Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ciampitti v. United States
Supreme Court brief1986
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In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V
ROBERT CIAMPITT!, ALBRECHT AND HEUN
CORPORATION, BRUCE CIAMPITTI AND PACIFIC
FOUR CORPORATION, PETITIONER
eee eee eee ee
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
| PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
ALFRED A. PORRO, JR.
10 Stuyvesant Avenue
P.O. Box 357
Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071
(201) 438-1923
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the term “normal” high tide line is
synonymous with the term “mean” high water line as
was previously held in Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 US 10 (1935).
2. Whether the subject property was _ properly
classified as “wetlands” under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, more commonly known as the
Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1251, et seq., subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, where it is not regularly flowed by tide, and
not inundated.
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
United States of America, Plaintiff
Diamond Beach Development Corporation-Defendant/
Petitioner
Robert Ciampitti - Defendant/Petitioner
Albrecht and HEUN Corp. - Defendant
Specific Four Corporation - Defendant/Petitioner
Bruce Ciampitti - Defendant/Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENIS
Questions Presented for Review.................... i
List of Parties to the Proceedings................. ii
Nee en os ck vhs enwewes iv
ea ca wea v ash wacacndcceseseeae V
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and
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i. ann kaa canes cackee, l
ees ceca ccacncacececsccca 2
Reasons for Granting Certiorari
1. The New Jersey District Courts holding with
respect to land being above the mean high
water line and simultaneously below ordinary
high tide are in direct conflict with the principles
established by the United States Supreme Courtin
Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S.
ee oh ake 46S 3550 ka 8A 888 6 4
A. Lands were held to be above the mean
high water line.and simultaneously below
the ordinary high tide line by the Trial
ee a 5k eka cate ges 4
Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles .6
C. The decision of the Trial Court conflicts
with the Mandate of the United States
Supreme Court in Borax Consolidated,
LEG. V. LOS ANGEIES ... 0... cccseccneess 8
D. Impact of Federal Water Pollution
Control Act on Tria! Court Decision that
the property constituted wetlands. ..... 9
wo
2. The Federal Court of Appeals for the 3rd
Circuit has rendered a decision in conflict
with the 6th Circuit in U.S. v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.
1984) cert. granted, Docket No. 84-701,
argued on October 16, 1985.............. 12
A. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, is
analogous to U.S. v. Ciampitti........... 12
B. The 3rd Circuit holding is in conflict with
the Gth Circuit Court. .....cscccccesecces 13
IND asc ewanddocccdadeadenssseesekeuuebeees 17
Appendix
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
1. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League Inv. v. Marsh, 715
FE GN Mile WUD nena nn.0cesseccceeccesecacs 10
2. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 US ——
10, 80 L.ed 9, 56 S.Ct. 23 (1935)... 0... 4,6,7,12
3. City of Los Angeles v. Borax, 5th Cir. F.Supp. 281
eh WG aa be hkabe bce hencebecaawekbiereeinsssss 6
4. Diamond Beach Joint Venture Association v.
Township of Lower, Superior Court of N.J.,
Atlantic County, Law Division Docket No.
LOE SUE v5 n.nn6nnnhcececnsantacsunesenenen
5. Hardin v. Jordon, 140 US 381,35 L.ed 433, 11 S.Ct.
+ Meee cucecas cauendsdahhuas seekeeubesecters cas 7
6. Shilney v. Bowlby, 152 US 1, 38 L.ed 331, 14 S.Ct.
KAT e Tre reT Tere Tre re eT TTT TTT TTT TTT 7
7. Weismann v. US Army Corps of Engineers, 526
eo ok § ft A Re rere 10
8. U.S. v. Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1981)
cert. granted, Docket No. 84-701, argued Oct. 16,
rrr roe ere 4,10,13.14.15
U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D. N.J. 1984)... 3
Statutes and Regulations:
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USC 1251
GR BOE. cc ccccccccccccccccccccssccccecde dese Mela
2. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33
es Ge ON On dv i ccicncscunebéscauasest es
me ff ff, 9,10,12,13$14
— 2: & | werpeperrrrerr yar 9
Miscellaneous:
1. Funk & Wagnalls, New Comprehensive
International Dictionary of the English Language,
Encyclopedia Edition, JG. Ferguson Publishing Co.
2. Schureman, Tide & Current Glossary, 23, Special
publication No. 228, United States Coast &
Geodetic Survey (1949) ....... 2... cece eee e eee ees h
3. Shalowitz, Shore & Sea Boundaries, US Dept. of
Commerce, Coast & Geodetic Survey, US Court
Printing Office (1962) ............ eee ee eee eee 6
JURISDICTION
Judgment of the Court of Appeal: was entered on
August 7, 1985. The jurisdiction of this courtis invoked
by way of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari under 28 USC
1254(1), the same having been timely filed pursuant to
28 USC 2101(c).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND —
REGULATIONS INVOLVED
1. Federal.Water Pollution Cuntro! Act, 33 USC 1251,
et seq.
2. United States Army Corps Regulations, 33 CFR
323.2 (1983)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
NO.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V
ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT AND
HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE CIAMP!”7i AND
PACIFIC FOUR CORPORATION, PE? TIONER
PETITION FOR A WRIT OR CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Alfred A. Porro, Jr., on behalf of Petitioners, Robert C.
Ciampitti, et als., Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to review
the judgement of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in this case entered on August 7, 1985.
STATEMENT
This matter involved a substantially developed tract of
land approximately 25 acres located in the Township of
Lower, Cape May County in the State of New Jersey. A 1907
riparian grant was issued to defendants predecessors in
title vesting all title and interest of the State in the Grantee,
thereby conferring the right to dredge, fill and develop the
subject property. (Exhibit p. 82 & 87). Subdivision of the site
dates back to 1920 (Vol. IV p. 1193) and was recently upheld
by the Superior Court of New Jersey.’
Located on the site is arailroad embankment which
historically separates this tract from a bay area. An
artificially constructed breach in the embankment
" Diamond Beach Joint Venture Association v. Township
of Lower, et als., Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Docket No. L-46263-78, rendered by the
Honorable Robert H. Steadie in March of 1980.
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which came into existence between 1962 and 1969
connects various manmade mosquito ditches placed
on the site to alleviate poor upland storm drainage.
(Vol. Il. 533.535).
Elevation of the site ranges from 3.75 to 6 or 7 feet above
the mean high water line, in some instances to 8 or 9 feet. As
a whole the site is 1 to 1 1/2 feet above the mean high water
line. (Exh. p. 467).
Pursuant to the 1907 Grant from the State of New Jersey
the 1929 subdivision and recent Municipal, County and State
of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
permits, a substantial portion of the property is under
development with existing roadways, sewers and utilities
having been installed.
A major portion of the subject property is alleged to be
“wetlands”. Jurisdiction of the Corps is asserted under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, more commonly known
as the Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1251 et seq. Both parties
agree that only a smali percentage (1.45 acres) of the site
falis beiow the mean high water line.
OPINIONS BELOW
Appellant property owners seek review of a permanent
injunction entered by the New Jersey District Court,
subsequently affirmed by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals,
enjoining the filling and future development of the subject
premises and ordering the restoration of the site via
removal of all roads, sewers and improvements, in an effort
to convert this development into wetlands.
This matter was opened to the Court on October 24, 1982
on and Order to Show Cause and a Temporary Restraining
Order by plaintiff seeking to enjoin defendants from further
development of the 1980 subdivision. (Vol. | p. 4 & 7). A
Verified Complaint seeking permanent injunctive relief was
subsequently filed and a request for restoration of the site
and
conversion into wetiand in accordance with the Clean Water
Act, 33 USC 1251 et seq. and the Rive.s and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 USC 403 and 407. Said
complaint was later amended to allow for additional
defendants.
After several days of depositions, the trial court issued an
opinion on April 2, 1984, entering an Order for Preliminary
Injunction thereby preventing further development of the
property. United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D. NJ
1984). (Vol | p. 63-78). It was heid that the site in question
constituted wetlands and that the defendants had
discharged fill material without obtaining a permit in
violation of the Clean Water Act.
Additional testimony was taken at a hearing on the
issuance of apermanent injunction. A final Order was issued
on November 28, 1984 permanently restraining defendants
from developing the site and ordering restoration through
the removal of sewers, roadways and improvements and
ordering the conversion of the tract into “wetlands”. The
Court determined that the site (except for 1.45 acres) was
above mean high water. It then decided the tract was below
normal high tide. Provisions with respect to restoration
were Stayed pending submission of a permit application to
the Army Corps of Engineers. United States v. Ciampitti,
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Docket No. 83-
4004.
Appeal was taken to the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. A
decision affirming the Tria! Court’s determination was
entered on August 7, 1985. United States v. Diamond Beach
Development Corp. and Robert Ciampitti, et als., Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division Docket No. 85-5004
argued August 6, 1985.
Review by the United States Supreme Court on a Writ of
Certiorari is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (1) (a) in
that a conflict between the holding of the lower court
A.
and applicable decisions which were previously
entered by the United States Supreme Court. Review is
additionally sought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (1) (a) in
that the Court of Appeals holding relative to an
application of jurisdictional standards to which the
Corps is subject under the Clean Water Act isin conflict
with the application of the requisites in United States v.
Bayview Homes, 729 F. 2d 391 (6th Cir. 1981) cert.
granted, Docket No. 84-701, argued Oct. 16, 1985.
REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI
1. THE NEW JERSEY DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING
WITH RESPECT TO LANDS BEING ABOVE THE MEAN
HIGH WATER LINE.AND SIMULTANEOUSLY BELOW
ORDINARY HIGH TIDE ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH
THE PRINCIPALS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT IN BORAX CONSOLIDATED,
LTD. v. LOS ANGELES, 296 US 10, 80 L.ed. 9, 56 S.Ct. 23
(1935).
Lands were held to be above the mean high water line
and simultaneously below the ordinary high tide line by
the Trial Court.
It is undisputed that the Trial Court found the
premises in question to be above the mean high tide
with the exception of 1.45 acres. Judge Gerry in his
November 28 Opinion found only a smal! portion of the
tract to be below the mean high water line.
“Of the 26.72 acres of land within the Diamond
Beach site .... the
government claims that 1.45, ali within the area
designated as wetlands, are below the mean high
water line.
November 28 1984 Opinion p.3.
In ruling that the government failed to carry its
burden of proof regarding areas asserted by them to be
tidal flowed and below the mean high water line the
Court Stated:
“Somewhat less than 1.45 acres therefore,
is below the mean high water line. . .”
emphasis supplied.
Conversely, in granting plaintiff's application for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief the Trial Court in its April
2, 1984 Opinion designated parts of the site as below
normal high tide and thus “wetlands” within the
context of the Corps regulations promulgated to
enforce the Clean Water Act (hereinafter CWA). In so
holding the Court stated:
“During normal high tide conditions surface
water covers a majority of the site...over
fifty percent of the site was covered during
an inspection on November 4, 1984...”.
emphasis supplied.
District Court Opinion, April 2, 1984 p.9.
These findings were relied upon by the Trial Court in
reaching its Opinion of November 28, 1984 wherein
permanent injunctive action was taken. November 28,
1984 Opinion, p.7. Discussing the jurisdiction of the
Corps under the CWA the Court emphasized the fact
that although not determinative, the issue of whether
lands were located below the normal mean high line
were relevant considerations in a finding that a parcel
constitutes. ‘wetlands’. Once again, the Court therein
made reference to its earlier holding that a majority of
ee
the 26.72 acres in question was allegedly below the
demarcation of the normal or ordinary high tide.
Based upon the same evidence and within the
confines of the November 28 Opinion, the District Court
has held that a “majority” of the 26.72 acre tract lies
below the “normal” or ordinary high tide while
simultaneously, in contradiction thereof, making the
determination that less than 1.45 acres were below the
mean high water line.
B. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles
Since the landmark ruling in Borax Consolidated,
Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 US 10 80 L.ed. 9, 56 S.Ct. 23,
(1935), there can be no question that the term “ordinary
high water mark” is synonymous with “mean high
water mark”. Sha/owitz, Shore & Sea Boundaries, US
Dept. of Commerce Coast & Geodetic Survey, US Shore
& Sea Boundaries, Gov't. Printing Office, Volume 1,
§6413. Although the United States Coast and Geodetic
Survey, the government branch which compiled the
Tidal Datum Surveys has not standardized the term for
technical engineering purposes, when used in relation
to tides, the phrase is said to be the equivalent of the
term “mean”. Schureman Tide & Current Glossary, 23,
Special Publication No. 228, USC & GS (1949).
Borax involved a suit to quiet title to land claimed to
be tideland. The City of Los Angeles asserted title under
a prior State Legislative Grant. Borax claims title in fee
Simple was vested in it by virtue of a prior federal
patent. Initially the action was dismissed, the District
Court holding that a federal grant could not be attacked
collaterally. The City of Los Angeles v. Borax, F.Supp.
281 (D. 1934). On appeal the Circuit Court held the
challenge to be proper. The issue as to location of the
ordinary high water mark was said to be one for
judicial determination and the matter was remanded
for retrial within the perimeters of the meaning of
ordinary high water mark as defined by the Court. 74
F.2d 901 (Cir. 1935). Appeal was made to the United
States Supreme Court.
At issue in the Supreme Court review was whether
the ordinary high “water mark” which marked the
boundary between the land conveyed to Borax’s
predecessors in title and the tidelands to which the
State had power to convey was to be the “mean high
tide line’’as define* by the lower court or “neap tide’
line. 296 US at 23.
Prior to Borax it had been established that tidelands
belonging to the State extended to the high water mark.
