Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Baker
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DEC 23 1985
JOSEPH F. sr SNIOL, UR,
No. 85- eta |
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
: ‘ | Supreme Court, U.S.
7. 11 01, | F I ‘- D
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
BURBANK-GLENDALE-PASADENA
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
vs.
KENNETH L. BAKER, et ai.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
a
=
RICHARD K. SIMON
Counsel cf Record
MICHAEL C. KELLEY
JAMES I. Ham
SANDRA E. PURNELL
KaDISON, PFAELZER, WOODARD,
QuINN & RossI
707 Wilshire Blvd.
Fortieth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 688-9000
Attorneys for Burbank-
Glendcie-Pasadena
Airport Authority
Bowne of Los Angeles, Inc., Law Printers (213) 742-6600.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does state regulation of airport operations to
achieve noise abatement through imposition of repetitive
nuisance liability on proprietors of public airports violate
the supremacy clause as applied by this Court in City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973)?
2. Does state regulation of airport operations to
achieve noise abatement through imposition of repetitive
nuisance liability on proprietors of publie airports result
in an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution?
PARTIES BELOW
The parties to the proceedings in the California Su-
preme Court from which review is sought are Petitioner
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority* and Re-
spondents Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth L. Baker, Patrick J.
Bigley, William & Jan Biilos, Joe & Angie DeCasper,
Charles & Janet Ludecke, Mr. & Mrs. Frank B. Miller,
Sr., Thomas D. & Irene Pineiro, Gary & Gail Rainwater,
John & Allison Rocke, Herb & Rose Rosen, Michael A.
Rotella, Michael & Irma Taranto and Carl & Doris
Waugh.
*Petitioner Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority is a
joint powers agency created by the cities of Burbank, Glendale and
Pasadena pursuant to California Government Code §§ 6500 ef seq.
and 6546.1.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented For Review ...............
yO Fwerrerer es ore er eee ee
Sens TN aks 5 ae ak cee
So ae ee ar Tek me Prat
Constitutional Provisions And Statutes Involved
co a 8 eens Se er eye
Reasons For Granting The Writ................
I.
State Regulation Of Airport Operations Through
Imposition Of Repetitive Nuisance Liability Vio-
lates The Supremacy Clause As Applied By This
Court In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Termi-
GE, FAR. cn kad edhe snes eee
A. State Regulation Of Aircraft Noise Is Pre-
PPE ry Toe ere ra ree
B. The Imposition Of Perpetual Nuisanee Lia-
bility By State Courts Upon Airport Opera-
tors For Decisions Affecting Aircraft Noise
Is A Prohibited Form Of Regulation......
C. The Holding Below Is Contrary To The Dec!-
sion In City Of Burbank And Inconsistent
With The Only Other Federal Court Deci-
sion On The [enw .. cscs stuns steeeinss
II.
State Regulation Of Airport Operations Through
Imposition Of Repetitive Nuisance Liability On
Airport Proprietors Will Result In An Undue
Burden On Interstate Commerce In Violation Of
The Commeree Clamee. i... cocccsictaunsuunes
~~
J Ww WH DSO — we om, FE
11
11
14
18
ill
Page
A. State Commerce Regulations May Not
Impose An Undue Burden On Interstate
ee nye eeyeeese 21
B. Imposition Of Nuisance Liability On Airport
Proprietors By California Courts Would
Constitute An Undue Burden On Interstate
edi ee kn cas aas ca kae sas 22
Ce, eee pe uauescnseicsec 26
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A. Opinion Of California Supreme
Re cee lake k Seva keeecaceacs A-1l
Appendix B. Opinion Of California Court Of
et ews Lae waesenee sass A-21
Appendix C. Order Of Los Angeles County Supe-
ec. ecu nae ween A-51
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571
CREE ch GA ash KS KGNS es heebe ke bekes babes eas 17
Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. v.
Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) ....
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411
U.8. 624 (19738) ......... i, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
na beak e betes eee 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26
Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), a/ff’d,
GOT Ty Be COD 0k 6 60 own kkh acc dehions 22, 23, 24
Greater Westchester Homeowners Association v.
Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160
Cal.Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
br rere ares er a er ne tes ae 10, 19
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 857 (1962) 25
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ......... 11
Luedtke v. County of Miiwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th
CEU nccced nc skaveneaeubeecuneces 3, 10, 20, 26
Northwest Airlines, Ine. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292
fre eerie ee pre ere TT ee ee 9
Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34
Cal.3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal.Rptr. 367
Sc os ais KEa Oak eka wap Ch Reeeeee peewee 24
Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 496
<a CIE 654.046244 K0045 808 ade eee 5
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
( y Se rr et Penner ery rt ee era. Te 11
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Page
San Diego Building Trades Council, Local 2020 v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ........... 9, 15, 16,17
Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d 265, 239 P.2d 625
CRE F402 26 bE RACER KR KEL REREN CEA N AE ERS OES; 5
Sperry v. Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S.
err ety ee err oe 17
Southern Pacifie Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
ho ee ee ret ee re 21, 22, 23, 24
Constitution
United States Constitution, Art. I, See. 8 ........
United States Constitution, Art. VI .............
Statutes
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 85-726,
§ 105, 92 Stat. 1708, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West
. TED 6 6 GA nankenkcGarceuneeeakbact sss 13
Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, November 18,
1976, reprinted in Noise Regulation Reporter
(BNA) Clot. Fide), SRcBOOS . oc cc ccc cccnescsn 12
California Code of Civil Procedure, See. 73la (West
PE ks wa Xess ae b5k One es ee b PES tha ba renee 19
California Government Code, See. 911.2 (West
ME a6 6k 5 bt skh esaens oueked ce bebenees 4
California Public Resources Code, See. 21001 et seq. 13
California Government Code, See. 6500 .......... i
California Government Code, See. 6546.1 ........ i
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726,
§§ 101 et seq., 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301
(WN. BOWE os nAn 6 660m s Gane un es hbase aaes 11
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
STATUTES
Page
Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574,
§ 7(a), 86 Stat. 1234, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1431 (1976) 11
United States Code, Title 28, See. 1257(3) ....... 2
No. 85-
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
BURBANK-GLENDALE-PASADENA
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
VS.
KENNETH L. BAKER, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Petitioner Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Au-
thority, a California joint powers agency and owner of the
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport, prays that a Writ of
Certiorari issue to the Supreme Court of the State of
California to review that court’s decision in case No.
31869, entitled Baker, et al. v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena
Airport Authority.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of
California, 39 Cal.3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218 Cal.Rptr. 293
2
(1985), is set forth in Appendix A at page A-1l. The
opinions of the Court of Appeal of the State of California,
Second Appellate District, 149 Cal.App.3d 872, 197
Cal.Rptr. 357 (1983) (not officially reported), and the
unreported memorandum opinion of the Superior Court
for the County of Los Angeles are set forth in Appendices
B and C at pages A-21 and A-51, respectively.
In relevant part, the California Supreme Court held
that federal preemption of locai regulation of airport
noise does not bar plaintiffs from bringing successive
nuisance damage actions against California airports for
personal injury, emotional distress aad property damage
until the nuisance created by jet air»raft operations is
abated. Holding that airport operations are continuing,
rather than permanent, nuisances, the court concluded
that such damage actions are not barred by otherwise
applicable statutes of limitation.’
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(3). The decision of the California Supreme
Court was entered on September 23, 1985, and this
Petition for Certiorari has been filed less than 90 days
thereafter.
Review by certiorari is sought on the grounds that the
California Supreme Court has decided substantial ques-
tions arising under the United States Constitution and
federal statutes involving the application of this Court's
'The court also held that, notwithstanding California legislation
prohibiting the Airport Authority from exercising the power of
eminent domain to condemn residentiai real property, the Airport
Authority could concurrently be sued for inverse condemnation, a
ruling which is not contested in this Petition.
3
decision in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc..
411 U.S. 624 (1973), in a manner contrary to the princi-
ples announced in that decision and in conflict with the
only federal court that has faced similar issues. See
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1975).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
INVOLVED
Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3:
“The Congress shall have power to regulate Com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes;”
Constitution of the United States, Article VI, Para-
graph 2:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shali be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all treaties made or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Airport Authority, Petitioner here, is the owner
and operator of the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
(“Burbank Airport”), a major public air transport facil-
ity serving approximately 2.8 million passengers annually
in interstate and intrastate commerce. Burbank Airport
(then known as the Hollywood-Burbank Airport) was the
4
subject of this Court’s decision in City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
In 1982, twenty-four individuals residing in the vicinity
of Burbank Airport initiated this action against the Air-
port Authority sounding in inverse condemnation and
nuisance.” Plaintiffs alleged that noise and other by-
products created by the operation of jet aircraft using
Burbank Airport had injured them. They sought $100,000
each for personal injuries and emotional distress, and
$106,000 per residence for property damage.
The Airport Authority demurred to plaintiffs’ nuisance
claims on the ground that, on the face of the complaint,
the claims were barred by the statutes of limitation
applicable to persona! injury and property damage claims
against public entities. See Cal. Gov't. Code § 911.2 (West
1980). The trial court sustained the demurrer and plain-
tiffs appealed.
On December 14, 1983, the California Court of Appeal
held that because, in its view. airports could voluntarily
abate those jet aircraft operations deemed to constitute a
nuisance, plaintiffs could “elect” to treat the nuisance as
“continuing” rather than “permanent”. As a consequence,
airport noise plaintiffs were permitted to sue the airport
repeatedly until the nuisance subsides or is abated and
thus could write their own immunity from the statutes of
limitation.®
2A companion ease, Blaine, et al. v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena
Airport Authority, et al., involving identical claims on behalf of 308
plaintiffs, is also pending against Petitioner.
3Under California law, as under the law of most jurisdictions, if a
nuisance is considered permanent, plaintiffs must collect ali of their
damages, past, present and future, in one action. The statutes of
limitation applicable to such claims begin to run at the inception of
4)
The Airport Authority appealed to the California Su-
preme Court, which granted review on February 16, 1984.
On September 23, 1985, that court followed and expanded
upon the Court of Appeal’s analysis, holding that
“[alirport operations are the quintessential continuing
nuisance,” 39 Cal.3d at 873, entitling persons allegedly
harmed by them to “bring successive # vions for damages
until the nuisance is abated.” Id. at °49.
The California Supreme Court specifically ruled on the
federal preemption issue when it affirmed the holding of
the Court of Appeal. It concluded that while certain
publie utilities must be considered permanent nuisances
because they are privileged to continue to operate despite
their interference with others’ property rights, 39 Cal.3d
at 872, California airports were not such entities and were
not protected by federal preemption:
‘We do not deal with such an extensive privilege.
Federal preemption of local regulation of airport
noise is not absolute. In Greater Westchester, ... 26
Cal.3d 86, we concluded that federal preemption
does not operate to wholly eliminate local responsi-
bility for airport noise control. We based this conclu-
sion, in part, on the distinction drawn by the United
States Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, (1973) 411 U.S. 624, between a munici-
pality’s exercise of the police power and its proprie-
tary efforts to reduce airport noise. Federal law
the nuisance. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cai.2d 104, 107,
496 P.2d 480 (1945). In contrast, if a nuisance is deemed continuing,
plaintiffs may bring successive actions to collect damages periodi-
eally for harm suffered during the period specified in the cpplicable
statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d 265,
267-68, 239 P.2d 625 (1952). Consequently, under a continuing
nuisance theory, plaintiffs have a new cause of action for each day
they allege that an activity is a nuisance.
6
preempts only the former. (Jd, at pp. 635-636, fn. 14;
Greater Westchester, ...26 Cal.3d at p. 96. See also
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco (9th Cir.
1981) 651 F.2d 1306, 1314, cert. den. 455 U.S. 1000.)
The message of City of Burbank and Greater West-
chester is clear: state law damage remedies remain
available against an airport proprietor despite the
fact that federal law precludes interference with
commercial flight patterns and schedules.”
39 Cal.3d at 872.
The California Supreme Court’s ruling in this case was
based squarely upon its interpretation of federal law. The
scope of federal preemption and its effect on local at-
tempts at aircraft noise regulation are clearly federal
questions, decided in part in City of Burbank, 411 U.S.
624 (1973).* In the decision below, the California Su-
preme Court interposed its own restrictive interpretation
of federal preemption and broadened the scope of permit-
ted state intrusion into air transit regulation.
A sensitive issue of national transportation policy such
as the one presented here should properly be decided by
this Court in order to insure uniformity of application
throughout the states and to guarantee that the national
interest in promoting interstate commerce is not thwarted
by parochial state and local concerns.
*City of Burbank left open the question of the scope of a proprie-
tor’s authority to adopt noise control measures. Jd. at 635 n.14. The
seope of a state’s authority to interfere with airport operations
through the judicial imposition of nuisance judgments upon the
airport proprietor was not at issue in that case and has not been
decided by this Court.
7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
By the decision below, the California Supreme Court
has overruled sub silentio this Court’s decision in City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973), which held that the operation of public airports
accommodating commercial jet aircraft, and the noise by-
products of jet aircraft, were not subject to local regula-
tion. In that ease, this Court found that the delicate
balance between air safety, efficiency and noise abatement
mandated a uniform and exclusive system of federal
regulation of aircraft noise, 411 U.S. at 638-39, and that
local regulation of airport operations aimed at controlling
jet aircraft noise was thus preempted by federai law. 411
U.S. at 633.
The California Supreme Court decision effectively ig-
nores this prohibition against local noise regulation.
While paying lip service to the principle that the state is
powerless to enjoin aircraft operations at the behest of
homeowners in adjacent communities, the court has fash-
ioned a system of perpetual tort liability to achieve the
same result indirectly. Under the California Supreme
Court’s decision, airports have been sentenced to a Hob-
son’s choice of absorbing repeated and costly challenges
to airport operational decisions or submitting to the
parochial demands of local residents to the detriment of
the larger publie good and safety.
Based upon what the corrt declared to be an airport
proprietor’s “separate duty to reduce noise,” 39 Cal.3d at
873, the decision below subjects to loeal serutiny (and
thus to the vagaries of local judicial processes) the very
activities that City of Burbank held preempted: takeoff
and landing procedures, runway preferences and modifi-
cations in the number, frequency or scheduling of flights.
The decision below gives local residents, through court
8
action, the right to challenge every decision that might
affect noise levels in their community.”
