Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ciampitti v. United States

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In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V

ROBERT CIAMPITT!, ALBRECHT AND HEUN

CORPORATION, BRUCE CIAMPITTI AND PACIFIC

FOUR CORPORATION, PETITIONER

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THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

| PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

ALFRED A. PORRO, JR.

10 Stuyvesant Avenue

P.O. Box 357

Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071

(201) 438-1923

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the term “normal” high tide line is

synonymous with the term “mean” high water line as

was previously held in Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los

Angeles, 296 US 10 (1935).

2. Whether the subject property was _ properly

classified as “wetlands” under the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, more commonly known as the

Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1251, et seq., subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of

Engineers, where it is not regularly flowed by tide, and

not inundated.

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

United States of America, Plaintiff

Diamond Beach Development Corporation-Defendant/

Petitioner

Robert Ciampitti - Defendant/Petitioner

Albrecht and HEUN Corp. - Defendant

Specific Four Corporation - Defendant/Petitioner

Bruce Ciampitti - Defendant/Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENIS

Questions Presented for Review.................... i

List of Parties to the Proceedings................. ii

Nee en os ck vhs enwewes iv

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Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and

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Reasons for Granting Certiorari

1. The New Jersey District Courts holding with

respect to land being above the mean high

water line and simultaneously below ordinary

high tide are in direct conflict with the principles

established by the United States Supreme Courtin

Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S.

ee oh ake 46S 3550 ka 8A 888 6 4

A. Lands were held to be above the mean

high water line.and simultaneously below

the ordinary high tide line by the Trial

ee a 5k eka cate ges 4

Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles .6

C. The decision of the Trial Court conflicts

with the Mandate of the United States

Supreme Court in Borax Consolidated,

LEG. V. LOS ANGEIES ... 0... cccseccneess 8

D. Impact of Federal Water Pollution

Control Act on Tria! Court Decision that

the property constituted wetlands. ..... 9

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2. The Federal Court of Appeals for the 3rd

Circuit has rendered a decision in conflict

with the 6th Circuit in U.S. v. Riverside

Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.

1984) cert. granted, Docket No. 84-701,

argued on October 16, 1985.............. 12

A. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, is

analogous to U.S. v. Ciampitti........... 12

B. The 3rd Circuit holding is in conflict with

the Gth Circuit Court. .....cscccccesecces 13

IND asc ewanddocccdadeadenssseesekeuuebeees 17

Appendix

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

1. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League Inv. v. Marsh, 715

FE GN Mile WUD nena nn.0cesseccceeccesecacs 10

2. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 US ——

10, 80 L.ed 9, 56 S.Ct. 23 (1935)... 0... 4,6,7,12

3. City of Los Angeles v. Borax, 5th Cir. F.Supp. 281

eh WG aa be hkabe bce hencebecaawekbiereeinsssss 6

4. Diamond Beach Joint Venture Association v.

Township of Lower, Superior Court of N.J.,

Atlantic County, Law Division Docket No.

LOE SUE v5 n.nn6nnnhcececnsantacsunesenenen

5. Hardin v. Jordon, 140 US 381,35 L.ed 433, 11 S.Ct.

+ Meee cucecas cauendsdahhuas seekeeubesecters cas 7

6. Shilney v. Bowlby, 152 US 1, 38 L.ed 331, 14 S.Ct.

KAT e Tre reT Tere Tre re eT TTT TTT TTT TTT 7

7. Weismann v. US Army Corps of Engineers, 526

eo ok § ft A Re rere 10

8. U.S. v. Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1981)

cert. granted, Docket No. 84-701, argued Oct. 16,

rrr roe ere 4,10,13.14.15

U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D. N.J. 1984)... 3

Statutes and Regulations:

1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USC 1251

GR BOE. cc ccccccccccccccccccccssccccecde dese Mela

2. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33

es Ge ON On dv i ccicncscunebéscauasest es

me ff ff, 9,10,12,13$14

— 2: & | werpeperrrrerr yar 9

Miscellaneous:

1. Funk & Wagnalls, New Comprehensive

International Dictionary of the English Language,

Encyclopedia Edition, JG. Ferguson Publishing Co.

2. Schureman, Tide & Current Glossary, 23, Special

publication No. 228, United States Coast &

Geodetic Survey (1949) ....... 2... cece eee e eee ees h

3. Shalowitz, Shore & Sea Boundaries, US Dept. of

Commerce, Coast & Geodetic Survey, US Court

Printing Office (1962) ............ eee ee eee eee 6

JURISDICTION

Judgment of the Court of Appeal: was entered on

August 7, 1985. The jurisdiction of this courtis invoked

by way of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari under 28 USC

1254(1), the same having been timely filed pursuant to

28 USC 2101(c).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND —

REGULATIONS INVOLVED

1. Federal.Water Pollution Cuntro! Act, 33 USC 1251,

et seq.

2. United States Army Corps Regulations, 33 CFR

323.2 (1983)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

NO.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V

ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT AND

HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE CIAMP!”7i AND

PACIFIC FOUR CORPORATION, PE? TIONER

PETITION FOR A WRIT OR CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Alfred A. Porro, Jr., on behalf of Petitioners, Robert C.

Ciampitti, et als., Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to review

the judgement of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit in this case entered on August 7, 1985.

STATEMENT

This matter involved a substantially developed tract of

land approximately 25 acres located in the Township of

Lower, Cape May County in the State of New Jersey. A 1907

riparian grant was issued to defendants predecessors in

title vesting all title and interest of the State in the Grantee,

thereby conferring the right to dredge, fill and develop the

subject property. (Exhibit p. 82 & 87). Subdivision of the site

dates back to 1920 (Vol. IV p. 1193) and was recently upheld

by the Superior Court of New Jersey.’

Located on the site is arailroad embankment which

historically separates this tract from a bay area. An

artificially constructed breach in the embankment

" Diamond Beach Joint Venture Association v. Township

of Lower, et als., Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Docket No. L-46263-78, rendered by the

Honorable Robert H. Steadie in March of 1980.

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which came into existence between 1962 and 1969

connects various manmade mosquito ditches placed

on the site to alleviate poor upland storm drainage.

(Vol. Il. 533.535).

Elevation of the site ranges from 3.75 to 6 or 7 feet above

the mean high water line, in some instances to 8 or 9 feet. As

a whole the site is 1 to 1 1/2 feet above the mean high water

line. (Exh. p. 467).

Pursuant to the 1907 Grant from the State of New Jersey

the 1929 subdivision and recent Municipal, County and State

of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

permits, a substantial portion of the property is under

development with existing roadways, sewers and utilities

having been installed.

A major portion of the subject property is alleged to be

“wetlands”. Jurisdiction of the Corps is asserted under the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, more commonly known

as the Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1251 et seq. Both parties

agree that only a smali percentage (1.45 acres) of the site

falis beiow the mean high water line.

OPINIONS BELOW

Appellant property owners seek review of a permanent

injunction entered by the New Jersey District Court,

subsequently affirmed by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals,

enjoining the filling and future development of the subject

premises and ordering the restoration of the site via

removal of all roads, sewers and improvements, in an effort

to convert this development into wetlands.

This matter was opened to the Court on October 24, 1982

on and Order to Show Cause and a Temporary Restraining

Order by plaintiff seeking to enjoin defendants from further

development of the 1980 subdivision. (Vol. | p. 4 & 7). A

Verified Complaint seeking permanent injunctive relief was

subsequently filed and a request for restoration of the site

and

conversion into wetiand in accordance with the Clean Water

Act, 33 USC 1251 et seq. and the Rive.s and Harbors

Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 USC 403 and 407. Said

complaint was later amended to allow for additional

defendants.

After several days of depositions, the trial court issued an

opinion on April 2, 1984, entering an Order for Preliminary

Injunction thereby preventing further development of the

property. United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D. NJ

1984). (Vol | p. 63-78). It was heid that the site in question

constituted wetlands and that the defendants had

discharged fill material without obtaining a permit in

violation of the Clean Water Act.

Additional testimony was taken at a hearing on the

issuance of apermanent injunction. A final Order was issued

on November 28, 1984 permanently restraining defendants

from developing the site and ordering restoration through

the removal of sewers, roadways and improvements and

ordering the conversion of the tract into “wetlands”. The

Court determined that the site (except for 1.45 acres) was

above mean high water. It then decided the tract was below

normal high tide. Provisions with respect to restoration

were Stayed pending submission of a permit application to

the Army Corps of Engineers. United States v. Ciampitti,

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Docket No. 83-

4004.

Appeal was taken to the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. A

decision affirming the Tria! Court’s determination was

entered on August 7, 1985. United States v. Diamond Beach

Development Corp. and Robert Ciampitti, et als., Superior

Court of New Jersey, Law Division Docket No. 85-5004

argued August 6, 1985.

Review by the United States Supreme Court on a Writ of

Certiorari is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (1) (a) in

that a conflict between the holding of the lower court

A.

and applicable decisions which were previously

entered by the United States Supreme Court. Review is

additionally sought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (1) (a) in

that the Court of Appeals holding relative to an

application of jurisdictional standards to which the

Corps is subject under the Clean Water Act isin conflict

with the application of the requisites in United States v.

Bayview Homes, 729 F. 2d 391 (6th Cir. 1981) cert.

granted, Docket No. 84-701, argued Oct. 16, 1985.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

1. THE NEW JERSEY DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING

WITH RESPECT TO LANDS BEING ABOVE THE MEAN

HIGH WATER LINE.AND SIMULTANEOUSLY BELOW

ORDINARY HIGH TIDE ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH

THE PRINCIPALS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT IN BORAX CONSOLIDATED,

LTD. v. LOS ANGELES, 296 US 10, 80 L.ed. 9, 56 S.Ct. 23

(1935).

Lands were held to be above the mean high water line

and simultaneously below the ordinary high tide line by

the Trial Court.

It is undisputed that the Trial Court found the

premises in question to be above the mean high tide

with the exception of 1.45 acres. Judge Gerry in his

November 28 Opinion found only a smal! portion of the

tract to be below the mean high water line.

“Of the 26.72 acres of land within the Diamond

Beach site .... the

government claims that 1.45, ali within the area

designated as wetlands, are below the mean high

water line.

November 28 1984 Opinion p.3.

In ruling that the government failed to carry its

burden of proof regarding areas asserted by them to be

tidal flowed and below the mean high water line the

Court Stated:

“Somewhat less than 1.45 acres therefore,

is below the mean high water line. . .”

emphasis supplied.

Conversely, in granting plaintiff's application for

Preliminary Injunctive Relief the Trial Court in its April

2, 1984 Opinion designated parts of the site as below

normal high tide and thus “wetlands” within the

context of the Corps regulations promulgated to

enforce the Clean Water Act (hereinafter CWA). In so

holding the Court stated:

“During normal high tide conditions surface

water covers a majority of the site...over

fifty percent of the site was covered during

an inspection on November 4, 1984...”.

emphasis supplied.

District Court Opinion, April 2, 1984 p.9.

These findings were relied upon by the Trial Court in

reaching its Opinion of November 28, 1984 wherein

permanent injunctive action was taken. November 28,

1984 Opinion, p.7. Discussing the jurisdiction of the

Corps under the CWA the Court emphasized the fact

that although not determinative, the issue of whether

lands were located below the normal mean high line

were relevant considerations in a finding that a parcel

constitutes. ‘wetlands’. Once again, the Court therein

made reference to its earlier holding that a majority of

ee

the 26.72 acres in question was allegedly below the

demarcation of the normal or ordinary high tide.

Based upon the same evidence and within the

confines of the November 28 Opinion, the District Court

has held that a “majority” of the 26.72 acre tract lies

below the “normal” or ordinary high tide while

simultaneously, in contradiction thereof, making the

determination that less than 1.45 acres were below the

mean high water line.

B. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles

Since the landmark ruling in Borax Consolidated,

Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 US 10 80 L.ed. 9, 56 S.Ct. 23,

(1935), there can be no question that the term “ordinary

high water mark” is synonymous with “mean high

water mark”. Sha/owitz, Shore & Sea Boundaries, US

Dept. of Commerce Coast & Geodetic Survey, US Shore

& Sea Boundaries, Gov't. Printing Office, Volume 1,

§6413. Although the United States Coast and Geodetic

Survey, the government branch which compiled the

Tidal Datum Surveys has not standardized the term for

technical engineering purposes, when used in relation

to tides, the phrase is said to be the equivalent of the

term “mean”. Schureman Tide & Current Glossary, 23,

Special Publication No. 228, USC & GS (1949).

Borax involved a suit to quiet title to land claimed to

be tideland. The City of Los Angeles asserted title under

a prior State Legislative Grant. Borax claims title in fee

Simple was vested in it by virtue of a prior federal

patent. Initially the action was dismissed, the District

Court holding that a federal grant could not be attacked

collaterally. The City of Los Angeles v. Borax, F.Supp.

281 (D. 1934). On appeal the Circuit Court held the

challenge to be proper. The issue as to location of the

ordinary high water mark was said to be one for

judicial determination and the matter was remanded

for retrial within the perimeters of the meaning of

ordinary high water mark as defined by the Court. 74

F.2d 901 (Cir. 1935). Appeal was made to the United

States Supreme Court.

At issue in the Supreme Court review was whether

the ordinary high “water mark” which marked the

boundary between the land conveyed to Borax’s

predecessors in title and the tidelands to which the

State had power to convey was to be the “mean high

tide line’’as define* by the lower court or “neap tide’

line. 296 US at 23.

Prior to Borax it had been established that tidelands

belonging to the State extended to the high water mark.

Hardin v. Jordon, 140 US 381, 35 L.ed 433, 11 S.Ct. 808,

838; Shilney v. Bowlby, 152 US 1, 38 L.ed 331, 14 S.Ct.

