Appendix — Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.
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ame Court, U.S
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DEC 17 198)
No.
— ;
CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
CHRISTINE A. CRAFT,
Petitioner,
VS.
METROMEDIA, INC.,
Respondent.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DENNIS E. EGAN
Counsel of Record
Missouri I.D. No. 27449
PoPpHAM, CONWAY, SWEENY, FREMONT
& BuNDSCHU, P.C.
1300 Commerce Trust Building
922 Walnut Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
(816) 221-2288
Attorneus for Petitioner
E. L. MeNDENHALL, INc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX
Opinion by the Court of Appeals, June 28, 1986 ............ Al
Judgment of Court of Appeals ..................2...:.ssscecceeeeeeeeeee= A34
Order of the Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc, and Modifying Earlier Opinion,
I TIS Fre BI aces esinsecrintenttcsesinnicdeesane A36
Modification of Opinion of June 28, 1985, Issued August
I I cic sas tasica eeescadeceeclenhcbandbniecnipiensndntlighaininisiaidiadaaaiancunitaaeion A38
Memorandum and Order of the District Court, Oc-
i CIEE cciibbaennbicccniceteittensncscictunitotalopenecinisieniaseaniuraimeaeiinettin A39
Judgment on Fraud Verdict in Joplin, January 13,
1984 ...... panihdebiliaviialida A70
Order of the District Court Overruling Defendant’s
Motion for Directed Verdict, January 13, 1984 ........ A7l1
Order of the District Court Overruling Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment n.o.v. or for New Trial, Feb-
ruary 7, 1984 Sisiniabbaaiiiieadasdcasaaaiblebansnien A73
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestions for Rehear-
Te Be ncchncscalnnices-toseicspncitneeevnsinieaceactoeenisaitinsidannanmariitas AT
Appellate Review of Civil Jury Verdicts ......................- A107
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APPENDIX
Christine A. CRAFT,
Appellee/Cross-Appeilant,
Vv.
METROMEDIA, INC.,
_ Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 84-1336, 84-1380.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 14, 1985.
Decided June 28, 1985.
A2
Before LAY, Chief Judge, and McMILLIAN and
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Christine Craft was reassigned from coanchor to re-
porter by KMBC-TV in Kansas City, Missouri, and as a
result brought this action against the station’s owner and
operator, Metromedia, Inc. Craft alleged that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation
of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. (1982), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), and that she had been fraud-
ulently induced into accepting the KMBC employment.
The primary focus of the suit was KMBC’s concern with
appearance—whether the station’s standards for on-air
personnel were stricter and more strictly enforced as to
females than as to males and whether the station mis-
represented to Craft its intentions as to changing her
appearance to persuade her to accept the anchor job. The
district court! found against Craft on her Title VII sex
discrimination claim and refused a new trial as to the
jury verdict against her on her equal pay claim. The
court, however, set aside as excessive the jury verdict
in Craft’s favor on the fraud claim and ordered a new
trial. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 868 (W.D.
Mo.1983). Craft appeals from these rulings while Meiro-
media appeals from the judgment on the jury verdict,
1. The Honorable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., United States
District Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri.
A3
again in Craft’s favor, in the second fraud trial. We
affirm the Title VII and Equal Pay Act judgments against
Craft but further conclude that she did not make a sub-
missible case on her fraud claim and thus reverse the
judgment against Metromedia on that issue.
Christine Craft commenced her television career in
mid-1975 as a weeknight weather reporter at a small
station in Salinas, California. After about a year and a
half, during which she also worked as an announcer,
reporter, and substitute sportscaster, she became the week-
end weather anchor at a San Francisco television station.
She spent a year there, again handling some additional
news and substitute sports assignments.
Craft then was hired by Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem to host the “Women in Sports” portion of its network
television program “CBS Sports Spectacular.” At the
network’s behest she had her hair cut short and bleached
blond. She was required to use black eyebrow pencil
and dark red lipstick, and a CBS technician applied heavy
makeup before every on-air appearance. “Women in
Sports” was discontinued after thirty weeks, and Craft
returned to California.
About a year later Craft resumed her television career
as a reporter at a station in Santa Barbara, California.
She remained there, also serving as coanchor of the late
news and occasionally doing sports and weather, until
December 1980, when she began work at KMBC.
KMBC, having slipped in its local news ratings, had
determined to adopt the coanchor format used by its two
major competitors in Kansas City. Furthermore, it had
determined that, because of the perceived “coldness” of
its anchor, Scott Feldman, the new position was to be
filled by a female to “soften” its news presentation. The
A4
station obtained tapes of a number of performers, including
Craft, from Media Associates of Dallas. After studying
these tapes, KMBC news director Ridge Shannon con-
tacted Craft, among other individuals, to see if she was
interested in auditioning for the job. Craft described her
unpleasant experience at CBS and made plain that she
was not interested if KMBC intended a “makeover” of
her appearance. She continued to stress this point while
in Kansas City for the audition, and Shannon and R. Kent
Replogle, vice president and general manager of KMBC,
assured her they planned no changes such as those at CBS.
Shannon did mention that KMBC made some use of con-
sultants, and Craft indicated some willingness to work
on her appearance and dress.
Craft accepted the coanchor position at KMBC and
at the station’s request stopped in Dallas for a meeting
with Lynn Wilford of Media Associates before reporting
to Kansas City. She made her debut as coanchor on
January 5, 1981, and the testimony is essentially uncon-
tradicted that Shannon and Replogle immediately began
having concerns about her clothing and makeup. Wilford
came to Kansas City on January 14 to work with Craft
on dress as well as on various aspects of her presentation
technique. It was during this visit that Wilford for the only
time applied Craft’s makeup, and the results on the 6 p.m,
news were so unsatisfactory that Craft was allowed to
remove the makeup before the 10 p.m. broadcast.
In the following months Shannon continued to make
occasional suggestions or criticisms as to certain articles
of Craft’s clothing, and Craft was provided with materials,
including the book Women’s Dress for Success, on ward-
robe and makeup. Then, beginning in April, KMBC ar-
ranged for Macy’s Department Store to provide clothing
for Craft in exchange for advertising time. Craft was
A5
assisted by a consultant from Macy’s in selecting outfits.
She would then return to the KMBC studio, try on the
clothing, and appear before camera so tapes could be
made to send to Wilford for review.
On May 19 and 20, 1981, Media Associates initiated
some research of viewer perceptions of KMBC’s newscasts
by conducting four “focus group” discussions. By this
technique groups of ten individuals viewed sample video
tapes of local news programs and then gave their reactions
in sessions moderated by a Media Associates representa-
tive. The response to Craft’s appearance was, as summed
up by the district court, “overwhelmingly negative.” 572
F.Supp. at 873. When Replogle and Shannon met with
Craft the following day to discuss this result, Craft at first
wanted to be let out of her contract to return to California.
Replogle, however, stated that management was ready
to work with her to overcome the problems, and Craft
ultimately agreed to cooperate. Thereafter, her wardrobe
was more closely supervised, and the “clothing calendar’?
then mentioned by Replogle was eventually instituted in
late July or early August.
As a further follow-up, KMBC and Media Associates
in late June conducted a telephone survey of some 400
randomly selected persons in the greater Kansas City
viewing area. These persons were asked to respond to a
questionnaire specifically drafted to pursue issues raised
in the focus group discussions. For example in one seg-
ment the survey participants were asked to rank Craft
in comparison with the female coanchors at KMBC’s com-
2. The “clothing calendar” was a calendar given to Craft
showing in detail for each day the blazer, blouse, and skirt (or
occasionally siacks) she was to wear. A note in one corner
indicated that the appropriate accessory would be either a single
strand of pearls or a single gold chain.
A6
petitors in response to some fourteen statements, four of
which dealt with “good looks” or the dress of and image of
a “professional anchor woman.” Craft came out trailing
in almost every category. Media Associates’ report on
the results of this survey, which was conveyed to Shannon
and Replogle on August 3, 1981, suggested that Craft
was having an extremely adverse impact on KMBC’s ac-
ceptance among Kansas City viewers. On August 13 Media
Associates recommended that Craft be replaced, and
KMBC, after initial resistance, agreed.
The next day Shannon told Craft she was being re-
assigned to reporter at no loss of pay or contractual bene-
fits. He characterized the results of the research, in the
language of the district court, as “devastating and un-
precedented in the history of the consultants of Media As-
sociates.” 572 F.Supp. at 874. Craft states that Shannon
also told her she was being reassigned because the audi-
ence perceived her as too old, too unattractive, and not
deferential enough to men. Shannon, however, specifically
denies making such a statement, and the district court
believed his version of the conversation. Id.
After the weekend Craft sent a telegram to KMBC
refusing to accept reassignment, and when further dis-
cussions failed to resolve the matter, she returned to
Santa Barbara where on September 1, 1981, she commenced
work as a coanchor at the television station at which
she previously had been employed. This suit followed in
four counts: the Title VII sex discrimination and the
fraud counts, the allegation of violation of the Equal Pay
Act based on the differential between Craft’s and Scott
Feldman’s salaries, and an allegation of prima facie tort
based on an intent by KMBC to injure Craft. This last
count was abandoned during the first trial in Kansas
City.
A7
Following that first trial the district court rejected
the findings of the advisory jury® on the Title VII sex
discrimination claim and entered judgment for Metro-
media on that issue. The district court found that KMBC
required both male and female on-air personnel to main-
tain professional, businesslike appearances “consistent with
community standards” and that the station enforced that
requirement in an evenhanded, nondiscriminatory manner.
572 F.Supp. at 877-78. Any greater attention to Craft’s
appearance, the court concluded, was “tailored to fit her
individual needs” and was necessary because of her “be-
low-average aptitude” in matters of clothing and makeup.
Id. at 878. The district court also found that Craft had
not been constructively discharged because there was in-
sufficient evidence that her working conditions had be-
come so intolerable that she had no choice but to quit or
that KMBC had intended to force her resignation. Id.
at 879. Finally, the court concluded that the telephone
survey conducted by Media Associates had not been dis-
criminatory or designed to effect Craft’s removal as co-
anchor and that KMBC had reasonably relied on the survey
results as the basis for the personnel change. id. at 873-
878-79.
As to the Equal Pay Act count, the district court
upheld the jury verdict in favor of Metromedia and re-
fused to grant Craft a new trial. It rejected her allegations
of error in the jury instructions and in the exclusion of cer-
tain testimony and concluded that the weight of the evi-
dence was not contrary to the jury’s finding that Feld-
man’s higher salary was based on permissible factors such
3. There is no right to a jury trial in a Title VII suit
Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410 (8th Cir.
1978). Advisory use of the jury is authorized by Rule 39(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A8
as his education in broadcasting, his greater experience in
major television markets, and his established identity with
Kansas City viewers.* Id. at 876, 879-80.
The district court, however, granted Metromedia a
new trial on the fraud count. In a bifurcated procedure the
Kansas City jury had found liability and awarded Craft
$375,000 in actual damages and then, after additional in-
structions, had awarded her $125,000 in punitive damages.
The court declared itself “firmly convinced” that the ver-
dict was “excessive” and “the result of passion, prejudice,
confusion, or mistake on the part of the jury.” Id. at 881.
In support it cited the “unprincipled” award of actual dam-
ages nearly double that requested by Craft in her com-
plaint (and nearly four times the amount she asked for
at closing argument), instructional errors as to wrongful
discharge and in the implementation of the bifurcated dam-
ages submission, and the “incessant and overwhelming”
publicity surrounding the case. Id. at 881-82. The dis-
trict court ordered that the new trial on the fraud count
be held in Joplin, Missouri, with the jury to be seques-
tered. Id. at 882.
On retrial the jury again found for Craft, awarding
$225,000 actual and $100,000 punitive damages. After the
district court denied motions for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and for another new trial, Metromedia filed
this appeal and Craft cross-appealed from the adverse
determinations on her Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims.
4. Craft had also asserted the pay differential as an inci-
dent of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, but the dis-
trict court held that that claim was merely duplicative of the
Equal Pay Act count and found the jury verdict dispositive. See
Orahood v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ark., 645 F.2d 651,
654 n. 3 (8th Cir.1981) (defendant may not be held liable under
Title VII when one of four affirmative defenses of the Equal
Pay Act has been established); see generally Washington County
v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981).
A9
Craft’s attacks on the district court’s disposition of
her Title VII sex discrimination claim are essentially
factual, rather than legal as she contends. Her central
position is that KMBC’s appearance standards were based
on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes and were
applied to women more constantly and vigorously than
they were applied to men. Her further contentions that the
district court erred in finding certain grooming cases con-
trolling and in allowing Metromedia to rebut her prima
facie case with stereotypical customer preferences follow
only if we accept her central factual position.
A.
As an initial matter Craft argues that, since her case
was one involving direct evidence of discrimination, the
district court erred in failing to shift the burden to Metro-
media to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have taken the challenged actions even in the
absence of gender bias. E.g., Bell v. Birmingham Linen
Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied,
on USS. ......... 104 S.Ct. 2385, 81 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984); Lee
v. Russell County Board of Education, 684 F.2d 769, 774
(11th Cir.1982). The cases relied on by Craft, however,
involved direct testimony of discrimination accepted by
the trier of fact. Bell, 715 F.2d at 1557; Lee, 684 F.2d at
774-75. It is apparent that the district court did not accept
any such testimony in this case. Thus, the burden-shifting
rule for which Craft argues could have no application here,
and we need not give further consideration to whether it
should be adopted by this circuit. See Clay v. Hyatt
Regency Hotel, 724 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir.1984) (no direct
evidence that employer acted with a discriminatory mo-
tive); see also Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 118 (8th
Al0
Cir.1985) (to same effect in handicapped discrimination
suit under 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
In the alternative, Craft argues that she also estab-
lished a Title VII violation through use of circumstantial
evidence and inferences under the McDonnell Douglas
pattern of proof.° The district court plainly considered
whether KMBC’s position was pretextual, which indicates
that it reached its decision through this mode of analysis.
On review, however, we need not discuss the record in
terms of “prima facie case,” “articulation of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason,” and “pretext” but instead may
look directly to the ultimate factual issue: whether the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403
(1983); see Easley v. Empire Inc., 757 F.2d 923, 929-30
(8th Cir.1985). As the district court recognized, the bur-
den of proof on this issue always remains with the plain-
tiff. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 876-77 (quoting Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253,
101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). A finding
of intentional discrimination is a factual finding, Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d
66 (1982), cited in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
5. Under the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 1824-45, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), after a party suffering
an adverse employment action proves some set of facts—the
“prima facie case’—sufficient to give rise to an inference that
the employer was motivated by discrimination, the employer
must then articulate a legitimate reason for the decision so as
to dispel the inference of discrimination while finally the ag-
grieved party has the opportunity to show that the reason artic-
ulated was a pretext and that the employer actually was im-
properly motivated. See generally Texas Den’t of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207
(1981).
All
Jase US. ........, 105 S.Ct, 1504, 1508, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985),
and the court found against Craft.
Finally, Craft argues that the district court erred in
finding her claim of discrimination in employment con-
ditions controlled by grooming cases such as Knott v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir.1975).
In Knott we held that appearance regulations making
distinctions on the basis of sex will not support allegations
of discrimination when the standards are reasonable and
are enforced as to both sexes in an evenhanded manner.
Id. at 1252. Again what Craft really contests is the dis-
trict court’s factual determination that KMBC’s actions
concerning the appearance of its on-air personnel fell
within the Knott guidelines.
Because many of Craft’s arguments boldly seek re-
evaluation of the evidence and rejection of the district
court’s factual findings, we make clear our limited stan-
dard of review in such cases. Factual findings may be
set aside only when clearly erroneous. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
52(a). Our “foremost principle” is that “‘a finding is
“clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer
COIR, asin is Sees , 10° S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518
(1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746
(1948) ); see Hoefelman v. Conservation Commission of
Missouri, 718 F.2d 281, 285 (8th Cir.1983). We may
not duplicate the function of the district court by making
our own determination of the facts and reversing if we
believe we would have decided the case differently:
“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence,
Al2
the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.” Anderson, 105 S.Ct. at 1512; Inwood Labora-
tories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 857-58, 102 S.Ct.