That such control-through-litigation was a key object of
the decision below is readily acknowledged by the
majority:
“Moreover, we should be particularly cautious not
to enlarge the category of permanent nuisances be-
yond those structures or conditions that truly are
permanent. Where some means of abatement exists,
there is little or no incentive to make remedial efforts
once the nuisance is classified as permanent. Such a
result is at odds with tort law’s philosophy of encour-
aging innovation and repair to decrease future
harm.”
39 Cal.3d at 872.
“Thus, despite the fact that the flights to and from
the airport are privileged, defendant shoulders an
affirmative responsibility to minimize noise levels
through the use of buffers, barriers or other noise
reducing devices.”
39 Cal.3d at 873.°
The predictable consequence of this new right to pun-
ish, and thus regulate, airport operational deci-
*The record below reflects the recent use of collective, repetitive
court actions by homeowners to attempt to force operational changes
at San Franeisco International Airport by “nuisancing the airport to
death.” See Amicus Brief of City and County of San Francisco at
page 2.
*Because the decision below arose from the trial court’s sustaining
of a demurrer to the complaint, the court reached well beyond the
record to opine regarding the Airport Authority’s legal or practical
ability to undertake further noise-reduction measures.
9
sions — irrespective of whether those decisions are
imposed upon airports by the federal government or
initiated by the proprietor — will be a continuous wave of
lawsuits as local residents attempt to pressure airports to
divert noise away from them and onto their neighbors, or
to reduce noise by lessening service.’ Preemption doc-
trine is made no less applicable, however, because the
method of regulation chosen by the state is economic
eoercion through tort lisbilliy. See San Diego Building
Trades Council, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).
Thus, the inherent vice of the decision below lies in
both the ends sought and the means selected by the court.
The control and management of aircraft noise is a
uniquely national issue sinee noise and safety (like air-
craft and airports) are inextricably l:aked in a nationwide
matrix. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973),
citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,
303 (1944). The proper balance cannot be struck by a
system that pits airports against homeowners in endless
local serimmages before local juries over the wisdom of
decisions affecting flight operations and, consequently,
noise levels. The inevitable result of such local regulation
is incompatibility in a system requiring consistency.
This Court has left undecided whether states may
impose any nuisance liability on airport proprietors for
"Even before remittitur, the 332 plaintiffs in this and its companion
action filed new damage claims against the Airport Authority pur-
porting to seek an additional $100,000 each for personal injury and
emotional distress, and $100,060 per residence for property damage.
These 332 plaintiffs represent only a fraction of the thousands of
persons residing within comparable distances from Burbank Airport
and a minuscule portion of those living in similar proximity to other
California airports.
10
operational decisions. See Greater Westchester Homeown-
ers Association v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329,
160 Cal.Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980). The holdings of the lower courts are split. Com-
pare Greater Westchester, supra, with Luedtke v. Cownty of
Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975). The decision
below, however, clearly exceeds all limits which courts
have previously placed on the rights of plaintiffs to seek
damages against airports for noise.
Regardless of what liability may be imposed on airports
for land use or planning decisions having little or no
effect upon aircraft operations, the holding below pur-
ports to impose unlimited and infinite noise liability upon
publie airports for engaging in activity that cannot be
separated from what is condoned, permitted or required
(and clearly preempted) by federal regulation. The deci-
sion below thus extends perpetual liability to new classes
of activity: those which the proprietor is privileged by
federal law to continue and those which cannot be con-
trolled by the proprietor, short of cessation of operations.
Should the new California rule be fellowed in other
jurisdictions, the evils which led this Court to strike down
the Burbank airport curfew in City of Burbank, will
multiply nationwide. The airport which sought protection
in 1973 from parochial legislative polities threatening the
safety and integrity of the national aviation system must
again, in 1985, appeal to this Court to protect air com-
merece from an equally effective and injurious form of
local regulation.
11
I.
STATE REGULATION OF AIRPORT OPERATIONS
THROUGH IMPOSITION OF REPETITIVE NUF-
SANCE LIABILITY VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE AS APPLIED BY THIS COURT IN CITY
@°OF BURBANK V. LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL,
INC.
A. State Regulation Of Aircraft Noise Is Preempted.
The supremacy of federal law in the regulation of
aircraft noise was established by this Court in City of
Burbank v. Locvckheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973). In that decision, this Court declared that the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, $§ 101
et seq., T2 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.CLA. § 1301 et seq. (West
1976), supplemented by the Noise Control Act of 1972,
Puh. L. No. 92-574, § 7(a), 86 Stat. 1234, 49 ULS.C.A.
§ 1431 (1976). constituted a scheme of federal regulation
of aircraft noise so pervasive that Congress left no room
for the states to supplement it. City of Burbank, 411 U.S.
at 633-34, citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947).
The Federal Aviation Administration has ‘full control
over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local control.”
City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633. The complete displace-
ment of traditional state power over noise is mandated by
the complex and intricate interdependence between avia-
tion safety, efficiency, noise control, and management of
air traffic on a nationwide seale. /d., 411 U.S. at 638-39.
Here, as elsewhere, state law which “stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress” must be stricken down. //ines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
12
Since this Court’s decision in City of Burbank, the
scope of federal preemption over the nation’s aviation
system has broadened still further. Three years after City
of Burbank that trend was reflected in the Department of
Transportation's Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, which
stated that the role of the federal government was:
“to control aireraft noise by the regulation of source
emissions, by flight operational procedures, and by
management of the air traffic control system and
navigable airspace in ways that minimize noise im-
pact on residential areas, consistent with the highest
standards of safety.”
Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, November 18, 1976,
reprinted in Voise Regulation Re porter (BNA) (Ref. File),
54:1002.
In contrast, the Noise Abatement Poliey alloeated to
state and local governments a narrowly limited responsi-
bility to provide for land use planning and development,
zoning, and housing regulation that would limit the uses
of land near airports to purposes compatible with airport
operations.” Id.
Additionally, in 1978, Congress expressly denied state
and local governments the right to regulate air carriers in
the wake of airline deregulation:
“{N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no
interstate ageney or other political ageney of two or
more States shail enaet or enforce any law, rule,
“The Noise Abatement Policy also carefully outlined the scope of
an airport proprietor’s ability to take steps to reduce noise. The
Policy expressly excluded steps that would “unjustly diseriminate
against any user, impede the federal interest in safety and manage-
ment of the air navigation system, or unreasonably interfere with
interstate or foreign commerce.” /d.
13
regulation, standard, or other provision having the
foree and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier having authority under
iltle IV of this Act to provide interstate air
transportation.”
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 85-726, § 105,
92 Stat. 1708, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West Supp. 1984).
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has
also recently expressed its view of the broad scope of
federal preemption, taking the position that court action
aimed at reversing operational decisions of airport propri-
etors is preempted. In United States of America v. State of
California, et al., United States District Court, Eastern
District of California, Case No. 85-1600 LKK, filed No-
vember 15, 1985, the FAA has alleged that the State of
California, by suing airport proprietors under the Califor-
nia Environmental Quality Act (Cal. Pub. Res. Code
§ 21001 et seg.) to limit the number and type of commer-
cial aircraft operations at major California airports, is
unlawfully exercising its powers and that such suits are
preempted by federal control of aircraft operations and
aviation noise.
These actions by Congress and the federal agencies
charged with managing the system of commercial aviation
evidence the expansion of federal control over jet aircraft
and their noise by-products since this Court decided City
of Burbank. In the face of this development, the California
Supreme Court’s decision must be struck down.
14
B. The Imposition Of Perpetual Nuisance Liability By
State Courts Upon Airport Operators For Decisions
Affecting Aircraft Noise Is A Prohibited Form Of
Regulation.
The court below found that “[a]irport operations are
the quintessential continuing nuisance,” 39 Cal.3d at 873,
entitling persons allegedly harmed by it to “bring succes-
sive actions for damages until the nuisance is abated.” Jd.
at 869. Although purporting formally to recognize federal
preemption of local regulation (including court-ordered
injunctive relief) of airport noise, id. at 868 n.6, 872, the
court nevertheless ruled that state law damage remedies
premised on nuisance liability are available against air-
port proprietors, and continuing damages recoverable
until the nuisance is abated, “despite the fact that federal
law precludes interference with commercial flight pat-
terns and schedules.” Jd. at 872. In clear effect, the court
held that while the State of California could not directly
interfere with decisions of an airport proprietor affecting
flight operations, it could impose damages upon him until
the desired decisions are implemented “voluntarily”.
For the same reasons that a state cannot impose noise
regulations upon airport proprietors directly through its
police powers or indirectly through court ordered injunc-
tion, a state cannot impose noise regulation indirectly
through the economic coercion of repeated damages ac-
tions. As the court below explicitly acknowledged, the
intended purpose of repeated damages actions is to force
airport proprietors to adopt various measures to reduce
noise. Jd. at 869, 872. Those decisions, however, are solely
within the province of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion working in conjunction with the airport proprietor,
and may not be the subject of second-guessing by local
residents or local courts.
15
Invalidation of state tort laws imposing liability in
fields where the federal government has preempted state
interference with decisions of the putative tortfeasor is
not novel. Decisions of this Court recognize that the form
of state action — whether legislative or judicial, or pre-
mised upon general tort or specific regulatory law — is
not a litmus test of its propriety. Rather, the rule long
established by this Court is that state tort liability that
breaches a preemptive federal policy is as repugnant to
the supremacy clause as direct regulation. Chicago and
North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1981) (“Kalo Brick”); San Diego
Building Trades Council, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1951).
In the Kalo Brick case, a railroad was given permission
by the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) to
abandon a route serving piaintiff’s business. Plaintiff
subsequently sued the railroad in tort for the harm
caused his business by the cessation of rail service. This
Court found that ICC review and approval of the rail-
road’s abandonment application preempted the state
court from imposing tort liability on the railroad for the
decision. Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 328-29.
The rationale expressed by the court below for impos-
ing nuisance liability on the Airport Authority notwith-
standing the preemptive effect of federal regulation is
that such liability does not conflict with federal law
because it is predicated upon a proprietor’s right
voluntarily to control airport operations. 39 Cal.3d at 872-
73. Plaintiff in Kalo Brick made the same argument —
that state ‘crt liability would be consistent with and
“eomplem. i::tary” to federal regulation of railroad service
— but this Court flatly dismissed that notion as inconsis-
tent with the authority vested in the ICC:
16
“The judgment as to what constitutes reasonableness
belongs exclusively to the Commission. Cf. Purcell v.
U ‘ates, 315 U.S., at 384-385, 62 S.Ct., at 710-
va would vitiate the overarching congressional
intent of creating ‘an efficient and nationally inte-
grated railroad system,’ JCC v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives Assn., 315 U.S. 373, 376-377, 62 S.Ct. 717, 719-
720, 86 L.Ed. 904 (1942), to permit the State of lowa
to use the threat of damages to require a carrier to do
exactly what the Commissioner is empowered to
excuse. A system under which each State could,
through its courts, impose on railroad carriers its
own version of reasonable service requirements could
hardly be more at odds with the uniformity contem-
plated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Com-
merece Act.”
Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 325-326.
As in Kalo Brick, the purpose of California’s imposition
of repetitive nuisance liability here is to control indirectly
the diseretion of an enterprise engaged in interstate
transportation. Also as in Kalo Brick, the effect of tolerat-
ing such liability rules would be to foster interference
with federal policy for, as City of Burbank pointed out, the
interdependence of noise, safety and efficiency “requires
a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if
the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Avia-
tion Act are to be fulfilled.” City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at
639.
State court damage remedies were also held to be
preempted in San Diego Building Trades Council, Local
2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, an
employer brought a state tort action against several
unions attempting to organize plant employees. Plaintiff
argued that the union’s activities were neither protected
ee
17
nor prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act. Jd. at
246.
This Court held in Garmon that the state could not
assume jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims unless the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board declared that it lacked
jurisdiction over the issues, noting that “[t]he governing
consideration is that to allow the States to control activi-
ties that are potentially subject to federal regulation
involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor
policy.” 7d. at 246 (footnote omitted).
The Court made it clear that the imposition of damages
by a state court was as intrusive as overt state regulation
or judicial injunction:
“Nor is it significant that California asserted its
power to give damages rather than to enjoin what the
Board may restrain though it could not compensate.
Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct
which must be free from state regulation if national
policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can
be as effectively exerted through an award of dam-
ages as through some form of preventative relief.”
Id, at 246-247.
Other cases decided by this Court also embrace the rule
that imposition of damages by the state violates the
supremacy clause if direct regulation of the underlying
conduct would also be preempted. See Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 581-82, 584 (1981) (imposi-
tion of contract damages based on a finding that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission would have
found a higher sales price reasonable is a usurpation of
federal authority tantamount to direct regulation);
Sperry v. Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379,
403 (1963) (patent agent not subject to rules relating to
18
the unauthorized practice of law since “the authority of
Congress is no less when the state power which it dis-
places would otherwise have been exercised by the state
judiciary rather than by the state legislature’).
C. The Holding Below Is Contrary To The Decision In
City Of Burbank And Inconsistent With The Only
Other Federal Court Decision On The Issue.
The decision below reasoned that “[f]ederal preemp-
tion of local reguiation of airport noise is not absolute”
because preemption extends only to a municipality’s exer-
cise of the police power and not to an airport proprietor’s
own efforts to reduce noise. 39 Cal.3d at 872. Having
created this basis for a proprietor’s “separate duty to
reduce noise’, id. at 873, the court allowed residents in
communities adjacent to airports to bring successive
actions for damages, premised on a continuing nuisance
theory, until the proprietor abates the noise. Jd. at 869.
The conflict between this decision and City of Burbank
is readily apparent: the decision below purports to expose
airport proprietors to continuing nuisance liability for the
full panoply of aircraft operations which produce noise,
even though most aspects of aircraft operational decisions
ean neither be controlled by the airport proprietor nor
enjoined by a court. The airport proprietor is thus left
with the choice of ceasing all operations, absorbing con-
tinuing liability or submitting to a state court’s judgment
of what noise abatement procedures are reasonable.
The use of continuous damages liability to coerce enact-
ment of noise control measures desired by local residents
(and which the state could not otherwise mandate) can-
not be sanctioned through resort to a fiction that the state
is doing something other than regulating aircraft opera-
tions. Conducting nuisance trials will inexorably lead
PED.
