Opposition Brief — Ciampitti v. United States

Supreme Court brief1986

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

No. 85-1002 JAN 30 see

JOSEPH F., SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

|

In the Supreme Court of the Rnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ET AL., PETITIONERS

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORA Ri TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

F. HENRY Hasicut II

Assistant Attorney General

Davipb C. SHILTON

ELLEN J. DURKEE

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washingion, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq., federal jurisdiction to regulate discharges into

“adjacent wetlands” is limited to areas below the mean high

water mark.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ee l

aE Sal a a a I

SS rrr I

Ses bids e664 celewcn bss desiveer ese 5

SS 8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles,

bac deen head ewe be dees 7

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., 729 F.2d 391, rev’d, No. 84-701

ea aa ere 7-8

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985) ........... 2, 5-6

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. 1251

et seq. :

OS a eee 2

oS | 3

SE CED eb oe dees sk w decease nawees 3

eR |

Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401

et seq. :

IV

Page

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

33 C.F.R.:

OU AE cae k cane eae gekskucs couhareueves 2

Pt. 323:

Br ee rere ee 2

a rarer rear 2

a er er rer 2,5

I BERD vss <u edna cou cSnanaeesses 2

ge PPE ee errr eer eer er ete reer eT 2

Sk 8) errr errr err re err ere 5

ee Sf | re 2

OCI SEP EMUMMAMO) 5a sic ccccrnwanscecs 2

BS NN Oh 6a 005 0 6k44e deed aneees 2

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 85-1002

ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ET AL., PETITIONERS

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 58a-59a) is

unreported. The district court’s opinion granting a prelimi-

nary injunction (Pet. App. la-35a) is reported at 583 F.

Supp. 483. The district court’s opinion granting a perman-

ent injunction (Pet. App. 36a-57a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

August 7, 1985. The petition fo; a writ of certiorari was filed

on November 5, 1985. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act

(CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344, the United States Army Corps of

Engineers administers a permit program for the discharge

(1)

2

of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United

States.” See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview

Homes, Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985). Without a Corps

permit, such discharges are prohibited (33 U.S.C. 131 1(a)).

Under the Corps’ regulations, “waters of the United

States”—and hence the scope of the Corps’ CWA regula-

tory jurisdiction—are defined to include, inter alia,

“wetlands” that are “adjacent” to water bodies that are

“subject to the ebb and flow of the tide” (33 C.F.R.

323.2(a)-(d)).!

Pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33

U.S.C. 403, the Corps also administers a permit program

for the building of structures and for excavating and filling

in “navigable waters.” See 33 C.F.R. Pt. 322. The scope of

the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction under the Rivers and

Harbors Act is more limited than under the Clean Water

Act. See 33 C.F.R. 323.2(b) and Pt. 329. In waters subject to

tidal action, federal regulatory jurisdiction under the Rivers

and Harbors Act is asserted over areas below the “mean

(average) high water” line (33 C.F.R. 329.12(a)(2)(b)).’

2. a. Petitioners own or sought to develop property

known as the Diamond Beach site located in Cape May

County, New Jersey. The Diamond Beach site is adjacent to

'The regulations define the term “wetlands” as follows (33 C.F.R.

323.2(c)):

The term “wetlands” means those areas that are inundated or

saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration

sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do

support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in

saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,

marshes, bogs and similar areas.

?Where possible, the mean high water line is determined by averaging

tidal datum over an 18.6-year period. 33 C.F.R. 329.12(a)(2). “Marsh-

lands and similar areas” are subject to Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdic-

tion, “but only so far as the area is subject to inundation by the mean

high waters.” 33 C.F.R. 329.12(b).

3

Jarvis Sound, a large tidal body of water that is connected

to the Atlantic Ocean. In late 1979 or 1980, petitioners

commenced filling portions of the Diamond Beach site with

sand (Pet. App. 10a). In 1983, petitioners had a 50-foot pipe

and a tide gate placed on a corner of the site in order “to

allow storm water to run off the site [and] to prevent tidal

water from coming onto the site” (id. at Sa (emphasis in

original)). Although the petitioner primarily responsible for

these development activities, Robert Ciampitti, had been

advised by his consultants by at least 1980 that areas on the

site were probably “wetlands” subject to federal jurisdic-

tion, petitioners did not apply te the Corps for a permit, nor

did they contact the Corps to inquire about federal

requirements (id. at 4a-Sa).

