Appendix — American Methyl Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States

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85 =% 1 8 c Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

No. OCT 25 1985

IN THE CLERK

came

Supreme Court of the United

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,

~ Petitioner

MoToR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASS’N

OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.,

AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION,

CHRYSLER CORPORATION,

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

and VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.,

Respondents

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

DALE EDWARD ANDERSON *

CLARON C. SPENCER

1200 Beneficial Life Tower

36 South State Street

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801) 538-2100

Attorneys for Petitioner

American Methyl Corporation

Of Counsel:

BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH

1200 Beneficial Life Tower

36 South State Street

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Dated: October 25, 1985 * Counsel of Record

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co.. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS—APPENDICES

Appendices:

A.

B.

Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association, et al.

v. EPA, 768 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ..................

Judgment, Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Associa-

tion, et al. v. EPA, Nos. 81-2279, 81-2279 (July

es IIR, RP IN ii iciindlis ci eccdacceesdepacernlecgligaiieniinbeiasece

Environmental Protection Agency, Grant of Ap-

plication for a Fuel Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. 48975

SE Ot a piesbigivuinphasematinapectves

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Motor

Vehicles Manufacturers Association, et al. v. EPA,

No. 81-2276 (Sept. 18, 1985 D.C. Cir.) -..................

Order Denying Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,

Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association, et al.

v. EPA, No. 81-2276 (Sept. 18, 1985 D.C. Cir.) ......

Order Staying Issuance of the Mandate, Motor

Vehicles Manufacturers Association, et al. v. EPA,

No. 81-2276 (Oct. 1, 1985 D.C. Cir.) ........................

SB Ue. FE) iti

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 81-2276

MoTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE

UNITED STATES, INC., et al.,

Petitioners

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent

AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,

Intervenor

No. 81-2279

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Petitioner

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent

AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,

Intervenor

Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

2a

Argued May 14, 1985

Decided July 26, 1985

Gary P. Toth, with whom William H. Crabtree, Mark

Slywynsky, Michael W. Grice, Robert G. Seasonwein and

William L. Weber, Jr. were on the brief, for petitioners

in Nos. 81-2276 and 81-2279.

David E. Dearing, Attorney, Department of Justice,

with whom Samuel I. Gutter, Robert A. Weissman, At-

torneys, A. James Barnes, General Counsel, Gerald K.

Gleason, Assistant General Counsel, Environmental Pro-

tection Agency and Jose R. Allen, Attorney, Department

of Justice were on the brief, for respondents in Nos. 81-

2276 and 81-2279. Nancy Marvel and Ralph Colleli, Jr.

entered appearances for respondents in Nos. 81-2276 and

81-2279.

James W. Moorman, with whom Scott N. Stone, Rus-

sell V. Randle and David B. Robinson were on the brief,

for intervenor American Methyl Corporation. Arnold B.

Podgorsky and Laurence S. Kirsch entered appearances

for intervenor in Nos. 81-2276 and 81-2279.

V. Peter Wynne was on the brief for Atlantic Rich-

field Company, amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos.

81-2276 and 81-2279.

Milton D. Andrews and Lance E. Tunick were on the

brief for Automobile Importers of America, Inc., amicus

curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 81-2276 and 81-2279.

Before: TAMM, WALD and MIKvA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: Petitioners’ seek review of a

decision of the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-

+The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United

States, Inc. (“MVMA”), American Motors Corporation, Chrysler

Corporation, General Motors Corporation (“GM” or “General

3a

tection Agency (the “Administrator” or the “EPA”) to

grant a waiver of the Clean Air Act’s (the “Act’”) re

strictions on new fuels or fuel additives, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 7545(f) (4), to American Methyl Corporation? for a

proprietary fuel known as Petrocoal. Finding that the

EPA’s decision to grant the waiver was arbitrary, ca-

pricious and an abuse of discretion, we vacate the Petro-

coal waiver and remand to the agency for further pro-

ceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Since this court has already had occasion to set forth

the background of this case in American Methyl Corp. v.

EPA, 749 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we present here

only a brief synopsis of that background, highlighting the

facts particularly relevant to the present petition. The

statutory provision at issue is section 211(f) of the Clean

Air Act which places substantial restrictions on new

fuels or fuel additives (collectively referred to as “fuel’’).

