

limited given the availability of an inverse condemnation

action. See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 857

(1962).""

"The inverse condemnation action is a less intrusive means of

protecting property interests. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137,

142 (1970) (court must consider whether state interest “could be

promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities’).

While inverse condemnation will fully compensate plaintiffs for

damage to their property, such liability will not unduly burden

interstate commerce because it does not present the specter of

“reneated and vexatious litigation,” 39 Cal.3d at 874 (dissent), which

provides plaintiffs with the opportunity to regulate airport operations

through collective court action.

26

CONCLUSION

Beeause the court below decided important questions

arising under the Constitution and laws of the United

States in a manner that is inconsistent with the decision

of this Court in City of Burbank and with the decision of

the Seventh Cireuit in Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, the

Airport Authority respectfully prays that a Writ of Certi-

orari issue to the Supreme Court of the State of Califor-

nia to review that court’s decision in case No. 31869,

Baker, et al. v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport

Authority.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD K. SIMON

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL C. KELLEY

JAMES I. HAM

SANDRA E. PURNELL

KADISON, PFAELZER, WOODARD,

QUINN & RossI

Attorneys for Burbank-

Glendale-Pasadena Airport

Authority

A-1

APPENDIX A

Opinion Of California Supreme Court Below

California Supreme Court.

Kenneth L. Baker, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, Defen-

dant and Respondent.

Filed: September 23, 1985.

Appeal From: California Court of Appeal, Second Dis-

trict, Division Four (Civ. No. 69670).

REYNOSO, J.— We are asked to resolve two ques-

tions: whether a public entity lacking the power of emi-

nent domain may nonetheless be lable in inverse

condemnation; and, whether a plaintiff may elect to treat

commercial airport noise and vibrations as a continuing,

rather than a permanent, nuisance. For the reasons set

forth below, we answer both questions in the affirmative.

Plaintiffs are homeowners who live adjacent to defen-

dant Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport. The airport

became a public entity in 1978 when it was purchased by

the three cities pursuant to Government Code section

6500 et seq.’ In 1982, plaintiffs filed suit for inverse

condemnation and

'The cities’ joint powers agreement was specifically authorized by

Government Code section 6546.1, which provides in relevant part: “In

the County of Los Angeles, any agency, commission, or board pro-

vided for by joint powers agreement entered into by cities pursuant

to Article 1 (commencing with Section 6500) of this chapter for the

purpose of the acquisition, operation, repair, maintenance, improve-

ment and administration of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport as a

publie airport, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as

amended, may carry out such purpose and may authorize the issuance

A-2

[39 Cal.3d 866}

nuisance caused by noise, smoke, and vibrations from

flights over their homes. The trial court sustained demur-

rers to both causes of action, dismissing the inverse

condemnation action because defendant is prohibited by

statute from exercising the power of eminent domain, and

dismissing the nuisance action as barred by the statute of

limitations covering permanent nuisances. Plaintiffs

appeal.

1. Inverse Condemnation

Defendant contends that because “inverse condemna-

tion” is a “shorthand description of the manner in which a

landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his

property when condemnation proceedings have not been

instituted” (United States v. Clarke (1980) 445 U.S. 253,

257) [63 L.Ed.2d 373, 377, 100 S.Ct. 1127], it should

follow that if an entity lacks the power to condemn by

eminent domain, it cannot be liable in inverse condemna-

tion. Indeed, there is some authority for this mechanical

view. (3 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1981) $8.1

[4], p. 8-39; Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agcy.

(9th Cir. 1977) 566 F.2d 1353, revd. on other grounds sub

nom., Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy.

(1979) 440 U.S. 391 [59 L.Ed.2d 401, 99 S.Ct. 1171];

Western Internat’l Hotels v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agcy. (D.

Nev. 1975) 387 F.Supp. 429, 439; Gregory v. City of New

York (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 346 F.Supp. 140, 1438; Ex Parte

Carter (Ala. 1980) 395 So.2d 65, 67; Collopy v. Wildlife

Com’n, etc. (Colo. 1981) 625 P.2d 994, 1005; ef. MeCor-

of revenue bonds, pursuant to this article, to pay for acquiring,

repairing, improving, financing and refinancing such project, includ-

ing all facilities and improvements and all expenses incidental

thereto or connected therewith...”

A-3

mick v. Penna. Public Utility Com’n (1980) 48 Cmwith. Ct.

384 [409 A.2d 962, 964].) As defendant is prohibited

from exercising eminent domain power,’ it therefore con-

tends that it cannot be subject to suit for inverse

condemnation.

These authorities are not controlling. They fail to ree-

ognize that the term, “inverse condemnation,” describes

an action grounded not on statutory condemnation power,

but on the constitutional proscription against the taking

(U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) or the taking or damaging

(Cal. Const., art. I, $19) of property for public use

without just compensation. A landowner

[39 Cal.3d 867]

whose property has been invaded by a public entity that

lacks eminent domain power suffers no less a taking

merely because the defendant was not authorized to take.

We have previously recognized the constitutional basis

of an inverse condemnation action. In Rose v. State of

California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505], we held

that mere failure of the Legislature to enact a statute

“Government Code section 6546.1 provides in part that defendant

“shall not authorize or permit...the purchase of fee title to con-

demned real property zoned for residential use...” Moreover, we

eannot agree with plaintiffs that Public Utilities Code section 21652

authorizes defendant to take by condemnation the air space ease-

ments at issue here. Although that section recognizes air space

easements may be acquired by condemnation when “neesssary to

permit imposition ... of excessive noise, [or] vibration... due to the

operation of aircraft to and from the airport” (id., subd. (a) (2)), the

section also specifies that only persons “authorized to exercise the

power of eminent domain” may acquire such air space easements.

(/d., subd. (a); italies added.) This section, therefore, cannot be

construed as granting to defendant the power of eminent domain to

take the subject easements.

A-4

authorizing an inverse condemnation suit did not entitle

the state to disregard the constitutional imperative; we

therefore allowed the action even though the state had not

consented to be sued. (/d., at pp. 719-723.) Similarly, the

eourt in Sutfin v. State of California (1968) 261

Cal.App.2d 50 |67 Cal.Rptr. 665], held that liability in

inverse condemnation did “ ‘not depend upon a showing

that there is statutory authority in the defendant entity to

exercise affirmative eminent domain powers to accomplish

the same result. All that is necessary to show is that the

damage resulted from an exercise of governmental power

while seeking to promote “the general interest in its

relation to any legitimate object of government.” ’” (Jd.,

at p. 55) We later explicitly recognized what was implicit

in Rose and Sutfin: “[t]he authority for prosecution of an

inverse condemnation proceeding derives from article I,

section 19, of the California Constitution...” (/[oltz v.

San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1976) 17

Cal.3d 648, 652 [131 Cal.Rptr. 646, 552 P.2d 430].)°

We therefore conclude that plaintiffs’ inverse condem-

nation action may be maintained although defendant

*To the same effect, see McMahan’s of Santa Monica v. City of Santa

Monica (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 683, 692-693 [194 Cal.Rptr. 582];

Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles {1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 720, 732 [84

Cal.Rptr. 11]; Podesta v. Linden Irr. Dist. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 38,

47 [296 P.2d 401]; Alper v. Clark County (1977) 93 Nev. 569 [571

P.2d 810, 812-813]; see also Zinn v. Stale (1983) 112 Wis.2d 417 [334

N.W.2d 67, 76-77|; Van Dissel v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.

(1981) 181 N.J. Super. 516 [438 A.2d 563, 568]; Minch v. Cily of

"argo (N.D. 1980) 297 N.W.2d 785, 789; Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz

(N.D.Cal. 1982) 539 F.Supp. 887, 896; Ocean Acres, etc. v. Dare Cly.

Bd, of Health (E.D.N.C. 1981) 514 F.Supp. 1117, 1120; ef. Gordon v.

City of Warren (6th Cir. 1978) 579 F.2d 386, 391. See generally Van

Alstyne, Slatutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation; The Scope of

Legislative Power (1967) 19 Stan.l..Rev. 727, passim.

ey

A-5

lacks eminent domain power. (Fountain v. Metro, Atlanta

Rapid Transit Authority (11th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d 1038,

1043-1045.)* As the inverse condemnation claim was filed

within the five-year statute of limitations (Frustruck v.

City of Fairfax (1963) 212

[39 Cal.3d 868]

Cal.App.2d 345, 374 [28 Cal.Rptr. 357]), the trial court

erred in dismissing this cause of action.”

2. Nuisance

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges thet defen-

dant’s activities became a nuisance as of January 29,

‘The instant case does not involve allegations of unreasonable

zoning or regulatory permit activity —the remedy for which, of

course, is not an inverse condemnation suit for damages, but declara-

tory relief or mandamus. (Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d

266, 272-273 [157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25].) Clearly, in cases of

physical invasion an inverse condemnation action is appropriate.

(Marina Plaza v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1977) 73

Cal.App.3d 311, 325 [140 Cal.Rptr. 725].)

"United States v. Clarke (1980) supra, 445 U.S. 253, does not

suggest a contrary result. In Clarke the court granted an injunction

against a state’s continued invasion of a plaintiff's land for use as a

road. The court held that the state had no defense to the requested

injunction on a theory of inverse condemnation; it did not address the

question whether the plaintiff had a remedy in inverse condemnation.

Defendant’s reliance on City of Los Angeles v. Oliver (1929) 102

Cal.App. 299 [283 P. 298], for the proposition that the constitutional

guarantee of just compensation does not require an inverse condem-

nation remedy so long as a “reasonably efficient remedy remains’’

(id., at p. 315) is similarly misplaced. Oliver concerned only proce-

dures for caleulating just compensation after the state exercised its

right of eminent domain; it had nothing to do with the right to bring

an inverse condemnation action.