548. What was yet unresolved was exactly where the

line of demarcation of the mean high water mark would

lie. Given the constant ebb and flow of the sea along the

shore line the Borax Courts acknowledged that the

boundary would lie between the ordinary “high and low

water mark’. 296 US at 22. The exact line of the

demarcation was to represent a “mean of all high

tides’: 296 US at 26.

74 F.2d 906 Mean high tide line was defined as the

average high tide over the course of 18.6 years.

’ Neap tides are those which occur when the moon is in

its first and third quarters thereby causing the tide to

rise not as high or as low as on the average.

* In adopting the ‘mean’ approach the court rejected use

of the “spring tide” line, that being the range of tide at

the time of the new moon and full moon at which point

the water rises higher and falls lower than usual. Also

rejected was the “neap tide’ standard. Such occurs

when the moon is in the first and third quarter whereby

the tide fails to rise at high or fall as low as on the

average. 296 US at 23 citing Tidal Datum Plane USC &

GS, Special Publication No. 135 p.3.).

“Mean high water’ was hitherto defined by the

USCGS, now NOAA, as the “average height of all high

waters at (a given) place over a considerable period of

time”. Given the variations in tidal water levels over the

course of 18.6 years, the Supreme Court was in accord

with the Court of Appeals and chose to adopt such a

span of time as the requisite period over which tides

were to be observed in order to establish the “mean” or

“ordinary” high water line. 296 US at 27.

In sum, the Supreme Court in Borax utilizing the

terms “ordinary high water mark” and “mean high

water mark” interchangeably established the scientific

standard to be employed in determining its line of

demarcation. For decades “ordinary” and “mean” high

tide have been declared to be the same.

C. The Decision of the Trial Court conflicts with the

mandates of the United States Supreme Court in Borax

Consolidated, Ltd v. Los Angeles.

Of crucial importance to the court in this Petition

for Certiorari is the lower courts conflict with Borax. In

particular, the trial court through its use of the terms

“normal” and “mean” as its relates to the flow of tides

has failed to follow the well established doctrine of the

United States Supreme Court. In its decision the trial

court found that less than 1.45 acres of the 26.72 of land

were below the mean high water line. Directly opposed

to this is the determination that the normal high tide

flows over the majority of the property.

Use of the term “ordinary” in Borax is synonymous

to the Tria! Courts utilization of “normal” in its opinion

as they both relate to the designation of tidal marks.

Funk & Wagnalls International Dictionary, New

Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English

Language, Encyclopedia Edition, JG Ferguson

Publishing Co. (1980), defines “ordinary” as:

“of common or everyday occurence. . .

usual. .. regular... normal...”

In that only 1.45 acres are tide flowed, the balance of

the property is non-tidai and the decision of the Trial

Court must be reversed. Reveral of the Trial Court's

holdings relative to its finding of wetlands would result

in the determination that the lands in question were not

federally protected wetlands and thus not subject to

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under the

CWA.

D. Impact of Federal Water Pollution Control Act on Trial

Court Decision that the property constituted wetlands.

The Federal Water Pollution Control! Act, more

commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33

USC 1251 et seq. was designed to eliminate the

discharge of pollutants into the nations waters, 33 USC

1231 (a) (1). While any discharge of defined pollutants,

including dredged spoil, rock and sand, 33 USC 1362 (b)

is presumptively unlawful, 33 USC §1311, jurisdiction is

vested in the United States Army Corps of Engineers

pursuant to §404, 33 USC 1344 having authority to

oversee Subject areas and to grant permission of the

disposal of the dredged or fill material through the

medium of permits. Under the terms of the Act the

Corps was to promulgate regulations to serve as a

basis for evaluating the advisability of a permit which

is to be issued only in such circumstances as will not

have an adverse impact on work quality. 33 USC

1344(b) 40 CFR §230 (1983).

The CWA defines the “navigable waters” over which

it has jurisdiction as “the wates of the United States

including territorial seas”. Section 502(7), 33 USC §1362

(7). Although “wetlands” is no where mentioned or

defined in the Act itself, the Corps when promulgating

regulations determine that ‘‘wetlands’ are

encompassed by the term ‘waters of the United States”

9.

and thus are within the intended scope of the Act.

Wetlands are specifically defined in 33 CFR 323.2(c)

(1983) as:

“Those areas the are inundated and

Saturated by surface or ground water ina

frequency or duration sufficient to support,

and that under normal circumstances do

Support a prevalence of vegetation typically

adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.

Wetlands generally include swamps,

marshes, bogs, and similar areas’.

To qualify, a wetland must be “adjacent” or

“bordering contiguous or neighboring’to navigable

waters and their tributaries. 33 CFR 323.2(d).

Jurisdiction of the Corps and applicability of the

CWA provisions over the subject property are therefore

dependent upon the finding that the site constitutes

wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or its

tributaries. Three facts have generally been

considered by the Corps in determinations of wetland

designations within 33 CFR 323.2(c): (1) soil conditions;

(2) vegetation and (3) the degree and frequency of

inundation. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League Inc. v.

Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 1983); Weismann v.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.

1976); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391

(6th Cir. 1984) cert. granted, Docket No. 84-701 argued

on October 16, 1985.

Although the focus of this Petition is upon the third

prong of the test respecting inundation, brief mention

is made of evidence of soil conditions and vegetation

upon the site so that the court may have an overview of

the proofs presented below.

Attempts by the United States to demonstrate that

the hydrology of the area typified wetlands was not

10.

presented by a duly qualified expert in hydrology and

hence should have been deemed inadmissible in

accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 702. Further, no salinity

tests were conducted by the Corps despite its assertion

that the site was subject to tidal flow from Jarvis

Sound, a saltwater body adjacent to the Atlantic

Ocean. Tests performed by experts on behalf of

Ciampitti unquestionably demonstrate the absence of

Saltwater on the site. (Vol. ll, p. 535, 587).

Relative to vegetation present on the site, it was

demonstrated at the trial that while some forms of

plant life which survive in wetland areas were located

on the tract, such vegetation is also typically found on

upland areas and hence the presence of any such

plants is not indicative. (Vol. ll, p. 546-571). No evidence

was presented from which it could be concluded that

the viability of the vegetation in question was

dependent upon tidal flow.

At issue in this Petition are the lower courts’ findings

relative to inundation and saturation of the Ciampitti

site, the third prong of the Corps wetlands test. If the

Trial Court and Court of Appeals’ determinations are

found to be in conflict with the Borax case, supra, and

accordingly overruled, the determination that the site

is inundated and saturated with water sufficient to

allow a “wetlands” designation cannot stand. Such

tract not constituting federally protected wetlands

would not be the intended subject of the CWA nor would

the Corps have a right to regulate the development of

the site.

In that the Corps has failed to assert jurisdiction

premised on the presence of ground water on the

Ciampitti site, alleged tidal flow is the only basis upon

which jurisdiction can rest.

11. A

Absent frequent inundation and saturation by tidal

waters resulting in the ability to support wetlands

vegetation it cannot be concluded that a “wetlands”

within the CWA exists. Absent such a wetland, no

jurisdiction exists over the site under the provisions of

the Act.

While tidal flow of property is not in and of itself a

prerequisite to Corps jurisdiction under the CWA, it is

relevant in determining whether the lands in question

are “inundated and saturated by surface or ground

water’. To such an extent as will support vegetation

adapted for life in such saturated soil conditions,

thereby constituting wetlands as defined in 33 CFR

323.2(C).

With respect to the question of tide flow as was

previously set forth herein in detail, the trial court inits

decision on a preliminary injunction issue concluded

that a majority of the site was covered by water during

“norma!” high tide conditions. Conversely, in its final

determination, the trial court held that a mere 1.45 of

the 26.72 acres of land were above the mean high tide

line.

In comparing the definitions of ordinary or “normal”

high tide with “mean” high tide the United States

Supreme Court concluded that the phrases are

synonymous. Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles,

Supra. Use of the respective terms in a manner in

which two different results are reached (i.e. 1.45 acres

are tide flowed as compared to 50 percent or

approximately 13 acres) is in conflict with the Borax

mandates and thus must be overruled.

2. THE FEDERAL OF APPEALS FOR THE 3RD CIRCUIT HAS

RENDERED A DECISION WHICH IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE

6TH CIRCUIT IN U.S. v.R/VERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, 729,

F.2d 391 (6TH CIR. 1984) CERT. GRANTED, DOCKET NO. 84-

701, ARGUED ON OCTOBER 16, 1985.

12.

A. US. v. Riverside Bayview Homes is Analogous to

U.S. v. Ciampitti.

The 6th Circuit in United States v. Riverside Bayview

Homes 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984) cert. granted, Docket

No. 84-701 agrued on October 16, 1985, clarified the

regulatory definition of “wetlands”. 33 CFR 323.2(c)

(1983) defining the prerequisites necessary to support

a determination of jurisdiction by the Corps resting

upon a finding that a particular site constituted

federally protected wetlands subject to the CWA.

Riverside, which was recently heard by this Court on

October 16, 1985 is directly analogous to the case at

bar. Both cases involved situations wherein the

government sought a permanent injunction against the

filling of a site without Army Corps of Engineers

permits having been granted for the same. Both the

Riverside property and the Ciampitti property are

located in suburban areas and have been previously

plotted as subdivisions, ironically both in the early

1900's. Like the Ciampitti property, the Riverside

property was originally surrounded by dikes which

prevented any tide flow or water flow onto the property

whatsoever. The dike involved on the Riverside.

property was eventually destroyed allowing some

drainage onto the property. Likewise, in the case at

hand, a substantial railroad embankment surrounds

the property cutting off all major tidal flow,

13.

which embankment is solid except for a breach which

allows storm water run off to leave the site and escape

onto surrounding properties.

After a series of appeals, it was determined that 33

CFR 323.2(c) (1983) was the applicable definition

pursuant to which it must be determined whether the

property in fact constitutes wetlands. This is the

precise definition which governs the case at bar. After

analyzing the definition of “wetlands” contained

within 33 CFR 323.2(c) the Court of Appeals for the 6th

Circuit held that before a finding that a piece of

property constitutes wetlands may be made, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that both the property is

inundated by tidal flow and that aquatic vegetation

exists on the site. Both must be present and the

existence of the aquatic vegetation has to have been

caused by the inundation in question.

After extensively examining the history behind this

regulation, the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit

concluded:

“Neither inundation nor aquatic vegetation

would be sufficient, standing alone, to bring

a piece of land within the definition. Both

must be present, and the latter must be

Caused by the former.

Were this not so, then areas which

inexplicably support some species of

aquatic vegetation, but which are not

normally inundated, would fall within the

wetiands definition. Such a preverse result

could not have been what the court

contemplated in promulgating the

regulation. Indeed as noted earlier, the

Corps expressly adverted to the situation of

“area that are not aquatic but experience an

abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation”

and emphasize that such lands were not

intended to be covered by the regulations.

(at p. 396)”.

14.

ee

Applying this standard in the Riverside case, the 6th

Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government had

failed to meet its burden of proof insofar as it was

unable to demonstrate that the vegetation found on the

property, although it could consist of wetlands

vegetation, had been caused by the inundatioii of the

property or in fact thet the property was inundated or

flooded at a frequency and duration sufficient to

Support wetlands vegetation under normal

circumstances.

B. The 3rd Circuit Holding is in Conflict with the 6th

Circuit Court.

Relying on the Riverside case, petitioners at the time

of trial in this matter have contended that in fact

absolutely no proof had been offered by the

government to show that the premises in question had

been inundated or flooded at a frequency or duration

sufficient to support or that it does support wetlands

vegetation under normal circumstances.

The trial court in issuing a permanent injunction

found that a mere 1.45 of the 26.72 acres in question

were flowed by the ordinary or normal high tide and

hence could be classified as inundated. Although the

trial court attempted to comply with the Bayview

Standard, it did so incorrectly, its decision being in

direct conflict with the 6th Circuit. In reaching its

determination the trial court merely concluded that the

presence of vegetation considered together with the

presence of some saturated soil conditions and the

presence of some water on the site was sufficient to

meet the Riverview test.

Riverside requires that the vegetation present on the

site be demonstrated to have been precipitated by the

waters which inundate and saturate soil. 729 F.2d at

15.

396. It follows that areas which support aquatic

vegetation although not inundated are not within the

purview of federally protected wetlands.

At trial no evidence was presented to support the

findings that on-site vegetation was caused by tidal

waters which inundated the lands. On the contrary,

Ciampitti’s experts testified to the fact that the plant

life in question could exist on non-wetland sites.

Relative to the question of inundation and saturation

evidence in the record does not support a finding of

inundation sufficient to meet the Riverside test. The

Corps visited the site shortly after extremely heavy

rain storms, not during the average dry conditions.

Flooding caused by storm water in and of itself is not

sufficient to base a determination of inundation under

the Riverside standard. Furthermore, with respect to

tidal waters, the trial court held that 1.45 acres of the

entire 26.72 acre tract was flowed by normal tide

waters. Designation of an entire tract as wetland

subject to CWA and Corps permit requirements based

on such a nominal area is contrary to Riverside’s

mandate that federally protected wetlands be

“inundated and saturated”

Thus, the determinations of the 3rd and 6th Circuits

with regard to the requirements sufficient to designate

a parcel as “wetlands” are in conflict

16.

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CONCLUSION

In that the Trial Court and Circuit Court decisions are

in conflict with those previously entered by the United

States Supreme Court and are further in conflict with

those of other Circuits, it is respectfully requested that

this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ALFRED A. PORRO, JR.

Attorney for Petitioners,

Robert Ciampitti, et als.