Specifically section 211(f) (1) makes it

... unlawful for any manufacturer .. . to first in-

troduce into commerce, or to increase the concentra-

tion in use of, any fuel or fuel additive for general

use in light duty motor vehicles . . . which is not

substantially similar to any fuel or fuel additive

Motors”) and Volkswagen of America, inc. are jointly prosecuting

the petition for review in No. 81-2276. General Motors is the peti-

tioner in the consolidated action, No. 81-2279. MVMA is a trade

association of automobile manufacturers. The petitioners are col-

lectively referred to in this opinion as “petitioners” or “MVMA.”

Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) and Automobile Importers

of America, Inc. (“AIA”) filed amici curiae briefs in support of

the petitioners.

2 American Methyl Corporation is an intervenor in this case on

the side of the EPA. At the time of the waiver decision and up

until June 30, 1982, American Methyl was incorporated under the

name Anafuel Unlimited. We refer to the corporation by its current

name, American Methyl.

4a

utilized in the certification of any . . . [1975 or later

model year vehicle or engine].

42 U.S.C. § 7545(f) (1). Section 211(f) (4), however,

allows the Administrator to waive this prohibition in

specified circumstances:

The Administrator, upon application of any man-

ufacturer . . . may waive the prohibitions estab-

lished . . . if he determines that the applicant has

established that such fuel or fuel additive or a

specified concentration thereof, and the emission

products of such fuel or additive or specified concen-

tration thereof, will not cause or contribute to a

failure of any emission control device or system

(over the useful life of any vehicle in which such

device or system is used) to achieve compliance by

the vehicle with the emission standards with respect

to which it has been certified pursuant to section

7525 of this title.

42 U.S.C. § 7545 (f) (4).

On February 20, 1981, American Methyl applied for a

section 211(f) (4) waiver for a methanol/gasoline blend

fuel called Petrocoal. EPA published a public notice on

April 13, 1981, acknowledging receipt of the application

and soliciting comments on whether Petrocoal met the

waiver criteria. See 46 Fed. Reg. 21,695 (1981), Joint

Appendix (“J.A.”) at 79. Under section 211(f) (4), a

waiver is treated as granted if the Administrator fails

to grant or deny the application within 180 days of its

8 “Certification” refers to the process of testing and issuance of

a certificate of conformity required by section 206(a) of the Act,

42 U.S.C. §7525(a), whereby manufacturers must demonstrate,

under carefully controlled procedures that their vehicles, or any

engine or emission control system incorporated therein, conform

with the applicable emissions standards prescribed in 42 U.S.C.

§ 7521.

5a

receipt. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f) (4).* By mutual consent of

the EPA and American Methyl, this 180-day review

period, scheduled to expire on August 19, 1981, was ex-

tended, see 46 Fed. Reg. 48,082 (Aug. 26, 1981) (30 day

extension) and 46 Fed. Reg. 47,299 (Sept. 25, 1981) (10

day extension), until September 28, 1981, when EPA

granted a conditional waiver for Petrocoal. See Petro-

coal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,975 (Oct. 5, 1981). The

Administrator ® determined that American Methyl had

met the burden necessary to establish its eligibility for a

waiver for Petrocoal under section 211(f) (4) provided

that the finished fuel met the following conditions:

(T]he concentration of methanol . . . does not ex-

ceed 12 percent, by volume, the concentration of total

alcohols in the fuel does not exceed 15 percent, by

*Intervenor American Methyl] argues that the provision that a

waiver is automatically granted if the Administrator fails to act

within 180 days indicates that Congress intended a lenient burden

of proof under section 211(f) (4) and that we should accord special

deference to the Administrator’s decision. See Brief for American

Methyl ai 25, 27-29. Section 211(f) (4), however, establishes a clear

burden on the waiver applicant to establish that the new fuel will

not cause or contribute to the failure of any emission control device

to achieve compliance with emission standards over the useful life

of a vehicie. See infra pp. 11-12. Neither the Act nor its legislative

history indicates how Congress intended us to reconcile the clear

burden placed on the waiver applicant to qualify for a waiver grant

and the automatic granting of a waiver in the absence of action by

the Administrator within 180 days. We find it most plausible to

construe the 180-day limitation as a means of ensuring prompt

administrative action on waiver applications; hence, we reject

American Methyl’s assertion that it has any bearing on the ap-

plicant’s burden of proof. We also note that the 180-day period in

no way limits the time an applicant has to conduct tests and compile

the necessary information to qualify for a waiver prior to filing an

application.