19
courts and juries to rule on the reasonableness of traffic
patterns, aircraft operational procedures, or curfews, all
of which were held preempted from state regulation in
City of Burbank. 411 U.S. at 639.”
The authorities cited in the opinion below provide no
basis for excepting local regulation of airport proprietors’
operational decisions from the scope of federal preemp-
tion. The only authority found by the court below was its
own decision in Greater Westchester Homeowners Associa-
tion v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 108, 603 P.2d 1329, 160
Cal.Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980)
(holding that the decision of the proprietor of Los Ange-
les International Airport to build new runways would
subject the proprietor to nuisance liability). However, the
eourt in Greater Westchester justified such liability by
noting that City of Burbank had expressly reserved the
issue of a proprietor’s powers to enact noise control
measures.’” Greater Westchester, 26 Cal.3d at 95-98.
Nothing in City of Burbank suggests that nuisance
liability is not a form of state regulation. The case clearly
°The inevitability of an inquiry into the reasonableness of aircraft
operations and noise control measures results from the nature of an
action for nuisance and the defenses available to the airport proprie-
tor. Under California law, an airport cannot be deemed a nuisance
without evidence of the employment of unnecessary and injurious
methods of operation. See Cal. Civ. Proe. Code § 75la (West 1980).
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court in Greater Westches-
ter confined its holding to liability arising out of airport planning,
design, and land use decisions over which the airport proprietor
retained “substantial proprietary control”. 26 Cai.3d at 97. The
decision below embodies no such limitations, suggesting that a
proprietor will be liable in nuisance regardless of whether it is within
the power of the proprietor to control the noise complained of without
interfering with operational procedures within the exclusive control
of the federal government.
20
held that the state quc regulator was preempted from
imposing noise regulations on airport proprietors. City of
Burbank, 411 U.S. at 640. City of Burbank thus provides
no justification for the imposition of continuous nuisance
liability on airport operators since the decision below
imposes such liability as state regulator, not as airport
proprietor.
This Court has held that decisions concerning flight
patterns, takeoff and landing procedures, curfews and
modifications in the number, frequency or scheduling of
flights, among others, cannot be the subject of parochial
regulations. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 686-39. The
decision below clearly permits (and is predicated on the
expectation of) state interference with such activities
through the imposition of nuisance liability. The effective-
ness of this mode of state regulation is undeniable. In
order to avoid the continuous expense of litigation and
damage awards, airport proprietors will be forced to
enact the very measures this Court declared would upset
the delicate balance between safety and efficiency that
mandated the exclusion of locally imposed noise
regulation.
The decision of the California Supreme Court is also
inconsistent with the only federal appeals court decision
applying the holding of City of Burbank to a nuisance
action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Cireuit, in Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d
387, 391 (7th Cir. 1975), held that state-imposed nuisance
liability was preempted by City of Burbank. The court in
Luedtke found that an airport proprietor could not be held
liable for negligence or for creating a nuisance if airport
operations were in compliance with federal laws and
regulations. 521 F.2d at 391. Thus, Lwedtke held unlawful
the exact regulatory scheme the California Supreme
MIR oe
21
Court has established. Such a decisive split over the scope
of City of Burbank’s preemption ruling should not be
allowed to fester.
II.
STATE REGULATION OF AIRPORT OPERATIONS
THROUGH IMPOSITION OF REPETITIVE NUI-
SANCE LIABILITY ON AIRPORT PROPRIETORS
WILL RESULT IN AN UNDUE BURDEN ON IN-
TERSTATE COMMERCE IN VIOLATION OF THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. State Commerce Regulations May Not Impose An
Undue Burden On Interstate Commerce.
The commerce clause of the Constitution vests in Con-
gress the power to regulate commerce between the states.
State regulations are precluded even where Congress has
not acted if they are deemed to interfere with interstate
ecommerce. Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 769 (1945). State regulations are evaluated on the
basis of a balancing test weighing the “legitimate !ocal
publie interest” underlying them against the burden they
impose on interstate commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church,
397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (striking down an Arizona
restriction barring the shipment of uncrated cantaloupes
out of that state). Bruce Church indicates the kind of
interest balancing that goes into commerce clause
decisions:
‘Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
venefits. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
22
U.S. 440, 443, 80 S.Ct. 813, 816, 4 L.Ed.2d 852. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.”
397 U.S. at 142.
B. Imposition Of Nuisance Liability On Airport Pro-
prietors By California Courts Would Constitute An
Undue Burden On Interstate Commerce.
As the court below readily acknowledges, the purpose
of imposing continuing nuisance liability on California
airport proprietors is not simply to compensate residents
for damages, but also to encourage the imposition of
‘remedial’ noise control measures. 39 Cal.3d at 872. The
pernicious effects on interstate commerce of the avowedly
regulatory component of the decision below closely resem-
ble the effects found to violate the commerce clause in key
decisions of this Court. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. 761;
Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407
U.S. 258 (1972).
In the Southern Pacific decision, Arizona’s regulations
limiting the length of trains for the purpose of increased
rail safety were struck down. The regulations at issue in
Southern Pacific required that trains passing through
Arizona be broken up and reformed, which had the practi-
eal effect of applying Arizona’s train length limitation.
throughout the southwest rail corridor. 325 U.S. at 774-
75. This Court noted that if each state could impose
length limitations on trains, rail carriers would be re-
quired either to break up and reform their trains at each
state border or conform their operations to the most
23
stringent length restriction imposed along the route. Id.
at 773. Either alternative was unacceptable because of the
possibility of states enacting conflicting regulations
where uniformity was essential and because of the burden
imposed on interstate commerce by the Arizona regula-
tions. Jd. at 773-75.
Just as the train length limitation struck down in
Southern Pacific was held to burden interstate commerce
because of the prospect that other states would adopt
similar regulations, California’s attempt to regulate local
airport noise through the imposition of nuisance liability
creates a burden on interstate air transportation. Also, as
in Southern Pacific, the commerce that California has
attempted to regulate through the decision below is essen-
tially interstate in nature and i. accordingly entitled to
protection from overreaching state regulation.
Air carriers, required to comply with noise rules
adopted by Burbank Airport (or at any of the other major
airports in California) in order to avoid or mitigate
nuisanee liability, will have to make adjustments in their
schedules, equipment or operating procedures that will
have effects throughout their interstate route structure.
The impact on interstate commerce from such regulation
will esealate exponentially should other states follow
California’s example in using the erude instrument of
nuisance liability to foree airport proprietors to reduce
noise.
The faet that California has eschewed a more direct
approach at regulation in favor of imposing nuisance
liability on airport operators does not change the com-
meree clause analysis. See Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264
(2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In Flood, a
baseball player challenged the structure of national major
league baseball, asserting state antitrust and common law
24
causes of action. The claims were dismissed because such
actions would place an undue burden on interstate com-
merce. 443 F.2d at 268. This Court reasoned that awards
of monetary damages under state antitrust and common
law theories against the baseball league would result in
enforcement of the “strictest standard of several states”
and have an extra-territorial effect “considerably more
far-reaching than that in Southern Pacific.” Id. at 268.
Accord, Partee v. San Diego Chargers Footuc.! Co., 34
Cal.3d 378, 385, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal.Rptr. 367 (1983)
(commerce clause prohibits imposition of state antitrust
damages on professional football team due to the need for
national uniformity in player-team-league relationships).
Flood teaches that enforcement of state laws imposing
damages are as violative of the commerce clause as direct
regulation where the effect of the damages award will be
to burden interstate commerce unreasonably. Commercial
aircraft operations are, a fortiori, activity in interstate
ecommerce. Regulation at one point within the network of
air transportation will affect the entire system. To permit
nuisance liability for jet aircraft noise in one state is to
permit that state’s noise rule to govern air commerce in
the other states. As Southern Pacific and Flood illustrate,
such regulation is consistently struck down as unduly
burdensome on interstate commerce.
While imposition of nuisance damages would constitute
a serious burden on interstate commerce, the State of
California can claim no significant countervailing interest
justifying the intrusion. In Southern Pacific, the state’s
safety claims were of doubtful validity. 325 U.S. at 775-76.
In Flood, the court considered enforcement of state anti-
trust laws to be of little comparative importance. 443 F.2¢c
at 268. In the present case, the state interest is to
compensate landowners for damages resulting from the
|
abe MB tse
25
exposure of their property to the by-products of commer-
cial jet aircraft operations and to reduce the effects of
noise on airport neighbors. It is well established, however,
that the state has little permissible interest in the regula-
tion of aircraft noise. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639-40.
Moreover, any interest the state may have in providing a
eontinuing nuisance remedy to its residents is extremely
limited given the availability of an inverse condemnation
action. See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 857
(1962).""
"The inverse condemnation action is a less intrusive means of
protecting property interests. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970) (court must consider whether state interest “could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities’).
While inverse condemnation will fully compensate plaintiffs for
damage to their property, such liability will not unduly burden
interstate commerce because it does not present the specter of
“reneated and vexatious litigation,” 39 Cal.3d at 874 (dissent), which
provides plaintiffs with the opportunity to regulate airport operations
through collective court action.
26
CONCLUSION
Beeause the court below decided important questions
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States in a manner that is inconsistent with the decision
of this Court in City of Burbank and with the decision of
the Seventh Cireuit in Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, the
Airport Authority respectfully prays that a Writ of Certi-
orari issue to the Supreme Court of the State of Califor-
nia to review that court’s decision in case No. 31869,
Baker, et al. v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Authority.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD K. SIMON
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL C. KELLEY
JAMES I. HAM
SANDRA E. PURNELL
KADISON, PFAELZER, WOODARD,
QUINN & RossI
Attorneys for Burbank-
Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Authority
A-1
APPENDIX A
Opinion Of California Supreme Court Below
California Supreme Court.
Kenneth L. Baker, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, Defen-
dant and Respondent.
Filed: September 23, 1985.
Appeal From: California Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, Division Four (Civ. No. 69670).
REYNOSO, J.— We are asked to resolve two ques-
tions: whether a public entity lacking the power of emi-
nent domain may nonetheless be lable in inverse
condemnation; and, whether a plaintiff may elect to treat
commercial airport noise and vibrations as a continuing,
rather than a permanent, nuisance. For the reasons set
forth below, we answer both questions in the affirmative.
Plaintiffs are homeowners who live adjacent to defen-
dant Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport. The airport
became a public entity in 1978 when it was purchased by
the three cities pursuant to Government Code section
6500 et seq.’ In 1982, plaintiffs filed suit for inverse
condemnation and
'The cities’ joint powers agreement was specifically authorized by
Government Code section 6546.1, which provides in relevant part: “In
the County of Los Angeles, any agency, commission, or board pro-
vided for by joint powers agreement entered into by cities pursuant
to Article 1 (commencing with Section 6500) of this chapter for the
purpose of the acquisition, operation, repair, maintenance, improve-
ment and administration of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport as a
publie airport, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended, may carry out such purpose and may authorize the issuance
A-2
[39 Cal.3d 866}
nuisance caused by noise, smoke, and vibrations from
flights over their homes. The trial court sustained demur-
rers to both causes of action, dismissing the inverse
condemnation action because defendant is prohibited by
statute from exercising the power of eminent domain, and
dismissing the nuisance action as barred by the statute of
limitations covering permanent nuisances. Plaintiffs
appeal.
1. Inverse Condemnation
Defendant contends that because “inverse condemna-
tion” is a “shorthand description of the manner in which a
landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his
property when condemnation proceedings have not been
instituted” (United States v. Clarke (1980) 445 U.S. 253,
257) [63 L.Ed.2d 373, 377, 100 S.Ct. 1127], it should
follow that if an entity lacks the power to condemn by
eminent domain, it cannot be liable in inverse condemna-
tion. Indeed, there is some authority for this mechanical
view. (3 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1981) $8.1
[4], p. 8-39; Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agcy.
(9th Cir. 1977) 566 F.2d 1353, revd. on other grounds sub
nom., Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy.
(1979) 440 U.S. 391 [59 L.Ed.2d 401, 99 S.Ct. 1171];
Western Internat’l Hotels v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agcy. (D.
Nev. 1975) 387 F.Supp. 429, 439; Gregory v. City of New
York (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 346 F.Supp. 140, 1438; Ex Parte
Carter (Ala. 1980) 395 So.2d 65, 67; Collopy v. Wildlife
Com’n, etc. (Colo. 1981) 625 P.2d 994, 1005; ef. MeCor-
of revenue bonds, pursuant to this article, to pay for acquiring,
repairing, improving, financing and refinancing such project, includ-
ing all facilities and improvements and all expenses incidental
thereto or connected therewith...”
A-3
mick v. Penna. Public Utility Com’n (1980) 48 Cmwith. Ct.
384 [409 A.2d 962, 964].) As defendant is prohibited
from exercising eminent domain power,’ it therefore con-
tends that it cannot be subject to suit for inverse
condemnation.
These authorities are not controlling. They fail to ree-
ognize that the term, “inverse condemnation,” describes
an action grounded not on statutory condemnation power,
but on the constitutional proscription against the taking
(U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) or the taking or damaging
(Cal. Const., art. I, $19) of property for public use
without just compensation. A landowner
[39 Cal.3d 867]
whose property has been invaded by a public entity that
lacks eminent domain power suffers no less a taking
merely because the defendant was not authorized to take.
We have previously recognized the constitutional basis
of an inverse condemnation action. In Rose v. State of
California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505], we held
that mere failure of the Legislature to enact a statute
“Government Code section 6546.1 provides in part that defendant
“shall not authorize or permit...the purchase of fee title to con-
demned real property zoned for residential use...” Moreover, we
eannot agree with plaintiffs that Public Utilities Code section 21652
authorizes defendant to take by condemnation the air space ease-
ments at issue here. Although that section recognizes air space
easements may be acquired by condemnation when “neesssary to
permit imposition ... of excessive noise, [or] vibration... due to the
operation of aircraft to and from the airport” (id., subd. (a) (2)), the
section also specifies that only persons “authorized to exercise the
power of eminent domain” may acquire such air space easements.
(/d., subd. (a); italies added.) This section, therefore, cannot be
construed as granting to defendant the power of eminent domain to
take the subject easements.
