Appendix — Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.

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ame Court, U.S

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DEC 17 198)

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CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

CHRISTINE A. CRAFT,

Petitioner,

VS.

METROMEDIA, INC.,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS E. EGAN

Counsel of Record

Missouri I.D. No. 27449

PoPpHAM, CONWAY, SWEENY, FREMONT

& BuNDSCHU, P.C.

1300 Commerce Trust Building

922 Walnut Street

Kansas City, Missouri 64106

(816) 221-2288

Attorneus for Petitioner

E. L. MeNDENHALL, INc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX

Opinion by the Court of Appeals, June 28, 1986 ............ Al

Judgment of Court of Appeals ..................2...:.ssscecceeeeeeeeeee= A34

Order of the Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc, and Modifying Earlier Opinion,

I TIS Fre BI aces esinsecrintenttcsesinnicdeesane A36

Modification of Opinion of June 28, 1985, Issued August

I I cic sas tasica eeescadeceeclenhcbandbniecnipiensndntlighaininisiaidiadaaaiancunitaaeion A38

Memorandum and Order of the District Court, Oc-

i CIEE cciibbaennbicccniceteittensncscictunitotalopenecinisieniaseaniuraimeaeiinettin A39

Judgment on Fraud Verdict in Joplin, January 13,

1984 ...... panihdebiliaviialida A70

Order of the District Court Overruling Defendant’s

Motion for Directed Verdict, January 13, 1984 ........ A7l1

Order of the District Court Overruling Defendant’s

Motion for Judgment n.o.v. or for New Trial, Feb-

ruary 7, 1984 Sisiniabbaaiiiieadasdcasaaaiblebansnien A73

Petition for Rehearing and Suggestions for Rehear-

Te Be ncchncscalnnices-toseicspncitneeevnsinieaceactoeenisaitinsidannanmariitas AT

Appellate Review of Civil Jury Verdicts ......................- A107

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APPENDIX

Christine A. CRAFT,

Appellee/Cross-Appeilant,

Vv.

METROMEDIA, INC.,

_ Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 84-1336, 84-1380.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1985.

Decided June 28, 1985.

A2

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and McMILLIAN and

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Christine Craft was reassigned from coanchor to re-

porter by KMBC-TV in Kansas City, Missouri, and as a

result brought this action against the station’s owner and

operator, Metromedia, Inc. Craft alleged that she had

been discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation

of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq. (1982), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,

29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), and that she had been fraud-

ulently induced into accepting the KMBC employment.

The primary focus of the suit was KMBC’s concern with

appearance—whether the station’s standards for on-air

personnel were stricter and more strictly enforced as to

females than as to males and whether the station mis-

represented to Craft its intentions as to changing her

appearance to persuade her to accept the anchor job. The

district court! found against Craft on her Title VII sex

discrimination claim and refused a new trial as to the

jury verdict against her on her equal pay claim. The

court, however, set aside as excessive the jury verdict

in Craft’s favor on the fraud claim and ordered a new

trial. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 868 (W.D.

Mo.1983). Craft appeals from these rulings while Meiro-

media appeals from the judgment on the jury verdict,

1. The Honorable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., United States

District Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri.

A3

again in Craft’s favor, in the second fraud trial. We

affirm the Title VII and Equal Pay Act judgments against

Craft but further conclude that she did not make a sub-

missible case on her fraud claim and thus reverse the

judgment against Metromedia on that issue.

Christine Craft commenced her television career in

mid-1975 as a weeknight weather reporter at a small

station in Salinas, California. After about a year and a

half, during which she also worked as an announcer,

reporter, and substitute sportscaster, she became the week-

end weather anchor at a San Francisco television station.

She spent a year there, again handling some additional

news and substitute sports assignments.

Craft then was hired by Columbia Broadcasting Sys-

tem to host the “Women in Sports” portion of its network

television program “CBS Sports Spectacular.” At the

network’s behest she had her hair cut short and bleached

blond. She was required to use black eyebrow pencil

and dark red lipstick, and a CBS technician applied heavy

makeup before every on-air appearance. “Women in

Sports” was discontinued after thirty weeks, and Craft

returned to California.

About a year later Craft resumed her television career

as a reporter at a station in Santa Barbara, California.

She remained there, also serving as coanchor of the late

news and occasionally doing sports and weather, until

December 1980, when she began work at KMBC.

KMBC, having slipped in its local news ratings, had

determined to adopt the coanchor format used by its two

major competitors in Kansas City. Furthermore, it had

determined that, because of the perceived “coldness” of

its anchor, Scott Feldman, the new position was to be

filled by a female to “soften” its news presentation. The

A4

station obtained tapes of a number of performers, including

Craft, from Media Associates of Dallas. After studying

these tapes, KMBC news director Ridge Shannon con-

tacted Craft, among other individuals, to see if she was

interested in auditioning for the job. Craft described her

unpleasant experience at CBS and made plain that she

was not interested if KMBC intended a “makeover” of

her appearance. She continued to stress this point while

in Kansas City for the audition, and Shannon and R. Kent

Replogle, vice president and general manager of KMBC,

assured her they planned no changes such as those at CBS.

Shannon did mention that KMBC made some use of con-

sultants, and Craft indicated some willingness to work

on her appearance and dress.

Craft accepted the coanchor position at KMBC and

at the station’s request stopped in Dallas for a meeting

with Lynn Wilford of Media Associates before reporting

to Kansas City. She made her debut as coanchor on

January 5, 1981, and the testimony is essentially uncon-

tradicted that Shannon and Replogle immediately began

having concerns about her clothing and makeup. Wilford

came to Kansas City on January 14 to work with Craft

on dress as well as on various aspects of her presentation

technique. It was during this visit that Wilford for the only

time applied Craft’s makeup, and the results on the 6 p.m,

news were so unsatisfactory that Craft was allowed to

remove the makeup before the 10 p.m. broadcast.

In the following months Shannon continued to make

occasional suggestions or criticisms as to certain articles

of Craft’s clothing, and Craft was provided with materials,

including the book Women’s Dress for Success, on ward-

robe and makeup. Then, beginning in April, KMBC ar-

ranged for Macy’s Department Store to provide clothing

for Craft in exchange for advertising time. Craft was

A5

assisted by a consultant from Macy’s in selecting outfits.

She would then return to the KMBC studio, try on the

clothing, and appear before camera so tapes could be

made to send to Wilford for review.

On May 19 and 20, 1981, Media Associates initiated

some research of viewer perceptions of KMBC’s newscasts

by conducting four “focus group” discussions. By this

technique groups of ten individuals viewed sample video

tapes of local news programs and then gave their reactions

in sessions moderated by a Media Associates representa-

tive. The response to Craft’s appearance was, as summed

up by the district court, “overwhelmingly negative.” 572

F.Supp. at 873. When Replogle and Shannon met with

Craft the following day to discuss this result, Craft at first

wanted to be let out of her contract to return to California.

Replogle, however, stated that management was ready

to work with her to overcome the problems, and Craft

ultimately agreed to cooperate. Thereafter, her wardrobe

was more closely supervised, and the “clothing calendar’?

then mentioned by Replogle was eventually instituted in

late July or early August.

As a further follow-up, KMBC and Media Associates

in late June conducted a telephone survey of some 400

randomly selected persons in the greater Kansas City

viewing area. These persons were asked to respond to a

questionnaire specifically drafted to pursue issues raised

in the focus group discussions. For example in one seg-

ment the survey participants were asked to rank Craft

in comparison with the female coanchors at KMBC’s com-

2. The “clothing calendar” was a calendar given to Craft

showing in detail for each day the blazer, blouse, and skirt (or

occasionally siacks) she was to wear. A note in one corner

indicated that the appropriate accessory would be either a single

strand of pearls or a single gold chain.

A6

petitors in response to some fourteen statements, four of

which dealt with “good looks” or the dress of and image of

a “professional anchor woman.” Craft came out trailing

in almost every category. Media Associates’ report on

the results of this survey, which was conveyed to Shannon

and Replogle on August 3, 1981, suggested that Craft

was having an extremely adverse impact on KMBC’s ac-

ceptance among Kansas City viewers. On August 13 Media

Associates recommended that Craft be replaced, and

KMBC, after initial resistance, agreed.

The next day Shannon told Craft she was being re-

assigned to reporter at no loss of pay or contractual bene-

fits. He characterized the results of the research, in the

language of the district court, as “devastating and un-

precedented in the history of the consultants of Media As-

sociates.” 572 F.Supp. at 874. Craft states that Shannon

also told her she was being reassigned because the audi-

ence perceived her as too old, too unattractive, and not

deferential enough to men. Shannon, however, specifically

denies making such a statement, and the district court

believed his version of the conversation. Id.

After the weekend Craft sent a telegram to KMBC

refusing to accept reassignment, and when further dis-

cussions failed to resolve the matter, she returned to

Santa Barbara where on September 1, 1981, she commenced

work as a coanchor at the television station at which

she previously had been employed. This suit followed in

four counts: the Title VII sex discrimination and the

fraud counts, the allegation of violation of the Equal Pay

Act based on the differential between Craft’s and Scott

Feldman’s salaries, and an allegation of prima facie tort

based on an intent by KMBC to injure Craft. This last

count was abandoned during the first trial in Kansas

City.

A7

Following that first trial the district court rejected

the findings of the advisory jury® on the Title VII sex

discrimination claim and entered judgment for Metro-

media on that issue. The district court found that KMBC

required both male and female on-air personnel to main-

tain professional, businesslike appearances “consistent with

community standards” and that the station enforced that

requirement in an evenhanded, nondiscriminatory manner.

572 F.Supp. at 877-78. Any greater attention to Craft’s

appearance, the court concluded, was “tailored to fit her

individual needs” and was necessary because of her “be-

low-average aptitude” in matters of clothing and makeup.

Id. at 878. The district court also found that Craft had

not been constructively discharged because there was in-

sufficient evidence that her working conditions had be-

come so intolerable that she had no choice but to quit or

that KMBC had intended to force her resignation. Id.

at 879. Finally, the court concluded that the telephone

survey conducted by Media Associates had not been dis-

criminatory or designed to effect Craft’s removal as co-

anchor and that KMBC had reasonably relied on the survey

results as the basis for the personnel change. id. at 873-

878-79.

As to the Equal Pay Act count, the district court

upheld the jury verdict in favor of Metromedia and re-

fused to grant Craft a new trial. It rejected her allegations

of error in the jury instructions and in the exclusion of cer-

tain testimony and concluded that the weight of the evi-

dence was not contrary to the jury’s finding that Feld-

man’s higher salary was based on permissible factors such

3. There is no right to a jury trial in a Title VII suit

Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410 (8th Cir.

1978). Advisory use of the jury is authorized by Rule 39(c) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A8

as his education in broadcasting, his greater experience in

major television markets, and his established identity with

Kansas City viewers.* Id. at 876, 879-80.

The district court, however, granted Metromedia a

new trial on the fraud count. In a bifurcated procedure the

Kansas City jury had found liability and awarded Craft

$375,000 in actual damages and then, after additional in-

structions, had awarded her $125,000 in punitive damages.

The court declared itself “firmly convinced” that the ver-

dict was “excessive” and “the result of passion, prejudice,

confusion, or mistake on the part of the jury.” Id. at 881.

In support it cited the “unprincipled” award of actual dam-

ages nearly double that requested by Craft in her com-

plaint (and nearly four times the amount she asked for

at closing argument), instructional errors as to wrongful

discharge and in the implementation of the bifurcated dam-

ages submission, and the “incessant and overwhelming”

publicity surrounding the case. Id. at 881-82. The dis-

trict court ordered that the new trial on the fraud count

be held in Joplin, Missouri, with the jury to be seques-

tered. Id. at 882.

On retrial the jury again found for Craft, awarding

$225,000 actual and $100,000 punitive damages. After the

district court denied motions for judgment notwithstand-

ing the verdict and for another new trial, Metromedia filed

this appeal and Craft cross-appealed from the adverse

determinations on her Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims.

4. Craft had also asserted the pay differential as an inci-

dent of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, but the dis-

trict court held that that claim was merely duplicative of the

Equal Pay Act count and found the jury verdict dispositive. See

Orahood v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ark., 645 F.2d 651,

654 n. 3 (8th Cir.1981) (defendant may not be held liable under

Title VII when one of four affirmative defenses of the Equal

Pay Act has been established); see generally Washington County

v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981).

A9

Craft’s attacks on the district court’s disposition of

her Title VII sex discrimination claim are essentially

factual, rather than legal as she contends. Her central

position is that KMBC’s appearance standards were based

on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes and were

applied to women more constantly and vigorously than

they were applied to men. Her further contentions that the

district court erred in finding certain grooming cases con-

trolling and in allowing Metromedia to rebut her prima

facie case with stereotypical customer preferences follow

only if we accept her central factual position.

A.

As an initial matter Craft argues that, since her case

was one involving direct evidence of discrimination, the

district court erred in failing to shift the burden to Metro-

media to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

it would have taken the challenged actions even in the

absence of gender bias. E.g., Bell v. Birmingham Linen

Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied,

on USS. ......... 104 S.Ct. 2385, 81 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984); Lee

v. Russell County Board of Education, 684 F.2d 769, 774

(11th Cir.1982). The cases relied on by Craft, however,

involved direct testimony of discrimination accepted by

the trier of fact. Bell, 715 F.2d at 1557; Lee, 684 F.2d at

774-75. It is apparent that the district court did not accept

any such testimony in this case. Thus, the burden-shifting

rule for which Craft argues could have no application here,

and we need not give further consideration to whether it

should be adopted by this circuit. See Clay v. Hyatt

Regency Hotel, 724 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir.1984) (no direct

evidence that employer acted with a discriminatory mo-

tive); see also Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 118 (8th

Al0

Cir.1985) (to same effect in handicapped discrimination

suit under 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).

In the alternative, Craft argues that she also estab-

lished a Title VII violation through use of circumstantial

evidence and inferences under the McDonnell Douglas

pattern of proof.° The district court plainly considered

whether KMBC’s position was pretextual, which indicates

that it reached its decision through this mode of analysis.

On review, however, we need not discuss the record in

terms of “prima facie case,” “articulation of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason,” and “pretext” but instead may

look directly to the ultimate factual issue: whether the

defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.

United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403

(1983); see Easley v. Empire Inc., 757 F.2d 923, 929-30

(8th Cir.1985). As the district court recognized, the bur-

den of proof on this issue always remains with the plain-

tiff. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 876-77 (quoting Texas Depart-

ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253,

101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). A finding

of intentional discrimination is a factual finding, Pullman-

Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d

66 (1982), cited in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

5. Under the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93

S.Ct. 1817, 1824-45, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), after a party suffering

an adverse employment action proves some set of facts—the

“prima facie case’—sufficient to give rise to an inference that

the employer was motivated by discrimination, the employer

must then articulate a legitimate reason for the decision so as

to dispel the inference of discrimination while finally the ag-

grieved party has the opportunity to show that the reason artic-

ulated was a pretext and that the employer actually was im-

properly motivated. See generally Texas Den’t of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207

(1981).

All

Jase US. ........, 105 S.Ct, 1504, 1508, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985),

and the court found against Craft.

Finally, Craft argues that the district court erred in

finding her claim of discrimination in employment con-

ditions controlled by grooming cases such as Knott v.

Missouri Pacific Railroad, 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir.1975).

In Knott we held that appearance regulations making

distinctions on the basis of sex will not support allegations

of discrimination when the standards are reasonable and

are enforced as to both sexes in an evenhanded manner.

Id. at 1252. Again what Craft really contests is the dis-

trict court’s factual determination that KMBC’s actions

concerning the appearance of its on-air personnel fell

within the Knott guidelines.

Because many of Craft’s arguments boldly seek re-

evaluation of the evidence and rejection of the district

court’s factual findings, we make clear our limited stan-

dard of review in such cases. Factual findings may be

set aside only when clearly erroneous. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

52(a). Our “foremost principle” is that “‘a finding is

“clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-

take has been committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer

COIR, asin is Sees , 10° S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518

(1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746

(1948) ); see Hoefelman v. Conservation Commission of

Missouri, 718 F.2d 281, 285 (8th Cir.1983). We may

not duplicate the function of the district court by making

our own determination of the facts and reversing if we

believe we would have decided the case differently:

“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence,

Al2

the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly

erroneous.” Anderson, 105 S.Ct. at 1512; Inwood Labora-

tories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 857-58, 102 S.Ct.