A-6

1978—the date defendant became a public entity. Be-

eause plaintiffs did not file their complaint until 1982, a

question arises as to whether their nuisance claim was

timely filed. The answer depends on whether the nuisance

is characterized as continuing or permanent.

The trial court ruled that because this particular nui-

sance is not subject to judicial abatement’ it is a perma-

nent nuisance upon which the statute of limitations (Gov.

Code, § 911.2, Code Civ. Proe., $§ 338, subd. 2 and 340)

had run at the time plaintiffs filed their claim.

It does not follow, however, that simply because com-

mercial flights operated in compliance with federal law

may not be enjoined, the nuisance at issue is a permanent

one. Whether a nuisance will be classified as continuing

or permanent depends not on the offending party’s inter-

est in continuing the nuisance, but on the type of harm

suffered. (See Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6

Cal.3d 920, 937 [101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480].)

Two distinet classifications have emerged in nuisance

law which determine the remedies available to injured

parties and the applicable statute of limitations. On the

one hand, permanent nuisances are of a type where “ ‘by

one act a permanent injury is done, [and] damages are

assessed once for all.’ (Williams v. Southern Pacific R.R.

Co. (1907) 150 Cal. 624, 626

<1 Clommercial flights which are conducted in strict compliance

with federal regulations may not be enjoined as nuisances, both

because of the continuing public interest in air transportation, and

because of the likelihood of direct conflict with federal law.” (Greater

Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d

86, 94 [160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329]; see also Loma Portal Civic

Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 591 [39

Cal.Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548/].)

A-7

[39 Cal.3d 869]

[89 P. 599], quoting Beronio v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co.

(1890) 86 Cal. 415, 421 [24 P. 1093].) The cases finding

the nuisance complained of to be unquestionably perma-

nent in nature have involved solid structures, such as a

building encroaching upon the plaintiff's land (Rankin v.

DeBare (1928) 205 Cal. 639 [271 P. 1050],’ a steam

railroad operating over plaintiff's land (Williams, supra,

150 Cal. 624),° or regrade of a street for a rail system

(Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co. (1894) 103 Cal. 614

[37 P. 750]). In such eases, plaintiffs ordinarily are

required to bring one action for all past, present and

future damage within three years after the permanent

nuisance is erected. (Rankin, supra, 205 Cal. at p. 641;

Williams, supra, 150 Cal. at p. 626; Robinson, supra, 129

Cal. at p. 11.) The statutory period is shorter for claims

against public entities. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) Damages

are not dependent upon any subsequent use of the prop-

erty but are complete when the nuisance comes into

existence. (Hachus, supra, 103 Cal. at p. 622.)

On the other hand, if a nuisance is a use which may be

discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in

character and persons harmed by it may bring successive

actions for damages until the nuisance is abated. (Phil-

lips v. City of Pasadena (1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108

[162 P.2d 625].) Recovery is limited, however, to actual

"See also Castelletto v. Bendon (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 64 [13

Cal.Rptr. 907]; Troeger v. Fink (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 22 [332 P.2d

779}; Bertram v. Orlando (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 506 [227 P.2d 894,

24 A.L.R.2d 899}.

5See also Robinson v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 8 [61 P.

947].

A-8

injury suffered prior to commencement of each action.

Prospective damages are unavailable.

The classic example of a continuing nuisance is an

ongoing or repeated disturbance, such as the one before

us today, caused by noise, vibration or foul odor. (E.g.,

Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons (1932) 216 Cal. 156, 158 [13

P.2d 733] [vibration, noise and noxious soot, smoke and

gases emanating from pottery factory].)* Indeed, even

more substantial physical invasions of land have been

held to be continuing in character. (E.g., Tracy v. Ferrera

(1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 827, 828 [301 P.2d 905] [deflec-

tion of rain water and emission of noxious odors and

fumes from neighbor’s pipes and furnace].)'? As empha-

sized in Tracy, the distinction to be drawn is between

[39 Cal.3d 870]

encroachments of a permanent nature erected upon one’s

lands, and a complaint made, not of the location of the

offending structures, but of the continuing use of such

*See also Wade v. Campbell (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 54, 59 [19

Cal.Rptr. 173, 92 A.L.R.2d 966] (noxious smells, disturbing noises,

flies and mosquitoes associated with dairy); Williams v. Blue Bird

Laundry Co. (1927) 85 Cal.App. 388, 395 [259 P. 484] (loud noise,

offensive odors and heavy black smoke emitted from laundry).

See also Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co. (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d

382, 387 [233 P.2d 914] (emission of dust and gases from cement

plant injuring neighbor's cattle); Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp.

(1941) 48 Cal.App. 429, 436 [119 P.2d 973] (illicit use of facilities on

plaintiff's land to process oil and gas); Collins v. Sargent (1928) 89

Cal.App. 107, 116-117 [264 P. 776] (regular use of exposives in

gravel quarry shaking piaintiff's house and throwing gravel upon his

land).

Bitbiads ix. .

A-9

structures. (/d., supra, 144 Cal.App.2d at p. 828.) The

former are permanent, the latter is not.”

In ease of doubt as to the permanency of the injury the

plaintiff may elect whether to treat a particular nuisance

as permanent or continuing. (Spaulding v. Cameron

(1952) 38 Cal.2d 265, 268 [239 P.2d 625].) The impor-

tance of the plaintiff's election has long been recognized.

(United States v. Dickinson (1946) 331 U.S. 745, 749 [91

L.Ed. 1789, 1794, 67 S.Ct. 1382]; Kornoff v. Kingsburg

Cotton Oil Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 265, 269-271 [288 P. 2d

507]; Kafka, supra, 191 Cal. at p. 752; Williams, supra,

150 Cal. at p. 628; Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell,

Inc. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 316, 326 [164 Cal.Rptr. 591];

Tracy, supra, 144 Cal.App.2d at p. 829; 3 Witkin, Cal.

Procedure (3d ed 1985] Actions, § 425, pp. 458-459; Rest.

2d Torts. § 930.) As the United States Supreme Court

noted in Dickinson, a case in which a landowner sued to

recover damages after the government flooded his land,

“Ti]f suit must be brought, lest he jeopardize his rights,

as soon as his land is invaded, other contingencies would

be running against him — for instance, the uncertainty of

the damage and the risk of res judicata against recovering

later for damage as yet uncertain. The source of the entire

claim... is not a single event; it is continuous.” (Dickin-

son, supra, 331 U.S. at p. 749 [91 L.Ed. at p. 1794].)

Another contingency running against the plaintiff is the

statute of limitations. In Spaulding we expressed concern

“Even solid structures have been considered nuisances where it

appeared that the structures couid have been removed. (Phillips,

supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 107 [city installed barrier blocking access to

plaintiff's property]; Kafka v. Bozio (1923) 191 Cal. 746, 751-752 [218

P. 753] [eneroaching structure pushing plaintiff's building out of

alignment]; Strong v. Sullivan (1919) 180 Cai. 331, 334 [181 P. 59]

[luneh stand erected daily obstructing plaintiff's property].)

A-10

that “if the initial injury is slight and plaintiff delays suit

until he has suffered substantial damage and the court

then determines that the nuisance was permanent, the

defendant may be able to raise the defense that the

statute of limitations ran from the time of the initial

injury, [Citation.] On the other hand, if the defendant is

willing and able to abate the nuisance, it is unfair to

award damages on the theory that it will continue [Cita-

tions.]” (Spaulding, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 268.) We then

emphasized that “[b]ecause of these difficulties, it has

been recognized that in doubtful cases the plaintiff should

have an election to treat the nuisance as either permanent

or not. [Citations.]” (Jbid.)

Defendant contends, however, that this is not a case to

which election applies because Spaulding separately cate-

gorized privileged activity

[39 Cal.3d 871]

nuisances as permanent. Defendants read too much into

the Spaulding opinion.

Although Spaulding contains language suggesting that

election is unavailable when the nuisance arises as a

result of privileged activity,” this isolated aspect of the

opinion must be viewed in context. First, the purported

'21n discussing the continuing/permanent distinction and the basis

of election, the court noted in passing: “The clearest case of a

permanent nuisance or trespass is the one where the offending

structure or condition is maintained as a necessary part of the

operations of a public utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of

indefinite duration and since the utility by making compensation is

entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only one action

should be allowed to recover for all the damages inflicted. It would be

unfair to the utility to subject it to suecessive suits and unfair to the

injured party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable

A-11

exclusion is dictum only. Spaulding did not involve a

question of privilege. In Spaulding, the defendant, a

private landowner, negligently maintained piles of dirt on

his property which caused mudslides on the plaintiff's

land when it rained. The trial court ordered the nuisance

abated but also awarded prospective damages for perma-

nent diminution in the value of plaintiff's property. Thus,

the issue was the necessity of election, not whether

privilege precluded such election.

Second, Spaulding’s election discussion is based, in

part, on Phillips, supra, 27 Cal.2d 104, a case involving

“privileged” governmental activity. In Phillips we held

that even assuming the city could not be required to

remove a road block obstructing access to Phillips’ prop-

erty, it could not be said as a matter of law that the gate

was a permanent nuisance since it apparently “could have

been removed at any time.” (/d., at p. 108.) It is difficult

to reconcile this case, affirmatively relied upon in Spauld-

ing, with an interpretation of the latter as absolutely

barring election when privileged activity is at issue. The

two opinions are more realisticaliy viewed as focusing the

election inquiry on the ability to abate rather than on the

possibility of a court order requiring abatement.

Third, publie policy militates against defining a nui-

sance as permanent or continuing on the basis of privilege

alone. As noted, the purpose of nuisance law is to provide

a means of recovery for harm suffered. The doctrine of

election is designed to facilitate just and equitable recov-

ery. Though the traditional remedy of injunctive relief

may be unavailable in a given case, the damage suffered is

no different than in a case involving identical but nonpriv-

ileged activity. Both victims are harmed in the same way,

damages at once. [Citation.]” (Spaulding, supra, 38 Cal.2d at pp.