A-4
authorizing an inverse condemnation suit did not entitle
the state to disregard the constitutional imperative; we
therefore allowed the action even though the state had not
consented to be sued. (/d., at pp. 719-723.) Similarly, the
eourt in Sutfin v. State of California (1968) 261
Cal.App.2d 50 |67 Cal.Rptr. 665], held that liability in
inverse condemnation did “ ‘not depend upon a showing
that there is statutory authority in the defendant entity to
exercise affirmative eminent domain powers to accomplish
the same result. All that is necessary to show is that the
damage resulted from an exercise of governmental power
while seeking to promote “the general interest in its
relation to any legitimate object of government.” ’” (Jd.,
at p. 55) We later explicitly recognized what was implicit
in Rose and Sutfin: “[t]he authority for prosecution of an
inverse condemnation proceeding derives from article I,
section 19, of the California Constitution...” (/[oltz v.
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1976) 17
Cal.3d 648, 652 [131 Cal.Rptr. 646, 552 P.2d 430].)°
We therefore conclude that plaintiffs’ inverse condem-
nation action may be maintained although defendant
*To the same effect, see McMahan’s of Santa Monica v. City of Santa
Monica (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 683, 692-693 [194 Cal.Rptr. 582];
Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles {1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 720, 732 [84
Cal.Rptr. 11]; Podesta v. Linden Irr. Dist. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 38,
47 [296 P.2d 401]; Alper v. Clark County (1977) 93 Nev. 569 [571
P.2d 810, 812-813]; see also Zinn v. Stale (1983) 112 Wis.2d 417 [334
N.W.2d 67, 76-77|; Van Dissel v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
(1981) 181 N.J. Super. 516 [438 A.2d 563, 568]; Minch v. Cily of
"argo (N.D. 1980) 297 N.W.2d 785, 789; Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz
(N.D.Cal. 1982) 539 F.Supp. 887, 896; Ocean Acres, etc. v. Dare Cly.
Bd, of Health (E.D.N.C. 1981) 514 F.Supp. 1117, 1120; ef. Gordon v.
City of Warren (6th Cir. 1978) 579 F.2d 386, 391. See generally Van
Alstyne, Slatutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation; The Scope of
Legislative Power (1967) 19 Stan.l..Rev. 727, passim.
ey
A-5
lacks eminent domain power. (Fountain v. Metro, Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority (11th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d 1038,
1043-1045.)* As the inverse condemnation claim was filed
within the five-year statute of limitations (Frustruck v.
City of Fairfax (1963) 212
[39 Cal.3d 868]
Cal.App.2d 345, 374 [28 Cal.Rptr. 357]), the trial court
erred in dismissing this cause of action.”
2. Nuisance
Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges thet defen-
dant’s activities became a nuisance as of January 29,
‘The instant case does not involve allegations of unreasonable
zoning or regulatory permit activity —the remedy for which, of
course, is not an inverse condemnation suit for damages, but declara-
tory relief or mandamus. (Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d
266, 272-273 [157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25].) Clearly, in cases of
physical invasion an inverse condemnation action is appropriate.
(Marina Plaza v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1977) 73
Cal.App.3d 311, 325 [140 Cal.Rptr. 725].)
"United States v. Clarke (1980) supra, 445 U.S. 253, does not
suggest a contrary result. In Clarke the court granted an injunction
against a state’s continued invasion of a plaintiff's land for use as a
road. The court held that the state had no defense to the requested
injunction on a theory of inverse condemnation; it did not address the
question whether the plaintiff had a remedy in inverse condemnation.
Defendant’s reliance on City of Los Angeles v. Oliver (1929) 102
Cal.App. 299 [283 P. 298], for the proposition that the constitutional
guarantee of just compensation does not require an inverse condem-
nation remedy so long as a “reasonably efficient remedy remains’’
(id., at p. 315) is similarly misplaced. Oliver concerned only proce-
dures for caleulating just compensation after the state exercised its
right of eminent domain; it had nothing to do with the right to bring
an inverse condemnation action.
A-6
1978—the date defendant became a public entity. Be-
eause plaintiffs did not file their complaint until 1982, a
question arises as to whether their nuisance claim was
timely filed. The answer depends on whether the nuisance
is characterized as continuing or permanent.
The trial court ruled that because this particular nui-
sance is not subject to judicial abatement’ it is a perma-
nent nuisance upon which the statute of limitations (Gov.
Code, § 911.2, Code Civ. Proe., $§ 338, subd. 2 and 340)
had run at the time plaintiffs filed their claim.
It does not follow, however, that simply because com-
mercial flights operated in compliance with federal law
may not be enjoined, the nuisance at issue is a permanent
one. Whether a nuisance will be classified as continuing
or permanent depends not on the offending party’s inter-
est in continuing the nuisance, but on the type of harm
suffered. (See Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6
Cal.3d 920, 937 [101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480].)
Two distinet classifications have emerged in nuisance
law which determine the remedies available to injured
parties and the applicable statute of limitations. On the
one hand, permanent nuisances are of a type where “ ‘by
one act a permanent injury is done, [and] damages are
assessed once for all.’ (Williams v. Southern Pacific R.R.
Co. (1907) 150 Cal. 624, 626
<1 Clommercial flights which are conducted in strict compliance
with federal regulations may not be enjoined as nuisances, both
because of the continuing public interest in air transportation, and
because of the likelihood of direct conflict with federal law.” (Greater
Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d
86, 94 [160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329]; see also Loma Portal Civic
Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 591 [39
Cal.Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548/].)
A-7
[39 Cal.3d 869]
[89 P. 599], quoting Beronio v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co.
(1890) 86 Cal. 415, 421 [24 P. 1093].) The cases finding
the nuisance complained of to be unquestionably perma-
nent in nature have involved solid structures, such as a
building encroaching upon the plaintiff's land (Rankin v.
DeBare (1928) 205 Cal. 639 [271 P. 1050],’ a steam
railroad operating over plaintiff's land (Williams, supra,
150 Cal. 624),° or regrade of a street for a rail system
(Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co. (1894) 103 Cal. 614
[37 P. 750]). In such eases, plaintiffs ordinarily are
required to bring one action for all past, present and
future damage within three years after the permanent
nuisance is erected. (Rankin, supra, 205 Cal. at p. 641;
Williams, supra, 150 Cal. at p. 626; Robinson, supra, 129
Cal. at p. 11.) The statutory period is shorter for claims
against public entities. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) Damages
are not dependent upon any subsequent use of the prop-
erty but are complete when the nuisance comes into
existence. (Hachus, supra, 103 Cal. at p. 622.)
On the other hand, if a nuisance is a use which may be
discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in
character and persons harmed by it may bring successive
actions for damages until the nuisance is abated. (Phil-
lips v. City of Pasadena (1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108
[162 P.2d 625].) Recovery is limited, however, to actual
"See also Castelletto v. Bendon (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 64 [13
Cal.Rptr. 907]; Troeger v. Fink (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 22 [332 P.2d
779}; Bertram v. Orlando (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 506 [227 P.2d 894,
24 A.L.R.2d 899}.
5See also Robinson v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 8 [61 P.
947].
A-8
injury suffered prior to commencement of each action.
Prospective damages are unavailable.
The classic example of a continuing nuisance is an
ongoing or repeated disturbance, such as the one before
us today, caused by noise, vibration or foul odor. (E.g.,
Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons (1932) 216 Cal. 156, 158 [13
P.2d 733] [vibration, noise and noxious soot, smoke and
gases emanating from pottery factory].)* Indeed, even
more substantial physical invasions of land have been
held to be continuing in character. (E.g., Tracy v. Ferrera
(1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 827, 828 [301 P.2d 905] [deflec-
tion of rain water and emission of noxious odors and
fumes from neighbor’s pipes and furnace].)'? As empha-
sized in Tracy, the distinction to be drawn is between
[39 Cal.3d 870]
encroachments of a permanent nature erected upon one’s
lands, and a complaint made, not of the location of the
offending structures, but of the continuing use of such
*See also Wade v. Campbell (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 54, 59 [19
Cal.Rptr. 173, 92 A.L.R.2d 966] (noxious smells, disturbing noises,
flies and mosquitoes associated with dairy); Williams v. Blue Bird
Laundry Co. (1927) 85 Cal.App. 388, 395 [259 P. 484] (loud noise,
offensive odors and heavy black smoke emitted from laundry).
See also Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co. (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d
382, 387 [233 P.2d 914] (emission of dust and gases from cement
plant injuring neighbor's cattle); Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp.
(1941) 48 Cal.App. 429, 436 [119 P.2d 973] (illicit use of facilities on
plaintiff's land to process oil and gas); Collins v. Sargent (1928) 89
Cal.App. 107, 116-117 [264 P. 776] (regular use of exposives in
gravel quarry shaking piaintiff's house and throwing gravel upon his
land).
Bitbiads ix. .
A-9
structures. (/d., supra, 144 Cal.App.2d at p. 828.) The
former are permanent, the latter is not.”
In ease of doubt as to the permanency of the injury the
plaintiff may elect whether to treat a particular nuisance
as permanent or continuing. (Spaulding v. Cameron
(1952) 38 Cal.2d 265, 268 [239 P.2d 625].) The impor-
tance of the plaintiff's election has long been recognized.
(United States v. Dickinson (1946) 331 U.S. 745, 749 [91
L.Ed. 1789, 1794, 67 S.Ct. 1382]; Kornoff v. Kingsburg
Cotton Oil Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 265, 269-271 [288 P. 2d
507]; Kafka, supra, 191 Cal. at p. 752; Williams, supra,
150 Cal. at p. 628; Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 316, 326 [164 Cal.Rptr. 591];
Tracy, supra, 144 Cal.App.2d at p. 829; 3 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (3d ed 1985] Actions, § 425, pp. 458-459; Rest.
2d Torts. § 930.) As the United States Supreme Court
noted in Dickinson, a case in which a landowner sued to
recover damages after the government flooded his land,
“Ti]f suit must be brought, lest he jeopardize his rights,
as soon as his land is invaded, other contingencies would
be running against him — for instance, the uncertainty of
the damage and the risk of res judicata against recovering
later for damage as yet uncertain. The source of the entire
claim... is not a single event; it is continuous.” (Dickin-
son, supra, 331 U.S. at p. 749 [91 L.Ed. at p. 1794].)
Another contingency running against the plaintiff is the
statute of limitations. In Spaulding we expressed concern
“Even solid structures have been considered nuisances where it
appeared that the structures couid have been removed. (Phillips,
supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 107 [city installed barrier blocking access to
plaintiff's property]; Kafka v. Bozio (1923) 191 Cal. 746, 751-752 [218
P. 753] [eneroaching structure pushing plaintiff's building out of
alignment]; Strong v. Sullivan (1919) 180 Cai. 331, 334 [181 P. 59]
[luneh stand erected daily obstructing plaintiff's property].)
A-10
that “if the initial injury is slight and plaintiff delays suit
until he has suffered substantial damage and the court
then determines that the nuisance was permanent, the
defendant may be able to raise the defense that the
statute of limitations ran from the time of the initial
injury, [Citation.] On the other hand, if the defendant is
willing and able to abate the nuisance, it is unfair to
award damages on the theory that it will continue [Cita-
tions.]” (Spaulding, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 268.) We then
emphasized that “[b]ecause of these difficulties, it has
been recognized that in doubtful cases the plaintiff should
have an election to treat the nuisance as either permanent
or not. [Citations.]” (Jbid.)
Defendant contends, however, that this is not a case to
which election applies because Spaulding separately cate-
gorized privileged activity
[39 Cal.3d 871]
nuisances as permanent. Defendants read too much into
the Spaulding opinion.
Although Spaulding contains language suggesting that
election is unavailable when the nuisance arises as a
result of privileged activity,” this isolated aspect of the
opinion must be viewed in context. First, the purported
'21n discussing the continuing/permanent distinction and the basis
of election, the court noted in passing: “The clearest case of a
permanent nuisance or trespass is the one where the offending
structure or condition is maintained as a necessary part of the
operations of a public utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of
indefinite duration and since the utility by making compensation is
entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only one action
should be allowed to recover for all the damages inflicted. It would be
unfair to the utility to subject it to suecessive suits and unfair to the
injured party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable
A-11
exclusion is dictum only. Spaulding did not involve a
question of privilege. In Spaulding, the defendant, a
private landowner, negligently maintained piles of dirt on
his property which caused mudslides on the plaintiff's
land when it rained. The trial court ordered the nuisance
abated but also awarded prospective damages for perma-
nent diminution in the value of plaintiff's property. Thus,
the issue was the necessity of election, not whether
privilege precluded such election.
Second, Spaulding’s election discussion is based, in
part, on Phillips, supra, 27 Cal.2d 104, a case involving
“privileged” governmental activity. In Phillips we held
that even assuming the city could not be required to
remove a road block obstructing access to Phillips’ prop-
erty, it could not be said as a matter of law that the gate
was a permanent nuisance since it apparently “could have
been removed at any time.” (/d., at p. 108.) It is difficult
to reconcile this case, affirmatively relied upon in Spauld-
ing, with an interpretation of the latter as absolutely
barring election when privileged activity is at issue. The
two opinions are more realisticaliy viewed as focusing the
election inquiry on the ability to abate rather than on the
possibility of a court order requiring abatement.
Third, publie policy militates against defining a nui-
sance as permanent or continuing on the basis of privilege
alone. As noted, the purpose of nuisance law is to provide
a means of recovery for harm suffered. The doctrine of
election is designed to facilitate just and equitable recov-
ery. Though the traditional remedy of injunctive relief
may be unavailable in a given case, the damage suffered is
no different than in a case involving identical but nonpriv-
ileged activity. Both victims are harmed in the same way,
damages at once. [Citation.]” (Spaulding, supra, 38 Cal.2d at pp.
267-268.)
A-12
and both may seek damages for such harm. Where the
nuisance is a continuing one, both victims, therefore,
should be able to bring successive actions as dam-
[39 Cal.3d 872]
ages accrue. To hoid that the statute of limitations applies
te one continuing nuisance but not the other is to put the
burden on the victim to choose his or her tortfeasor
wisely. Nuisance law neither requires nor supports such a
harsh result.
Moreover, we should be particularly cautious not to
enlarge the category of permanent nuisances beyond
those structures or conditions that truly are permanent.
Where some means of abatement exists, there is little or
no incentive to make remedial efforts once the nuisance is
classified as permanent. Such a result is at odds with tort
law’s philosophy of encouraging innovation and repair to
decrease future harm.
Finally, the privilege alluded to in Spaulding is quite
different from the privilege claimed in the present case.