2182, 2190-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982).

Furthermore, we have stated that the burden is on

the objecting party to clearly demonstrate error in the

factual findings. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. General

Electric Co., 758 F.2d 319, 323 (8th Cir.1985); Hunt v.

Pan American Energy, 540 F.2d 894, 901 (8th Cir.1976),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 786, 50 L.Ed.2d 778

(1977); Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147, 150 n. 2

(8th Cir.1975). The evidence is to be construed in the

light most favorable to the party prevailing below. Taut-

fest v. City of Lincoln, 742 F.2d 477, 481 (8th Cir.1984);

United Barge Co. v. Notre Dame Fleeting & Towing Ser-

vice, 568 F.2d 599, 602 (8th Cir.1978).

We turn first to the most prominent factual element

of Craft’s case—her testimony that Shannon told her she

was being reassigned because she was too old, too unat-

tractive, and not deferential enough to men or because

the audience perceived her as such. Shannon, however,

specifically denied making that statement. The only addi-

tional evidence® was that of Feldman, who testified on

6. Craft argues that the statement attributed to Shannon

would be consistent with the survey results and the station’s

interpretation thereof; however, no questions on the survey dealt

with age, and Craft actually was rated lowest among her female

counterparts as to the strength “does not play second fiddle’ to

male anchor. The testimony of Brenda Williams that Shannon

told her Craft was being removed because people didn’t like her

appearance is basically consistent with what the district court

found Shannon did tell Craft and does not support the idea that

Shannon went further and made the “too old” comment. Fi-

nally, Craft argues that the district court never expressly re-

(Continued on following page)

Al3

the stand at trial that he did not recall Shannon making

such a comment but who had said in his deposition that

Shannon had done so—again diametrically opposite testi-

mony, this time from one witness. Credibility thus was

central to the district court’s finding on this point.

Respect for the role of the district court is especially

crucial as to determinations which rest on “variations in

demeanor and tone of voice” of the witnesses and “the

listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.”

Anderson, 105 S.Ct. at 1512 (emphasis added). The Su-

preme Court has cautioned:

[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision

to credit the testimony of one of two or more wit-

nesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially

plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic

evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent,

can virtually never be clear error.

Id. at 1513 (emphasis added). The district court was in

the best position to determine whether to believe Shannon

or Craft, and there are no circumstances suggesting any

basis for finding clear error in the district court’s choice

in favor of Shannon.

Craft next argues, as do the amici curiae, that the dis-

trict court clearly erred in failing to find that KMBC en-

forced appearance standards more strictly as to female

Footnote continued—

jected her testimony that Shannon also told her viewers wanted

to see “young, pretty women for news anchors.” We believe,

however, that this statement was implicitly discounted by the

court through its failure to include any such comment in its af-

firmative findings as to what Shannon did say to Craft and

through its discrediting of the “too old, too unattractive” testi-

mony. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 874.

Al4

than as to male on-air personnel.’ In support of her

position she points to the evidence most favorable to her,

which shows that only females were subject to daily

scrutiny of their appearance or were ever required to

change clothes at the station before going on the air and

that no male was ever directed to take time from his

journalistic duties to select clothing, with the help of a

consultant, from Macy’s and to test that clothing on

camera for the approval of another consultant. The dis-

trict court, however, concluded that such facts, in light

of other evidence, showed only that KMBC was concerned

with the appearance of all.its on-air personnel and that

it took measures appropriate to individual situations,

characteristics, and shortcomings. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at

875, 876, 878. The court found that KMBC had only

gradually increased its attentions to Craft’s appearance,

with the institution of the clothing calendar representing

the culmination of efforts made necessary when lesser

suggestions, such as those complied with by other per-

sonnel, proved ineffective. Id. at 878.

The evidence shows that one female, Brenda Williams,

had never been the subject of criticism for her appearance

while numerous males on occasion had been given specific

7. The court instead concluded,

If anything, [the] evidence shows a consistent concern by

management over the appearance of all on-air personnel

without regard to sex but with regard to the peculiar char-

acteristics of each employee. Plaintiff was an employee of

atypical aptitudes and attitudes, and defendant merely acted

to correct appearance problems which plaintiff was unable

or unwilling to remedy. The actions taken by defendant in

regard to plaintiff’s appearance were not the result of any

general animus toward women or of any specific animus to-

ward plaintiff as a woman. It may well be that in plaintiff's

case some of the steps taken by management were unprece-

dented, but they were not ipso facto discriminatory.

Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 878.

Al5

directions as to their individual shortcomings. Mike Placke,

for example, had been told to lose weight, to get better-

fitting clothes, to refrain from wearing sweaters under

jackets, and to tie his necktie in a certain manner. Sim-

ilarly, Michae] Mahoney had been told to lose weight and

to pay more attention to his wardrobe and hairstyle, while

Bob Werley had been told to try wearing contact lenses

and to get a hair piece and had been given a makeup

chart on a form similar to that used with Craft. Shannon

had discussed hair or moustache problems with Tim Rich-

ardson, Dave Dusik, Stan Carmack, and Corrice Collins,

and Craig Sager had been advised to improve his ward-

robe. Even Feldman on at least two occasions had re-

ceived specific directives regarding his choice of shirts,

and the Macy’s clothing consultant who worked with Craft

testified that she had also met with Feldman and Dusik.

Media Associates eventually prepared wardrobe “dos” and

“don’ts” for male as well as female newscasters.* The

district court found that the male personnel generally com-

plied with grooming suggestions.

An interpretation of this record as showing that KMBC

enforced its appearance standards equally as to males and

females in response to individual problems is neither “il-

logical” nor “implausible” and has “support in inferences

that may be drawn from the facts.” Anderson, 105 S.Ct.

at 1513. We cannot conclude that the district court erred

in this respect.

Our determination is not altered by the testimony,

cited by Craft, of the consultant Wilford or of other

female KMBC employees to the effect that the station put

8. Shannon testified that the tips for females were prepared

in May 1981 primarily for Craft while the guides for males were

not prepared until November 1981, around three months after

Craft left the station.

Al6

more emphasis on the appearance of females. This testi-

mony represents only the opinions and impressions of the

witnesses as to KMBC’s policy, and the district court by

implication rejected such opinions, making its own finding

to the contrary on the record.® The court also apparently

chose not to believe testimony by Pam Whiting that

Shannon had said it was more important for she and

Craft than for Feldman to look good on the air; Whiting

herself had been subject to a great deal of attention as

to her appearance and had eventually left the station,

and on the stand she expressed the opinion that appearance

was overemphasized in television news and said she hoped

Craft prevailed. Finally, the district court attributed the

use in the survey of questions on appearance and good

looks only as to female anchors as prompted not by sexual

bias but by the concerns raised as to Craft by the focus

groups. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 873. The viewers were

asked to rank the male anchors on more points concern-

ing personality and “coldness,” Feldman’s perceived weak-

nesses. The inclusion of a makeup criterion and a require-

ment that Craft not deviate from her clothing calendar

in the “standards of performance” by which her work was

to be evaluated, in contrast to the absence of any appear-

ance objectives in Feldman’s “standards of performance,”

similarly just reflected management’s efforts to pursue

with personnel their individual weaknesses.*°

9. Furthermore, the female employees generally testified

only that they had no knowledge of criticisms by KMBC of the

appearance of male on-air personnel. In a strict sense such

testimony is not even inconsistent with that of Shannon that

such criticisms were made.

10. Feldman’s temper and personality, for example, were

his special problems. He frequently argued with the female

producers, and management had spoken to him about his “throw-

ing curve balls” during newcasts to fluster other on-air person-

nel. In addition, he had been sharply reprimanded for referring

to Craft in the newsroom as “that girl.”

Al7

Craft further argues, however, again joined by the

amici curiae, that even if KMBC was evenhanded in ap-

plying its appearance standards, the district court erred

in failing to recognize that the standards themselves were

discriminatory." She contends that she was forced to

conform to a stereotypical image of how a woman anchor

should appear. The evidence included a communication

from the consultant, Wilford, to Shannon suggesting that

Craft purchase more blouses with “feminine touches,”

such as bows and ruffles, because many of her clothes

were “too masculine.” The general wardrobe hints for

females developed by Media Associates warned that

women with “soft” hairstyles and looks should wear blazers

to establish their authority and credibility while women

with short “masculine” hairstyles shouldn’t wear “mas-

culine” clothing in dark colors and with strong lines be-

cause they would appear too “aggressive.” The district

court found that Craft had been hired to “soften” KMBC’s

news presentation. id. at 871.

The “dos” and “don’ts” for anchors suggested that

while males should remember “professional image,” female

anchors were to remember “professional elegance” (em-

phasis added). The outfits on the clothing calendar given

to Craft were dominated by recognized fashion labels.

Wilford testified that in April she had told Craft not to

wear the same outfit more than once every three to four

weeks because people would start calling in about it; males,

11. The court instead concluded,

Thus, defendant’s standards of appearance for its on-air

personnel can in no way be considered discriminatory per se.

Both men and women were required to maintain a profes-

sional, business-like appearance consistent with community

standards. Since television is a visual medium, as plaintiff

admitted in her testimony, such a reasonable requirement

is obviously critical to defendant’s economic well-being.

Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 877.

Al8

however, Wilford said, could wear an outfit every week

and a suit even twice within the same week if combined

with a different tie. Wilford further testified that viewers

—particularly other women—criticize women more se-

verely than men for their appearance on camera and

that women’s dress is more complex and demanding be-

cause “society has made it that way.” Craft’s argument

is that these differing standards as to females reflect

customer preferences, which a number of cases have

held cannot justify discriminatory practices. E.g., Diaz v.

Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 275, 30 L.Ed.2d 267

(1971); see also Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d

602, 609 (9th Cir.1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074, 103

S.Ct. 1534, 75 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil

Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir.1981).

The district court, however, found that KMBC’s ap-

pearance standards were based instead on permissible

factors. 572 F.Supp. at 877. While there may have

been some emphasis on the feminine stereotype of “soft-

ness” and bows and ruffles and on the fashionableness of

female anchors, the evidence suggests such concerns were

incidental to a true focus on consistency of appearance,

proper coordination of colors and textures, the effects of

studio lighting on clothing and makeup, and the greater

degree of conservatism thought necessary in the Kansas

City market. The “dos” and “don’ts” for female anchors

addressed the need to avoid, for example, tight sweaters

or overly “sexy” clothing and extreme “high fashion” or

“sporty” outfits while the male “dos” and “don’ts sim-

ilarly cautioned against “frivolous” colors and “extreme”

textures and styles as damaging to the “authority” of

newscasters. These criteria do not implicate the primary

thrust of Title VII, which is to prompt employers to “dis-

Al19g

card outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment

disadvantages for one sex.” Knott v. Missouri Pacific

Railroad, 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir.1975); see gen-

erally Note, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against

Television Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Ap-

pearance, 85 Colum.L.Rev. 190, 201 (1985).™

Courts have recognized that the appearance of a com-

pany’s employees may contribute greatly to the company’s

image and success with the public and thus that a rea-

sonable dress or grooming code is a proper management

prerogrative. E.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register Co.,

481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C.Cir.1973); La Von Lanigan v.

Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F.Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D.Mo.

1979). Evidence showed a particular concern with ap-

pearance in television; the district court stated that rea-

sonable appearance requirements were “obviously critical”

to KMBC’s economic well-being; and even Craft admitted

12. Dress requirements that have been found to violate

Title VII have generally involved, for example, demeaning stereo-

types as to female characteristics and abilities or stereotypical

notions of female attractiveness or use of female sexuality to

attract business. E.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d

602, 608-09 (9th Cir.1982) (weight requirements for female flight

attendants to insure slenderness), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074,

103 S.Ct. 1534, 75 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Carroll v. Talman Fed.

Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir.1979) (re-

quirement that only female employees wear uniforms was de-

meaning and implied that females had lesser professional status

and was based on the stereotype that females are so caught up

in competition as to appearance that they cannot adhere to

good business taste as to dress), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929, 100

S.Ct. 1316, 63 L.Ed.2d 762 (1980); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,

567 F.2d 429, 439 n. 24 (D.C.Cir.1976) (female cabin attendants

forbidden to wear eyeglasses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98

S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); Equal Empl. Opportunity

Comm’n v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp. 599, 607-11 (S.D.

N.Y.1981) (female lobby attendant required to wear revealing and

provocative uniform that subjected her to sexual harassment).

Cf. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.Supp. 292 (N.D.

Tex.1981) (flight attendant position limited to females by em-

ployer who merely wished to exploit female sexuality as a

marketing tool to attract customers and insure profitability).

A20

she recognized that television was a visual medium and

that on-air personnel would need tc wear appropriate

clothes and makeup. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 877; see Note, su-

pra, at-201 (“As television is a visual medium, television

networks and local stations clearly have a right to re-

quire both male and female anchors to maintain a pro-

fessional appearance while on camera.”). While we be-

lieve the record shows an overemphasis by KMBC on

appearance, we are not the proper forum in which to

debate the relationship between newsgathering and dis-

semination and considerations of appearance and presenta-

tion—i.e., questions of substance versus image—in television

journalism. The record does not leave us with the “def-

inite and firm conviction” that the district court erred

or adopted an impermissible view of the evidence when

it concluded that KMBC’s appearance standards were

shaped only by neutral professional and technical con-

siderations and not by any stereotypical notions of female

roles and images.

We further reject the argument of Craft that the

perception, discussed above, that she would add warmth

and “comfortability” to the newscast defined a stereo-

typical “female” role, secondary to that of the male an-

chor, into which she was forced in terms of story as-

signments and division of duties. First, we observe that

the research survey asked participants to rank both male

and female anchors in response to the statement “com-

fortable to watch.” In addition, the district court rejected

Craft’s factual contention that Feldman was assigned the

lead story more frequently and was given more live stories

while she was assigned the human interest, personal, and

humorous stories. The court, for example, while acknowl-

edging the testimony of news producer Sandra Wood-

ward that she initially was instructed to give Feldman

A21

about two-thirds of the lead stories, also accepted testi-

mony of Shannon that that policy had been designed to

ease the transition to coanchors for Craft and the viewers

and was discontinued after a few weeks, after which time

the lead stories were equitably divided. Craft, 572 F.

Supp. at 872, 875. The court further found that the on-

site reporting and hard news stories were equitably dis-

tributed. Id. at 875. Finally, Shannon testified that

Craft herself suggested her Thursday arts and entertain-

ment segment to take advantage of her cultural back-

ground and her contacts from Santa Barbara with various

Hollywood personalities. Craft cites no facts sufficient

for us to find the district court’s interpretation of the

record in this regard clearly erroneous.

We also cannot conclude that the district court erred

when it held that Craft was not impermissibly removed

as anchor on the basis of gender. While we disposed

earlier of the alleged “too old, too unattractive” state-

ment and have also already discussed the legitimate

reasons why the survey questions focused on appearance

only as to the female and not as to the male anchors,

Craft further argues that her reassignment was based on

a discriminatory interpretation of the survey results. She

contends that discrimination may be inferred in that

KMBC attributed all the negative viewer reaction to her

despite Feldman’s earlier problems in the ratings and the

failure of most respondents to name him as a positive

reason for watching the station. She further alleges that

she was unfairly burdened with having to offset Feld-

man’s weaknesses. The inferences on which she relies,

however, are insufficient to justify setting aside the con-

clusions of the district court.

Craft essentially is asking us to reject the district

court’s findings accepting Media Associates’ interpretation

A22

of the survey data and to substitute our own interpreta-

tion thereof. The evaluation of expert testimony, how-

ever, is primarily the function of the district court. Hoefel-

man v. Conservation Commission of Missouri, 718 F.2d 281,

284-85 (8th Cir.1983). The court here specifically found

that the survey had been “conducted in accordance with

generally accepted principles of survey research” and that

its results were “trustworthy.” Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 873.

Craft scored low on many neutral points such as knowl-

edge of Kansas City, journalism ability, and apparent

enjoyment of her job, and the court found “simply no

evidence” that the survey had been designed to effect her

removal because of her gender. Id. at 878. It concluded

that KMBC was entitled to—and did—rely on the Media

Associates report. Id. at 879.