DATED: November 4, 1985

iM.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V

ROBERT CIAMPITT|, ALBRECHT Civil Action No. 83-4004

AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE

N. CIAMPITT! and PACIFIC FOUR OPINION

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Samuel P. Moulthrop, Esquire

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Ms. Jodi Lee Alper

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

970 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorneys of Plaintiff

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Aifred A. Porro, Jr., Esquired

10 Stuyvesant Avenue

Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071

Attorney for Defendants, Robert Ciampitti,

Bruce N. Ciampitti. and Pacific Four

Corporation

James A. Waldron, Esquire

Rubin and Waldron

2700 Pacific Avenue

P.0. Box 65

Wildwood, New Jersey 08260

Attorneys for Defendant, Albrecht

and Heun Corporation

GERRY, District Judge

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This matter is before the court on the Government's

request for a preliminary injunction. It wants to prevent the

defendants from engaging in fill activities at the Diamond

Beach site in Cape May County, New Jersey, which the

Government contends contains federally regulated

wetlands.

The Government is proceeding under the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (hereinafter

“Clean Water Act’) and the Rivers and Harbors

Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (hereinafter

“Refuse Act’).

A hearing was held on November 9, 15 and 17, 1983. The

court had previously issued a temporary restraining order

on October 24, 1983 barring defendants from any further fill

activities on the site until the matter could be heard.

The following constitutes this court's findings and fact

and conclusion of law.

|. FINDINGS OF FACT

hk. The Defendants and Their Relationship to the Diamond Beach

ite

Robert Ciampitti is an individual residing within the

District of New Jersey. (Robert Ciampitti Deposition

(hereinafter R.C. Dep.), p.4; Tr. 3, p.24.) He and Pacific Four

Corporation (hereinafter “Pacific Four’), a corporation

Organized and existing under the laws of Pennsylvania and

doing business within the District of New Jersey, are the

developers of the site. (R.C. Dep., pp. 11-13.)

Bruce Nicholas Ciampitti, Robert's brother and the largest

single owner of parcels of land at the site, gave Robert a

power of agency for ail land at the site in the name of Bruce

Nicholas. (R.C. Dep., pp. 59, 110; Tr. 3, pp. 60-61, 82.) (Bruce

Ciampitti holds title to the land under the name Bruce

Nicholas. R.C. Dep., p. 30.)

3a

In addition, Robert Ciampitti was designated agent and

representative for Pacific Four and all indiv,cua! lot owners

at the site to secure all necessary approvals to install

improvements at the site. (R.C. Dep., pp. 12, 71, 74; Tr. 3, pp.

45, 80, 81.) Those individuals are paying Robert Ciampitti for

his efforts on their behalf, (R.C. Dep., p. 76); and in some

instances, Ciampitti has directed and paid for filling

activities at the site himself, hoping later “to strike a deal”

with the actual property owners. (R.C. Dep., p. 91; William

Albrecht Deposition (hereinafter W.A. Dep.) pp. 19, 24.)

In light of Robert Ciampitti’s activities at the site, the

parties stipulated on the record that he is the principal

defendant -- the one responsible for having conducted the

activites at the site. (Tr. 1, p. 29.) For that reason, in the

remainder of this opinion, the court shall refer only to the

“defendants,” when discussing activities at the site.

Albrecht and Heun Corporation is tne construction

company responsible for placing and grading fill on the site

under the direction of Robert Ciampitti. (R.C. Dep., pp. 144,

151; W.A. Dep., pp. 19, 24.) Robert Ciampitti also contracted

with Gerald E. Speitel Associates, a consulting engineering

firm (hereinafter “Speitel”), to work for him. (Tr. 3, p. 137.)

B. Activities at the Site

As early as 1980, Robert Ciampitti was made aware of

federal wetlands regulations by his consultants, Speitel. he

was aware that in certain areas along navigable

waterways, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter

“the Corns"), had jurisdiccion over those areas through their

regulations. (R.C. Dep., pp. 60-62: Tr. 1, pp. 103, 105; Tr. 3, pp.

100, 113-137, 160-161.)

Specifically, he was told by Speitel that there was

possible state and federal jurisdiction over wetlands on the

site. The Corps, which was summoned to the site by Gary

Franklin, A Speitel employee, told Speitel that a federal

permit to fill that area was unlikely. Despite those warnings,

Ciampitti directed Speitel to ¢-velop engineering pians for

the site ard told Speitel that he would possibly be filling

wetland areas. (Tr. 1, pp. 103-105; Tr. 3, pp. 100, 113, 137, 147-

149, 160-161.)

4a

Robert Ciampitti did nothing between 1980 and 1983 to

contact the Corps about its jurisdiction over the site. He

assumed that if the Corps had jurisdiction, it would so

advise him. (R.C. Dep., pp. 72-73; Tr. 3, pp. 100-101.)

Furthermore, he did not apply to the Corps for a wetlands

permit, because in March 1983, he became aware of a 1907

land grant held by the previous owners of the site which

provides:

The bearers of the title of the property within this grant

have the right to dredge, fill, reappropriate lands under

water, construct wharfs, marinas, inlets, buildings, or

anything that they deem appropriate to their private

and exclusive use.

(R.C. Dep., pp. 102-103; Tr. 3, pp. 76, 153; Defendant's Trial

Exhibit 14.)

In the summer of 1983, after learning of this grant,

defendant decided to develop portions of the site which he

was aware were designated as New Jersey wetlands and

possible federal wetlands, believing that the grant gave him

authority to do so. (R.C. Dep., p. 128; Tr. 3, pp. 97, 153.) In

particular, he had a fifty foot pipe and a tide gate placed on

the northwest corner of the site in order to keep debris from

coming in and going out; to al!ow storm water to run off the

site; and to prevent tidal water from coming onto the site.

(R.C. Dep., pp. 115-118; Tr. 3, p. 102.)

These activities were noted by Robert E. Eckhardt from

the Corps’ Philadelphia District, Regulatory Branch for the

Surveillance and Inspection Section, who inspected the site

on September 2, 1983. (R.C. Dep., p. 138; Robert Eckhardt

Affidavit (hereinafter R.E. Aff.) p. 7; Tr. 1, p. 35.)

He observed the following:

a. Approximately 3,000 feet of roadway had

been constructed in areas he believed to be

wetlands contiguous to Jarvis Sound on the

site.

b. The roads were constructed of sand

hauled to the site.

c. The fill consisted of sand.

5a

d. A tide gate had been constructed in atidal

creek and stopped tidal flow into large

portions of the area designated as wetlands

at the site.

e. The tide gate is a type that causes

wetlands to be drained of water.

f. The ‘wetiands” impounded by the tide gate

showed signs of deterioration; e.g.,

vegetation was becoming dry.

g. Storm sewers and outlets had been

installed in certain portions of the roads.

h. There were no soil erosion control

measures at the site.

(R.E. Aff., p. 9; Tr. 1, pp. 40-45, 49.)

The fill material and tidal gate were placed in federally

designated wetlands as depicted on Government Trial

Exhibit RR-1. (R.E. Aff.. p. 10: John Olson Affidavit

(hereinafter J.0. Aff.), p. 6-7: Tr. 1, pp. 38-49.)

Eckhardt told Ciampitti that the site contained tidai

wetlands and directed Ciampitti to cease further fill

activities in those areas. (R.C. Dep., p. 139: R.E. Aff., p. 14; Tr.

1, pp. 50-51.) Ciampitti told Eckhardt that he wouid stop the

fill activity, (R.E. Aff.. p. 15), but he did not stop because he

did not believe he had been properly notified by an

appropriate officiai of the Corps. (R.C. Dep., p. 144.)

On September 15, 1983, Eckhardt returned to the site and

Observed approximately three dump trucks and two

bulldozers hauling and spreading fill material into the

designated wetlands. (R.E. Aff. p. 18: Tr. 1, pp. 56-57.)

Eckhardt advised the bulldozer operator to stop filling in

wetlands. The operator, Mr. Albrecht, made a telephone call

and said he would stop woik. (R.E. Aff., p. 19; Tr. 1, pp. 57-

58.)

6a

On September 15, 1983, the District Engineer of the Corps

issued a “cease and desist’ letter directing Robert Ciampitti

to stop fill activities in the wetlands and remove the tide

gate. (R.E. Aff., p. 21; Tr. 1, p. 107.) On September 16, 1983,

this “cease and desist” letter was delivered by Robert

Eckhardt and John Olson of the Corps to the office of James

Webb, Jr., Esquire, the attorney for Robert Ciampitti. On that

date, John Olson advised Webb of the location of wetlands

on the site and explained to him the scope and nature of the

violations there. (R.E. Aff., p. 22; Tr. 1, pp. 60, 64, 111: Tr. 3, p.

104.) Robert Ciampitti became aware that the cease and

desist letter had been issued against him for filling federal

wetlands, and that the letter had been served upon James

Webb, his attorney. (R.C. Dep., p. 146; Tr. 3, p. 104.)

Nonetheless, he did not cease filling activities at the site. (Tr.

1, p. 72; Tr. 3, p. 1031.) He directed Albrecht and Heun to

continue filling at the site. He did not contact the Corps and

disregarded the cease and desistletter. (R.C. Dep., pp. 147-

151; Tr. 3, pp. 103-106.)

On September 16, 1983, John M. Olson, Supervisory

Biologist serving as the Acting Chief of the Application

Section of the Philadelphia District of the Corps, inspected

the site and observed that approximately five acres of

earthen fill had been placed on wetlands and in tidal creeks

at the site, anc that a pipe with a tide gate had been installed

in one tidal creek. (J.0. Aff., p. 6.) Olson determined during

his September 16, 1983 inspection that wetlands were

located on the site and based that conclusion on:

a. The presence of tidal creeks flowing into

the site;

7a

b. The presence of existing vegetation

adapted for growth in saturated or inundated

Soils, including saltmarsh cordgrass

(Spartina alterniflora), saltmeadow

cordgrass (S. patens), salt grass (Distichlis

spicata), black grass (Juncus gerardii),

marsh elder (/va frutescens), sea lavender

(Limonium carolinianum) and salt wort

(Salicornia sp.):

c. Saturated soil conditions: and

d. The presence of standing water over

portions of the site.

(J.0. Aff., p. 7.)

He returned to the site on September 20, 1983 and

observed bulldozers working on upland areas adjacent to

the wetlands. He told the bulldozer operator which areas

were wetlands and could not be filled, and which areas were

uplands. (J.0. Aff., p. 14.)

On September 27, 1983, Robert Eckhardt received a phone

call from James Webb, attorney for Roberty Ciampitti, who

advised Eckhardt that no one from the Corps would be

permitted on the site from that date onward. Webb also

Stated that the Corps could not stake out the wetlands on the

site the following day, as had been previously agreed to by

John Olson and James Webb, Esquire. (R.E. Aff., p 24: Tr. 1, p.

120; R.C. Dep., p. 158.)

On October 13, 1983, Robert Eckhardt returned to the site

and observed that, since his last visit to the site, additional

fill material had been placed in the wetlands as depicted on

Government Trial Exhibit RR-3. He also observed a bulldozer

Spreading fill on one of the roadways which had previously

been constructed in the wetlands. (J.0. Aff., p. 25: Tr. 1, p.

70.) See GRR-3.

8a

—

On October 20, 1983, Robert Eckhardt returned to the site

and observed that, since his last visit to the site, fill material

had been placed in additiona! areas of the wetlands as

depicted on Government Trial Exhibit RR-4. he also observed

a tractor-trailer dump truck discharging fill in the wetlands.

(R.E. Aff., p. 28; Tr. 1, p. 72.) See GRR-4.

C. The Site and Its Development

The portion of the Diamond Beach site involved in this

controversy is described in Lower Township tax records

simply enough as Blocks 696, 701, 706, 716, 721, 726 and 731.

(Complaint p. 19; R.E. Aff., p. 12; J.0. Aff., p. 16; R.C. Dep., pp.

12, 71, 74; Tr. 3, p. 23.) It is a tract of land located along New

Jersey Avenue, which is known as Park Boulevard in Lower

Township (Tr. 2, p. 105), between West Jefferson Avenue ana

Madison Avenue. (Tr. 1, p. 39.) It is bounded on the West by

East Railroad Avenue and Jarvis Sound.

A railroad embankment is located on the site parallel to

East Railroad Avenue. (Tr. 1, pp. 45-56.) It was built in

approximately 1924. (Tr. 3, pp. 113-114.) in a 1957 photo of

the site, (D-1), remnants of a road running next to the

railroad right-of-way can be seen. (Tr. 3, np. 123, 67.)

Sometime prior to 1955, the southern portion of the site

was used as a dumping ground. (Tr. 3, pp. 39-40.) As of 1957,

mosquito ditches appeared on the property. (Tr. 3, p. 125.)

Sometime between 1957 and 1962, a driving range was

constructed on the site which was no longer in use as of

1969. The vegetation has grown back. (Tr. 3, pp. 126-127.)

Furthermore, the railroad was no longer used as of 1962.

(Tr. 3.) Sometime between 1962 and 1969, a breach appeared

in the railroad embankment. It has not been firmly

established whether the breach was created as a result of a

major storm that occurred in 1962 or was manmade. (Tr. 1, p.

150; Tr. 3, pp. 117, 130.)

ee eee. eee ee ea ee Bae |

Most important, in 1975 the federal government claimed

jurisdiction over the wetlands under the Clean Water Act. In

1979 or early 1980, subsequent to the federal claim of

jurisdiction, Memphis, Rochester and Richmond Avenues,

and part of Park Boulevard were filled. All the evidence of

record indicates that at the time of this first fill activity by

tie defendant the site could be characterized as wetlands

and was subject to tidal flow. (See infra at 8-9: Tr. 2, p. 19.)

Following that, in 1982, Albrecht, at Ciampitti’s direction,

filled Ratiroad, Raleigh, Madison, South Station and Austin

Avenues. (2D, p. 20.) A water well was installed by the

Wildwood Utilities Authority between South Station and

Raleigh, east of Park. In addition, those areas depicted on

Government Exhibit RR were filled, and the tidal gate was

installed. (Tr. 3, p. 74.)