In a word, the Spaulding privilege is absolute. Spaulding
referred to an “offending structure or condition [] main-
tained as a necessary part of the operations of a public
utility” as a clear permanent nuisance, “[s]ince the utility
by making compensation is entitled to continue them.” (Id.,
38 Cal.2d at p. 267.) (Italies added.)
We do not deal with such an extensive privilege. Fed-
eral preemption of local regulation of airport noise is not
absolute. In Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d 86, we
concluded that federal preemption does not operate to
wholly eliminate local responsibility for airport noise
control. We based this conclusion in part, on the distine-
tion drawn by the United States Supreme Court in City of
A-13
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal (1973) 411 U.S. 624
[36 L.Ed.2d 547, 93 S.Ct. 1854], between a municipality’s
exercise of the police power and its proprietary efforts to
reduce airport noise. Federal law preempts only the
former. (/d., at pp. 635-636, fn. 14 [36 L.Ed.2d at pp. 554-
555]; Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 96. See
also San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco (9th Cir.
1981) 651 F.2d 1306, 1314, cert. den., 455 U.S. 1000 [71
L.Ed.2d 866, 102 S.Ct. 1631].) the message of City of
Burbank and Greater Westchester is clear: state law dam-
age remedies remain available against an airport proprie-
tor despite the fact that federal law precludes
interference with commercial flight patterns and
schedules.
Moreover, recovery is not limited to damages for per-
manent nuisance only. In Greater Westchester we affirmed
damage awards totalling $86,000 for personal injuries
sustained during the period 1967-1975 by persons living
near Los Angeles International Airport. (Jd., 26 Cal.3d at
p. 92.) Although we did not otherwise identify the nui-
sance as permanent or continuing, the time frame given
strongly suggests the latter.
[39 Cal.3d 873]
The airport operator’s separate duty to reduce noise,
and hence, separate nuisance liability, is particularly
compelling in the present case. Defendant is a public
entity charged with responsibility for the “acquisition,
operation, repair, maintenance, improvement and admin-
istration” of the airport as a public airport. (Gov. Code,
§ 6546.1.) Not only does defendant play a proprietary
role in the airport’s operations, but it is expressly re-
quired by statute to make all reasonable efforts to curb
noise pollution at the airport. “In operating the airport,
A-14
the separate publie entity ... shall not permit or author-
ize any activity in conjunction with the airport which
results in an increase in the size of the noise impact area
... and shall further comply with the future community
noise equivalent levels prescribed by [the California Ad-
ministrative Code]....[§] In addition, the entity shall
diligently pursue all reasonable avenues available to in-
sure that the adverse effects of noise are being mitigated
to the greatest extent reasonably possible.” (Jbid.) Thus,
despite the fact that the flights to and from the airport
are privileged, defendant shoulders an affirmative respon-
sibility to minimize noise levels through the use of buff-
ers, barriers or other noise reducing devices. The
privilege is not absolute.
Airport operations are the quintessential continuing
nuisance. Although federal law precluding interference in
any way with flight patterns and schedules adds an
element of permanency to an otherwise continuing prob-
lem, it does not mandate that the overall nuisance is a
permanent one. Thus plaintiffs may elect whether to treat
airport noise and vibrations as a continuing or as a
permanent nuisance.
Because plaintiffs elected to treat the airport as a
eontinuing nuisance, we conclude that the statute of
limitations does not bar their nuisance claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed as
to both causes of action.
Bird, C. J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., and Grodin, J.,
concurred.
MOSK, J., Coneurring and Dissenting. — I agree with
the majority that plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action
for inverse condemnation even though defendant lacks
the power of eminent domain.
A-15
I am compelled to dissent, however, from their discus-
sion and disposition of the nuisance cause of action. They
effectively ignore principles that have guided the courts
of this state and other jurisdictions in the task of classify-
ing nuisances, and thus err in concluding that plaintiffs’
claim is timely.
[39 Cal.3d 874]
Moreover, they potentially subject this airport to repeated
and vexatious litigation based on the same nuisance.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s activities became a
nuisance as of January 29, 1978 —the date defendant
became a public entity. If a nuisance is deemed “perma-
nent,” a plaintiff must — within the applicable statute of
limitations — sue for all past, present, and future dam-
ages in one action. If, by contrast, a nuisance is deemed
“continuing,” a plaintiff may sue only for damages suf-
fered before the action was filed, but he will not be barred
from pressing future claims so long as the nuisance
continues.
In Spaulding v. Cameron (1952) 38 Cal.2d 265 [239
P.2d 625], Justice Traynor prescribed the test for deter-
mining whether a nuisance is continuing or permanent,
and discussed the policy of the law: “In early decisions of
this court it was held that it should not be presumed that
a nuisance would continue, and damages were not allowed
for a decrease in market value caused by the existence of
the nuisance but were limited to the actual physical injury
suffered before the commencement of the action. [Cita-
tions.] The remedy for a continuing nuisance was either a
suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for damages
as new injuries occurred. Sitwations arose, however, where
injunctive relief was not appropriate or where successive
actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff or the defen-
A-16
dant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized that some types
of nuisances should be considered permanent, and in such
cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages were
allowed in one action.
“The clearest ease of a permanent nuisance or trespass
is the one where the offending structure or condition is
maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a
publie utility. Sinee such conditions are ordinarily of
indefinite duration and since the utility by making com-
pensation is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate
that only one action should be allowed to recover for all
the damages inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to
subject it to successive suits and unfair to the injured
party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable
damages at once.” (/d., at p. 267, italics added.)
Thus, if a use of property alleged to be a nuisance is
likely to continue indefinitely because its owner cannot be
compelled to abate, the nuisance is deemed permanent
and the plaintiff is given a single cause of action for his
damages past, present, and future. This test for classify-
ing nuisances as either continuing or permanent turns on
whether the nuisance is reasonably abatable. It is the rule
followed not only in this state (see, e.g., Kornoff v.
Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 265, 269-271
[288 P.2d 507];
[39 Cal.3d 875]
Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 267), but in
other jurisdictions as well (see, e.g., Maloney v. Heftler
Reaity Company (Fla.App. 1975) 316 So.2d 594, 595; City
of Columbus v. Myszka (1980) 246 Ga. 571, 572 [272
S.E.2d 302]; Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc. (Iowa 1972)
196 N.W.2d 557, 562; Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Company v.
Charles (Ky.App. 1974) 514 S.W.2d 659, 664; Goldstein v.
A-17
Potomac Elec. Power Co. (1979) 285 Md. 673, 688-690
[404 A.2d 1064]; Drybread v. City of St. Lowis (Mo.App.
1982) 634 S.W.2d 519, 520-521; Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drain-
age Dist. (Mo.App. 1980) 602 S.W.2d 787, 792-793; Sun-
dell v. Town of New London (1979) 119 N.H. 839 [409
A.2d 1315, 1320-1321]: Aguayo v. Village of Charma
(1969) 79 N.M. 729, 731 [449 P.2d 331]; Krueger v.
Mitchell (1983) 112 Wis.2d 88, 102-103 [332 N.W.2d
733]). It is also approved by commentators: “But if the
nuisance can not be abated, or is such that the court will
not enjoin its continuance, all damages must be obtained
in one action.” (1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts
(1956) § 1.30, p. 91.)
Under these principles, the nuisance alleged here must
be deemed permanent. First, injunctive relief is not sim-
ply inappropriate, it is unavailable. As this court observed
in Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los
Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86 [160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d
13291, certiorari denied, 449 U.S. 820 [66 L.Ed.2d 22, 101
S.Ct. 77], “commercial flights which are conducted in
strict compliance with federal regulations may not be
enjoined as nuisances, both because of the continuing
public interest in air transportation, and because of the
likelihood of direct conflict with federal law.” (Jd., at p.
94; see also Loma Portal Civic Cluw v. American Airlines,
Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 591 [39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d
548].) Second, successive actions are plainly undesirable.
As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held in
Krueger v. Mitchell, an airport noise case, “The injured
party must... present his...entire claim for past and
future damages in one action. This limitation on such a
damage action is necessary in order to protect airport
proprietors from repeated and vexatious litigation based
on the same nuisance.” (112 Wis.2d at p. 103.)
A-18
In some cases classification may be doubtful; in such
cases, the Spaulding court observed, a plaintiff should be
allowed to elect whether to treat the alleged nuisance as
continuing or permanent. (38 Cal.2d at p. 268.) Recogniz-
ing that their claim here would be barred by limitations if
the asserted nuisance is characterized as permanent,
plaintiffs insist this case is within the class defined in
Spaulding as “doubtful,” and hence that they may avoid
the limitations bar by treating the alleged nuisance as
continuing.
Spaulding allows such an election only if, inter alia,
“the defendant is noi privileged to continue the nui-
sance....” (Ibid.) As Greater West-
[39 Cal.3d 876]
chester establishes, defendant’s use of its property may
not be enjoined as a nuisance: there are no allegations
that defendant either is not subject to or has failed to
comply with federal regulations. (26 Cal.3d at p. 94.)
Thus, defendant is privileged to continue the nuisance
alleged here.’
Nor is defendant’s privilege to continue the alleged
nuisance diminished by its ability to adopt means within
its power to mitigate the allegedly offensive noise. Al-
though the federal government has apparently not pre-
empted all facets of noise control (Greater Westchester,
supra, 26 Cal.38d at pp. 93-100, and authorities cited;
Bennett, Airport Noise Litigation: Case Law Review
(1982) 47 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 464-469; Werlich &
'Since “privileged” in this context merely means not reasonably
abatable (see Spaulding, supra, 38 Cal.2d at pp. 267-268), the
majority’s claim to the contrary (ante, at pp. 870-872) is manifestly
specious.
a ee ee ee
at weet eee
A-19
Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement Contro-
versy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal
Liability Shuffle (1981) 15 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 69, 83-91;
Comment, The 1980 Airport Noise Act: Noise Abatement or
Just More Noise? (1981) 14 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 1049,
passim), it is clear that permissible local regulation may
be imposed only by airport proprietors, and not by third
parties. (See Bennett, supra, 47 J. Air L. & Com. at pp.
469-473, and cases cited.) Thus in City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal (1973) 411 U.S. 624 [36 L.Ed.2d
547, 93 S.Ct. 1854], the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a municipal ordinance that purported to regu-
late noise by imposing a take-off curfew on a privately
owned airport. City of Burbank plainly establishes that
the delicate federal/local-proprietor noise control scheme
currently in effect will not tolerate private suits seeking
mandatory imposition of local noise controls. (Cf. San
Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco (9th Cir. 1981) 651
F.2d 1306, 1316-1319, cert. den. (1982) 455 U.S. 1000 [71
L.Ed.2d 866, 102 S.Ct. 1631] [state may not direct an
airport proprietor to exercise its noise abatement
power ].)
Thus, plaintiffs may not elect to treat the alleged
nuisance as continuing: defendant is privileged to con-
tinue the nuisance and it must therefore be classified as
permanent. (See Krueger v. Mitchell, supra, 112 Wis.2d at
pp. 102-103 [injunctive relief against airport noise un-
available; plaintiff may claim damages for permanent
nuisance only].)”
aa =
*Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920 [161 Cal.Rptr.
568, 496 P.2d 480], does not support a contrary conclusion. In Nestle
we held, inter alia, that a nuisance action based on airport noise was
improperly dismissed on the basis of government immunity, and
suggested that the plaintiffs on remand might be able to demonstrate
A-20
[39 Cal.3d 877]
Claims against publie entities alleging injuries to per-
sons or personal property must be brought by the 100th
day after the accrual of the eause of action; all other
claims — including those for real property dam-
age — must be brought within 1 year after accrual of the
cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) As plaintiffs implie-
itly admit, their nuisance cause of action accrued when
the publie entity undertook operations on January 29,
1978; from that date, plaintiffs claim, defendant’s opera-
tions have “substantially interfered” with the use and
enjoyment of their properties. Because the limitations
period began to run at that time, it is clear that plaintiffs’
1982 complaint is untimely.
I would accordingly affirm the order dismissing the
nuisance cause of action.
Lueas, J., concurred.
a continuing nuisance. This dictum, of course, preceded the United
States Supreme Court’s noise control preemption decision in City of
Burbank (1973) supra, 411 U.S. 624; moreover, the court was not
asked to consider Spaulding’s first requirement for election: a nui-
sance may not be treated as continuing if the defendant is privileged
to continue it.
et Bee
A-21
APPENDIX B
Opinion Of California Court Of Appeal Below
(unofficial report)
AMERIAN, Associate Justice.
BACKGROUND
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered
on April 5, 1983, following the sustaining of a demurrer
by respondent Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Au-
thority (hereinafter respondent) to appellants’ first
amended complaint for inverse condemnation and
nuisance.
Appellants are homeowners who reside adjacent to the
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport (hereinafter Air-
port). On June 10, 1982, appellants filed a suit for inverse
condemnation and nuisance based on damage t» persons
and property caused by excessive noise, smoke and vibra-
tions from flight patterns to and from the Airport and
over appellants’ homes. Respondent and the sities of
Glendale, Burbank and Pasadena were named as
defendants.
The first cause of action of the vomplaint is for inverse
condemnation “for the taking of an easement” over appel-
lants’ properties. The cause of action alleges that respon-
dent, “on January 29, 1978, authorized jet take-offs and
landings from [Airport]. The activities ...subject [ap-
pellants’] properties to noise, smoke and vibration, which
constituted a taking on or about January 29, 1978.” it is
further alleged that “said flights over [appellants’]...
properties have continued to the date of [the] complaint”
and that the flights ‘take place at all hours of the day and
A-22
night.”” The cause of action alleges that the “flights cause
substantial interference with the use and peaceful enjoy-
ment” of appellants’ properties and that the “flights,
which constitute a taking, commenced on January 29,
1978.”
It is alleged that the “easement for noise, smoke and
vibration over [appellants’] properties was taken for a
publie use.” The cause of action alleges that appellants
are “claiming compensation for... damages and taking of
an easement, physical injuries to the real properties, and
severance damages in the amounts of their claim...”
It is further alleged that the easement taken by respon-
dent is “an air easement...taken in the airspace above
the surface of the properties. The air easement is for
‘excessive noise, vibration discomfort, or interference
with the use and enjoyment of real property located
adjacent to or in the vicinity of an airspace and...
reduction in the market value of real property by reason
thereof...through the operation of aircraft to and from
the airport,’ as those terms are used in California Code of
Civil Procedure § 1239.3.'”