We further reject Craft’s argument that even if the

survey was objective, KMBC’s reliance on it was merely

a pretext because the station ignored improved ratings

and profits during her tenure: This shows only that

broadcast market research is an inexact science and does

not make clearly erroneous the district court’s conclusion

that KMBC still relied upon the survey in good faith.

The court in addition found that the ratings cited by Craft

were “equivocal at best” and were not yet available when

she was reassigned. Id. at 876. KMBC’s failure to delay

its decision a few days until the ratings did come out

may just be testament to the unprecedented negative re-

action to Craft suggested by the survey. Finally, KMBC’s

allegedly differing treatment of two males who also were

criticized in the survey is insufficient to raise an inference

of discrimination because of the more extreme nature

of Craft’s difficulties and Craft’s pivotal role on the news-

cast as coanchor.

A23

c.

Our conclusion that Craft was not subject to sex dis-

crimination either in KMBC’s application of its appear-

ance standards or in its reassignment of her to reporter

effectively determines the outcome of her claim of con-

structive discharge. Craft does not dispute that such a

claim requires a showing of work conditions that a reason-

able person would find intolerable, Johnson v. Bunny Bread

Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.1981); she contends, how-

ever, that a finding of unlawfully discriminatory working

conditions is sufficient to meet this standard. See Held v.

Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir.1982). Given the

absence of such a finding here, her argument fails. Fur-

thermore, even if we were to accept Craft’s argument that

her reassignment (which was permitted by the terms of

her contract) or the criticism of her appearance, while

not discriminatory, did make her working conditions in-

tolerable, the district court found no evidence that KMBC

took those actions with an intent to force her to quit. See

Bunny Bread, 646 F.2d at 1256. The court in fact believed

testimony that Replogle in May had urged Craft to re-

main as anchor and that Shannon at the time of the re-

assignment had urged Craft to reconsider her immediate

reaction and remain as reporter rather than returning to

Santa Barbara. Craft, 572 F.Supp. at 874, 879.

D.

In sum, Craft’s arguments as to her Title VII dis-

crimination claims are basically factual invitations to us

to reevaluate the record and interpret the evidence in

the light most favorable to her while overlooking sub-

stantial evidence favorable to KMBC.* Even her con-

13. Craft’s argument rests in part on the failure of the

district court to take into consideration many issues raised by

(Continued on following page)

A24

tention, for example, that the district court in finding no

discrimination erred “as a matter of law” addresses a

factual issue. To grant her relief we would have to adopt

findings contrary to those of the district court and assume

a judicial role contrary to that assigned to us by Rule

52(a) and Supreme Court precedent. See Anderson,

supra; Pullman-Standard, supra. We decline to do either.

The district court found that KMBC was equally concerned

with the appearance of its male and female on-air per-

sonnel and that any extra attention to Craft was the

gradual result of her indifference to the station’s legitimate

need that she maintain a professional, businesslike image

appropriate to Kansas City. The court further found

that Craft’s reassignment to reporter was made in reason-

able reliance on a proper market survey and that no con-

structive discharge occurred. We are not firmly convinced

that any of these conclusions is clearly erroneous.

Il.

Turning to the fraud claim, Metromedia argues that,

as a matter of law, Craft failed to make a submissible jury

issue. The alleged misrepresentation, as set out in the

verdict directing instruction requested by Craft at the

Joplin trial, was that “defendant represented to the plain-

tiff that her appearance was fine and that defendant liked

everything about her appearance and intended no make-

Footnote continued—

her evidence. We have already discussed a number of such

claims, and we do not believe the district court’s order is defi-

cient in failing to deal with every piece of evidence in the record,

particularly in light of the ten-day trial resulting in a transcript

in excess of 2,000 pages. See Tate v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 733

F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, ........ We. lasanees , 105

S.Ct. 160, 83 L.Ed.2d 97 (1984); Talley v. United States Postal

Service, 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, ........

UB... ccccczz , 104 S.Ct. 2155, 80 L.Ed.2d 541 (1984).

A25

over or substantial changes in her appearance.”** Spe-

cifically, Metromedia contends that this statement is one

of opinion or value that will not support a fraud claim or

is too indefinite to be actionable and that there is insuf-

ficient evidence that the statement was false or false when

made.*®

The parties do not dispute that Missouri law applies

to Craft’s fraud claim. Under such law the burden is on

the plaintiff to establish a submissible case of fraud, and

failure as to any one essential element is fatal to the

entire claim. Powers v. Shore, 248 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo.1952)

(en banc); Lowther v. Hays, 225 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Mo.

1950); Emily v. Bayne, 371 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Mo.Ct.App.

1963). Fraud may be established by circumstantial evi-

dence, Martin v. Brune, 631 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Mo.Ct.App.

1982); however, it may not be presumed, and a party’s

case will fail if he can show only facts and circumstances

which are equally consistent with honesty and good faith.

Macon-Atlanta State Bank v. Gall, 666 S.W.2d 934, 941

(Mo.Ct.App.1984).

The standard of review as to the submissibility of

Craft’s case is the same under both federal and Missouri

14. At the first trial Craft also submitted as a representa-

tion that she was hired specifically for the job of coanchor and

for no other purpose. She expressly abandoned this claim at

the second trial in Joplin. Our review of the submissibility of

the fraud claim is based on the record at that trial, but we observe

that our study of the record of the Kansas City trial revealed no

ay favorable to Craft that was not also before the second

ury.

15. Metromedia also argues that there is insufficient evi-

dence that Craft relied on the alleged misrepresentation or suf-

fered damages attributable thereto, that Craft waived her claim,

and, in the alternative, that a third trial should be held because

of errors in admission of evidence, the jury instructions, and

closing arguments. Because of our disposition of the issues set

forth in the body of our opinion, we need not reach these addi-

tional points.

A26

law. Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir.1984).

We may find for Metromedia only if “all the evidence

points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable infer-

ences sustaining the position” of Craft. Id. (quoting Dace

v. ACF Industries, 722 F.2d 374, 375 (8th Cir.1983) (quot-

ing Decker-Ruhl Ford Sales v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,

523 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir.1975)). Furthermore, we must

resolve direct factual conflicts in favor of Craft, assume

as true all facts in her favor which the evidence tends

to prove, and give her the benefit of all reasonable infer-

ences. We may not find for Metromedia if the evidence so

viewed would “allow reasonable jurors to differ as to

the conclusions that could be drawn.” See Crues, 729

F.2d at 1148 (quoting Dace, 722 F.2d at 375).

A.

It is true, as Metromedia argues, that a statement

of opinion or value is not an actionable representation

of fact because it relates to terms of degree capable of

different interpretations. E.g., Carrier Corp. v. Royale

Investment Co., 366 S.W.2d 346, 356 (Mo.1963) (state-

ment that a refrigerating machine is “easy” to install is

not an actionable representation because the term “easy”

has a comparative or relative connotation). While this

principle may be relevant to KMBC’s statements that it

“liked” Craft’s appearance, it is not controlling as to the

more crucial portion of the submitted representation that

the station did not intend any “makeover or substantial

changes” in Craft’s appearance.

Statements of present intent may be representations

of fact which, if false, will support fraud claims under

Missouri law. Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank of

Windsor, 737 F.2d 1490, 1498 (8th Cir.1984); White v.

Muivania, 575 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Mo.1978) (en banc). We

A27

have no difficulty concluding that the “no makeover or

substantial changes” representation requested by Craft

in the instruction was a statement of present intent on

the part of Shannon and Replogle. We do not believe

the presence of somewhat imprecise terms such as “change”

and “makeover” automatically renders their statement non-

actionable “opinion” or “puffery” in the classical sense

argued by Metromedia. Missouri courts have found suffi-

cient allegations of fraud for the jury when service station

operators have been told their leases would not be can-

celed if they ran “good” operations and performed “satis-

factorily.” Essex v. Getty Oil Co., 661 S.W.2d 544, 549-51

(Mo.Ct.App.1983); Sagehorn v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,

648 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo.Ct.App.1983).

The critical element in a fraud case based on a state-

ment of present intent is proof that the speaker at the

time of utterance actually did not intend to perform con-

sistently with his words; absent such an inconsistent

intent there is no misrepresentation of fact or state of

mind but only a breach of promise or failure to perform.

See Grosser v. Kandel-Iken Builders, 647 S.W.2d 911, 914

(Mo.Ct.App.1983) ; Brennaman v. Andes & Roberts Brothers

Construction Co., 506 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo.Ct.App.1973). It

is not enough if for any reason, good or bad, the speaker

changes his mind and fails or refuses to carry his ex-

pressed intention into effect. Dillard v. Earnhart, 457 S.W.

2d 666, 670 (Mo.1970) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 530

comment a (1938)). As Missouri courts thus have held,

an intent not to perform

cannot be established solely by proof of [the speak-

er’s] nonperformance nor does his failure to perform

the agreement throw upon him the burden of showing

A28

that his nonperformance was due to reasons which

operated after the agreement was entered into. Such

intention may be shown by any other evidence which

sufficiently indicates its existence as, for example, the

certainty that he would not be in funds to carry

out his promise.

Dillard, 457 S.W.2d at 671 (quoting Restatement of Torts

§ 530 comment c (1938)). Craft’s claim of fraud comes

down to this narrow issue.

Craft argues vigorously that KMBC, contrary to the

statements it made to her, had from the beginning a secret

intention to substantially change or make over her ap-

pearance. She stresses Shannon’s instruction to Wilford

not to discuss makeup with Craft during their first meet-

ing because he would be working with Craft himself

on appearance and makeup. Wilford, prior to Craft’s

selection, had expressed the opinion that Craft’s appear-

ance was not conservative or sophisticated enough for

Kansas City audiences, although the consensus of the

Group at Media Associates had been that Craft was the

strongest of the three finalists it screened. Shannon tes-

tified that he knew when he hired Craft that he would

be working on her makeup and clothing, and criticism

of her appearance began with her debut on the newscast.

Shannon further testified that appearance was KMBC’s

major concern in an anchor, and Replogle agreed that

while appearance was not the only qualification, it was

the “first thing on the list.” The evidence established

that KMBC in the past had given performers direct

orders with respect to their appearance. For example,

Cheryl Jones had Seen ordered to change her hairstyle

to eliminate the “irizzy appearance” (she was given her

most recent formal] portrait as a guide to what Replogle

and Shannon wanted and was told that the result had to

A29

pe acceptable to them and that they would handle any

questions from her hairdresser), and Mike Placke had

been ordered to lose twenty-five pounds, to get a good-

fitting suit, to avoid wearing sweaters and vests, and to

tie his tie with a four-in-hand instead of a Windsor knot.

While this evidence supports the inference that Shan-

non and Replogle at the time they made the challenged

statements knew they were going to work on Craft’s ap-

pearance, we are not satisfied that it demonstrates that

when they promised they intended “no makeover or sub-

stantial changes,” such statements were false. It is well

to consider further what “makeover or substantial changes”

means.!* The ultimate measure of the representation’s

truth or falsity is what Craft could reasonably have under-

stood KMBC to have promised. See Toenjes v. L.J. Mc-

Neary Construction Co., 406 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo.Ct.App.

1966). She testified that a “makeover” was “changing

someone’s appearance” and that she had believed KMBC

didn’t want to change anything about her. This position,

however, is not totally consistent with the “substantial

changes” (emphasis added) language submitted in the jury

instruction. It seems plain, thus, that a jury could not

reasonably have measured the falsity of KMBC’s repre-

sentation against Craft’s subjective view of a “makeover”

as any change at all. Therefore, the intent to work on

Craft’s appearance demonstrated abundantly by her evi-

dence does not establish that Shannon and Replogle at the

time of their representation had the intention to “make

her over.”

While it can be argued that Craft was “made over” in

being forced to exchange her casual California beach

16. Shannon and Replogle were convinced that the actions

they took in regard to Craft did not constitute a “makeover.”

A30

look—she testified that in Santa Barbara she occasionally

went directly from the beach to the studio—for a conser-

vative, sophisticated, businesslike image of “professional

elegance,” we believe that in her audition interviews with

KMBC Craft was concerned essentially with her hair and

makeup and not with clothing.” The language of an

alleged misrepresentation must be considered in light of

the background in which the statements were made and

the context in which the words were used. Toenjes, 406

S.W.2d at 105. KMBC’s statements to Craft were made

in response to her expressions of concern about her ex-

perience with CBS, where the network had required that

her hair be cropped and died blond, her eyebrows shaved

and died black, and heavy makeup applied.

Even if Craft does have an arguable position that the

representation of “no makeover or substantial changes”

had application to clothing, a reasonable jury could not

have found a “makeover” until KMBC’s efforts reached

their most extreme extent in the late days of Craft’s em-

ployment. There is, however, no evidence that the station

at the time it made the challenged representation knew

it would exercise such an intrusive degree of control or

knew that such control would be in its eyes necessary.

The record demonstrates that KMBC asserted varying de-

grees of control over the appearances of its on-air per-

sonnel, finding no control at all necessary as to Brenda

Williams while requiring assorted measures of other an-

17. The record reveals no action by KMBC in regard to

Craft’s hair or makeup that could be seen as constituting a

“makeover.” The station expressed a desire that her hair be

worn at the length and natural color apparent in the Santa

Barbara tape, and Craft assured the station that her shorter,

lighter hairstyle upon arrival in Kansas City was due to a

recent unsatisfactory styling and that she intended to iet her

hair grow back out. Furthermore, Craft was allowed to apply

her own makeup except for the one ill-fated occasion, and we

do not believe mere suggestions constitute a “makeover,”

A31

chors, sportscasters and weathercasters. There is no evi-

dence that the station had any knowledge where along this

spectrum Craft might fall or what facility she might

demonstrate in adjusting her wardrobe to the Kansas

City climate and market. In fact, the record is basically

uncontradicted as to the gradual increase in the intensity

of the measures taken by KMBC in regard to Craft’s ap-

pearance. Craft at first was given only the most gen-

eral advice through books and fashion magazines and a

memorandum suggesting makeup techniques. Although

Wilford testified that she had been asked on short notice

to come to Kansas City in January, just days after Craft’s

debut as coanchor, to work specifically on Craft’s (and

Pam Whiting’s) appearance, it was not until April that the

arrangement with Macy’s and its clothing consultant was

established. The clothing calendar was not actually in-

stituted until late July or early August.

Having considered the record in the light most favor-

able to Craft and given her the benefit of all favorable

inferences, we must conclude that there is insufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to have found that KMBC

at the time it made its representation contemplated such

extensive measures as to her appearance so as to make

false its statements that it intended “no makeover or sub-

stantial changes.” Even taking the evidence as establish-

ing that KMBC’s actions differed from those promised,

the record does no more than suggest that the station,

because of the difficulties it experienced with Craft,

changed its mind as to steps that would be necessary as

to her appearance. See Dillard, 457 S.W.2d at 670 (quot-

ing Restatement of Torts § 530 comment a (1938)). Such

evidence does not establish Craft’s case of fraud or shift

the burden to KMBC to show that its “nonperformance”

was caused by reasons operating after it made its repre-

A32

sentation. See Dillard, 457 S.W.2d at 671 (quoting Restate-

ment of Torts § 530 comment c (1938)). There is here,

as in Dillard, a failure of proof that the statements of pres-

ent intent were false when made. Craft as a matter of

law has not established a submissible case of fraud. The

judgment on the jury verdict on this issue must be re-

versed and the district court instructed to enter judgment

in favor of Metromedia.

Iit.

In view of our conclusion above we need not reach

Craft’s arguments that the district court’s factual findings

on her Title VII claim impermissibly conflicted with

the findings of the jury on the fraud claim and that the

district court erred in granting a new trial on the fraud

issue. We note, however, that the authority to grant or

deny a new trial is a matter of discretion which we may

not reverse absent a strong showing of clear abuse. Com-

mercial National Bank v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 631 F.

2d 563, 565 (8th Cir.1980); Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d

1385, 1388 (8th Cir.1979); Bates v. Hensley, 414 F.2d 1006,

1011 (8th Cir.1969).