267-268.)

A-12

and both may seek damages for such harm. Where the

nuisance is a continuing one, both victims, therefore,

should be able to bring successive actions as dam-

[39 Cal.3d 872]

ages accrue. To hoid that the statute of limitations applies

te one continuing nuisance but not the other is to put the

burden on the victim to choose his or her tortfeasor

wisely. Nuisance law neither requires nor supports such a

harsh result.

Moreover, we should be particularly cautious not to

enlarge the category of permanent nuisances beyond

those structures or conditions that truly are permanent.

Where some means of abatement exists, there is little or

no incentive to make remedial efforts once the nuisance is

classified as permanent. Such a result is at odds with tort

law’s philosophy of encouraging innovation and repair to

decrease future harm.

Finally, the privilege alluded to in Spaulding is quite

different from the privilege claimed in the present case.

In a word, the Spaulding privilege is absolute. Spaulding

referred to an “offending structure or condition [] main-

tained as a necessary part of the operations of a public

utility” as a clear permanent nuisance, “[s]ince the utility

by making compensation is entitled to continue them.” (Id.,

38 Cal.2d at p. 267.) (Italies added.)

We do not deal with such an extensive privilege. Fed-

eral preemption of local regulation of airport noise is not

absolute. In Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d 86, we

concluded that federal preemption does not operate to

wholly eliminate local responsibility for airport noise

control. We based this conclusion in part, on the distine-

tion drawn by the United States Supreme Court in City of

A-13

Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal (1973) 411 U.S. 624

[36 L.Ed.2d 547, 93 S.Ct. 1854], between a municipality’s

exercise of the police power and its proprietary efforts to

reduce airport noise. Federal law preempts only the

former. (/d., at pp. 635-636, fn. 14 [36 L.Ed.2d at pp. 554-

555]; Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 96. See

also San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco (9th Cir.

1981) 651 F.2d 1306, 1314, cert. den., 455 U.S. 1000 [71

L.Ed.2d 866, 102 S.Ct. 1631].) the message of City of

Burbank and Greater Westchester is clear: state law dam-

age remedies remain available against an airport proprie-

tor despite the fact that federal law precludes

interference with commercial flight patterns and

schedules.

Moreover, recovery is not limited to damages for per-

manent nuisance only. In Greater Westchester we affirmed

damage awards totalling $86,000 for personal injuries

sustained during the period 1967-1975 by persons living

near Los Angeles International Airport. (Jd., 26 Cal.3d at

p. 92.) Although we did not otherwise identify the nui-

sance as permanent or continuing, the time frame given

strongly suggests the latter.

[39 Cal.3d 873]

The airport operator’s separate duty to reduce noise,

and hence, separate nuisance liability, is particularly

compelling in the present case. Defendant is a public

entity charged with responsibility for the “acquisition,

operation, repair, maintenance, improvement and admin-

istration” of the airport as a public airport. (Gov. Code,

§ 6546.1.) Not only does defendant play a proprietary

role in the airport’s operations, but it is expressly re-

quired by statute to make all reasonable efforts to curb

noise pollution at the airport. “In operating the airport,

A-14

the separate publie entity ... shall not permit or author-

ize any activity in conjunction with the airport which

results in an increase in the size of the noise impact area

... and shall further comply with the future community

noise equivalent levels prescribed by [the California Ad-

ministrative Code]....[§] In addition, the entity shall

diligently pursue all reasonable avenues available to in-

sure that the adverse effects of noise are being mitigated

to the greatest extent reasonably possible.” (Jbid.) Thus,

despite the fact that the flights to and from the airport

are privileged, defendant shoulders an affirmative respon-

sibility to minimize noise levels through the use of buff-

ers, barriers or other noise reducing devices. The

privilege is not absolute.

Airport operations are the quintessential continuing

nuisance. Although federal law precluding interference in

any way with flight patterns and schedules adds an

element of permanency to an otherwise continuing prob-

lem, it does not mandate that the overall nuisance is a

permanent one. Thus plaintiffs may elect whether to treat

airport noise and vibrations as a continuing or as a

permanent nuisance.

Because plaintiffs elected to treat the airport as a

eontinuing nuisance, we conclude that the statute of

limitations does not bar their nuisance claims.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed as

to both causes of action.

Bird, C. J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., and Grodin, J.,

concurred.

MOSK, J., Coneurring and Dissenting. — I agree with

the majority that plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action

for inverse condemnation even though defendant lacks

the power of eminent domain.

A-15

I am compelled to dissent, however, from their discus-

sion and disposition of the nuisance cause of action. They

effectively ignore principles that have guided the courts

of this state and other jurisdictions in the task of classify-

ing nuisances, and thus err in concluding that plaintiffs’

claim is timely.

[39 Cal.3d 874]

Moreover, they potentially subject this airport to repeated

and vexatious litigation based on the same nuisance.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s activities became a

nuisance as of January 29, 1978 —the date defendant

became a public entity. If a nuisance is deemed “perma-

nent,” a plaintiff must — within the applicable statute of

limitations — sue for all past, present, and future dam-

ages in one action. If, by contrast, a nuisance is deemed

“continuing,” a plaintiff may sue only for damages suf-

fered before the action was filed, but he will not be barred

from pressing future claims so long as the nuisance

continues.

In Spaulding v. Cameron (1952) 38 Cal.2d 265 [239

P.2d 625], Justice Traynor prescribed the test for deter-

mining whether a nuisance is continuing or permanent,

and discussed the policy of the law: “In early decisions of

this court it was held that it should not be presumed that

a nuisance would continue, and damages were not allowed

for a decrease in market value caused by the existence of

the nuisance but were limited to the actual physical injury

suffered before the commencement of the action. [Cita-

tions.] The remedy for a continuing nuisance was either a

suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for damages

as new injuries occurred. Sitwations arose, however, where

injunctive relief was not appropriate or where successive

actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff or the defen-

A-16

dant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized that some types

of nuisances should be considered permanent, and in such

cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages were

allowed in one action.

“The clearest ease of a permanent nuisance or trespass

is the one where the offending structure or condition is

maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a

publie utility. Sinee such conditions are ordinarily of

indefinite duration and since the utility by making com-

pensation is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate

that only one action should be allowed to recover for all

the damages inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to

subject it to successive suits and unfair to the injured

party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable

damages at once.” (/d., at p. 267, italics added.)

Thus, if a use of property alleged to be a nuisance is

likely to continue indefinitely because its owner cannot be

compelled to abate, the nuisance is deemed permanent

and the plaintiff is given a single cause of action for his

damages past, present, and future. This test for classify-

ing nuisances as either continuing or permanent turns on

whether the nuisance is reasonably abatable. It is the rule

followed not only in this state (see, e.g., Kornoff v.

Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 265, 269-271

[288 P.2d 507];

[39 Cal.3d 875]

Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 267), but in

other jurisdictions as well (see, e.g., Maloney v. Heftler

Reaity Company (Fla.App. 1975) 316 So.2d 594, 595; City

of Columbus v. Myszka (1980) 246 Ga. 571, 572 [272

S.E.2d 302]; Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc. (Iowa 1972)

196 N.W.2d 557, 562; Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Company v.

Charles (Ky.App. 1974) 514 S.W.2d 659, 664; Goldstein v.

A-17

Potomac Elec. Power Co. (1979) 285 Md. 673, 688-690

[404 A.2d 1064]; Drybread v. City of St. Lowis (Mo.App.

1982) 634 S.W.2d 519, 520-521; Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drain-

age Dist. (Mo.App. 1980) 602 S.W.2d 787, 792-793; Sun-

dell v. Town of New London (1979) 119 N.H. 839 [409

A.2d 1315, 1320-1321]: Aguayo v. Village of Charma

(1969) 79 N.M. 729, 731 [449 P.2d 331]; Krueger v.

Mitchell (1983) 112 Wis.2d 88, 102-103 [332 N.W.2d

733]). It is also approved by commentators: “But if the

nuisance can not be abated, or is such that the court will

not enjoin its continuance, all damages must be obtained

in one action.” (1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts

(1956) § 1.30, p. 91.)

Under these principles, the nuisance alleged here must

be deemed permanent. First, injunctive relief is not sim-

ply inappropriate, it is unavailable. As this court observed

in Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los

Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86 [160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d

13291, certiorari denied, 449 U.S. 820 [66 L.Ed.2d 22, 101

S.Ct. 77], “commercial flights which are conducted in

strict compliance with federal regulations may not be

enjoined as nuisances, both because of the continuing

public interest in air transportation, and because of the

likelihood of direct conflict with federal law.” (Jd., at p.

94; see also Loma Portal Civic Cluw v. American Airlines,

Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 591 [39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d

548].) Second, successive actions are plainly undesirable.

As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held in

Krueger v. Mitchell, an airport noise case, “The injured

party must... present his...entire claim for past and

future damages in one action. This limitation on such a

damage action is necessary in order to protect airport

proprietors from repeated and vexatious litigation based

on the same nuisance.” (112 Wis.2d at p. 103.)

A-18

In some cases classification may be doubtful; in such

cases, the Spaulding court observed, a plaintiff should be

allowed to elect whether to treat the alleged nuisance as

continuing or permanent. (38 Cal.2d at p. 268.) Recogniz-

ing that their claim here would be barred by limitations if

the asserted nuisance is characterized as permanent,

plaintiffs insist this case is within the class defined in

Spaulding as “doubtful,” and hence that they may avoid

the limitations bar by treating the alleged nuisance as

continuing.

Spaulding allows such an election only if, inter alia,

“the defendant is noi privileged to continue the nui-

sance....” (Ibid.) As Greater West-

[39 Cal.3d 876]

chester establishes, defendant’s use of its property may

not be enjoined as a nuisance: there are no allegations

that defendant either is not subject to or has failed to

comply with federal regulations. (26 Cal.3d at p. 94.)