The second cause of action is for nuisance. The allega-
tions of that cause of action are, in essence, that as a
result of the flight patterns authorized by respondent,
appellants “suffered interference to the senses, hearing
and health [from the] noise and vibrations from [air-
port].” It is alleged that each appellant “suffered per-
sonal injury, in the amount of $100,000.00” and that the
'Code of Civil Procedure section 1239.3 was repealed by Statutes
1975, chapter 1275, section 1, page 3409, operative July 1, 1976. The
comment by the Law Revision Commission states, “The substance of
Section 1239.3 is continued in Publie Utilities Code section 21652.”
oe
ete
A-23
“personal injury is for the period from one hundred days
prior to the filing of the claim to the date of the trial.’”
On September 24, 1982, a demurrer filed by defendant
cities was sustained without leave to amend. A judgment
of dismissal was entered as to those defendants on Octo-
ber 5, 1982, and they are not parties to this appeal.
The basis of defendant cities’ demurrer to the com-
plaint was that, as a matter of law, only respondent would
be liable for any damages. Pursuant to Government Code
section 6500 et seq.,° defendant cities executed a “joint
exercise of powers agreement” whereby respondent was
ereated for purposes of acquiring and operating the then
named Hollywood-Burbank Airport. (Presently the Air-
port is named the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport).
Pursuant to this agreement, dated June 14, 1977, respon-
dent was to become the owner and operator of the Airport
and, as authorized by section 6508.1, respondent was
“ereated [as] a public entity, separate and apart from the
Parties hereto... The debts, liabilities and obligations of
the Authority [respondent] do not constitute debts, lia-
bilities or obligations of the Parties.”’
On October 19, 1982, the complaint was amended by
adding the names of Micheel A. Rotella and John and
"Copies of the claim submitted to respondent and defendant cities
of Glendale, Burbank and Pasadena (hereinafter defendant cities)
for personal injuries and property damage caused by flight patterns
authorized by respondent over appellants’ homes were attached as
exhibits to the complaint. The claim for appellants, excluding Mr.
Rotella and Mr. and Mrs. Rocke, shows that it was received by
defendant cities and respondent on February 23, 1982. The joint
claim of Rotella and the Rockes is marked as received on June 16,
1982.
3All references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
A-24
Allison Rocke as plaintiffs to the complaint. A copy of the
claim for damages which had been submitted to respon-
dent and defendant cities by Mr. Rotella and Mr. and
Mrs. Rocke was also added as an exhibit to the complaint.
A demurrer to the amended complaint was filed by re-
spondent on November 18, 1982.
On April 5, 1983, the trial court issued an order
sustaining the demurrer of respondent to the first
amended complaint without leave to amend. The order
and judgment of dismissal which followed were based
upon the following rulings:
“(1) The First Cause of Action (inverse condemna-
tion) of the First Amended Complaint fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action;
‘“*(2) The Second Cause of Action of the First Amended
Complaint seeks damages for the maintenance of a nui-
sanee. The proper legal test for determining whether the
airport is a permanent nuisance is whether the nuisance is
subject to judicial, as opposed to voluntary, abatement.
As an airport serving the public, the [Airport] is not
subject to judicial abatement. Therefore, if the airport is a
nuisance, it is a permanent nuisance and plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action and is barred by the provisions of
California Government Code Section 911.2 and by the
California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 338(2) and
340.
“The Court further finds that there is no reasonable
possibility that plaintiffs can amend their First Amended
Complaint to state any cause of action entitling plaintiffs
to any relief against the defendant and that defendant’s
demurrer to plaintiff's First Amended Complaint should
therefore be sustained without leave to amend... .”
td el I a
Pete
A-25
ISSUES
The following issues are raised in the instant appeal:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the de-
murrer to the first cause of action for inverse condemna-
tion on grounds that a cause of action for inverse
condemnation could not be stated because respondent is
not authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to
acquire air easements over appellants’ properties; (2)
Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer
to the second cause of action for nuisance on grounds that
if the Airport is a nuisance it must be deemed a perma-
nent nuisance and the cause of action for nuisance was,
therefore, barred by the applicable statute of limitations
as untimely.
For reasons discussed below, we conciude that the trial
court properly sustained the demurrer to the first cause
of action for inverse condemnation because respondent is
not statutorily authorized to exercise the power of emi-
nent domain. We do, however, conclude that the demurrer
to the second cause of action was improperly sustained
because appellants may, and have elected to, treat the
alleged nuisance as continuous and this cause of action,
therefore, is not untimely.
DISCUSSION
Inverse Condemnation
[1] On this appeal we must first resolve the issue
whether an action for inverse condemnation may be main-
tained against a publie entity only where that public
entity has the capacity to exercise the power of eminent
domain. Respondent’s demurrer to the cause of action for
inverse condemnation was based solely on grounds that a
eause of action for inverse condemnation cannot be stated
A-26
against it because it is not authorized by statute to
condemn avigation easements. Respondent forwards the
same argument here. In support of this argument respon-
dent relies upon various provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Government Code and the Publie Utilities
Code. On the basis of the code provisions cited by respon-
dent it is argued that since respondent cannot acquire the
subject air easements through the power of eminent
domain and since existence of the power to exercise
eminent domain is necessary to maintain an action for
inverse condemnation, the trial court properly sustained
its demurrer to appellants’ cause of action for inverse
condemnation.
We conclude that respondent properly contends that an
action for inverse condemnation may be maintained
against it only if it could have taken the air easements at
issue through the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main. We are also persuaded by respondent’s argument
that it does not have the power to exercise eminent
domain because it is not authorized by law to take the air
easements at issue here.*
The most recent decision by this state’s Supreme Court
concerning eminent domain is found in City of Oakland ».
Oakland Raiders (1982) 32 Cal.3d 60, 183 Cal.Rptr. 673,
‘It is worthy of note that this is not a case where the power to take
the air easements under eminent domain is under direct review.
Respondent has not initiated formal eminent domain proceedings
with respect to the air easements at issue. The issue whether respon-
dent has the power of eminent domain has arisen only because
respondent has asserted that it does not have such power as an
absolute defense to the action in inverse condemnation. It is in this
context that we are called upon to consider the legal concepts of
eminent domain and inverse condemnation as well as their
interrelationship.
A-27
646 P.2d 835. In that case, the court reiterated the
established rule that “ ‘The power of eminent domain is
an inherent attribute of sovereignty.’ (County of San
Mateo v. Coburn (1900) 130 Cal. 631, 634 [63 P. 78];
accord City of Anaheim v. Michel (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d
835, 837 [66 Cal.Rptr. 543]; Anaheim Union High Sch.
Dist. v. Vieira (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 169, 171 [51
Cal.Rptr. 94].) This sovereign power has been described
as ‘universally’ recognized and ‘necessary to the very
existence of government.’ (1 Nichols on Eminent Domain
(3d ed. 1980) §$§ 1.11, 1.14[2], pp. 1-10, 1-22.) When
properly exercised, that power affords an orderly compro-
mise between the public good and the protection and
indemnification of private citizens whose property is
taken to advance that good. That protection is constitu-
tionally ordained by the Fifth Amendment to the United ©
States Constitution, which is made applicable to the
states by nature of the Fourteenth Amendment (Chicago,
Burlington Sc. R’d. v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 233-
241 [17 S.Ct. 581, 583-586, 41 L.Ed.2d 979]) and by
article I, section 19 of the California Constitution. [{]
Because the power to condemn is an inherent attribute of
general government, we have observed that ‘constitutional
provisions merely place limitations upon its exercise.’
(People v. Chevalier (1959) 5Z Cal.2d 299, 304 [340 P.2d
598].) The two constitutional restraints are that the
taking be for a ‘public use’ and that ‘just compensation’
be paid therefor. (Ibid.; City of Anaheim, supra, 259
Cal.App.2d at p. 837 [66 Cal.Rptr. 543].)...” (City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, supra, at p. 64, 183 Cal.Rptr.
673, 646 P.2d 835.)
In addition to eminent domain proceedings, the other
procedural device for ensuring the constitutional pro-
scription that “private property will not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation” is
A-28
inverse condemnation. The principal distinetion between
the two procedures is that in eminent domain proceed-
ings, the publie authority takes the initiative, whereas in
inverse condemnation proceedings it is the property
owner who initiates litigation. (See Klopping v. City of
Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 43, 104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d
1345; Selby Realty Co. v. City ef San Buenaventura (1973)
10 Cal.3d 110, 119, 109 Cal.Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111;
Cothran v. San Jose Water Works (1962) 58 Cal.2d 608, 25
Cal.Rptr. 569, 375 P.2d 449; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax
(1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357.)
We have discovered no California cases which specifi-
eally deal with the question whether actions in inverse
condemnation may be maintained only against public
authorities who could have first, but did not, initiate
formal eminent domain proceedings. However, cases and
commentators do suggest that it is only upon this princi-
ple that actions or proceedings in inverse condemnation
may be brought.
In United States v. Clarke (1980) 445 U.S. 253, 100
S.Ct. 1127, 63 L.Ed.2d 373, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that Title 25 of the United States Code, section
357, which provides that “lands allotted in severalty to
Indians may be condemned for any public purpose under
the laws of the State or Territory” (at p. 254, 100 S.Ct. at
1128) did not authorize a state or local government to
“eondemn” allotted Indian trust lands by physical oecu-
pation. The court, therefore, concluded that an action in
inverse condemnation could not be maintained. The court
observed that the public entities there involved had never
instituted formal action to condemn the land in question.
The court expressly rejected the Ninth Cireuit Court of
Appeals holding that section 357 of Title 25 of the United
States Code permitted acquisition of allotted lands by
A-29
inverse condemnation after also rejecting the Court of
Appeals reasoning that “ ‘once the taking has been accom-
plished . .. it serves little purpose to interpret the statute
to refuse to permit an inverse condemnation suit to be
maintained on the groun[d] that the state should have
filed an eminent domain action prior to the taking.’ ” (At
p. 255, 100 S.Ct. at 1129.)
The Supreme Court discussed, at length, the nature of
eminent domain and inverse condemnation proceedings.
The court wrote, “[t]he phrase ‘inverse condemnation’
appears to be one that was coined simply as a shorthand
description of the manner in which a landowner recovers
just compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted. As
defined by one land use planning expert, ‘[i]nverse con-
demnation is “a cause of action against a governmental
defendant to recover the value of property which has been
taken in facet by the government defendant, even though
no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been attempted by the taking agency.”’ D. Hagman,
Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law 328
(1971) (emphasis [omitted]). A landowner is entitled to
bring such an action as a result of ‘the self-executing
eharacter of the constitutional provision with respect to
compensation....’ See 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain
§ 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972). A condemnation proceeding,
by contrast, typically involves an action by the condemnor
to effect a taking and acquire title. The phrase ‘inverse
condemnation, as a common understanding of that
phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is
the ‘inverse’ or ‘reverse’ of a condemnation proceeding.
[¥] There also are important practical differences be-
tween condemnation proceedings and actions by landown-
ers to recover compensation for ‘inverse condemnation.’
Condemnation proceedings, depending on the applicable
A-30
statute, require various affirmative action on the part of
the condemning authority. To accomplish a taking by
seizure, on the other hand, a condemning authority need
only occupy the land in question. Such a taking thus
shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the en-
croachment and to take affirmative action to recover just
compensation. ...” (At p. 257, 100 S.Ct. at 1130.)
The court concluded by holding that the language of
section 357, authorizing condemnation of lands, referred
“not to an action by a landowner to recover compensation
for a taking, but to a formal condemnation proceeding
instituted by the condemning authority.” (United States v.
Clarke, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 258, 100 S.Ct. at 1131.)
This case does suggest that an action in inverse con-
demnation against a public authority may be instituted
only if the publie authority was authorized to condemn
the property or property interest in question in the first
place through exercising the power of eminent domain.
(See also, Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 258, fn.
2, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2140, fn. 2, 65 L.Ed.2d 106).
In Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659,
39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719, an inverse condemnation
case, the court was called upon to determine “whether a
property owner who loses the use of the next intersecting
street which affords him access to the general system of
publie streets should be compensated.” (At p. 661, 2
Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719.) The court heid that the
property owner's complaint for inverse condemnation
withstood general demurrers because it alleged, inter
alia, that the closing of the street crossing in question
substantially impaired the property owner’s right of aec-
eess to the street. One of the contentions raised by the
railroad was that it was not a proper party defendant to
the action. This contention was rejected by the court
ee t«S™
a
A-31
which wrote, “defendant railroad was an active joint
participant in closing the crossing....” (At p. 662, 39
Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719.) The court arrived at this
conclusion after taking judicial notice that a public utili- —
ties commission decision authorized the City of Los Ange-
les to close the street crossing in issue. It is apparent that
the city, in turn, authorized the defendant railroad to
participate in closing the street crossing. Implicit in the
court’s determination that the railroad was a proper party
defendant in the inverse condemnation action was that it
was a proper party defendant only by virtue of the
authorization for it to participate in closing the street
crossing.
Commentators also recognize that existence of the
power of eminent domain is a prerequisite to liability in
inverse condemnation proceedings instituted by private
property owners. One commentator has observed that “an
airport approach height restriction would, apparently,
require payment of compensation if invoked to limit
development of property located adjacent to a publicly
operated airport, but not if applied to like property on the
periphery of a privately owned and operated airport.”
(Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A
Legislative Prospectus, 8 Santa Clara Lawyer 1, 22.)
Another commentator expressly observed that, “[t]he
remedy of inverse condemnation, by the very premise
which gives rise to it, is available only as against defend-
ants who possess the power of eminent domain.” (3 P.
Nichols, Eminent Domaia § 8.1[4] 8-39 {1981).]°
°22A West, Words and Phrases (1958), p. 231, provides that,
“inverse or reverse condemnation contemplates a situation in which
property has been taken by the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, but without any payment of compensation therefor having
been made.”
Oo
A-32
We conclude, then, that respondent correctly urges
that an action in inverse condemnation may only be
maintained agaiust a party in whom the power of eminent
domain is vested.
{[2, 3] We turn now to the question of whether respon-
dent has the power to exercise eminent domain for pur-
poses of acquiring the air easements involved in the case
at bar. The general rule with respect to public entities
such as respondent is that such public entities have “*..
no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by law. [Citation.]’”