Defendant plans to develop the entire Diamond Beach site

to include approximately 1,500 single family dwellings, 6-8

multi-unit dwellings, a mote! facility and a shopping certer.

(R.C. Dep., p. 132; Tr. 3, p. 83.) To date, none of the

defendants had either applied for or obtained a permit under

the Clean Water Act, (R.E. Aff., p. 31; J.0. Aff., p. 15); the

Rivers and Harbors Act (/d.); or the Refuse Act (/d.).

D. The Presence of Wetlands on the Site

On the basis of the evidence thus far presented to the

court, it concludes that federally reguiated wetlands exist

on the Diamond Beach site as designated on Government

Trial Exhibits RR-5 and 100-102. (See Tr. 1, p. 130; Tr. 2, p.

101.)!

1. Defendant has not evaluated the site using federal

wetlands criteria so he is not in a position to directly

challenge the federal designation. Nonetheless, his

expert, Gary Franklin of Speitel, admitted that the area

designated by the New Jersey Department of

Environmental Protection Agency is in fact a salt water

marsh. (Tr. 3, p. 186.) This area appears on the overlay

Mr. Franklin produced for the court. It appears to be

somewhat smaller than the federaliy designated

wetlands area. See 0-30.

10a

SF

Vegetation on the site which indicates a wetlands

environment includes: marsh hay, salt marsh cordgrass,

high tide bush, salt marsh fleabone, black grass and sea

myrtle. (Tr. 1, p. 131; Tr. 2, p. 110; Government Trial Exhibit

8.) These plants are commonly found in New Jersey salt

marshes, (Tr. 2, p. 109), and are adapted to an area subject to

tidal flow. (Tr. 1, pp. 146-147.) Specifically, salt marsh grass

and salt grass, two plants which survive frequent flooding,

are found immediately adjacent to the tidal ditches on the

site. Up from the tidal ditches, but still within the federally

designated wetlands area, high tide bush, groundsel tree

and sea myrtle, vegetation adapted for life in saturated soil,

can be found. (Tr. 2, p. 17.)

No significant areas within the wetlands designated area

do not include the species described above (Tr. 1, p. 131);

and the federally designated wetlands area is dominated by

these plants. (Tr. 1, p. 132; Tr. 3, pp. 162-163.) Furthermore,

these species exist beyond even the federally designated

wetlands line. (Tr. 1, p. 132.)

The salt marsh snail, a salt marsh invertebrate which

lives only in wetlands, has been found on the site. (Tr. 2, p.

114.) lsopods, which are characteristic of salt marshes have

also been found there. (Tr. 2, p. 114.) Fish were observed in

the creek on the site (Tr. 2, p. 114); snowy egrets were

observed feeding on the fish (Tr. 1, p. 123).

Great Blue Heron and the Clapper Rail (which typically

nest in salt marshes and are found only in wetlands) have

been observed on the site. (Tr. 2, p. 114.)

The soil in the federally designated wetlands at the site ts

Saturated throughout, in most cases directly to the surface.

(Tr. 1, pp. 132-133; Tr. 2, p. 112.) It is wet, very dark and

primarily sand, which indicates an anaerobic condition. (Tr.

2, p. 134.) ,

At the upper edges of the federally designated wetiands

boundary, the soils are aiso saturated and there is a high

water table. (Tr. 2, p. 113.)

Ila

|

During normal high tide conditions, surface water covers

a majority of the site: although there are areas on the site

above the high tide line which are never covered by water,

over 50% of the site was covered during an inspection on

November 4, 1983, even with the fill present. (Tr. 1, p. 145.) It

can presently be determined by examining breaches in the

fill on the site and adjacent communities of the same

elevation (Tr. 1, p. 154) that, without fill, tidal waters would

normally flow onto the site trough the entire southernmost

portion and the break inthe railroad embankment. (Tr. 1, pp.

141, 150-151, 154; Tr. 2, p. 24.)2

Finally, the Diamond Beach site was mapped as a

wetlands area by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service

on its National Wetiands inventory between 1978 and 1980.

On that map, the site was designated as a mixed emergent

wetland with open water. (Tr. 2, pp. 119-121; Government

Trial Exhibit QQ.)

There is inconclusive evidence that the site contains

wetlands which are below the mean high tide line. Although

Government expert Olson and defense expert Franklin-both

testified that some small portion of the site is below the

mean high water line (Tr. 1, pp. 157-158: Tr. 3, p. 182),

Government expert Tiner, whom the court found to be most

knowledgeable in this area, refused to testify about that

Subject because he believed that the data necessary to make

such a determination was not available. (Tr. 2, pp. 132-133.)

2. There is a mojor tidal creek which flows through the

railroad embankment south of the site below the area

of fill. (Tr. 1, pp. 151-152.) Also, according to

defendants expert, there is a tidal tributary to the

southeast of the site which would allow salt water to

enter the site (Tr. 3, pp. 170-171): amarsh system to the

southeas* which is a potential water source (Tr. 3, p.

172); and an inlet to the site from the east which

connects the site to the ocean through the Cape May

Canal (Tr. 3, p. 173).

19a

E. The Importance of the Wetlands and the Damage Done Thereto

by Defendants

Tidal wetlands are used as nursing and spawning areas

for a variety of forage fish and sport and commercially

important fish species. (Tr. 2, p. 11; J.0. Aff.,, 12.)

When this site is open to tidal flow, the plant production is

washed into the adjacent tidal waters where it becomes the

primary food source for aquatic organisms. The organic

detritus of the tidal marsh serves as the base for the

estuarian web. (Tr. 2, p. 11; J.0. Aff., » 10.)

Wetlands, including this site, also act as water quality

purification areas. They improve water quality by tapping

run-off from adjacent developed areas (Tr. 2, p. 11; J.0. Aff...

9), and they act as a buffer, shielding adjacent upland areas

from storm actions. They then serve as a Storage area for

storm and flood waters. (Tr. 2, p. 11.)

Furthermore, wetlands, including this site, are important

habitats for aquatic animals, as well as mammals and birds,

including:

a. wintering, migatory and _ breeding

waterfowl and other birds:

b. passerine bird species; and

c. fur-bearing mammals.

(Tr. 2, p. 11; JO. Aff.» 17.) ~wW.

Fill on this site eliminates wetlands and reduces their

productive value. Normal tidal flow is prevented, and

therefore nursery and spawning grounds for aquatic

Organismsare not created, and the exportation of food

materials into adjacent waters cannot be realized. (Tr. 2, pp.

18, 46, 105.)

13a

The fill on the site had damaged the underlying five acres

of wetland habitat. The blockage of tidal flow is adversely

affecting the approximately 19 acres of wetlands enclosed

within the perimeter of the fill. (J.0. Aff.,» 8.) Without tidal

flow, vegetation on the site will change, and there will be an

Overall draining effect of the area. (Tr. 2, p. 147.)

Furthermore, erosion at the site is already causing fill to

wash into the surrounding marsh and adjacent tidal waters.

(Tr. 1, p. 124; Tr. 2, p. 123.)

ll. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - THE PREREQUISITES FOR THE

ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE

DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN MET

The traditional test for determining whether a preliminary

injunction should issue has been stated in numerous cases

from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In/n re Arthur

Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir.

1980), the court stated it as foilows:

We have repeatedly held that for the District Court to

grant a preliminary injunction the moving party must

generally show (1) areasonabie probability of eventual

success in the litigation, and (2) that the movant will be

irreparably injured pendente /ite if relief is not granted

Moreover, while the burden rests with the moving

party to make these two requisite showings, the

district court should take into account, when they are

relevant (3) the possibility of harm to other interested

persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and

(4) the public interest. Oourn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147

(3d Cir. 1975) (Citations omitted).

Delaware River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trail Tr., Inc.,

501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974): A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia

Pictures, Inc., 440 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1971): Allis-Chalmers

Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d

Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Ne/son v. Miller,

373 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1967).

14a

This court must now determine whether the requirements

of the test have been met in the present case.

A. Reasonable Probability of Evenutual Success in the Litigation

1. The Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants

into the waters of the United States except in compliance

with other sections of the Act. The provisions of 33 U.S.C. §

1344 regulate the discharge of fill material into those waters

by requiring a discharger to obtain an appropriate permit

from the Corps before commencing operations.

As the court found above, none of the defendants has

applied for a permit. It is also clear that “fill” material, as

that term is defined in the Act, is being discharged by

defendants. See 323.2(K). Therefore, the issue to which the

parties directed their energies is whether “waters of the

United States” are involved.

The term “waters of the United States” specifically

includes wetlands. The reguiations implementing 33 U.S.C. §

1344 provide in pertinent part:

The term ‘waters of the United States’ means:

* * *

(3) Tributaries to navigable waters of the United States.

including adjacent wetlands ......................

a oe *

(c) The term ‘wetlands’ means those areas that are

inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater ata

frequency and duration sufficient to support. and that

under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence

of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil

conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,

marshes, begs and similar areas

3. Although section 1344 refers to “navigable waters,

that term is defined in Section 502(7) of the Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1362(7) as “waters of the United States.”

= 15a

33 C.F.R. § 323.2.

These regulations were specifically adopted pursuant to

court order in Natural Resources Defense Council v.

Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975). The court there

concluded that Congress intended the Clean Water Act to

assert “federal jurisdiction over the Nation's waters to the

maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of

the Constitution,” and that the term “navigable waters” was

not limited to the traditional tests of navigability. 1392 F.

Supp. at 686. See PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp.

1370, 1381 (D. D.C. 1975).

This standard of jurisdiction has been continually

repeated in recent cases. See United States v. Tilton, 705

F.2d 429, 431 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lambert, 695

F.2d 536, 537, 538 (11th Cir. 1983): United States v. Byrd, 609

F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979); Leslie Salt Company v.

Frochike, 578 F.2d 742, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978); United States

v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Company, 504 F.2d 1317,

1324-25 (6th Cir. 1974).

The Government presented strong evidence

demonstrating that the land in question presently retains

and, at the time it was filled by defendants, retained all the

essential characteristics of ‘wetlands’ as they are

described under the Act, i.e., it was inundated and/or

Saturated by water at a frequency and duration sufficient to

Support vegetation that typically thrives in saturated soil

conditions.4 See the court's Findings of Fact.

4. Defendants challenged the criteria by which the

Government would have the court decide this issue

contending that in the absence of salinity tests a

wetlands determination cannot be made. The court

disagrees. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.

Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) (three-prong test

which includes type of soil, degree and frequency of

inundation and saturation, type of vegetation); Bayou

Des Familles Dev. v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, 541 F.

Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1982); and United States v.

Weismann, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1339 (M.D. Fia. 1980).

16a

The Government has proven through two. expert

witnesses that the site which has been designated as

federally reguiated wetlands has an abundance of “obligate

hydrophytes” (plants requiring a saturated environment to

survive), anumber of which even live beyond the designated

wetlands line. The site has been proven to contain saturated

soils with regular inundation. The soils were found to show

evidence of an anaerobic condition, suggesting frequent

water coverage. The tidal flow was graphically depicted

through ground and aerial photographs showing water-

filled tidal ditches and tidal creeks. Testimony from both the

Government and the defendants’ expert proved the

movement of tidal fiow from the west, south and east onto

the site.

Under the circumstances, the Government's likelihood of

success on the merits is strong. In fact the Government has

succeeded on the merits, subject, of course, to the court

being persuaded otherwise by RELEVANT controverting

evidence which has not already been presented but which

defendants may present at the permanent injunction

hearing.

The defendants have argued and continue to urge upon

the court the importance of the history and development of

the site to determine whether the Corps has jurisdiction over

the property. Although the court is as fascinated by the

history of the site as defendants’ expert Mr. Franklin is, it

agrees with Mr. Franklin that for purposes of the present

controversy that history is of purely scientific value and is

not dispositive of the legal issues before the court. (Tr. 3, pp.

165-166.)

17a

Defendants’ arguments on this point are not clearly

delineated. The court perceives that defendants are making

the following three arguments and will treat with them

accordingly:

1. The Government would be violating the

defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights if it

required them to remove the fill:

2. The site is not a natural wetland: i.e., it

was not always a wetland, so the defendants

should not be penalized for the fact that it has

become one; and

3. The area became subject to tidal flow

because of a manmade breach in the railroad

embankment, and, therefore, it is not

properly characterized as federal wetlands.

Defendants’ first argument, which is derivatively based

on United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.

1974), is without merit under the circumstances of this case.

So long as nothing that occurred o” or to the property,

before that time in 1975 when the Corps claimed jurisdiction

over the wetlands, destroyed the “wetland” character of the

site, there is no justification for preventing the Corps from

requiring the defendant to comply with the appropriate

regulations on the basis of some violations of the Fifth

Amendment due process or taking clause. Neither the

dump’s nor the driving range’s presence, nor any other

activity, transformed the land into irrevocably “dry land” in

1975. Therefore, this situation can be easily distinguished

from the situation in Stoeco Homes.

Stoeco involved the Rivers and Harbors Act. In 1970, the

Government's permit policy with respect to § 10 was

changed. Previously, it had not required dredge and fiil

permits for work shoreward of the established legal harbor

lines. The new policy requireu permits for such work.

18a

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1

Defendants had acquired a tract of land in 1951. The site

had been a tidal marsh in 1927 when it was filled to a level

substantially above mean high tide. Stoeco Homes, 498 at

610. At the time it was filled, the policy of the Secretary of the

Army was not to require a permit because the site lay

shoreward of the established legal harbor lines. Therefore,

at the time the filling occurred, it was legal.

