Reply Brief — American Methyl Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States
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ae Supreme Court, U.S,
4 FILED
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JAN @ 980
No. 85-718
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
CLERA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,
PETITIONER
Vv.
THE MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF
Dale Edward Anderson
Claron C. Spencer
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utsh 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Reply of petitioner ..... een CONS EME O ences ye eee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Methyl Corp. v. E.P.A.
749 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ...........-.
Statutes:
Clean Air Act
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APPENDIX A
Affidavit of Ronald E. Eames..............-.
APPENDIX B
Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act
De Es a CU eo Sik S SiS ies cect veces
No. 85-718
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,
PETITIONER
V.
THE MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF
I
The question before this Court goes much deeper
than the EPA and the Association have admitted. In
fact, they have presented questions which do not even
address the real issue. The question is not whether the
second panel of the court of appeals erred in its review
of an earlier EPA Administrator's waiver of the prohibi-
tion to sell petitioner's fuel in commerce. The reai
question is whether the present Administrator and the
2
Association can avoid the statutory safeguards of Sec-
tion 211(c) and have a fuel removed from commerce
under the guise of a ruling that the waiver should not
have been granted in the first place. It must be
understood that the sole purpose of this case from the
beginning has been to remove petitioner's fuel from
commerce without petitioner having had the protection
and the safeguards of a Section 211(c) proceeding.
The first panel of the court of appeals held that once
a fuel has been introduced into commerce the sole means
for its control or prohibition is by the procedure set
forth in Section 211(c). American Methyl Corp. v.
E.P.A., 749 F.2d 826, 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1984):
We hold that the Administrator may not revoke the
Petrocoal waiver pursuant to Section 211(f), but may
forbid the marketing of Petrocoal only pursuant to
his authority to control or prohibit fuel and fuel
additives under Section 211\7).
* * * section 211(f), which does not admit the
existence of a revocation procedure, not surprisingly
fails to regulate the conduct of such proceedings. !f
Section 211(f) is construed as EPA would have it, no
particular substantive or procedural requirements
(apart from whatever procedural minima may be
required by the Constitution's due process clause)
need be followed.
Pisin.
3
* « « Thus, while Congress may have wanted the
Administrator to correct his mistakes, it provided a
mechanism sufficient to this task in section 211(c).
It further understood this mechanism as the exclusive
means by which he was to correct waivers mistakenly
granted by default. We therefore see no need to
imply authority under section 211(f) to reconsider
waivers granted after due deliberation. What suf-
fices to correct waivers mistakenly granted by
default should also suffice to correct the (hopefully)
far smaller proportion of waivers mistakenly granted
after careful consideration.
The importance of review in the case now before the
Court is a matter of life or death to the petitioner
because the EPA has informed petitioner's president and
at least three of petitioner's customers that upon receipt
of the mandate in this case the EPA will not control or
prohibit the marketing of Petrocoal in proceedings
required by Section 211(c) as mandated in the first
panel's decision, but will interpret the second panel's
decision as having effectively removed Petrocoal from
commerce. The supposed theory for this interpretation
is that Petrocoal was never introduced into commerce
because the waiver granted by the Administrator in 1981
was vacated by the second panel of the court of appeals
in this case in 1985. (Affidavit of Ronald E. Eames
attached hereto as Appendix A.)
4
II
The opposition of the Association and EPA is based
upon the erroneous assertion that there is statutory
authority for judicial review of the granting of the
Petrocoal waiver. The Association asserts that the
review was "fully consistent with the applicable provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act." (Br. 5.) The EPA asserts
that "Congress fully intended that rulings on waivers
under Section 211(f)(4) would be subject to judicial
review. (Br. 7.) Such is not the case.
The Clean Air Act contains specific provisions for
judicial review of only specified actions of the Adminis-
trator. The statutory scheme of the Clean Air Act
shows that Congress intended to preclude judicial review
of the granting of a waiver.
The provisions and limitations for judicial review of
actions under the Clean Air Act are set forth in sub-
sections (b) and (e) of Section 307 (42 U.S.C. § 7607)(b)).
Section 307(b) describes various kinds of actions under
the different sections of the statute that can be
reviewed and is reproduced in full in the Appendix B to
this brief.
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5
The judicial review authority with regard to the
entire Clean Air Act is in Section 307(b) (42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)). The review authority for actions taken under
sections which are not involved in this case are:
any emission standard or requirement under sec-
tion 7412;
any standard of performance or requirement
under section 7411;
any standard under section 7521;
any determination under section 7521(b)(5).
However, the review authority with regard to actions
taken under Section 211 (42 U.S.C. § 7545) is limited to
"any control or prohibition." The pertinent language is
as follows:
(b) Judicial review
(1) A petition for review of action of the Adminis-
trator in promulgating * * * any control or prohibi-
tion under section 7545 [Section 211] of this title
* * * may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. + * *
Although the Administrator's actions under Section
211 include the issuance of waivers (subsection (f)) as
well as the imposition of controls and prohibitions (sub-
section (c)), it is only the controls and prohibitions that
are subject to judicial review. Subsection 211(c)
6
specifically speaks of the "control or prohibition" of
fuels in commerce and provides for specific proceedings
by the Administrator to accomplish such "control ‘or
prohibition." No such language is used in speaking of the
waiver of fuel into commerce under subsection 211(f).