Thus, defendant is privileged to continue the nuisance

alleged here.’

Nor is defendant’s privilege to continue the alleged

nuisance diminished by its ability to adopt means within

its power to mitigate the allegedly offensive noise. Al-

though the federal government has apparently not pre-

empted all facets of noise control (Greater Westchester,

supra, 26 Cal.38d at pp. 93-100, and authorities cited;

Bennett, Airport Noise Litigation: Case Law Review

(1982) 47 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 464-469; Werlich &

'Since “privileged” in this context merely means not reasonably

abatable (see Spaulding, supra, 38 Cal.2d at pp. 267-268), the

majority’s claim to the contrary (ante, at pp. 870-872) is manifestly

specious.

a ee ee ee

at weet eee

A-19

Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement Contro-

versy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal

Liability Shuffle (1981) 15 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 69, 83-91;

Comment, The 1980 Airport Noise Act: Noise Abatement or

Just More Noise? (1981) 14 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 1049,

passim), it is clear that permissible local regulation may

be imposed only by airport proprietors, and not by third

parties. (See Bennett, supra, 47 J. Air L. & Com. at pp.

469-473, and cases cited.) Thus in City of Burbank v.

Lockheed Air Terminal (1973) 411 U.S. 624 [36 L.Ed.2d

547, 93 S.Ct. 1854], the United States Supreme Court

invalidated a municipal ordinance that purported to regu-

late noise by imposing a take-off curfew on a privately

owned airport. City of Burbank plainly establishes that

the delicate federal/local-proprietor noise control scheme

currently in effect will not tolerate private suits seeking

mandatory imposition of local noise controls. (Cf. San

Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco (9th Cir. 1981) 651

F.2d 1306, 1316-1319, cert. den. (1982) 455 U.S. 1000 [71

L.Ed.2d 866, 102 S.Ct. 1631] [state may not direct an

airport proprietor to exercise its noise abatement

power ].)

Thus, plaintiffs may not elect to treat the alleged

nuisance as continuing: defendant is privileged to con-

tinue the nuisance and it must therefore be classified as

permanent. (See Krueger v. Mitchell, supra, 112 Wis.2d at

pp. 102-103 [injunctive relief against airport noise un-

available; plaintiff may claim damages for permanent

nuisance only].)”

aa =

*Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920 [161 Cal.Rptr.

568, 496 P.2d 480], does not support a contrary conclusion. In Nestle

we held, inter alia, that a nuisance action based on airport noise was

improperly dismissed on the basis of government immunity, and

suggested that the plaintiffs on remand might be able to demonstrate

A-20

[39 Cal.3d 877]

Claims against publie entities alleging injuries to per-

sons or personal property must be brought by the 100th

day after the accrual of the eause of action; all other

claims — including those for real property dam-

age — must be brought within 1 year after accrual of the

cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) As plaintiffs implie-

itly admit, their nuisance cause of action accrued when

the publie entity undertook operations on January 29,

1978; from that date, plaintiffs claim, defendant’s opera-

tions have “substantially interfered” with the use and

enjoyment of their properties. Because the limitations

period began to run at that time, it is clear that plaintiffs’

1982 complaint is untimely.

I would accordingly affirm the order dismissing the

nuisance cause of action.

Lueas, J., concurred.

a continuing nuisance. This dictum, of course, preceded the United

States Supreme Court’s noise control preemption decision in City of

Burbank (1973) supra, 411 U.S. 624; moreover, the court was not

asked to consider Spaulding’s first requirement for election: a nui-

sance may not be treated as continuing if the defendant is privileged

to continue it.

et Bee

A-21

APPENDIX B

Opinion Of California Court Of Appeal Below

(unofficial report)

AMERIAN, Associate Justice.

BACKGROUND

This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered

on April 5, 1983, following the sustaining of a demurrer

by respondent Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Au-

thority (hereinafter respondent) to appellants’ first

amended complaint for inverse condemnation and

nuisance.

Appellants are homeowners who reside adjacent to the

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport (hereinafter Air-

port). On June 10, 1982, appellants filed a suit for inverse

condemnation and nuisance based on damage t» persons

and property caused by excessive noise, smoke and vibra-

tions from flight patterns to and from the Airport and

over appellants’ homes. Respondent and the sities of

Glendale, Burbank and Pasadena were named as

defendants.

The first cause of action of the vomplaint is for inverse

condemnation “for the taking of an easement” over appel-

lants’ properties. The cause of action alleges that respon-

dent, “on January 29, 1978, authorized jet take-offs and

landings from [Airport]. The activities ...subject [ap-

pellants’] properties to noise, smoke and vibration, which

constituted a taking on or about January 29, 1978.” it is

further alleged that “said flights over [appellants’]...

properties have continued to the date of [the] complaint”

and that the flights ‘take place at all hours of the day and

A-22

night.”” The cause of action alleges that the “flights cause

substantial interference with the use and peaceful enjoy-

ment” of appellants’ properties and that the “flights,

which constitute a taking, commenced on January 29,

1978.”

It is alleged that the “easement for noise, smoke and

vibration over [appellants’] properties was taken for a

publie use.” The cause of action alleges that appellants

are “claiming compensation for... damages and taking of

an easement, physical injuries to the real properties, and

severance damages in the amounts of their claim...”

It is further alleged that the easement taken by respon-

dent is “an air easement...taken in the airspace above

the surface of the properties. The air easement is for

‘excessive noise, vibration discomfort, or interference

with the use and enjoyment of real property located

adjacent to or in the vicinity of an airspace and...

reduction in the market value of real property by reason

thereof...through the operation of aircraft to and from

the airport,’ as those terms are used in California Code of

Civil Procedure § 1239.3.'”

The second cause of action is for nuisance. The allega-

tions of that cause of action are, in essence, that as a

result of the flight patterns authorized by respondent,

appellants “suffered interference to the senses, hearing

and health [from the] noise and vibrations from [air-

port].” It is alleged that each appellant “suffered per-

sonal injury, in the amount of $100,000.00” and that the

'Code of Civil Procedure section 1239.3 was repealed by Statutes

1975, chapter 1275, section 1, page 3409, operative July 1, 1976. The

comment by the Law Revision Commission states, “The substance of

Section 1239.3 is continued in Publie Utilities Code section 21652.”

oe

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A-23

“personal injury is for the period from one hundred days

prior to the filing of the claim to the date of the trial.’”

On September 24, 1982, a demurrer filed by defendant

cities was sustained without leave to amend. A judgment

of dismissal was entered as to those defendants on Octo-

ber 5, 1982, and they are not parties to this appeal.

The basis of defendant cities’ demurrer to the com-

plaint was that, as a matter of law, only respondent would

be liable for any damages. Pursuant to Government Code

section 6500 et seq.,° defendant cities executed a “joint

exercise of powers agreement” whereby respondent was

ereated for purposes of acquiring and operating the then

named Hollywood-Burbank Airport. (Presently the Air-

port is named the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport).

Pursuant to this agreement, dated June 14, 1977, respon-

dent was to become the owner and operator of the Airport

and, as authorized by section 6508.1, respondent was

“ereated [as] a public entity, separate and apart from the

Parties hereto... The debts, liabilities and obligations of

the Authority [respondent] do not constitute debts, lia-

bilities or obligations of the Parties.”’

On October 19, 1982, the complaint was amended by

adding the names of Micheel A. Rotella and John and

"Copies of the claim submitted to respondent and defendant cities

of Glendale, Burbank and Pasadena (hereinafter defendant cities)

for personal injuries and property damage caused by flight patterns

authorized by respondent over appellants’ homes were attached as

exhibits to the complaint. The claim for appellants, excluding Mr.

Rotella and Mr. and Mrs. Rocke, shows that it was received by

defendant cities and respondent on February 23, 1982. The joint

claim of Rotella and the Rockes is marked as received on June 16,

1982.

3All references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise

indicated.

A-24

Allison Rocke as plaintiffs to the complaint. A copy of the

claim for damages which had been submitted to respon-

dent and defendant cities by Mr. Rotella and Mr. and

Mrs. Rocke was also added as an exhibit to the complaint.

A demurrer to the amended complaint was filed by re-

spondent on November 18, 1982.

On April 5, 1983, the trial court issued an order

sustaining the demurrer of respondent to the first

amended complaint without leave to amend. The order

and judgment of dismissal which followed were based

upon the following rulings:

“(1) The First Cause of Action (inverse condemna-

tion) of the First Amended Complaint fails to state facts

sufficient to constitute a cause of action;

‘“*(2) The Second Cause of Action of the First Amended

Complaint seeks damages for the maintenance of a nui-

sanee. The proper legal test for determining whether the

airport is a permanent nuisance is whether the nuisance is

subject to judicial, as opposed to voluntary, abatement.

As an airport serving the public, the [Airport] is not

subject to judicial abatement. Therefore, if the airport is a

nuisance, it is a permanent nuisance and plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to con-

stitute a cause of action and is barred by the provisions of

California Government Code Section 911.2 and by the

California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 338(2) and

340.

“The Court further finds that there is no reasonable

possibility that plaintiffs can amend their First Amended

Complaint to state any cause of action entitling plaintiffs

to any relief against the defendant and that defendant’s

demurrer to plaintiff's First Amended Complaint should

therefore be sustained without leave to amend... .”

td el I a

Pete

A-25

ISSUES

The following issues are raised in the instant appeal:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the de-

murrer to the first cause of action for inverse condemna-

tion on grounds that a cause of action for inverse

condemnation could not be stated because respondent is

not authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to

acquire air easements over appellants’ properties; (2)

Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer

to the second cause of action for nuisance on grounds that

if the Airport is a nuisance it must be deemed a perma-

nent nuisance and the cause of action for nuisance was,

therefore, barred by the applicable statute of limitations

as untimely.