Hardin v. Jordon, 140 US 381, 35 L.ed 433, 11 S.Ct. 808,
838; Shilney v. Bowlby, 152 US 1, 38 L.ed 331, 14 S.Ct.
548. What was yet unresolved was exactly where the
line of demarcation of the mean high water mark would
lie. Given the constant ebb and flow of the sea along the
shore line the Borax Courts acknowledged that the
boundary would lie between the ordinary “high and low
water mark’. 296 US at 22. The exact line of the
demarcation was to represent a “mean of all high
tides’: 296 US at 26.
74 F.2d 906 Mean high tide line was defined as the
average high tide over the course of 18.6 years.
’ Neap tides are those which occur when the moon is in
its first and third quarters thereby causing the tide to
rise not as high or as low as on the average.
* In adopting the ‘mean’ approach the court rejected use
of the “spring tide” line, that being the range of tide at
the time of the new moon and full moon at which point
the water rises higher and falls lower than usual. Also
rejected was the “neap tide’ standard. Such occurs
when the moon is in the first and third quarter whereby
the tide fails to rise at high or fall as low as on the
average. 296 US at 23 citing Tidal Datum Plane USC &
GS, Special Publication No. 135 p.3.).
“Mean high water’ was hitherto defined by the
USCGS, now NOAA, as the “average height of all high
waters at (a given) place over a considerable period of
time”. Given the variations in tidal water levels over the
course of 18.6 years, the Supreme Court was in accord
with the Court of Appeals and chose to adopt such a
span of time as the requisite period over which tides
were to be observed in order to establish the “mean” or
“ordinary” high water line. 296 US at 27.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Borax utilizing the
terms “ordinary high water mark” and “mean high
water mark” interchangeably established the scientific
standard to be employed in determining its line of
demarcation. For decades “ordinary” and “mean” high
tide have been declared to be the same.
C. The Decision of the Trial Court conflicts with the
mandates of the United States Supreme Court in Borax
Consolidated, Ltd v. Los Angeles.
Of crucial importance to the court in this Petition
for Certiorari is the lower courts conflict with Borax. In
particular, the trial court through its use of the terms
“normal” and “mean” as its relates to the flow of tides
has failed to follow the well established doctrine of the
United States Supreme Court. In its decision the trial
court found that less than 1.45 acres of the 26.72 of land
were below the mean high water line. Directly opposed
to this is the determination that the normal high tide
flows over the majority of the property.
Use of the term “ordinary” in Borax is synonymous
to the Tria! Courts utilization of “normal” in its opinion
as they both relate to the designation of tidal marks.
Funk & Wagnalls International Dictionary, New
Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English
Language, Encyclopedia Edition, JG Ferguson
Publishing Co. (1980), defines “ordinary” as:
“of common or everyday occurence. . .
usual. .. regular... normal...”
In that only 1.45 acres are tide flowed, the balance of
the property is non-tidai and the decision of the Trial
Court must be reversed. Reveral of the Trial Court's
holdings relative to its finding of wetlands would result
in the determination that the lands in question were not
federally protected wetlands and thus not subject to
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under the
CWA.
D. Impact of Federal Water Pollution Control Act on Trial
Court Decision that the property constituted wetlands.
The Federal Water Pollution Control! Act, more
commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33
USC 1251 et seq. was designed to eliminate the
discharge of pollutants into the nations waters, 33 USC
1231 (a) (1). While any discharge of defined pollutants,
including dredged spoil, rock and sand, 33 USC 1362 (b)
is presumptively unlawful, 33 USC §1311, jurisdiction is
vested in the United States Army Corps of Engineers
pursuant to §404, 33 USC 1344 having authority to
oversee Subject areas and to grant permission of the
disposal of the dredged or fill material through the
medium of permits. Under the terms of the Act the
Corps was to promulgate regulations to serve as a
basis for evaluating the advisability of a permit which
is to be issued only in such circumstances as will not
have an adverse impact on work quality. 33 USC
1344(b) 40 CFR §230 (1983).
The CWA defines the “navigable waters” over which
it has jurisdiction as “the wates of the United States
including territorial seas”. Section 502(7), 33 USC §1362
(7). Although “wetlands” is no where mentioned or
defined in the Act itself, the Corps when promulgating
regulations determine that ‘‘wetlands’ are
encompassed by the term ‘waters of the United States”
9.
and thus are within the intended scope of the Act.
Wetlands are specifically defined in 33 CFR 323.2(c)
(1983) as:
“Those areas the are inundated and
Saturated by surface or ground water ina
frequency or duration sufficient to support,
and that under normal circumstances do
Support a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs, and similar areas’.
To qualify, a wetland must be “adjacent” or
“bordering contiguous or neighboring’to navigable
waters and their tributaries. 33 CFR 323.2(d).
Jurisdiction of the Corps and applicability of the
CWA provisions over the subject property are therefore
dependent upon the finding that the site constitutes
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or its
tributaries. Three facts have generally been
considered by the Corps in determinations of wetland
designations within 33 CFR 323.2(c): (1) soil conditions;
(2) vegetation and (3) the degree and frequency of
inundation. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 1983); Weismann v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.
1976); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391
(6th Cir. 1984) cert. granted, Docket No. 84-701 argued
on October 16, 1985.
Although the focus of this Petition is upon the third
prong of the test respecting inundation, brief mention
is made of evidence of soil conditions and vegetation
upon the site so that the court may have an overview of
the proofs presented below.
Attempts by the United States to demonstrate that
the hydrology of the area typified wetlands was not
10.
presented by a duly qualified expert in hydrology and
hence should have been deemed inadmissible in
accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 702. Further, no salinity
tests were conducted by the Corps despite its assertion
that the site was subject to tidal flow from Jarvis
Sound, a saltwater body adjacent to the Atlantic
Ocean. Tests performed by experts on behalf of
Ciampitti unquestionably demonstrate the absence of
Saltwater on the site. (Vol. ll, p. 535, 587).
Relative to vegetation present on the site, it was
demonstrated at the trial that while some forms of
plant life which survive in wetland areas were located
on the tract, such vegetation is also typically found on
upland areas and hence the presence of any such
plants is not indicative. (Vol. ll, p. 546-571). No evidence
was presented from which it could be concluded that
the viability of the vegetation in question was
dependent upon tidal flow.
At issue in this Petition are the lower courts’ findings
relative to inundation and saturation of the Ciampitti
site, the third prong of the Corps wetlands test. If the
Trial Court and Court of Appeals’ determinations are
found to be in conflict with the Borax case, supra, and
accordingly overruled, the determination that the site
is inundated and saturated with water sufficient to
allow a “wetlands” designation cannot stand. Such
tract not constituting federally protected wetlands
would not be the intended subject of the CWA nor would
the Corps have a right to regulate the development of
the site.
In that the Corps has failed to assert jurisdiction
premised on the presence of ground water on the
Ciampitti site, alleged tidal flow is the only basis upon
which jurisdiction can rest.
11. A
Absent frequent inundation and saturation by tidal
waters resulting in the ability to support wetlands
vegetation it cannot be concluded that a “wetlands”
within the CWA exists. Absent such a wetland, no
jurisdiction exists over the site under the provisions of
the Act.
While tidal flow of property is not in and of itself a
prerequisite to Corps jurisdiction under the CWA, it is
relevant in determining whether the lands in question
are “inundated and saturated by surface or ground
water’. To such an extent as will support vegetation
adapted for life in such saturated soil conditions,
thereby constituting wetlands as defined in 33 CFR
323.2(C).
With respect to the question of tide flow as was
previously set forth herein in detail, the trial court inits
decision on a preliminary injunction issue concluded
that a majority of the site was covered by water during
“norma!” high tide conditions. Conversely, in its final
determination, the trial court held that a mere 1.45 of
the 26.72 acres of land were above the mean high tide
line.
In comparing the definitions of ordinary or “normal”
high tide with “mean” high tide the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the phrases are
synonymous. Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles,
Supra. Use of the respective terms in a manner in
which two different results are reached (i.e. 1.45 acres
are tide flowed as compared to 50 percent or
approximately 13 acres) is in conflict with the Borax
mandates and thus must be overruled.
2. THE FEDERAL OF APPEALS FOR THE 3RD CIRCUIT HAS
RENDERED A DECISION WHICH IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE
6TH CIRCUIT IN U.S. v.R/VERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, 729,
F.2d 391 (6TH CIR. 1984) CERT. GRANTED, DOCKET NO. 84-
701, ARGUED ON OCTOBER 16, 1985.
12.
A. US. v. Riverside Bayview Homes is Analogous to
U.S. v. Ciampitti.
The 6th Circuit in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984) cert. granted, Docket
No. 84-701 agrued on October 16, 1985, clarified the
regulatory definition of “wetlands”. 33 CFR 323.2(c)
(1983) defining the prerequisites necessary to support
a determination of jurisdiction by the Corps resting
upon a finding that a particular site constituted
federally protected wetlands subject to the CWA.
Riverside, which was recently heard by this Court on
October 16, 1985 is directly analogous to the case at
bar. Both cases involved situations wherein the
government sought a permanent injunction against the
filling of a site without Army Corps of Engineers
permits having been granted for the same. Both the
Riverside property and the Ciampitti property are
located in suburban areas and have been previously
plotted as subdivisions, ironically both in the early
1900's. Like the Ciampitti property, the Riverside
property was originally surrounded by dikes which
prevented any tide flow or water flow onto the property
whatsoever. The dike involved on the Riverside.
property was eventually destroyed allowing some
drainage onto the property. Likewise, in the case at
hand, a substantial railroad embankment surrounds
the property cutting off all major tidal flow,
13.
which embankment is solid except for a breach which
allows storm water run off to leave the site and escape
onto surrounding properties.
After a series of appeals, it was determined that 33
CFR 323.2(c) (1983) was the applicable definition
pursuant to which it must be determined whether the
property in fact constitutes wetlands. This is the
precise definition which governs the case at bar. After
analyzing the definition of “wetlands” contained
within 33 CFR 323.2(c) the Court of Appeals for the 6th
Circuit held that before a finding that a piece of
property constitutes wetlands may be made, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that both the property is
inundated by tidal flow and that aquatic vegetation
exists on the site. Both must be present and the
existence of the aquatic vegetation has to have been
caused by the inundation in question.
After extensively examining the history behind this
regulation, the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit
concluded:
“Neither inundation nor aquatic vegetation
would be sufficient, standing alone, to bring
a piece of land within the definition. Both
must be present, and the latter must be
Caused by the former.
Were this not so, then areas which
inexplicably support some species of
aquatic vegetation, but which are not
normally inundated, would fall within the
wetiands definition. Such a preverse result
could not have been what the court
contemplated in promulgating the
regulation. Indeed as noted earlier, the
Corps expressly adverted to the situation of
“area that are not aquatic but experience an
abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation”
and emphasize that such lands were not
intended to be covered by the regulations.
(at p. 396)”.
14.
ee
Applying this standard in the Riverside case, the 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government had
failed to meet its burden of proof insofar as it was
unable to demonstrate that the vegetation found on the
property, although it could consist of wetlands
vegetation, had been caused by the inundatioii of the
property or in fact thet the property was inundated or
flooded at a frequency and duration sufficient to
Support wetlands vegetation under normal
circumstances.
B. The 3rd Circuit Holding is in Conflict with the 6th
Circuit Court.
Relying on the Riverside case, petitioners at the time
of trial in this matter have contended that in fact
absolutely no proof had been offered by the
government to show that the premises in question had
been inundated or flooded at a frequency or duration
sufficient to support or that it does support wetlands
vegetation under normal circumstances.
The trial court in issuing a permanent injunction
found that a mere 1.45 of the 26.72 acres in question
were flowed by the ordinary or normal high tide and
hence could be classified as inundated. Although the
trial court attempted to comply with the Bayview
Standard, it did so incorrectly, its decision being in
direct conflict with the 6th Circuit. In reaching its
determination the trial court merely concluded that the
presence of vegetation considered together with the
presence of some saturated soil conditions and the
presence of some water on the site was sufficient to
meet the Riverview test.
Riverside requires that the vegetation present on the
site be demonstrated to have been precipitated by the
waters which inundate and saturate soil. 729 F.2d at
15.
396. It follows that areas which support aquatic
vegetation although not inundated are not within the
purview of federally protected wetlands.
At trial no evidence was presented to support the
findings that on-site vegetation was caused by tidal
waters which inundated the lands. On the contrary,
Ciampitti’s experts testified to the fact that the plant
life in question could exist on non-wetland sites.
Relative to the question of inundation and saturation
evidence in the record does not support a finding of
inundation sufficient to meet the Riverside test. The
Corps visited the site shortly after extremely heavy
rain storms, not during the average dry conditions.
Flooding caused by storm water in and of itself is not
sufficient to base a determination of inundation under
the Riverside standard. Furthermore, with respect to
tidal waters, the trial court held that 1.45 acres of the
entire 26.72 acre tract was flowed by normal tide
waters. Designation of an entire tract as wetland
subject to CWA and Corps permit requirements based
on such a nominal area is contrary to Riverside’s
mandate that federally protected wetlands be
“inundated and saturated”
Thus, the determinations of the 3rd and 6th Circuits
with regard to the requirements sufficient to designate
a parcel as “wetlands” are in conflict
16.
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CONCLUSION
In that the Trial Court and Circuit Court decisions are
in conflict with those previously entered by the United
States Supreme Court and are further in conflict with
those of other Circuits, it is respectfully requested that
this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ALFRED A. PORRO, JR.
Attorney for Petitioners,
Robert Ciampitti, et als.