2182, 2190-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982).
Furthermore, we have stated that the burden is on
the objecting party to clearly demonstrate error in the
factual findings. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. General
Electric Co., 758 F.2d 319, 323 (8th Cir.1985); Hunt v.
Pan American Energy, 540 F.2d 894, 901 (8th Cir.1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 786, 50 L.Ed.2d 778
(1977); Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147, 150 n. 2
(8th Cir.1975). The evidence is to be construed in the
light most favorable to the party prevailing below. Taut-
fest v. City of Lincoln, 742 F.2d 477, 481 (8th Cir.1984);
United Barge Co. v. Notre Dame Fleeting & Towing Ser-
vice, 568 F.2d 599, 602 (8th Cir.1978).
We turn first to the most prominent factual element
of Craft’s case—her testimony that Shannon told her she
was being reassigned because she was too old, too unat-
tractive, and not deferential enough to men or because
the audience perceived her as such. Shannon, however,
specifically denied making that statement. The only addi-
tional evidence® was that of Feldman, who testified on
6. Craft argues that the statement attributed to Shannon
would be consistent with the survey results and the station’s
interpretation thereof; however, no questions on the survey dealt
with age, and Craft actually was rated lowest among her female
counterparts as to the strength “does not play second fiddle’ to
male anchor. The testimony of Brenda Williams that Shannon
told her Craft was being removed because people didn’t like her
appearance is basically consistent with what the district court
found Shannon did tell Craft and does not support the idea that
Shannon went further and made the “too old” comment. Fi-
nally, Craft argues that the district court never expressly re-
(Continued on following page)
Al3
the stand at trial that he did not recall Shannon making
such a comment but who had said in his deposition that
Shannon had done so—again diametrically opposite testi-
mony, this time from one witness. Credibility thus was
central to the district court’s finding on this point.
Respect for the role of the district court is especially
crucial as to determinations which rest on “variations in
demeanor and tone of voice” of the witnesses and “the
listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.”
Anderson, 105 S.Ct. at 1512 (emphasis added). The Su-
preme Court has cautioned:
[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision
to credit the testimony of one of two or more wit-
nesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially
plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent,
can virtually never be clear error.
Id. at 1513 (emphasis added). The district court was in
the best position to determine whether to believe Shannon
or Craft, and there are no circumstances suggesting any
basis for finding clear error in the district court’s choice
in favor of Shannon.
Craft next argues, as do the amici curiae, that the dis-
trict court clearly erred in failing to find that KMBC en-
forced appearance standards more strictly as to female
Footnote continued—
jected her testimony that Shannon also told her viewers wanted
to see “young, pretty women for news anchors.” We believe,
however, that this statement was implicitly discounted by the
court through its failure to include any such comment in its af-
firmative findings as to what Shannon did say to Craft and
through its discrediting of the “too old, too unattractive” testi-
mony. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 874.
Al4
than as to male on-air personnel.’ In support of her
position she points to the evidence most favorable to her,
which shows that only females were subject to daily
scrutiny of their appearance or were ever required to
change clothes at the station before going on the air and
that no male was ever directed to take time from his
journalistic duties to select clothing, with the help of a
consultant, from Macy’s and to test that clothing on
camera for the approval of another consultant. The dis-
trict court, however, concluded that such facts, in light
of other evidence, showed only that KMBC was concerned
with the appearance of all.its on-air personnel and that
it took measures appropriate to individual situations,
characteristics, and shortcomings. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at
875, 876, 878. The court found that KMBC had only
gradually increased its attentions to Craft’s appearance,
with the institution of the clothing calendar representing
the culmination of efforts made necessary when lesser
suggestions, such as those complied with by other per-
sonnel, proved ineffective. Id. at 878.
The evidence shows that one female, Brenda Williams,
had never been the subject of criticism for her appearance
while numerous males on occasion had been given specific
7. The court instead concluded,
If anything, [the] evidence shows a consistent concern by
management over the appearance of all on-air personnel
without regard to sex but with regard to the peculiar char-
acteristics of each employee. Plaintiff was an employee of
atypical aptitudes and attitudes, and defendant merely acted
to correct appearance problems which plaintiff was unable
or unwilling to remedy. The actions taken by defendant in
regard to plaintiff’s appearance were not the result of any
general animus toward women or of any specific animus to-
ward plaintiff as a woman. It may well be that in plaintiff's
case some of the steps taken by management were unprece-
dented, but they were not ipso facto discriminatory.
Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 878.
Al5
directions as to their individual shortcomings. Mike Placke,
for example, had been told to lose weight, to get better-
fitting clothes, to refrain from wearing sweaters under
jackets, and to tie his necktie in a certain manner. Sim-
ilarly, Michae] Mahoney had been told to lose weight and
to pay more attention to his wardrobe and hairstyle, while
Bob Werley had been told to try wearing contact lenses
and to get a hair piece and had been given a makeup
chart on a form similar to that used with Craft. Shannon
had discussed hair or moustache problems with Tim Rich-
ardson, Dave Dusik, Stan Carmack, and Corrice Collins,
and Craig Sager had been advised to improve his ward-
robe. Even Feldman on at least two occasions had re-
ceived specific directives regarding his choice of shirts,
and the Macy’s clothing consultant who worked with Craft
testified that she had also met with Feldman and Dusik.
Media Associates eventually prepared wardrobe “dos” and
“don’ts” for male as well as female newscasters.* The
district court found that the male personnel generally com-
plied with grooming suggestions.
An interpretation of this record as showing that KMBC
enforced its appearance standards equally as to males and
females in response to individual problems is neither “il-
logical” nor “implausible” and has “support in inferences
that may be drawn from the facts.” Anderson, 105 S.Ct.
at 1513. We cannot conclude that the district court erred
in this respect.
Our determination is not altered by the testimony,
cited by Craft, of the consultant Wilford or of other
female KMBC employees to the effect that the station put
8. Shannon testified that the tips for females were prepared
in May 1981 primarily for Craft while the guides for males were
not prepared until November 1981, around three months after
Craft left the station.
Al6
more emphasis on the appearance of females. This testi-
mony represents only the opinions and impressions of the
witnesses as to KMBC’s policy, and the district court by
implication rejected such opinions, making its own finding
to the contrary on the record.® The court also apparently
chose not to believe testimony by Pam Whiting that
Shannon had said it was more important for she and
Craft than for Feldman to look good on the air; Whiting
herself had been subject to a great deal of attention as
to her appearance and had eventually left the station,
and on the stand she expressed the opinion that appearance
was overemphasized in television news and said she hoped
Craft prevailed. Finally, the district court attributed the
use in the survey of questions on appearance and good
looks only as to female anchors as prompted not by sexual
bias but by the concerns raised as to Craft by the focus
groups. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 873. The viewers were
asked to rank the male anchors on more points concern-
ing personality and “coldness,” Feldman’s perceived weak-
nesses. The inclusion of a makeup criterion and a require-
ment that Craft not deviate from her clothing calendar
in the “standards of performance” by which her work was
to be evaluated, in contrast to the absence of any appear-
ance objectives in Feldman’s “standards of performance,”
similarly just reflected management’s efforts to pursue
with personnel their individual weaknesses.*°
9. Furthermore, the female employees generally testified
only that they had no knowledge of criticisms by KMBC of the
appearance of male on-air personnel. In a strict sense such
testimony is not even inconsistent with that of Shannon that
such criticisms were made.
10. Feldman’s temper and personality, for example, were
his special problems. He frequently argued with the female
producers, and management had spoken to him about his “throw-
ing curve balls” during newcasts to fluster other on-air person-
nel. In addition, he had been sharply reprimanded for referring
to Craft in the newsroom as “that girl.”
Al7
Craft further argues, however, again joined by the
amici curiae, that even if KMBC was evenhanded in ap-
plying its appearance standards, the district court erred
in failing to recognize that the standards themselves were
discriminatory." She contends that she was forced to
conform to a stereotypical image of how a woman anchor
should appear. The evidence included a communication
from the consultant, Wilford, to Shannon suggesting that
Craft purchase more blouses with “feminine touches,”
such as bows and ruffles, because many of her clothes
were “too masculine.” The general wardrobe hints for
females developed by Media Associates warned that
women with “soft” hairstyles and looks should wear blazers
to establish their authority and credibility while women
with short “masculine” hairstyles shouldn’t wear “mas-
culine” clothing in dark colors and with strong lines be-
cause they would appear too “aggressive.” The district
court found that Craft had been hired to “soften” KMBC’s
news presentation. id. at 871.
The “dos” and “don’ts” for anchors suggested that
while males should remember “professional image,” female
anchors were to remember “professional elegance” (em-
phasis added). The outfits on the clothing calendar given
to Craft were dominated by recognized fashion labels.
Wilford testified that in April she had told Craft not to
wear the same outfit more than once every three to four
weeks because people would start calling in about it; males,
11. The court instead concluded,
Thus, defendant’s standards of appearance for its on-air
personnel can in no way be considered discriminatory per se.
Both men and women were required to maintain a profes-
sional, business-like appearance consistent with community
standards. Since television is a visual medium, as plaintiff
admitted in her testimony, such a reasonable requirement
is obviously critical to defendant’s economic well-being.
Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 877.
Al8
however, Wilford said, could wear an outfit every week
and a suit even twice within the same week if combined
with a different tie. Wilford further testified that viewers
—particularly other women—criticize women more se-
verely than men for their appearance on camera and
that women’s dress is more complex and demanding be-
cause “society has made it that way.” Craft’s argument
is that these differing standards as to females reflect
customer preferences, which a number of cases have
held cannot justify discriminatory practices. E.g., Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 275, 30 L.Ed.2d 267
(1971); see also Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d
602, 609 (9th Cir.1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074, 103
S.Ct. 1534, 75 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil
Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir.1981).
The district court, however, found that KMBC’s ap-
pearance standards were based instead on permissible
factors. 572 F.Supp. at 877. While there may have
been some emphasis on the feminine stereotype of “soft-
ness” and bows and ruffles and on the fashionableness of
female anchors, the evidence suggests such concerns were
incidental to a true focus on consistency of appearance,
proper coordination of colors and textures, the effects of
studio lighting on clothing and makeup, and the greater
degree of conservatism thought necessary in the Kansas
City market. The “dos” and “don’ts” for female anchors
addressed the need to avoid, for example, tight sweaters
or overly “sexy” clothing and extreme “high fashion” or
“sporty” outfits while the male “dos” and “don’ts sim-
ilarly cautioned against “frivolous” colors and “extreme”
textures and styles as damaging to the “authority” of
newscasters. These criteria do not implicate the primary
thrust of Title VII, which is to prompt employers to “dis-
Al19g
card outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment
disadvantages for one sex.” Knott v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad, 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir.1975); see gen-
erally Note, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against
Television Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Ap-
pearance, 85 Colum.L.Rev. 190, 201 (1985).™
Courts have recognized that the appearance of a com-
pany’s employees may contribute greatly to the company’s
image and success with the public and thus that a rea-
sonable dress or grooming code is a proper management
prerogrative. E.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register Co.,
481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C.Cir.1973); La Von Lanigan v.
Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F.Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D.Mo.
1979). Evidence showed a particular concern with ap-
pearance in television; the district court stated that rea-
sonable appearance requirements were “obviously critical”
to KMBC’s economic well-being; and even Craft admitted
12. Dress requirements that have been found to violate
Title VII have generally involved, for example, demeaning stereo-
types as to female characteristics and abilities or stereotypical
notions of female attractiveness or use of female sexuality to
attract business. E.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d
602, 608-09 (9th Cir.1982) (weight requirements for female flight
attendants to insure slenderness), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074,
103 S.Ct. 1534, 75 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Carroll v. Talman Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir.1979) (re-
quirement that only female employees wear uniforms was de-
meaning and implied that females had lesser professional status
and was based on the stereotype that females are so caught up
in competition as to appearance that they cannot adhere to
good business taste as to dress), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929, 100
S.Ct. 1316, 63 L.Ed.2d 762 (1980); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,
567 F.2d 429, 439 n. 24 (D.C.Cir.1976) (female cabin attendants
forbidden to wear eyeglasses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98
S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); Equal Empl. Opportunity
Comm’n v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp. 599, 607-11 (S.D.
N.Y.1981) (female lobby attendant required to wear revealing and
provocative uniform that subjected her to sexual harassment).
Cf. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.Supp. 292 (N.D.
Tex.1981) (flight attendant position limited to females by em-
ployer who merely wished to exploit female sexuality as a
marketing tool to attract customers and insure profitability).
A20
she recognized that television was a visual medium and
that on-air personnel would need tc wear appropriate
clothes and makeup. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 877; see Note, su-
pra, at-201 (“As television is a visual medium, television
networks and local stations clearly have a right to re-
quire both male and female anchors to maintain a pro-
fessional appearance while on camera.”). While we be-
lieve the record shows an overemphasis by KMBC on
appearance, we are not the proper forum in which to
debate the relationship between newsgathering and dis-
semination and considerations of appearance and presenta-
tion—i.e., questions of substance versus image—in television
journalism. The record does not leave us with the “def-
inite and firm conviction” that the district court erred
or adopted an impermissible view of the evidence when
it concluded that KMBC’s appearance standards were
shaped only by neutral professional and technical con-
siderations and not by any stereotypical notions of female
roles and images.
We further reject the argument of Craft that the
perception, discussed above, that she would add warmth
and “comfortability” to the newscast defined a stereo-
typical “female” role, secondary to that of the male an-
chor, into which she was forced in terms of story as-
signments and division of duties. First, we observe that
the research survey asked participants to rank both male
and female anchors in response to the statement “com-
fortable to watch.” In addition, the district court rejected
Craft’s factual contention that Feldman was assigned the
lead story more frequently and was given more live stories
while she was assigned the human interest, personal, and
humorous stories. The court, for example, while acknowl-
edging the testimony of news producer Sandra Wood-
ward that she initially was instructed to give Feldman
A21
about two-thirds of the lead stories, also accepted testi-
mony of Shannon that that policy had been designed to
ease the transition to coanchors for Craft and the viewers
and was discontinued after a few weeks, after which time
the lead stories were equitably divided. Craft, 572 F.
Supp. at 872, 875. The court further found that the on-
site reporting and hard news stories were equitably dis-
tributed. Id. at 875. Finally, Shannon testified that
Craft herself suggested her Thursday arts and entertain-
ment segment to take advantage of her cultural back-
ground and her contacts from Santa Barbara with various
Hollywood personalities. Craft cites no facts sufficient
for us to find the district court’s interpretation of the
record in this regard clearly erroneous.
We also cannot conclude that the district court erred
when it held that Craft was not impermissibly removed
as anchor on the basis of gender. While we disposed
earlier of the alleged “too old, too unattractive” state-
ment and have also already discussed the legitimate
reasons why the survey questions focused on appearance
only as to the female and not as to the male anchors,
Craft further argues that her reassignment was based on
a discriminatory interpretation of the survey results. She
contends that discrimination may be inferred in that
KMBC attributed all the negative viewer reaction to her
despite Feldman’s earlier problems in the ratings and the
failure of most respondents to name him as a positive
reason for watching the station. She further alleges that
she was unfairly burdened with having to offset Feld-
man’s weaknesses. The inferences on which she relies,
however, are insufficient to justify setting aside the con-
clusions of the district court.
Craft essentially is asking us to reject the district
court’s findings accepting Media Associates’ interpretation
A22
of the survey data and to substitute our own interpreta-
tion thereof. The evaluation of expert testimony, how-
ever, is primarily the function of the district court. Hoefel-
man v. Conservation Commission of Missouri, 718 F.2d 281,
284-85 (8th Cir.1983). The court here specifically found
that the survey had been “conducted in accordance with
generally accepted principles of survey research” and that
its results were “trustworthy.” Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 873.
Craft scored low on many neutral points such as knowl-
edge of Kansas City, journalism ability, and apparent
enjoyment of her job, and the court found “simply no
evidence” that the survey had been designed to effect her
removal because of her gender. Id. at 878. It concluded
that KMBC was entitled to—and did—rely on the Media
Associates report. Id. at 879.