The court found that the Government had given its blanket

consent to encroachments on the federal navigational

servitude shoreward of established legal harbor lines; and

that “when Stoeco purchased in 1951 what then had been

fast land for twenty-four years, the navigational servitude

had long since been surrendered.” Accordingly, defendants

were not required to remove the 1927 fill. Such forced

removal would have raised Fifth Amendment due process

and taking clauses issues.

The court noted in concluding its opinion:

(T)he holding is limited, of course, to tidal marshlands

which had become fast land prior to the change in

policy of the Army Corps of Engineers. Any work

undertaken in estuarine areas which were subject to

the ebb and flow of the tide when the Army Corps of

Engineers published its new regulations asserting the

navigational servitude to its full extent, are, under the

terms of these regualtions, now subject to the § 10

permit requirement.

33 C.F.R. § 209.150(b). /d. at 611. The court's reasoning

applies equally well to the regulations under the Clean

Water Act as applied to the site. The Diamond Beach site was

not fast in 1975 when the Corps published its new

regulations in July of that year asserting the navigational

servitude to encompass adjacent wetlands: there is

nothing in the record which indicates that the sources of

ground water and tidal flow which saturate the site were not

available in 1975, nor that the site was fast land at that time.

(See aerial photographs of the site, the New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection designation, onthe

National Wetlands Inventory Map, Tr. 2, P. 19.) Therefore,

when the defendants began the fill operations in 1983, they

were subject to the permit requirements of § 1344.

5. § 323.3 Discharges requiring permits.

(a) General. Department of the Army permits will be

required for the discharge of dredged or fill material

into waters of the United States. Certain discharges

specified in §§ 323.4-1, 323.4-2 and 323.4-3- are

permitted by this regulation. If a discharge of dredged

or fill material is not permitted by this regulation, an

individual or general Section 404 permit will be

required for the discharge of dredged or fill material

into waters of the United States in accordance with the

following phased schedule:

(1) Before July 25, 1975, discharges into navigable

waters of the United States.

(2) After July 25, 1975, discharges into navigable

waters of the United States and adjacent wetlands.

(3) After September 1, 1976, discharges into navigable

waters of the United States and their primary

tributaries, including adjacent wetlands, and into

natural lakes, greater than 5 acres in surface area. (See

also § 323.4-2 for discharges that are permitted by this

regulation.)

(4) After July 1, 1977. discharges into ail waters ofthe

United States. (See a/so § 323.4-2 for discharges that

are permitted by this regulation.)

i. a

a

vi lil

An offshoot of defendants’ first “development and

history” argument is the argument that because of the

railroad embankment to the west of the site, which served

as a barrier for some period of time, the site was not always

naturally flowed by the tide. From this they would

presumably have the court conclude that the site does not

fall within the Corps’ jurisdiction.

r:- F—-F

§ 323.4-1 Discharges prior to effective dates of phasing.

(a) Discharges of dredged or fill material in waters of

the United States that occur before the phase-in dates

specified in § 323.3(a) (2) through (4) of this part are

hereby permitted for purposes of Section 404, provided

the conditions in paragraph (c) of this section are met.

(b) Discharges of dredged or fill materiai of less than

500 cubic yards into waters other than navigable

waters of the United States (see 33 CFR Part 329) that

are part of an activity that was commenced before July

25, 2975, that were completed by January 25, 1975, and

that involve a single and complete project and not a

number of projects associated with a complete

development plan are hereby permitted for purposes of

Section 404, provided the conditions in paragraph (c) cf

this section are met. The term “commenced” as used

herein shall be satisfied if there has been, before July

25, 1975, some discharge of dredged or fill material as a

part of the above activity or an entering into of a

written contractual obligation to have the dredged or

fill material discharged at a designated disposal site by

a contractor.

(c) For the purposes of Section 404, the following

conditions must have been satisfied for the discharges

occurring before the dates specified in paragraphs (a)

and (b) of this section:

(1) That the discharge was not located in the

proximity of a public water intake;

(2) That the discharge did not contain unacceptable

levels of pathogenic organisms in areas used for

recreation involving physical contact with the water:

(3) That the discharge did not destroy or endanger the

critical habitat or a threatened or endangered species,

as identified under the Endangered Species Act.

Both § 323.2 and § 323.4-1 have since been modified to

exciude the phase-in provisions. See 47 FR 31810,

7/22/82

Qian

First of all, as the court has just conciuded, the history of

the site is not relevant unless it indicates that the land was

fast at the time the Corps claimed jurisdiction. As long as it

was wet when the Corps extended its jurisdiction and when

the fill activity began, the history of the site is irrelevant. See

United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 881, 883 (D. Md.

1981) (only pertinent question is whether land was wetlands

when filling activity took place.)

Secondly, the existence of an artificial barrier, in this case

a railroad embankment, which may prevent tidal flow to a

site is not determinative of the limits of Corps’ jurisdiction.

Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States

by manmade dikes or barriers, natural river burns, beach

dunes and the like are specifically defined as adjacent

wetlands, 33 CFR § 323.2(d), therefore making them “waters

of the United States” for regulatory purposes. 33 CFR §

323.2(a) (7). See United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 431

(11th Cir. 1983) (even without direct or indirect surface

connection between wetlands in questicn and adjacent

river, area came under wetlands definition).

So even without the ingress and egress of tidal waters, the

site cou!d be classified as an adjacent wetlands area subject

to Corps regulations. But here, the artificial barrier was

breached -- sometime between 1962 and 1969 -- and thus did

not serve as a barrier to tidal flow until defendants installed

the tidal gate. At least since that time, a thriving wetlands

environment has been established. Furthermore, tidal

waters flow onto the site from the southeast where no

barrier exists,6 and groundwaters saturate the soil.

6. Defendants argue that their fill activities are exempt

from Corps permit requirements under 33 CFR 323.4-2

which, when in effect, exempted certain discharges

into non-tidal streams and their impoundments,

including adjacent wetlands that are located above the

headwaters. First of all, § 323.4-2 is no longer in effect

and wasnotin effect at the time defendants initiated the

impermissable activity. More important. tida/ wafers

are involved in this matter.

rar

Finally, with regard to defendants’ third historical

argument, the fact that part of the area may have become

wetlands because of a manmade connection between the

site and tidal waterways is not dispositive of the Corps’

jurisdiction. This court finds that federal jurisdiction is

determined by whether the site is presently wetlands and

not by how it came to be wetlands.

The Act applies to wetlands without reference to the

manner by which they came to be in that condition. See 33

CFR § 323.2. Furthermore, since Congress intended to

exercise its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to the

greatest extent possible inorder to protect our environment,

the court has no reason to believe that Congress did not

intend to reach wetlands which are the habitats of fish, fowl

and vegetation alike simply because those environments

were, at Some point in time, encouraged by human conduct.

More specifically, it was noted in the Federal Register, V.

42, No. 138, p. 37128 (1977), on the occasion of a modification

of the definition of wetiands in 323.2:

The words ‘those areas that are periodically inundated’

which appeared in the 1975 definition of ‘wetland’ were

eliminated in the 1977 definiton because the legislative

intent under Section 404 (33 U.S.C. § 1344) is to regulate

discharges of dredged or fill material into the aquatic

system as it exists, and notas it may have existed over

a period of time.

(Emphasis: added.)

Although there are no cases of which the court is aware

dealing with this issue under the Clean Water Act, there are

Cases on point under the Rivers and Harbors Act. See Kaiser

Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) United States v.

DeFelice, 641 F.2d. 1169. 1172 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal

jurisdiction occurred by operation of law when an

artificially created canal became connected to a tidal

waterway); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d at

611 (once artificial canals are connected to a tidal water

body, they become navigable waters of the United States by

Operation of law).

AA =

While the court recognizes that a regulation under the

Rivers and Harbors Act provides that “(n)avigability may

also be found where artificial aids have been or may be used

to make the waterbody suitable for use in navigation,” 33

CFR § 329.8,’ the court does not believe that the existence of

this regulation was determinative of the courts’ decisions.

And they stand for the proposition that the Government is

not exceeding its power under the Commerce Clause by

regulating “artificially” created navigable waters.

7. § 329.8 Improved or natural conditions of the

waterbody.

Determinations are not limited to the natural or

Original condition of the waterbody. Navigability may

also be found where artificial aids have been or may be

used to make the waterbody suitable for use in

navigation.

(a) Existing improvements: artificial waterbodies. (1)

An artificial channel may often constitute a navigable

water of the United States, even though it has been

privately developed and maintained, or passes

through private property. The test is generally as

developed above, that is, whether the waterbody is

capable of use to transport interstate commerce.

Canals which two navigable waters of the United

States and which are used for commerce clearly fall

within the test, and themselves become navigable. A

Canal open to navigable where it in fact supports

interstate commerce. A canal or other artificial

waterbody that is subject to ebb and flow of the tide is

also a navigable water of the United States.

(2) The artificial waterbody may be a major portion of

a river or harbor area or merely a minor backwash.

slip, or turning areas. (See § 329.12(b) of this Part.)

(3) Private ownership of the iands underlying the

waterbody, or of the lands through which it runs, does

not preclude a finding of navigability. Ownership does

become a controlling factor if a privately constructed

and operated canal is not used to transport interstate

commerce nor used by the public: it is then not

considered to be a navigable water of the United

States. However, a private waterbody, eventhough not

itself navigable, may so affect the navigable capacity

of nearby waters as to nevertheless be subject to

certain regulatory authorities

24a

That estuarine system which has developed on the

Diamond Beach site is no less entitled to protection and is no

less valuable to our society now that it has developed than

any other wetlands site.

In addition to arguing the history and development of the

site, defendants maintain that neither the Corps nor the New

Jersey Department of Environmental Protection has

jurisdiction over the Diamond Beach site because of a 1907

riparian grant covering the site which allows the defendants

to do whatever they want with the property, including filling

it, regardless of superseding federal and state statutes and

regulations contrary to the grant’'s provisions.

It is not clear to the court what significance the defend-

ants attach to the 1907 grant. If he is arguing that the grant's

mere existence somehow supports his contention that the

site was never considered to be ‘wetlands,’ the court rejects

it. The fact that the State of New Jersey in 1907 did not

recognize the importance of protecting vitally important

estuarine areas and allowed for the dredging and filling of

such sites has no relationship whatsoever to whether those

areas are or are not “wetlands” under a federal act.

Furthermore, if the defendants are making the equally

groundless argument that the grant prevents the federal

government from asserting jurisdiction over the site under

the Clean Water Act, the court also rejects it.

The defendants argue in a conclusory fashion that the

1907 grant vests absolute property rights in the grantee and

his successors. If defendants mean to argue by this that the

Government may not “take” the property, their argument is

premature. As defendant Ciampitti has not applied for a

permit and, consequently, has not been refused a permit, no

taking without just compensaticn claim is presently

cognizable: there has been no determination that the

property may not be put to the uses desired. Avoyelles

Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 927 (5th Cir.

1983).8

If the defendants are arguing that the federal government

may not regu/ate navigable waters of the United States

under the Clean Water Act because of the 1907 New Jersey

grant, they are either laboring under a serious

misapprehension or disregarding very basic tenets of the

United States Constitution. When a valid act of Congress is

in conflict with state law, state action must give way to the

federal legislation. “So long as Congress acts within an area

delegated to it, the preemption of conflicting state or local

action . . . flow directly from the substantive source of the

congressional action coupled with the supremacy clause of

Article VI... .” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 376

(1978). See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164

(1979); United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir.

1981).

8. With regard to the Government's power to take the

property, see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 554,

551 (1981), rehearing denied, 452 U.S. 911, on remand,

657 F.2d 244, appeal after remand, 686 F.2d 766. “The

navigation servitude, which is a term used to describe

the paramount interest of the United States in... the

navigable waters of the nation, derives from the

Commerce Clause... .” United States v. Certain Parcels

of Lane Situated in City of Valdez, 666 F.2d 1236, 1238

(9th Cir. 1982). “Once Congress determines that an

action will improve or protect navigation, the

Government may rely on the navigation servitude to

accomplish that action. /d. at 1239 (citation omitted).

But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164

(1979). The court need not address at this time whether

the property falls within the navigational servitude for

taking clause purposes.

26a

Defendant's final assault on the Government's claim to

jurisdiction over the site is based on the Coastal Zone

Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (hereinafter the

“Management Act”). The defendant misunderstands the Act.

Specifically, they argue that the Corps’ claim under § 404

must fail because the Government has not introduced any

evidence establishing that defendant has not complied with

state law under the Coastai Zone Management Act, or that

the Corps’ requirements are no more strict than state

requirements.

The Coastal Zone Management Act requires that federal

exercises of jurisdiction over certain projects within a

state’s coastal zone must, to the fullest extent possible, be

consistent with and approved state Coastal Zone

Management program. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1). The

defendants claim in essence that the Coastal Area Facility

Review Act (hereinafter “CAFRA”), N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 et seq.,

which is an approved program under the federal

Management Act, preempts the federal government's

jurisdiction in this case. There is nothing in the Management

Act or in Cape May Green, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d

Cir. 1983), upon which defendants rely, which supports his

theory of preemption.

A regulation promulgated by the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, the federal agency charged

with administering the Management Act, provide:

When federal agency standards are more restrictive

than standards or requirements contained in the

state's management program, the federal agency may

continue to apply its stricter standards (e.g., restrict

project development or design alternatives

notwithstanding permissive management program

policies)....

15 CFR § 930.39(d) (1982).

27a

Furthermore, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(f) provides that nothing in

the Management Act shall in any way affect any

requirement established by the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act (also known as the Clean Water Act), and that

such requirements shall be incorrporated in any program

developed pursuant to the Management Act. Accordingly,

CAFRA incorporates the Clean Water Act requirements to be

stricter than those contained in CAFRA.