DATED: November 4, 1985
iM.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V
ROBERT CIAMPITT|, ALBRECHT Civil Action No. 83-4004
AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE
N. CIAMPITT! and PACIFIC FOUR OPINION
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Samuel P. Moulthrop, Esquire
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Ms. Jodi Lee Alper
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorneys of Plaintiff
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Aifred A. Porro, Jr., Esquired
10 Stuyvesant Avenue
Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071
Attorney for Defendants, Robert Ciampitti,
Bruce N. Ciampitti. and Pacific Four
Corporation
James A. Waldron, Esquire
Rubin and Waldron
2700 Pacific Avenue
P.0. Box 65
Wildwood, New Jersey 08260
Attorneys for Defendant, Albrecht
and Heun Corporation
GERRY, District Judge
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This matter is before the court on the Government's
request for a preliminary injunction. It wants to prevent the
defendants from engaging in fill activities at the Diamond
Beach site in Cape May County, New Jersey, which the
Government contends contains federally regulated
wetlands.
The Government is proceeding under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (hereinafter
“Clean Water Act’) and the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (hereinafter
“Refuse Act’).
A hearing was held on November 9, 15 and 17, 1983. The
court had previously issued a temporary restraining order
on October 24, 1983 barring defendants from any further fill
activities on the site until the matter could be heard.
The following constitutes this court's findings and fact
and conclusion of law.
|. FINDINGS OF FACT
hk. The Defendants and Their Relationship to the Diamond Beach
ite
Robert Ciampitti is an individual residing within the
District of New Jersey. (Robert Ciampitti Deposition
(hereinafter R.C. Dep.), p.4; Tr. 3, p.24.) He and Pacific Four
Corporation (hereinafter “Pacific Four’), a corporation
Organized and existing under the laws of Pennsylvania and
doing business within the District of New Jersey, are the
developers of the site. (R.C. Dep., pp. 11-13.)
Bruce Nicholas Ciampitti, Robert's brother and the largest
single owner of parcels of land at the site, gave Robert a
power of agency for ail land at the site in the name of Bruce
Nicholas. (R.C. Dep., pp. 59, 110; Tr. 3, pp. 60-61, 82.) (Bruce
Ciampitti holds title to the land under the name Bruce
Nicholas. R.C. Dep., p. 30.)
3a
In addition, Robert Ciampitti was designated agent and
representative for Pacific Four and all indiv,cua! lot owners
at the site to secure all necessary approvals to install
improvements at the site. (R.C. Dep., pp. 12, 71, 74; Tr. 3, pp.
45, 80, 81.) Those individuals are paying Robert Ciampitti for
his efforts on their behalf, (R.C. Dep., p. 76); and in some
instances, Ciampitti has directed and paid for filling
activities at the site himself, hoping later “to strike a deal”
with the actual property owners. (R.C. Dep., p. 91; William
Albrecht Deposition (hereinafter W.A. Dep.) pp. 19, 24.)
In light of Robert Ciampitti’s activities at the site, the
parties stipulated on the record that he is the principal
defendant -- the one responsible for having conducted the
activites at the site. (Tr. 1, p. 29.) For that reason, in the
remainder of this opinion, the court shall refer only to the
“defendants,” when discussing activities at the site.
Albrecht and Heun Corporation is tne construction
company responsible for placing and grading fill on the site
under the direction of Robert Ciampitti. (R.C. Dep., pp. 144,
151; W.A. Dep., pp. 19, 24.) Robert Ciampitti also contracted
with Gerald E. Speitel Associates, a consulting engineering
firm (hereinafter “Speitel”), to work for him. (Tr. 3, p. 137.)
B. Activities at the Site
As early as 1980, Robert Ciampitti was made aware of
federal wetlands regulations by his consultants, Speitel. he
was aware that in certain areas along navigable
waterways, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter
“the Corns"), had jurisdiccion over those areas through their
regulations. (R.C. Dep., pp. 60-62: Tr. 1, pp. 103, 105; Tr. 3, pp.
100, 113-137, 160-161.)
Specifically, he was told by Speitel that there was
possible state and federal jurisdiction over wetlands on the
site. The Corps, which was summoned to the site by Gary
Franklin, A Speitel employee, told Speitel that a federal
permit to fill that area was unlikely. Despite those warnings,
Ciampitti directed Speitel to ¢-velop engineering pians for
the site ard told Speitel that he would possibly be filling
wetland areas. (Tr. 1, pp. 103-105; Tr. 3, pp. 100, 113, 137, 147-
149, 160-161.)
4a
Robert Ciampitti did nothing between 1980 and 1983 to
contact the Corps about its jurisdiction over the site. He
assumed that if the Corps had jurisdiction, it would so
advise him. (R.C. Dep., pp. 72-73; Tr. 3, pp. 100-101.)
Furthermore, he did not apply to the Corps for a wetlands
permit, because in March 1983, he became aware of a 1907
land grant held by the previous owners of the site which
provides:
The bearers of the title of the property within this grant
have the right to dredge, fill, reappropriate lands under
water, construct wharfs, marinas, inlets, buildings, or
anything that they deem appropriate to their private
and exclusive use.
(R.C. Dep., pp. 102-103; Tr. 3, pp. 76, 153; Defendant's Trial
Exhibit 14.)
In the summer of 1983, after learning of this grant,
defendant decided to develop portions of the site which he
was aware were designated as New Jersey wetlands and
possible federal wetlands, believing that the grant gave him
authority to do so. (R.C. Dep., p. 128; Tr. 3, pp. 97, 153.) In
particular, he had a fifty foot pipe and a tide gate placed on
the northwest corner of the site in order to keep debris from
coming in and going out; to al!ow storm water to run off the
site; and to prevent tidal water from coming onto the site.
(R.C. Dep., pp. 115-118; Tr. 3, p. 102.)
These activities were noted by Robert E. Eckhardt from
the Corps’ Philadelphia District, Regulatory Branch for the
Surveillance and Inspection Section, who inspected the site
on September 2, 1983. (R.C. Dep., p. 138; Robert Eckhardt
Affidavit (hereinafter R.E. Aff.) p. 7; Tr. 1, p. 35.)
He observed the following:
a. Approximately 3,000 feet of roadway had
been constructed in areas he believed to be
wetlands contiguous to Jarvis Sound on the
site.
b. The roads were constructed of sand
hauled to the site.
c. The fill consisted of sand.
5a
d. A tide gate had been constructed in atidal
creek and stopped tidal flow into large
portions of the area designated as wetlands
at the site.
e. The tide gate is a type that causes
wetlands to be drained of water.
f. The ‘wetiands” impounded by the tide gate
showed signs of deterioration; e.g.,
vegetation was becoming dry.
g. Storm sewers and outlets had been
installed in certain portions of the roads.
h. There were no soil erosion control
measures at the site.
(R.E. Aff., p. 9; Tr. 1, pp. 40-45, 49.)
The fill material and tidal gate were placed in federally
designated wetlands as depicted on Government Trial
Exhibit RR-1. (R.E. Aff.. p. 10: John Olson Affidavit
(hereinafter J.0. Aff.), p. 6-7: Tr. 1, pp. 38-49.)
Eckhardt told Ciampitti that the site contained tidai
wetlands and directed Ciampitti to cease further fill
activities in those areas. (R.C. Dep., p. 139: R.E. Aff., p. 14; Tr.
1, pp. 50-51.) Ciampitti told Eckhardt that he wouid stop the
fill activity, (R.E. Aff.. p. 15), but he did not stop because he
did not believe he had been properly notified by an
appropriate officiai of the Corps. (R.C. Dep., p. 144.)
On September 15, 1983, Eckhardt returned to the site and
Observed approximately three dump trucks and two
bulldozers hauling and spreading fill material into the
designated wetlands. (R.E. Aff. p. 18: Tr. 1, pp. 56-57.)
Eckhardt advised the bulldozer operator to stop filling in
wetlands. The operator, Mr. Albrecht, made a telephone call
and said he would stop woik. (R.E. Aff., p. 19; Tr. 1, pp. 57-
58.)
6a
On September 15, 1983, the District Engineer of the Corps
issued a “cease and desist’ letter directing Robert Ciampitti
to stop fill activities in the wetlands and remove the tide
gate. (R.E. Aff., p. 21; Tr. 1, p. 107.) On September 16, 1983,
this “cease and desist” letter was delivered by Robert
Eckhardt and John Olson of the Corps to the office of James
Webb, Jr., Esquire, the attorney for Robert Ciampitti. On that
date, John Olson advised Webb of the location of wetlands
on the site and explained to him the scope and nature of the
violations there. (R.E. Aff., p. 22; Tr. 1, pp. 60, 64, 111: Tr. 3, p.
104.) Robert Ciampitti became aware that the cease and
desist letter had been issued against him for filling federal
wetlands, and that the letter had been served upon James
Webb, his attorney. (R.C. Dep., p. 146; Tr. 3, p. 104.)
Nonetheless, he did not cease filling activities at the site. (Tr.
1, p. 72; Tr. 3, p. 1031.) He directed Albrecht and Heun to
continue filling at the site. He did not contact the Corps and
disregarded the cease and desistletter. (R.C. Dep., pp. 147-
151; Tr. 3, pp. 103-106.)
On September 16, 1983, John M. Olson, Supervisory
Biologist serving as the Acting Chief of the Application
Section of the Philadelphia District of the Corps, inspected
the site and observed that approximately five acres of
earthen fill had been placed on wetlands and in tidal creeks
at the site, anc that a pipe with a tide gate had been installed
in one tidal creek. (J.0. Aff., p. 6.) Olson determined during
his September 16, 1983 inspection that wetlands were
located on the site and based that conclusion on:
a. The presence of tidal creeks flowing into
the site;
7a
b. The presence of existing vegetation
adapted for growth in saturated or inundated
Soils, including saltmarsh cordgrass
(Spartina alterniflora), saltmeadow
cordgrass (S. patens), salt grass (Distichlis
spicata), black grass (Juncus gerardii),
marsh elder (/va frutescens), sea lavender
(Limonium carolinianum) and salt wort
(Salicornia sp.):
c. Saturated soil conditions: and
d. The presence of standing water over
portions of the site.
(J.0. Aff., p. 7.)
He returned to the site on September 20, 1983 and
observed bulldozers working on upland areas adjacent to
the wetlands. He told the bulldozer operator which areas
were wetlands and could not be filled, and which areas were
uplands. (J.0. Aff., p. 14.)
On September 27, 1983, Robert Eckhardt received a phone
call from James Webb, attorney for Roberty Ciampitti, who
advised Eckhardt that no one from the Corps would be
permitted on the site from that date onward. Webb also
Stated that the Corps could not stake out the wetlands on the
site the following day, as had been previously agreed to by
John Olson and James Webb, Esquire. (R.E. Aff., p 24: Tr. 1, p.
120; R.C. Dep., p. 158.)
On October 13, 1983, Robert Eckhardt returned to the site
and observed that, since his last visit to the site, additional
fill material had been placed in the wetlands as depicted on
Government Trial Exhibit RR-3. He also observed a bulldozer
Spreading fill on one of the roadways which had previously
been constructed in the wetlands. (J.0. Aff., p. 25: Tr. 1, p.
70.) See GRR-3.
8a
—
On October 20, 1983, Robert Eckhardt returned to the site
and observed that, since his last visit to the site, fill material
had been placed in additiona! areas of the wetlands as
depicted on Government Trial Exhibit RR-4. he also observed
a tractor-trailer dump truck discharging fill in the wetlands.
(R.E. Aff., p. 28; Tr. 1, p. 72.) See GRR-4.
C. The Site and Its Development
The portion of the Diamond Beach site involved in this
controversy is described in Lower Township tax records
simply enough as Blocks 696, 701, 706, 716, 721, 726 and 731.
(Complaint p. 19; R.E. Aff., p. 12; J.0. Aff., p. 16; R.C. Dep., pp.
12, 71, 74; Tr. 3, p. 23.) It is a tract of land located along New
Jersey Avenue, which is known as Park Boulevard in Lower
Township (Tr. 2, p. 105), between West Jefferson Avenue ana
Madison Avenue. (Tr. 1, p. 39.) It is bounded on the West by
East Railroad Avenue and Jarvis Sound.
A railroad embankment is located on the site parallel to
East Railroad Avenue. (Tr. 1, pp. 45-56.) It was built in
approximately 1924. (Tr. 3, pp. 113-114.) in a 1957 photo of
the site, (D-1), remnants of a road running next to the
railroad right-of-way can be seen. (Tr. 3, np. 123, 67.)
Sometime prior to 1955, the southern portion of the site
was used as a dumping ground. (Tr. 3, pp. 39-40.) As of 1957,
mosquito ditches appeared on the property. (Tr. 3, p. 125.)
Sometime between 1957 and 1962, a driving range was
constructed on the site which was no longer in use as of
1969. The vegetation has grown back. (Tr. 3, pp. 126-127.)
Furthermore, the railroad was no longer used as of 1962.
(Tr. 3.) Sometime between 1962 and 1969, a breach appeared
in the railroad embankment. It has not been firmly
established whether the breach was created as a result of a
major storm that occurred in 1962 or was manmade. (Tr. 1, p.
150; Tr. 3, pp. 117, 130.)
ee eee. eee ee ea ee Bae |
Most important, in 1975 the federal government claimed
jurisdiction over the wetlands under the Clean Water Act. In
1979 or early 1980, subsequent to the federal claim of
jurisdiction, Memphis, Rochester and Richmond Avenues,
and part of Park Boulevard were filled. All the evidence of
record indicates that at the time of this first fill activity by
tie defendant the site could be characterized as wetlands
and was subject to tidal flow. (See infra at 8-9: Tr. 2, p. 19.)