Finally, Craft argues that the district court erred in

excluding certain evidence offered on her equal pay claim

and that the verdict against her on that claim was against

the clear weight of the evidence. Specifically, Craft con-

tends that Brenda Williams should have been allowed to

testify that she was told she would not be hired to replace

Craft as coanchor if she held out for a salary comparable to

Feldman’s and to give her opinion that the station had

created a “female anchor” position that would pay only

an amount substantially less than that paid to the male

anchor. The admission of evidence, however, also is within

the discretion of the district court, and we may not reverse

A33

absent a “clear and prejudicial” abuse of that discretion.

Roth v. Black & Decker, 737 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir.1984);

Haynes v. American Motors Corp., 691 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th

Cir.1982). When the excluded testimony is considered

against the matters as to which Williams was allowed to

testify before the jury, we cannot find such an abuse.

The weight of the evidence argument is particularly

directed to the discretion of the district court; and while

some of our decisions suggest that we could not review

the denial of such a new trial motion even for abuse

of discretion, SCNO Barge Lines v. Anderson Clayton &

Co., 745 F.2d 1188, 1194 (8th Cir.1984); cf. Kelley v. Crunk,

713 F.2d 426, 427 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (weight of

evidence arguments lead to serious seventh amendment

questions), we need not reach that issue because we

find no abuse of discretion here. See Rey v. City of

Fredericktown, 729 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1984); Aimor

Electric Works v. Omaha National Bank, 727 F.2d 688, 692

(8th Cir.1984); Burnett v. Lloyds of London, 710 F.2d 488,

489-90 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam); Minnesota Mutual

Life Insurance Co. v. Wright, 312 F.2d 655, 659-60 (8th

Cir.1963); see generally C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2819 (1973).

We affirm the judgment of the district court as to

all the Title VII and Equal Pay Act issues but reverse

the judgment entered on the jury verdict on the fraud

count and instruct the district court to enter judgment for

Metromedia.

A34

(Filed June 28, 1985)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Eighth Circuit

No. 84-1336/1380WM

September Term, 1984

Christine Craft,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

vs.

Metromedia, Inc., d/b/a KMBC-TV 9,

Appellant/Cross-Appeilee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri

JUDGMENT

This appeal from the United States District Court was

submitted on the record of the said District Court, briefs

of the parties and was argued by counsel.

Upon consideration of the premises, it is adjudged and

decreed that the judgment of the said District Court

against Craft on the Title VII and Equal Pay Act issues

is affirmed. It is further adjudged and decreed that the

judgment of the district court on the jury verdict on the

fraud count be and is hereby reversed and the cause is

remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-

en erenicceeacaateaarniil

A35

trict of Missouri with instructions to enter judgment for

Metromedia in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

June 28, 1985

(See attached sheet for cost info.)

A true copy:

ATTEST:

/s/ Robert D. St. Vrain

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals,

8th Circuit.

(Seal)

A36

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Eighth Circuit

Nos. 84-1336/380-WM

Christine Craft,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

Vs.

Metromedia, Inc.,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri

Appellee-Cross-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En

Banc has been considered by the Court and is denied.

Petition for Rehearing by the panel is also denied.

The Court on its own motion substitutes pages 27 and

28 for pages 27 and 28 in the opinion as originally filed.*

August 19, 1985

*See A37.

A37

MODIFICATION OF OPINION OF JUNE 28, 1985,

ISSUED AUGUST 19, 1985 ON CRAFT’S MOTION

FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR

REHEARING EN BANC

While it can be argued that Craft was “made over”

in being forced to exchange her casual California beach

look—Shannon testified that Craft had told him* that in

Santa Barbara she occasionally went directly from the

beach to the studio—for a conservative, sophisticated,

businesslike image of “professional elegance,” we believe

that in her audition interviews with KMBC Craft was

concerned essentially with her hair and makeup and not

with clothing.” The language of an alleged misrepresenta-

tion must be considered in light of the background in

which the statements were made and the context in which

the words were used. Toenjes, 406 S.W.2d at 105. KMBC’s

statements to Craft were made in response to her expres-

sions of concern about her experience with CBS, where

the network had required that her hair be cropped and

dyed blond, her eyebrows shaved and dyed black, and

heavy makeup applied.

17. The record reveals no action by KMBC in regard to

Craft’s hair or makeup that could be seen as constituting a

“makeover.” The station expressed a desire that her hair be

worn at the length and natural color apparent in the Santa

Barbara tape, and Craft assured the station that her shorter,

lighter hairstyle upon arrival in Kansas City was due to a recent

unsatisfactory styling and that she intended to let her hair grow

back out. Furthermore, Craft was allowed to apply her own

makeup except for the one ill-fated occasion, and we do not

believe mere suggestions constitute a “makeover.”

*Emphasis added to denote modification.

A38

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Eighth Circuit

Nos. 84-1336/380-WM

Christine Craft,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

vs.

Metromedia, Inc., etc.,

Appellant/ Cross-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Missouri

Appellee/cross-appellant Craft’s motion for a stay of

mandate is denied.

September 16, 1985

A39

(Filed October 31, 1983)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For the Western District of Missouri

Western Division

No. 83-0007-CV-W-8

CHRISTINE CRAFT,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

METROMEDIA, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER*

Plaintiff Christine Craft filed her four-count com-

plaint against defendant Metromedia, Inc. on January 5,

1983. Count I alleges that defendant discriminated against

plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Count II alleges that defendant paid plaintiff less than

similarly situated male employees in violation of the Equal

Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Count III alleges

that defendant made intentional fraudulent misrepresenta-

tions to induce plaintiff to accept employment. Count IV

alleges that defendant’s actions toward plaintiff, even if

lawful, were intended to injure her and therefore consti-

tuted a prima facie tort.

Counsel prepared the case on an accelerated discovery

schedule, and trial commenced on July 25, 1983. On the

eleventh day of trial, a jury of two men and four women

reached the following results: On Count I, the jury, sitting

*“This Memorandum and Order is reported at 572 F.Supp.

868.

A40

only in an advisory capacity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c),

found in favor of plaintiff. On Count II, the jury returned

a verdict for defendant. On Count III, the jury found in

favor of plaintiff and awarded actual damages of $375,000

and punitive damages of $125,000. Count IV was aban-

doned during trial and was not submitted to the jury.

Three matters are now before the court. First are

findings of fact and conclusions of law on plaintiff’s claim

of sex discrimination. Second is plaintiff’s motion for

a new trial on her Equal Pay Act claim. Third is defen-

dant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,

new trial, or remittitur on the fraud count.

I. SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIM

There is no right to a jury trial in discrimination

actions filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964. Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410

(8th Cir. 1978). Therefore, with respect to Count I, the

jury functioned only in an advisory capacity under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 39(c). See Order of July 22, 1983. This court

is “at liberty to accept or reject the advisory verdict.”

Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Minnesota Trans-

fer Railway Co., 371 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1967). Since

the decision of an advisory jury is not binding on the

court and presents nothing for appellate review, it is incum-

bent upon the court to enter findings of fact and conclu-

sions of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), just as if there

had been no jury. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed-

eral Practice and Procedure § 2335 (1971).

A. Findings of Fact

Plaintiff Christine Craft is a female citizen of the

United States and is a resident and citizen of California,

residing at the time of trial at 3557 Padaro Lane, Car-

rte

o-oo rly whee dw

A41

pinteria, California. Defendant Metromedia, Inc. is a Dela-

ware corporation with its headquarters and principal place

of business in New Jersey. Its headquarters are located

at One Harmon Plaza, Secaucus, New Jersey. Prior to

May 18, 1982, defendant was the owner and operator, pur-

suant to a license issued by the Federal Communications

Commission, of KMBC-TV, Channel 9 (hereinafter

KMBC), in Kansas City, Missouri. KMBC has been a

network affiliate of the American Broadcasting Company

(ABC) throughout the relevant period. Plaintiff was em-

ployed at KMEC as a staff announcer and performed duties

as a co-anchor and reporter from December, 1980, to Au-

gust 14, 1981. At all times here relevant, R. Kent Replogle

was vice president and general manager of KMBC and

Ridge Shannon was news director. Replogle was the high-

est ranking station employee, and Shannon reported di-

rectly to him. On May 18, 1982, the assets of KMBC

were acquired by the Hearst Corporation, which is not

a party to this action.

Plaintiff received a liberal arts degree in English and

anthropology from the University of California at Santa

Barbara in 1968. Upon graduation, she was first employed

for two years as a teacher of emotionally disturbed and

retarded children. Thereafter she pursued other interests,

particularly surfing, and supported herself with an assort-

ment of part-time jobs. Eventually, plaintiff decided to

pursue a career in broadcasting. In mid-1975, she was

hired as a weeknight weather reporter at KSBW-TV, a

small station in Salinas, California. During her tenure

of approximately one and one-half years, plaintiff worked

as an announcer, reporter, and substitute sportscaster, in

addition to her job as weather reporter. In late 1976

plaintiff became the weekend weather anchor at KPIX-

TV in San Francisco, California, which is the sixth largest

A42

television market in the nation. Plaintiff remained at

KPIX for one year, and while there she also did some

news reporting and substitute sports production and an-

choring.

Plaintiff was next hired by CBS as the host of a

segment of CBS Sports Spectacular entitled “Women in

Sports.” As part of this program, plaintiff was involved

in summarizing weekly news concerning women’s athletics

and in producing weekly profiles of women athletes. While

at CBS, plaintiff's appearance was altered by network

makeup specialists. Her hair was cut short and bleached

blonde, and she was required to use black eyebrow pencil

and dark red lipstick. Plaintiff voiced objection to this

treatment but did not voluntarily leave her employment

at CBS because of it. “Women in Sports” was discontinued

after thirty weeks. Plaintiff returned to California and

engaged in pursuits other than television for about a year.

In mid-1979, plaintiff returned to television as a re-

porter at KEYT-TV in Santa Barbara, California, which

is the 116th largest television market in the nation. Plain-

tiff also served as weeknight news anchor and occasionally

presented sports and weather. Plaintiff resigned her em-

ployment at KEYT in December, 1980, to accept employ-

ment with defendant at KMBC in Kansas City.

Kansas City is the nation’s twenty-seventh largest tele-

vision market, and KMBC has two main competitors:

KCTV (formerly KCMO-TV), Channel 5, the CBS affiliate;

and WDAF-TV, channel 4, the NBC affiliate. From July,

1978, to January 5, 1981, Scott Feldman was the solo anchor

on the 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. weekday newscasts at KMBC.

For several years prior to Feldman’s arrival in 1978, defen-

dant had been the ratings leader in the local television

news market, but its ratings had slipped since Feldman’s

A43

arrival, Research indicated that the decline was due to

two factors: the appearance of co-anchors at KMBC’s

competitors, and a perception among viewers that Feldman

lacked warmth, thereby diminishing his professionalism

and authoritativeness. Based on that research and the

presence of co-anchors at KMBC’s competitors, Replogle

and Shannon determined that KMBC should adopt a co-

anchor format and that, in order to “soften” the image

of its news presentation, the co-anchor should be a woman.

In the search for a female co-anchor, Shannon re-

viewed videotapes of numerous candidates. The Media

Associates (later known as Audience Research and De-

velopment) of Dallas, Texas, a media consulting firm re-

tained by KMBC, supplied a tape of plaintiff’s work in

Santa Barbara. Based on his review of many tapes,

Shannon contacted ‘several individuals, including plaintiff,

to ascertain who was interested in and available to audi-

tion for the new co-anchor position. During their first

telephone conversation in November of 1980, plaintiff told

Shannon she was interested in the position so long as

it did not involve a “makeover” of her appearance, such

as she had experienced at CBS. Following further discus-

sions, it was agreed that plaintiff would come to Kansas

City for an audition, which occurred in late November,

1980. During renewed discussions about the nature of

the job and the issue of plaintiff's appearance, Shannon

explained the station had consultants who worked with

on-air personnel in various areas, including delivery, cloth-

ing, and makeup. Plaintiff acknowledged her lack of ex-

pertise in matters of makeup and hair and indicated her

willingness to work on her appearance with a consultant.

At the conclusion of the interview and audition, plain-

tiff was offered the position at a salary of $28,000. She

returned to California with a copy of defendant’s standard

A44

contract for personal services. Shannon and Replogle had

advised plaintiff to review the contract with her attorney,

and plaintiff contacted her friend, Robert Hamilton, an

attorney and writer who had previous experience negotiat-

ing contracts for personal services.

In the weeks that followed, Hamilton negotiated with

Shannon on behalf of plaintiff, with the following results:

First, the term of the contract was reduced from three

years to two years. Second, plaintiff’s salary was increased

to $35,000 during the first year and $38,500 during the

second year. Third, the standard provision permitting de-

fendant to terminate the contract at the end of each

thirteen-week cycle was deleted; in lieu thereof, defendant

retained the right to terminate the contract after twelve,

eighteen, and twenty-four months, thereby giving plaintiff

greater job security. On the other hand, defendant re-

jected Hamilton’s request that plaintiff’s position be specifi-

cally described as co-anchor; instead, the standard language

describing her position as staff announcer and permitting

defendant to reassign her remained in the contract. Defen-

dant also refused to include a clothing allowance in the

contract as requested by Hamilton.

Counsel for defendant revised the standard contract

to include the modifications described above. Copies of

the contract were presented to plaintiff for execution some-

time after she commenced her duties at the station; man-

agement again suggested the contract should be reviewed

by her attorney. After approximately three weeks on

the job as co-anchor, plaintiff signed the contract on Jan-

uary 22, 1981, without reading it in detail and without

consulting an attorney.

Plaintiff had moved to Kansas City in mid-December

1980. At the direction of Shannon, she traveled via Dallas,

A45

Texas, where she stopped and met with Lynn Wilford

of the Media Associates. They evaluated plaintiff’s abil-

ities and discussed effective news presentation. At the

request of Shannon, Wilford kept discussion of plaintiff's

appearance to a minimum.

Plaintiff began working at the station in late Decem-

ber, 1980. During a short transitional period, plaintiff

did some reporting and promotional work so that viewers

would become acquainted with her. It was also necessary

for plaintiff to familiarize herself with certain technical

aspects of the KMBC news operation. She began as co-

anchor on January 5, 1981; to further ease the transition

for plaintiff and the viewing audience, Shannon directed

the news producer to assign the “lead-in” or first news

story of each broadcast to Feldman about two-thirds of

the time and to plaintiff about one-third of the time. This

allocation continued for a few weeks; thereafter, lead

stories were allocated equitably between Feldman and

plaintiff.

Soon after plaintiff began her duties as co-anchor,

it became apparent to Shannon and Replogle that on sev-

eral occasions plaintiff’s on-air makeup and clothing were

inappropriate. Shannon commented to plaintiff several

times early in her employment that she should dress more

conservatively and use makeup properly. He arranged

for Lynn Wilford to come to Kansas City on January

14, 1981, to assist plaintiff in improving her appearance.

During this visit, Wilford worked on plaintiff's wardrobe

and makeup. In subsequent periodic visits to the station,

Wilford continued these efforts, achieving only modest

success.

During her initial months of employment, plaintiff

had considerable discretion in the selection of her on-

A46

air clothing. Although Shannon made occasional sugges-

tions or criticisms as to the appropriateness of certain

pieces of clothing, neither he nor any other representative

of defendant mandated that plaintiff observe any strict

dress code during her first months at the station. Begin-

ning in April, 1981, KMBC arranged for Macy’s Depart-

ment Store to provide clothing for plaintiff in exchange

for advertising time. Maureen Shawver, a clothing con-

sultant from Macy’s, assisted plaintiff in making clothing

selections. In addition, Wilford reviewed videotapes of

plaintiff in various outfits. Plaintiff was not ordered to

wear any of the clothes selected, and in fact she rejected

several items suggested by Shawver.

On May 19 and 20, 1981, Steven Meacham of the

Media Associates conducted four focus group discussions

to learn how television viewers perceived KMBC’s news

program. A focus group is an accepted research technique

whereby a small group of individuals with similar demo-

graphic characteristics meet to discuss a given subject,

in this instance television news in Kansas City. A focus

group does not product scientifically reliable results be-

cause of the small statistical sample; however, it may

suggest possible trends and areas for further research.