When the Corps discovered petitioners’ activities in 1983,

a Corps official informed Ciampitti that the site contained

wetlands subject to federal permitting jurisdiction and

directed Ciampitti to halt filling activities in specified areas

(Pet. App. 6a). Petitioners refused to comply with a cease

and desist order subsequently issued by the Corps (id. at

7a-9a), and the United States initiated this action in the

district court seeking to enjoin petitioners’ unauthorized

filling of wetlands and to require restoration of illegally-

filled areas. The government also sought civil penalties

against Robert Ciampitti. The statutory authorities relied

upon by the government were the Clean Water Act, the

Rivers and Harbors Act, and the Refuse Act (Pet. App.

3a).3

’The Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. 407, is a subsection of the Rivers and

Harbors Act that prohibits, inter alia, the depositing of refuse in

“navigable waters,” as that term is defined under the Rivers and Har-

bors Act. The Clean Water Act permit program effectively superseded

this provision of the Refuse Act, because a properly-issued Clean Water

Act permit is deemed to constitute compliance with the Refuse Act (33

U.S.C. 1342(a)(5) and (k)).

4

Following evidentiary hearings, the district court entered

a preliminary injunction and then a permanent injunction

prohibiting further filling activity on approximately 26

acres of the property (Pet. App. 34a-35a, 39a, 54a). The

district court also ordered some of the petitioners to apply

for a Corps permit to engage in fill activities (id. at 55a). In

the event that those petitioners failed to apply for a permit

or a permit were denied, those petitioners were required to

remove the illegally-placed fill and to prepare and imple-

ment a plan for restoration of the wetlands (id. at 5Sa-57a).*

b. The district court found that the area subject to the

injunction against filling was an “adjacent wetland” under

the Corps’ regulations implementing the CWA. Prior to

filling, the area was predominantly vegetated with plants

adapted for life in frequently flooded or saturated soil (Pet.

App. Ila). The soil in this 26-acre area was “saturated

throughout, in most cases directly to the surface” (ibid.).

The district court found (id. at 22a, 44a-45a) that both tidal

waters flowing on the surface and groundwaters saturated

the soil. Even with the illegally-deposited fill material, much

of the area was covered with surface water, and, “without

fill, tidal waters would normally flow onto the site” from

two directions (id. at 12a, 22a).

At trial, the government also attempted to prove that 1.45

acres—all within the area designated as “wetlands” by the

court—were below the mean high water line and, therefore,

subject to the prohibitions of the Rivers and Harbors Act.

Although there was no dispute that some of this 1.45-acre

area was below the mean high water line, the district court

‘The district court held in abeyance the question of civil penalties

against petitioner Robert Ciampitti (Pet. App. 53a, 57a). The court

indicated that Ciampitti’s efforts to prepare and implement a restora-

tion plan would be considered in the court's later determination of the

size or necessity for civil penalties (id. at 33a).

5

found the evidence too inconclusive to establish the precise

boundaries of the area below the mean high water line ( Pet.

App. 39a-41a, 47a). Accordingly, the district court did not

base any of the relief it ordered on violations of the Rivers

and Harbors Act or the Refuse Act (Pet. App. 47a). Instead,

the court premised the relief entirely on its conclusion that

the area in question was a wetland subject to Clean Water

Act jurisdiction.

On appeal by petitioners, the court of appeals affirmed

without an opinion for the reasons set forth in the district

court’s opinion (Pet. App. 58a-S9a).

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does

not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other

court of appeals. Accordingly, further review is not

warranted.

1. a. At bottom, petitioners contend that because the

district court found that somewhat less than 1.45 acres of

the property is below the mean high water line, the courts

below necessarily erred in holding that approximately 26

acres were “wetlands” subject to Clean Water Act jurisdic-

tion. This contention confuses the jurisdictional reach of

the Rivers and Harbors Act —which extends only up to the

mean high water line (33 C.F.R. 329.12)—with that of the

Clean Water Act (see page 2 & note |, supra). Because the

district court did not base the relief ordered on either the

Rivers and Harbors Act or the Refuse Act, the location of

the mean high water line is simply irrelevant to the disposi-

tion of this case.