Following that, in 1982, Albrecht, at Ciampitti’s direction,
filled Ratiroad, Raleigh, Madison, South Station and Austin
Avenues. (2D, p. 20.) A water well was installed by the
Wildwood Utilities Authority between South Station and
Raleigh, east of Park. In addition, those areas depicted on
Government Exhibit RR were filled, and the tidal gate was
installed. (Tr. 3, p. 74.)
Defendant plans to develop the entire Diamond Beach site
to include approximately 1,500 single family dwellings, 6-8
multi-unit dwellings, a mote! facility and a shopping certer.
(R.C. Dep., p. 132; Tr. 3, p. 83.) To date, none of the
defendants had either applied for or obtained a permit under
the Clean Water Act, (R.E. Aff., p. 31; J.0. Aff., p. 15); the
Rivers and Harbors Act (/d.); or the Refuse Act (/d.).
D. The Presence of Wetlands on the Site
On the basis of the evidence thus far presented to the
court, it concludes that federally reguiated wetlands exist
on the Diamond Beach site as designated on Government
Trial Exhibits RR-5 and 100-102. (See Tr. 1, p. 130; Tr. 2, p.
101.)!
1. Defendant has not evaluated the site using federal
wetlands criteria so he is not in a position to directly
challenge the federal designation. Nonetheless, his
expert, Gary Franklin of Speitel, admitted that the area
designated by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection Agency is in fact a salt water
marsh. (Tr. 3, p. 186.) This area appears on the overlay
Mr. Franklin produced for the court. It appears to be
somewhat smaller than the federaliy designated
wetlands area. See 0-30.
10a
SF
Vegetation on the site which indicates a wetlands
environment includes: marsh hay, salt marsh cordgrass,
high tide bush, salt marsh fleabone, black grass and sea
myrtle. (Tr. 1, p. 131; Tr. 2, p. 110; Government Trial Exhibit
8.) These plants are commonly found in New Jersey salt
marshes, (Tr. 2, p. 109), and are adapted to an area subject to
tidal flow. (Tr. 1, pp. 146-147.) Specifically, salt marsh grass
and salt grass, two plants which survive frequent flooding,
are found immediately adjacent to the tidal ditches on the
site. Up from the tidal ditches, but still within the federally
designated wetlands area, high tide bush, groundsel tree
and sea myrtle, vegetation adapted for life in saturated soil,
can be found. (Tr. 2, p. 17.)
No significant areas within the wetlands designated area
do not include the species described above (Tr. 1, p. 131);
and the federally designated wetlands area is dominated by
these plants. (Tr. 1, p. 132; Tr. 3, pp. 162-163.) Furthermore,
these species exist beyond even the federally designated
wetlands line. (Tr. 1, p. 132.)
The salt marsh snail, a salt marsh invertebrate which
lives only in wetlands, has been found on the site. (Tr. 2, p.
114.) lsopods, which are characteristic of salt marshes have
also been found there. (Tr. 2, p. 114.) Fish were observed in
the creek on the site (Tr. 2, p. 114); snowy egrets were
observed feeding on the fish (Tr. 1, p. 123).
Great Blue Heron and the Clapper Rail (which typically
nest in salt marshes and are found only in wetlands) have
been observed on the site. (Tr. 2, p. 114.)
The soil in the federally designated wetlands at the site ts
Saturated throughout, in most cases directly to the surface.
(Tr. 1, pp. 132-133; Tr. 2, p. 112.) It is wet, very dark and
primarily sand, which indicates an anaerobic condition. (Tr.
2, p. 134.) ,
At the upper edges of the federally designated wetiands
boundary, the soils are aiso saturated and there is a high
water table. (Tr. 2, p. 113.)
Ila
|
During normal high tide conditions, surface water covers
a majority of the site: although there are areas on the site
above the high tide line which are never covered by water,
over 50% of the site was covered during an inspection on
November 4, 1983, even with the fill present. (Tr. 1, p. 145.) It
can presently be determined by examining breaches in the
fill on the site and adjacent communities of the same
elevation (Tr. 1, p. 154) that, without fill, tidal waters would
normally flow onto the site trough the entire southernmost
portion and the break inthe railroad embankment. (Tr. 1, pp.
141, 150-151, 154; Tr. 2, p. 24.)2
Finally, the Diamond Beach site was mapped as a
wetlands area by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
on its National Wetiands inventory between 1978 and 1980.
On that map, the site was designated as a mixed emergent
wetland with open water. (Tr. 2, pp. 119-121; Government
Trial Exhibit QQ.)
There is inconclusive evidence that the site contains
wetlands which are below the mean high tide line. Although
Government expert Olson and defense expert Franklin-both
testified that some small portion of the site is below the
mean high water line (Tr. 1, pp. 157-158: Tr. 3, p. 182),
Government expert Tiner, whom the court found to be most
knowledgeable in this area, refused to testify about that
Subject because he believed that the data necessary to make
such a determination was not available. (Tr. 2, pp. 132-133.)
2. There is a mojor tidal creek which flows through the
railroad embankment south of the site below the area
of fill. (Tr. 1, pp. 151-152.) Also, according to
defendants expert, there is a tidal tributary to the
southeast of the site which would allow salt water to
enter the site (Tr. 3, pp. 170-171): amarsh system to the
southeas* which is a potential water source (Tr. 3, p.
172); and an inlet to the site from the east which
connects the site to the ocean through the Cape May
Canal (Tr. 3, p. 173).
19a
E. The Importance of the Wetlands and the Damage Done Thereto
by Defendants
Tidal wetlands are used as nursing and spawning areas
for a variety of forage fish and sport and commercially
important fish species. (Tr. 2, p. 11; J.0. Aff.,, 12.)
When this site is open to tidal flow, the plant production is
washed into the adjacent tidal waters where it becomes the
primary food source for aquatic organisms. The organic
detritus of the tidal marsh serves as the base for the
estuarian web. (Tr. 2, p. 11; J.0. Aff., » 10.)
Wetlands, including this site, also act as water quality
purification areas. They improve water quality by tapping
run-off from adjacent developed areas (Tr. 2, p. 11; J.0. Aff...
9), and they act as a buffer, shielding adjacent upland areas
from storm actions. They then serve as a Storage area for
storm and flood waters. (Tr. 2, p. 11.)
Furthermore, wetlands, including this site, are important
habitats for aquatic animals, as well as mammals and birds,
including:
a. wintering, migatory and _ breeding
waterfowl and other birds:
b. passerine bird species; and
c. fur-bearing mammals.
(Tr. 2, p. 11; JO. Aff.» 17.) ~wW.
Fill on this site eliminates wetlands and reduces their
productive value. Normal tidal flow is prevented, and
therefore nursery and spawning grounds for aquatic
Organismsare not created, and the exportation of food
materials into adjacent waters cannot be realized. (Tr. 2, pp.
18, 46, 105.)
13a
The fill on the site had damaged the underlying five acres
of wetland habitat. The blockage of tidal flow is adversely
affecting the approximately 19 acres of wetlands enclosed
within the perimeter of the fill. (J.0. Aff.,» 8.) Without tidal
flow, vegetation on the site will change, and there will be an
Overall draining effect of the area. (Tr. 2, p. 147.)
Furthermore, erosion at the site is already causing fill to
wash into the surrounding marsh and adjacent tidal waters.
(Tr. 1, p. 124; Tr. 2, p. 123.)
ll. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - THE PREREQUISITES FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN MET
The traditional test for determining whether a preliminary
injunction should issue has been stated in numerous cases
from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In/n re Arthur
Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir.
1980), the court stated it as foilows:
We have repeatedly held that for the District Court to
grant a preliminary injunction the moving party must
generally show (1) areasonabie probability of eventual
success in the litigation, and (2) that the movant will be
irreparably injured pendente /ite if relief is not granted
Moreover, while the burden rests with the moving
party to make these two requisite showings, the
district court should take into account, when they are
relevant (3) the possibility of harm to other interested
persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and
(4) the public interest. Oourn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147
(3d Cir. 1975) (Citations omitted).
Delaware River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trail Tr., Inc.,
501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974): A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia
Pictures, Inc., 440 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1971): Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Ne/son v. Miller,
373 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1967).
14a
This court must now determine whether the requirements
of the test have been met in the present case.
A. Reasonable Probability of Evenutual Success in the Litigation
1. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants
into the waters of the United States except in compliance
with other sections of the Act. The provisions of 33 U.S.C. §
1344 regulate the discharge of fill material into those waters
by requiring a discharger to obtain an appropriate permit
from the Corps before commencing operations.
As the court found above, none of the defendants has
applied for a permit. It is also clear that “fill” material, as
that term is defined in the Act, is being discharged by
defendants. See 323.2(K). Therefore, the issue to which the
parties directed their energies is whether “waters of the
United States” are involved.
The term “waters of the United States” specifically
includes wetlands. The reguiations implementing 33 U.S.C. §
1344 provide in pertinent part:
The term ‘waters of the United States’ means:
* * *
(3) Tributaries to navigable waters of the United States.
including adjacent wetlands ......................
a oe *
(c) The term ‘wetlands’ means those areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater ata
frequency and duration sufficient to support. and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, begs and similar areas
3. Although section 1344 refers to “navigable waters,
that term is defined in Section 502(7) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7) as “waters of the United States.”
= 15a
33 C.F.R. § 323.2.
These regulations were specifically adopted pursuant to
court order in Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975). The court there
concluded that Congress intended the Clean Water Act to
assert “federal jurisdiction over the Nation's waters to the
maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution,” and that the term “navigable waters” was
not limited to the traditional tests of navigability. 1392 F.
Supp. at 686. See PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp.
1370, 1381 (D. D.C. 1975).
This standard of jurisdiction has been continually
repeated in recent cases. See United States v. Tilton, 705
F.2d 429, 431 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lambert, 695
F.2d 536, 537, 538 (11th Cir. 1983): United States v. Byrd, 609
F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979); Leslie Salt Company v.
Frochike, 578 F.2d 742, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Company, 504 F.2d 1317,
1324-25 (6th Cir. 1974).
The Government presented strong evidence
demonstrating that the land in question presently retains
and, at the time it was filled by defendants, retained all the
essential characteristics of ‘wetlands’ as they are
described under the Act, i.e., it was inundated and/or
Saturated by water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
Support vegetation that typically thrives in saturated soil
conditions.4 See the court's Findings of Fact.
4. Defendants challenged the criteria by which the
Government would have the court decide this issue
contending that in the absence of salinity tests a
wetlands determination cannot be made. The court
disagrees. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) (three-prong test
which includes type of soil, degree and frequency of
inundation and saturation, type of vegetation); Bayou
Des Familles Dev. v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, 541 F.
Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1982); and United States v.
Weismann, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1339 (M.D. Fia. 1980).
16a
The Government has proven through two. expert
witnesses that the site which has been designated as
federally reguiated wetlands has an abundance of “obligate
hydrophytes” (plants requiring a saturated environment to
survive), anumber of which even live beyond the designated
wetlands line. The site has been proven to contain saturated
soils with regular inundation. The soils were found to show
evidence of an anaerobic condition, suggesting frequent
water coverage. The tidal flow was graphically depicted
through ground and aerial photographs showing water-
filled tidal ditches and tidal creeks. Testimony from both the
Government and the defendants’ expert proved the
movement of tidal fiow from the west, south and east onto
the site.
Under the circumstances, the Government's likelihood of
success on the merits is strong. In fact the Government has
succeeded on the merits, subject, of course, to the court
being persuaded otherwise by RELEVANT controverting
evidence which has not already been presented but which
defendants may present at the permanent injunction
hearing.
The defendants have argued and continue to urge upon
the court the importance of the history and development of
the site to determine whether the Corps has jurisdiction over
the property. Although the court is as fascinated by the
history of the site as defendants’ expert Mr. Franklin is, it
agrees with Mr. Franklin that for purposes of the present
controversy that history is of purely scientific value and is
not dispositive of the legal issues before the court. (Tr. 3, pp.
165-166.)
17a
Defendants’ arguments on this point are not clearly
delineated. The court perceives that defendants are making
the following three arguments and will treat with them
accordingly:
1. The Government would be violating the
defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights if it
required them to remove the fill:
2. The site is not a natural wetland: i.e., it
was not always a wetland, so the defendants
should not be penalized for the fact that it has
become one; and
3. The area became subject to tidal flow
because of a manmade breach in the railroad
embankment, and, therefore, it is not
properly characterized as federal wetlands.
Defendants’ first argument, which is derivatively based
on United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.
1974), is without merit under the circumstances of this case.
So long as nothing that occurred o” or to the property,
before that time in 1975 when the Corps claimed jurisdiction
over the wetlands, destroyed the “wetland” character of the
site, there is no justification for preventing the Corps from
requiring the defendant to comply with the appropriate
regulations on the basis of some violations of the Fifth
Amendment due process or taking clause. Neither the
dump’s nor the driving range’s presence, nor any other
activity, transformed the land into irrevocably “dry land” in
1975. Therefore, this situation can be easily distinguished
from the situation in Stoeco Homes.
Stoeco involved the Rivers and Harbors Act. In 1970, the
Government's permit policy with respect to § 10 was
changed. Previously, it had not required dredge and fiil
permits for work shoreward of the established legal harbor
lines. The new policy requireu permits for such work.
18a
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1
Defendants had acquired a tract of land in 1951. The site
had been a tidal marsh in 1927 when it was filled to a level
substantially above mean high tide. Stoeco Homes, 498 at
610. At the time it was filled, the policy of the Secretary of the
Army was not to require a permit because the site lay
shoreward of the established legal harbor lines. Therefore,
at the time the filling occurred, it was legal.