5 The waiver was actually signed by the Acting Administrator

John W. Hernandez not the then current Administrator Anne M.

Gorsuch. For ease of reference we will refer to the Administrator

on whose behalf the waiver was granted.

6a

volume, the ratio of methanol to four-carbon alco-

hols in the finished fuel does not exceed 6.5 to 1, by

volume and the finished fuel is blended such that it

meets the American Society for Testing and Mate-

rials (ASTM) fuel volatility specifications for the

area and time of year in which it is sold.

Id. at 48,976.

On December 4, 1981, MVMA filed both a petition for

administrative reconsideration of the waiver by the EPA

and the present petition for judicial review of the waiver

by this court. The EPA did not act on MVMA’s petition

for administrative reconsideration. On February 22,

1983, MVMA filed a supplemental petition for reconsid-

eration supported by new data which purportedly con-

tradicted one of the EPA’s basic assumptions in grant-

ing the waiver—namely that increased evaporative emis-

sions due to the use of Petrocoal could be controlled by

controlling the volatility of the blended fuel. This sup-

plemental petition together with the new data submitted

prompted the EPA to reconsider the waiver grant, see

48 Fed. Reg. 19,779, 19,780 (1983) (notice and request

for comments on petition for reconsideration), and to a

proposed revocation of the waiver. See 49 Fed. Reg.

11,879, 11,885 (1984) (notice of reconsideration and pro-

posed revocation of Petrocoal waiver). Coincidentally

with the EPA’s publication of the proposed notice of

revocation, the parties to the pending petition for judi-

cial review of the waiver grant jointly moved to remand

the record to the EPA for further administrative pro-

ceedings. This court granted that motion on April 3,

1984,

A month later on May 3, 1984, however, American

Methyl formally requested the EPA to terminate the

revocation proceeding on the ground that section 211(f)

did not authorize the EPA to revoke a waiver. The

EPA’s General Counsel denied this request in a letter

7a

ruling dated June 8, 1984. American Methyl petitioned

this court for judicial review of both the notice of pro-

posed revocation and the letter ruling. On July 27, 1984,

this court granted American Methyl’s motion to stay the

EPA’s proposed revocation proceeding. On the merits,

this court held that the EPA may not revoke a waiver

pursuant to section 211(f), but may forbid the market-

ing of Petrocoal pursuant to section 211(c} which grants

the Administrator the authority to regulate fuels or fuel

additives. American Methyl, 749 F.2d at 828. The case

was remanded to the EPA for further proceedings pur-

suant to section 211(c). To date, the EPA has not initi-

ated a proceeding to regulate Petrocoal under section

211(c).

Following this court’s remand to the EPA for further

proceedings pursuant to section 211(c), MVMA moved

the court to order the return of the record on its peti-

tion for review of the original waiver decision and to

hear oral argument. The court granted the motion on

February 138, 1985. and oral argument was heard on

May 14, 1985.

The principai issue presented in this case is the rea-

sonableness of the EPA’s determination that American

Methyl sufficiently established that Petrocoal met the

criteria to qualify for a waiver under section 211(f) (4).

This challenge to the grant of the Petrocoal waiver, how-

ever, has raised two initial questions of statutory con-

struction related to the showing an applicant must make

in order to qualify for a section 211(f) (4) waiver. Spe-

cifically, the statutory questions are: (1) Does section

211(f) (4) require the EPA to determine that a fuel will

not cause or contribute to any increase in emissions or

only that it will not cause or contribute to an increase

which exceeds applicable emission standards; and (2)

Does section 211(f) (4) oblige the EPA to require ap-

plicants to submit emission data on vehicles tested over

a 50,000-mile period or may the EPA evaluate the long-

8a

term effects of a new fuel on the basis of reasoned tech-

nical judgments?