We further reject Craft’s argument that even if the
survey was objective, KMBC’s reliance on it was merely
a pretext because the station ignored improved ratings
and profits during her tenure: This shows only that
broadcast market research is an inexact science and does
not make clearly erroneous the district court’s conclusion
that KMBC still relied upon the survey in good faith.
The court in addition found that the ratings cited by Craft
were “equivocal at best” and were not yet available when
she was reassigned. Id. at 876. KMBC’s failure to delay
its decision a few days until the ratings did come out
may just be testament to the unprecedented negative re-
action to Craft suggested by the survey. Finally, KMBC’s
allegedly differing treatment of two males who also were
criticized in the survey is insufficient to raise an inference
of discrimination because of the more extreme nature
of Craft’s difficulties and Craft’s pivotal role on the news-
cast as coanchor.
A23
c.
Our conclusion that Craft was not subject to sex dis-
crimination either in KMBC’s application of its appear-
ance standards or in its reassignment of her to reporter
effectively determines the outcome of her claim of con-
structive discharge. Craft does not dispute that such a
claim requires a showing of work conditions that a reason-
able person would find intolerable, Johnson v. Bunny Bread
Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.1981); she contends, how-
ever, that a finding of unlawfully discriminatory working
conditions is sufficient to meet this standard. See Held v.
Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir.1982). Given the
absence of such a finding here, her argument fails. Fur-
thermore, even if we were to accept Craft’s argument that
her reassignment (which was permitted by the terms of
her contract) or the criticism of her appearance, while
not discriminatory, did make her working conditions in-
tolerable, the district court found no evidence that KMBC
took those actions with an intent to force her to quit. See
Bunny Bread, 646 F.2d at 1256. The court in fact believed
testimony that Replogle in May had urged Craft to re-
main as anchor and that Shannon at the time of the re-
assignment had urged Craft to reconsider her immediate
reaction and remain as reporter rather than returning to
Santa Barbara. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 874, 879.
D.
In sum, Craft’s arguments as to her Title VII dis-
crimination claims are basically factual invitations to us
to reevaluate the record and interpret the evidence in
the light most favorable to her while overlooking sub-
stantial evidence favorable to KMBC.* Even her con-
13. Craft’s argument rests in part on the failure of the
district court to take into consideration many issues raised by
(Continued on following page)
A24
tention, for example, that the district court in finding no
discrimination erred “as a matter of law” addresses a
factual issue. To grant her relief we would have to adopt
findings contrary to those of the district court and assume
a judicial role contrary to that assigned to us by Rule
52(a) and Supreme Court precedent. See Anderson,
supra; Pullman-Standard, supra. We decline to do either.
The district court found that KMBC was equally concerned
with the appearance of its male and female on-air per-
sonnel and that any extra attention to Craft was the
gradual result of her indifference to the station’s legitimate
need that she maintain a professional, businesslike image
appropriate to Kansas City. The court further found
that Craft’s reassignment to reporter was made in reason-
able reliance on a proper market survey and that no con-
structive discharge occurred. We are not firmly convinced
that any of these conclusions is clearly erroneous.
Il.
Turning to the fraud claim, Metromedia argues that,
as a matter of law, Craft failed to make a submissible jury
issue. The alleged misrepresentation, as set out in the
verdict directing instruction requested by Craft at the
Joplin trial, was that “defendant represented to the plain-
tiff that her appearance was fine and that defendant liked
everything about her appearance and intended no make-
Footnote continued—
her evidence. We have already discussed a number of such
claims, and we do not believe the district court’s order is defi-
cient in failing to deal with every piece of evidence in the record,
particularly in light of the ten-day trial resulting in a transcript
in excess of 2,000 pages. See Tate v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 733
F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, ........ We. lasanees , 105
S.Ct. 160, 83 L.Ed.2d 97 (1984); Talley v. United States Postal
Service, 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, ........
UB... ccccczz , 104 S.Ct. 2155, 80 L.Ed.2d 541 (1984).
A25
over or substantial changes in her appearance.”** Spe-
cifically, Metromedia contends that this statement is one
of opinion or value that will not support a fraud claim or
is too indefinite to be actionable and that there is insuf-
ficient evidence that the statement was false or false when
made.*®
The parties do not dispute that Missouri law applies
to Craft’s fraud claim. Under such law the burden is on
the plaintiff to establish a submissible case of fraud, and
failure as to any one essential element is fatal to the
entire claim. Powers v. Shore, 248 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo.1952)
(en banc); Lowther v. Hays, 225 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Mo.
1950); Emily v. Bayne, 371 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Mo.Ct.App.
1963). Fraud may be established by circumstantial evi-
dence, Martin v. Brune, 631 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Mo.Ct.App.
1982); however, it may not be presumed, and a party’s
case will fail if he can show only facts and circumstances
which are equally consistent with honesty and good faith.
Macon-Atlanta State Bank v. Gall, 666 S.W.2d 934, 941
(Mo.Ct.App.1984).
The standard of review as to the submissibility of
Craft’s case is the same under both federal and Missouri
14. At the first trial Craft also submitted as a representa-
tion that she was hired specifically for the job of coanchor and
for no other purpose. She expressly abandoned this claim at
the second trial in Joplin. Our review of the submissibility of
the fraud claim is based on the record at that trial, but we observe
that our study of the record of the Kansas City trial revealed no
ay favorable to Craft that was not also before the second
ury.
15. Metromedia also argues that there is insufficient evi-
dence that Craft relied on the alleged misrepresentation or suf-
fered damages attributable thereto, that Craft waived her claim,
and, in the alternative, that a third trial should be held because
of errors in admission of evidence, the jury instructions, and
closing arguments. Because of our disposition of the issues set
forth in the body of our opinion, we need not reach these addi-
tional points.
A26
law. Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir.1984).
We may find for Metromedia only if “all the evidence
points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable infer-
ences sustaining the position” of Craft. Id. (quoting Dace
v. ACF Industries, 722 F.2d 374, 375 (8th Cir.1983) (quot-
ing Decker-Ruhl Ford Sales v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
523 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir.1975)). Furthermore, we must
resolve direct factual conflicts in favor of Craft, assume
as true all facts in her favor which the evidence tends
to prove, and give her the benefit of all reasonable infer-
ences. We may not find for Metromedia if the evidence so
viewed would “allow reasonable jurors to differ as to
the conclusions that could be drawn.” See Crues, 729
F.2d at 1148 (quoting Dace, 722 F.2d at 375).
A.
It is true, as Metromedia argues, that a statement
of opinion or value is not an actionable representation
of fact because it relates to terms of degree capable of
different interpretations. E.g., Carrier Corp. v. Royale
Investment Co., 366 S.W.2d 346, 356 (Mo.1963) (state-
ment that a refrigerating machine is “easy” to install is
not an actionable representation because the term “easy”
has a comparative or relative connotation). While this
principle may be relevant to KMBC’s statements that it
“liked” Craft’s appearance, it is not controlling as to the
more crucial portion of the submitted representation that
the station did not intend any “makeover or substantial
changes” in Craft’s appearance.
Statements of present intent may be representations
of fact which, if false, will support fraud claims under
Missouri law. Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank of
Windsor, 737 F.2d 1490, 1498 (8th Cir.1984); White v.
Muivania, 575 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Mo.1978) (en banc). We
A27
have no difficulty concluding that the “no makeover or
substantial changes” representation requested by Craft
in the instruction was a statement of present intent on
the part of Shannon and Replogle. We do not believe
the presence of somewhat imprecise terms such as “change”
and “makeover” automatically renders their statement non-
actionable “opinion” or “puffery” in the classical sense
argued by Metromedia. Missouri courts have found suffi-
cient allegations of fraud for the jury when service station
operators have been told their leases would not be can-
celed if they ran “good” operations and performed “satis-
factorily.” Essex v. Getty Oil Co., 661 S.W.2d 544, 549-51
(Mo.Ct.App.1983); Sagehorn v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
648 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo.Ct.App.1983).
The critical element in a fraud case based on a state-
ment of present intent is proof that the speaker at the
time of utterance actually did not intend to perform con-
sistently with his words; absent such an inconsistent
intent there is no misrepresentation of fact or state of
mind but only a breach of promise or failure to perform.
See Grosser v. Kandel-Iken Builders, 647 S.W.2d 911, 914
(Mo.Ct.App.1983) ; Brennaman v. Andes & Roberts Brothers
Construction Co., 506 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo.Ct.App.1973). It
is not enough if for any reason, good or bad, the speaker
changes his mind and fails or refuses to carry his ex-
pressed intention into effect. Dillard v. Earnhart, 457 S.W.
2d 666, 670 (Mo.1970) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 530
comment a (1938)). As Missouri courts thus have held,
an intent not to perform
cannot be established solely by proof of [the speak-
er’s] nonperformance nor does his failure to perform
the agreement throw upon him the burden of showing
A28
that his nonperformance was due to reasons which
operated after the agreement was entered into. Such
intention may be shown by any other evidence which
sufficiently indicates its existence as, for example, the
certainty that he would not be in funds to carry
out his promise.
Dillard, 457 S.W.2d at 671 (quoting Restatement of Torts
§ 530 comment c (1938)). Craft’s claim of fraud comes
down to this narrow issue.
Craft argues vigorously that KMBC, contrary to the
statements it made to her, had from the beginning a secret
intention to substantially change or make over her ap-
pearance. She stresses Shannon’s instruction to Wilford
not to discuss makeup with Craft during their first meet-
ing because he would be working with Craft himself
on appearance and makeup. Wilford, prior to Craft’s
selection, had expressed the opinion that Craft’s appear-
ance was not conservative or sophisticated enough for
Kansas City audiences, although the consensus of the
Group at Media Associates had been that Craft was the
strongest of the three finalists it screened. Shannon tes-
tified that he knew when he hired Craft that he would
be working on her makeup and clothing, and criticism
of her appearance began with her debut on the newscast.
Shannon further testified that appearance was KMBC’s
major concern in an anchor, and Replogle agreed that
while appearance was not the only qualification, it was
the “first thing on the list.” The evidence established
that KMBC in the past had given performers direct
orders with respect to their appearance. For example,
Cheryl Jones had Seen ordered to change her hairstyle
to eliminate the “irizzy appearance” (she was given her
most recent formal] portrait as a guide to what Replogle
and Shannon wanted and was told that the result had to
A29
pe acceptable to them and that they would handle any
questions from her hairdresser), and Mike Placke had
been ordered to lose twenty-five pounds, to get a good-
fitting suit, to avoid wearing sweaters and vests, and to
tie his tie with a four-in-hand instead of a Windsor knot.
While this evidence supports the inference that Shan-
non and Replogle at the time they made the challenged
statements knew they were going to work on Craft’s ap-
pearance, we are not satisfied that it demonstrates that
when they promised they intended “no makeover or sub-
stantial changes,” such statements were false. It is well
to consider further what “makeover or substantial changes”
means.!* The ultimate measure of the representation’s
truth or falsity is what Craft could reasonably have under-
stood KMBC to have promised. See Toenjes v. L.J. Mc-
Neary Construction Co., 406 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo.Ct.App.
1966). She testified that a “makeover” was “changing
someone’s appearance” and that she had believed KMBC
didn’t want to change anything about her. This position,
however, is not totally consistent with the “substantial
changes” (emphasis added) language submitted in the jury
instruction. It seems plain, thus, that a jury could not
reasonably have measured the falsity of KMBC’s repre-
sentation against Craft’s subjective view of a “makeover”
as any change at all. Therefore, the intent to work on
Craft’s appearance demonstrated abundantly by her evi-
dence does not establish that Shannon and Replogle at the
time of their representation had the intention to “make
her over.”
While it can be argued that Craft was “made over” in
being forced to exchange her casual California beach
16. Shannon and Replogle were convinced that the actions
they took in regard to Craft did not constitute a “makeover.”
A30
look—she testified that in Santa Barbara she occasionally
went directly from the beach to the studio—for a conser-
vative, sophisticated, businesslike image of “professional
elegance,” we believe that in her audition interviews with
KMBC Craft was concerned essentially with her hair and
makeup and not with clothing.” The language of an
alleged misrepresentation must be considered in light of
the background in which the statements were made and
the context in which the words were used. Toenjes, 406
S.W.2d at 105. KMBC’s statements to Craft were made
in response to her expressions of concern about her ex-
perience with CBS, where the network had required that
her hair be cropped and died blond, her eyebrows shaved
and died black, and heavy makeup applied.
Even if Craft does have an arguable position that the
representation of “no makeover or substantial changes”
had application to clothing, a reasonable jury could not
have found a “makeover” until KMBC’s efforts reached
their most extreme extent in the late days of Craft’s em-
ployment. There is, however, no evidence that the station
at the time it made the challenged representation knew
it would exercise such an intrusive degree of control or
knew that such control would be in its eyes necessary.
The record demonstrates that KMBC asserted varying de-
grees of control over the appearances of its on-air per-
sonnel, finding no control at all necessary as to Brenda
Williams while requiring assorted measures of other an-
17. The record reveals no action by KMBC in regard to
Craft’s hair or makeup that could be seen as constituting a
“makeover.” The station expressed a desire that her hair be
worn at the length and natural color apparent in the Santa
Barbara tape, and Craft assured the station that her shorter,
lighter hairstyle upon arrival in Kansas City was due to a
recent unsatisfactory styling and that she intended to iet her
hair grow back out. Furthermore, Craft was allowed to apply
her own makeup except for the one ill-fated occasion, and we
do not believe mere suggestions constitute a “makeover,”
A31
chors, sportscasters and weathercasters. There is no evi-
dence that the station had any knowledge where along this
spectrum Craft might fall or what facility she might
demonstrate in adjusting her wardrobe to the Kansas
City climate and market. In fact, the record is basically
uncontradicted as to the gradual increase in the intensity
of the measures taken by KMBC in regard to Craft’s ap-
pearance. Craft at first was given only the most gen-
eral advice through books and fashion magazines and a
memorandum suggesting makeup techniques. Although
Wilford testified that she had been asked on short notice
to come to Kansas City in January, just days after Craft’s
debut as coanchor, to work specifically on Craft’s (and
Pam Whiting’s) appearance, it was not until April that the
arrangement with Macy’s and its clothing consultant was
established. The clothing calendar was not actually in-
stituted until late July or early August.
Having considered the record in the light most favor-
able to Craft and given her the benefit of all favorable
inferences, we must conclude that there is insufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to have found that KMBC
at the time it made its representation contemplated such
extensive measures as to her appearance so as to make
false its statements that it intended “no makeover or sub-
stantial changes.” Even taking the evidence as establish-
ing that KMBC’s actions differed from those promised,
the record does no more than suggest that the station,
because of the difficulties it experienced with Craft,
changed its mind as to steps that would be necessary as
to her appearance. See Dillard, 457 S.W.2d at 670 (quot-
ing Restatement of Torts § 530 comment a (1938)). Such
evidence does not establish Craft’s case of fraud or shift
the burden to KMBC to show that its “nonperformance”
was caused by reasons operating after it made its repre-
A32
sentation. See Dillard, 457 S.W.2d at 671 (quoting Restate-
ment of Torts § 530 comment c (1938)). There is here,
as in Dillard, a failure of proof that the statements of pres-
ent intent were false when made. Craft as a matter of
law has not established a submissible case of fraud. The
judgment on the jury verdict on this issue must be re-
versed and the district court instructed to enter judgment
in favor of Metromedia.
Iit.
In view of our conclusion above we need not reach
Craft’s arguments that the district court’s factual findings
on her Title VII claim impermissibly conflicted with
the findings of the jury on the fraud claim and that the
district court erred in granting a new trial on the fraud
issue. We note, however, that the authority to grant or
deny a new trial is a matter of discretion which we may
not reverse absent a strong showing of clear abuse. Com-
mercial National Bank v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 631 F.
2d 563, 565 (8th Cir.1980); Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d
1385, 1388 (8th Cir.1979); Bates v. Hensley, 414 F.2d 1006,
1011 (8th Cir.1969).