The court found that the Government had given its blanket
consent to encroachments on the federal navigational
servitude shoreward of established legal harbor lines; and
that “when Stoeco purchased in 1951 what then had been
fast land for twenty-four years, the navigational servitude
had long since been surrendered.” Accordingly, defendants
were not required to remove the 1927 fill. Such forced
removal would have raised Fifth Amendment due process
and taking clauses issues.
The court noted in concluding its opinion:
(T)he holding is limited, of course, to tidal marshlands
which had become fast land prior to the change in
policy of the Army Corps of Engineers. Any work
undertaken in estuarine areas which were subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide when the Army Corps of
Engineers published its new regulations asserting the
navigational servitude to its full extent, are, under the
terms of these regualtions, now subject to the § 10
permit requirement.
33 C.F.R. § 209.150(b). /d. at 611. The court's reasoning
applies equally well to the regulations under the Clean
Water Act as applied to the site. The Diamond Beach site was
not fast in 1975 when the Corps published its new
regulations in July of that year asserting the navigational
servitude to encompass adjacent wetlands: there is
nothing in the record which indicates that the sources of
ground water and tidal flow which saturate the site were not
available in 1975, nor that the site was fast land at that time.
(See aerial photographs of the site, the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection designation, onthe
National Wetlands Inventory Map, Tr. 2, P. 19.) Therefore,
when the defendants began the fill operations in 1983, they
were subject to the permit requirements of § 1344.
5. § 323.3 Discharges requiring permits.
(a) General. Department of the Army permits will be
required for the discharge of dredged or fill material
into waters of the United States. Certain discharges
specified in §§ 323.4-1, 323.4-2 and 323.4-3- are
permitted by this regulation. If a discharge of dredged
or fill material is not permitted by this regulation, an
individual or general Section 404 permit will be
required for the discharge of dredged or fill material
into waters of the United States in accordance with the
following phased schedule:
(1) Before July 25, 1975, discharges into navigable
waters of the United States.
(2) After July 25, 1975, discharges into navigable
waters of the United States and adjacent wetlands.
(3) After September 1, 1976, discharges into navigable
waters of the United States and their primary
tributaries, including adjacent wetlands, and into
natural lakes, greater than 5 acres in surface area. (See
also § 323.4-2 for discharges that are permitted by this
regulation.)
(4) After July 1, 1977. discharges into ail waters ofthe
United States. (See a/so § 323.4-2 for discharges that
are permitted by this regulation.)
i. a
a
vi lil
An offshoot of defendants’ first “development and
history” argument is the argument that because of the
railroad embankment to the west of the site, which served
as a barrier for some period of time, the site was not always
naturally flowed by the tide. From this they would
presumably have the court conclude that the site does not
fall within the Corps’ jurisdiction.
r:- F—-F
§ 323.4-1 Discharges prior to effective dates of phasing.
(a) Discharges of dredged or fill material in waters of
the United States that occur before the phase-in dates
specified in § 323.3(a) (2) through (4) of this part are
hereby permitted for purposes of Section 404, provided
the conditions in paragraph (c) of this section are met.
(b) Discharges of dredged or fill materiai of less than
500 cubic yards into waters other than navigable
waters of the United States (see 33 CFR Part 329) that
are part of an activity that was commenced before July
25, 2975, that were completed by January 25, 1975, and
that involve a single and complete project and not a
number of projects associated with a complete
development plan are hereby permitted for purposes of
Section 404, provided the conditions in paragraph (c) cf
this section are met. The term “commenced” as used
herein shall be satisfied if there has been, before July
25, 1975, some discharge of dredged or fill material as a
part of the above activity or an entering into of a
written contractual obligation to have the dredged or
fill material discharged at a designated disposal site by
a contractor.
(c) For the purposes of Section 404, the following
conditions must have been satisfied for the discharges
occurring before the dates specified in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section:
(1) That the discharge was not located in the
proximity of a public water intake;
(2) That the discharge did not contain unacceptable
levels of pathogenic organisms in areas used for
recreation involving physical contact with the water:
(3) That the discharge did not destroy or endanger the
critical habitat or a threatened or endangered species,
as identified under the Endangered Species Act.
Both § 323.2 and § 323.4-1 have since been modified to
exciude the phase-in provisions. See 47 FR 31810,
7/22/82
Qian
First of all, as the court has just conciuded, the history of
the site is not relevant unless it indicates that the land was
fast at the time the Corps claimed jurisdiction. As long as it
was wet when the Corps extended its jurisdiction and when
the fill activity began, the history of the site is irrelevant. See
United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 881, 883 (D. Md.
1981) (only pertinent question is whether land was wetlands
when filling activity took place.)
Secondly, the existence of an artificial barrier, in this case
a railroad embankment, which may prevent tidal flow to a
site is not determinative of the limits of Corps’ jurisdiction.
Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States
by manmade dikes or barriers, natural river burns, beach
dunes and the like are specifically defined as adjacent
wetlands, 33 CFR § 323.2(d), therefore making them “waters
of the United States” for regulatory purposes. 33 CFR §
323.2(a) (7). See United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 431
(11th Cir. 1983) (even without direct or indirect surface
connection between wetlands in questicn and adjacent
river, area came under wetlands definition).
So even without the ingress and egress of tidal waters, the
site cou!d be classified as an adjacent wetlands area subject
to Corps regulations. But here, the artificial barrier was
breached -- sometime between 1962 and 1969 -- and thus did
not serve as a barrier to tidal flow until defendants installed
the tidal gate. At least since that time, a thriving wetlands
environment has been established. Furthermore, tidal
waters flow onto the site from the southeast where no
barrier exists,6 and groundwaters saturate the soil.
6. Defendants argue that their fill activities are exempt
from Corps permit requirements under 33 CFR 323.4-2
which, when in effect, exempted certain discharges
into non-tidal streams and their impoundments,
including adjacent wetlands that are located above the
headwaters. First of all, § 323.4-2 is no longer in effect
and wasnotin effect at the time defendants initiated the
impermissable activity. More important. tida/ wafers
are involved in this matter.
rar
Finally, with regard to defendants’ third historical
argument, the fact that part of the area may have become
wetlands because of a manmade connection between the
site and tidal waterways is not dispositive of the Corps’
jurisdiction. This court finds that federal jurisdiction is
determined by whether the site is presently wetlands and
not by how it came to be wetlands.
The Act applies to wetlands without reference to the
manner by which they came to be in that condition. See 33
CFR § 323.2. Furthermore, since Congress intended to
exercise its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to the
greatest extent possible inorder to protect our environment,
the court has no reason to believe that Congress did not
intend to reach wetlands which are the habitats of fish, fowl
and vegetation alike simply because those environments
were, at Some point in time, encouraged by human conduct.
More specifically, it was noted in the Federal Register, V.
42, No. 138, p. 37128 (1977), on the occasion of a modification
of the definition of wetiands in 323.2:
The words ‘those areas that are periodically inundated’
which appeared in the 1975 definition of ‘wetland’ were
eliminated in the 1977 definiton because the legislative
intent under Section 404 (33 U.S.C. § 1344) is to regulate
discharges of dredged or fill material into the aquatic
system as it exists, and notas it may have existed over
a period of time.
(Emphasis: added.)
Although there are no cases of which the court is aware
dealing with this issue under the Clean Water Act, there are
Cases on point under the Rivers and Harbors Act. See Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) United States v.
DeFelice, 641 F.2d. 1169. 1172 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal
jurisdiction occurred by operation of law when an
artificially created canal became connected to a tidal
waterway); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d at
611 (once artificial canals are connected to a tidal water
body, they become navigable waters of the United States by
Operation of law).
AA =
While the court recognizes that a regulation under the
Rivers and Harbors Act provides that “(n)avigability may
also be found where artificial aids have been or may be used
to make the waterbody suitable for use in navigation,” 33
CFR § 329.8,’ the court does not believe that the existence of
this regulation was determinative of the courts’ decisions.
And they stand for the proposition that the Government is
not exceeding its power under the Commerce Clause by
regulating “artificially” created navigable waters.
7. § 329.8 Improved or natural conditions of the
waterbody.
Determinations are not limited to the natural or
Original condition of the waterbody. Navigability may
also be found where artificial aids have been or may be
used to make the waterbody suitable for use in
navigation.
(a) Existing improvements: artificial waterbodies. (1)
An artificial channel may often constitute a navigable
water of the United States, even though it has been
privately developed and maintained, or passes
through private property. The test is generally as
developed above, that is, whether the waterbody is
capable of use to transport interstate commerce.
Canals which two navigable waters of the United
States and which are used for commerce clearly fall
within the test, and themselves become navigable. A
Canal open to navigable where it in fact supports
interstate commerce. A canal or other artificial
waterbody that is subject to ebb and flow of the tide is
also a navigable water of the United States.
(2) The artificial waterbody may be a major portion of
a river or harbor area or merely a minor backwash.
slip, or turning areas. (See § 329.12(b) of this Part.)
(3) Private ownership of the iands underlying the
waterbody, or of the lands through which it runs, does
not preclude a finding of navigability. Ownership does
become a controlling factor if a privately constructed
and operated canal is not used to transport interstate
commerce nor used by the public: it is then not
considered to be a navigable water of the United
States. However, a private waterbody, eventhough not
itself navigable, may so affect the navigable capacity
of nearby waters as to nevertheless be subject to
certain regulatory authorities
24a
That estuarine system which has developed on the
Diamond Beach site is no less entitled to protection and is no
less valuable to our society now that it has developed than
any other wetlands site.
In addition to arguing the history and development of the
site, defendants maintain that neither the Corps nor the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection has
jurisdiction over the Diamond Beach site because of a 1907
riparian grant covering the site which allows the defendants
to do whatever they want with the property, including filling
it, regardless of superseding federal and state statutes and
regulations contrary to the grant’'s provisions.
It is not clear to the court what significance the defend-
ants attach to the 1907 grant. If he is arguing that the grant's
mere existence somehow supports his contention that the
site was never considered to be ‘wetlands,’ the court rejects
it. The fact that the State of New Jersey in 1907 did not
recognize the importance of protecting vitally important
estuarine areas and allowed for the dredging and filling of
such sites has no relationship whatsoever to whether those
areas are or are not “wetlands” under a federal act.
Furthermore, if the defendants are making the equally
groundless argument that the grant prevents the federal
government from asserting jurisdiction over the site under
the Clean Water Act, the court also rejects it.
The defendants argue in a conclusory fashion that the
1907 grant vests absolute property rights in the grantee and
his successors. If defendants mean to argue by this that the
Government may not “take” the property, their argument is
premature. As defendant Ciampitti has not applied for a
permit and, consequently, has not been refused a permit, no
taking without just compensaticn claim is presently
cognizable: there has been no determination that the
property may not be put to the uses desired. Avoyelles
Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 927 (5th Cir.
1983).8
If the defendants are arguing that the federal government
may not regu/ate navigable waters of the United States
under the Clean Water Act because of the 1907 New Jersey
grant, they are either laboring under a serious
misapprehension or disregarding very basic tenets of the
United States Constitution. When a valid act of Congress is
in conflict with state law, state action must give way to the
federal legislation. “So long as Congress acts within an area
delegated to it, the preemption of conflicting state or local
action . . . flow directly from the substantive source of the
congressional action coupled with the supremacy clause of
Article VI... .” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 376
(1978). See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979); United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir.
1981).
8. With regard to the Government's power to take the
property, see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 554,
551 (1981), rehearing denied, 452 U.S. 911, on remand,
657 F.2d 244, appeal after remand, 686 F.2d 766. “The
navigation servitude, which is a term used to describe
the paramount interest of the United States in... the
navigable waters of the nation, derives from the
Commerce Clause... .” United States v. Certain Parcels
of Lane Situated in City of Valdez, 666 F.2d 1236, 1238
(9th Cir. 1982). “Once Congress determines that an
action will improve or protect navigation, the
Government may rely on the navigation servitude to
accomplish that action. /d. at 1239 (citation omitted).
But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164
(1979). The court need not address at this time whether
the property falls within the navigational servitude for
taking clause purposes.
26a
Defendant's final assault on the Government's claim to
jurisdiction over the site is based on the Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (hereinafter the
“Management Act”). The defendant misunderstands the Act.
Specifically, they argue that the Corps’ claim under § 404
must fail because the Government has not introduced any
evidence establishing that defendant has not complied with
state law under the Coastai Zone Management Act, or that
the Corps’ requirements are no more strict than state
requirements.
The Coastal Zone Management Act requires that federal
exercises of jurisdiction over certain projects within a
state’s coastal zone must, to the fullest extent possible, be
consistent with and approved state Coastal Zone
Management program. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1). The
defendants claim in essence that the Coastal Area Facility
Review Act (hereinafter “CAFRA”), N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 et seq.,
which is an approved program under the federal
Management Act, preempts the federal government's
jurisdiction in this case. There is nothing in the Management
Act or in Cape May Green, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d
Cir. 1983), upon which defendants rely, which supports his
theory of preemption.
A regulation promulgated by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the federal agency charged
with administering the Management Act, provide:
When federal agency standards are more restrictive
than standards or requirements contained in the
state's management program, the federal agency may
continue to apply its stricter standards (e.g., restrict
project development or design alternatives
notwithstanding permissive management program
policies)....
15 CFR § 930.39(d) (1982).
27a
Furthermore, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(f) provides that nothing in
the Management Act shall in any way affect any
requirement established by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (also known as the Clean Water Act), and that
such requirements shall be incorrporated in any program
developed pursuant to the Management Act. Accordingly,
CAFRA incorporates the Clean Water Act requirements to be
stricter than those contained in CAFRA.