This Court’s decision in United Siates v. Riverside Bay-

view Homes. Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985), unequivocally

repudiates the notion that Clean Water Act jurisdiction

over “adjacent wetlands” is bounded by the mean high

water line. The Court in Riverside approved the Corps’

eee

6

assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over “adjacent wet-

lands” and held that flooding from an adjacent water body

is not required by the Corps’ regulation defining “wet-

lands.” Slip op. 7-8, 12-13. Rather, “saturation by either

surface or ground water is sufficient to bring an area within

the category of wetlands, provided that the saturation is

sufficient to and does support wetland vegetation.” Slip op.

8. In other words, there is no requirement that a “wetland”

be located below the mean high water line nor that it be

regularly inundated by tidal flow.

Here, the district court found, as a matter of fact, “the

presence of both saturated soil and aquatic vegetation” in

the area in question and further found that “the soil satura-

tion ‘causes’ the growth of the vegetation” (Pet. App. 44a).

The district court’s findings plainly bring the property

within the category of “wetlands” as defined by the Corps’

regulation (33 C.F.R. 323.2(c)). Petitioners cannot plausi-

bly dispute that the property is adjacent to a tidal water-

body. These findings establish that petitioners’ property

falls within the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction under Section

404 of the Clean Water Act. See Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., slip op. 9.

b. Petitioners erroneously argue (Pet. 4-6, 11-12) that

there is a factual inconsistency between the district court’s

findings that somewhat less than 1.45 acres lie below the

mean high water line (Pet. App. 39a-41a) and that “{dJuring

normal high tide conditions, surface water covers a major-

ity of the site” (id. at 12a). Petitioners apparently fail to

recognize that the mean high water line is an average mark.

Thus, by definition, tides will often rise higher than the

mean. In addition, petitioners never acknowledge that the

district court found that the wetlands are saturated by tidal

surface waters and ground water (id. at 22a). Stated differ-

ently, the district court was clearly correct in observing (id.

at 45a (emphasis in original)) that “the fact that we cannot

7

quite conclude that much of the land is below mean high

water does not indicate, as [petitioners] argue, that it is not

saturated by surface or ground water.” Accordingly, the

district court’s factual findings as to tidal flow on the prop-

erty present no question warranting this Court’s review.

c. The case on which petitioners principally rely, Borax

Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), is

totally irrelevant to the delineation of Clean Water Act

jurisdiction. That case, which predates the relevant pro-

visions of the Clean Water Act by 37 years, involved a

boundary dispute between an upland and a tideland owner.

One contested issue was how the line of “ordinary high

water”—the boundary under the governing federal law—

was to be determined in view of the fact that the range of

tides varies according to the lunar phase (296 U.S. at 23).°

The rule of law governing such boundary disputes has

nothing to do with Clean Water Act jurisdiction, nor is it

even remotely relevant to the factual issue in this case—

whether the disputed area is saturated with water.®

2. Petitioners’ other contention (Pet. 12-16) is that the

decision below conflicts with the court of appeals’ decision

in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729

‘Specifically, the upland owner argued that the boundary should be

established as the mean of high neap tides, which occur when the moon

is in its first and third quarters and which do not, on average, rise as high

as when the moon is in other phases. The Court instead adopted the rule

that a mean of all tides, not just neap tides, determined the boundary.

Borax, 296 U.S. at 26.

Petitioners’ argument (Pet. 12) that Borax requires, as a matter of

law, that the district court’s reference to “normal high tide conditions”

in its factual findings be treated as synonymous with the legal term,

“mean high water,” as used in Borax, is incorrect. The district court

clearly did not intend the reference to “normal high tide conditions” as a

legal benchmark, but instead merely meant that it is not unusual for

high tides to cover a substantial part of the property.

8

F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985).

That contention, which we believe was without merit in any

event (see Pet. App. 42a-45a), no longer warrants con-

sideration in light of this Court’s reversal of the Sixth

Circuit’s decision.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

F. Henry Hasicut Il

Assistant Attorney General

Davip C. SHILTON

ELLEN J. DURKEE

Attorneys

JANUARY 1986

DO}J-1986-01

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.