Reply Brief — American Methyl Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States

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ae Supreme Court, U.S,

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JAN @ 980

No. 85-718

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

CLERA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,

PETITIONER

Vv.

THE MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIA-

TION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

Dale Edward Anderson

Claron C. Spencer

1200 Beneficial Life Tower

36 South State Street

Salt Lake City, Utsh 84111

Attorneys for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reply of petitioner ..... een CONS EME O ences ye eee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Methyl Corp. v. E.P.A.

749 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ...........-.

Statutes:

Clean Air Act

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APPENDIX A

Affidavit of Ronald E. Eames..............-.

APPENDIX B

Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act

De Es a CU eo Sik S SiS ies cect veces

No. 85-718

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,

PETITIONER

V.

THE MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIA-

TION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

I

The question before this Court goes much deeper

than the EPA and the Association have admitted. In

fact, they have presented questions which do not even

address the real issue. The question is not whether the

second panel of the court of appeals erred in its review

of an earlier EPA Administrator's waiver of the prohibi-

tion to sell petitioner's fuel in commerce. The reai

question is whether the present Administrator and the

2

Association can avoid the statutory safeguards of Sec-

tion 211(c) and have a fuel removed from commerce

under the guise of a ruling that the waiver should not

have been granted in the first place. It must be

understood that the sole purpose of this case from the

beginning has been to remove petitioner's fuel from

commerce without petitioner having had the protection

and the safeguards of a Section 211(c) proceeding.

The first panel of the court of appeals held that once

a fuel has been introduced into commerce the sole means

for its control or prohibition is by the procedure set

forth in Section 211(c). American Methyl Corp. v.

E.P.A., 749 F.2d 826, 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1984):

We hold that the Administrator may not revoke the

Petrocoal waiver pursuant to Section 211(f), but may

forbid the marketing of Petrocoal only pursuant to

his authority to control or prohibit fuel and fuel

additives under Section 211\7).

* * * section 211(f), which does not admit the

existence of a revocation procedure, not surprisingly

fails to regulate the conduct of such proceedings. !f

Section 211(f) is construed as EPA would have it, no

particular substantive or procedural requirements

(apart from whatever procedural minima may be

required by the Constitution's due process clause)

need be followed.

Pisin.

3

* « « Thus, while Congress may have wanted the

Administrator to correct his mistakes, it provided a

mechanism sufficient to this task in section 211(c).

It further understood this mechanism as the exclusive

means by which he was to correct waivers mistakenly

granted by default. We therefore see no need to

imply authority under section 211(f) to reconsider

waivers granted after due deliberation. What suf-

fices to correct waivers mistakenly granted by

default should also suffice to correct the (hopefully)

far smaller proportion of waivers mistakenly granted

after careful consideration.

The importance of review in the case now before the

Court is a matter of life or death to the petitioner

because the EPA has informed petitioner's president and

at least three of petitioner's customers that upon receipt

of the mandate in this case the EPA will not control or

prohibit the marketing of Petrocoal in proceedings

required by Section 211(c) as mandated in the first

panel's decision, but will interpret the second panel's

decision as having effectively removed Petrocoal from

commerce. The supposed theory for this interpretation

is that Petrocoal was never introduced into commerce

because the waiver granted by the Administrator in 1981

was vacated by the second panel of the court of appeals

in this case in 1985. (Affidavit of Ronald E. Eames

attached hereto as Appendix A.)

4

II

The opposition of the Association and EPA is based

upon the erroneous assertion that there is statutory

authority for judicial review of the granting of the

Petrocoal waiver. The Association asserts that the

review was "fully consistent with the applicable provi-

sions of the Clean Air Act." (Br. 5.) The EPA asserts

that "Congress fully intended that rulings on waivers

under Section 211(f)(4) would be subject to judicial

review. (Br. 7.) Such is not the case.

The Clean Air Act contains specific provisions for

judicial review of only specified actions of the Adminis-

trator. The statutory scheme of the Clean Air Act

shows that Congress intended to preclude judicial review

of the granting of a waiver.

The provisions and limitations for judicial review of

actions under the Clean Air Act are set forth in sub-

sections (b) and (e) of Section 307 (42 U.S.C. § 7607)(b)).

Section 307(b) describes various kinds of actions under

the different sections of the statute that can be

reviewed and is reproduced in full in the Appendix B to

this brief.

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5

The judicial review authority with regard to the

entire Clean Air Act is in Section 307(b) (42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)). The review authority for actions taken under

sections which are not involved in this case are:

any emission standard or requirement under sec-

tion 7412;

any standard of performance or requirement

under section 7411;

any standard under section 7521;

any determination under section 7521(b)(5).

However, the review authority with regard to actions

taken under Section 211 (42 U.S.C. § 7545) is limited to

"any control or prohibition." The pertinent language is

as follows:

(b) Judicial review

(1) A petition for review of action of the Adminis-

trator in promulgating * * * any control or prohibi-

tion under section 7545 [Section 211] of this title

* * * may be filed only in the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia. + * *

Although the Administrator's actions under Section

211 include the issuance of waivers (subsection (f)) as

well as the imposition of controls and prohibitions (sub-

section (c)), it is only the controls and prohibitions that

are subject to judicial review. Subsection 211(c)

6

specifically speaks of the "control or prohibition" of

fuels in commerce and provides for specific proceedings

by the Administrator to accomplish such "control ‘or

prohibition." No such language is used in speaking of the

waiver of fuel into commerce under subsection 211(f).