Finally, Craft argues that the district court erred in
excluding certain evidence offered on her equal pay claim
and that the verdict against her on that claim was against
the clear weight of the evidence. Specifically, Craft con-
tends that Brenda Williams should have been allowed to
testify that she was told she would not be hired to replace
Craft as coanchor if she held out for a salary comparable to
Feldman’s and to give her opinion that the station had
created a “female anchor” position that would pay only
an amount substantially less than that paid to the male
anchor. The admission of evidence, however, also is within
the discretion of the district court, and we may not reverse
A33
absent a “clear and prejudicial” abuse of that discretion.
Roth v. Black & Decker, 737 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir.1984);
Haynes v. American Motors Corp., 691 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th
Cir.1982). When the excluded testimony is considered
against the matters as to which Williams was allowed to
testify before the jury, we cannot find such an abuse.
The weight of the evidence argument is particularly
directed to the discretion of the district court; and while
some of our decisions suggest that we could not review
the denial of such a new trial motion even for abuse
of discretion, SCNO Barge Lines v. Anderson Clayton &
Co., 745 F.2d 1188, 1194 (8th Cir.1984); cf. Kelley v. Crunk,
713 F.2d 426, 427 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (weight of
evidence arguments lead to serious seventh amendment
questions), we need not reach that issue because we
find no abuse of discretion here. See Rey v. City of
Fredericktown, 729 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1984); Aimor
Electric Works v. Omaha National Bank, 727 F.2d 688, 692
(8th Cir.1984); Burnett v. Lloyds of London, 710 F.2d 488,
489-90 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam); Minnesota Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Wright, 312 F.2d 655, 659-60 (8th
Cir.1963); see generally C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2819 (1973).
We affirm the judgment of the district court as to
all the Title VII and Equal Pay Act issues but reverse
the judgment entered on the jury verdict on the fraud
count and instruct the district court to enter judgment for
Metromedia.
A34
(Filed June 28, 1985)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 84-1336/1380WM
September Term, 1984
Christine Craft,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
Metromedia, Inc., d/b/a KMBC-TV 9,
Appellant/Cross-Appeilee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
JUDGMENT
This appeal from the United States District Court was
submitted on the record of the said District Court, briefs
of the parties and was argued by counsel.
Upon consideration of the premises, it is adjudged and
decreed that the judgment of the said District Court
against Craft on the Title VII and Equal Pay Act issues
is affirmed. It is further adjudged and decreed that the
judgment of the district court on the jury verdict on the
fraud count be and is hereby reversed and the cause is
remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
en erenicceeacaateaarniil
A35
trict of Missouri with instructions to enter judgment for
Metromedia in accordance with the opinion of this Court.
June 28, 1985
(See attached sheet for cost info.)
A true copy:
ATTEST:
/s/ Robert D. St. Vrain
Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals,
8th Circuit.
(Seal)
A36
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Eighth Circuit
Nos. 84-1336/380-WM
Christine Craft,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
Vs.
Metromedia, Inc.,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
Appellee-Cross-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En
Banc has been considered by the Court and is denied.
Petition for Rehearing by the panel is also denied.
The Court on its own motion substitutes pages 27 and
28 for pages 27 and 28 in the opinion as originally filed.*
August 19, 1985
*See A37.
A37
MODIFICATION OF OPINION OF JUNE 28, 1985,
ISSUED AUGUST 19, 1985 ON CRAFT’S MOTION
FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
REHEARING EN BANC
While it can be argued that Craft was “made over”
in being forced to exchange her casual California beach
look—Shannon testified that Craft had told him* that in
Santa Barbara she occasionally went directly from the
beach to the studio—for a conservative, sophisticated,
businesslike image of “professional elegance,” we believe
that in her audition interviews with KMBC Craft was
concerned essentially with her hair and makeup and not
with clothing.” The language of an alleged misrepresenta-
tion must be considered in light of the background in
which the statements were made and the context in which
the words were used. Toenjes, 406 S.W.2d at 105. KMBC’s
statements to Craft were made in response to her expres-
sions of concern about her experience with CBS, where
the network had required that her hair be cropped and
dyed blond, her eyebrows shaved and dyed black, and
heavy makeup applied.
17. The record reveals no action by KMBC in regard to
Craft’s hair or makeup that could be seen as constituting a
“makeover.” The station expressed a desire that her hair be
worn at the length and natural color apparent in the Santa
Barbara tape, and Craft assured the station that her shorter,
lighter hairstyle upon arrival in Kansas City was due to a recent
unsatisfactory styling and that she intended to let her hair grow
back out. Furthermore, Craft was allowed to apply her own
makeup except for the one ill-fated occasion, and we do not
believe mere suggestions constitute a “makeover.”
*Emphasis added to denote modification.
A38
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Eighth Circuit
Nos. 84-1336/380-WM
Christine Craft,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
Metromedia, Inc., etc.,
Appellant/ Cross-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri
Appellee/cross-appellant Craft’s motion for a stay of
mandate is denied.
September 16, 1985
A39
(Filed October 31, 1983)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Western District of Missouri
Western Division
No. 83-0007-CV-W-8
CHRISTINE CRAFT,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
METROMEDIA, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER*
Plaintiff Christine Craft filed her four-count com-
plaint against defendant Metromedia, Inc. on January 5,
1983. Count I alleges that defendant discriminated against
plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Count II alleges that defendant paid plaintiff less than
similarly situated male employees in violation of the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Count III alleges
that defendant made intentional fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions to induce plaintiff to accept employment. Count IV
alleges that defendant’s actions toward plaintiff, even if
lawful, were intended to injure her and therefore consti-
tuted a prima facie tort.
Counsel prepared the case on an accelerated discovery
schedule, and trial commenced on July 25, 1983. On the
eleventh day of trial, a jury of two men and four women
reached the following results: On Count I, the jury, sitting
*“This Memorandum and Order is reported at 572 F.Supp.
868.
A40
only in an advisory capacity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c),
found in favor of plaintiff. On Count II, the jury returned
a verdict for defendant. On Count III, the jury found in
favor of plaintiff and awarded actual damages of $375,000
and punitive damages of $125,000. Count IV was aban-
doned during trial and was not submitted to the jury.
Three matters are now before the court. First are
findings of fact and conclusions of law on plaintiff’s claim
of sex discrimination. Second is plaintiff’s motion for
a new trial on her Equal Pay Act claim. Third is defen-
dant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
new trial, or remittitur on the fraud count.
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
There is no right to a jury trial in discrimination
actions filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410
(8th Cir. 1978). Therefore, with respect to Count I, the
jury functioned only in an advisory capacity under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 39(c). See Order of July 22, 1983. This court
is “at liberty to accept or reject the advisory verdict.”
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Minnesota Trans-
fer Railway Co., 371 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1967). Since
the decision of an advisory jury is not binding on the
court and presents nothing for appellate review, it is incum-
bent upon the court to enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), just as if there
had been no jury. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 2335 (1971).
A. Findings of Fact
Plaintiff Christine Craft is a female citizen of the
United States and is a resident and citizen of California,
residing at the time of trial at 3557 Padaro Lane, Car-
rte
o-oo rly whee dw
A41
pinteria, California. Defendant Metromedia, Inc. is a Dela-
ware corporation with its headquarters and principal place
of business in New Jersey. Its headquarters are located
at One Harmon Plaza, Secaucus, New Jersey. Prior to
May 18, 1982, defendant was the owner and operator, pur-
suant to a license issued by the Federal Communications
Commission, of KMBC-TV, Channel 9 (hereinafter
KMBC), in Kansas City, Missouri. KMBC has been a
network affiliate of the American Broadcasting Company
(ABC) throughout the relevant period. Plaintiff was em-
ployed at KMEC as a staff announcer and performed duties
as a co-anchor and reporter from December, 1980, to Au-
gust 14, 1981. At all times here relevant, R. Kent Replogle
was vice president and general manager of KMBC and
Ridge Shannon was news director. Replogle was the high-
est ranking station employee, and Shannon reported di-
rectly to him. On May 18, 1982, the assets of KMBC
were acquired by the Hearst Corporation, which is not
a party to this action.
Plaintiff received a liberal arts degree in English and
anthropology from the University of California at Santa
Barbara in 1968. Upon graduation, she was first employed
for two years as a teacher of emotionally disturbed and
retarded children. Thereafter she pursued other interests,
particularly surfing, and supported herself with an assort-
ment of part-time jobs. Eventually, plaintiff decided to
pursue a career in broadcasting. In mid-1975, she was
hired as a weeknight weather reporter at KSBW-TV, a
small station in Salinas, California. During her tenure
of approximately one and one-half years, plaintiff worked
as an announcer, reporter, and substitute sportscaster, in
addition to her job as weather reporter. In late 1976
plaintiff became the weekend weather anchor at KPIX-
TV in San Francisco, California, which is the sixth largest
A42
television market in the nation. Plaintiff remained at
KPIX for one year, and while there she also did some
news reporting and substitute sports production and an-
choring.
Plaintiff was next hired by CBS as the host of a
segment of CBS Sports Spectacular entitled “Women in
Sports.” As part of this program, plaintiff was involved
in summarizing weekly news concerning women’s athletics
and in producing weekly profiles of women athletes. While
at CBS, plaintiff's appearance was altered by network
makeup specialists. Her hair was cut short and bleached
blonde, and she was required to use black eyebrow pencil
and dark red lipstick. Plaintiff voiced objection to this
treatment but did not voluntarily leave her employment
at CBS because of it. “Women in Sports” was discontinued
after thirty weeks. Plaintiff returned to California and
engaged in pursuits other than television for about a year.
In mid-1979, plaintiff returned to television as a re-
porter at KEYT-TV in Santa Barbara, California, which
is the 116th largest television market in the nation. Plain-
tiff also served as weeknight news anchor and occasionally
presented sports and weather. Plaintiff resigned her em-
ployment at KEYT in December, 1980, to accept employ-
ment with defendant at KMBC in Kansas City.
Kansas City is the nation’s twenty-seventh largest tele-
vision market, and KMBC has two main competitors:
KCTV (formerly KCMO-TV), Channel 5, the CBS affiliate;
and WDAF-TV, channel 4, the NBC affiliate. From July,
1978, to January 5, 1981, Scott Feldman was the solo anchor
on the 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. weekday newscasts at KMBC.
For several years prior to Feldman’s arrival in 1978, defen-
dant had been the ratings leader in the local television
news market, but its ratings had slipped since Feldman’s
A43
arrival, Research indicated that the decline was due to
two factors: the appearance of co-anchors at KMBC’s
competitors, and a perception among viewers that Feldman
lacked warmth, thereby diminishing his professionalism
and authoritativeness. Based on that research and the
presence of co-anchors at KMBC’s competitors, Replogle
and Shannon determined that KMBC should adopt a co-
anchor format and that, in order to “soften” the image
of its news presentation, the co-anchor should be a woman.
In the search for a female co-anchor, Shannon re-
viewed videotapes of numerous candidates. The Media
Associates (later known as Audience Research and De-
velopment) of Dallas, Texas, a media consulting firm re-
tained by KMBC, supplied a tape of plaintiff’s work in
Santa Barbara. Based on his review of many tapes,
Shannon contacted ‘several individuals, including plaintiff,
to ascertain who was interested in and available to audi-
tion for the new co-anchor position. During their first
telephone conversation in November of 1980, plaintiff told
Shannon she was interested in the position so long as
it did not involve a “makeover” of her appearance, such
as she had experienced at CBS. Following further discus-
sions, it was agreed that plaintiff would come to Kansas
City for an audition, which occurred in late November,
1980. During renewed discussions about the nature of
the job and the issue of plaintiff's appearance, Shannon
explained the station had consultants who worked with
on-air personnel in various areas, including delivery, cloth-
ing, and makeup. Plaintiff acknowledged her lack of ex-
pertise in matters of makeup and hair and indicated her
willingness to work on her appearance with a consultant.
At the conclusion of the interview and audition, plain-
tiff was offered the position at a salary of $28,000. She
returned to California with a copy of defendant’s standard
A44
contract for personal services. Shannon and Replogle had
advised plaintiff to review the contract with her attorney,
and plaintiff contacted her friend, Robert Hamilton, an
attorney and writer who had previous experience negotiat-
ing contracts for personal services.
In the weeks that followed, Hamilton negotiated with
Shannon on behalf of plaintiff, with the following results:
First, the term of the contract was reduced from three
years to two years. Second, plaintiff’s salary was increased
to $35,000 during the first year and $38,500 during the
second year. Third, the standard provision permitting de-
fendant to terminate the contract at the end of each
thirteen-week cycle was deleted; in lieu thereof, defendant
retained the right to terminate the contract after twelve,
eighteen, and twenty-four months, thereby giving plaintiff
greater job security. On the other hand, defendant re-
jected Hamilton’s request that plaintiff’s position be specifi-
cally described as co-anchor; instead, the standard language
describing her position as staff announcer and permitting
defendant to reassign her remained in the contract. Defen-
dant also refused to include a clothing allowance in the
contract as requested by Hamilton.
Counsel for defendant revised the standard contract
to include the modifications described above. Copies of
the contract were presented to plaintiff for execution some-
time after she commenced her duties at the station; man-
agement again suggested the contract should be reviewed
by her attorney. After approximately three weeks on
the job as co-anchor, plaintiff signed the contract on Jan-
uary 22, 1981, without reading it in detail and without
consulting an attorney.
Plaintiff had moved to Kansas City in mid-December
1980. At the direction of Shannon, she traveled via Dallas,
A45
Texas, where she stopped and met with Lynn Wilford
of the Media Associates. They evaluated plaintiff’s abil-
ities and discussed effective news presentation. At the
request of Shannon, Wilford kept discussion of plaintiff's
appearance to a minimum.
Plaintiff began working at the station in late Decem-
ber, 1980. During a short transitional period, plaintiff
did some reporting and promotional work so that viewers
would become acquainted with her. It was also necessary
for plaintiff to familiarize herself with certain technical
aspects of the KMBC news operation. She began as co-
anchor on January 5, 1981; to further ease the transition
for plaintiff and the viewing audience, Shannon directed
the news producer to assign the “lead-in” or first news
story of each broadcast to Feldman about two-thirds of
the time and to plaintiff about one-third of the time. This
allocation continued for a few weeks; thereafter, lead
stories were allocated equitably between Feldman and
plaintiff.
Soon after plaintiff began her duties as co-anchor,
it became apparent to Shannon and Replogle that on sev-
eral occasions plaintiff’s on-air makeup and clothing were
inappropriate. Shannon commented to plaintiff several
times early in her employment that she should dress more
conservatively and use makeup properly. He arranged
for Lynn Wilford to come to Kansas City on January
14, 1981, to assist plaintiff in improving her appearance.
During this visit, Wilford worked on plaintiff's wardrobe
and makeup. In subsequent periodic visits to the station,
Wilford continued these efforts, achieving only modest
success.
During her initial months of employment, plaintiff
had considerable discretion in the selection of her on-
A46
air clothing. Although Shannon made occasional sugges-
tions or criticisms as to the appropriateness of certain
pieces of clothing, neither he nor any other representative
of defendant mandated that plaintiff observe any strict
dress code during her first months at the station. Begin-
ning in April, 1981, KMBC arranged for Macy’s Depart-
ment Store to provide clothing for plaintiff in exchange
for advertising time. Maureen Shawver, a clothing con-
sultant from Macy’s, assisted plaintiff in making clothing
selections. In addition, Wilford reviewed videotapes of
plaintiff in various outfits. Plaintiff was not ordered to
wear any of the clothes selected, and in fact she rejected
several items suggested by Shawver.
On May 19 and 20, 1981, Steven Meacham of the
Media Associates conducted four focus group discussions
to learn how television viewers perceived KMBC’s news
program. A focus group is an accepted research technique
whereby a small group of individuals with similar demo-
graphic characteristics meet to discuss a given subject,
in this instance television news in Kansas City. A focus
group does not product scientifically reliable results be-
cause of the small statistical sample; however, it may
suggest possible trends and areas for further research.