(City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, supra, 32 Cal.3d 60,
64, 183 Cal.Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d 835.) We are thus obliged
to examine the statutes pertinent to the case before us.°
[4] Both parties to this appeal refer us to section
6546.1 and Publie Utilities Code section 21652. Section
6546.1, contained in article 2 entitled, “Power to Issue
Revenue Bonds,” provides:
“In the County of Los Angeles, any agency, commis-
sion, or board provided for by joint powers agreement
entered into by cities pursuant to Article 1 (commencing
with Section 6500) of this chapter for the purpose of the
*Appellants have extensively argued that statutory authority for
exercising the power of eminent domain is not required because of the
“self-executing” nature of the California and United States Constitu-
tions. This is an incorrect interpretation of the concept that the
proseription against taking private property for public use without
just compensation is self-executing. The self-executing nature of
article I, section 19 of the California Constitution and the 5th
Amendment of the United States Constitution refers only to the
remedy, not to the theory of recovery. (See United States v. Clarke,
supra, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130, 63 L.Ed.2d 373; City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, supra, 32 Cal.3d 60, 64, 183 Cal.Rptr.
673, 646 P.2d 835.)
oh ce
J spiced
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tea dae. Benn ini ete ND TS teem Sear | jot
CN eee
A-33
acquisition, operation, repair, maintenance, improvement
and administration of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport as
a public airport, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended, may carry out such purpose and may
authorize the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to this
article, to pay for acquiring, repairing, improving, finane-
ing and refinancing such project including all facilities
and improvements and all expenses incidental thereto or
connected therewith. Property tax revenues accruing to,
levied by, or collected by any local agency which is a party
to such a joint powers agreement shall not be used to
redeem such revenue bonds unless an ordinance authoriz-
ing the use of such property tax revenues for such pur-
poses is approved by a majority vote of the electors of the
local agency voting on the issue. In operating the airport,
the separate public entity above mentioned shall not
permit or authorize any activity in conjunction with the
airport which results in an inerease in the size of the noise
impact area based on a community noise equivalent level
of 70 decibels as established pursuant to Title 21, Califor-
nia Administrative Code, Chapter 2.5, Subchapter 6, and
shall further comply with the future community noise
equivalent levels prescribed by such title as it now exists
or is hereafter amended.
“The separate public entity shall implement the noise
monitoring requirements set forth in Title 21, California
Administrative Code, Chapter 2.5, Subchapter 6. In addi-
tion, the entity shall diligently pursue all reasonable
avenues available to insure that the adverse effects of
noise are being mitigated to the greatest extent reason-
ably possible.
“The separate public entity shall not authorize or per-
mit the lengthening of runways defined herein as the
paved portions of the runways presently on airport prop-
A-34
erty, or the purehase of fee title to condemned real
property zoned for residential use as of the effective date
of this statute.
“The power to issue revenue bonds under this section
shall be of no further force and effect after December 31,
1980, unless (1) the entity shall have initially issued
revenue bonds on or prior to December 31, 1980, or (2)
the entity is unable to initially issue revenue bonds to |
accomplish the purpose of this section by reason of
litigation, in which case the power to initially issue reve-
nue bonds under this section shall continue to be effective
until the final determination of such litigation and for one
year thereafter. If the entity shall have initially issued
revenue bonds within either of the time periods permitted
by the prior sentence of this paragraph, the power to issue
revenue bonds under this section shall continue so long as
this section shall be in effect.”
Publie Utilities Code section 21652 provides:
“(a) Any person authorized to exercise the power of
eminent domain for airport purposes may acquire by
purchase, gift, devise,.lease, condemnation, or otherwise:
(1) Any property necessary to permit the safe and
efficient operation of the airport, or to permit the removal,
elimination, obstruction-marking, or obstruction-lighting
of airport hazards, or to prevent the establishment of
airport hazards.
(2) Airspace or an easement in such airspace above
the surface of property where necessary to permit imposi-
tion upon such property of excessive noise, vibration,
discomfort, inconvenience, interference with use and en-
joyment, and any consequent reduction in market value,
due to the operation of aireraft to and from the airport.
A-35
(3) Remainder property underlying property taken
pursuant to paragraph (2), where permitted by Section
1240.410 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
“(b) As used in this section, ‘property’ includes real
and personal property and any right or interest therein,
whether within, beyond, adjacent to, or in the vicinity of,
the boundaries of an airport or airport site, and, by way of
illustration and not by way of limitation, includes air
rights, airspace, air easements, and easements in airport
hazards.”
Appellants urge that while section 6546.1 prohibits
respondent from acquiring “fee title to condemned real
property,” Public Utilities Code section 21652, neverthe-
less, authorizes respondent to acquire fee title to air
easements over their private property by exercising the
power of eminent domain. Respondent, on the other hand,
argues that the plain language of section 6546.1 prohibits
it from aequiring, through condemnation, fee title to air
easements as well.
We conclude that neither section 6546.1 nor Public
Utilities Code section 21652 authorizes respondent to
exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the air
easements at issue here. Our conclusion rests upon con-
sideration of the legislative history and intent surround-
ing the amendment to section 6546.1, in 1978.
The legislative history of section 6546.1 shows that the
third paragraph of this section which prohibits respon-
dent from purchasing “fee title to condemned real prop-
erty zoned for residential use” was added by amendment
in 1978. (Stats. 1978, ch. 62, § 1.) Another provision was
added to section 6546.1 by the 1978 amendment. That
provision extended respondent's power to issue revenue
bonds necessary to continued operation of the Airport.
A-36
Section 2 of Statutes 1978, chapter 62 provides:
“This act is an urgency statute necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or
safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitu-
tion and shall go into effect immediately. The facts
constituting such necessity are:
“The present owner-operator of the Hollywood-Bur-
bank Airport currently plans to cease operation of said
airport. Because no private person is presently willing
and abie to acquire and operate said airport, the sub-
stantial use thereof by the public will cease unless said
airport is acquired and operated by a public entity.
Because the principal service area of the airport con-
sists of more than one city in the County of Los
Angeles but not the entire county, a joint powers entity
established by the cities in said county which are
located in said principal service area will best serve the
interests of the publie using the airport. Because this
act will empower such a public entity to acquire, oper-
ate, repair, maintain, improve and administer said air-
port, it is necessary that this act take effect
immediately in order to prevent interruption in or
termination of public use of the Hollywood-Burbank
Airport.”
Further enlightenment as to the legislative intent in
promulgating the 1978 amendment of section 6546.1 is
found in the summary digest for laws enacted in 1978.
There, it is stated that:
“Existing law provides that in the County of Los
Angeles, any agency, commission or board established
pursuant to the exercise of the joint powers agreement
entered into by cities for the purpose of maintaining the
Hollywood-Burbank Airport as a public airport, is author-
ih es ne Se TI i VAN Ne lm a le
we tl
A-37
ized to issue revenue bonds. The power to issue such
bonds terminates as of December 31, 1980. [{] This bill
would extend the power to issue revenue bonds as long as
the provision continues to be in effect if the entity has
initially issued such bonds on or prior to December 31,
1980. The requirement of initial issuance of such bonds
would be extended in the event issuance of bonds is
prevented by litigation. [{] This bill would take effect
immediately as an urgency statute.” (1978 Summary
Digest, ch. 62, p. 17.)
From this seant legislative history, several conclusions
respecting the promulgating intent of the 1978 amend-
ment of section 6546.1 may be drawn. First, and most
significant in our view, is that the primary purpose of the
amendment was to effectuate uninterrupted public use of
the Airport by extending respondent’s power to issue
revenue bonds under certain conditions. Second, since the
history is conspicuously silent as to the intent which
motivated addition of the third paragraph of section
6546.1, that paragraph cannot be reasonably construed as
evidence of a legislative intent to grant respondent the
power of eminent domain. Third, this paragraph notwith-
standing, section 6546.1, cannot be construed as granting
to respondent the power of eminent domain as this sec-
tion primarily relates to the means by which respondent
ean generate funds to operate and maintain the Airport,
i.e., through issuance of revenue bonds.
Contrary to what appellants contend, Publie Utilities
Code section 21652 does not authorize respondent to take
by condemnation the air easements in issue here. While
that section recognizes that air easements may be ac-
quired by condemnation “where necessary to permit im-
position...of excessive noise, vibration...due to the
operation of aireraft to and from the airport”
A-38
(Pub.Util.Code § 21652, subd. (a)(2)), the seetion also
specifies that only persons “authorized to exereise the
power of eminent domain” may acquire such air ease-
ments (Pub.Util.Code, § 21652, subd. (a), emphasis
added). This section, therefore, cannot be construed as
granting to respondent the power of eminent domain to
take the subject air easements.
We conclude, therefore, that respondent does not have
statutory power to take the air easements in issue here by
exercising the power of eminent domain. Consequently,
since authority to exercisé the power of eminent domain is
a prerequisite to maintaining an action in inverse condem-
nation, the trial court properly sustained respondent’s
demurrer without leave to amend upon those grounds.
Nuisance
The demurrer to appellants’ cause of action for nui-
sanece was sustained without leave to amend on grounds
that a permanent nuisance is not subject to “judicial
abatement” and that “if the airport is a nuisance, it is a
permanent nuisance.” Upon these grounds, the court
found that the cause of action for nuisance failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and was
barred by section 911.2 and Code of Civil Procedure
sections 338, subdivision (2) and 340, as untimely.
Appellants contend that the demurrer to the nuisance
eause of action was improperly sustained because the
nuisance complained of can be abated, is continuous in
nature, and is not, therefore, barred by the applicable
sta*’2 of limitations. At argument, counsel for respon-
dent conceded that if appellants overcame the statute of
limitations problem, a cause of action for damages had
been pled. Accordingly, we restrict our discussion to the
Ee ere
easel a A ne iRoom bel Nb OS
ih Ci ar ONS 6B
enw ee rn ot Se ee ee
oy were ee
Ce ea TS
A-39
question of whether the nuisance is permanent or
continuous.
We hold that the order sustaining the demurrer to the
eause of action for nuisance was erroneous, but upon
slightly different grounds than urged by appellants. Our
discussion begins with the relevant sections of the Civil
Code.
Section 3479 of the Civil Code provides: “Anything
which is injurious to Health, ... or offensive to the senses,
...80 as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of
life or property,...is a nuisance.” The Civil Code also
distinguishes nuisances as either public or private. A
publie nuisance is defined by Civil Code section 3480 as
“...one which affects at the same time an entire commu-
nity or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage
inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” A private
nuisance is defined in Civil Code section 3481 as “[e]very
nuisance not included in the definition of the last section.
9
[5,6] The seeond cause of action for nuisance seeks
damages for personal injuries caused by noise and vibra-
tions and purports to be a cause of action for private
nuisanee. (Cf. Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116, 122-124, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350.) As
observed in the latter case, the significant difference
between a private and publie nuisance is that the former
“is a civil wrong based on disturbance of rights in land”
whereas the latter “is not dependent upon a disturbance
of rights in land but upon an interference with the rights
of the -ommunity at large.” (Jd., at p. 124, 99 Cal.Rptr.
350.) Here, the allegations of the second cause of action
for nuisance incorporate most of the allegations of the
first cause of action for inverse condemnation, which
A-40
inelude, inter alia, the allegation that jet flights over
appellants’ real properties ‘cause a substantial interfer-
ence with the use and peaceful enjoyment of [appellants’ |
real properties.” Appellants, as owners and residents of
the real property over which flights to and from the
Airport are made, have thus adequately alleged interfer-
ence with a property right upon which to predicate a claim
for damages for personal injury arising from private
nuisance.
[7] With respect to private nuisances, Civil Code
section 3501 provides that either a civil action (for dam-
ages) or abatement are available remedies. Appellants
have not sought abatement of the nuisance but have
elected to sue for damages for personal injuries allegedly
suffered as a consequence of the activities authorized by
respondent.’
[8] It is well-established in this state that owners or
operators of public airports are liable upon a nuisance
theory (public or private) for personal injuries and prop-
erty damage sustained by persons living in areas adjacent
to the airports caused by noise and vibrations from
aircraft using the facilities. (Greater Westchester Home-
owners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86,
160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329; Nestle v. City of Santa
Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d
480.) Cognizant of this, the question is thus whether the
nuisance complained of in the second cause of action is
permanent or continuous for purposes of determining
whether the statute of limitations bars the cause of action
for nuisance.
"In this state a party injured by maintenance of a nuisance need
not seek abatement thereof, but may sue for damages. (Mclvor v.
Mercer-Fraser Co. (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 247, 254, 172 P.2d 758.)
A-41
[9] There is no apparent dispute by appellants or
respondent over the applicable statute of limitations if
the nuisance is deemed permanent. Under the joint exer-
eise of powers agreement executed by defendant cities,
respondent was created as a separate public entity. As
such, the provisions of the Tort Claims Act (§ 800 et seq.)
are applicable. Specifically, appellants were required to
file a claim with respondent for their personal injuries as
a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit for damages
against respondent.
Section 911.2 provides: “A claim relating to a cause of
action...for injury to person...shall be presented...
not later than the 100th day after the accrual of the cause
of action... .’’ Section 901 provides, in part: “[T]he date
of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates
is the date upon which the cause of action would be
deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute
of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there
were no requirement that a claim be presented to and
acted upon by the public entity before an action could be
commenced thereon.”
The applicable statute of limitations for the alleged
personal injuries caused by aircraft noise and vibrations
as alleged in appellants’ second cause of action is one
year. (Code Civ.Proe., § 340.) Here, appellants instituted
the instant lawsuit within six months after their claims
were submitted to and denied by respondent (see
§ 911.2), and within one year of the period for which
appellants seek damages for their personal injuries.
Respondent, however, persuaded the trial court that
the nuisance complained of was required to be character-
ized as a permanent nuisance because the airport, itself,
eould not be abated.
fms ae
A-42
{10} Where a nuisance is considered permanent, the
limitations period runs from the time the nuisance is
created. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena (1945) 27 Cal.2d
104, 107, 162 P.2d 625.) “On thé other hand, if the
nuisance may be discontinued at any time it is considered
continuing in character. [Citations.] Every repetition of a
continuing nuisance is a separate wrong for which the
person injured may bring successive actions for damages
until the nuisance is abated, even though an action based
on the original wrong may be barred.” (/d., at pp. 107-
108, 162 P.2d 625.)