More important than all of this is the fact that the
Management Act does not apply to this controversy, and,
therefore, any question of consistency between the federal
and state action does not arise. As the Government so aptly
argues:
Section 307(c) of the CZMA is directed at three
different types of activites: (1) activities conducted or
supported by the Government, (2) development
projects of the Government, and (3) activities by
private parties authorized by a federal permit. 18
U.S.C. § 1456(c). “The first two paragraphs thus reach
activities in which the federai agency is itself the
principal actor, the third reaches the federally
approved activities of third parties.” Secretary of the
Interior v. California, supra, at 667. \t is obvious that
the filing of an injunctive suit by the United States does
not fall within any of the categories.* Rather, in the
case at hand, the activity in the coastal zone is purely a
private activity of defendant Robert Ciampitti. The
present case simply does not involve federal activity at
this time since the defendant has not yet applied for a
federal wetlands permit. If the defendant were to apply
for a permit, then the question of whether Section
307(c) (3) of the CZMA applies would arise. Because
defendant has failed to comply withthe permitting
requirement of the Clean Water Act. that question is
premature. For this reason, Section 307(c) of the CZMA
does not apply and no consistency determination is
required.
* Even under the National Enviromental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4371 et seq., an environmental
review statute of greater scope and application
than the CZMA, civil enforcement action, such as
the present case, do not constitute federal
actions. See 40 CFR § 1508.18(a).
28a
The Cape May-Greene case upon which defendant so
heavily relies is inapposite because there the federal
government was attempting to prevent development on a
flood plain by placing a condition on a federal sewer grant
for an area that had already been specifically approved for
development by the state. /d. at 182. Just as clearly as the
Act does not apply to the present situation, it applied to that
situation.9
The fact that defendant Ciampitti has applied for and
received some local permits is irrelevant.!° Defendant
continually refers to state approvals which he has received,
but there is no evidence of them in the record; and defendant
totally ignores the fact, for purposes of this argument, that
large portions of the site were designated wetlands on the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's map
and therefore could not be filled without state approval but
were nonetheless filled without that approval.
Finally, the court finds the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct.
656 (1984), upon which defendants also rely, irrelevant to
the issues before this court.
The court having found no merit to defendants’ challenges
to the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, it can
only conclude the Government's high probability of success.
9. The Government also maintains and the defendant
admitted (Tr. 3, pp. 85-86) that CAFRA does not apply te
this site. It applies to development of public facilities;
including housing developments of the 25 or more lots,
and there are 24 individual lot owners involved here.
10. According to the defendant, he has received
approval for a permit for soil and erosion control on
portions of Richmond, Rochester and Memphis
Avenues from the Cape May County Soil and
Conservation District. (D-16; Tr. 3, p. 71.) He has been
given permission by the Township of Lower to
construct streets, sidewalks, curbs and sewer pipes
along those avenues, and his waste water treatment
Capacity application has been approved by the
Township.
29a
2. The Rivers and Harbors Act and the Refuse Act
Given the evidence of record to date, it appears that the
Government has the broadest jurisdiction over the site
under the Clean Water Act."' Since the Court has determined
that the Government is likely to succeed on the merits of its
claim under that Act, the Corps’ possible jurisdiction under
the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Refuse Act is not
determinative of whether a preliminary injuction should
issue and need not be considered at this time.
B. irreparable Injury
It is clear that the Government need not make a showing of
“irreparable injury” in order to qualify for an injunction
under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d at
611. It is equally clear that such a showing is required under
the Refuse Act. /d.
11. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33U.S.C. §
403, requires a permit from the Corps for dredge and fill
activities which alter “the location, course, condition,
or capacity .. . of any of the navigable waters of the
United States.” For purposes of this Act, “navigable
water of the United States” means those waters of the
United States that are subject to the ebb and fiow of the
tide shoreward to the mean high water mark and/or
are presently used, or have been used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use to transport interstate or
foreign commerce. 33 CFR § 322.2. Those marsh areas
which are covered by waters of a navigable water, here
Jarvis Sound, at mean high tide are navigable waters
of the United States even though they are not navigable
in fact. United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1050
(D. Del. 1973); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498
F.2d 597, 610 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1974).
The evidence presented to the court regarding those
portions of the site below the mean high tide line would
at best support a finding that smali areas fall below
that line.
Under the Refuse Act, federal! jurisdiction is, at a
minimum, commensurate with jurisdiction under the
Rivers and Harbors Act. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d at 611.
And it has even been extended to non-navigable waters
where refuse deposited in those waters will in turn
wash into navigable waters. See United States v. Esso
Std. Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3d Cir. 1973).
30a
Nonetheless, this court is relying upon the Clean Water
Act and is confronted with the issue of whether a showing of
irreparable harm need be made under that statute.
There is no Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case
regarding the need for such a showing, and the parties
implicitly invite the court to decide that issue. It is an
invitiation the court declines.
It is clear that the Government has made a showing of
irreparable injury whether or not such a showing is
required. '2 See Findings of Fact, infra, at 10. And given that
the spring thaw has begun, the damage will increase
geometrically between the issuance of a preliminary
injunction and a final hearing on the merits.
- 12. In United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536 (11th Cir.
1983), the court held that a showing is necessary
because of the drastic nature of the remedy. And in
United States v. Kentiand-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 353 F.
Supp. 451 (E.D. Ky. 1973), the court held that the
Government had to make some showing of irreparable
harm. (The court recognized however, that the burden
is lessened where the public interest is at stake.)
However, there is plenty of general support for the
contrary position. A preliminary injunction based upon
the violation of a statue, especially one which makes
specific provision for injunctive relief, may issue upon
a showing that the federal statute has been violated.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944); United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 523-524 (3d
Cir. 1963). Inherent in the statute itself is the legislative
conclusion that violations of it cause irreparable injury
to the public. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320
F.2d at 523-524; United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc..,
359 F. Supp. 672, 678 (D. N.J. 1973), aff'd in part, 498
F.2d 597 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1974):
United States v. Nutrition Service, inc. 227 F. Supp. 375,
388-389 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d (3d Cir. 1965).
The Stoeco Homes case can be read to support this
proposition. See 498 F.2d at 611
3la
The court should grant the equitable relief sought by the
United States because there is no adequate remedy at law to
compensate the public for the harm caused by the disposal
of fill material into tidal wetlands. Tidal marshes serve a
variety of critical functions, incluaing the storage of flood
waters, nutrition for the estuarine food web, habitat for
wildlife, nursery and feeding grounds for fish, and filtration
of water run-off and tidal water. Only if the filling is
immediately enjoyed will the United States have the
continuing benefit of these ecologically valuable lands.
C. The Possibility of Harm to Other Interested Persons
Another factor weighed by the courts in ruling on requests
for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief is the injury
to the defendant or other interested parties if an injunction
issues. In the present context, the only foreseeable iiijury to
the defendant is economic loss. Even that would be minimal
as this preliminary injunction would merely restrain
defendants from further filling activities and require them to
remove the tidal gate. This would aliow the tidal waters to
return until the issues in this matter can be finally decided.
The defendant is free to fill and develop properties which are
not in this wetland area.
In fact, the economic loss to the defendant from cessation
of such activities is far outweighed by the benefit to the
community from the enjoining of activities adversely
affecting the environment. Moreover, any economic burden
placed upon defendant by the injunctive relief sought in this
case must be balanced against the significant benefits that
will accrue to the public-at-large from abatement of the
filling operation.
D. The Public Interest
Finally, in situations involving the Government, courts
must determine whether the issuance of an injunction wouid
further the public interest. In this context, the United States
Supreme Court has noted that courts of equity “go much
farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the
public interest... when only private interests are invoived.”
Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federal No. 40, 300 U.S. 515,
552 (1937); see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440-41
(1944).
it is axiomatic that the public interes‘ under the Clean
Water Act requires strict enforcement of the statute so as to
clean up the nation’s waters and preserve the surrounding
ecological environment. See, e.q., 33 U.S.C. § 1251; Train v.
City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
Having fully examined the record in this case in terms of
the criteria for granting a preliminary injunction, the court is
convinced that a preliminary injunction must issue, and that
the hearing to determine the Government's right to
permanent relief must be expedited. At that hearing, the
parties are entitled to present any relevant, new factual
evidence or relevant legal arguments which the court has
not yet considered.
The foregoing constitutes this court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 52(a).
The accompanying order will be entered.
ie pg 25a
/s/ John F. Gerry
JOHN F. GERRY, U.S.D.J.
DATED: April 2, 1984
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv
ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT
AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE
N. CIAMPITT! and PACIFIC FOUR
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
This matter having come before the court on the
Government's request for preliminary and permanent relief;
and
The court having carefully considered the record and the
parties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and for good cause shown;
it is this 2nd day of April, 1984, hereby ORDERED that
defendants are preliminarily restrained and enjoined from
allowing, suffering or causing the discharge of any
pollutants or fill material (including sand, gravel, rocks,
dirt, wood and concrete) from their properties located along
Park Boulevard between West Jefferson Avenue and
Madison Avenue and bounded on the west by Jarvis Sound
in Lower Township, Cape May County, New Jersey (more
particularly described in Lower Township tax records as
Blocks 696, 701, 706, 716, 721, 726 and 731) into the waters of
the United States which are adjacent thereto or into portions
of the site designated as wet!ands on Government Trial
Exhibit RR-5, and more particularly described in
Government Exhibits 100-102; and
34a
Furthermore, it is ORDERED that the tidal gate be removed
and that appropriate restraints be placed on the fill to
prevent it from washing into surrounding wetlands; and
It is FURTHER ORDERED that all parties appear on the 17th
day of Aprii, 1984, at 9:30 A.M., for the fina! hearing in this
matter.
i.e. pg 25a
/s/ John F. Gerry
JOHN F. GERRY, U.S.D.J.
35a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V
ROBERT C. CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT
AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE
N. CIAMPITT! and PACIFIC FOUR
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Samuel P. Moulthrop, Esquire
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Ms. Jodi Lee Alper
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Alfred A. Porro, Jr., Esquire
10 Stuyvesant Avenue
Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071
Attorney for Defendant Robert C. Ciampitti,
Bruce N. Ciampitti and Pacific Four
Corporation
GERRY, District Judge
36a
1. INFRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the Government's
request for a permanent injunction restraining the
defendants from engaging in fill activities at the Diamond
Beachsite in Cape May County, New Jersey. Also at issue is
the question of whether the defendants will be required to
remove the fill already placed by them on the site, and
whether they will be required to restore the site to its
conditon prior to the inception of fill activities. Finally, the
court must decide whether the imposition of civil penalties
against defendants is appropriate.
The Government has proceeded under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), the Rivers and
Harbors Act, and the Refuse Act. On October 24, 1983, this
court issued a temporary restraining order barring any
further fill activities by defendants until the matter could be
heard. A hearing on the issuance of apreliminary injunction
was held November 9, 15 and 17, 1983.
By opinion dated April 2, 1984, the court issued a
preliminary injunction preventing any further fill activities.
U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483. In that opinion, the court
held that the Government had succeeded on the merits of its
case under the Clean Water Act, the proofs having
established that the site in question constituted wetlands,
and that the defendants had Gischarged fill material without
obtaining the required permit. All the requirements for
issuance of a preliminary injunction were met. See /n re
Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143
(3d Cir. 1980). The defendants were invited to present
“RELEVANT” evidence at a permanent injunction hearing to
controvert the prior evidence on which basis we ruled that
the Government had succeeded on the merits.
37a
As to the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Refuse Act, this
court held that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether
any portion of the site fell below the mean high water mark
and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of
Engineers such that a permit was necessary before fill
activities could occur. The preliminary injunction, therefore,
was not issued on the basis of these two Acts. However, it
was Clear from the evidence that the Government had the
broadest jurisdiction over the site under the Clean Water
Act. 583 F. Supp. at 497. That is to say, much larger areas of
the site were wetlands than were arguably below the mean
high water mark, and those areas arguably below the mean
high water mark, were in any event encompassed by the
wetlands areas. Thus, success under the Rivers and Harbors
Act and the Refuse Act was not crucial to the Government's
application for a preliminary injunction
A hearing on the issuance of a permanent injunction was
held on May 21, June 6 and July 5, 1984.
The following shall constitute the court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
2. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The court adopts its previous findings and
conclusions and incorporates them herein, with the
following supplementations.
B. Clean Water Act
There has been no additional evidence submitted which
alters the court's finding of jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act. That is, the court continues to hold that the site in
question, as described in Governments Exhibits RR-5 and
100-102, contains wetlands.
38a
C. Rivers and Harbors Act/Refuse Act
The Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403, and the
Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407, extend federal! jurisdiction over
and, to a ce~*3in extent, beyond, the “navigable waters of
the United States.” The term “navigable waters,” for the
purposes of these statutes, means those waters of the
United States that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide
shoreward to the mean high water mark. 33 C.F.R. § 322.2.
Testimony was introduced at both the preliminary and
permanent injunction hearings regarding the presence of
territory on the site below the mean high water mark.
Of the 26.72 acres of land within the Diamond Beach site
that are federal wetiands (see Government Exhibit 101,
Government Exhibit 43), the Government claims that 1.45
acres, all within the area designated as wetlands, are below
the mean high water line. (These 1.45 acres are colored in
blue on Government Exhibit 101.)
indisputably, some of these 1.45 acres are below the mean
high water line. the defendants’ witness, Gerald Speitel,
conceded that some man-made ditches within the disputed
area are below mean high water. Beyond these ditches,
however, the evidence is less conclusive.