Meacham acted as moderator of the focus group discus-
sions. Many topics were discussed, and the participants
reviewed sample videotapes of local news programs. The
response to plaintiff, and in particular to her appearance,
was overwhelmingly negative. During the course of these
discussions, and after the participants’ attitude toward
plaintiff had become apparent, Meacham on more than
one occasion made derogatory remarks about plaintiff. Al-
though his comments may have been indecorous and ill-
advised, it is clear from listening to the tapes that they
he met.
he ett METS ay AE MDD ING Wm CaP 0 -
ane
A47
were made after the attitude of the group had been made
very clear and they did not influence the opinions held
by focus group participants.
Station management observed the focus groups from
behind a one-way mirror. Shannon and Replogle met
with plaintiff on May 21, 1981, to discuss the results
and possible responses. Replogle advised plaintiff that
there seemed to be some problems with her acceptance
by the Kansas City viewing audience, but he indicated
that management was ready to work with her to overcome
those problems. Plaintiff at first said she wanted to be
let out of her contract so that she could return “home”
to California. Replogle reiterated defendant’s desire to
retain plaintiff’s services and to work with her to overcome
the negative audience response. Plaintiff eventually
agreed to cooperate with defendant in that endeavor. Rep-
logle stated that defendant would be instituting a clothing
calendar for plaintiff. She agreed to follow the calendar
when she received it. Thereafter, plaintiff’s wardrobe was
more closely supervised, but the clothing calendar was
not formally instituted until late July or early August
a few weeks before plaintiff was removed as co-anchor.
As a follow-up to the focus groups, Media Associates
conducted a telephone survey in late June, 1981, of the
attitudes of four hundred randomly selected individuals
residing in the greater Kansas City viewing area. All
persons and organizations involved in the construction,
administration, and analysis of the survey were ex-
perienced in market and broadcasting research. The sur-
vey measured the attitudes of Kansas City television view-
ers toward a wide range of selected aspects of television
news in Kansas City. The questionnaire was drafted by
Steven Meacham and revised by station management and
A48
included questions on various issues raised by the focus
group participants, including plaintiff's dress and appear-
ance. The questionnaire asked questions from both sides
of the appearance and dress issues for plaintiff, in an
attempt to see if persons surveyed perceived as strengths
those qualities which the focus groups perceived as draw-
backs. The questionnaire was administered during long-
distance telephone interviews by trained employees of
Weise, Rozmarin & Associates of Omaha, Nebraska.
Weise, Rozmarin used accepted quality control procedures
in validating the interviewers’ work and the data entered
for computer analysis. The data was processed with the
commonly used Statistical Program for the Social Sciences
and was generated in the form of a computer print-out
with indexed tables. Weise, Rozmarin forwarded the data
to Media Associates in Dallas. The survey was conducted
in accordance with generally accepted principles of survey
research, and its results are trustworthy; moreover, defen-
dant’s reliance on those results was reasonable and appro-
priate. Plaintiff's attempt to question the validity of the
survey research through the testimony of Thomas Bei-
secker, an Associate Professor of Communications Studies
at the University of Kansas, was not persuasive. He con-
ceded the telephone survey was not sex-biased and he
lacked credentials and experience in the area of broadcast-
ing research.
Shannon and Replogle received the final results of
the June telephone survey on about August 3, 1981. The
report concluded that plaintiff was having an extremely
adverse impact on defendant’s acceptance among Kansas
City viewers. In the survey, plaintiff was compared to
the female co-anchors at WDAF and KCMO and was found
to be the least popular and least accepted of the three
in almost every category. Comparisons were made pri-
A49
marily to Anne Peterson, who co-anchored at KMBC’s
primary competitor, KCMO. In virtually every compari-
son with Peterson, plaintiff trailed. On August 13, 1981,
Shannon and Replogle met with consultants from Media
Associates, who recommended that plaintiff be replaced
immediately. Shannon and Replogle initially resisted the
suggestion, but after discussing the matter in Replogle’s
office the next morning, Friday, August 14, they agreed
to remove plaintiff as co-anchor and to reassign her to
the position of general assignment reporter at no loss in
pay or other contractual benefits. Shannon decided he
would tell plaintiff of the decision to reassign her when
she came to work at 2:30 pm. After finishing his dis-
cussion with Replogle, which lasted most cf the morning,
Shannon went to his office in the newsroom. Shortly
thereafter, he encountered plaintiff, who had come to work
early to edit a story. Since she would soon be leaving
for an interview, Shannon decided to inform her of the
reassignment immediately. At his request, plaintiff en-
tered Shannon’s office. During the discussicn that fol-
lowed, only the two of them were present and the door
to Shannon’s office was closed.
Shannon began by reminding plaintiff of their previous
discussions about her appearance and on-air stumbling and
their attempts to overcome those obstacles. Referring to
the recent research, he said that these factors had created
a wall between plaintiff and viewers and that she was
being removed as co-anchor and reassigned as a general
assignment reporter. Plaintiff asked why she was being
reassigned, and in response, Shannon turned to a cabinet
behind hi: Jk in which he had placed the Media As-
sociates’ rey. rt. He picked it up and said that the results
of the research were devastating and unprecedented in
the history of Media Associates. Shannon said that the
}
A50
report proved that the audience perceived plaintiff’s dress,
appearance, makeup, and presentation as stumbling blocks.
Further, Shannon said thet the report showed that female
viewers were leaving KMBC for its closest competitor,
KCMO. Although Shannon told plaintiff that defendant
intended to honor its contractual obligation to her, plaintiff
said that she was going home to Santa Barbara. Shannon
encouraged plaintiff to stay on as a reporter and suggested
she take the weekend off to consider the matter. Before
leaving Shannon’s office, plaintiff indicated that she did
not think she would change her mind about leaving. At
no time during their discussion on August 14, 1981, did
Shannon tell plaintiff she was being reassigned because
she was too old, too unattractive, and not deferential
enough to men or that she was being reassigned because
the audience so perceived her.
Over the weekend, plaintiff discussed her situation
with several persons, including her attorney Robert Hamil-
ton and a local newspaper reporter. On the following Mon-
day, August 17, 1981, she sent a telegram to defendant
reiterating her decision not to accept a reassignment. Dur-
ing this same period, Hamilton telephoned Shannon several
times to urge him to reinstate plaintiff as co-anchor. When
Shannon refused, Hamilton on one occasion lost his temper
and threatened to make the matter a “cause celebre.”
A meeting on Tuesday, August 18, 1981, between plaintiff,
Shannon, and Replogle at the Kansas City Club, called
by defendant in an attempt to resolve the matter ami-
cably, ended in an impasse.
When Shannon arrived at work on Monday, August
24, 1981, he found the clothes defendant had bought for
plaintiff on the couch in his office and plaintiff’s key
to the station on his desk. Plaintiff appeared at the station
ry tyr ey ; : : od 2B vy wine , ; . ts —
ea Le ie a aa
4 Furey i. ‘pi. +3 sive ; i , i, J
Nad tle uted ey ey a’ Fass nt I oe WR, ie | tha 7 FG
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fy i ’ ’ ‘
A51
about 8:45 a.m. that morning and informed Shannon she
was reporting to work as a co-anchor. He responded that
she could work as a reporter. Plaintiff said “good-bye”
and left, returned to her apartment and drove to Santa
Barbara, California, a few days later. On September 1,
1981, plaintiff commenced work as co-anchor at KEYT
in Santa Barbara, a job che still held at the time of trial.
KMBC management was concerned about the appear-
ance of all its on-air personnel, both male a:d female.
Management expected grooming and dress to be consistent
with community standards; on-air personnel understood
the need to maintain a professional and business-like ap-
pearance. Whenever an appearance problem was detected,
management responded with measures appropriate to the
individual situation. Plaintiff received counseling in cloth-
ing and makeup, areas in which she ‘acknowledged her
lack of expertise. When it later became apparent that
additional measures were needed to correct the problems,
clothing was acquired from Macy’s and a clothing calendar
was instituted.
Pam Whiting, the weekend co-anchor during most of
the time plaintiff was weeknight co-anchor, is another
example of management’s individualized response to ap-
pearance problems. Like plaintiff, Whiting, whose prior
employment was limited to radio, was inexperienced in
the use of appropriate television makeup; therefore, con-
sultants were used to educate her in makeup techniques.
Clothing was also an occasional problem, but the circum-
stances did not warrant a clothing calendar or routine
purchase of clothing for Whiting. Unlike plaintiff, Whiting
also had problems with her weight and her hairstyle;
therefore, individualized analysis and recommendations
were made in those areas.
A52
Brenda Williams has been employed at KMBC since
1977 in various positions, including weekend anchor and
reporter, and Williams was selected to replace plaintiff
as weeknight co-anchor in September, 1981. Williams’
appearance was always satisfactory to defendant, and no
corrective measures were ever necessary.
Defendant also gave individualized attention to the
appearance of male on-air personnel. The appearance of
co-anchor Scott Feldman was generally satisfactory; how-
ever, on at least two occasions, he received specific direc-
tives regarding his choice of shirts. Shannon and Wilford
told Mike Placke, the weekend weatherman, to lose weight
and improve his wardrobe; he followed those suggestions.
Wilford suggested that Bob Werley, a reporter, blow dry
his hair, try contact lenses, and change his on-air make-
up. Werley took the advice although he discovered that
he could not wear contact lenses, so he changed his make-
up to improve his appearance with glasses. Michael Ma-
honey, a reporter, was told that he needed to lose weight
and improve his wardrobe; he did so. In addition, Ma-
honey occasionally experienced a nervous twitch in his
mouth, which resembled a sneer. Management attempted
to assist him in overcoming this problem. Shannon told
Tim Richardson, a noon newscaster and reporter, to change
his hairstyle; Richardson complied.
Newsroom operations were conducted without regard
to sex, consistent with defendant’s policy of equal co-
anchors. After the first few weeks of plaintiff’s perfor-
mance as co-anchor, lead-in stories were equitably dis-
tributed between plaintiff and her co-anchor, Scott Feld-
man. Other job assignments which plaintiff considered
desirable, including on-site reporting and “hard” news
stories, were also equitably distributed, as were less desir-
a Yee ee Nee
A53
able duties such as “news teases” (short promotional seg-
ments taped at about 4 p.m.), to the extent possible given
the exigencies of the newsroom. On one _ occasion,
in March, 1981, Shannon reprimanded Feldman for refer-
ring to plaintiff as “that girl,” telling Feldman that such
conduct would not be tolerated. As plaintiff testified,
“Ridge reprimanded Scott for using that type of language
and told both of us we were co-equal, we were co-anchors
and he would not tolerate that sort of language.”
Although Feldman was paid more than plaintiff, the
differential was based on factors other than sex. Feldman
had an education in broadcasting, several years of expe-
rience as a news anchor in major television markets prior
to coming to Kansas City in 1978, and was well established
in the Kansas City market by the time plaintiff arrived
in 1981. On the other hand, plaintiff had no formal educa-
tion in broadcasting, her experience as a news anchor
was limited to small television markets, and she was un-
known to Kansas City viewers.
Ratings, or measurements of the size of the viewing
audience, are very important in the television industry
because they have a direct effect on a station’s advertising
revenue. Two private companies, Arbitron and Nielsen,
issue ratings several times a year. Ratings measure audi-
ence behavior by ascertaining the number of persons ac-
tually tuned to a given station. In contrast, audience
research, such as that conducted by Media Associates, mea-
sures attitudes in an attempt to explain and forecast the
ratings. Audience research enables station management
to adjust its programming to increase, or at least to main-
tain, its share of the audience.
The results of the audience research have been pre-
viously summarized. In addition, both parties introduced
A54
considerable evidence on KMBC’s ratings before, during,
and after plaintiff's tenure at the statign. This evidence
was equivocal at best and is of no Mticuler assistance
to the court in resolving the issues raised under Title
VII since defendant removed plaintiff as co-anchor based
on research showing negative viewer attitudes toward
plaintiff which could be expected to result in an eventual
erosion of defendant’s ratings. The July, 1981, ratings’
were unavailable and unknown to defendant when plaintiff
was removed as co-anchor; therefore, whether those ratings
ultimately wert up or down is simply irrelevant to the
issue of sex discrimination. Even assuming the ratings
improved during and immediately after plaintiff's tenure,
that would simply mean that defendant and its consultants
erred in their predictions, and such evidence would not
support an inference of sex discrimination.
In summary, plaintiff was not discriminated against
because of her sex. The measures taken by defendant
with respect to her appearance were necessary and appro-
priate considering her individual shortcomings. Plaintiff's
salary was determined on the basis of factors other than
sex. Plaintiff was not constructively discharged since ;
defendant did not render her working conditions intoler-
able, and they were not, in fact, intolerable. Plaintiff
voluntarily resigned rather than accept a reassignment
pursuant to the terms of her contract. Accordingly, she
suffered no damages attributable to any wrongful act of
defendant.
ee Oe ee ee ee eT ee or
ee ee wey ee ee eae eee
B. Conclusions of Law
Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The court has jurisdiction over the
parties and subject matter jurisdiction of this action under
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1).
ee ene nn i a. og
A55
42 US.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) provides in part that it
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”
Plaintiff makes essentially three claims of sex discrim-
ination. She first asserts discrimination in the terms
and conditions of her employment; specifically, she com-
plains that she was subjected to a rigorous dress code
and constant criticism of her appearance while her male
counterparts received no such treatment. Plaintiff’s sec-
ond complaint of sex discrimination concerns her removal
as co-anchor; she claims that defendant’s explicit and im-
plicit reasons for removing her were based on sex and
that defendant’s actions amounted to a constructive dis-
charge. Finally, plaintiff asserts that she was paid less
than Scott Feldman because of her sex. With respect
to all of her claims under Title VII, “[t]he ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff.” Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
Plaintiff’s first claim of sex discrimination based on
defendant’s actions with respect to her appearance must
be analyzed both in terms of theory and practice. To
the extent that plaintiff might argue that Title VII abso-
lutely prohibits an employer from imposing reasonable
but different standards of appearance for males and fe-
males, such a position must be rejected as contrary to
the overwhelming weight of authority. Title VII “was
never intended to interfere in the promulgation and en-
forcement of personal appearance regulations by private
employers.” Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 527
A56
F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (8th Cir. 1975). “[A] private employer
may require male employees to adhere to different modes
of dress and grooming than those required of female em-
ployees and such does not constitute an unfair employment
practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).”
Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975). See also
Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56
(9th Cir. 1977) (citing cases).
The courts which have considered this issue have taken
a realistic and common-sense approach. For instance, in
Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), the court stated:
Perhaps no facet of business life is more impor-
tant than a company’s place in public estimation. That
the image created by its employees dealing with the
public when on company assignment affects its rela-
tions is so weil known that we may take judicial
notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favor-
able acceptance. Good grooming regulations reflect
a company’s policy in our highly competitive business
environment. Reasonable requirements in furtherance
of that policy are an aspect of managerial responsibil-
ity.’
Id. at 1124-25. Judge Collinson of this district has taken
a similar approach:
Employment decisions . . . based on either dress codes
or policies regarding hair length are more closely re-
lated to the company’s choice of how to run its busi-
ness rather than to its obligation to provide equal
1. It is well recognized that Title VII “was not intended
to ‘diminish traditional management prerogatives.’” Burdine,
450 U.S. at 259.
Pe ae eS a eee) ae
lie CO A Aa Gi Ek tet
A57
employment opportunities. The decision to project
a certain image as one aspect of company policy is
the employer’s preroga ive which employees may ac-
cept or reject. If they choose to reject the policy,
they are subject to such sanctions as deemed appropri-
ate by the company. An employer is simply not re-
quired to account for personal preferences with respect
to dress and grooming standards.
Lanigan v. Bartiett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392
(W.D. Mo. 1979). See also Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en
banc).
Thus, defendant’s standards of appearance for its on-
air personnel can in no way be considered discriminatory
per se. Both men and women were required to maintain
a professional, business-like appearance consistent with
community standards. Since television is a visual medium,
as plaintiff admitted in her testimony, such a reasonable
requirement is obviously critical to defendant’s economic
well-being.
Plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination is also based
~ on defendant’s standards of appearance as applied. She
contends that defendant routinely and rigorously enforced
dress and makeup requirements for women but not for
men. This court recognizes that otherwise permissible
appearance and grooming standards could be unlawful if
invidiously applied. See Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252 (uphold-
ing validity of reasonable grooming and appearance stan-
dards when “imposed in an evenhanded manner on all
employees”). Ultimately the issue is a matter of proof,
and the evidence fails to sustain plaintiff's position.
An individual’s appearance is a unique and often sensi-
tive matter. Television by its nature requires station man-
A58
agement to exercise special supervision over matters of
personal appearance, yet it was apparent at trial that
KMBC management found it preferable and politic to per-
mit on-air personnel to operate within rather general ap-
pearance guidelines to the extent feasible considering the
skill and judgment of each employee. Many employees,
both male and female, demonstrated a fairly consistent
ability to maintain their appearance at a level acceptable
to management; therefore, little or no supervision or criti-
cism was necessary. Other employees, also of both sexes,
had more difficulty maintaining their appearance. Plain-
tiff was one of these; therefore, management found it
necessary to offer criticism, advice, and assistance, tailored
to fit her individual needs.
In plaintiff’s particular case, management had to con-
tend with several factors. First was plaintiff’s highly
visible role as co-anchor, which meant that the fortunes
of KMBC were linked to the impression plaintiff left with
viewers. Second was plaintiff's below-average aptitude
in matters of clothing and makeup. Third was plaintiff's
attitude that her appearance was not critical to her success
as an anchor, an attitude directly opposite to that of man-
agement. The final factor was plaintiff’s acute sensitivity
to management’s efforts to improve her appearance. Faced
with this unique and difficult situation, management re-
sponded cautiously and gradually. With the assistance
of consultants, defendant first attempted to teach plaintiff
the necessary skills in makeup and clothing. When this
diplomatic approach proved ineffective, the next step was
to acquire clothing for plaintiff and to suggest how it
should be worn. Finally, management found it necessary
to implement a clothing calendar and to monitor plaintiff's
appearance closely.
A59
Defendant’s responses to the appearance problems of
other employees, both male and female, do not support
an inference of discrimination. If anything, that evidence
shows a consistent concern by management over the ap-
pearance of all on-air personnel without regard to sex
but with regard to the peculiar characteristics of each
employee. Plaintiff was an employee of atypical aptitudes
and attitudes, and defendant merely acted to correct ap-
pearance problems which plaintiff was unable or unwilling
to remedy. The actions taken by defendant in regard
to plaintiff's appearance were not the result of any general
animus toward women or of any specific animus toward
plaintiff as a woman. It may well be that in plaintiff’s
case some of the steps taken by management were un-
precedented, but they were not ipso facto discriminatory.
Plaintiff’s second claim of sex discrimination concerns
her removal as co-anchor. Insofar as this claim is based
on the much-publicized litany—‘“too old, too unattractive,
and not deferential enough to men”—allegedly uttered
by Shannon on August 14, 1981, it is rejected since this
court has concluded as a matter of fact that Shannon
said no such thing.
Plaintiff also contends that discrimination can be in-
ferred from the circumstances surrounding her removal
as co-anchor; however, she has not sustained her burden
of proof on this contention. Defendant’s reliance on the
results of the telephone survey conducted by Media As-
sociates was not pretextual and was in fact the reason
plaintiff was reassigned. The survey was a routine pro-
cedure designed to evaluate many facets of the KMBC
news operation and was conducted, tabulated, and evalu-
ated by persons experienced in the field of broadcast re-
search. There is simply no evidence that the survey was
A60
designed to effect the removal of plaintiff as co-anchor
because of her sex or any other reason: even plaintiff's
expert conceded the survey was not sex-biased. Under
these circumstances, defendant was entitled to rely on
the results of the survey.
Plaintiff suggests an inference of sexual animus can
be drawn by contrasting the consultant’s report to the
ratings from the same period; however, even assuming
the ratings unequivocally showed KMBC to be in first
place just prior to plaintiff’s removal as co-anchor, a more
plausible inference is that television research is an inex-
act science. It might also be argued broadly that defendant
should not have relied on the consultant’s report as a
basis for removing plaintiff as co-anchor, but this is a
normative issue not properly before the court under Title
VII:
The news business may indeed have its quirks and
vagaries, in this age when the selection of a new
anchor for the CBS evening news is itself front-page
news, but consultant’s reports and ratings routinely
serve as the basis for personnel changes. Furthermore,
the ratings and the report provided strong evidence
in support of the defendant’s decision.
Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc., 25 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) { 31,650 (D.R.I. July 3, 1980).
As part of the claim arising out of her removal as
co-anchor, plaintiff also contends that she was construc-
tively discharged because of her sex. This contention is
untenable on both the law and the facts. “Generally,
a constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliber-
ately makes or allows the employee’s working conditions
to become so intolerable that the employee has no other
choice but to quit.” Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689
A6é1
F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982). “To constitute a construc-
tive discharge, the employer’s actions must have been
taken with the intention of forcing the employee to quit.”
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th
Cir. 1981). Here the evidence does not support a finding
that plaintiff's working conditions became so intolerable
that she had no choice but to quit; moreover, there is
no evidence that any of the actions by defendant were
taken with the intent to force plaintiff's resignation. On
the contrary, it appears that defendant repeatedly ex-
pressed its desire to retain plaintiff first as co-anchor and
later as a reporter.
Plaintiff's last claim under Title VII is simply a reprise
of her Equal Pay Act claim. The jury found against
her on that claim, and elsewhere this court has refused
to disturb that finding. See Section II, infra. It would
therefore be entirely inappropriate to reconsider the matter
under Title VII since the jury found the defendant had
established a defense under the Equal Pay Act. See Ora-
hood v. Board of Trustees, 645 F.2d 651, 654 n3 (8th
Cir. 1981) (“a defendant who establishes one of [the four
affirmative defenses in the Equal Pay Act] cannot be
held liable under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act’).
Even assuming plaintiff's pay claim could now be consid-
ered under Title VII, the evidence demonstrated that the
difference in pay between plaintiff and Scott Feldman
was attributable to several factors other than sex, particu-
larly education and experience.
In summary, defendant’s actions toward plaintiff dur-
ing her employment at KMBC were not based on her
sex—with one notable and ironic exception: but for the
fact that she is a female, plaintiff would not have been
hired as a co-anchor in December, 1980, regardless of her
A42
other abilities. Thereafte: uefendant’s treatment of plain-
tiff was the result of the factors other than sex. Her
salary was less than that of Scott Feldman not because
she was a woman but because her education and expe-
rience were not commensurate with his. She was a “co-
equal co-anchor,” and newsroom operations were con-
ducted without regard to sex. Her affinity for the casual
beach life and her apparent indifference to matters of
appearance required defendant to formulate and implement
corrective measures appropriate to her unique circum-
stances. Defendant reassigned plaintiff because properly
conducted audience research dem onetrated unprecedented
negative viewer response toward fet. She was not con-
structively discharged; rather, she voluntarily left KMBC
rather than abide by the terms of a contract which
she had signed but never carefully reviewed.
Il. EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM
The jury returned a verdict for defendant under Count
II, the Equal Pay Act claim, and plaintiff has moved for
a new trial.
A review of the suggestions filed in support of the
motion fails to convince the court that the verdict on
Count II should be disturbed. Contrary to plaintiff’s asser-
tion, the verdict was not against the clear weight of the
evidence. Plaintiff's allegations of instructiona] error on
Count II are not well taken. Finally, the court adheres
to its previous rulings on the admission and exclusion
of evidence concerning the compensation of other KMBC
employees.
ll. FRAUD CLAIM
On plaintiff's claim of fraud under Count III, the
jury awarded actual damages of $375,000 and punitive
Pee, Tey ee ee
A63
damages of $125,000. Defendant now seeks judgment not-
withstanding the verdict cr a new trial or remittitur. De-
fendant has filed extensive suggestions in support of its
motion, and plaintiff has responded in kind.
At the outset, it is apparent that the motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. Tech-
nically, it is merely a renewal of the motion for directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence. Johnson
v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1980). In this case,
the motion for directed verdict was denied after extensive
post-trial briefing and argument. Order of August 31,
1983. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
“can be granted only if the motion for directed verdict
should have been granted.” Walker v. KFC Corp., 515
F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D. Cal. 1981). Defendant has not
convinced this court that a directed verdict should have
been granted; therefore, the motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict will be denied.
This court has greater latitude in considering defen-
dant’s alternative motion for a new trial: “Rule 59 gives
the trial judge ample power to prevent what he considers
to be a miscarriage of justice. It is his right, and indeed
his duty, to order a new trial if he deems it in the interest
of justice to do so.” 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2803 (1973). A new trial may
be ordered for a great variety of reasons:
It has been said that the general grounds for a new
trial are that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that
for other reasons the trial was not fair, and that the
motion may also raise questions of law arising out
of substantial errors in the admission or rejection of
evidence or the giving or refusal of instructions.
A64
Id. § 2805. See also Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v.
Aalco Wrecking Co., 466 F.2d 179, 187 (8th Cir. 1972)
(court may order new trial if first trial resulted in a
miscarriage of justice), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
“(Where the trial court finds the verdict contrary to
the weight of the evidence and grants a new trial
. . . the appeilate court should ‘exercise a closer degree
of scrutiny and supervision ... in order to protect the
litigants’ right to jury trial.’” Id., 466 F.2d at 187 (quoting
Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960)). On the other
hand:
When evidence is erroneously admitted or excluded
or where the trial court has erred in the instructions
to the jury, the trial court is considered in a better
position to correct a manifest injustice in ruling on
the motion for new trial. Under these circumstances
the grant of the new trial does not interfere with
the role of the jury as the trier of fact.
Fireman’s Fund, 466 F.2d at 186. The trial court is also
in the best position to determine whether the verdict is
excessive; it is the opinion of the Eighth Circuit that
inadequacy or excessiveness of a verdict is basically,
and should be, a matter for the trial court which
has had the benefit of hearing the testimony and of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses and which
knows the community and its standards; that this is
a responsibility which, for better working of the judi-
cial process and for other seemingly obvious reasons,
is best placed upon its shoulders; and that we shall
continue to consider review, as we have said before,
not routinely and in every case, but only in those
rare situations where we are pressed to conclude that
— —~ |
»
Beats cite ane
A65
there is a “plain injustice” or a “monstrous” or “shock-
ing” result.
Nodak Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 533 F.2d 401, 410 (8th
Cir. 1976) (quoting Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton,
294 F.2d 439, 447-48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929
(1961) ).
The jury awarded plaintiff $375,000 in actual damages
and $125,000 in punitive damages. The court is firmly
convinced that this verdict is excessive and is the result
of passion, prejudice, confusion. »r mistake on the part
of the jury. It is telling to jote that plaintiff prayed
for $200,000 in actual damages in her complaint and her
counsel asked for $75,000 to $100,000 in actual damages
in closing argument, yet the jury awarded $375,000. Al-
though the award of punitive damages was within the
amount specified in the prayer and closing argument, the
jury’s unprincipled award of actual damages makes the
award of punitive damages inherently suspect.
Instructional errors may be in part responsible for
the excessive award. Prior to trial, the court announced
that the issue of punitive damages would be submitted,
if at all, only after a finding of liability. The goal of
this bifurcated procedure was to focus the jury’s attention
first on the question of liability in order to promote a
more reasoned analysis of the case. Unfortunately, the
issue of punitive damages was not expressly withdrawn
from the jury when the case was first submitted, and
it is apparent that the award of “compensatory” damages
contains a substantial, but undefined, punitive element.
On retrial, the submission of damages will again be bifur-
cated; however, the issue of punitive damages will be
expressly withdrawn from the jury during its initial de-
liberations to eliminate the risk of jury confusion or mis-
take,
A66
Another instructional shortcoming concerns the issue
_ Of wrongful discharge. In a case such as this, it is im-
portant that the jury not be given a roving commission
to second-guess defendant’s managerial decisions. Defen-
dant submitted a proposed instruction to withdraw from
the jury any consideration of the general fairness or reason-
ableness of defendant’s actions toward plaintiff. Although
the court was amendable to such an instruction in theory,
defendant’s proposal was unsatisfactory as were attempts
to revise it. The proposed instruction was also rejected
in favor of Instruction No. 12, which expressly withdrew
wrongful discharge and related issues from the jury under
Count I. However, a review of the instructions as a whole
now convinces the court that wrongful discharge and re-
lated issues were not clearly withdrawn from the jury’s
consideration, particularly with respect to Count III. It
is therefore quite possible that the jury was confused
or mistaken as to the applicable law, and a new trial
is appropriate.
In addition to the mistake and confusion possibly cre-
ated by the instructions, the excessive verdict is also cer-
tainly attributable to passion and prejudice caused by the
pervasive publicity surrounding this case. News reports
and commentary on the circumstances surrounding plain-
tiff’s departure from KMBC began within days after she
was removed as co-anchor and increased as trial ap-
proached. The effect of this pretrial publicity was ex-
plored during voir dire, but the news coverage of course
continued after the jury was impaneled. Although the
jury was repeatedly admonished not to discuss the case
with anyone and to disregard news accounts of the trial,
even the most conscientious juror would have been unable
to ignore the pervasive and relentless publicity and could
not have been immune from its effect.
A67
In support of its motion for new trial, defendant has
filed two volumes which contain only a sampling of the
local and national coverage of the case by newspapers
and wire services. In addition, the trial received obsessive
attention from local television stations and the national
networks. Although cameras were not allowed in the
courtroom, television crews were frequently stationed at
the perimeter of the building, recording the comings and
goings of trial participants. Present each day in the gallery
were courtroom artists and a substantial number of re-
porters, including some whose faces were undoubtedly well
known to the jurors. During closing arguments, the gallery
was literally crammed to capacity.2, The news accounts
resulting from all this attention in most instances described
the case in terms of plaintiff’s prayer for $1.2 million
in damages and her allegation that defendant told her
she was “too old, too unattractive, and not deferential
enough to men.” The ceaseless incantation of these allega-
tions worked to the advantage of plaintiff and to the serious
detriment of defendant.
Consistent with the customary practice in civil cases
in this district, the jury was never sequestered. The court
is firmly convinced that, as a result, the jury became
so infected with passion and prejudice that it was unable
to discharge its duty of fairness to both parties. Upon
retrial, the jury will be sequestered to assure both parties
an impartial jury.
Two additional measures will be taken to ensure the
integrity of the jury. First, the case will be retried te
2. By an unfortunate circumstance of timing, the jury
retired to deliberate late on a Friday afternoon. Deliberations
were recessed over the weekend, thereby increased the risk tha‘
the jury was exposed to prejudicial publicity at a crucial point
in the trial.
A68
a jury of twelve. See Local Rule 14C. See also 9 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2491 (1971 & Supp. 1982). This should reduce the
risk that one or two headstrong jurors might unduly in-
fluence the jury and should increase the chances that
reason will prevail over passion. Second, the case will
be retried in Joplin, Missouri, in the Southwestern Division
of this District. Moving the case away from Kansas City
should reduce the level of trial publicity and make it
more likely that the jury can reach a decision based solely
on the evidence presented in court. In addition, jury
selection should be easier since it is less likely that pros-
pective jurors in the Southwestern Division will have been
exposed to the intense publicity which emanated from
Kansas City during the first trial.
Because of the excessive verdict attributable to incom-
plete instruction of the jury and to incessant and over-
whelming trial publicity, a new trial on all issues raised
under Count III is required. Reduction of the damage
award by remittiture is inappropriate because passion and
prejudice influenced not only the jury’s calculation of dam-
ages but also its decision on the threshold issue of liabil-
ity. See Richardson v. Communications Workers of Amer-
ica, 530 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir.) (in excessive verdict
cases, decision whether to reduce verdict or grant new
trial is primarily for trial court), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
824 (1976).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is
ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of defen-
dant and against plaintiff on Count I of her complaint.