[11] Respondent argues that the sole test for deter-
mining whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing
depends upon whether the nuisance can be eliminated or
abated, or whether it is likely to continue indefinitely. In
support of these arguments, respondent relies primarily
upon Spaulding v. Cameron (1952) 38 Cal.2d 265, 239
P.2d 625, and Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co. (1955)
45 Cal.2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 and Code of Civil Procedure
section 73la.” Close scrutiny of these cases, however,
shows that even where a nuisance may not or need not be
“Code of Civil Procedure section 73la provides: “Whenever any
city, city and county, or county shall have established zones or
districts under authority of law wherein certain manufacturing or
commercial or airport uses are expressly permitted, except in an
action to abate a public nuisance brought in the name of the people of
the State of California, no person or persons, firm or corporation
shall be enjoined or restrained by the injunctive process from the
reasonable and necessary operation in any such industrial or com-
mercial zone or airport of any use expressly permitted therein, nor
shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evidence of the employ-
ment of unnecessary and injurious methods of operation. Nothing in
this act shall be deemed to apply to the regulation and working hours
of canneries, fertilizing plants, refineries and other similar establish-
ments whose operation produce offensive odors.”
A-43
abated (Code Civ.Proc., § 73la), appellants may, never-
theless, elect to treat that nuisance as continuing.
Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Cal.2d 265, 239 P.2d
625, involved an action for damages and for injunctive
relief brought by a homeowner whose property was sub-
| jected to damages from mud caused by the defendant’s
negligence in constructing a fill during leveling opera-
tions conducted by the defendant on his property located
near plaintiff's land. Plaintiff was awarded past and
future damages as well as injunctive relief in the form of
an order that defendant remove the fill or take protective
measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs prop-
erty. The Supreme Court reversed, in part, the trial
eourt’s judgment because the award of future damages
and the injunction to abate the nuisance were mutually
exclusive remedies and plaintiff was not entitled, there-
fore, to double recovery. The Supreme Court observed
that since there was evidence to support both remedies
(anticipated damages and the injunction), it could not be
said as a matter of law that the nuisance could or could
not be abated. The cause was remanded to the trial court
for a determination whether or not the nuisance was
permanent. The judgment for past and present damages
was affirmed.
Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., swpra, 45 Cal.2d
265, 288 P.2d 507, involved an action by homeowners
living adjacent to a cotton gin for damages (past, present
and future) for nuisance caused by the noxious odors,
fumes, dust and lint created by the cotton gin during its
operations. The evidence showed that the cotton gin was
operational for only six months out of each year. The
court observed at the outset of its opinion that “the
parties apparently treated the trespass as permanent
because of its recurrent character, rather than as a con-
i, ee asciasen Cue Rican aia ana siianinalacaiaatlall
hearin BB he
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A-44
tinuous trespass.” (/d., at p. 268, 288 P.2d 507.) The
issue whether plaintiffs could recover future damages was
discussed in light of Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38
Cal.2d 265, 239 P.2d 625, and revolved around the ques-
tion of whether the nuisance created by the cotton gin
should be characterized as continuing or permanent. The
court quoted from Spaulding as follows:
“The remedy for a continuing nuisance was either a
suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for damages
as new injuries occurred. Situations arose, however,
where injunctive relief was not appropriate or where
successive actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff
or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized
that some types of nuisances should be considered perma-
nent, and in such eases recovery of past and anticipated
future damages were allowed in one action. [Citations. |
“*The clearest case of a permanent nuisance or tres-
pass is one where the offending structure or condition is
maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a
publie utility. Sinee such conditions are ordinarily of
indefinite duration and since the utility by making com-
pensation is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate
that only one action should be allowed to recover for all
the damages inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to
subject it to successive suits and unfair to the injured
party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable
damages at once. [Citations. ]
‘““*A more diffieult problem is presented, however, if the
defendant is not privileged tv continue the nuisance or
trespass but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is
willing that it continue if he can secure full compensation
for both past and anticipated future injuries. To attempt
categorically to classify such a nuisance as either perma-
nent or not may lead to serious injustice to one or the
<<
—,
A-45
3 other of the parties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not
permanent and sues only for past damages, he may be met
with the plea of res judicata in a later action for addi-
tional injury if the court then decides the nuisance was
permanent in character from its inception. [Citation.]
Similarly, if the initial injury is slight and plaintiff delays
suit until he has suffered substantial damage and the
eourt then determines that the nuisance was permanent,
the defendant may be able to raise the defense that the
statute of limitations ran from the time of the initial
injury. [Citation.] On the other hand, if the defendant is
willing and able to abate the nuisance, it is unfair to
award damages on the theory that it will continue.
[ Citations. ]
“*Because of these difficulties it has been recognized
that in doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election
to treat the nuisaice as either permanent or not. [Cita-
tions.] If the defendant is not privileged to continue the
nuisance and is able to abate it, he carnot complain if the
plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as damages
accrue until abatement takes place. [Citations.] On the
other hand, if it appears improbable as a practical matter
that the nuisance can or wil! be abated, the plaintiff
should not be left to the troublesome remedy of succes-
sive actions. [Citations.]’”’ (Kernoff v. Kingsburg Cotton
Oil Co., supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 269-271, 288 P.2d 507.)
The court then made the following observation: “In the
present ease, defendant’s ginning mill is lawfully oper-
ated in a location properly zoned therefor and need not,
or may not (Code Civ.Proe., § 73la), be abated. If plain-
tiffs are not permitted to sue for all damages, past,
present, and future, then they must bring successive
actions each year at the close of each ginning season with
the attendant risk that the court may determine that the
—_——E~*~
A-46
trespass occurring the previous year was a permanent one
for which plaintiffs had been theretofore adequately com-
pensated. [{] It appears that here plaintiffs elected to sue
for all damages past, present and future and that such
damages are recoverable under the rule heretofore set
forth (Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Cal.3d 265 [239
P.2d 625]).” (Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., supra,
45 Cal.2d at p. 271, 288 P.2d 507.)
Implicit in this observation is cognizance of the plain-
tiffs’ election to characterize the nvisance as permanent.
Nothing in Spaulding or Kornoff s: *gests that where an
operation of an enterprise need not. may not be abated
(Code Civ.Proce., § 731a), a plaintiff seeking recovery for
damages upon a theory of nuisance must elect to treat the
nuisance as permanent. It is also observed that Code of
Civil Procedure section 731la does not preclude the rights
of landowners, such as appellants, who suffer from air-
plane annoyances to seek damages from the owners or
operators of an airport. (See Loma Portal Civic Club v.
American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 39 Cal. Rptr.
708, 394 P.2d 548; Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn.
v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 26 Cal.3d 86, 160 Cal.Rptr.
733, 603 P.2d 1329.) There are no California cases which
hold that even where injunctive relief is unavailable under
Code of Civil Procedure section 73la, the nuisance for
which damages or compensation is sought must be charac-
terized as permanent.
Indeed, the language of Nestle v. City of Santa Monica,
supra, 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480,
supports the conclusion that nuisances caused by the
owners or operators of airports are not necessarily perma-
nent but may be characterized as continuous nuisances
for purposes of resolving disputes concerning the statute
of limitations. In Nestle, homeowners brought suit against
ee
A-47
the City of Santa Moniea for injuries alleged to have been
suffered by virtue of the city’s operation of the Santa
Monica Airport. The homeowners sought to recover prop-
erty and personal injury damages claiming that “vibra-
tion, fumes, and noise emanating from jet aircraft landing
and taking off at the airport caused damage to their
property, interfered with the free enjoyment of their
property and resulted in physical pain, suffering and
emotional disturbance.” (Id., at p. 924, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568,
496 P.2d 480.) The homeowners asserted theories of
inverse condemnation, nuisance, negligence and zoning
violations as the bases of recovery. The trial court ruled,
inter alia, that the homeowners had failed to state facts
sufficient to state a cause of action for nuisance upon the
theory that the city was immune from liability for
damages.
The Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that
the City of Santa Monica was not immune from liability.
The court then observed: “On remand, concern over appli-
eation of the proper statute of limitations may arise. If
appellants demonstrate that whatever nuisance caused by
the defendant is continuing in nature, every repetition of
the wrong may create further liability. Hence, the statute
of. limitations would not run merely from the original
intrusion. This is the well-settled rule with respect to
property damage (see, e.g., Phillips v. City of Pasadena
(1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625]), and it
would be incongruous fo» 927i repetition to be considered
a separate wrong for property damage purposes but not
for personal injuries....Accordiugly, if the stetute of
limitations becomes an issue, the trial court must deter-
mine whether nuisance causing personal injury loss has
concluded or is continuing and then apply the appropriate
statute of limitations principles.” (Nestle v. City of Santa
A-48
Monica, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 937-938, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568,
496 P.2d 480; fn. omitted.)
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Nestle v. City of
Santa Monica, supra, 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496
P.2d 480, also rejected the trial court’s conclusion that
“the airport was not a nuisance because it was maintained
under the authority of several statutes. Section 3482 of
the Civil Code provides: ‘Nothing which is done or main-
tained under the express authority of a statute can be
deemed a nuisance.’”’ (Id., at p. 938, fn. 16, 101 Cal. Rptr.
568, 496 P.2d 480.) The court then wrote: “In Hassell v.
San Francisco (1938) 11 Cal.2d 168 [78 P.2d 1021],
appellant contended that, by virtue of section 3482, the
construction of a public convenience station above ground
eould not constitute a nuisance. In rejecting that argu-
ment, we interpreted the section narrowly, stating (at p.
171 [78 P.2d 1021]): ‘“A statutory sanction cannot be
pleaded in justification of acts which by the general rules
of law constitute a nuisance, unless the acts complained
of are authorized by the express terms of the statute
under which the justification is made, or by the plainest
and most necessary implication from the powers ex-
pressly conferred, so that it can be fairly stated that the
legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which
oeceasions the injury.”’” (/d., at p. 938, fn. 16, 101
Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480.) Therefore, “although an
activity authorized by statute cannot be a nuisance, the
manner in which the activity is performed may constitute
a nuisance.” (Venuto v. Corning-Owens Fiberglas Corp.,
supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 129, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350.)
[12] These rules persuade us that respondent’s argu-
ment that the Airport must be characterized as a perma-
nent nuisance because it cannot be abated is not sound.
While it is clear that the Airport may not be abated and
A-49
may not be considered a nuisance absent specific allega-
tions concerning “unnecessary and injurious” methods of
operations (Code Civ.Proc., § 731a), it is also clear that
the manner in which the authorized activity is conducted
may constitute a nuisance. It is this type of nuisance
which serves as the basis of appellants’ cause of action for
nuisance. Through incorporation by reference many of the
allegations of the first cause of action for inverse condem-
nation, appellants have alleged in the cause of action for
nuisance that the activities (flights) causing the nuisance
“have continued to the date of [the] complaint.” This
allegation, in conjunction with the allegation that the
personal injuries suffered as a “result of interference,
noise, and vibrations ...is for the period from 100 days
prior to the filing of the claim to the date of the trial,”
shows that: (1) the noise and vibrations caused by the
flight patterns authorized over appellants’ homes may
constitute a private nuisance, and (2) that appellants
have elected to characterize the nuisance as continuous.
We conclude that appellants did state facts sufficient to
state a cause of action for nuisance and that the cause of
action for nuisance is not barred by the statute of
limitations.”
*In this ease the question of whether the noise levels, scheduling of
flights and location of flight patterns can be altered while at the same
time respondent can still operate the Airport is a fact question which
has not been reached yet, inasmuch as we are dealing with pleading
issues raised on demurrer.
4-50
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a
new order sustaining the demurrer to the first cause of
action and overruling the demurrer to the second cause of
action, allowing respondent time to answer.
KINGSLEY, Acting P.J., and LUCAS, J.*, coneur.
*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
A-51
APPENDIX C
Order Of Los Angeles County Superior Court Below
Superior Court Of The State Of California For The
County Of Los Angeles.
Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth L. Baker, et al., Plaintiffs, vs.
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, Defen-
dant. Case No. C 413 871.
Order Sustaining Demurrer Without Leave To Amend
And Judgment Of Dismissal.
The demurrer of defendant Burbank-Glendale-
Pasadena Airport Authority to the First Amended Com-
plaint having been submitted on March 8, 1983, and the
Court having heard the argument of counsel and consid-
ered all the moving papers in connection therewith, the
Court rules as follows:
(1) The First Cause of Action (inverse condemna-
tion) of the First Amended Complaint fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action;
(2) The Second Cause of Action of the First
Amended Complaint seeks damages for the mainte-
nance of a nuisance. The proper legal test for deter-
mining whether the airport is a permanent nuisance
is whether the nuisance is subject to judicial, as
opposed to voluntary, abatement. As an airport serv-
ing the public, the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-
port is not subject to judicial abatement. Therefore,
if the airport is a nuisance, it is a permanent nui-
sance and plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
and is barred by the provisions of California Govern-
A-52
ment Code Section 911.2 and by California Code of
Civil Procedure Sections 338(2) and 340.
The Court further finds that there is no reasonable
possibility that plaintiffs can amend their First Amended
Complaint to state any cause of action entitling plaintiffs
to any relief against the defendant and that defendant’s
demurrer to plaintiff's First Amended Complaint should
therefore be sustained without leave to amend. Defend-
ants are entitled to recover their costs in the amount of
$ pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1032 et seq.
This Order constitutes a judgment of dismissal with
prejudice and is effective for all purposes and the Clerk is
ordered to enter said judgment in accordance with Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure Section 581(d).
A-53
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 5, 1983.
MAX F. DEUTZ
Judge of the Superior Court
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City and County of Los Angeles; I am over the age of
eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my
business address is: 1706 Maple Avenue, Los Angeles,
California.
On December 23, 1985, I served the within Petition for
Writ of Certiorari in re: “Burbank Glendale v. Kenneth L.
Baker” in the United States Supreme Court, October
Term 1985, No.... .
on the Attorneys in said action, by placing 3 copies
thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage fully
prepaid, in the United States post office mail box at Los
Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
John J. Schimmenti
Schimmenti, Mullins & Berberian
999 No. Supelveda Blvd., #602
El Segundo, CA 90245
I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on December 23, 1985, at Los Angeles,
California : |
é
ne. bik P2cleste/
CE CE MEDINA
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.