In order to establish the mean high water line for the
Diamond Beach sie, the Government's expert, Richard
Rauch, had to extrapolate from tidal bench marks above and
below the site, since no data was available regarding the
site itself. Mr. Rauch obtained data from two tidal! bench
marks: Bench Mark 5838 E1977, located north of the
Diamond Beach site in the vicinity of Sunset Lake, and
Bench Mark 5901J, located south of the Diamond Beach site.
These two bench marks were chosen because of their
proximity to the site.
39a
By using surveying methods, elevations were established
for the two bench marks, and then the elevations of the tidal
bench marks were related to elevations established at
control points on the Diamond Beach site. Mr. Rauch
determined the mean high water line on the site to
approximate an elevation of 2.94 feet. However, in depicting
the mean high water line on Exhibit 101, Mr. Rauch used an
elevation of 3.0 feet.
Once the elevation for the site was established, the
contours of the area below that elevation (3.0 feet) were
made using the process of photogrammetry. This process
involves the use of aerial photographs viewed through a
stereoscope.
Although there was considerable testimony regarding the
accuracy of the elevation established (2.94 feet) and the
accuracy of the contours onthe map of the site (Government
Exhibit 101), this court is siill not convinced that, apart from
the man-made ditches, any of the land in question lies below
the mean high water line. The problem, in the court's view, is
with the methodology used to produce the data in question.
The affidavit of defendants’ expert, James P. Weidener,
introduced as Defendants’ Exhibit 46, concludes that the
depiction of areas below the mean high water line is “flawed
and subject to error.” Mr. Weidener made, among others, the
following criticisms of the Government's evidence. First, he
stated, the tide bench marks used were not sufficiently close
to the Diamond Beach site and, “more importantly,” were in
different bodies of water from the Diamond Beach site. Mr.
Weidener stated that bench marks should have been
established in Jarvis Sound, on which the property lies,
because the elevations of mean high water from other
bodies of water may not accurately reflect those at Jarvis
Sound. Second, Mr. Weidener stated that the tidal datum
epoch used in arriving at the mean high water lines for the
sites north and south of the property was not the most
current epoch for which data was available. The use slightiy
stale data, the court infers, could have affected the accuracy
of the Government’s evidence. Third, Mr. Weidener stated
40a
that the use of photogrammetry in order to establish contour
boundaries is inappropriate because of problems with
accuracy. Finally, the court notes that the Government used
a figure of 3.0 feet as the elevation for the mean high water
line and made its maps in acordance with this elevation. The
actual elevation the Government calculated was 2.94 feet.
Although the difference is not great, the use of the 3.0 figure
may nevertheless result in a finding that a larger area is
below mean high water than is actually the case.
The court, based on the above criticisms of the
Government's methodology, is unable to find that the
Government has carried its burden with respect to the areas
asserted to be below mean high water, except for the man-
made ditches, about which there is no controversy.
Somewhat less than 1.45 acres, therefore, is below the mean
high water line, although, based on the Government's
exhibits, the court is not in a position to state the precise
location or area of these pieces of territory.
3. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Clean Water Act - Injunctive Relief
Having reaffirmed our finding of Corps jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act, and finding no reason to disturb our
conclusions regarding the other requirements for injunctive
relief, the court will permanently enjoin the discharge of fil!
material into the wetlands, as designated in Government
Exhibits 101 and 43.
The court must briefly address the arguments raised by
the defendants in opposition to this conclusion.
First, the defendants contend that, based on arecent case
out of the Sixth Circuit, the court should reconsider its
conclusion that the property in question contains wetlands.
41a
In U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.
1984), the Sixth Circuit was faced with a case where,
between the issuance and appeal of a permanent injunction,
the Corps promulgated a new regulation changing the
definition of “wetlands.” The case was remanded for further
proceedings in light of the new definition. 615 F.2d 1363 (6th
Cir. 1980). On the second appeal, the issue was whether the
district court on remand had properly interpreted the new
definition to include the property of the defendants.
The former definition of wetlands was as follows:
those areas that are (1) periodically inundated and that
(2) are normally characterized by the prevalance of
vegetation that requires saturated soi! conditions for
growth and reproduction.
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (2) (i) (h) (1976). This definiton was
changed, according to the Corps, to eliminate several
problems. The reference to “periodic inundation” was
deleted because the Corps ccncluded that the Clean Water
Act, § 404 (33 U.S.C. § 1344), was intended to regulate
discharges into the aquatic system as /t exists, not as it may
have existed over a record period. 729 F.2d at 395.
Furthermore, “normally” was replaced by the phrase “under
normal circumstances do support.” This change was
adopted, in part, to make clearer that excluded from Corps
jurisdiction are those areas that are not aquatic but
experience an abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation. /d.
at 396, and alse to make clearer that man-made
Obstructions to the flow of water, such as tidal gates (as are
present here) would noi exempt a site from Corps
jurisdiction. /d. Thus, the new, and present, definition of
wetlands is as follows:
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support, and under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted
for life in saturated soil conditions.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1983).
In construing this newer definition, the Riverside court
stated as follows:
42a
The new regulation makes clear that it is the present
occurrence of inundation or flooding sufficient to
support wetlands vegetation, not the mere presence of
such vegetation from some other cause, that deter-
mines whether a particular area is wetland... . Neither
inundation nor aquatic vegetation would be sufficient,
standing aione, to bring a piece of tand within the
definition. Both must be present, and the /atter must be
caused by the former.
Were this no so, then areas which inexplicably support
some species of aquatic vegetation, but which are not
normally inundated, would fall within the wetlands
definition. Such a perverse result could not have been
what the Corps contemplated. . . . Indeed, as noted
earlier, the Corps expressly adverted to the situation of
“areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal
presence of aquatic vegetation” and emphasized that
such lands were not intended to be covered by the
regulations.
729 F.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
In holding that the lands in that case were not wetlands,
the Riverside court noted that the lands, although arguably
“periodically inundated” (in accordance with the previous
wetlands definition), were not presently inundated. The
presence of the vegetation was “abnormal,” and
attributable not to the few present instances of flooding, but
to the type of soil on the property. /d. at 397.
This court has some reservations about the Sixth Circuit's
construction of the regulation at issue, although it has no
problem with that construction as applied to the facts of that
case. We find, however, that the facts of the instant case
clearly support Corps jurisdiction, even under the Riverside
test. In our previous opinion, we found as follows:
The soil in the federally designated wetlands at the site
is saturated throughout, in most cases directly to the
surface.
During normal high tide conditions, surface water
covers a majority of the site... .
43a
Vegetation on the site which indicates a wetlands
environment includes: marsh hay, salt marsh
cordgrass, high tide bush, salt marsh fleabone, black
grass, and sea myrtle. These plants are commoniy
found in New Jersey salt marshes and are adapted to
an area subject to tidal flow.
583 F. Supp. at 489. We further concluded:
The Government has proven... that the site... has an
abundance of . . . plants requiring a saturated
environment to survive... .
Id. at 492 (emphasis added). This court believes that its
findings indicate the presence of areas inundated by surface
or ground water, the presence in those areas of a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil, and
that such finding support the conclusion that the latter
circumstance is caused by the former.
In considering “causation” under this regulation, this
court does not believe the Sixth Circuit announced a test
whereby it becomes necessary to rule out any and every
possible cause for the existence of aquatic vegetation other
than frequently saturated soil. This would be an impossible
test, it would seem. Rather, this court believes the Sixth
Circuit was speaking of causation in a somewhat looser
sense, whereby by the presence of frequently saturated soii
would ordinarily be taken as the “cause” of the vegetation,
absent some peculiar circumstance indicating another
Cause.
In this case, the court has found the presence of both
Saturated soil and aquatic vegetation; and absent any
evidence to indicate that, under the circumstances, the
presence of the vegetation is, in some sense abnormal, the
court conciudes that the soil saturation “causes” the growth
of the vegetation. This is not the “perverse” case to which
the Sixth Circuit alludes wherein, even absent the regular
presence of soild saturation, aquatic plants are
nevertheless abundantly present.’ In such a case it
obviously becomes necessary to look for the explanation of
the growth in other factors beside the presence of surface or
ground water. Here, there is no need to look any further.
44a
Accordingly, our finding of Corps jurisdiction is not
Gisturbed by the Riverside decision.
The court further notes that the fact that we cannot quite
conclude that much of the land is below mean high water
does not indicate, as defendants argue, that it is not
Saturated by surface or ground water.
The defendants’ second challenge to the issuance of a
permanent injunction is one previously raised and cisposed
of, but which we will reiterate. This is the “taking” issue
The defendants state that the assertion of Corps
jurisdiction over the property combined with the injunction
against further discharges onto the property, amounts to a
taking for which compensation must be paid.
The first problem with this argument is that neither of the
defendants who have answered the complaint (that is,
neither Robert Ciampitti nor Albrecht and Heun) is, on the
record, a property owner. These defendants, therefore, lack
standing to even raise the issue. We only address the issue
further because counse! for Robert Ciampitti entered an
appearance for Bruce Nicholas Ciampitti and Pacific Four
Corporation. Bruce Nicholas Ciampitti, at least, owns some
of the property and has standing to raise the issue
(although, to do so, he should have filed an answer and
counterclaim). Whether a taking claim may even properly be
brought in this court, however, is doubtful. If the taking
claim exceeds $10,000, jurisdiction is exclusive in the Court
of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. American
Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
aff'd 614 F.2d 769; Bayou des Families Development Corp. v.
U.S. Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1982).
45a
Furthermore, as this court stated in its previous opinion,
the issue is, in any event, premature unti! a permit is appiied
for and denied. The defendants argue that, if applied for, a
permit will most certainly be denied. However, any informal
predictions by Corps personnel can hardly take the place of
a formal denial following a formal submission in
compliance with the applicaton requirements of 33 C.F.K. §
325. The fact remains that no permit application has yet
been processed, and the taking issue is premature. See
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 927
(5th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
The defendants have introduced letters (Defendants’
Exhibit 32) which purport to demonstrate that the Corps has
been unwilling to meet with them to discuss a possible
permit application. It may well be that the Corps at this
juncture will not talk to Mr. Ciampitti. See 33 C.F.R. §326.3(c)
(4) and footnote 2 (where Clean Water Act violation is of a
nature that complaint is recommended to be filed by U.S.
Attorney, after-the-fact permit application should not be
accepted until the enforcement action is resolved). This fact
still does not convert the Corps assertion of jurisdiction into
a taking but further highlights the prematurity of the claim
Finaliy, of course, we note that the mere assertion of
jurisdiction and the injunction against filling may or may not
ultimately, on the mertis, amount to a taking. See, e.g.,
Deltona Corp. v. U.S., 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
In sum, then, the taking argument has no bearing on our
conclusion in favor of an injuction. (Of course, the mere fact
that property is “taken” only requires that compensation be
paid; nothing prevents the Government from taking the
property by preventing development.)
To repeat, then: the derendants are hereby permanently
enjoined from engaging in fill activities on those portions of
the site designated as wetlands.
46a
C. Rivers and Harbors Act/Refuse Act - Injunctive Relief
Above, we found that the man-made ditches on the
Diamond Beach site were below the mean high water line.
Even though man-made, these ditches are nonetheless
subject to Corps jurisdiction. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.8(a) (1)
(determination of navigability not limited to natural or
original condition of waterbody; a canal or other artificial
water body that is subject to ebb and flow of the tide is a
navigable water); see a/so 33 C.F.R. § 329.13(b). Therefore,
as to these ditches, a permanent injuction against fil!
activities is warranted under either 33 U.S.C. § 403 or § 407.
However, at this juncture, such an injunction is
unnecessary, since the permanent injunction against filling
the wetlands already encompasses any activities in these
ditches. Moreover, the court at this time lacks a clear survey
or metes and bounds description of the ditches such as
would make it possible to appropriately fashion an
injunctive order. Accordingly, no injunction specifically
directed to the man-made ditches will issue at this time.
The Government has apprised the court of case law
indicating that jurisdiction under these Acts may extend
even beyond the mean high water line, where activities
shoreward of the line may have an impact on navigable
waters below the line. See U.S. v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc.,
526 F.2d 1293, 1297-99 (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Moretti, 526
F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 480 F.2d 1132, 1135 (2d Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Esso Standard
Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3d Cir. 1967).
Thus, an injunction under these Acts to prohibit fill
activities in close proximity to the ditches may be
warranted, as fill placed on the banks of, or near, the ditches
may erode into the ditches. However, for the reasons given
above with respect to the ditches themselves, no injunction
specifically directed to fiil near the ditches will issue at this
time. The injunction we issue with respect to the entire
wetlands is sufficient to address the concerns of the
Government under all the Acts under which suit was
brought.
47a
ee
D. Restoratien Plan
The Government seeks an order requiring the defendants
to remove all fill placed within the wetlands area and to
return the site to its natural state by planting wetlands
vegetation and restoring waterways.
There can be no doubt that this court has the power under
the Clean Water Act to order the restoration proposed by the
Government. See U.S. v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1156 (M.D.
Fla. 1983); U.S. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1036,
1043 (N.D. Ill. 1982); U.S. v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp 1331 (M.D.
Fla. 1980); O'Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
The defendants argue, however, that the Government has
failed to justify, either procedurally or substantively, its
proposed plan. The defendants rely on U.S. v. Sexton Cove
Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1301 (5th Cir. 1976) and
Weisman, supra. The Weisman court,expanding on the
language in Sexton Cove Estates, stated:
(T)here are two prerequisites to be satisfied before any
consideration of the restoration plan itself: (1).the
court must have jurisdiction over the portion of the
property or activity to be directiy affected by the
restoration plan, and (2) the court must conduct a
hearing in which the merits,demerits, and alternatives
to the restoration plan are fully developed.