For reasons discussed below, we conciude that the trial

court properly sustained the demurrer to the first cause

of action for inverse condemnation because respondent is

not statutorily authorized to exercise the power of emi-

nent domain. We do, however, conclude that the demurrer

to the second cause of action was improperly sustained

because appellants may, and have elected to, treat the

alleged nuisance as continuous and this cause of action,

therefore, is not untimely.

DISCUSSION

Inverse Condemnation

[1] On this appeal we must first resolve the issue

whether an action for inverse condemnation may be main-

tained against a publie entity only where that public

entity has the capacity to exercise the power of eminent

domain. Respondent’s demurrer to the cause of action for

inverse condemnation was based solely on grounds that a

eause of action for inverse condemnation cannot be stated

A-26

against it because it is not authorized by statute to

condemn avigation easements. Respondent forwards the

same argument here. In support of this argument respon-

dent relies upon various provisions of the Code of Civil

Procedure, the Government Code and the Publie Utilities

Code. On the basis of the code provisions cited by respon-

dent it is argued that since respondent cannot acquire the

subject air easements through the power of eminent

domain and since existence of the power to exercise

eminent domain is necessary to maintain an action for

inverse condemnation, the trial court properly sustained

its demurrer to appellants’ cause of action for inverse

condemnation.

We conclude that respondent properly contends that an

action for inverse condemnation may be maintained

against it only if it could have taken the air easements at

issue through the exercise of the power of eminent do-

main. We are also persuaded by respondent’s argument

that it does not have the power to exercise eminent

domain because it is not authorized by law to take the air

easements at issue here.*

The most recent decision by this state’s Supreme Court

concerning eminent domain is found in City of Oakland ».

Oakland Raiders (1982) 32 Cal.3d 60, 183 Cal.Rptr. 673,

‘It is worthy of note that this is not a case where the power to take

the air easements under eminent domain is under direct review.

Respondent has not initiated formal eminent domain proceedings

with respect to the air easements at issue. The issue whether respon-

dent has the power of eminent domain has arisen only because

respondent has asserted that it does not have such power as an

absolute defense to the action in inverse condemnation. It is in this

context that we are called upon to consider the legal concepts of

eminent domain and inverse condemnation as well as their

interrelationship.

A-27

646 P.2d 835. In that case, the court reiterated the

established rule that “ ‘The power of eminent domain is

an inherent attribute of sovereignty.’ (County of San

Mateo v. Coburn (1900) 130 Cal. 631, 634 [63 P. 78];

accord City of Anaheim v. Michel (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d

835, 837 [66 Cal.Rptr. 543]; Anaheim Union High Sch.

Dist. v. Vieira (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 169, 171 [51

Cal.Rptr. 94].) This sovereign power has been described

as ‘universally’ recognized and ‘necessary to the very

existence of government.’ (1 Nichols on Eminent Domain

(3d ed. 1980) §$§ 1.11, 1.14[2], pp. 1-10, 1-22.) When

properly exercised, that power affords an orderly compro-

mise between the public good and the protection and

indemnification of private citizens whose property is

taken to advance that good. That protection is constitu-

tionally ordained by the Fifth Amendment to the United ©

States Constitution, which is made applicable to the

states by nature of the Fourteenth Amendment (Chicago,

Burlington Sc. R’d. v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 233-

241 [17 S.Ct. 581, 583-586, 41 L.Ed.2d 979]) and by

article I, section 19 of the California Constitution. [{]

Because the power to condemn is an inherent attribute of

general government, we have observed that ‘constitutional

provisions merely place limitations upon its exercise.’

(People v. Chevalier (1959) 5Z Cal.2d 299, 304 [340 P.2d

598].) The two constitutional restraints are that the

taking be for a ‘public use’ and that ‘just compensation’

be paid therefor. (Ibid.; City of Anaheim, supra, 259

Cal.App.2d at p. 837 [66 Cal.Rptr. 543].)...” (City of

Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, supra, at p. 64, 183 Cal.Rptr.

673, 646 P.2d 835.)

In addition to eminent domain proceedings, the other

procedural device for ensuring the constitutional pro-

scription that “private property will not be taken or

damaged for public use without just compensation” is

A-28

inverse condemnation. The principal distinetion between

the two procedures is that in eminent domain proceed-

ings, the publie authority takes the initiative, whereas in

inverse condemnation proceedings it is the property

owner who initiates litigation. (See Klopping v. City of

Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 43, 104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d

1345; Selby Realty Co. v. City ef San Buenaventura (1973)

10 Cal.3d 110, 119, 109 Cal.Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111;

Cothran v. San Jose Water Works (1962) 58 Cal.2d 608, 25

Cal.Rptr. 569, 375 P.2d 449; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax

(1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357.)

We have discovered no California cases which specifi-

eally deal with the question whether actions in inverse

condemnation may be maintained only against public

authorities who could have first, but did not, initiate

formal eminent domain proceedings. However, cases and

commentators do suggest that it is only upon this princi-

ple that actions or proceedings in inverse condemnation

may be brought.

In United States v. Clarke (1980) 445 U.S. 253, 100

S.Ct. 1127, 63 L.Ed.2d 373, the Supreme Court deter-

mined that Title 25 of the United States Code, section

357, which provides that “lands allotted in severalty to

Indians may be condemned for any public purpose under

the laws of the State or Territory” (at p. 254, 100 S.Ct. at

1128) did not authorize a state or local government to

“eondemn” allotted Indian trust lands by physical oecu-

pation. The court, therefore, concluded that an action in

inverse condemnation could not be maintained. The court

observed that the public entities there involved had never

instituted formal action to condemn the land in question.

The court expressly rejected the Ninth Cireuit Court of

Appeals holding that section 357 of Title 25 of the United

States Code permitted acquisition of allotted lands by

A-29

inverse condemnation after also rejecting the Court of

Appeals reasoning that “ ‘once the taking has been accom-

plished . .. it serves little purpose to interpret the statute

to refuse to permit an inverse condemnation suit to be

maintained on the groun[d] that the state should have

filed an eminent domain action prior to the taking.’ ” (At

p. 255, 100 S.Ct. at 1129.)

The Supreme Court discussed, at length, the nature of

eminent domain and inverse condemnation proceedings.

The court wrote, “[t]he phrase ‘inverse condemnation’

appears to be one that was coined simply as a shorthand

description of the manner in which a landowner recovers

just compensation for a taking of his property when

condemnation proceedings have not been instituted. As

defined by one land use planning expert, ‘[i]nverse con-

demnation is “a cause of action against a governmental

defendant to recover the value of property which has been

taken in facet by the government defendant, even though

no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has

been attempted by the taking agency.”’ D. Hagman,

Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law 328

(1971) (emphasis [omitted]). A landowner is entitled to

bring such an action as a result of ‘the self-executing

eharacter of the constitutional provision with respect to

compensation....’ See 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain

§ 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972). A condemnation proceeding,

by contrast, typically involves an action by the condemnor

to effect a taking and acquire title. The phrase ‘inverse

condemnation, as a common understanding of that

phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is

the ‘inverse’ or ‘reverse’ of a condemnation proceeding.

[¥] There also are important practical differences be-

tween condemnation proceedings and actions by landown-

ers to recover compensation for ‘inverse condemnation.’

Condemnation proceedings, depending on the applicable

A-30

statute, require various affirmative action on the part of

the condemning authority. To accomplish a taking by

seizure, on the other hand, a condemning authority need

only occupy the land in question. Such a taking thus

shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the en-

croachment and to take affirmative action to recover just

compensation. ...” (At p. 257, 100 S.Ct. at 1130.)

The court concluded by holding that the language of

section 357, authorizing condemnation of lands, referred

“not to an action by a landowner to recover compensation

for a taking, but to a formal condemnation proceeding

instituted by the condemning authority.” (United States v.

Clarke, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 258, 100 S.Ct. at 1131.)

This case does suggest that an action in inverse con-

demnation against a public authority may be instituted

only if the publie authority was authorized to condemn

the property or property interest in question in the first

place through exercising the power of eminent domain.

(See also, Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 258, fn.

2, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2140, fn. 2, 65 L.Ed.2d 106).

In Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659,

39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719, an inverse condemnation

case, the court was called upon to determine “whether a

property owner who loses the use of the next intersecting

street which affords him access to the general system of

publie streets should be compensated.” (At p. 661, 2

Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719.) The court heid that the

property owner's complaint for inverse condemnation

withstood general demurrers because it alleged, inter

alia, that the closing of the street crossing in question

substantially impaired the property owner’s right of aec-

eess to the street. One of the contentions raised by the

railroad was that it was not a proper party defendant to

the action. This contention was rejected by the court

ee t«S™

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A-31

which wrote, “defendant railroad was an active joint

participant in closing the crossing....” (At p. 662, 39

Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719.) The court arrived at this

conclusion after taking judicial notice that a public utili- —

ties commission decision authorized the City of Los Ange-

les to close the street crossing in issue. It is apparent that

the city, in turn, authorized the defendant railroad to

participate in closing the street crossing. Implicit in the

court’s determination that the railroad was a proper party

defendant in the inverse condemnation action was that it

was a proper party defendant only by virtue of the

authorization for it to participate in closing the street

crossing.

Commentators also recognize that existence of the

power of eminent domain is a prerequisite to liability in

inverse condemnation proceedings instituted by private

property owners. One commentator has observed that “an

airport approach height restriction would, apparently,

require payment of compensation if invoked to limit

development of property located adjacent to a publicly

operated airport, but not if applied to like property on the

periphery of a privately owned and operated airport.”

(Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A

Legislative Prospectus, 8 Santa Clara Lawyer 1, 22.)

Another commentator expressly observed that, “[t]he

remedy of inverse condemnation, by the very premise

which gives rise to it, is available only as against defend-

ants who possess the power of eminent domain.” (3 P.