The granting of a waiver is not a "control or prohibition."

The only place other than Section 307(b) where the

words "control" and "prohibition" are used is in Section

211(c) (42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)) which reads in pertinent part

as follows:

(c) Offending fuels and fuel additives; control;

prohibition.

(1) The Administrator may * * * control or prohi-

bit the manufacture, introduction into commerce,

offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive

for use in a motor vehicle * * *.

The words "control" and "prohibition" are also used in

subsections 211(e)(2)(A), 211(ce)(2B) and 211(¢)2)(C).

(See Appendix G to the petition.)

It is clear that by the specific language of the

judicial review provisions of Section 307(b), Congress

confined the judicial review of actions under Section 211

to those of control or prohibition and thereby excluded

review of ine granting of waivers.

ae AO aD hi. eli.

7

The Solicitor General refers at pages 2 and 7 of the

EPA brief to Section 211(f5) as the authority for

judicial review of waivers. Section 211(f)(5) reads as

follows:

No action of the Administrator under this section

may be stayed by any court pending judicial review of

such action.

Section 211(f)(5) merely provides that where review is

permitted an action of the Administrator may not be

stayed pending such review. That section does not

include the word "waiver" as would appear from page 2

of the Solicitor General's brief.

To make it clear that no general judicial review

authority exists apart from Section 307(b), subsection (e)

of Section 307 provices as follows:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

authorize judicial review of regulations or order of

the Administrator under this chapter, except as pro-

vided in this section.

Ill

Because of the lack of jurisdiction to review the

waiver and the threatened refusal of EPA to comply with

Section 211(¢) as directed by the decision of the first

panel, the need for review of the second panel's decision

8

is indisputable. In the absence of review, petitioner

requests a summary remand with directions to dismiss

the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

Dale E. Anderson

Claron C. Spencer

January 3, 1986

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APPENDIX A

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD E. EAMES

STATE OF UTAH )

) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Ronald E. Eames, being first duly sworn, does upon

oath state as follows:

1. I am the President of American Methyl Corpora-

tion, a Utah Corporation, Petitioner before this Court.

2. After the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals

was rendered in this matter, I was in a meeting held at

the offices of Mr. Richard Koslowski, Director of

Enforcement for the Federal Environmental Protection

Agency, Washington, D.C. There were present at said

meeting the following persons:

Richard Koslowski; Ralph Colleli, legal counsel

for EPA; James Caldwell; Scott Stone, legal counsel

for American Methyl; myself and possibly David

Dearing, legal counsel for the Justice Department.

3. In response to a question by myself concerning

EPA participation in a test program subsequent to the

issuance of the mandate in this case, Richard Koslowski

2a

stated that under no circumstances would Petrocoal be

allowed to be sold commercially after the mandate was

issued.

4. Ralph Colleli, legal counsel for EPA, stated, in

effect, that as far as EPA was concerned, the Court of

Appeals had imposed upon EPA the requirement to

prohibit the sale of Petrocoal by vacating the waiver.

Dated this 2nd day of January 1986.

i Cia a oo

Ronald E. Eames

Subscribed and sworn to by Ronald E. Eames before

me this 2nd day of January 1986. —

gee aay

ail NE Fee ae x CLE

Notary Public '

Residing in Salt Lake County,

Utah

My commission expires:

L1-9- 58

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FES RAGE Ree eARENARE BES REEOS

3a

APPENDIX B

Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)

(b) Judicial review

(1) A petition for review of action of the Adminis-

trator in promulgating any national primary or

secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission

standard or requirement under section 7412 of this

title, any standard of performance or requirement

under section 7411 of this title, any standard under

section 7521 of this title (other than a standard

required to be prescribed under section 7521(b)(1) of

this title), any determination under section 7521(b)(5)

of this title, any control or prohibition under section

7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of

this title, any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or

under section 7420 of this title, or any other nation-

ally applicable regulations promulgated, or final

action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter

may be filed only in the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for

review of the Administrator's action in approving or

promulgating any implementation plan under section

7410 of this title or section 7411(d) of this title, any

order under section 7411(j) of this title, under section

7412(c) of this title, under section 7413(d)of this

title, under section 7419 of this title, or under

section 7420 of this title, or his action under section

1857¢-10(e)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in effect

before August 7, 1977) or under regulations there-

under, or any other final action of the Administrator

under this chapter (including any denial or dis-

approval by the Administrator under subchapter 1 of

this chapter) which is locally or regionally applicable

may be filed only in the United States Court of

Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding

the preceding sentence a petition for review of any

action referred to in such sentence may be filed only

in the United States Court of Appeals for the District

4a

of Columbia if such action is based on a determina-

tion of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking

such action the Administrator finds and publishes

that such action is based on such a determination.

Any petition for review under this subsection shall be

filed within sixty days from the date notice of such

promulgation, approval, or action appears in the

Federal Register, except that if such petition is

based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth

day, then any petition for review under this sub-

section shall be filed within sixty days after such

grounds arise.

(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to

which review could have been obtained under para-

graph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in

civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.

* * ¥ *

(e) Other methods of judicial review not authorized

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

authorize judicia! review of regulations or orders of

the Administrator under this chapter, except as pro-

vided in this section.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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