More important than all of this is the fact that the

Management Act does not apply to this controversy, and,

therefore, any question of consistency between the federal

and state action does not arise. As the Government so aptly

argues:

Section 307(c) of the CZMA is directed at three

different types of activites: (1) activities conducted or

supported by the Government, (2) development

projects of the Government, and (3) activities by

private parties authorized by a federal permit. 18

U.S.C. § 1456(c). “The first two paragraphs thus reach

activities in which the federai agency is itself the

principal actor, the third reaches the federally

approved activities of third parties.” Secretary of the

Interior v. California, supra, at 667. \t is obvious that

the filing of an injunctive suit by the United States does

not fall within any of the categories.* Rather, in the

case at hand, the activity in the coastal zone is purely a

private activity of defendant Robert Ciampitti. The

present case simply does not involve federal activity at

this time since the defendant has not yet applied for a

federal wetlands permit. If the defendant were to apply

for a permit, then the question of whether Section

307(c) (3) of the CZMA applies would arise. Because

defendant has failed to comply withthe permitting

requirement of the Clean Water Act. that question is

premature. For this reason, Section 307(c) of the CZMA

does not apply and no consistency determination is

required.

* Even under the National Enviromental Policy

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4371 et seq., an environmental

review statute of greater scope and application

than the CZMA, civil enforcement action, such as

the present case, do not constitute federal

actions. See 40 CFR § 1508.18(a).

28a

The Cape May-Greene case upon which defendant so

heavily relies is inapposite because there the federal

government was attempting to prevent development on a

flood plain by placing a condition on a federal sewer grant

for an area that had already been specifically approved for

development by the state. /d. at 182. Just as clearly as the

Act does not apply to the present situation, it applied to that

situation.9

The fact that defendant Ciampitti has applied for and

received some local permits is irrelevant.!° Defendant

continually refers to state approvals which he has received,

but there is no evidence of them in the record; and defendant

totally ignores the fact, for purposes of this argument, that

large portions of the site were designated wetlands on the

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's map

and therefore could not be filled without state approval but

were nonetheless filled without that approval.

Finally, the court finds the Supreme Court's recent

decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct.

656 (1984), upon which defendants also rely, irrelevant to

the issues before this court.

The court having found no merit to defendants’ challenges

to the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, it can

only conclude the Government's high probability of success.

9. The Government also maintains and the defendant

admitted (Tr. 3, pp. 85-86) that CAFRA does not apply te

this site. It applies to development of public facilities;

including housing developments of the 25 or more lots,

and there are 24 individual lot owners involved here.

10. According to the defendant, he has received

approval for a permit for soil and erosion control on

portions of Richmond, Rochester and Memphis

Avenues from the Cape May County Soil and

Conservation District. (D-16; Tr. 3, p. 71.) He has been

given permission by the Township of Lower to

construct streets, sidewalks, curbs and sewer pipes

along those avenues, and his waste water treatment

Capacity application has been approved by the

Township.

29a

2. The Rivers and Harbors Act and the Refuse Act

Given the evidence of record to date, it appears that the

Government has the broadest jurisdiction over the site

under the Clean Water Act."' Since the Court has determined

that the Government is likely to succeed on the merits of its

claim under that Act, the Corps’ possible jurisdiction under

the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Refuse Act is not

determinative of whether a preliminary injuction should

issue and need not be considered at this time.

B. irreparable Injury

It is clear that the Government need not make a showing of

“irreparable injury” in order to qualify for an injunction

under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d at

611. It is equally clear that such a showing is required under

the Refuse Act. /d.

11. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33U.S.C. §

403, requires a permit from the Corps for dredge and fill

activities which alter “the location, course, condition,

or capacity .. . of any of the navigable waters of the

United States.” For purposes of this Act, “navigable

water of the United States” means those waters of the

United States that are subject to the ebb and fiow of the

tide shoreward to the mean high water mark and/or

are presently used, or have been used in the past, or

may be susceptible to use to transport interstate or

foreign commerce. 33 CFR § 322.2. Those marsh areas

which are covered by waters of a navigable water, here

Jarvis Sound, at mean high tide are navigable waters

of the United States even though they are not navigable

in fact. United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1050

(D. Del. 1973); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498

F.2d 597, 610 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1974).

The evidence presented to the court regarding those

portions of the site below the mean high tide line would

at best support a finding that smali areas fall below

that line.

Under the Refuse Act, federal! jurisdiction is, at a

minimum, commensurate with jurisdiction under the

Rivers and Harbors Act. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d at 611.

And it has even been extended to non-navigable waters

where refuse deposited in those waters will in turn

wash into navigable waters. See United States v. Esso

Std. Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3d Cir. 1973).

30a

Nonetheless, this court is relying upon the Clean Water

Act and is confronted with the issue of whether a showing of

irreparable harm need be made under that statute.

There is no Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case

regarding the need for such a showing, and the parties

implicitly invite the court to decide that issue. It is an

invitiation the court declines.

It is clear that the Government has made a showing of

irreparable injury whether or not such a showing is

required. '2 See Findings of Fact, infra, at 10. And given that

the spring thaw has begun, the damage will increase

geometrically between the issuance of a preliminary

injunction and a final hearing on the merits.

- 12. In United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536 (11th Cir.

1983), the court held that a showing is necessary

because of the drastic nature of the remedy. And in

United States v. Kentiand-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 353 F.

Supp. 451 (E.D. Ky. 1973), the court held that the

Government had to make some showing of irreparable

harm. (The court recognized however, that the burden

is lessened where the public interest is at stake.)

However, there is plenty of general support for the

contrary position. A preliminary injunction based upon

the violation of a statue, especially one which makes

specific provision for injunctive relief, may issue upon

a showing that the federal statute has been violated.

Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944); United

States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 523-524 (3d

Cir. 1963). Inherent in the statute itself is the legislative

conclusion that violations of it cause irreparable injury

to the public. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320

F.2d at 523-524; United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc..,

359 F. Supp. 672, 678 (D. N.J. 1973), aff'd in part, 498

F.2d 597 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1974):

United States v. Nutrition Service, inc. 227 F. Supp. 375,

388-389 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d (3d Cir. 1965).

The Stoeco Homes case can be read to support this

proposition. See 498 F.2d at 611

3la

The court should grant the equitable relief sought by the

United States because there is no adequate remedy at law to

compensate the public for the harm caused by the disposal

of fill material into tidal wetlands. Tidal marshes serve a

variety of critical functions, incluaing the storage of flood

waters, nutrition for the estuarine food web, habitat for

wildlife, nursery and feeding grounds for fish, and filtration

of water run-off and tidal water. Only if the filling is

immediately enjoyed will the United States have the

continuing benefit of these ecologically valuable lands.

C. The Possibility of Harm to Other Interested Persons

Another factor weighed by the courts in ruling on requests

for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief is the injury

to the defendant or other interested parties if an injunction

issues. In the present context, the only foreseeable iiijury to

the defendant is economic loss. Even that would be minimal

as this preliminary injunction would merely restrain

defendants from further filling activities and require them to

remove the tidal gate. This would aliow the tidal waters to

return until the issues in this matter can be finally decided.

The defendant is free to fill and develop properties which are

not in this wetland area.

In fact, the economic loss to the defendant from cessation

of such activities is far outweighed by the benefit to the

community from the enjoining of activities adversely

affecting the environment. Moreover, any economic burden

placed upon defendant by the injunctive relief sought in this

case must be balanced against the significant benefits that

will accrue to the public-at-large from abatement of the

filling operation.

D. The Public Interest

Finally, in situations involving the Government, courts

must determine whether the issuance of an injunction wouid

further the public interest. In this context, the United States

Supreme Court has noted that courts of equity “go much

farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the

public interest... when only private interests are invoived.”

Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federal No. 40, 300 U.S. 515,

552 (1937); see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440-41

(1944).

it is axiomatic that the public interes‘ under the Clean

Water Act requires strict enforcement of the statute so as to

clean up the nation’s waters and preserve the surrounding

ecological environment. See, e.q., 33 U.S.C. § 1251; Train v.

City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).

Having fully examined the record in this case in terms of

the criteria for granting a preliminary injunction, the court is

convinced that a preliminary injunction must issue, and that

the hearing to determine the Government's right to

permanent relief must be expedited. At that hearing, the

parties are entitled to present any relevant, new factual

evidence or relevant legal arguments which the court has

not yet considered.

The foregoing constitutes this court's Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 52(a).

The accompanying order will be entered.

ie pg 25a

/s/ John F. Gerry

JOHN F. GERRY, U.S.D.J.

DATED: April 2, 1984

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Vv

ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT

AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE

N. CIAMPITT! and PACIFIC FOUR

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

This matter having come before the court on the

Government's request for preliminary and permanent relief;

and

The court having carefully considered the record and the

parties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,

and for good cause shown;

it is this 2nd day of April, 1984, hereby ORDERED that

defendants are preliminarily restrained and enjoined from

allowing, suffering or causing the discharge of any

pollutants or fill material (including sand, gravel, rocks,

dirt, wood and concrete) from their properties located along

Park Boulevard between West Jefferson Avenue and

Madison Avenue and bounded on the west by Jarvis Sound

in Lower Township, Cape May County, New Jersey (more

particularly described in Lower Township tax records as

Blocks 696, 701, 706, 716, 721, 726 and 731) into the waters of

the United States which are adjacent thereto or into portions

of the site designated as wet!ands on Government Trial

Exhibit RR-5, and more particularly described in

Government Exhibits 100-102; and

34a

Furthermore, it is ORDERED that the tidal gate be removed

and that appropriate restraints be placed on the fill to

prevent it from washing into surrounding wetlands; and

It is FURTHER ORDERED that all parties appear on the 17th

day of Aprii, 1984, at 9:30 A.M., for the fina! hearing in this

matter.

i.e. pg 25a

/s/ John F. Gerry

JOHN F. GERRY, U.S.D.J.

35a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V

ROBERT C. CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT

AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE

N. CIAMPITT! and PACIFIC FOUR

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Samuel P. Moulthrop, Esquire

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Ms. Jodi Lee Alper

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

970 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Alfred A. Porro, Jr., Esquire

10 Stuyvesant Avenue

Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071

Attorney for Defendant Robert C. Ciampitti,

Bruce N. Ciampitti and Pacific Four

Corporation

GERRY, District Judge

36a

1. INFRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on the Government's

request for a permanent injunction restraining the

defendants from engaging in fill activities at the Diamond

Beachsite in Cape May County, New Jersey. Also at issue is

the question of whether the defendants will be required to

remove the fill already placed by them on the site, and

whether they will be required to restore the site to its

conditon prior to the inception of fill activities. Finally, the

court must decide whether the imposition of civil penalties

against defendants is appropriate.

The Government has proceeded under the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), the Rivers and

Harbors Act, and the Refuse Act. On October 24, 1983, this

court issued a temporary restraining order barring any

further fill activities by defendants until the matter could be

heard. A hearing on the issuance of apreliminary injunction

was held November 9, 15 and 17, 1983.

By opinion dated April 2, 1984, the court issued a

preliminary injunction preventing any further fill activities.

U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483. In that opinion, the court

held that the Government had succeeded on the merits of its

case under the Clean Water Act, the proofs having

established that the site in question constituted wetlands,

and that the defendants had Gischarged fill material without

obtaining the required permit. All the requirements for

issuance of a preliminary injunction were met. See /n re

Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143

(3d Cir. 1980). The defendants were invited to present

“RELEVANT” evidence at a permanent injunction hearing to

controvert the prior evidence on which basis we ruled that

the Government had succeeded on the merits.

37a

As to the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Refuse Act, this

court held that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether

any portion of the site fell below the mean high water mark

and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of

Engineers such that a permit was necessary before fill

activities could occur. The preliminary injunction, therefore,

was not issued on the basis of these two Acts. However, it

was Clear from the evidence that the Government had the

broadest jurisdiction over the site under the Clean Water

Act. 583 F. Supp. at 497. That is to say, much larger areas of

the site were wetlands than were arguably below the mean

high water mark, and those areas arguably below the mean

high water mark, were in any event encompassed by the

wetlands areas. Thus, success under the Rivers and Harbors

Act and the Refuse Act was not crucial to the Government's

application for a preliminary injunction

A hearing on the issuance of a permanent injunction was

held on May 21, June 6 and July 5, 1984.

The following shall constitute the court's findings of fact

and conclusions of law.

2. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The court adopts its previous findings and

conclusions and incorporates them herein, with the

following supplementations.

B. Clean Water Act

There has been no additional evidence submitted which

alters the court's finding of jurisdiction under the Clean

Water Act. That is, the court continues to hold that the site in

question, as described in Governments Exhibits RR-5 and

100-102, contains wetlands.

38a

C. Rivers and Harbors Act/Refuse Act

The Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403, and the

Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407, extend federal! jurisdiction over

and, to a ce~*3in extent, beyond, the “navigable waters of

the United States.” The term “navigable waters,” for the

purposes of these statutes, means those waters of the

United States that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide

shoreward to the mean high water mark. 33 C.F.R. § 322.2.

Testimony was introduced at both the preliminary and

permanent injunction hearings regarding the presence of

territory on the site below the mean high water mark.

Of the 26.72 acres of land within the Diamond Beach site

that are federal wetiands (see Government Exhibit 101,

Government Exhibit 43), the Government claims that 1.45

acres, all within the area designated as wetlands, are below

the mean high water line. (These 1.45 acres are colored in

blue on Government Exhibit 101.)

indisputably, some of these 1.45 acres are below the mean

high water line. the defendants’ witness, Gerald Speitel,

conceded that some man-made ditches within the disputed

area are below mean high water. Beyond these ditches,

however, the evidence is less conclusive.