It is further
A69
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial
on the Equal Pay Act Claim is d»nied. It is further
ORDERED that defendant’s alternative motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for remittitur
on Count III are denied. It is further
ORDERED that defendant’s alternative motion for a
new trial on Count III is granted. Retrial of all issues
raised under Count III will begin at 9:30 a.m. on Wed-
nesday, January 4, 1984, at the Federal Courthouse in
Joplin, Missouri; a jury of twelve will be impaneled and
will be sequestered throughout the proceedings. It is fur-
ther
ORDERED that no later than Friday, November 18,
1983, each side shall file suggestions concerning the most
appropriate method by which to conduct an orderly, effi-
cient, and searching voir dire of prospective jurors. It
is further
ORDERED that proposed jury instructions shall be
filed no later than Friday, December 9, 1983.
/s/ Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.
Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.
United States District Judge
October 31, 1983
A70
(Filed January 13, 1984)
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Western District of Missouri,
83-0007-CV-W-8
Christine Craft-
V.
Metromedia, Inc.
Honorable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.
[X] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court
and a jury with the judicial officer named above pre-
siding. The issues have been tried and the jury has ren-
dered its verdict.
[ ] Decision by Court. This action came to trial
or hearing before the Court with the judge (magistrate)
named above presiding. The issues have been tried or
heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
on the claim of Plaintiff Christine Craft against Defendant
Metromedia, Inc., for fraudulent representations, judgment
is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff and against De-
fendant, with actual damages assessed at Two Hundred
Twenty-five Thousand ($225,000) Dollars and punitive
damages assessed at One Hundred Thousand ($100,000)
Dollars.
R. F. Connor
Clerk
/s/ (illegible)
(By) Deputy Clerk
January 13, 1984
EEE
A771
(Filed January 17, 1984)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Western District of Missouri
Western Division
No. 83-0007-CV-W-8
CHRISTINE CRAFT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
METROMEDIA, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Prior to submission of plaintiff’s fraud claim, the court
deferred a ruling on defendant’s motion for directed ver-
dict at the close of all the evidence. Rule 50(b) provides
that “[w]henever a motion for a directed verdict made
at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason
is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the
action to the jury subject to a later determination of the
legal questions raised by the motion.” Rule 58 provides
that “upon a general verdict of a jury . . . the clerk, unless
the court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign,
and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction
by the court.”
It appears to the court that under Rule 50(b) deferral
of defendant’s motion for directed verdict was tantamount
to a denial thereof, and the clerk of the court routinely
enters judgment as of the date of the verdict. Therefore,
it appears that the time for filing motions under Rules
AT72
50(b) and 59(b) began to run at the time of verdict;
moreover, Rule 6(b) prohibits the court from extending
the time for filing such motions. Accordingly, in the in-
terest of clarity; it is
ORDERED that defendant’s motion for directed ver-
dict at the close of all the evidence shall be deemed denied
as of January 13, 1984.
/s/ Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.
Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.
United States District Judge
January 17, 1984
A73
(Filed February 7, 1984)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Western District of Missouri
Western Division
No. 83-0007-CV-W-8
CHRISTINE CRAFT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
METROMEDIA, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Pursuant to the order of October 31, 1983, a new trial
on plaintiff’s fraud claim commenced in Joplin, Missouri,
on January 4, 1984. On January 13, 1984, the sequestered
jury of twelve found in favor of plaintiff and awarded her
$225,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Defendant has now filed its Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial as
to Count III, to which plaintiff has responded.
Defendant’s motion contains eighty-seven allegations
of error (plus subparts), each of which defendant asserts
constitute prejudicial and plain error warranting judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, yet another
trial. Having reviewed this compendium of alleged errors,
the court finds no sufficient reason to disturb the verdict.
In addition, the court is satisfied that the problems
with the first trial, as described in the order of October 31,
1983, did not reoccur in the Joplin trial. The instructional
AT4
errors on wrongful discharge and punitive damages were
corrected in the second trial, and the potential prejudicial
impact of trial publicity on the jury was minimized or
eliminated by sequestration and the increased number of
jurors.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that defendant’s Motion for Judgment Not-
withstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial as
to Count III is denied. It is further
ORDERED that costs will be taxed as follows:
1. Each side will bear its own costs incurred up to
and including August 8, 1983, the date of verdict
in the first trial.
9. All costs incurred after Au,ust 8, 1983, will be
taxed to defendant. .
/s/ Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.
Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.
United States District Judge
February 7, 1984
A75
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 84-1336
No. 84-1380
CHRISTINE 4. CRAFT,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
METROMEDIA, INC.,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION
FOR REHEARING EN BANC
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution declares:
In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of common
law.
Christine Craft petitions for rehearing or suggests re-
hearing en banc, because the panel opinion handed down
in this case simply is in fatal conflict with the Seventh
Amendment. Three members of the Court have put their
name to an opinion which violates all rules of appellate
review enshrined in the decisions of this Court and the
Supreme Court of the United States, by attempting to re-
sift, reweigh, reexamine and redetermine factual issues on
plaintiff's Missouri common law fraud claim, despite two
A76
lengthy trials in which 18 jurors, fairly chosen from cross
sections of the *- Missouri communities of Kansas City
and Joplin, a ave personally heard, seen, examined,
sifted, weighea anu determined the factual issues as the
Constitution directs they—and only they—must do. At-
lantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369
U.S. 355 at 359-60 (1962). Judicial integrity and conscience
compel reinstatement of Craft’s jury verdict.
Craft’s common law fraud claim arose from a series
of preemployment conversations between Craft and sta-
tion management at KMBC, Ridge Shannon and Kent
Replogle. In response to direct questions by Craft and a
friend, Bob Hamilton, Shannon and Replogle repeatedly
told Craft they did not intend to make her over or change
her into something she was not, but that they were more
interested in Craft’s journalistic credentials, and “liked
what they saw.” Contrary to these representations man-
agement was already working with consultants on the
changes that would be made in Craft's appearance. Man-
agement’s efforts to remold Craft's appearance into their
image began “from day one” of her employment, and
continued unabated thereafter, until her removal for rea-
sons related to her appearance. Material errors exist
between this Court’s recitation of evidence—set forth in
the light least favorable to Craft—and what the trial record
truly shows when “considered in the light most favor-
able to Craft.” (emphasis added). That fact alone “would
be a matter for rehearing” under local rule 16.
Rehearing en banc is warranted as well, however,
because denial of any citizen’s Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial is indeed a grave constitutional issue. The
panel opinion destroys uniformity of this Court’s decisions
on the important subject of the rigid boundary of appellate
A77
review of sufficiency of evidence for a jury, a boundary
which all appellate courts are required to steadfastly and
zealously secure against breach in order to preserve public
confidence in our constitutional jury system.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc., supra, 369 U.S. at 359-60:
We might agree with the Court of Appeals had the
question of fact been left to us. But neither we nor
the Court of Appeals can redetermine facts found by
the jury any more than the District Court can prede-
termine them. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court has often prohibited incursions by
Courts of Appeal into the jury’s sole province to weigh
facts when alleged insufficiency of evidence results in
reversal on appeal: See, e.g., Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S.
152 at 155-56 (1964); Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company, 372 U.S. 108, 112-115 (1963) and cases cited:
Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959)
[reversing this Court]; Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645.
652-653 (1946).
The opinion is self-contradictory, in that the portion
devoted to rejecting Ms. Craft's appeal of the trial judge’s
sex discrimination findings repeatedly admonishes Craft
that the district court decision cannot be disturbed, be-
cause Craft’s arguments “[b]oldly seek re-evaluation of
the evidence and rejection of the district court’s factual
findings.” (Slip Op. at 10).' All other trial court rulings
challenged by Craft are met with similarly solid deference
to the trial judge. Thus, the unanswerable questions are
—
1. More than 25 times between pages 8-22 the opinion
refers to the district court’s discretion to decide sex-discrimination
“facts,” and the appeals court indeed “makes clear” its limited
review of those issues.
el
A78
how and why the panel opinion can embrace a completely
new fact finding exercise on Craft’s fraud claims—thereby
suddenly abandoning all deference to the jury as fact-
finder and the decision of this same district judge who
considered and rejected defendant’s arguments against
submissibility of fraud at least six times in pretrial,
trial and post-trial motions over the course of two trials
before two different juries. The integrity of this Court’s
opinions demands reinstatement of Craft’s jury verdict,
for it defies law and logic to hold, as did the panel, that
every aspect of Judge Stevens’ memorandum order is im-
pervious to attack—except his profoundly correct ruling
that “it is apparent that the motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict should be denied.” 572 F. Supp. at
880.?
I. SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS EXIST BETWEEN
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO CRAFT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS “FACT FINDING”
Court of Appeals Fact Finding:
“While it can be argued that Craft was ‘made over’
in being forced to exchange her casual California
beach look—she testified that in Santa Barbara she
occasionally went directly from the beach to the
studio... .” (Slip Opinion at 27.) (Apparent Source:
Ridge Shannon Vol. VI, 83.)
2. Because Judge Stevens’ rulings throughout both trials
betray that his sympathies were not with plainiff, his rulings in
favor of the sufficiency of evidence for submissibility are most
compelling. Indeed although plaintiff vigorously opposed the
order for separate retrial of the fraud claims, the panel opinion
reduces the entire Joplin proceedings to an empty, monumentally
wasteful mockery.
A79
Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal
None. Craft never testified as the opinion states;
Ridge Shannon did—but his testimony must be (but ob-
viously was not) ignored. Baynes v. Jenkins, 593 S.W.2d
519, 521 (Mo. banc 1980); Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc.,
722 F.2d 374, 376-77 (8th Cir. 1983), supplemented, 728
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984). The language of the appellate
opinion also bears striking resemblance to the District
Court’s view of Craft’s supposed “affinity for the casual
beach life.” 572 F. Supp. at 879.
To the contrary, clothing requirements of Kansas City
were no different than the “normal clothing” worn in
Santa Barbara and elsewhere where Craft had worked
during her years in TV. (Vol. II, 189). Craft described
“normal” appearance, which the jury eould infer was
“reasonable” for Kansas City, as follows (Vol. II, 193):
Q. My question is, what do you mean when you say
“normal clothing” and “that is a subjective term?”
A. I mean the same things I had worn all my years
in television in the sense of clean. I usually wear
silk shirts and pearls or a blazer and a shirt, nor-
mal in that sense, a dress. I have always worn
makeup. Always worn what I consider normal
clothes.
“From day one” management’s “relentless” obsession
was on Craft’s assymetrical face, makeup, the fact that
one eye was smaller than the other, clothing selection
and consultation. It can be more than “argued” Craft
was “made over” as to everything all evidence showed,
and the jury believed, she was forced to undergo. (Vol I,
part 2 at 115-118, 128-31, 136-39, 142-47, 151-61, 170-76,
182-199; Vol. II, 7-19, 24-27, 31-38, 40-41; P. Ex. 104, 65)
A80
This Court’s unauthorized acceptance of Shannon’s
testimony robbed Craft of a jury evaluation on key cred-
ibility determinations. For example, Shannon testified
regarding a preemployment conversation with Craft:
I said, ‘Do you understand we have consultants and
the consultants, they offer coaching?’ She said, ‘I
would be acceptable to that. That doesn’t bother me.’
I said, ‘We get into appearance and clothes’ and she
said, ‘I am not much on makeup. I really don’t care
that much about clothing. This is one of my low
priorities.’ She said, ‘In fact, sometimes I will get
up in the mornings and if it is a nice morning I will
go out and surf and I will go to work and just wear
to work what I have got on. And sometimes I wear
makeup and sometimes I don’t’ and she said she did
not care and did not have a lot of knowledge about
clothing and makeup.
I said, ‘We would like to work with you on that and
that would be what the coach with Media Associates
could do.’ She said, ‘Boy, that would be great, I
would like that. I would really appreciate that.’
(Vol. VI at 83)
Even on cross-examination, Craft’s testimony re-
mained staunchly different—and binding on this Court:
Now is it also true during this time that you were
talking to Mr. Shannon and Mr. Replogle there at
that time of your audition and interview, you indi-
cated that you had very little interest in the matter
of clothing and makeup. Answer: I indicated that
my primary interest was news. Question: Did you
not also indicate that you would need help in those
areas? Answer: No, I did not indicate that I would
Pee y aansossclill
A81
need help in those areas. Question: Was there not
some discussion of your getting help in those areas?
Answer: There was not. (Vol. II at 143-144)
In light of Craft’s uncontradicted stated concerns
about her appearance, Shannon’s testimony that she en-
thusiastically embraced the prospect of station manage-
ment and consultants “geiting into appearance and clothes”
appears incredible—as plaintiff argued and was accepted
by the jury. Shannon’s trial testimony also contradicted
his own earlier sworn testimony:
Question: So, you didn’t tell her if she was hired
on she would be subject to the dictates
of the Media Consultants?
Answer: Exactly the opposite.
(Vol. V at 130).°
Court of Appeals “Fact Finding”
“TWije believe Craft in her audition interviews was
concerned essentially with hair and makeup and not
with clothing.” (Slip Opinion at 27.) (Apparent
Source: Brief of Appellant at 30-36.)
* * *
“KMBC’s statements to Craft were made in response
to her expressions of concern about her experience
at CBS where the network required her hair to be
cut and dyed blonde, her eyebrow shade dyed black
and heavy makeup applied.” (Slip Opinion at 27-28.)
(Apparent Source: Appeliant’s Brief at 32)
3. These and other discrepancies in Shannon’s testimony
alone would have been a sufficient reason for the jury to dis-
believe him entirely. Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., supra, 722
F.2d at 378 n.8.
A82
Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal
Contrary to what this panel believes, the record
showed, and the jury believed Craft was concerned about
changes in her appearance generally, not limited to hair,
makeup or the CBS situation, because she wanted “to
do what I felt was the best thing I did in communicating
which was to be pretty much myself as often as possible.”
(Vol. I, part 2, 104). During plaintiff's conversations
with Ridge Shannon, the subject of appearance generally
was discussed:
I reiterated to him again that if they wanted someone
who looked different than the person on the tape,
that I wouldn’t be interested. (Vol. I at 90-91) I
told him the CBS experience had made me extremely
uncomfortable about changes in my appearance and
if they liked what they saw we could talk further
and I would come back for an audition. Otherwise
I wasn’t interested. (Vol. I at 91) If they wanted
to hire someone who was bandbox perfect do not
hire me. (Vol. I at 92)
In discussing the reasons why she accepted the em-
ployment offer in Kansas City, Craft testified:
The original salary offer was not that much more
than what I was making in Santa Barbara where I
was still working at that time. The most important
thing is that I would be allowed to be myself in every
conversation between Santa Barbara and Kansas City,
between Metromedia and Christine Craft. That was
reiterated and I was assured that they had no inten-
tions of changing my appearance, they liked my appear-
ance. (Vol. II at 192) (Also see Vol. I, 104)
A83
When asked what kind of changes she had in mind
during these discussions with Shannon, Craft testified,
“change my appearance.” (Vol. II at 187)
While the parties significantly differ on what was said
during their preemployment discussions, even Ridge Shan-
non’s testimony utterly destroys this Court’s “finding”
since “appearance”, was part of his discussions with Craft
and the consultants. (Vol. VI at 83, 110).
Representatives of KMBC repeatedly assured Craft
“They liked everything about me. They didn’t want to
change me...and they kept saying what they wanted was
a journalist:”
We love her just the way she is. What we are looking
for is the fresh California beach look. . .. [W]e have
a male co-anchor, and we want to balance him with
a strong, independent woman. And what we like is
Christine’s freshness and her naturalness.... We love
the way she looks. (Vol. III at pp. 11-12) When Craft
told Shannon that makeup and hair were not one of
her first priorities, “They said they liked what they
saw.” (Vol. I at 173) Management repeatedly said,
What they wanted was a good journalist. (Vol. I, Part
2, at 173)
Craft further testified on cross-examination that cloth-
ing as well as makeup was a part of her discussion with
Shannon and Replogle. (Vol. II at 134-135) Credited evi-
dence on general appearance could not be clearer or more
opposite to the opinion:
Q: [W]hat changes did you have in mind when you
had these discussions with Mr. Shannon?
A: Change my appearance (Vol. II, 87) ** * ‘everal
times I told them and they concurred, what you
A84
see is what you get. If you want to change me,
change my appearance, don’t hire me. (Vol. II, 88)
Even Replogle used the term appearance, agreeing
management told Craft they did not intend to make her
over, redo her or change her fundamental appearance.