Meacham acted as moderator of the focus group discus-

sions. Many topics were discussed, and the participants

reviewed sample videotapes of local news programs. The

response to plaintiff, and in particular to her appearance,

was overwhelmingly negative. During the course of these

discussions, and after the participants’ attitude toward

plaintiff had become apparent, Meacham on more than

one occasion made derogatory remarks about plaintiff. Al-

though his comments may have been indecorous and ill-

advised, it is clear from listening to the tapes that they

he met.

he ett METS ay AE MDD ING Wm CaP 0 -

ane

A47

were made after the attitude of the group had been made

very clear and they did not influence the opinions held

by focus group participants.

Station management observed the focus groups from

behind a one-way mirror. Shannon and Replogle met

with plaintiff on May 21, 1981, to discuss the results

and possible responses. Replogle advised plaintiff that

there seemed to be some problems with her acceptance

by the Kansas City viewing audience, but he indicated

that management was ready to work with her to overcome

those problems. Plaintiff at first said she wanted to be

let out of her contract so that she could return “home”

to California. Replogle reiterated defendant’s desire to

retain plaintiff’s services and to work with her to overcome

the negative audience response. Plaintiff eventually

agreed to cooperate with defendant in that endeavor. Rep-

logle stated that defendant would be instituting a clothing

calendar for plaintiff. She agreed to follow the calendar

when she received it. Thereafter, plaintiff’s wardrobe was

more closely supervised, but the clothing calendar was

not formally instituted until late July or early August

a few weeks before plaintiff was removed as co-anchor.

As a follow-up to the focus groups, Media Associates

conducted a telephone survey in late June, 1981, of the

attitudes of four hundred randomly selected individuals

residing in the greater Kansas City viewing area. All

persons and organizations involved in the construction,

administration, and analysis of the survey were ex-

perienced in market and broadcasting research. The sur-

vey measured the attitudes of Kansas City television view-

ers toward a wide range of selected aspects of television

news in Kansas City. The questionnaire was drafted by

Steven Meacham and revised by station management and

A48

included questions on various issues raised by the focus

group participants, including plaintiff's dress and appear-

ance. The questionnaire asked questions from both sides

of the appearance and dress issues for plaintiff, in an

attempt to see if persons surveyed perceived as strengths

those qualities which the focus groups perceived as draw-

backs. The questionnaire was administered during long-

distance telephone interviews by trained employees of

Weise, Rozmarin & Associates of Omaha, Nebraska.

Weise, Rozmarin used accepted quality control procedures

in validating the interviewers’ work and the data entered

for computer analysis. The data was processed with the

commonly used Statistical Program for the Social Sciences

and was generated in the form of a computer print-out

with indexed tables. Weise, Rozmarin forwarded the data

to Media Associates in Dallas. The survey was conducted

in accordance with generally accepted principles of survey

research, and its results are trustworthy; moreover, defen-

dant’s reliance on those results was reasonable and appro-

priate. Plaintiff's attempt to question the validity of the

survey research through the testimony of Thomas Bei-

secker, an Associate Professor of Communications Studies

at the University of Kansas, was not persuasive. He con-

ceded the telephone survey was not sex-biased and he

lacked credentials and experience in the area of broadcast-

ing research.

Shannon and Replogle received the final results of

the June telephone survey on about August 3, 1981. The

report concluded that plaintiff was having an extremely

adverse impact on defendant’s acceptance among Kansas

City viewers. In the survey, plaintiff was compared to

the female co-anchors at WDAF and KCMO and was found

to be the least popular and least accepted of the three

in almost every category. Comparisons were made pri-

A49

marily to Anne Peterson, who co-anchored at KMBC’s

primary competitor, KCMO. In virtually every compari-

son with Peterson, plaintiff trailed. On August 13, 1981,

Shannon and Replogle met with consultants from Media

Associates, who recommended that plaintiff be replaced

immediately. Shannon and Replogle initially resisted the

suggestion, but after discussing the matter in Replogle’s

office the next morning, Friday, August 14, they agreed

to remove plaintiff as co-anchor and to reassign her to

the position of general assignment reporter at no loss in

pay or other contractual benefits. Shannon decided he

would tell plaintiff of the decision to reassign her when

she came to work at 2:30 pm. After finishing his dis-

cussion with Replogle, which lasted most cf the morning,

Shannon went to his office in the newsroom. Shortly

thereafter, he encountered plaintiff, who had come to work

early to edit a story. Since she would soon be leaving

for an interview, Shannon decided to inform her of the

reassignment immediately. At his request, plaintiff en-

tered Shannon’s office. During the discussicn that fol-

lowed, only the two of them were present and the door

to Shannon’s office was closed.

Shannon began by reminding plaintiff of their previous

discussions about her appearance and on-air stumbling and

their attempts to overcome those obstacles. Referring to

the recent research, he said that these factors had created

a wall between plaintiff and viewers and that she was

being removed as co-anchor and reassigned as a general

assignment reporter. Plaintiff asked why she was being

reassigned, and in response, Shannon turned to a cabinet

behind hi: Jk in which he had placed the Media As-

sociates’ rey. rt. He picked it up and said that the results

of the research were devastating and unprecedented in

the history of Media Associates. Shannon said that the

}

A50

report proved that the audience perceived plaintiff’s dress,

appearance, makeup, and presentation as stumbling blocks.

Further, Shannon said thet the report showed that female

viewers were leaving KMBC for its closest competitor,

KCMO. Although Shannon told plaintiff that defendant

intended to honor its contractual obligation to her, plaintiff

said that she was going home to Santa Barbara. Shannon

encouraged plaintiff to stay on as a reporter and suggested

she take the weekend off to consider the matter. Before

leaving Shannon’s office, plaintiff indicated that she did

not think she would change her mind about leaving. At

no time during their discussion on August 14, 1981, did

Shannon tell plaintiff she was being reassigned because

she was too old, too unattractive, and not deferential

enough to men or that she was being reassigned because

the audience so perceived her.

Over the weekend, plaintiff discussed her situation

with several persons, including her attorney Robert Hamil-

ton and a local newspaper reporter. On the following Mon-

day, August 17, 1981, she sent a telegram to defendant

reiterating her decision not to accept a reassignment. Dur-

ing this same period, Hamilton telephoned Shannon several

times to urge him to reinstate plaintiff as co-anchor. When

Shannon refused, Hamilton on one occasion lost his temper

and threatened to make the matter a “cause celebre.”

A meeting on Tuesday, August 18, 1981, between plaintiff,

Shannon, and Replogle at the Kansas City Club, called

by defendant in an attempt to resolve the matter ami-

cably, ended in an impasse.

When Shannon arrived at work on Monday, August

24, 1981, he found the clothes defendant had bought for

plaintiff on the couch in his office and plaintiff’s key

to the station on his desk. Plaintiff appeared at the station

ry tyr ey ; : : od 2B vy wine , ; . ts —

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A51

about 8:45 a.m. that morning and informed Shannon she

was reporting to work as a co-anchor. He responded that

she could work as a reporter. Plaintiff said “good-bye”

and left, returned to her apartment and drove to Santa

Barbara, California, a few days later. On September 1,

1981, plaintiff commenced work as co-anchor at KEYT

in Santa Barbara, a job che still held at the time of trial.

KMBC management was concerned about the appear-

ance of all its on-air personnel, both male a:d female.

Management expected grooming and dress to be consistent

with community standards; on-air personnel understood

the need to maintain a professional and business-like ap-

pearance. Whenever an appearance problem was detected,

management responded with measures appropriate to the

individual situation. Plaintiff received counseling in cloth-

ing and makeup, areas in which she ‘acknowledged her

lack of expertise. When it later became apparent that

additional measures were needed to correct the problems,

clothing was acquired from Macy’s and a clothing calendar

was instituted.

Pam Whiting, the weekend co-anchor during most of

the time plaintiff was weeknight co-anchor, is another

example of management’s individualized response to ap-

pearance problems. Like plaintiff, Whiting, whose prior

employment was limited to radio, was inexperienced in

the use of appropriate television makeup; therefore, con-

sultants were used to educate her in makeup techniques.

Clothing was also an occasional problem, but the circum-

stances did not warrant a clothing calendar or routine

purchase of clothing for Whiting. Unlike plaintiff, Whiting

also had problems with her weight and her hairstyle;

therefore, individualized analysis and recommendations

were made in those areas.

A52

Brenda Williams has been employed at KMBC since

1977 in various positions, including weekend anchor and

reporter, and Williams was selected to replace plaintiff

as weeknight co-anchor in September, 1981. Williams’

appearance was always satisfactory to defendant, and no

corrective measures were ever necessary.

Defendant also gave individualized attention to the

appearance of male on-air personnel. The appearance of

co-anchor Scott Feldman was generally satisfactory; how-

ever, on at least two occasions, he received specific direc-

tives regarding his choice of shirts. Shannon and Wilford

told Mike Placke, the weekend weatherman, to lose weight

and improve his wardrobe; he followed those suggestions.

Wilford suggested that Bob Werley, a reporter, blow dry

his hair, try contact lenses, and change his on-air make-

up. Werley took the advice although he discovered that

he could not wear contact lenses, so he changed his make-

up to improve his appearance with glasses. Michael Ma-

honey, a reporter, was told that he needed to lose weight

and improve his wardrobe; he did so. In addition, Ma-

honey occasionally experienced a nervous twitch in his

mouth, which resembled a sneer. Management attempted

to assist him in overcoming this problem. Shannon told

Tim Richardson, a noon newscaster and reporter, to change

his hairstyle; Richardson complied.

Newsroom operations were conducted without regard

to sex, consistent with defendant’s policy of equal co-

anchors. After the first few weeks of plaintiff’s perfor-

mance as co-anchor, lead-in stories were equitably dis-

tributed between plaintiff and her co-anchor, Scott Feld-

man. Other job assignments which plaintiff considered

desirable, including on-site reporting and “hard” news

stories, were also equitably distributed, as were less desir-

a Yee ee Nee

A53

able duties such as “news teases” (short promotional seg-

ments taped at about 4 p.m.), to the extent possible given

the exigencies of the newsroom. On one _ occasion,

in March, 1981, Shannon reprimanded Feldman for refer-

ring to plaintiff as “that girl,” telling Feldman that such

conduct would not be tolerated. As plaintiff testified,

“Ridge reprimanded Scott for using that type of language

and told both of us we were co-equal, we were co-anchors

and he would not tolerate that sort of language.”

Although Feldman was paid more than plaintiff, the

differential was based on factors other than sex. Feldman

had an education in broadcasting, several years of expe-

rience as a news anchor in major television markets prior

to coming to Kansas City in 1978, and was well established

in the Kansas City market by the time plaintiff arrived

in 1981. On the other hand, plaintiff had no formal educa-

tion in broadcasting, her experience as a news anchor

was limited to small television markets, and she was un-

known to Kansas City viewers.

Ratings, or measurements of the size of the viewing

audience, are very important in the television industry

because they have a direct effect on a station’s advertising

revenue. Two private companies, Arbitron and Nielsen,

issue ratings several times a year. Ratings measure audi-

ence behavior by ascertaining the number of persons ac-

tually tuned to a given station. In contrast, audience

research, such as that conducted by Media Associates, mea-

sures attitudes in an attempt to explain and forecast the

ratings. Audience research enables station management

to adjust its programming to increase, or at least to main-

tain, its share of the audience.

The results of the audience research have been pre-

viously summarized. In addition, both parties introduced

A54

considerable evidence on KMBC’s ratings before, during,

and after plaintiff's tenure at the statign. This evidence

was equivocal at best and is of no Mticuler assistance

to the court in resolving the issues raised under Title

VII since defendant removed plaintiff as co-anchor based

on research showing negative viewer attitudes toward

plaintiff which could be expected to result in an eventual

erosion of defendant’s ratings. The July, 1981, ratings’

were unavailable and unknown to defendant when plaintiff

was removed as co-anchor; therefore, whether those ratings

ultimately wert up or down is simply irrelevant to the

issue of sex discrimination. Even assuming the ratings

improved during and immediately after plaintiff's tenure,

that would simply mean that defendant and its consultants

erred in their predictions, and such evidence would not

support an inference of sex discrimination.

In summary, plaintiff was not discriminated against

because of her sex. The measures taken by defendant

with respect to her appearance were necessary and appro-

priate considering her individual shortcomings. Plaintiff's

salary was determined on the basis of factors other than

sex. Plaintiff was not constructively discharged since ;

defendant did not render her working conditions intoler-

able, and they were not, in fact, intolerable. Plaintiff

voluntarily resigned rather than accept a reassignment

pursuant to the terms of her contract. Accordingly, she

suffered no damages attributable to any wrongful act of

defendant.

ee Oe ee ee ee eT ee or

ee ee wey ee ee eae eee

B. Conclusions of Law

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The court has jurisdiction over the

parties and subject matter jurisdiction of this action under

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1).

ee ene nn i a. og

A55

42 US.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) provides in part that it

shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer

“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”

Plaintiff makes essentially three claims of sex discrim-

ination. She first asserts discrimination in the terms

and conditions of her employment; specifically, she com-

plains that she was subjected to a rigorous dress code

and constant criticism of her appearance while her male

counterparts received no such treatment. Plaintiff’s sec-

ond complaint of sex discrimination concerns her removal

as co-anchor; she claims that defendant’s explicit and im-

plicit reasons for removing her were based on sex and

that defendant’s actions amounted to a constructive dis-

charge. Finally, plaintiff asserts that she was paid less

than Scott Feldman because of her sex. With respect

to all of her claims under Title VII, “[t]he ultimate

burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains

at all times with the plaintiff.” Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Plaintiff’s first claim of sex discrimination based on

defendant’s actions with respect to her appearance must

be analyzed both in terms of theory and practice. To

the extent that plaintiff might argue that Title VII abso-

lutely prohibits an employer from imposing reasonable

but different standards of appearance for males and fe-

males, such a position must be rejected as contrary to

the overwhelming weight of authority. Title VII “was

never intended to interfere in the promulgation and en-

forcement of personal appearance regulations by private

employers.” Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 527

A56

F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (8th Cir. 1975). “[A] private employer

may require male employees to adhere to different modes

of dress and grooming than those required of female em-

ployees and such does not constitute an unfair employment

practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).”

Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th

Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975). See also

Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56

(9th Cir. 1977) (citing cases).

The courts which have considered this issue have taken

a realistic and common-sense approach. For instance, in

Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C.

Cir. 1973), the court stated:

Perhaps no facet of business life is more impor-

tant than a company’s place in public estimation. That

the image created by its employees dealing with the

public when on company assignment affects its rela-

tions is so weil known that we may take judicial

notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favor-

able acceptance. Good grooming regulations reflect

a company’s policy in our highly competitive business

environment. Reasonable requirements in furtherance

of that policy are an aspect of managerial responsibil-

ity.’

Id. at 1124-25. Judge Collinson of this district has taken

a similar approach:

Employment decisions . . . based on either dress codes

or policies regarding hair length are more closely re-

lated to the company’s choice of how to run its busi-

ness rather than to its obligation to provide equal

1. It is well recognized that Title VII “was not intended

to ‘diminish traditional management prerogatives.’” Burdine,

450 U.S. at 259.

Pe ae eS a eee) ae

lie CO A Aa Gi Ek tet

A57

employment opportunities. The decision to project

a certain image as one aspect of company policy is

the employer’s preroga ive which employees may ac-

cept or reject. If they choose to reject the policy,

they are subject to such sanctions as deemed appropri-

ate by the company. An employer is simply not re-

quired to account for personal preferences with respect

to dress and grooming standards.

Lanigan v. Bartiett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392

(W.D. Mo. 1979). See also Willingham v. Macon Telegraph

Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en

banc).

Thus, defendant’s standards of appearance for its on-

air personnel can in no way be considered discriminatory

per se. Both men and women were required to maintain

a professional, business-like appearance consistent with

community standards. Since television is a visual medium,

as plaintiff admitted in her testimony, such a reasonable

requirement is obviously critical to defendant’s economic

well-being.

Plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination is also based

~ on defendant’s standards of appearance as applied. She

contends that defendant routinely and rigorously enforced

dress and makeup requirements for women but not for

men. This court recognizes that otherwise permissible

appearance and grooming standards could be unlawful if

invidiously applied. See Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252 (uphold-

ing validity of reasonable grooming and appearance stan-

dards when “imposed in an evenhanded manner on all

employees”). Ultimately the issue is a matter of proof,

and the evidence fails to sustain plaintiff's position.