In order to establish the mean high water line for the

Diamond Beach sie, the Government's expert, Richard

Rauch, had to extrapolate from tidal bench marks above and

below the site, since no data was available regarding the

site itself. Mr. Rauch obtained data from two tidal! bench

marks: Bench Mark 5838 E1977, located north of the

Diamond Beach site in the vicinity of Sunset Lake, and

Bench Mark 5901J, located south of the Diamond Beach site.

These two bench marks were chosen because of their

proximity to the site.

39a

By using surveying methods, elevations were established

for the two bench marks, and then the elevations of the tidal

bench marks were related to elevations established at

control points on the Diamond Beach site. Mr. Rauch

determined the mean high water line on the site to

approximate an elevation of 2.94 feet. However, in depicting

the mean high water line on Exhibit 101, Mr. Rauch used an

elevation of 3.0 feet.

Once the elevation for the site was established, the

contours of the area below that elevation (3.0 feet) were

made using the process of photogrammetry. This process

involves the use of aerial photographs viewed through a

stereoscope.

Although there was considerable testimony regarding the

accuracy of the elevation established (2.94 feet) and the

accuracy of the contours onthe map of the site (Government

Exhibit 101), this court is siill not convinced that, apart from

the man-made ditches, any of the land in question lies below

the mean high water line. The problem, in the court's view, is

with the methodology used to produce the data in question.

The affidavit of defendants’ expert, James P. Weidener,

introduced as Defendants’ Exhibit 46, concludes that the

depiction of areas below the mean high water line is “flawed

and subject to error.” Mr. Weidener made, among others, the

following criticisms of the Government's evidence. First, he

stated, the tide bench marks used were not sufficiently close

to the Diamond Beach site and, “more importantly,” were in

different bodies of water from the Diamond Beach site. Mr.

Weidener stated that bench marks should have been

established in Jarvis Sound, on which the property lies,

because the elevations of mean high water from other

bodies of water may not accurately reflect those at Jarvis

Sound. Second, Mr. Weidener stated that the tidal datum

epoch used in arriving at the mean high water lines for the

sites north and south of the property was not the most

current epoch for which data was available. The use slightiy

stale data, the court infers, could have affected the accuracy

of the Government’s evidence. Third, Mr. Weidener stated

40a

that the use of photogrammetry in order to establish contour

boundaries is inappropriate because of problems with

accuracy. Finally, the court notes that the Government used

a figure of 3.0 feet as the elevation for the mean high water

line and made its maps in acordance with this elevation. The

actual elevation the Government calculated was 2.94 feet.

Although the difference is not great, the use of the 3.0 figure

may nevertheless result in a finding that a larger area is

below mean high water than is actually the case.

The court, based on the above criticisms of the

Government's methodology, is unable to find that the

Government has carried its burden with respect to the areas

asserted to be below mean high water, except for the man-

made ditches, about which there is no controversy.

Somewhat less than 1.45 acres, therefore, is below the mean

high water line, although, based on the Government's

exhibits, the court is not in a position to state the precise

location or area of these pieces of territory.

3. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Clean Water Act - Injunctive Relief

Having reaffirmed our finding of Corps jurisdiction under

the Clean Water Act, and finding no reason to disturb our

conclusions regarding the other requirements for injunctive

relief, the court will permanently enjoin the discharge of fil!

material into the wetlands, as designated in Government

Exhibits 101 and 43.

The court must briefly address the arguments raised by

the defendants in opposition to this conclusion.

First, the defendants contend that, based on arecent case

out of the Sixth Circuit, the court should reconsider its

conclusion that the property in question contains wetlands.

41a

In U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.

1984), the Sixth Circuit was faced with a case where,

between the issuance and appeal of a permanent injunction,

the Corps promulgated a new regulation changing the

definition of “wetlands.” The case was remanded for further

proceedings in light of the new definition. 615 F.2d 1363 (6th

Cir. 1980). On the second appeal, the issue was whether the

district court on remand had properly interpreted the new

definition to include the property of the defendants.

The former definition of wetlands was as follows:

those areas that are (1) periodically inundated and that

(2) are normally characterized by the prevalance of

vegetation that requires saturated soi! conditions for

growth and reproduction.

33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (2) (i) (h) (1976). This definiton was

changed, according to the Corps, to eliminate several

problems. The reference to “periodic inundation” was

deleted because the Corps ccncluded that the Clean Water

Act, § 404 (33 U.S.C. § 1344), was intended to regulate

discharges into the aquatic system as /t exists, not as it may

have existed over a record period. 729 F.2d at 395.

Furthermore, “normally” was replaced by the phrase “under

normal circumstances do support.” This change was

adopted, in part, to make clearer that excluded from Corps

jurisdiction are those areas that are not aquatic but

experience an abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation. /d.

at 396, and alse to make clearer that man-made

Obstructions to the flow of water, such as tidal gates (as are

present here) would noi exempt a site from Corps

jurisdiction. /d. Thus, the new, and present, definition of

wetlands is as follows:

those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface

or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient

to support, and under normal circumstances do

support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted

for life in saturated soil conditions.

33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1983).

In construing this newer definition, the Riverside court

stated as follows:

42a

The new regulation makes clear that it is the present

occurrence of inundation or flooding sufficient to

support wetlands vegetation, not the mere presence of

such vegetation from some other cause, that deter-

mines whether a particular area is wetland... . Neither

inundation nor aquatic vegetation would be sufficient,

standing aione, to bring a piece of tand within the

definition. Both must be present, and the /atter must be

caused by the former.

Were this no so, then areas which inexplicably support

some species of aquatic vegetation, but which are not

normally inundated, would fall within the wetlands

definition. Such a perverse result could not have been

what the Corps contemplated. . . . Indeed, as noted

earlier, the Corps expressly adverted to the situation of

“areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal

presence of aquatic vegetation” and emphasized that

such lands were not intended to be covered by the

regulations.

729 F.2d at 396 (emphasis added).

In holding that the lands in that case were not wetlands,

the Riverside court noted that the lands, although arguably

“periodically inundated” (in accordance with the previous

wetlands definition), were not presently inundated. The

presence of the vegetation was “abnormal,” and

attributable not to the few present instances of flooding, but

to the type of soil on the property. /d. at 397.

This court has some reservations about the Sixth Circuit's

construction of the regulation at issue, although it has no

problem with that construction as applied to the facts of that

case. We find, however, that the facts of the instant case

clearly support Corps jurisdiction, even under the Riverside

test. In our previous opinion, we found as follows:

The soil in the federally designated wetlands at the site

is saturated throughout, in most cases directly to the

surface.

During normal high tide conditions, surface water

covers a majority of the site... .

43a

Vegetation on the site which indicates a wetlands

environment includes: marsh hay, salt marsh

cordgrass, high tide bush, salt marsh fleabone, black

grass, and sea myrtle. These plants are commoniy

found in New Jersey salt marshes and are adapted to

an area subject to tidal flow.

583 F. Supp. at 489. We further concluded:

The Government has proven... that the site... has an

abundance of . . . plants requiring a saturated

environment to survive... .

Id. at 492 (emphasis added). This court believes that its

findings indicate the presence of areas inundated by surface

or ground water, the presence in those areas of a prevalence

of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil, and

that such finding support the conclusion that the latter

circumstance is caused by the former.

In considering “causation” under this regulation, this

court does not believe the Sixth Circuit announced a test

whereby it becomes necessary to rule out any and every

possible cause for the existence of aquatic vegetation other

than frequently saturated soil. This would be an impossible

test, it would seem. Rather, this court believes the Sixth

Circuit was speaking of causation in a somewhat looser

sense, whereby by the presence of frequently saturated soii

would ordinarily be taken as the “cause” of the vegetation,

absent some peculiar circumstance indicating another

Cause.

In this case, the court has found the presence of both

Saturated soil and aquatic vegetation; and absent any

evidence to indicate that, under the circumstances, the

presence of the vegetation is, in some sense abnormal, the

court conciudes that the soil saturation “causes” the growth

of the vegetation. This is not the “perverse” case to which

the Sixth Circuit alludes wherein, even absent the regular

presence of soild saturation, aquatic plants are

nevertheless abundantly present.’ In such a case it

obviously becomes necessary to look for the explanation of

the growth in other factors beside the presence of surface or

ground water. Here, there is no need to look any further.

44a

Accordingly, our finding of Corps jurisdiction is not

Gisturbed by the Riverside decision.

The court further notes that the fact that we cannot quite

conclude that much of the land is below mean high water

does not indicate, as defendants argue, that it is not

Saturated by surface or ground water.

The defendants’ second challenge to the issuance of a

permanent injunction is one previously raised and cisposed

of, but which we will reiterate. This is the “taking” issue

The defendants state that the assertion of Corps

jurisdiction over the property combined with the injunction

against further discharges onto the property, amounts to a

taking for which compensation must be paid.

The first problem with this argument is that neither of the

defendants who have answered the complaint (that is,

neither Robert Ciampitti nor Albrecht and Heun) is, on the

record, a property owner. These defendants, therefore, lack

standing to even raise the issue. We only address the issue

further because counse! for Robert Ciampitti entered an

appearance for Bruce Nicholas Ciampitti and Pacific Four

Corporation. Bruce Nicholas Ciampitti, at least, owns some

of the property and has standing to raise the issue

(although, to do so, he should have filed an answer and

counterclaim). Whether a taking claim may even properly be

brought in this court, however, is doubtful. If the taking

claim exceeds $10,000, jurisdiction is exclusive in the Court

of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. American

Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979),

aff'd 614 F.2d 769; Bayou des Families Development Corp. v.

U.S. Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1982).

45a

Furthermore, as this court stated in its previous opinion,

the issue is, in any event, premature unti! a permit is appiied

for and denied. The defendants argue that, if applied for, a

permit will most certainly be denied. However, any informal

predictions by Corps personnel can hardly take the place of

a formal denial following a formal submission in

compliance with the applicaton requirements of 33 C.F.K. §

325. The fact remains that no permit application has yet

been processed, and the taking issue is premature. See

Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 927

(5th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).

The defendants have introduced letters (Defendants’

Exhibit 32) which purport to demonstrate that the Corps has

been unwilling to meet with them to discuss a possible

permit application. It may well be that the Corps at this

juncture will not talk to Mr. Ciampitti. See 33 C.F.R. §326.3(c)

(4) and footnote 2 (where Clean Water Act violation is of a

nature that complaint is recommended to be filed by U.S.

Attorney, after-the-fact permit application should not be

accepted until the enforcement action is resolved). This fact

still does not convert the Corps assertion of jurisdiction into

a taking but further highlights the prematurity of the claim

Finaliy, of course, we note that the mere assertion of

jurisdiction and the injunction against filling may or may not

ultimately, on the mertis, amount to a taking. See, e.g.,

Deltona Corp. v. U.S., 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Andrus v.

Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).

In sum, then, the taking argument has no bearing on our

conclusion in favor of an injuction. (Of course, the mere fact

that property is “taken” only requires that compensation be

paid; nothing prevents the Government from taking the

property by preventing development.)

To repeat, then: the derendants are hereby permanently

enjoined from engaging in fill activities on those portions of

the site designated as wetlands.

46a

C. Rivers and Harbors Act/Refuse Act - Injunctive Relief

Above, we found that the man-made ditches on the

Diamond Beach site were below the mean high water line.

Even though man-made, these ditches are nonetheless

subject to Corps jurisdiction. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.8(a) (1)

(determination of navigability not limited to natural or

original condition of waterbody; a canal or other artificial

water body that is subject to ebb and flow of the tide is a

navigable water); see a/so 33 C.F.R. § 329.13(b). Therefore,

as to these ditches, a permanent injuction against fil!

activities is warranted under either 33 U.S.C. § 403 or § 407.

However, at this juncture, such an injunction is

unnecessary, since the permanent injunction against filling

the wetlands already encompasses any activities in these

ditches. Moreover, the court at this time lacks a clear survey

or metes and bounds description of the ditches such as

would make it possible to appropriately fashion an

injunctive order. Accordingly, no injunction specifically

directed to the man-made ditches will issue at this time.

The Government has apprised the court of case law

indicating that jurisdiction under these Acts may extend

even beyond the mean high water line, where activities

shoreward of the line may have an impact on navigable

waters below the line. See U.S. v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc.,

526 F.2d 1293, 1297-99 (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Moretti, 526

F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. American Cyanamid

Co., 480 F.2d 1132, 1135 (2d Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Esso Standard

Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3d Cir. 1967).

Thus, an injunction under these Acts to prohibit fill

activities in close proximity to the ditches may be

warranted, as fill placed on the banks of, or near, the ditches

may erode into the ditches. However, for the reasons given

above with respect to the ditches themselves, no injunction

specifically directed to fiil near the ditches will issue at this

time. The injunction we issue with respect to the entire

wetlands is sufficient to address the concerns of the

Government under all the Acts under which suit was

brought.

47a

ee

D. Restoratien Plan

The Government seeks an order requiring the defendants

to remove all fill placed within the wetlands area and to

return the site to its natural state by planting wetlands

vegetation and restoring waterways.

There can be no doubt that this court has the power under

the Clean Water Act to order the restoration proposed by the

Government. See U.S. v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1156 (M.D.

Fla. 1983); U.S. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1036,

1043 (N.D. Ill. 1982); U.S. v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp 1331 (M.D.

Fla. 1980); O'Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.

Pa. 1981).

The defendants argue, however, that the Government has

failed to justify, either procedurally or substantively, its

proposed plan. The defendants rely on U.S. v. Sexton Cove

Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1301 (5th Cir. 1976) and

Weisman, supra. The Weisman court,expanding on the

language in Sexton Cove Estates, stated:

(T)here are two prerequisites to be satisfied before any

consideration of the restoration plan itself: (1).the

court must have jurisdiction over the portion of the

property or activity to be directiy affected by the

restoration plan, and (2) the court must conduct a

hearing in which the merits,demerits, and alternatives

to the restoration plan are fully developed.