Nichols, Eminent Domaia § 8.1[4] 8-39 {1981).]°

°22A West, Words and Phrases (1958), p. 231, provides that,

“inverse or reverse condemnation contemplates a situation in which

property has been taken by the exercise of the power of eminent

domain, but without any payment of compensation therefor having

been made.”

Oo

A-32

We conclude, then, that respondent correctly urges

that an action in inverse condemnation may only be

maintained agaiust a party in whom the power of eminent

domain is vested.

{[2, 3] We turn now to the question of whether respon-

dent has the power to exercise eminent domain for pur-

poses of acquiring the air easements involved in the case

at bar. The general rule with respect to public entities

such as respondent is that such public entities have “*..

no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it

only when expressly authorized by law. [Citation.]’”

(City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, supra, 32 Cal.3d 60,

64, 183 Cal.Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d 835.) We are thus obliged

to examine the statutes pertinent to the case before us.°

[4] Both parties to this appeal refer us to section

6546.1 and Publie Utilities Code section 21652. Section

6546.1, contained in article 2 entitled, “Power to Issue

Revenue Bonds,” provides:

“In the County of Los Angeles, any agency, commis-

sion, or board provided for by joint powers agreement

entered into by cities pursuant to Article 1 (commencing

with Section 6500) of this chapter for the purpose of the

*Appellants have extensively argued that statutory authority for

exercising the power of eminent domain is not required because of the

“self-executing” nature of the California and United States Constitu-

tions. This is an incorrect interpretation of the concept that the

proseription against taking private property for public use without

just compensation is self-executing. The self-executing nature of

article I, section 19 of the California Constitution and the 5th

Amendment of the United States Constitution refers only to the

remedy, not to the theory of recovery. (See United States v. Clarke,

supra, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130, 63 L.Ed.2d 373; City of

Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, supra, 32 Cal.3d 60, 64, 183 Cal.Rptr.

673, 646 P.2d 835.)

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A-33

acquisition, operation, repair, maintenance, improvement

and administration of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport as

a public airport, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of

1958, as amended, may carry out such purpose and may

authorize the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to this

article, to pay for acquiring, repairing, improving, finane-

ing and refinancing such project including all facilities

and improvements and all expenses incidental thereto or

connected therewith. Property tax revenues accruing to,

levied by, or collected by any local agency which is a party

to such a joint powers agreement shall not be used to

redeem such revenue bonds unless an ordinance authoriz-

ing the use of such property tax revenues for such pur-

poses is approved by a majority vote of the electors of the

local agency voting on the issue. In operating the airport,

the separate public entity above mentioned shall not

permit or authorize any activity in conjunction with the

airport which results in an inerease in the size of the noise

impact area based on a community noise equivalent level

of 70 decibels as established pursuant to Title 21, Califor-

nia Administrative Code, Chapter 2.5, Subchapter 6, and

shall further comply with the future community noise

equivalent levels prescribed by such title as it now exists

or is hereafter amended.

“The separate public entity shall implement the noise

monitoring requirements set forth in Title 21, California

Administrative Code, Chapter 2.5, Subchapter 6. In addi-

tion, the entity shall diligently pursue all reasonable

avenues available to insure that the adverse effects of

noise are being mitigated to the greatest extent reason-

ably possible.

“The separate public entity shall not authorize or per-

mit the lengthening of runways defined herein as the

paved portions of the runways presently on airport prop-

A-34

erty, or the purehase of fee title to condemned real

property zoned for residential use as of the effective date

of this statute.

“The power to issue revenue bonds under this section

shall be of no further force and effect after December 31,

1980, unless (1) the entity shall have initially issued

revenue bonds on or prior to December 31, 1980, or (2)

the entity is unable to initially issue revenue bonds to |

accomplish the purpose of this section by reason of

litigation, in which case the power to initially issue reve-

nue bonds under this section shall continue to be effective

until the final determination of such litigation and for one

year thereafter. If the entity shall have initially issued

revenue bonds within either of the time periods permitted

by the prior sentence of this paragraph, the power to issue

revenue bonds under this section shall continue so long as

this section shall be in effect.”

Publie Utilities Code section 21652 provides:

“(a) Any person authorized to exercise the power of

eminent domain for airport purposes may acquire by

purchase, gift, devise,.lease, condemnation, or otherwise:

(1) Any property necessary to permit the safe and

efficient operation of the airport, or to permit the removal,

elimination, obstruction-marking, or obstruction-lighting

of airport hazards, or to prevent the establishment of

airport hazards.

(2) Airspace or an easement in such airspace above

the surface of property where necessary to permit imposi-

tion upon such property of excessive noise, vibration,

discomfort, inconvenience, interference with use and en-

joyment, and any consequent reduction in market value,

due to the operation of aireraft to and from the airport.

A-35

(3) Remainder property underlying property taken

pursuant to paragraph (2), where permitted by Section

1240.410 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

“(b) As used in this section, ‘property’ includes real

and personal property and any right or interest therein,

whether within, beyond, adjacent to, or in the vicinity of,

the boundaries of an airport or airport site, and, by way of

illustration and not by way of limitation, includes air

rights, airspace, air easements, and easements in airport

hazards.”

Appellants urge that while section 6546.1 prohibits

respondent from acquiring “fee title to condemned real

property,” Public Utilities Code section 21652, neverthe-

less, authorizes respondent to acquire fee title to air

easements over their private property by exercising the

power of eminent domain. Respondent, on the other hand,

argues that the plain language of section 6546.1 prohibits

it from aequiring, through condemnation, fee title to air

easements as well.

We conclude that neither section 6546.1 nor Public

Utilities Code section 21652 authorizes respondent to

exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the air

easements at issue here. Our conclusion rests upon con-

sideration of the legislative history and intent surround-

ing the amendment to section 6546.1, in 1978.

The legislative history of section 6546.1 shows that the

third paragraph of this section which prohibits respon-

dent from purchasing “fee title to condemned real prop-

erty zoned for residential use” was added by amendment

in 1978. (Stats. 1978, ch. 62, § 1.) Another provision was

added to section 6546.1 by the 1978 amendment. That

provision extended respondent's power to issue revenue

bonds necessary to continued operation of the Airport.

A-36

Section 2 of Statutes 1978, chapter 62 provides:

“This act is an urgency statute necessary for the

immediate preservation of the public peace, health or

safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitu-

tion and shall go into effect immediately. The facts

constituting such necessity are:

“The present owner-operator of the Hollywood-Bur-

bank Airport currently plans to cease operation of said

airport. Because no private person is presently willing

and abie to acquire and operate said airport, the sub-

stantial use thereof by the public will cease unless said

airport is acquired and operated by a public entity.

Because the principal service area of the airport con-

sists of more than one city in the County of Los

Angeles but not the entire county, a joint powers entity

established by the cities in said county which are

located in said principal service area will best serve the

interests of the publie using the airport. Because this

act will empower such a public entity to acquire, oper-

ate, repair, maintain, improve and administer said air-

port, it is necessary that this act take effect

immediately in order to prevent interruption in or

termination of public use of the Hollywood-Burbank

Airport.”

Further enlightenment as to the legislative intent in

promulgating the 1978 amendment of section 6546.1 is

found in the summary digest for laws enacted in 1978.

There, it is stated that:

“Existing law provides that in the County of Los

Angeles, any agency, commission or board established

pursuant to the exercise of the joint powers agreement

entered into by cities for the purpose of maintaining the

Hollywood-Burbank Airport as a public airport, is author-

ih es ne Se TI i VAN Ne lm a le

we tl

A-37

ized to issue revenue bonds. The power to issue such

bonds terminates as of December 31, 1980. [{] This bill

would extend the power to issue revenue bonds as long as

the provision continues to be in effect if the entity has

initially issued such bonds on or prior to December 31,

1980. The requirement of initial issuance of such bonds

would be extended in the event issuance of bonds is

prevented by litigation. [{] This bill would take effect

immediately as an urgency statute.” (1978 Summary

Digest, ch. 62, p. 17.)

From this seant legislative history, several conclusions

respecting the promulgating intent of the 1978 amend-

ment of section 6546.1 may be drawn. First, and most

significant in our view, is that the primary purpose of the

amendment was to effectuate uninterrupted public use of

the Airport by extending respondent’s power to issue

revenue bonds under certain conditions. Second, since the

history is conspicuously silent as to the intent which

motivated addition of the third paragraph of section

6546.1, that paragraph cannot be reasonably construed as

evidence of a legislative intent to grant respondent the

power of eminent domain. Third, this paragraph notwith-

standing, section 6546.1, cannot be construed as granting

to respondent the power of eminent domain as this sec-

tion primarily relates to the means by which respondent

ean generate funds to operate and maintain the Airport,

i.e., through issuance of revenue bonds.

Contrary to what appellants contend, Publie Utilities

Code section 21652 does not authorize respondent to take

by condemnation the air easements in issue here. While

that section recognizes that air easements may be ac-

quired by condemnation “where necessary to permit im-

position...of excessive noise, vibration...due to the

operation of aireraft to and from the airport”

A-38

(Pub.Util.Code § 21652, subd. (a)(2)), the seetion also

specifies that only persons “authorized to exereise the

power of eminent domain” may acquire such air ease-

ments (Pub.Util.Code, § 21652, subd. (a), emphasis

added). This section, therefore, cannot be construed as

granting to respondent the power of eminent domain to

take the subject air easements.

We conclude, therefore, that respondent does not have

statutory power to take the air easements in issue here by

exercising the power of eminent domain. Consequently,

since authority to exercisé the power of eminent domain is

a prerequisite to maintaining an action in inverse condem-

nation, the trial court properly sustained respondent’s

demurrer without leave to amend upon those grounds.