(Vol. III at 210); he admitted Creft had said she was
not interested in a job which involv « “making me into
something I am not.” (Vol. III at 166, 228) Other wit-
nesses discussing the requirements imposed by KMEC re-
ferred continually to KMBC general appearance require-
ments which, as the jury was free to infer, from common
sense and the context of all evidence, included not only
makeup and hairstyles but clothing as well. The jury sim-
ply was never confronted with—or else weighed and re-
jected—the type of fine distinction this Court seeks to
impose. (See for example, Vol. IV at 74, 91, 214, 228; Vol.
VI at 166, 215.)
The CBS experience and its effect on Craft as ex-
plained and discussed with management of KMBC was con-
siderably broader than mere hair color and eyebrow
makeup, and was related to Craft’s general conceins about
appearance. Bob Hamilton repeatedly reminded man-
atement:
You know what CBS did to Christine. They tried to
make her into something she was not. They tried to
change her and she doesn’t want to come to work for
you if that is what you are going to try to do her
now.
(Vol. III at 45) In fact in Bob Hamilton’s conversation
with Ridge Shannon, the lopping off of Craft’s hair and
making her into a blonde at CBS was not mentioned. The
term makeover and change her into something that she
is not were the terms that Hamilton used in his conver-
Diasec:
A853
sation with Ridge Shannon. (Vol. III at 45) Kent Replogle
admitted telling Craft “You don’t want a makeover and 3
agree with that.” (Vol. III at 208-209) Further, Shannon
and Replogle were told Craft “wants to be a journalist,
not a beauty queen.” (Vol. III at 45-46)
Crucially, management never told Craft of its always-
extant belief that appearance was the number one criterion
for a television newsperson (Vol. III at 174-175), and that
Shannon always believed “having an attractive anchor was
part of the requirement for effective delivery of the news
on Channel 9.” (Vol. V at 119, 120)
Court of Appeals Fact Finding
“There is, however, no evidence that the station at the
time it made the challenged representation knew it
would exercise such an intrusive degree of control or
knew that such control would be in its eyes necessary.”
(Slip Opinion at 28) (Apparent Source: Appellant's
Brief at 36-37)
“There is no evidence that the station had any knowl-
edge where along this spectrum Craft might fall or
what facilities she might demonstrate in adjusting her
wardrobe to the Kansas City climate and market.”
(Slip Opinion at 28) (Apparent Source: Shannon,
Vol. VI at 107)
Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal
Present intent to change Craft could not have been
more strongly shown—by direct and circumstantial evi-
dence.* The Media Associate consultants reviewing the
4. As Instruction No. 14 aptly provides, “[i]ntent can be
inferred from circumstantial evidence because a defendant’s in-
tent not to perform will seldom be capable of proof by direct
evidence.” Missouri law is in full accord. Allison v. Mildred,
307 S.W.2d 447, 453 (Mo. 1957); see Martin v. Brune, 631 S.W.2d
77, 80 (Mo. App. 1982); yet Craft proved intent by direct evidence.
A86
audition tapes for the purposes of reporting to KMBC’s
management had.negative comments concerning Craft’s
dress and hair and concluded her “overall look” and “ap-
pearance” would not work, because her “look” was not
sophisticated enough or as conservative as Kansas City
required. _(Vol.-IV_ at 212-214) Lynn Wilford and Ridge
Shannon had several conversations before Craft began
work concerning Craft’s “problems on camera” and the
“work” that Lynn Wilford was to do with Craft concerning
these problems. Ridge Shannon agreed with most of Wil-
ford’s assessments of Craft’s “problems.” When Shannon
sent Craft to Dallas to first meet Lynn Wilford in December
of 1980 before Craft reported to work, he “[s]pecifically
told Lynn, I do not want you to talk to Christine about
appearance. .. .” (Vol. VI, 111) He told Wilford that
Craft had been hurt badly by the CBS situation, and that
he did not want Wilford to work on her appearance but
that “he wanted to work on that himself in Kansas City.”
(Vol. IV at 218) Thus, the allowable inference for the jury
was Shannon knew at that moment that management and
the consultants intended forcing changes in Craft’s ap-
pearance once she reported for work. Because he knew
from Craft’s statements regarding CBS that what the
consultants and he contemplated would be precisely what
Craft did not want, Shannon wanted to hide his deceit.
Given Shannon’s undisputed admission that changes
in Craft’s appearance were intended, the intrusive degree
of control which the jury found Shannon would and did ex-
ercise over Craft’s appearance was amply supported by
the station’s past practice and history of working with
individuals’ appearance. (Vol. IV at 72, II at 220) The
Court’s own opinion recognizes that where management
thought on air performers had appearance problems, man-
agement exercised contro] that a jury could find “in-
A87
trusive.” (Slip Op. at 13-14, 26) Such evidence, together
with management’s belief that appearance was the “num-
ber one criterion” for a newsperson, inexorably led the
jury to the inference that similarly “intrusive” measures
were in store for Craft; but no inference is necessary be-
cause intent was established by direct evidence.
The evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom demonstrated that station management recog-
nized problems with Craft’s appearance before hiring her,
that station management intended to work on these prob-
lems and that in the past it had exercised what the jury
could infer was. “intrusive” control over on air personnel
when appearance issues arose. There was more than suffi-
cient evidence on defendant’s intent. In fact, under the
rule in Pinken v. Frank, 704 F.2d 1019 at 1026 (8th Cir.
1983), what the panel admits is enough to establish “in-
tent”.®
Court of Appeals Fact Finding
“Even if Craft does have an arguable position that
the representation that no ‘makeover or substantial
changes’ had application to clothing, a reasonable jury
could not have found a make over until KMBC’s
efforts reached their most extreme extent in the late’
days of Craft’s employment.” (Slip Opinion at 28)
“In fact the record is basically uncontradicted as to
the gradual increase in the intensity of measures taken
by KMBC in regard to Craft’s appearance.” (Slip
Opinion at 28)
5. In Pinken v. Frank this Court held:
Although the existence of fraudulent intent is never pre-
sumed, it may be inferred where a party knowingly mis-
states a material fact, knowing that the party to whom it is
made will rely on it. (Emphasis added).
No doubt plaintiff had that and more.
A88
“Craft at first was given only the most general advice
through books, fashion magazines and a memorandum
suggesting makeup techniques.” (Slip Opinion at 28)
“Even taking the evidence as establishing that KMBC’s
actions differed from those promised, the record does
no more than suggest that the station, because of
difficulties it experienced with Craft changed its mind,
as to steps that would be necessary as to her appear-
ance.”
Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited on Appeal
The credited evidence flatly contradicts an asserted
“gradual increase in intensity” of appearance measures.
Craft testified appearance criticisms began “immediately”
and were “continuous” and “relentless” “from day one”
until she was removed. (Vol. I, Pt. 2, 130-137, 171-72, 193)
No more is required; but there is much more. Signif-
icantly, Shannon admitted that he began criticizing Craft's
appearance “from day one” of her employment (Vol. YI
at 215) and that he began working on her clothing and
appearance from day one. (Vol. VI at 230)
Wilford was requested by Shannon to make an “emer-
gency visit to Kansas City on January 14,” within nine
days of Craft’s debut, “to work with Pam [Whiting] and
Christine on their appearance.” (Vol. IV at 220-221) On
“day one” Shannon told Craft one eye was too small,
her jaw was too square and her clothes did not look right.
(Vol. I, Pt. 2, at 128-130) Immediately thereafter, Lynn
Wilford performed the specific, intrusive “ill-fated” make-
up application she was forced to wear on air (Vol. I,
Pt. 2, 142-146), and gave Craft a detailed, specific “makeup
analysis” by Gigi Coker, a woman Craft never met. (Vol.
A89
I, Pt. 2, 151-52)® In January Ridge Shannon did not
“suggest” but tuld Craft “to follow these instructions.”
(Vol. II, p. 8-9; P’s Ex. 65). If Craft had known of suck
requirements, “I never would have gone to work for
KMBC Metromedia.” (Vol. II, 12) In January of 1981,
Lynn Wilford took her to Macy’s for the purpose of ob-
taining clothes. (Vol. II at p. 15) In February of 1981,
she was sent to Macy’s for clothes and began trying these
clothes on in front of the camera. (Vol. II at 15-16) )
Not only did “intrusive” working-hour sessions begin in
February with Maureen Shawver at Macy’s but it con-
tinued thereafter. By March of 1981 when Ridge Shannon
directed her to go to Macy’s to obtain particular clothes,
ie., a bowed polyester blouse in place of the cream silk
blouse with pearls she was wearing, she had already been
taken to Macy’s on previous occasions by Lynn Wilford.
(Vol. I, Pt. 2, at 174).
When station management started “from day one”
working on Craft’s appearance, no research had been
done concerning her appearance, and, as shown above,
credited evidence bindingly establishes appearance was
the focus “continuously,” from beginning to end. (Vol. II,
16-17) No more is required for the jury. Although de-
fendant argued at the second trial it merely had “changed
its mind” about appearance activities due to negative focus
group research in June, Judge Stevens recognized, “change
in mind is a fact issue” (Vol. II, 30) which defendant
6. P’s Ex. 104 (which includes Ex. 65), attached hereto
for convenience, starkly exposes the utter falseness of the opin-
ion’s characterization of these intrusive mandates as “the most
general advice” or “suggestions.” The jury was free to de-
termine the opposite. (See also P’s Ex. 138, 151, 152, 155, 163,
315, 358)
A90
urged but the jury flatly rejected." Prior to the imple-
mentation of the fashion calendar in July of 1981, Craft
testified that in June of 1981 when she and Ridge dis-
cussed her appearance as a result of the focus group tapes,
she at that time had been wearing clothes selected for
her either by Lynn Wilford or Maureen Shawver for sev-
eral months, going back to January and February of 1981.
(Vol. II at 24) “Intrusive” is a normative term—for the
jury, not this Court.
Court of Appeals Fact Finding
“It is well to consider further what ‘makeover’ or
‘substantial changes’ means.” (Slip Op. at 26)
“The record reveals no action by KMBC in regard to
Craft’s hair or makeup that could be seen as consti-
tuting a ‘make over’. . . . Furthermore, Craft was
7". Although not precisely relevant to the issues in this
appeal, the district court and possibly the panel in light of its
result was puzzled as to the defendant’s motive. Why would the
defendant bring Craft half-way across the country to defraud
her? The answer is simple.
Shannon admitted on cross-examination that they had
screened approximately 200 people about the co-anchor job
prior to Craft (Volume VI at 165-166) and at the time they
were talking with Craft they were running up against their
deadline set for the selection of a co-anchor. (Volume VI at
166-167) (1) She fit budget; (2) was not under contract; and
(3) was a good journalist. (Vol. VI, 73-74) She was the
last of the three finalists to audition. (Vol. VI, 76) Wilford ad-
mitted that the group opinion was that Craft was the strongest
of the last three candidates being screened when Craft was
selected. (Volume IV at 215) But, as Shannon damningly testi-
fied, she was “overly reluctant to leave California to come to
Kansas City,” so Shannon “tried to be as persuasive as possible.”
(Vol. VI, 187) As argued to the jury, the station could not af-
ford to hire the people they wanted for co-anchor. Of the re-
maining individuals Craft had the best potential to be remade
over into something the defendant wanted but could not afford.
When Craft failed to meet the station’s “dress, makeup and
general appearance” expectations, and “resisted attempts to im-
prove her... .”, she was removed as anchor. (Vol. III at 215)
A9l
allowed to apply her own makeup except for the one
ill-fated occasion, and we do not believe mere sugges-
tions constitute a ‘make over.’ ” (Slip Opinion at 27,
footnote 17)
Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal
As earlier discussion cements, reasonable minds might
differ on what “make over” means or what constituted a
make over. Such was for the jury to decide—not this
Court.* Appearance changes were not “mere suggestions”
but requirements for Craft’s job. (Vol. II, 126; Vol. IV,
236; Vol. V, 110-120).®
Il. THE OPINION IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
LAW REGARDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
FOR FRAUD AND THE REQUIRED REVIEW
OF JURY ISSUES
The panel’s opinion is fundamentally flawed not only
by its failure to acknowledge plaintiff's evidence and the
reasonable inferences the jury could and did draw there-
from, but also by its misuse of authority concerning re-
quired scope of review. Part I establishes the opinion
merely recites but does not follow the applicable rule that
it can only find in favor of Metromedia if “all the evi-
8. The opinion footnotes, “Shannon and Replogle were con-
vinced . . . actions they took . . . did not constitute a makeover.”
Id. n.16. This is only the most obvious proof that appellate re-
view was improper. Dace, supra; Bayne v. Jenkins, supra. In-
deed, if management’s opinions were the legal standard, there
would be no need for courts and juries.
9. Craft begs the indulgence of the Court concerning the
additional length of this petition. However, because of the depth
of the panel’s misreading of the record, anything but a point-
by-point response would be inadequate. Because at least six
members of the Court are unfamiliar with the lengthy record
in this case, a detailed statement is needed to properly present
the issues to the full Court.
A92
dence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable
inferences sustaining the position” of Craft. (See Slip Op.
at 23 citing Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1148 (8th
Cir. 1984)). The panel opinion is further defective be-
cause it ignores the amplification of this standard con-
tained in the very case cited by the panel opinion. Crues
held this court “must... assume as true all facts support-
ing [Craft] which the evidence tended to prove... .” Id.
at 1148. See also Easley v. Empire Incorporated, 757 F.2d
923, 928 (8th Cir. 1985), and cases cited therein, wherein
Judge Gibson declares:
We can interfere with the conclusion of a jury only
where there is a ‘complete absence of probative facts’
to support the verdict.
This rule is necessarily inconsistent with the opinion’s
conclusion that “the intent to work on Craft’s appearance
[was] demonstrated abundantly by her evidence” but that
this somehow was not sufficient to make a submissible
case on whether the defendant had an intention to impose
a make over or substantial change.’®
10. An example of the Court’s fundamentally misguided
opinion is its reliance on Dillard v. Earnhart, 457 S.W.2d 666 (Mo.
1970). (See Slip Op. at 29.) The differences between the Dillard
and the Craft cases are stark. The Dillard court involved a re-
view of a trial finding of no fraud, rather than a 12-member jury
decision that the defendant had acted fraudulently. Thus, the
fraud argument was entitled to no favorable inferences. The
Dillard opinion observes that “all the evidence” supports the
result. Even this panel does not make so bold a statement about
the case at bar. The Dillard case concerned a clear, significant
change of circumstances that led to Clyde, Sr.’s refusal to release
the deed. Here, without any change of circumstances whatso-
ever, the defendant began to implement the makeover and, at
the same time, took concrete steps to conceal this intention from
Craft. The panel’s attempt to legitimize its violation of the jury-
judge separation by a citation to Dillard is nonsense. The Dil-
lard case provides no support for the court’s ill-advised avoidance
of the Seventh Amendment limitation.
re
A93
In light of the scope of review this Court must follow,
it is inconceivable that any “reasonable panel” could con-
clude that it was not for the jury to determine whether
the intent to work on Craft’s appearance, which the panel
opinion repeatedly admits is “demonstrated abundantly”
by the evidence, does not create a jury question on whether
the defendant’s state of mind was to cause a “makeover”
or “substantial changes” in Craft’s appearance. Whatever
the panel or Shannon and Replogle may “believe” as to
what amounts to a makeover or substantial change is
totally irrelevant and should not be in this Court’s opinion.
Craft obviously believed makeover and substantial changes
occurred, and that is what counts, since, as always, the
question is what the jury believed and could reasonably
find based on the evidence.”
If the evidence supported the conclusion that the de-
fendant intended to work on Craft’s appearance, the evi-
dence necessarily “tended to prove” defendant intended
to do a makeover or substantial changes, depending on
which party’s argument the jury believed—here obviously
Craft’s. Intent is locked in by Pinken v. Frank, 704 F.2d
at 1026. The Court cites Toenjes v. L. J. McNeary Con-
struction Co., 406 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo. App. 1966), but
stubbornly, inexplicably, does the
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