An individual’s appearance is a unique and often sensi-

tive matter. Television by its nature requires station man-

A58

agement to exercise special supervision over matters of

personal appearance, yet it was apparent at trial that

KMBC management found it preferable and politic to per-

mit on-air personnel to operate within rather general ap-

pearance guidelines to the extent feasible considering the

skill and judgment of each employee. Many employees,

both male and female, demonstrated a fairly consistent

ability to maintain their appearance at a level acceptable

to management; therefore, little or no supervision or criti-

cism was necessary. Other employees, also of both sexes,

had more difficulty maintaining their appearance. Plain-

tiff was one of these; therefore, management found it

necessary to offer criticism, advice, and assistance, tailored

to fit her individual needs.

In plaintiff’s particular case, management had to con-

tend with several factors. First was plaintiff’s highly

visible role as co-anchor, which meant that the fortunes

of KMBC were linked to the impression plaintiff left with

viewers. Second was plaintiff's below-average aptitude

in matters of clothing and makeup. Third was plaintiff's

attitude that her appearance was not critical to her success

as an anchor, an attitude directly opposite to that of man-

agement. The final factor was plaintiff’s acute sensitivity

to management’s efforts to improve her appearance. Faced

with this unique and difficult situation, management re-

sponded cautiously and gradually. With the assistance

of consultants, defendant first attempted to teach plaintiff

the necessary skills in makeup and clothing. When this

diplomatic approach proved ineffective, the next step was

to acquire clothing for plaintiff and to suggest how it

should be worn. Finally, management found it necessary

to implement a clothing calendar and to monitor plaintiff's

appearance closely.

A59

Defendant’s responses to the appearance problems of

other employees, both male and female, do not support

an inference of discrimination. If anything, that evidence

shows a consistent concern by management over the ap-

pearance of all on-air personnel without regard to sex

but with regard to the peculiar characteristics of each

employee. Plaintiff was an employee of atypical aptitudes

and attitudes, and defendant merely acted to correct ap-

pearance problems which plaintiff was unable or unwilling

to remedy. The actions taken by defendant in regard

to plaintiff's appearance were not the result of any general

animus toward women or of any specific animus toward

plaintiff as a woman. It may well be that in plaintiff’s

case some of the steps taken by management were un-

precedented, but they were not ipso facto discriminatory.

Plaintiff’s second claim of sex discrimination concerns

her removal as co-anchor. Insofar as this claim is based

on the much-publicized litany—‘“too old, too unattractive,

and not deferential enough to men”—allegedly uttered

by Shannon on August 14, 1981, it is rejected since this

court has concluded as a matter of fact that Shannon

said no such thing.

Plaintiff also contends that discrimination can be in-

ferred from the circumstances surrounding her removal

as co-anchor; however, she has not sustained her burden

of proof on this contention. Defendant’s reliance on the

results of the telephone survey conducted by Media As-

sociates was not pretextual and was in fact the reason

plaintiff was reassigned. The survey was a routine pro-

cedure designed to evaluate many facets of the KMBC

news operation and was conducted, tabulated, and evalu-

ated by persons experienced in the field of broadcast re-

search. There is simply no evidence that the survey was

A60

designed to effect the removal of plaintiff as co-anchor

because of her sex or any other reason: even plaintiff's

expert conceded the survey was not sex-biased. Under

these circumstances, defendant was entitled to rely on

the results of the survey.

Plaintiff suggests an inference of sexual animus can

be drawn by contrasting the consultant’s report to the

ratings from the same period; however, even assuming

the ratings unequivocally showed KMBC to be in first

place just prior to plaintiff’s removal as co-anchor, a more

plausible inference is that television research is an inex-

act science. It might also be argued broadly that defendant

should not have relied on the consultant’s report as a

basis for removing plaintiff as co-anchor, but this is a

normative issue not properly before the court under Title

VII:

The news business may indeed have its quirks and

vagaries, in this age when the selection of a new

anchor for the CBS evening news is itself front-page

news, but consultant’s reports and ratings routinely

serve as the basis for personnel changes. Furthermore,

the ratings and the report provided strong evidence

in support of the defendant’s decision.

Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc., 25 Empl. Prac.

Dec. (CCH) { 31,650 (D.R.I. July 3, 1980).

As part of the claim arising out of her removal as

co-anchor, plaintiff also contends that she was construc-

tively discharged because of her sex. This contention is

untenable on both the law and the facts. “Generally,

a constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliber-

ately makes or allows the employee’s working conditions

to become so intolerable that the employee has no other

choice but to quit.” Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689

A6é1

F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982). “To constitute a construc-

tive discharge, the employer’s actions must have been

taken with the intention of forcing the employee to quit.”

Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th

Cir. 1981). Here the evidence does not support a finding

that plaintiff's working conditions became so intolerable

that she had no choice but to quit; moreover, there is

no evidence that any of the actions by defendant were

taken with the intent to force plaintiff's resignation. On

the contrary, it appears that defendant repeatedly ex-

pressed its desire to retain plaintiff first as co-anchor and

later as a reporter.

Plaintiff's last claim under Title VII is simply a reprise

of her Equal Pay Act claim. The jury found against

her on that claim, and elsewhere this court has refused

to disturb that finding. See Section II, infra. It would

therefore be entirely inappropriate to reconsider the matter

under Title VII since the jury found the defendant had

established a defense under the Equal Pay Act. See Ora-

hood v. Board of Trustees, 645 F.2d 651, 654 n3 (8th

Cir. 1981) (“a defendant who establishes one of [the four

affirmative defenses in the Equal Pay Act] cannot be

held liable under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act’).

Even assuming plaintiff's pay claim could now be consid-

ered under Title VII, the evidence demonstrated that the

difference in pay between plaintiff and Scott Feldman

was attributable to several factors other than sex, particu-

larly education and experience.

In summary, defendant’s actions toward plaintiff dur-

ing her employment at KMBC were not based on her

sex—with one notable and ironic exception: but for the

fact that she is a female, plaintiff would not have been

hired as a co-anchor in December, 1980, regardless of her

A42

other abilities. Thereafte: uefendant’s treatment of plain-

tiff was the result of the factors other than sex. Her

salary was less than that of Scott Feldman not because

she was a woman but because her education and expe-

rience were not commensurate with his. She was a “co-

equal co-anchor,” and newsroom operations were con-

ducted without regard to sex. Her affinity for the casual

beach life and her apparent indifference to matters of

appearance required defendant to formulate and implement

corrective measures appropriate to her unique circum-

stances. Defendant reassigned plaintiff because properly

conducted audience research dem onetrated unprecedented

negative viewer response toward fet. She was not con-

structively discharged; rather, she voluntarily left KMBC

rather than abide by the terms of a contract which

she had signed but never carefully reviewed.

Il. EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM

The jury returned a verdict for defendant under Count

II, the Equal Pay Act claim, and plaintiff has moved for

a new trial.

A review of the suggestions filed in support of the

motion fails to convince the court that the verdict on

Count II should be disturbed. Contrary to plaintiff’s asser-

tion, the verdict was not against the clear weight of the

evidence. Plaintiff's allegations of instructiona] error on

Count II are not well taken. Finally, the court adheres

to its previous rulings on the admission and exclusion

of evidence concerning the compensation of other KMBC

employees.

ll. FRAUD CLAIM

On plaintiff's claim of fraud under Count III, the

jury awarded actual damages of $375,000 and punitive

Pee, Tey ee ee

A63

damages of $125,000. Defendant now seeks judgment not-

withstanding the verdict cr a new trial or remittitur. De-

fendant has filed extensive suggestions in support of its

motion, and plaintiff has responded in kind.

At the outset, it is apparent that the motion for judg-

ment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. Tech-

nically, it is merely a renewal of the motion for directed

verdict made at the close of all the evidence. Johnson

v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1980). In this case,

the motion for directed verdict was denied after extensive

post-trial briefing and argument. Order of August 31,

1983. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

“can be granted only if the motion for directed verdict

should have been granted.” Walker v. KFC Corp., 515

F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D. Cal. 1981). Defendant has not

convinced this court that a directed verdict should have

been granted; therefore, the motion for judgment notwith-

standing the verdict will be denied.

This court has greater latitude in considering defen-

dant’s alternative motion for a new trial: “Rule 59 gives

the trial judge ample power to prevent what he considers

to be a miscarriage of justice. It is his right, and indeed

his duty, to order a new trial if he deems it in the interest

of justice to do so.” 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2803 (1973). A new trial may

be ordered for a great variety of reasons:

It has been said that the general grounds for a new

trial are that the verdict is against the weight of

the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that

for other reasons the trial was not fair, and that the

motion may also raise questions of law arising out

of substantial errors in the admission or rejection of

evidence or the giving or refusal of instructions.

A64

Id. § 2805. See also Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v.

Aalco Wrecking Co., 466 F.2d 179, 187 (8th Cir. 1972)

(court may order new trial if first trial resulted in a

miscarriage of justice), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).

“(Where the trial court finds the verdict contrary to

the weight of the evidence and grants a new trial

. . . the appeilate court should ‘exercise a closer degree

of scrutiny and supervision ... in order to protect the

litigants’ right to jury trial.’” Id., 466 F.2d at 187 (quoting

Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3rd

Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960)). On the other

hand:

When evidence is erroneously admitted or excluded

or where the trial court has erred in the instructions

to the jury, the trial court is considered in a better

position to correct a manifest injustice in ruling on

the motion for new trial. Under these circumstances

the grant of the new trial does not interfere with

the role of the jury as the trier of fact.

Fireman’s Fund, 466 F.2d at 186. The trial court is also

in the best position to determine whether the verdict is

excessive; it is the opinion of the Eighth Circuit that

inadequacy or excessiveness of a verdict is basically,

and should be, a matter for the trial court which

has had the benefit of hearing the testimony and of

observing the demeanor of the witnesses and which

knows the community and its standards; that this is

a responsibility which, for better working of the judi-

cial process and for other seemingly obvious reasons,

is best placed upon its shoulders; and that we shall

continue to consider review, as we have said before,

not routinely and in every case, but only in those

rare situations where we are pressed to conclude that

— —~ |

»

Beats cite ane

A65

there is a “plain injustice” or a “monstrous” or “shock-

ing” result.

Nodak Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 533 F.2d 401, 410 (8th

Cir. 1976) (quoting Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton,

294 F.2d 439, 447-48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929

(1961) ).

The jury awarded plaintiff $375,000 in actual damages

and $125,000 in punitive damages. The court is firmly

convinced that this verdict is excessive and is the result

of passion, prejudice, confusion. »r mistake on the part

of the jury. It is telling to jote that plaintiff prayed

for $200,000 in actual damages in her complaint and her

counsel asked for $75,000 to $100,000 in actual damages

in closing argument, yet the jury awarded $375,000. Al-

though the award of punitive damages was within the

amount specified in the prayer and closing argument, the

jury’s unprincipled award of actual damages makes the

award of punitive damages inherently suspect.

Instructional errors may be in part responsible for

the excessive award. Prior to trial, the court announced

that the issue of punitive damages would be submitted,

if at all, only after a finding of liability. The goal of

this bifurcated procedure was to focus the jury’s attention

first on the question of liability in order to promote a

more reasoned analysis of the case. Unfortunately, the

issue of punitive damages was not expressly withdrawn

from the jury when the case was first submitted, and

it is apparent that the award of “compensatory” damages

contains a substantial, but undefined, punitive element.

On retrial, the submission of damages will again be bifur-

cated; however, the issue of punitive damages will be

expressly withdrawn from the jury during its initial de-

liberations to eliminate the risk of jury confusion or mis-

take,

A66

Another instructional shortcoming concerns the issue

_ Of wrongful discharge. In a case such as this, it is im-

portant that the jury not be given a roving commission

to second-guess defendant’s managerial decisions. Defen-

dant submitted a proposed instruction to withdraw from

the jury any consideration of the general fairness or reason-

ableness of defendant’s actions toward plaintiff. Although

the court was amendable to such an instruction in theory,

defendant’s proposal was unsatisfactory as were attempts

to revise it. The proposed instruction was also rejected

in favor of Instruction No. 12, which expressly withdrew

wrongful discharge and related issues from the jury under

Count I. However, a review of the instructions as a whole

now convinces the court that wrongful discharge and re-

lated issues were not clearly withdrawn from the jury’s

consideration, particularly with respect to Count III. It

is therefore quite possible that the jury was confused

or mistaken as to the applicable law, and a new trial

is appropriate.

In addition to the mistake and confusion possibly cre-

ated by the instructions, the excessive verdict is also cer-

tainly attributable to passion and prejudice caused by the

pervasive publicity surrounding this case. News reports

and commentary on the circumstances surrounding plain-

tiff’s departure from KMBC began within days after she

was removed as co-anchor and increased as trial ap-

proached. The effect of this pretrial publicity was ex-

plored during voir dire, but the news coverage of course

continued after the jury was impaneled. Although the

jury was repeatedly admonished not to discuss the case

with anyone and to disregard news accounts of the trial,

even the most conscientious juror would have been unable

to ignore the pervasive and relentless publicity and could

not have been immune from its effect.

A67

In support of its motion for new trial, defendant has

filed two volumes which contain only a sampling of the

local and national coverage of the case by newspapers

and wire services. In addition, the trial received obsessive

attention from local television stations and the national

networks. Although cameras were not allowed in the

courtroom, television crews were frequently stationed at

the perimeter of the building, recording the comings and

goings of trial participants. Present each day in the gallery

were courtroom artists and a substantial number of re-

porters, including some whose faces were undoubtedly well

known to the jurors. During closing arguments, the gallery

was literally crammed to capacity.2, The news accounts

resulting from all this attention in most instances described

the case in terms of plaintiff’s prayer for $1.2 million

in damages and her allegation that defendant told her

she was “too old, too unattractive, and not deferential

enough to men.” The ceaseless incantation of these allega-

tions worked to the advantage of plaintiff and to the serious

detriment of defendant.

Consistent with the customary practice in civil cases

in this district, the jury was never sequestered. The court

is firmly convinced that, as a result, the jury became

so infected with passion and prejudice that it was unable

to discharge its duty of fairness to both parties. Upon

retrial, the jury will be sequestered to assure both parties

an impartial jury.

Two additional measures will be taken to ensure the

integrity of the jury. First, the case will be retried te

2. By an unfortunate circumstance of timing, the jury

retired to deliberate late on a Friday afternoon. Deliberations

were recessed over the weekend, thereby increased the risk tha‘

the jury was exposed to prejudicial publicity at a crucial point

in the trial.

A68

a jury of twelve. See Local Rule 14C. See also 9 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 2491 (1971 & Supp. 1982). This should reduce the

risk that one or two headstrong jurors might unduly in-

fluence the jury and should increase the chances that

reason will prevail over passion. Second, the case will

be retried in Joplin, Missouri, in the Southwestern Division

of this District. Moving the case away from Kansas City

should reduce the level of trial publicity and make it

more likely that the jury can reach a decision based solely

on the evidence presented in court. In addition, jury

selection should be easier since it is less likely that pros-

pective jurors in the Southwestern Division will have been

exposed to the intense publicity which emanated from

Kansas City during the first trial.

Because of the excessive verdict attributable to incom-

plete instruction of the jury and to incessant and over-

whelming trial publicity, a new trial on all issues raised

under Count III is required. Reduction of the damage

award by remittiture is inappropriate because passion and

prejudice influenced not only the jury’s calculation of dam-

ages but also its decision on the threshold issue of liabil-

ity. See Richardson v. Communications Workers of Amer-

ica, 530 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir.) (in excessive verdict

cases, decision whether to reduce verdict or grant new

trial is primarily for trial court), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

824 (1976).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is

ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of defen-

dant and against plaintiff on Count I of her complaint.

It is further

A69

ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial

on the Equal Pay Act Claim is d»nied. It is further

ORDERED that defendant’s alternative motions for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for remittitur

on Count III are denied. It is further

ORDERED that defendant’s alternative motion for a

new trial on Count III is granted. Retrial of all issues

raised under Count III will begin at 9:30 a.m. on Wed-

nesday, January 4, 1984, at the Federal Courthouse in

Joplin, Missouri; a jury of twelve will be impaneled and

will be sequestered throughout the proceedings. It is fur-

ther

ORDERED that no later than Friday, November 18,

1983, each side shall file suggestions concerning the most

appropriate method by which to conduct an orderly, effi-

cient, and searching voir dire of prospective jurors. It

is further

ORDERED that proposed jury instructions shall be

filed no later than Friday, December 9, 1983.