489 F. Supp. at 1342-43. Here, based on the above findings of
fact and conclusions of law, there can be no doubt that this
court has jurisdiction over the affected portion of the site. As
to the hearing requirement, there is nothing in the case law
to suggest that the hearing on the restoration plan be a
hearing separate and apart from, or subsequent to, the
hearing on the merits (the hearing to determine whether the
Act was violated). In the Weisman case itself, no separate
hearing took place. 489 F. Supp. at 1343. Therefore, this
court finds nothing procedurally inappropriate about
ordering restoration on the present record.
The Weisman court elaborated as well on the criteria to be
applied in evaluating a proposed restoration pian.
48a
SP er pee
The selected plan must: (1) confer maximum
environmental benefits, (2) be achievable as a
practical matter, and (3) bear an equitabie relationship
to the degree and kind of wrong it is intended to
remedy.
489 F. Supp. at 1343. The Government's proposed plan is
actually merely a set of guidelines. The Government would
have the defendants submit a more detailed plan, subject to
approval or modification by the Corps of Engineers.
Nevertheless, there is enough in these guidelines to permit
this court to evaluate the pian’s appropriateness.
These guidelines require: that all fill be removed and that
the defendants identify the location where such removed fill
will be taken; that the area be replanted with plant species
found adjacent to the areas of fill removal; and that
waterways be restored. Further, the Government would
have the defendants submit an implementation schedule,
prepare a post-restoration monitoring program, and have
the defendants engage an outside consultant to actually
prepare and implement the program.
In opposition to the Government's proposal, the
defendants apparently take the position that there should be
no restoration; that is, that the site should be left as itis. The
defendants’ position is based on rather vague allegations
that restoration would have an adverse impact on the
environment insofar as it would destabilize partially
completed sewer and utility systems in the area and result in
an economic loss to both public and private investors in
these utility.and sewer lines. The court has scrutinized the
record in this case and finds little evidence to support these
allegations, other than the evidence that the defendants
themselves wiil suffer economic loss.
In evaluation whether a proposed restoration plan will
confer maximum environmental benefits, it is necessary to
consider the environmental importance of the wetlands on
the site as well as the harm caused by the defendants’
activities. Congress and the Corps of Enginners, through its
regulatory authority, have taken the position that wetlands
serve important environmental functions:
49a
Some wetlands are vital areas that constitute a productive and valuable
public resource, the unnecessary alteration or destruction of which
should be discoui aged as contrary to the public interest... .
Wetlands considered to perform functions important to the public interest
inciude: . . . wetlands which serve significant biological functions,
including food chain production, general habit, and nesting, spawning,
rearing and resting sites for aquatic or land species; . .. wetlands which
are significant in shielding other areas from wave action, erosion, or
storm damage; . . . wetlands which serve as valuable storage areas for
storm and flood waters . . . and wetlands which serve significant and
necessary water purification functions.
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b). In the court's findings of fact in
connection with the issuance of a preliminary injunction, we
found that the wetlands on the Diamond Beach site perform
all the vital functions enumerated above. 583 F. Supp. at 490.
We further found that the ability of these wetlands to
perform these vital functions was hindered by the
defendants’ activities. /d. It stands to reason that the return
of the wetiands area to its undeveloped state would confer
maximum environmental benefits. At best, the defendants’
protestations to the contrary are speculative; and the only
remedy they offer is that of doing nothing, which is
unacceptable. Cf, Weisman, supra, at 1347.
In evaluating the practicality of a proposed restoration,
we must consider its feasibility and cost-effectiveness. /d.
at 1348. There is nothing in the record to suggest either that
the fill could not be removed or that vegetation could not be
replanted. Of course, whether the replanted vegetation will
Survive is uncertain. in other circumstances, however, this
has not barred a proposed replanting. See Weisman, supra,
at 1347 (restoration of forest ordered, although full recovery
would take from 10 to 30 years). In considering cost-
effectiveness, we realize that we lack some information that
might be useful: the financial resources of the defendants
and an estimate of the cost of the restoration plan. Cf. U.S. v.
Robinson, supra, at 1164-65. But here, the indefiniteness of
the Government's proposa! is actually a virtue. The
defendants, so long as they are faithful to the goals of the
plan, will have considerable independence and will be able
to do what they feel is desirable to minimize the cost of
50a
restoration. Therefore, the court is not overly troubled by
certain lacunae in the record, especially given the equitable
considerations applicable here. See infra.
Finally, turning to the equities of this case, we find that the
defendants, with one exception, are not in a strong position
to argue equity. As this court has found previously, as early
as 1980 the defendants were aware of wetlands regulations
and the possibility that Diamond Beach was within the
jurisdiction of the Corps. In September 1983, the defendants
acted in defiance of a “cease and desist” order of the Corps.
583 F. Supp. at 486, 487. Even after this court issued its
preliminary injunction in April 1984, the defendants did not
cease their fill activities, and Robert Ciampitti was cited for
contempt in September, 1984. Even after that, fill activities
continued on the site. Thus the equities do not weigh in the
defendants’ favor.
However, this court believes that the defendant Albrecht
and Heun is in a better position to make an equitable
argument. The record indicates that this defendant was
merely a construction company which acted at the instance
of the other defendants, and that its role was more or less
passive. Moreover, this defendant does not appear to havea
continuing interest in the site. Accordingly, Albrecht and
Heun shall be excluded from this court's restoration order.
In sum, then, the court adopts the restoration plan
proposed by the Government. We shall retain jurisdiction to
resolve any disputes which may arise in either the
preparation or implementation of the plan.
Finally, we must address the timing of the plan. We
believe that restoration should occur as soon as possible.
However, it seems both wasteful and unfair to the
defendants to order restoration to proceed whiie there
exists the possibilty that the development of the Diamond
Beach may be approved by the Corps. Therefore, the court
will stay the implementation of the restoration plan on the
following conditions:
5la
A. The defendants shall. within 45 days of the
accompanying order, apply for a permit to
engage in fill activities at the site.
B. If the defendants have not applied for a
permit within 45 days of the order, then
implementation of the plan shall proceed as
scheduled in the order. Furthermore, if the
defendants’ permit application is returned
for failure to meet the requirements of 33
C.F.R. § 325.1, then implementation shall
proceed as scheduled in the order.
C. If defendants submit a proper application
within 45 days of the accompanying order,
then implementation of the restoration plan
will be stayed pending a decision by the
Corps on the application.
Of course. if the Corps grants the permit, the injunction and
restoration order wil be vacated or modified as is
appropriate. The stay conditions provided above only apply
to the implementation phase of the restoration plan. The
defendants will be required to prepare a plan within 60 days
of the accompanying order.
E. Civil Penalties
The Government seeks the imposition of civil penalties
against Robert Ciampitti only. Holding only this defendant
liable is appropriate, given the statement of his attorney
that he is the party responsible for the activities on the site
and all the evidence consistent with this conclusion. This
defendant clearly violated section 301(a) and 404 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1344, on at least 15
seperate days (inciuding those violations occuring after the
court’s order of April, 1984). Secticn 309(d) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1319(d), authorizes imposition of a penalty of up to
$10,000 for each day on which a violation occurs. The
Government urges that the flagrancy of Ciampitti's conduct
warrants a substantial penalty.
52a
The court does not entirely disagree. However, the
question of penalties will be held in abeyance pending the
preparation and implementation (if necessary) of the
restoration plan. We believe this course is appropriate
because it is more important that the site be restored than
that the defendant Robert Ciampitti be punished. To the
extent that Robert Ciampitti is not a person of unlimited
resources, the court prefers that his resources be initially
spent on clean-up of the site. Cf O'Leary, supra.
Furthermore, defendant Robert Ciampitti’s good faith in
preparing and implementing a restoration plan is arelevant
factor in assessing the size or necessi'y of civi! penalties.
The foregoing constitutes the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The accompanying order will be entered.
ie. pg 25a
/s/ John F. Gerry
JOHN R. GERRY, U.S.0.J.
DATED: November 28, 1984.
53a
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v
ROBERT C. CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT Civil Action No. 83-4004
AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE N.
CIAMPITTI and PACIFIC FOUR ORDER
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
This «matter having come before the court on the
Government's request for preliminary and permanent relief:
and the court having made findings of fact and conclusions
of law pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 52(a); and the court having
concluded that the defendants have violated sections 301(a)
rk 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and
1344;
It is, this 28th day of November, 1984, hereby ORDERED as
follows:
1. The defendants are permanently restrained and
enjoined from allowing, suffering or causing the discharge
of any pollutants or fill material (including sand, gravel,
rocks, dirt, wood and concrete) from their properties located
along Park Boulevard between West Jefferson Avenue and
Madison Avenue and bounded on the west by Jarvis Sound
in Lower Township, Cape May County, New Jersey (more
particularly described in Lower Township tax records as
Blocks 696, 701, 706, 716, 721, 726 and 731) into the waters of
the site designated as wetlands on Government Trial Exhibit
RR-5, and more particularly described in Government
Exhibits 100-102, and Government Exhibit 43.
54a
2. All of the fill, which is depicted on Government Exhibit
101 as the area shaded yellow, as well as all fill deposited
subsequent to the preparation of Exhibit 101, down to the
elevation of the wetlands as they existed prior to filling
activities, shall be removed by the defendants, other than
Albrechi and Heun Corporation, no later than 75 days after
entry of this order.
Provided, however, that paragraph 2 of this order shall be
stayed subject to the following conditions:
A. The defendants shall, within 45 days of the
date of this order, apply for a permit to
engage in fill activities at the site.
B. If the defendants have not applied for a
permit within 45 days of the date of this
order, then removal of the fill shall proceed
as scheduled. Furthermore, if the defendants’
permit application is returned for failure to
meet the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 325.1,
then implementation shall proceed as
scheduled.
C. If defendants submit a proper application
within 45 days of this order, ther: removal of
the fill will be stayed pending a decision by
the Corps on the application.
3. The defendants, other than Albrecht and Heun
Corporation, shall prepare and implement a plan to restore
vegetation to the areas from which fill is removed in
accordance with the fol)» wing schedule:
A. Defendants shall submit a proposed plan
for restoration and planting to the Corps of
Engineers no later than 60 days after entry of
this order;
B. The Corps of Engineers may approve the
plan submitted or may modify the plan and
approve the plan as modified;
55a
C. The defendants shall complete all work
necessary to implement the plan or modified
plan no later than 45 days after approval by
the Corps;
Provided, however, that paragraph C shall be stayed
subject to the following conditions:
A. The defendants shall, within 45 days of the
date of this order, apply for a permit to
engage in fill activities at the site.
B. If the defendants have not applied for a
permit within 45 days of the date of this
order, then implementation of the plan shall
proceed as scheduled. Furthermore, if the
defendants’ permit application is returned
for failure to meet the requirements of 33
C.F.R. § 325.1, then implementation shall
proceed as scheduled.
C. If defendants submit a proper application
within 45 days of this order, then
implementation of the restoration pian will
be stayed pending a decision by the Corps on
the application.
D. The plan described in paragraph 3A shall
include, but not be limited to:
(1) Planting of all areas disturbed by the
removal of fill material with plant species
typical of areas adjacent to the areas of fill
removal; i.e., Spartina Alterniflora,
Spartina Patens, and Distichlis Spicata,
and others as appropriate. Plantings shall
be spaced on a grid with three foot by two
foot centers. Plantings shall achieve 85%
survival rate after the first growing
season. Replanting would be required in
areas of less than 85% survival rate;
56a
(2) Preparation of a scaled drawing
indicating the iocation of proposed
wetland restoration and the elevations of
restored areas al intervals sufficient to
indicate that the depth of proposed
excavation refiects natural changes in
property contour;
(3) Restoration of all waterways within the
subject property;
(4) A schedule of activities leading to |
completion of the wetlands restoration |
plan;
(5) A schedule of the rate and sequence of
fertilizer application;
(6) Preparation of a _post-restoration
monitoring program;
i (7) {dentification of the focation of
disposal sites for material removed from
the project site; and
(8) The defendants shall engage a
consulting firm with established success
in implementing wetland creation/restor-
ation work, to prepare and implement the
above restoration plan.
E. In the event there arises a dispute
concerning the plan or any other provision of
this order, any party may apply to the court
to resolve such dispute.
4. The court shall retain jurisdiction on the issue of civil
penalties pending implementation of the restoration plan.
/s/ John F. Gerry
JOHN F. GERRY, U.S.D.J.
Pints « ms 4 ‘ OS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 85-5004
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
VS.
DIAMOND BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
and ROBERT CIAMPITT!, ALBRECHT AND HEUN
CORPORATION
BRUCE NICHOLAS CIAMPITTI, and
PACIFIC FOUR CORP.
ROBERT CIAMPITTI, BRUCE N. CIAMPITTI and
PACIFIC FOUR CORPORATION,
Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey-Camden
(D.C. Civil No. 83-4004)
District Judge: John F. Gerry
58a
Argued
August 6, 1985
Before: ALDISERT, Chief Judge, and STAPLETON and
MANSMANN, Circuit Judges.
JUDGEMENT ORDER
After consideration of all contentions raised by
appellants, and for the reasons set forth in the district court
opinion by the Honorable John F. Gerry, United States v.
Ciampitti, No. 83-4004 (D.N.J., Nov. 28, 1984), reprinted in
Appendix at 63-77; it is
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgement of the
district court be and is hereby affirmed.
Costs taxed against appellants.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Chief Judge Aldisert
Chief Judge
ATTEST:
/s/ Saily Mrvos
Sally Mrvos, Clerk
DATED: AUG 7 1985
59a
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.