The granting of a waiver is not a "control or prohibition."
The only place other than Section 307(b) where the
words "control" and "prohibition" are used is in Section
211(c) (42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)) which reads in pertinent part
as follows:
(c) Offending fuels and fuel additives; control;
prohibition.
(1) The Administrator may * * * control or prohi-
bit the manufacture, introduction into commerce,
offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive
for use in a motor vehicle * * *.
The words "control" and "prohibition" are also used in
subsections 211(e)(2)(A), 211(ce)(2B) and 211(¢)2)(C).
(See Appendix G to the petition.)
It is clear that by the specific language of the
judicial review provisions of Section 307(b), Congress
confined the judicial review of actions under Section 211
to those of control or prohibition and thereby excluded
review of ine granting of waivers.
ae AO aD hi. eli.
7
The Solicitor General refers at pages 2 and 7 of the
EPA brief to Section 211(f5) as the authority for
judicial review of waivers. Section 211(f)(5) reads as
follows:
No action of the Administrator under this section
may be stayed by any court pending judicial review of
such action.
Section 211(f)(5) merely provides that where review is
permitted an action of the Administrator may not be
stayed pending such review. That section does not
include the word "waiver" as would appear from page 2
of the Solicitor General's brief.
To make it clear that no general judicial review
authority exists apart from Section 307(b), subsection (e)
of Section 307 provices as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize judicial review of regulations or order of
the Administrator under this chapter, except as pro-
vided in this section.
Ill
Because of the lack of jurisdiction to review the
waiver and the threatened refusal of EPA to comply with
Section 211(¢) as directed by the decision of the first
panel, the need for review of the second panel's decision
8
is indisputable. In the absence of review, petitioner
requests a summary remand with directions to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
Dale E. Anderson
Claron C. Spencer
January 3, 1986
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APPENDIX A
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD E. EAMES
STATE OF UTAH )
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Ronald E. Eames, being first duly sworn, does upon
oath state as follows:
1. I am the President of American Methyl Corpora-
tion, a Utah Corporation, Petitioner before this Court.
2. After the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
was rendered in this matter, I was in a meeting held at
the offices of Mr. Richard Koslowski, Director of
Enforcement for the Federal Environmental Protection
Agency, Washington, D.C. There were present at said
meeting the following persons:
Richard Koslowski; Ralph Colleli, legal counsel
for EPA; James Caldwell; Scott Stone, legal counsel
for American Methyl; myself and possibly David
Dearing, legal counsel for the Justice Department.
3. In response to a question by myself concerning
EPA participation in a test program subsequent to the
issuance of the mandate in this case, Richard Koslowski
2a
stated that under no circumstances would Petrocoal be
allowed to be sold commercially after the mandate was
issued.
4. Ralph Colleli, legal counsel for EPA, stated, in
effect, that as far as EPA was concerned, the Court of
Appeals had imposed upon EPA the requirement to
prohibit the sale of Petrocoal by vacating the waiver.
Dated this 2nd day of January 1986.
i Cia a oo
Ronald E. Eames
Subscribed and sworn to by Ronald E. Eames before
me this 2nd day of January 1986. —
gee aay
ail NE Fee ae x CLE
Notary Public '
Residing in Salt Lake County,
Utah
My commission expires:
L1-9- 58
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3a
APPENDIX B
Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)
(b) Judicial review
(1) A petition for review of action of the Adminis-
trator in promulgating any national primary or
secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission
standard or requirement under section 7412 of this
title, any standard of performance or requirement
under section 7411 of this title, any standard under
section 7521 of this title (other than a standard
required to be prescribed under section 7521(b)(1) of
this title), any determination under section 7521(b)(5)
of this title, any control or prohibition under section
7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of
this title, any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or
under section 7420 of this title, or any other nation-
ally applicable regulations promulgated, or final
action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter
may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for
review of the Administrator's action in approving or
promulgating any implementation plan under section
7410 of this title or section 7411(d) of this title, any
order under section 7411(j) of this title, under section
7412(c) of this title, under section 7413(d)of this
title, under section 7419 of this title, or under
section 7420 of this title, or his action under section
1857¢-10(e)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in effect
before August 7, 1977) or under regulations there-
under, or any other final action of the Administrator
under this chapter (including any denial or dis-
approval by the Administrator under subchapter 1 of
this chapter) which is locally or regionally applicable
may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding
the preceding sentence a petition for review of any
action referred to in such sentence may be filed only
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
4a
of Columbia if such action is based on a determina-
tion of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking
such action the Administrator finds and publishes
that such action is based on such a determination.
Any petition for review under this subsection shall be
filed within sixty days from the date notice of such
promulgation, approval, or action appears in the
Federal Register, except that if such petition is
based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth
day, then any petition for review under this sub-
section shall be filed within sixty days after such
grounds arise.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to
which review could have been obtained under para-
graph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in
civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.
* * ¥ *
(e) Other methods of judicial review not authorized
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize judicia! review of regulations or orders of
the Administrator under this chapter, except as pro-
vided in this section.
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