/s/ Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.

Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.

United States District Judge

October 31, 1983

A70

(Filed January 13, 1984)

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Western District of Missouri,

83-0007-CV-W-8

Christine Craft-

V.

Metromedia, Inc.

Honorable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.

[X] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court

and a jury with the judicial officer named above pre-

siding. The issues have been tried and the jury has ren-

dered its verdict.

[ ] Decision by Court. This action came to trial

or hearing before the Court with the judge (magistrate)

named above presiding. The issues have been tried or

heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

on the claim of Plaintiff Christine Craft against Defendant

Metromedia, Inc., for fraudulent representations, judgment

is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff and against De-

fendant, with actual damages assessed at Two Hundred

Twenty-five Thousand ($225,000) Dollars and punitive

damages assessed at One Hundred Thousand ($100,000)

Dollars.

R. F. Connor

Clerk

/s/ (illegible)

(By) Deputy Clerk

January 13, 1984

EEE

A771

(Filed January 17, 1984)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For the Western District of Missouri

Western Division

No. 83-0007-CV-W-8

CHRISTINE CRAFT,

Plaintiff,

VS.

METROMEDIA, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER

Prior to submission of plaintiff’s fraud claim, the court

deferred a ruling on defendant’s motion for directed ver-

dict at the close of all the evidence. Rule 50(b) provides

that “[w]henever a motion for a directed verdict made

at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason

is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the

action to the jury subject to a later determination of the

legal questions raised by the motion.” Rule 58 provides

that “upon a general verdict of a jury . . . the clerk, unless

the court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign,

and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction

by the court.”

It appears to the court that under Rule 50(b) deferral

of defendant’s motion for directed verdict was tantamount

to a denial thereof, and the clerk of the court routinely

enters judgment as of the date of the verdict. Therefore,

it appears that the time for filing motions under Rules

AT72

50(b) and 59(b) began to run at the time of verdict;

moreover, Rule 6(b) prohibits the court from extending

the time for filing such motions. Accordingly, in the in-

terest of clarity; it is

ORDERED that defendant’s motion for directed ver-

dict at the close of all the evidence shall be deemed denied

as of January 13, 1984.

/s/ Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.

Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.

United States District Judge

January 17, 1984

A73

(Filed February 7, 1984)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For the Western District of Missouri

Western Division

No. 83-0007-CV-W-8

CHRISTINE CRAFT,

Plaintiff,

VS.

METROMEDIA, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER

Pursuant to the order of October 31, 1983, a new trial

on plaintiff’s fraud claim commenced in Joplin, Missouri,

on January 4, 1984. On January 13, 1984, the sequestered

jury of twelve found in favor of plaintiff and awarded her

$225,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive dam-

ages. Defendant has now filed its Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial as

to Count III, to which plaintiff has responded.

Defendant’s motion contains eighty-seven allegations

of error (plus subparts), each of which defendant asserts

constitute prejudicial and plain error warranting judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, yet another

trial. Having reviewed this compendium of alleged errors,

the court finds no sufficient reason to disturb the verdict.

In addition, the court is satisfied that the problems

with the first trial, as described in the order of October 31,

1983, did not reoccur in the Joplin trial. The instructional

AT4

errors on wrongful discharge and punitive damages were

corrected in the second trial, and the potential prejudicial

impact of trial publicity on the jury was minimized or

eliminated by sequestration and the increased number of

jurors.

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that defendant’s Motion for Judgment Not-

withstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial as

to Count III is denied. It is further

ORDERED that costs will be taxed as follows:

1. Each side will bear its own costs incurred up to

and including August 8, 1983, the date of verdict

in the first trial.

9. All costs incurred after Au,ust 8, 1983, will be

taxed to defendant. .

/s/ Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.

Joseph E. Stevens, Jr.

United States District Judge

February 7, 1984

A75

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Eighth Circuit

No. 84-1336

No. 84-1380

CHRISTINE 4. CRAFT,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

vs.

METROMEDIA, INC.,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION

FOR REHEARING EN BANC

The Seventh Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution declares:

In suits at common law, where the value in contro-

versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial

by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a

jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the

United States, than according to the rules of common

law.

Christine Craft petitions for rehearing or suggests re-

hearing en banc, because the panel opinion handed down

in this case simply is in fatal conflict with the Seventh

Amendment. Three members of the Court have put their

name to an opinion which violates all rules of appellate

review enshrined in the decisions of this Court and the

Supreme Court of the United States, by attempting to re-

sift, reweigh, reexamine and redetermine factual issues on

plaintiff's Missouri common law fraud claim, despite two

A76

lengthy trials in which 18 jurors, fairly chosen from cross

sections of the *- Missouri communities of Kansas City

and Joplin, a ave personally heard, seen, examined,

sifted, weighea anu determined the factual issues as the

Constitution directs they—and only they—must do. At-

lantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369

U.S. 355 at 359-60 (1962). Judicial integrity and conscience

compel reinstatement of Craft’s jury verdict.

Craft’s common law fraud claim arose from a series

of preemployment conversations between Craft and sta-

tion management at KMBC, Ridge Shannon and Kent

Replogle. In response to direct questions by Craft and a

friend, Bob Hamilton, Shannon and Replogle repeatedly

told Craft they did not intend to make her over or change

her into something she was not, but that they were more

interested in Craft’s journalistic credentials, and “liked

what they saw.” Contrary to these representations man-

agement was already working with consultants on the

changes that would be made in Craft's appearance. Man-

agement’s efforts to remold Craft's appearance into their

image began “from day one” of her employment, and

continued unabated thereafter, until her removal for rea-

sons related to her appearance. Material errors exist

between this Court’s recitation of evidence—set forth in

the light least favorable to Craft—and what the trial record

truly shows when “considered in the light most favor-

able to Craft.” (emphasis added). That fact alone “would

be a matter for rehearing” under local rule 16.

Rehearing en banc is warranted as well, however,

because denial of any citizen’s Seventh Amendment right

to a jury trial is indeed a grave constitutional issue. The

panel opinion destroys uniformity of this Court’s decisions

on the important subject of the rigid boundary of appellate

A77

review of sufficiency of evidence for a jury, a boundary

which all appellate courts are required to steadfastly and

zealously secure against breach in order to preserve public

confidence in our constitutional jury system.

As stated by the Supreme Court in Atlantic & Gulf

Stevedores, Inc., supra, 369 U.S. at 359-60:

We might agree with the Court of Appeals had the

question of fact been left to us. But neither we nor

the Court of Appeals can redetermine facts found by

the jury any more than the District Court can prede-

termine them. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court has often prohibited incursions by

Courts of Appeal into the jury’s sole province to weigh

facts when alleged insufficiency of evidence results in

reversal on appeal: See, e.g., Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S.

152 at 155-56 (1964); Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad

Company, 372 U.S. 108, 112-115 (1963) and cases cited:

Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959)

[reversing this Court]; Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645.

652-653 (1946).

The opinion is self-contradictory, in that the portion

devoted to rejecting Ms. Craft's appeal of the trial judge’s

sex discrimination findings repeatedly admonishes Craft

that the district court decision cannot be disturbed, be-

cause Craft’s arguments “[b]oldly seek re-evaluation of

the evidence and rejection of the district court’s factual

findings.” (Slip Op. at 10).' All other trial court rulings

challenged by Craft are met with similarly solid deference

to the trial judge. Thus, the unanswerable questions are

—

1. More than 25 times between pages 8-22 the opinion

refers to the district court’s discretion to decide sex-discrimination

“facts,” and the appeals court indeed “makes clear” its limited

review of those issues.

el

A78

how and why the panel opinion can embrace a completely

new fact finding exercise on Craft’s fraud claims—thereby

suddenly abandoning all deference to the jury as fact-

finder and the decision of this same district judge who

considered and rejected defendant’s arguments against

submissibility of fraud at least six times in pretrial,

trial and post-trial motions over the course of two trials

before two different juries. The integrity of this Court’s

opinions demands reinstatement of Craft’s jury verdict,

for it defies law and logic to hold, as did the panel, that

every aspect of Judge Stevens’ memorandum order is im-

pervious to attack—except his profoundly correct ruling

that “it is apparent that the motion for judgment notwith-

standing the verdict should be denied.” 572 F. Supp. at

880.?

I. SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS EXIST BETWEEN

EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO CRAFT AND THE

COURT OF APPEALS “FACT FINDING”

Court of Appeals Fact Finding:

“While it can be argued that Craft was ‘made over’

in being forced to exchange her casual California

beach look—she testified that in Santa Barbara she

occasionally went directly from the beach to the

studio... .” (Slip Opinion at 27.) (Apparent Source:

Ridge Shannon Vol. VI, 83.)

2. Because Judge Stevens’ rulings throughout both trials

betray that his sympathies were not with plainiff, his rulings in

favor of the sufficiency of evidence for submissibility are most

compelling. Indeed although plaintiff vigorously opposed the

order for separate retrial of the fraud claims, the panel opinion

reduces the entire Joplin proceedings to an empty, monumentally

wasteful mockery.

A79

Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal

None. Craft never testified as the opinion states;

Ridge Shannon did—but his testimony must be (but ob-

viously was not) ignored. Baynes v. Jenkins, 593 S.W.2d

519, 521 (Mo. banc 1980); Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc.,

722 F.2d 374, 376-77 (8th Cir. 1983), supplemented, 728

F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984). The language of the appellate

opinion also bears striking resemblance to the District

Court’s view of Craft’s supposed “affinity for the casual

beach life.” 572 F. Supp. at 879.

To the contrary, clothing requirements of Kansas City

were no different than the “normal clothing” worn in

Santa Barbara and elsewhere where Craft had worked

during her years in TV. (Vol. II, 189). Craft described

“normal” appearance, which the jury eould infer was

“reasonable” for Kansas City, as follows (Vol. II, 193):

Q. My question is, what do you mean when you say

“normal clothing” and “that is a subjective term?”

A. I mean the same things I had worn all my years

in television in the sense of clean. I usually wear

silk shirts and pearls or a blazer and a shirt, nor-

mal in that sense, a dress. I have always worn

makeup. Always worn what I consider normal

clothes.

“From day one” management’s “relentless” obsession

was on Craft’s assymetrical face, makeup, the fact that

one eye was smaller than the other, clothing selection

and consultation. It can be more than “argued” Craft

was “made over” as to everything all evidence showed,

and the jury believed, she was forced to undergo. (Vol I,

part 2 at 115-118, 128-31, 136-39, 142-47, 151-61, 170-76,

182-199; Vol. II, 7-19, 24-27, 31-38, 40-41; P. Ex. 104, 65)

A80

This Court’s unauthorized acceptance of Shannon’s

testimony robbed Craft of a jury evaluation on key cred-

ibility determinations. For example, Shannon testified

regarding a preemployment conversation with Craft:

I said, ‘Do you understand we have consultants and

the consultants, they offer coaching?’ She said, ‘I

would be acceptable to that. That doesn’t bother me.’

I said, ‘We get into appearance and clothes’ and she

said, ‘I am not much on makeup. I really don’t care

that much about clothing. This is one of my low

priorities.’ She said, ‘In fact, sometimes I will get

up in the mornings and if it is a nice morning I will

go out and surf and I will go to work and just wear

to work what I have got on. And sometimes I wear

makeup and sometimes I don’t’ and she said she did

not care and did not have a lot of knowledge about

clothing and makeup.

I said, ‘We would like to work with you on that and

that would be what the coach with Media Associates

could do.’ She said, ‘Boy, that would be great, I

would like that. I would really appreciate that.’

(Vol. VI at 83)

Even on cross-examination, Craft’s testimony re-

mained staunchly different—and binding on this Court:

Now is it also true during this time that you were

talking to Mr. Shannon and Mr. Replogle there at

that time of your audition and interview, you indi-

cated that you had very little interest in the matter

of clothing and makeup. Answer: I indicated that

my primary interest was news. Question: Did you

not also indicate that you would need help in those

areas? Answer: No, I did not indicate that I would

Pee y aansossclill

A81

need help in those areas. Question: Was there not

some discussion of your getting help in those areas?

Answer: There was not. (Vol. II at 143-144)

In light of Craft’s uncontradicted stated concerns

about her appearance, Shannon’s testimony that she en-

thusiastically embraced the prospect of station manage-

ment and consultants “geiting into appearance and clothes”

appears incredible—as plaintiff argued and was accepted

by the jury. Shannon’s trial testimony also contradicted

his own earlier sworn testimony:

Question: So, you didn’t tell her if she was hired

on she would be subject to the dictates

of the Media Consultants?

Answer: Exactly the opposite.

(Vol. V at 130).°

Court of Appeals “Fact Finding”

“TWije believe Craft in her audition interviews was

concerned essentially with hair and makeup and not

with clothing.” (Slip Opinion at 27.) (Apparent

Source: Brief of Appellant at 30-36.)

* * *

“KMBC’s statements to Craft were made in response

to her expressions of concern about her experience

at CBS where the network required her hair to be

cut and dyed blonde, her eyebrow shade dyed black

and heavy makeup applied.” (Slip Opinion at 27-28.)

(Apparent Source: Appeliant’s Brief at 32)

3. These and other discrepancies in Shannon’s testimony

alone would have been a sufficient reason for the jury to dis-

believe him entirely. Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., supra, 722

F.2d at 378 n.8.

A82

Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal

Contrary to what this panel believes, the record

showed, and the jury believed Craft was concerned about

changes in her appearance generally, not limited to hair,

makeup or the CBS situation, because she wanted “to

do what I felt was the best thing I did in communicating

which was to be pretty much myself as often as possible.”

(Vol. I, part 2, 104). During plaintiff's conversations

with Ridge Shannon, the subject of appearance generally

was discussed:

I reiterated to him again that if they wanted someone

who looked different than the person on the tape,

that I wouldn’t be interested. (Vol. I at 90-91) I

told him the CBS experience had made me extremely

uncomfortable about changes in my appearance and

if they liked what they saw we could talk further

and I would come back for an audition. Otherwise

I wasn’t interested. (Vol. I at 91) If they wanted

to hire someone who was bandbox perfect do not

hire me. (Vol. I at 92)

In discussing the reasons why she accepted the em-

ployment offer in Kansas City, Craft testified:

The original salary offer was not that much more

than what I was making in Santa Barbara where I

was still working at that time. The most important

thing is that I would be allowed to be myself in every

conversation between Santa Barbara and Kansas City,

between Metromedia and Christine Craft. That was

reiterated and I was assured that they had no inten-

tions of changing my appearance, they liked my appear-

ance. (Vol. II at 192) (Also see Vol. I, 104)

A83

When asked what kind of changes she had in mind

during these discussions with Shannon, Craft testified,

“change my appearance.” (Vol. II at 187)

While the parties significantly differ on what was said

during their preemployment discussions, even Ridge Shan-

non’s testimony utterly destroys this Court’s “finding”

since “appearance”, was part of his discussions with Craft

and the consultants. (Vol. VI at 83, 110).

Representatives of KMBC repeatedly assured Craft

“They liked everything about me. They didn’t want to

change me...and they kept saying what they wanted was

a journalist:”

We love her just the way she is. What we are looking

for is the fresh California beach look. . .. [W]e have

a male co-anchor, and we want to balance him with

a strong, independent woman. And what we like is

Christine’s freshness and her naturalness.... We love

the way she looks. (Vol. III at pp. 11-12) When Craft

told Shannon that makeup and hair were not one of

her first priorities, “They said they liked what they

saw.” (Vol. I at 173) Management repeatedly said,

What they wanted was a good journalist. (Vol. I, Part

2, at 173)

Craft further testified on cross-examination that cloth-

ing as well as makeup was a part of her discussion with

Shannon and Replogle. (Vol. II at 134-135) Credited evi-

dence on general appearance could not be clearer or more

opposite to the opinion:

Q: [W]hat changes did you have in mind when you

had these discussions with Mr. Shannon?

A: Change my appearance (Vol. II, 87) ** * ‘everal

times I told them and they concurred, what you

A84

see is what you get. If you want to change me,

change my appearance, don’t hire me. (Vol. II, 88)

Even Replogle used the term appearance, agreeing

management told Craft they did not intend to make her

over, redo her or change her fundamental appearance.