Nuisance

The demurrer to appellants’ cause of action for nui-

sanece was sustained without leave to amend on grounds

that a permanent nuisance is not subject to “judicial

abatement” and that “if the airport is a nuisance, it is a

permanent nuisance.” Upon these grounds, the court

found that the cause of action for nuisance failed to state

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and was

barred by section 911.2 and Code of Civil Procedure

sections 338, subdivision (2) and 340, as untimely.

Appellants contend that the demurrer to the nuisance

eause of action was improperly sustained because the

nuisance complained of can be abated, is continuous in

nature, and is not, therefore, barred by the applicable

sta*’2 of limitations. At argument, counsel for respon-

dent conceded that if appellants overcame the statute of

limitations problem, a cause of action for damages had

been pled. Accordingly, we restrict our discussion to the

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A-39

question of whether the nuisance is permanent or

continuous.

We hold that the order sustaining the demurrer to the

eause of action for nuisance was erroneous, but upon

slightly different grounds than urged by appellants. Our

discussion begins with the relevant sections of the Civil

Code.

Section 3479 of the Civil Code provides: “Anything

which is injurious to Health, ... or offensive to the senses,

...80 as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of

life or property,...is a nuisance.” The Civil Code also

distinguishes nuisances as either public or private. A

publie nuisance is defined by Civil Code section 3480 as

“...one which affects at the same time an entire commu-

nity or neighborhood, or any considerable number of

persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage

inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” A private

nuisance is defined in Civil Code section 3481 as “[e]very

nuisance not included in the definition of the last section.

9

[5,6] The seeond cause of action for nuisance seeks

damages for personal injuries caused by noise and vibra-

tions and purports to be a cause of action for private

nuisanee. (Cf. Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116, 122-124, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350.) As

observed in the latter case, the significant difference

between a private and publie nuisance is that the former

“is a civil wrong based on disturbance of rights in land”

whereas the latter “is not dependent upon a disturbance

of rights in land but upon an interference with the rights

of the -ommunity at large.” (Jd., at p. 124, 99 Cal.Rptr.

350.) Here, the allegations of the second cause of action

for nuisance incorporate most of the allegations of the

first cause of action for inverse condemnation, which

A-40

inelude, inter alia, the allegation that jet flights over

appellants’ real properties ‘cause a substantial interfer-

ence with the use and peaceful enjoyment of [appellants’ |

real properties.” Appellants, as owners and residents of

the real property over which flights to and from the

Airport are made, have thus adequately alleged interfer-

ence with a property right upon which to predicate a claim

for damages for personal injury arising from private

nuisance.

[7] With respect to private nuisances, Civil Code

section 3501 provides that either a civil action (for dam-

ages) or abatement are available remedies. Appellants

have not sought abatement of the nuisance but have

elected to sue for damages for personal injuries allegedly

suffered as a consequence of the activities authorized by

respondent.’

[8] It is well-established in this state that owners or

operators of public airports are liable upon a nuisance

theory (public or private) for personal injuries and prop-

erty damage sustained by persons living in areas adjacent

to the airports caused by noise and vibrations from

aircraft using the facilities. (Greater Westchester Home-

owners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86,

160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329; Nestle v. City of Santa

Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d

480.) Cognizant of this, the question is thus whether the

nuisance complained of in the second cause of action is

permanent or continuous for purposes of determining

whether the statute of limitations bars the cause of action

for nuisance.

"In this state a party injured by maintenance of a nuisance need

not seek abatement thereof, but may sue for damages. (Mclvor v.

Mercer-Fraser Co. (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 247, 254, 172 P.2d 758.)

A-41

[9] There is no apparent dispute by appellants or

respondent over the applicable statute of limitations if

the nuisance is deemed permanent. Under the joint exer-

eise of powers agreement executed by defendant cities,

respondent was created as a separate public entity. As

such, the provisions of the Tort Claims Act (§ 800 et seq.)

are applicable. Specifically, appellants were required to

file a claim with respondent for their personal injuries as

a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit for damages

against respondent.

Section 911.2 provides: “A claim relating to a cause of

action...for injury to person...shall be presented...

not later than the 100th day after the accrual of the cause

of action... .’’ Section 901 provides, in part: “[T]he date

of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates

is the date upon which the cause of action would be

deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute

of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there

were no requirement that a claim be presented to and

acted upon by the public entity before an action could be

commenced thereon.”

The applicable statute of limitations for the alleged

personal injuries caused by aircraft noise and vibrations

as alleged in appellants’ second cause of action is one

year. (Code Civ.Proe., § 340.) Here, appellants instituted

the instant lawsuit within six months after their claims

were submitted to and denied by respondent (see

§ 911.2), and within one year of the period for which

appellants seek damages for their personal injuries.

Respondent, however, persuaded the trial court that

the nuisance complained of was required to be character-

ized as a permanent nuisance because the airport, itself,

eould not be abated.

fms ae

A-42

{10} Where a nuisance is considered permanent, the

limitations period runs from the time the nuisance is

created. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena (1945) 27 Cal.2d

104, 107, 162 P.2d 625.) “On thé other hand, if the

nuisance may be discontinued at any time it is considered

continuing in character. [Citations.] Every repetition of a

continuing nuisance is a separate wrong for which the

person injured may bring successive actions for damages

until the nuisance is abated, even though an action based

on the original wrong may be barred.” (/d., at pp. 107-

108, 162 P.2d 625.)

[11] Respondent argues that the sole test for deter-

mining whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing

depends upon whether the nuisance can be eliminated or

abated, or whether it is likely to continue indefinitely. In

support of these arguments, respondent relies primarily

upon Spaulding v. Cameron (1952) 38 Cal.2d 265, 239

P.2d 625, and Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co. (1955)

45 Cal.2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 and Code of Civil Procedure

section 73la.” Close scrutiny of these cases, however,

shows that even where a nuisance may not or need not be

“Code of Civil Procedure section 73la provides: “Whenever any

city, city and county, or county shall have established zones or

districts under authority of law wherein certain manufacturing or

commercial or airport uses are expressly permitted, except in an

action to abate a public nuisance brought in the name of the people of

the State of California, no person or persons, firm or corporation

shall be enjoined or restrained by the injunctive process from the

reasonable and necessary operation in any such industrial or com-

mercial zone or airport of any use expressly permitted therein, nor

shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evidence of the employ-

ment of unnecessary and injurious methods of operation. Nothing in

this act shall be deemed to apply to the regulation and working hours

of canneries, fertilizing plants, refineries and other similar establish-

ments whose operation produce offensive odors.”

A-43

abated (Code Civ.Proc., § 73la), appellants may, never-

theless, elect to treat that nuisance as continuing.

Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Cal.2d 265, 239 P.2d

625, involved an action for damages and for injunctive

relief brought by a homeowner whose property was sub-

| jected to damages from mud caused by the defendant’s

negligence in constructing a fill during leveling opera-

tions conducted by the defendant on his property located

near plaintiff's land. Plaintiff was awarded past and

future damages as well as injunctive relief in the form of

an order that defendant remove the fill or take protective

measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs prop-

erty. The Supreme Court reversed, in part, the trial

eourt’s judgment because the award of future damages

and the injunction to abate the nuisance were mutually

exclusive remedies and plaintiff was not entitled, there-

fore, to double recovery. The Supreme Court observed

that since there was evidence to support both remedies

(anticipated damages and the injunction), it could not be

said as a matter of law that the nuisance could or could

not be abated. The cause was remanded to the trial court

for a determination whether or not the nuisance was

permanent. The judgment for past and present damages

was affirmed.

Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., swpra, 45 Cal.2d

265, 288 P.2d 507, involved an action by homeowners

living adjacent to a cotton gin for damages (past, present

and future) for nuisance caused by the noxious odors,

fumes, dust and lint created by the cotton gin during its

operations. The evidence showed that the cotton gin was

operational for only six months out of each year. The

court observed at the outset of its opinion that “the

parties apparently treated the trespass as permanent

because of its recurrent character, rather than as a con-

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A-44

tinuous trespass.” (/d., at p. 268, 288 P.2d 507.) The

issue whether plaintiffs could recover future damages was

discussed in light of Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38

Cal.2d 265, 239 P.2d 625, and revolved around the ques-

tion of whether the nuisance created by the cotton gin

should be characterized as continuing or permanent. The

court quoted from Spaulding as follows:

“The remedy for a continuing nuisance was either a

suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for damages

as new injuries occurred. Situations arose, however,

where injunctive relief was not appropriate or where

successive actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff

or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized

that some types of nuisances should be considered perma-

nent, and in such eases recovery of past and anticipated

future damages were allowed in one action. [Citations. |

“*The clearest case of a permanent nuisance or tres-

pass is one where the offending structure or condition is

maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a

publie utility. Sinee such conditions are ordinarily of

indefinite duration and since the utility by making com-

pensation is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate

that only one action should be allowed to recover for all

the damages inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to

subject it to successive suits and unfair to the injured

party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable

damages at once. [Citations. ]

‘““*A more diffieult problem is presented, however, if the

defendant is not privileged tv continue the nuisance or

trespass but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is

willing that it continue if he can secure full compensation

for both past and anticipated future injuries. To attempt

categorically to classify such a nuisance as either perma-

nent or not may lead to serious injustice to one or the

<<

—,

A-45

3 other of the parties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not

permanent and sues only for past damages, he may be met

with the plea of res judicata in a later action for addi-

tional injury if the court then decides the nuisance was

permanent in character from its inception. [Citation.]

Similarly, if the initial injury is slight and plaintiff delays

suit until he has suffered substantial damage and the

eourt then determines that the nuisance was permanent,

the defendant may be able to raise the defense that the

statute of limitations ran from the time of the initial

injury. [Citation.] On the other hand, if the defendant is

willing and able to abate the nuisance, it is unfair to

award damages on the theory that it will continue.