489 F. Supp. at 1342-43. Here, based on the above findings of

fact and conclusions of law, there can be no doubt that this

court has jurisdiction over the affected portion of the site. As

to the hearing requirement, there is nothing in the case law

to suggest that the hearing on the restoration plan be a

hearing separate and apart from, or subsequent to, the

hearing on the merits (the hearing to determine whether the

Act was violated). In the Weisman case itself, no separate

hearing took place. 489 F. Supp. at 1343. Therefore, this

court finds nothing procedurally inappropriate about

ordering restoration on the present record.

The Weisman court elaborated as well on the criteria to be

applied in evaluating a proposed restoration pian.

48a

SP er pee

The selected plan must: (1) confer maximum

environmental benefits, (2) be achievable as a

practical matter, and (3) bear an equitabie relationship

to the degree and kind of wrong it is intended to

remedy.

489 F. Supp. at 1343. The Government's proposed plan is

actually merely a set of guidelines. The Government would

have the defendants submit a more detailed plan, subject to

approval or modification by the Corps of Engineers.

Nevertheless, there is enough in these guidelines to permit

this court to evaluate the pian’s appropriateness.

These guidelines require: that all fill be removed and that

the defendants identify the location where such removed fill

will be taken; that the area be replanted with plant species

found adjacent to the areas of fill removal; and that

waterways be restored. Further, the Government would

have the defendants submit an implementation schedule,

prepare a post-restoration monitoring program, and have

the defendants engage an outside consultant to actually

prepare and implement the program.

In opposition to the Government's proposal, the

defendants apparently take the position that there should be

no restoration; that is, that the site should be left as itis. The

defendants’ position is based on rather vague allegations

that restoration would have an adverse impact on the

environment insofar as it would destabilize partially

completed sewer and utility systems in the area and result in

an economic loss to both public and private investors in

these utility.and sewer lines. The court has scrutinized the

record in this case and finds little evidence to support these

allegations, other than the evidence that the defendants

themselves wiil suffer economic loss.

In evaluation whether a proposed restoration plan will

confer maximum environmental benefits, it is necessary to

consider the environmental importance of the wetlands on

the site as well as the harm caused by the defendants’

activities. Congress and the Corps of Enginners, through its

regulatory authority, have taken the position that wetlands

serve important environmental functions:

49a

Some wetlands are vital areas that constitute a productive and valuable

public resource, the unnecessary alteration or destruction of which

should be discoui aged as contrary to the public interest... .

Wetlands considered to perform functions important to the public interest

inciude: . . . wetlands which serve significant biological functions,

including food chain production, general habit, and nesting, spawning,

rearing and resting sites for aquatic or land species; . .. wetlands which

are significant in shielding other areas from wave action, erosion, or

storm damage; . . . wetlands which serve as valuable storage areas for

storm and flood waters . . . and wetlands which serve significant and

necessary water purification functions.

33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b). In the court's findings of fact in

connection with the issuance of a preliminary injunction, we

found that the wetlands on the Diamond Beach site perform

all the vital functions enumerated above. 583 F. Supp. at 490.

We further found that the ability of these wetlands to

perform these vital functions was hindered by the

defendants’ activities. /d. It stands to reason that the return

of the wetiands area to its undeveloped state would confer

maximum environmental benefits. At best, the defendants’

protestations to the contrary are speculative; and the only

remedy they offer is that of doing nothing, which is

unacceptable. Cf, Weisman, supra, at 1347.

In evaluating the practicality of a proposed restoration,

we must consider its feasibility and cost-effectiveness. /d.

at 1348. There is nothing in the record to suggest either that

the fill could not be removed or that vegetation could not be

replanted. Of course, whether the replanted vegetation will

Survive is uncertain. in other circumstances, however, this

has not barred a proposed replanting. See Weisman, supra,

at 1347 (restoration of forest ordered, although full recovery

would take from 10 to 30 years). In considering cost-

effectiveness, we realize that we lack some information that

might be useful: the financial resources of the defendants

and an estimate of the cost of the restoration plan. Cf. U.S. v.

Robinson, supra, at 1164-65. But here, the indefiniteness of

the Government's proposa! is actually a virtue. The

defendants, so long as they are faithful to the goals of the

plan, will have considerable independence and will be able

to do what they feel is desirable to minimize the cost of

50a

restoration. Therefore, the court is not overly troubled by

certain lacunae in the record, especially given the equitable

considerations applicable here. See infra.

Finally, turning to the equities of this case, we find that the

defendants, with one exception, are not in a strong position

to argue equity. As this court has found previously, as early

as 1980 the defendants were aware of wetlands regulations

and the possibility that Diamond Beach was within the

jurisdiction of the Corps. In September 1983, the defendants

acted in defiance of a “cease and desist” order of the Corps.

583 F. Supp. at 486, 487. Even after this court issued its

preliminary injunction in April 1984, the defendants did not

cease their fill activities, and Robert Ciampitti was cited for

contempt in September, 1984. Even after that, fill activities

continued on the site. Thus the equities do not weigh in the

defendants’ favor.

However, this court believes that the defendant Albrecht

and Heun is in a better position to make an equitable

argument. The record indicates that this defendant was

merely a construction company which acted at the instance

of the other defendants, and that its role was more or less

passive. Moreover, this defendant does not appear to havea

continuing interest in the site. Accordingly, Albrecht and

Heun shall be excluded from this court's restoration order.

In sum, then, the court adopts the restoration plan

proposed by the Government. We shall retain jurisdiction to

resolve any disputes which may arise in either the

preparation or implementation of the plan.

Finally, we must address the timing of the plan. We

believe that restoration should occur as soon as possible.

However, it seems both wasteful and unfair to the

defendants to order restoration to proceed whiie there

exists the possibilty that the development of the Diamond

Beach may be approved by the Corps. Therefore, the court

will stay the implementation of the restoration plan on the

following conditions:

5la

A. The defendants shall. within 45 days of the

accompanying order, apply for a permit to

engage in fill activities at the site.

B. If the defendants have not applied for a

permit within 45 days of the order, then

implementation of the plan shall proceed as

scheduled in the order. Furthermore, if the

defendants’ permit application is returned

for failure to meet the requirements of 33

C.F.R. § 325.1, then implementation shall

proceed as scheduled in the order.

C. If defendants submit a proper application

within 45 days of the accompanying order,

then implementation of the restoration plan

will be stayed pending a decision by the

Corps on the application.

Of course. if the Corps grants the permit, the injunction and

restoration order wil be vacated or modified as is

appropriate. The stay conditions provided above only apply

to the implementation phase of the restoration plan. The

defendants will be required to prepare a plan within 60 days

of the accompanying order.

E. Civil Penalties

The Government seeks the imposition of civil penalties

against Robert Ciampitti only. Holding only this defendant

liable is appropriate, given the statement of his attorney

that he is the party responsible for the activities on the site

and all the evidence consistent with this conclusion. This

defendant clearly violated section 301(a) and 404 of the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1344, on at least 15

seperate days (inciuding those violations occuring after the

court’s order of April, 1984). Secticn 309(d) of the Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1319(d), authorizes imposition of a penalty of up to

$10,000 for each day on which a violation occurs. The

Government urges that the flagrancy of Ciampitti's conduct

warrants a substantial penalty.

52a

The court does not entirely disagree. However, the

question of penalties will be held in abeyance pending the

preparation and implementation (if necessary) of the

restoration plan. We believe this course is appropriate

because it is more important that the site be restored than

that the defendant Robert Ciampitti be punished. To the

extent that Robert Ciampitti is not a person of unlimited

resources, the court prefers that his resources be initially

spent on clean-up of the site. Cf O'Leary, supra.

Furthermore, defendant Robert Ciampitti’s good faith in

preparing and implementing a restoration plan is arelevant

factor in assessing the size or necessi'y of civi! penalties.

The foregoing constitutes the court's findings of fact and

conclusions of law pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 52(a).

The accompanying order will be entered.

ie. pg 25a

/s/ John F. Gerry

JOHN R. GERRY, U.S.0.J.

DATED: November 28, 1984.

53a

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v

ROBERT C. CIAMPITTI, ALBRECHT Civil Action No. 83-4004

AND HEUN CORPORATION, BRUCE N.

CIAMPITTI and PACIFIC FOUR ORDER

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

This «matter having come before the court on the

Government's request for preliminary and permanent relief:

and the court having made findings of fact and conclusions

of law pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 52(a); and the court having

concluded that the defendants have violated sections 301(a)

rk 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and

1344;

It is, this 28th day of November, 1984, hereby ORDERED as

follows:

1. The defendants are permanently restrained and

enjoined from allowing, suffering or causing the discharge

of any pollutants or fill material (including sand, gravel,

rocks, dirt, wood and concrete) from their properties located

along Park Boulevard between West Jefferson Avenue and

Madison Avenue and bounded on the west by Jarvis Sound

in Lower Township, Cape May County, New Jersey (more

particularly described in Lower Township tax records as

Blocks 696, 701, 706, 716, 721, 726 and 731) into the waters of

the site designated as wetlands on Government Trial Exhibit

RR-5, and more particularly described in Government

Exhibits 100-102, and Government Exhibit 43.

54a

2. All of the fill, which is depicted on Government Exhibit

101 as the area shaded yellow, as well as all fill deposited

subsequent to the preparation of Exhibit 101, down to the

elevation of the wetlands as they existed prior to filling

activities, shall be removed by the defendants, other than

Albrechi and Heun Corporation, no later than 75 days after

entry of this order.

Provided, however, that paragraph 2 of this order shall be

stayed subject to the following conditions:

A. The defendants shall, within 45 days of the

date of this order, apply for a permit to

engage in fill activities at the site.

B. If the defendants have not applied for a

permit within 45 days of the date of this

order, then removal of the fill shall proceed

as scheduled. Furthermore, if the defendants’

permit application is returned for failure to

meet the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 325.1,

then implementation shall proceed as

scheduled.

C. If defendants submit a proper application

within 45 days of this order, ther: removal of

the fill will be stayed pending a decision by

the Corps on the application.

3. The defendants, other than Albrecht and Heun

Corporation, shall prepare and implement a plan to restore

vegetation to the areas from which fill is removed in

accordance with the fol)» wing schedule:

A. Defendants shall submit a proposed plan

for restoration and planting to the Corps of

Engineers no later than 60 days after entry of

this order;

B. The Corps of Engineers may approve the

plan submitted or may modify the plan and

approve the plan as modified;

55a

C. The defendants shall complete all work

necessary to implement the plan or modified

plan no later than 45 days after approval by

the Corps;

Provided, however, that paragraph C shall be stayed

subject to the following conditions:

A. The defendants shall, within 45 days of the

date of this order, apply for a permit to

engage in fill activities at the site.

B. If the defendants have not applied for a

permit within 45 days of the date of this

order, then implementation of the plan shall

proceed as scheduled. Furthermore, if the

defendants’ permit application is returned

for failure to meet the requirements of 33

C.F.R. § 325.1, then implementation shall

proceed as scheduled.

C. If defendants submit a proper application

within 45 days of this order, then

implementation of the restoration pian will

be stayed pending a decision by the Corps on

the application.

D. The plan described in paragraph 3A shall

include, but not be limited to:

(1) Planting of all areas disturbed by the

removal of fill material with plant species

typical of areas adjacent to the areas of fill

removal; i.e., Spartina Alterniflora,

Spartina Patens, and Distichlis Spicata,

and others as appropriate. Plantings shall

be spaced on a grid with three foot by two

foot centers. Plantings shall achieve 85%

survival rate after the first growing

season. Replanting would be required in

areas of less than 85% survival rate;

56a

(2) Preparation of a scaled drawing

indicating the iocation of proposed

wetland restoration and the elevations of

restored areas al intervals sufficient to

indicate that the depth of proposed

excavation refiects natural changes in

property contour;

(3) Restoration of all waterways within the

subject property;

(4) A schedule of activities leading to |

completion of the wetlands restoration |

plan;

(5) A schedule of the rate and sequence of

fertilizer application;

(6) Preparation of a _post-restoration

monitoring program;

i (7) {dentification of the focation of

disposal sites for material removed from

the project site; and

(8) The defendants shall engage a

consulting firm with established success

in implementing wetland creation/restor-

ation work, to prepare and implement the

above restoration plan.

E. In the event there arises a dispute

concerning the plan or any other provision of

this order, any party may apply to the court

to resolve such dispute.

4. The court shall retain jurisdiction on the issue of civil

penalties pending implementation of the restoration plan.

/s/ John F. Gerry

JOHN F. GERRY, U.S.D.J.

Pints « ms 4 ‘ OS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 85-5004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS.

DIAMOND BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

and ROBERT CIAMPITT!, ALBRECHT AND HEUN

CORPORATION

BRUCE NICHOLAS CIAMPITTI, and

PACIFIC FOUR CORP.

ROBERT CIAMPITTI, BRUCE N. CIAMPITTI and

PACIFIC FOUR CORPORATION,

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey-Camden

(D.C. Civil No. 83-4004)

District Judge: John F. Gerry

58a

Argued

August 6, 1985

Before: ALDISERT, Chief Judge, and STAPLETON and

MANSMANN, Circuit Judges.

JUDGEMENT ORDER

After consideration of all contentions raised by

appellants, and for the reasons set forth in the district court

opinion by the Honorable John F. Gerry, United States v.

Ciampitti, No. 83-4004 (D.N.J., Nov. 28, 1984), reprinted in

Appendix at 63-77; it is

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgement of the

district court be and is hereby affirmed.

Costs taxed against appellants.

BY THE COURT,

/s/ Chief Judge Aldisert

Chief Judge

ATTEST:

/s/ Saily Mrvos

Sally Mrvos, Clerk

DATED: AUG 7 1985

59a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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