(Vol. III at 210); he admitted Creft had said she was

not interested in a job which involv « “making me into

something I am not.” (Vol. III at 166, 228) Other wit-

nesses discussing the requirements imposed by KMEC re-

ferred continually to KMBC general appearance require-

ments which, as the jury was free to infer, from common

sense and the context of all evidence, included not only

makeup and hairstyles but clothing as well. The jury sim-

ply was never confronted with—or else weighed and re-

jected—the type of fine distinction this Court seeks to

impose. (See for example, Vol. IV at 74, 91, 214, 228; Vol.

VI at 166, 215.)

The CBS experience and its effect on Craft as ex-

plained and discussed with management of KMBC was con-

siderably broader than mere hair color and eyebrow

makeup, and was related to Craft’s general conceins about

appearance. Bob Hamilton repeatedly reminded man-

atement:

You know what CBS did to Christine. They tried to

make her into something she was not. They tried to

change her and she doesn’t want to come to work for

you if that is what you are going to try to do her

now.

(Vol. III at 45) In fact in Bob Hamilton’s conversation

with Ridge Shannon, the lopping off of Craft’s hair and

making her into a blonde at CBS was not mentioned. The

term makeover and change her into something that she

is not were the terms that Hamilton used in his conver-

Diasec:

A853

sation with Ridge Shannon. (Vol. III at 45) Kent Replogle

admitted telling Craft “You don’t want a makeover and 3

agree with that.” (Vol. III at 208-209) Further, Shannon

and Replogle were told Craft “wants to be a journalist,

not a beauty queen.” (Vol. III at 45-46)

Crucially, management never told Craft of its always-

extant belief that appearance was the number one criterion

for a television newsperson (Vol. III at 174-175), and that

Shannon always believed “having an attractive anchor was

part of the requirement for effective delivery of the news

on Channel 9.” (Vol. V at 119, 120)

Court of Appeals Fact Finding

“There is, however, no evidence that the station at the

time it made the challenged representation knew it

would exercise such an intrusive degree of control or

knew that such control would be in its eyes necessary.”

(Slip Opinion at 28) (Apparent Source: Appellant's

Brief at 36-37)

“There is no evidence that the station had any knowl-

edge where along this spectrum Craft might fall or

what facilities she might demonstrate in adjusting her

wardrobe to the Kansas City climate and market.”

(Slip Opinion at 28) (Apparent Source: Shannon,

Vol. VI at 107)

Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal

Present intent to change Craft could not have been

more strongly shown—by direct and circumstantial evi-

dence.* The Media Associate consultants reviewing the

4. As Instruction No. 14 aptly provides, “[i]ntent can be

inferred from circumstantial evidence because a defendant’s in-

tent not to perform will seldom be capable of proof by direct

evidence.” Missouri law is in full accord. Allison v. Mildred,

307 S.W.2d 447, 453 (Mo. 1957); see Martin v. Brune, 631 S.W.2d

77, 80 (Mo. App. 1982); yet Craft proved intent by direct evidence.

A86

audition tapes for the purposes of reporting to KMBC’s

management had.negative comments concerning Craft’s

dress and hair and concluded her “overall look” and “ap-

pearance” would not work, because her “look” was not

sophisticated enough or as conservative as Kansas City

required. _(Vol.-IV_ at 212-214) Lynn Wilford and Ridge

Shannon had several conversations before Craft began

work concerning Craft’s “problems on camera” and the

“work” that Lynn Wilford was to do with Craft concerning

these problems. Ridge Shannon agreed with most of Wil-

ford’s assessments of Craft’s “problems.” When Shannon

sent Craft to Dallas to first meet Lynn Wilford in December

of 1980 before Craft reported to work, he “[s]pecifically

told Lynn, I do not want you to talk to Christine about

appearance. .. .” (Vol. VI, 111) He told Wilford that

Craft had been hurt badly by the CBS situation, and that

he did not want Wilford to work on her appearance but

that “he wanted to work on that himself in Kansas City.”

(Vol. IV at 218) Thus, the allowable inference for the jury

was Shannon knew at that moment that management and

the consultants intended forcing changes in Craft’s ap-

pearance once she reported for work. Because he knew

from Craft’s statements regarding CBS that what the

consultants and he contemplated would be precisely what

Craft did not want, Shannon wanted to hide his deceit.

Given Shannon’s undisputed admission that changes

in Craft’s appearance were intended, the intrusive degree

of control which the jury found Shannon would and did ex-

ercise over Craft’s appearance was amply supported by

the station’s past practice and history of working with

individuals’ appearance. (Vol. IV at 72, II at 220) The

Court’s own opinion recognizes that where management

thought on air performers had appearance problems, man-

agement exercised contro] that a jury could find “in-

A87

trusive.” (Slip Op. at 13-14, 26) Such evidence, together

with management’s belief that appearance was the “num-

ber one criterion” for a newsperson, inexorably led the

jury to the inference that similarly “intrusive” measures

were in store for Craft; but no inference is necessary be-

cause intent was established by direct evidence.

The evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn

therefrom demonstrated that station management recog-

nized problems with Craft’s appearance before hiring her,

that station management intended to work on these prob-

lems and that in the past it had exercised what the jury

could infer was. “intrusive” control over on air personnel

when appearance issues arose. There was more than suffi-

cient evidence on defendant’s intent. In fact, under the

rule in Pinken v. Frank, 704 F.2d 1019 at 1026 (8th Cir.

1983), what the panel admits is enough to establish “in-

tent”.®

Court of Appeals Fact Finding

“Even if Craft does have an arguable position that

the representation that no ‘makeover or substantial

changes’ had application to clothing, a reasonable jury

could not have found a make over until KMBC’s

efforts reached their most extreme extent in the late’

days of Craft’s employment.” (Slip Opinion at 28)

“In fact the record is basically uncontradicted as to

the gradual increase in the intensity of measures taken

by KMBC in regard to Craft’s appearance.” (Slip

Opinion at 28)

5. In Pinken v. Frank this Court held:

Although the existence of fraudulent intent is never pre-

sumed, it may be inferred where a party knowingly mis-

states a material fact, knowing that the party to whom it is

made will rely on it. (Emphasis added).

No doubt plaintiff had that and more.

A88

“Craft at first was given only the most general advice

through books, fashion magazines and a memorandum

suggesting makeup techniques.” (Slip Opinion at 28)

“Even taking the evidence as establishing that KMBC’s

actions differed from those promised, the record does

no more than suggest that the station, because of

difficulties it experienced with Craft changed its mind,

as to steps that would be necessary as to her appear-

ance.”

Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited on Appeal

The credited evidence flatly contradicts an asserted

“gradual increase in intensity” of appearance measures.

Craft testified appearance criticisms began “immediately”

and were “continuous” and “relentless” “from day one”

until she was removed. (Vol. I, Pt. 2, 130-137, 171-72, 193)

No more is required; but there is much more. Signif-

icantly, Shannon admitted that he began criticizing Craft's

appearance “from day one” of her employment (Vol. YI

at 215) and that he began working on her clothing and

appearance from day one. (Vol. VI at 230)

Wilford was requested by Shannon to make an “emer-

gency visit to Kansas City on January 14,” within nine

days of Craft’s debut, “to work with Pam [Whiting] and

Christine on their appearance.” (Vol. IV at 220-221) On

“day one” Shannon told Craft one eye was too small,

her jaw was too square and her clothes did not look right.

(Vol. I, Pt. 2, at 128-130) Immediately thereafter, Lynn

Wilford performed the specific, intrusive “ill-fated” make-

up application she was forced to wear on air (Vol. I,

Pt. 2, 142-146), and gave Craft a detailed, specific “makeup

analysis” by Gigi Coker, a woman Craft never met. (Vol.

A89

I, Pt. 2, 151-52)® In January Ridge Shannon did not

“suggest” but tuld Craft “to follow these instructions.”

(Vol. II, p. 8-9; P’s Ex. 65). If Craft had known of suck

requirements, “I never would have gone to work for

KMBC Metromedia.” (Vol. II, 12) In January of 1981,

Lynn Wilford took her to Macy’s for the purpose of ob-

taining clothes. (Vol. II at p. 15) In February of 1981,

she was sent to Macy’s for clothes and began trying these

clothes on in front of the camera. (Vol. II at 15-16) )

Not only did “intrusive” working-hour sessions begin in

February with Maureen Shawver at Macy’s but it con-

tinued thereafter. By March of 1981 when Ridge Shannon

directed her to go to Macy’s to obtain particular clothes,

ie., a bowed polyester blouse in place of the cream silk

blouse with pearls she was wearing, she had already been

taken to Macy’s on previous occasions by Lynn Wilford.

(Vol. I, Pt. 2, at 174).

When station management started “from day one”

working on Craft’s appearance, no research had been

done concerning her appearance, and, as shown above,

credited evidence bindingly establishes appearance was

the focus “continuously,” from beginning to end. (Vol. II,

16-17) No more is required for the jury. Although de-

fendant argued at the second trial it merely had “changed

its mind” about appearance activities due to negative focus

group research in June, Judge Stevens recognized, “change

in mind is a fact issue” (Vol. II, 30) which defendant

6. P’s Ex. 104 (which includes Ex. 65), attached hereto

for convenience, starkly exposes the utter falseness of the opin-

ion’s characterization of these intrusive mandates as “the most

general advice” or “suggestions.” The jury was free to de-

termine the opposite. (See also P’s Ex. 138, 151, 152, 155, 163,

315, 358)

A90

urged but the jury flatly rejected." Prior to the imple-

mentation of the fashion calendar in July of 1981, Craft

testified that in June of 1981 when she and Ridge dis-

cussed her appearance as a result of the focus group tapes,

she at that time had been wearing clothes selected for

her either by Lynn Wilford or Maureen Shawver for sev-

eral months, going back to January and February of 1981.

(Vol. II at 24) “Intrusive” is a normative term—for the

jury, not this Court.

Court of Appeals Fact Finding

“It is well to consider further what ‘makeover’ or

‘substantial changes’ means.” (Slip Op. at 26)

“The record reveals no action by KMBC in regard to

Craft’s hair or makeup that could be seen as consti-

tuting a ‘make over’. . . . Furthermore, Craft was

7". Although not precisely relevant to the issues in this

appeal, the district court and possibly the panel in light of its

result was puzzled as to the defendant’s motive. Why would the

defendant bring Craft half-way across the country to defraud

her? The answer is simple.

Shannon admitted on cross-examination that they had

screened approximately 200 people about the co-anchor job

prior to Craft (Volume VI at 165-166) and at the time they

were talking with Craft they were running up against their

deadline set for the selection of a co-anchor. (Volume VI at

166-167) (1) She fit budget; (2) was not under contract; and

(3) was a good journalist. (Vol. VI, 73-74) She was the

last of the three finalists to audition. (Vol. VI, 76) Wilford ad-

mitted that the group opinion was that Craft was the strongest

of the last three candidates being screened when Craft was

selected. (Volume IV at 215) But, as Shannon damningly testi-

fied, she was “overly reluctant to leave California to come to

Kansas City,” so Shannon “tried to be as persuasive as possible.”

(Vol. VI, 187) As argued to the jury, the station could not af-

ford to hire the people they wanted for co-anchor. Of the re-

maining individuals Craft had the best potential to be remade

over into something the defendant wanted but could not afford.

When Craft failed to meet the station’s “dress, makeup and

general appearance” expectations, and “resisted attempts to im-

prove her... .”, she was removed as anchor. (Vol. III at 215)

A9l

allowed to apply her own makeup except for the one

ill-fated occasion, and we do not believe mere sugges-

tions constitute a ‘make over.’ ” (Slip Opinion at 27,

footnote 17)

Actual Evidence Which Must Be Credited On Appeal

As earlier discussion cements, reasonable minds might

differ on what “make over” means or what constituted a

make over. Such was for the jury to decide—not this

Court.* Appearance changes were not “mere suggestions”

but requirements for Craft’s job. (Vol. II, 126; Vol. IV,

236; Vol. V, 110-120).®

Il. THE OPINION IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED

LAW REGARDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

FOR FRAUD AND THE REQUIRED REVIEW

OF JURY ISSUES

The panel’s opinion is fundamentally flawed not only

by its failure to acknowledge plaintiff's evidence and the

reasonable inferences the jury could and did draw there-

from, but also by its misuse of authority concerning re-

quired scope of review. Part I establishes the opinion

merely recites but does not follow the applicable rule that

it can only find in favor of Metromedia if “all the evi-

8. The opinion footnotes, “Shannon and Replogle were con-

vinced . . . actions they took . . . did not constitute a makeover.”

Id. n.16. This is only the most obvious proof that appellate re-

view was improper. Dace, supra; Bayne v. Jenkins, supra. In-

deed, if management’s opinions were the legal standard, there

would be no need for courts and juries.

9. Craft begs the indulgence of the Court concerning the

additional length of this petition. However, because of the depth

of the panel’s misreading of the record, anything but a point-

by-point response would be inadequate. Because at least six

members of the Court are unfamiliar with the lengthy record

in this case, a detailed statement is needed to properly present

the issues to the full Court.

A92

dence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable

inferences sustaining the position” of Craft. (See Slip Op.

at 23 citing Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1148 (8th

Cir. 1984)). The panel opinion is further defective be-

cause it ignores the amplification of this standard con-

tained in the very case cited by the panel opinion. Crues

held this court “must... assume as true all facts support-

ing [Craft] which the evidence tended to prove... .” Id.

at 1148. See also Easley v. Empire Incorporated, 757 F.2d

923, 928 (8th Cir. 1985), and cases cited therein, wherein

Judge Gibson declares:

We can interfere with the conclusion of a jury only

where there is a ‘complete absence of probative facts’

to support the verdict.

This rule is necessarily inconsistent with the opinion’s

conclusion that “the intent to work on Craft’s appearance

[was] demonstrated abundantly by her evidence” but that

this somehow was not sufficient to make a submissible

case on whether the defendant had an intention to impose

a make over or substantial change.’®

10. An example of the Court’s fundamentally misguided

opinion is its reliance on Dillard v. Earnhart, 457 S.W.2d 666 (Mo.

1970). (See Slip Op. at 29.) The differences between the Dillard

and the Craft cases are stark. The Dillard court involved a re-

view of a trial finding of no fraud, rather than a 12-member jury

decision that the defendant had acted fraudulently. Thus, the

fraud argument was entitled to no favorable inferences. The

Dillard opinion observes that “all the evidence” supports the

result. Even this panel does not make so bold a statement about

the case at bar. The Dillard case concerned a clear, significant

change of circumstances that led to Clyde, Sr.’s refusal to release

the deed. Here, without any change of circumstances whatso-

ever, the defendant began to implement the makeover and, at

the same time, took concrete steps to conceal this intention from

Craft. The panel’s attempt to legitimize its violation of the jury-

judge separation by a citation to Dillard is nonsense. The Dil-

lard case provides no support for the court’s ill-advised avoidance

of the Seventh Amendment limitation.

re

A93

In light of the scope of review this Court must follow,

it is inconceivable that any “reasonable panel” could con-

clude that it was not for the jury to determine whether

the intent to work on Craft’s appearance, which the panel

opinion repeatedly admits is “demonstrated abundantly”

by the evidence, does not create a jury question on whether

the defendant’s state of mind was to cause a “makeover”

or “substantial changes” in Craft’s appearance. Whatever

the panel or Shannon and Replogle may “believe” as to

what amounts to a makeover or substantial change is

totally irrelevant and should not be in this Court’s opinion.

Craft obviously believed makeover and substantial changes

occurred, and that is what counts, since, as always, the

question is what the jury believed and could reasonably

find based on the evidence.”

If the evidence supported the conclusion that the de-

fendant intended to work on Craft’s appearance, the evi-

dence necessarily “tended to prove” defendant intended

to do a makeover or substantial changes, depending on

which party’s argument the jury believed—here obviously

Craft’s. Intent is locked in by Pinken v. Frank, 704 F.2d

at 1026. The Court cites Toenjes v. L. J. McNeary Con-

struction Co., 406 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo. App. 1966), but

stubbornly, inexplicably, does the

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Appendix — Craft v. Metromedia, Inc. · 475 U.S. 1058 | Frix