[ Citations. ]

“*Because of these difficulties it has been recognized

that in doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election

to treat the nuisaice as either permanent or not. [Cita-

tions.] If the defendant is not privileged to continue the

nuisance and is able to abate it, he carnot complain if the

plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as damages

accrue until abatement takes place. [Citations.] On the

other hand, if it appears improbable as a practical matter

that the nuisance can or wil! be abated, the plaintiff

should not be left to the troublesome remedy of succes-

sive actions. [Citations.]’”’ (Kernoff v. Kingsburg Cotton

Oil Co., supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 269-271, 288 P.2d 507.)

The court then made the following observation: “In the

present ease, defendant’s ginning mill is lawfully oper-

ated in a location properly zoned therefor and need not,

or may not (Code Civ.Proe., § 73la), be abated. If plain-

tiffs are not permitted to sue for all damages, past,

present, and future, then they must bring successive

actions each year at the close of each ginning season with

the attendant risk that the court may determine that the

—_——E~*~

A-46

trespass occurring the previous year was a permanent one

for which plaintiffs had been theretofore adequately com-

pensated. [{] It appears that here plaintiffs elected to sue

for all damages past, present and future and that such

damages are recoverable under the rule heretofore set

forth (Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Cal.3d 265 [239

P.2d 625]).” (Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., supra,

45 Cal.2d at p. 271, 288 P.2d 507.)

Implicit in this observation is cognizance of the plain-

tiffs’ election to characterize the nvisance as permanent.

Nothing in Spaulding or Kornoff s: *gests that where an

operation of an enterprise need not. may not be abated

(Code Civ.Proce., § 731a), a plaintiff seeking recovery for

damages upon a theory of nuisance must elect to treat the

nuisance as permanent. It is also observed that Code of

Civil Procedure section 731la does not preclude the rights

of landowners, such as appellants, who suffer from air-

plane annoyances to seek damages from the owners or

operators of an airport. (See Loma Portal Civic Club v.

American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 39 Cal. Rptr.

708, 394 P.2d 548; Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn.

v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 26 Cal.3d 86, 160 Cal.Rptr.

733, 603 P.2d 1329.) There are no California cases which

hold that even where injunctive relief is unavailable under

Code of Civil Procedure section 73la, the nuisance for

which damages or compensation is sought must be charac-

terized as permanent.

Indeed, the language of Nestle v. City of Santa Monica,

supra, 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480,

supports the conclusion that nuisances caused by the

owners or operators of airports are not necessarily perma-

nent but may be characterized as continuous nuisances

for purposes of resolving disputes concerning the statute

of limitations. In Nestle, homeowners brought suit against

ee

A-47

the City of Santa Moniea for injuries alleged to have been

suffered by virtue of the city’s operation of the Santa

Monica Airport. The homeowners sought to recover prop-

erty and personal injury damages claiming that “vibra-

tion, fumes, and noise emanating from jet aircraft landing

and taking off at the airport caused damage to their

property, interfered with the free enjoyment of their

property and resulted in physical pain, suffering and

emotional disturbance.” (Id., at p. 924, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568,

496 P.2d 480.) The homeowners asserted theories of

inverse condemnation, nuisance, negligence and zoning

violations as the bases of recovery. The trial court ruled,

inter alia, that the homeowners had failed to state facts

sufficient to state a cause of action for nuisance upon the

theory that the city was immune from liability for

damages.

The Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that

the City of Santa Monica was not immune from liability.

The court then observed: “On remand, concern over appli-

eation of the proper statute of limitations may arise. If

appellants demonstrate that whatever nuisance caused by

the defendant is continuing in nature, every repetition of

the wrong may create further liability. Hence, the statute

of. limitations would not run merely from the original

intrusion. This is the well-settled rule with respect to

property damage (see, e.g., Phillips v. City of Pasadena

(1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625]), and it

would be incongruous fo» 927i repetition to be considered

a separate wrong for property damage purposes but not

for personal injuries....Accordiugly, if the stetute of

limitations becomes an issue, the trial court must deter-

mine whether nuisance causing personal injury loss has

concluded or is continuing and then apply the appropriate

statute of limitations principles.” (Nestle v. City of Santa

A-48

Monica, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 937-938, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568,

496 P.2d 480; fn. omitted.)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Nestle v. City of

Santa Monica, supra, 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496

P.2d 480, also rejected the trial court’s conclusion that

“the airport was not a nuisance because it was maintained

under the authority of several statutes. Section 3482 of

the Civil Code provides: ‘Nothing which is done or main-

tained under the express authority of a statute can be

deemed a nuisance.’”’ (Id., at p. 938, fn. 16, 101 Cal. Rptr.

568, 496 P.2d 480.) The court then wrote: “In Hassell v.

San Francisco (1938) 11 Cal.2d 168 [78 P.2d 1021],

appellant contended that, by virtue of section 3482, the

construction of a public convenience station above ground

eould not constitute a nuisance. In rejecting that argu-

ment, we interpreted the section narrowly, stating (at p.

171 [78 P.2d 1021]): ‘“A statutory sanction cannot be

pleaded in justification of acts which by the general rules

of law constitute a nuisance, unless the acts complained

of are authorized by the express terms of the statute

under which the justification is made, or by the plainest

and most necessary implication from the powers ex-

pressly conferred, so that it can be fairly stated that the

legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which

oeceasions the injury.”’” (/d., at p. 938, fn. 16, 101

Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480.) Therefore, “although an

activity authorized by statute cannot be a nuisance, the

manner in which the activity is performed may constitute

a nuisance.” (Venuto v. Corning-Owens Fiberglas Corp.,

supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 129, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350.)

[12] These rules persuade us that respondent’s argu-

ment that the Airport must be characterized as a perma-

nent nuisance because it cannot be abated is not sound.

While it is clear that the Airport may not be abated and

A-49

may not be considered a nuisance absent specific allega-

tions concerning “unnecessary and injurious” methods of

operations (Code Civ.Proc., § 731a), it is also clear that

the manner in which the authorized activity is conducted

may constitute a nuisance. It is this type of nuisance

which serves as the basis of appellants’ cause of action for

nuisance. Through incorporation by reference many of the

allegations of the first cause of action for inverse condem-

nation, appellants have alleged in the cause of action for

nuisance that the activities (flights) causing the nuisance

“have continued to the date of [the] complaint.” This

allegation, in conjunction with the allegation that the

personal injuries suffered as a “result of interference,

noise, and vibrations ...is for the period from 100 days

prior to the filing of the claim to the date of the trial,”

shows that: (1) the noise and vibrations caused by the

flight patterns authorized over appellants’ homes may

constitute a private nuisance, and (2) that appellants

have elected to characterize the nuisance as continuous.

We conclude that appellants did state facts sufficient to

state a cause of action for nuisance and that the cause of

action for nuisance is not barred by the statute of

limitations.”

*In this ease the question of whether the noise levels, scheduling of

flights and location of flight patterns can be altered while at the same

time respondent can still operate the Airport is a fact question which

has not been reached yet, inasmuch as we are dealing with pleading

issues raised on demurrer.

4-50

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The matter is

remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a

new order sustaining the demurrer to the first cause of

action and overruling the demurrer to the second cause of

action, allowing respondent time to answer.

KINGSLEY, Acting P.J., and LUCAS, J.*, coneur.

*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

A-51

APPENDIX C

Order Of Los Angeles County Superior Court Below

Superior Court Of The State Of California For The

County Of Los Angeles.

Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth L. Baker, et al., Plaintiffs, vs.

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, Defen-

dant. Case No. C 413 871.

Order Sustaining Demurrer Without Leave To Amend

And Judgment Of Dismissal.

The demurrer of defendant Burbank-Glendale-

Pasadena Airport Authority to the First Amended Com-

plaint having been submitted on March 8, 1983, and the

Court having heard the argument of counsel and consid-

ered all the moving papers in connection therewith, the

Court rules as follows:

(1) The First Cause of Action (inverse condemna-

tion) of the First Amended Complaint fails to state

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action;

(2) The Second Cause of Action of the First

Amended Complaint seeks damages for the mainte-

nance of a nuisance. The proper legal test for deter-

mining whether the airport is a permanent nuisance

is whether the nuisance is subject to judicial, as

opposed to voluntary, abatement. As an airport serv-

ing the public, the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-

port is not subject to judicial abatement. Therefore,

if the airport is a nuisance, it is a permanent nui-

sance and plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails

to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action

and is barred by the provisions of California Govern-

A-52

ment Code Section 911.2 and by California Code of

Civil Procedure Sections 338(2) and 340.

The Court further finds that there is no reasonable

possibility that plaintiffs can amend their First Amended

Complaint to state any cause of action entitling plaintiffs

to any relief against the defendant and that defendant’s

demurrer to plaintiff's First Amended Complaint should

therefore be sustained without leave to amend. Defend-

ants are entitled to recover their costs in the amount of

$ pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure

Section 1032 et seq.

This Order constitutes a judgment of dismissal with

prejudice and is effective for all purposes and the Clerk is

ordered to enter said judgment in accordance with Cali-

fornia Code of Civil Procedure Section 581(d).

A-53

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 5, 1983.

MAX F. DEUTZ

Judge of the Superior Court

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the

City and County of Los Angeles; I am over the age of

eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my

business address is: 1706 Maple Avenue, Los Angeles,

California.

On December 23, 1985, I served the within Petition for

Writ of Certiorari in re: “Burbank Glendale v. Kenneth L.

Baker” in the United States Supreme Court, October

Term 1985, No.... .

on the Attorneys in said action, by placing 3 copies

thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage fully

prepaid, in the United States post office mail box at Los

Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

John J. Schimmenti

Schimmenti, Mullins & Berberian

999 No. Supelveda Blvd., #602

El Segundo, CA 90245

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 23, 1985, at Los Angeles,

California : |

é

ne. bik P2cleste/

CE CE MEDINA

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Baker · 475 U.S. 1017 | Frix