II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION QUESTIONS

This court in reviewing the EPA’s construction and

implementation of the terms of section 211(f) (4) may

reverse the agency’s action only if it is outside the bounds

of its statutory authority, see American Methyl, 749 F.2d

at 833 (citing section 307(d)(9)(C) of the Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (9) (C)), or if it is arbitrary,

capricious, or an abuse of discretion.* With respect to

issues of statutory construction, if Congress’ intent can

be ascertained from the plain language of the statute

6Intervenor American Methyl] argues that section 307(d) (9),

42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (9), governs our review in this case, whereas

MVMA argues that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 706, governs. While not expressly addressing the issue, this court

in American Methyl, 749 F.2d at 833, apparently construed section

807(d) (9) of the Clean Air Act to govern review of the EPA’s

actions pursuant to section 211(f). We find it unnecessary to decide

this issue here since the standard we apply (i.e., whether the EPA’s

actions were in excess of statutory authority or arbitrary and ca-

pricious) is the same under either Act. See Small Refiners Lead

Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 519 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (the standard for substantive judicial review under the

Clean Air Act is taken directly from the Administrative Procedure

Act).

The scope of our review under the arbitrary and capricious

standard is well established. We must engage in a “searching and

careful” review of both the facts and the agency’s reasoning to

ensure that the agency’s decision was a product of reasoned deci-

sionmaking based upon a consideration of the relevant factors.

Id. at 520 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C.

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ); see also Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

43 (1983) (Agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for

its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found

and the choice made.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) ).

9a

or its legislative history then that intent must be given

effect. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 n.9 (1984).

If, on the other hand, the court determines that Con-

gress has not directly addressed the question at issue,

then “the question for the court is whether the agency’s

answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-

ute.” Id. at 2782. With these precepts in mind, we turn

to the statutory questions of whether section 211(f) (4)

compels the Administrator to deny a waiver application

if the fuel causes any increase in emissions and to re-

quire the applicant to submit 50,000-mile durability data.

A. Requisite Finding With Respect to Emission Increases

The EPA contends that to grant a waiver under sec-

tion 211(f) (4), the Administrator is required only to

determine that the fuel will not cause vehicles to ex-

ceed applicable emission standards. Brief for EPA at 9.

The EPA makes this argument in response to MVMA’s

and amicus AIA’s assertions that Congress intended sec-

tion 211(f) (4) to preclude the grant of a waiver if the

fuel caused any increase in emissions. See Brief for

MVMA at 30, 43; Brief for AIA at 19-22; but see Brief

for MVMA at 26, 45 (referring to any increase which

causes or contributes to a vehicle’s failure to meet emis-

sion standards). AIA contends that the Act’s language

stating that a waiver must be denied if a fuel “contrib-

utes” to a failure to achieve compliance with emission

standards “means that a waiver must be denied if the

subject fuel causes any increase in emissions.” Brief for

AIA at 20 (emphasis in original); see also Reply Brief

for MVMA at 12-13. We note at the outset that the

decision whether to grant a waiver is committed to the

discretion of the Administrator. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545

(f) (4) (“The Administrator . . . may waive the pro-

hibitions . . .”) (emphasis added). Thus, the question is

not whether the Administrator may deny a waiver on

the basis of an increase in emissions not amounting to a

10a

failure to meet emission standards, but whether section

211(f) (4) mandates that the Administrator must deny

a waiver if a fuel causes any increase in emissions.

The plain language of section 211(f) (4) refers not to

any increase in emissions but to “a failure of any emis-

sion control device or system . . . to achieve compliance

.. . with the [applicable] emissions standards...” 42

U.S.C. § 7545(f) (4). Section 211(f) (4) was added to

the Clean Air Act in 1977. See Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 222, 91 Stat. 685,

763-64.7 The Senate version of section 211(f) (4), relied

upon by AIA, would have required a waiver applicant to

establish that the fuel did not impair emission perform-

ance. See S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91

(1977). The conferees, however, rejected the Senate

version, and in adopting the current language of section

211(f) (4) stated:

Thus, if a fuel or fuel additive causes an increase

in engine emissions so as to increase tail pipe emis-

7 The Senate Committee in 1977 received testimony that a certain

fuel additive, MMT, “was impairing the performance of emission

control systems and increasing hydrocarbon emissions in test ve-

hicles.” S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1977). The

Committee was concerned that existing section 211(c), which al-

lows the Administrator to control or prohibit fuels by regulation,

could not adequately protect emissions systems currently in use

from the possible deterioration caused by MMT, or other new fuels

or additives, due to the delay associated with the procedural safe-

guards required in section 211(c) proceedings. Jd. As a result,

the Committee proposed and Congress ultimately enacted section

211(f) banning new fuels or fuel additives not substantially similar

to those utilized in the certification of any 1975 or later model year

vehicle or engine. The Senate Committee proposed iucluding the

waiver provision found in section 211(f) (4) because “[t]he com-

mittee was concerned with the increased use of crude oil that would

be necessitated by the prohibition in use of MMT or other octane

raising agents, and the smaller refineries that would be adversely

affected by these provisions when lead phase-down requirements

were taken into account.” Id. at 91.

lla

sions or interferes with performance of a specific

device or element of -nission control so as to cause

or contribute to the vehicle’s failure to meet the

standards at any point in its useful life, the Ac-

ministrator could not waive the prohibition.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 161

(1977) (emphasis added). Thus we find that both the

plain language of the Act and its legislative history

support the EPA’s view that the Administrator is not

required under section 211(f)(4) to adopt a “no in-

crease” standard and may grant a waiver as long as

the fuel does not cause or contribute to a failure to

achieve compliance with emission standards. Cf. Spe-

cialty Equip. Mkt. Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 720 F.2d 124,

133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting MVMA’s contention

that section 207(a)(2) of the Act required a “no-

increase” standard with respect to the certification of

aftermarket parts).

B. 50,000-Mile Durability Testing

Section 211(f)(4) provides that, to qualify for a

waiver, an applicant must establish that the fuel “will

not cause or contribute to a failure of any emission con-

trol device or system (over the useful life of any vehicle

in which such device or system is used) to achieve com-

pliance by the vehicle with the [applicable] ervission

standards.” 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f) (4) (emphasis added).

The Conference Report states that a waiver could not

be granted if the fuel caused or contributed to the “ve-

hicle’s failure to meet the standards at any point in its

useful life.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st

Sess. 161 (1977) (emphasis added); see supra p. 10

(quoting passage in full). Section 202(d), 42 U.S.C.

§ 7521(d), defines the “useful life” of a vehicle as five

years or 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first. Petitioners

argue that both the language of section 211(f) (4) and

its legislative history clearly indicate that an applicant

12a

must submit data which measure the fuel’s effect on

emissions over the “useful life’ of the vehicle (i.e.,

50,000-mile durability testing).* See Brief for MVMA

at 27-30, 37-41. Thus petitioners claim that the EPA

erred in granting the Petrocoal waiver in the absence

of 50,000-mile durability data.

The EPA, however, has established a practice of not

requiring 50,000-mile durability testing where it deter-

mines that the emissions effect of the fuel is of an in-

stantaneous, not deteriorative, nature. See Oxinal Waiver,

44 Fed. Reg. 37,074 (1979); MTBE Waiver, 44 Fed.

Reg. 12,242 (1979); TBA Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,530

(1979). Instead the EPA requires only “back-to-back”

testing.’ This practice is predicated upon EPA’s general

8 Conducting 50,000-mile durability testing involves operating a

matched set of vehicles for 50,000 miles and performing emissions

tests on each vehicle at 5,000-mile intervals. This is essentially the

same testing method required of automobile manufacturers to ob-

tain new motor vehicle certification under section 206 of the Act.

See Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,976 n.7; see also supra

note 3 (defining “certification”’).

°If a fuel is predicted to have only an instantaneous effect on

emissions then the fuel is predicted to cause an immediate, incre-

mental shift in the emission levels relative to a base fuel and this

shift is predicted to remain constant throughout the useful life of

the vehicle. “Back-to-back” emission testing is considered by the

EPA to be sufficient where only instantaneous effects are predicted.

Back-to-back emission testing refers to the testing of a vehicle on

a base fuel, then testing the same vehicle on the waiver fuel. The

difference in emission levels is attributed to the waiver fuel. The

EPA uses three statistical tests to evaluate the emission data

provided with respect to a fuel expected to have an instantaneous

emission effect: (1) the Paired Difference Test which determines

the mean difference in emissions between the base fuel and the

waiver fuel; (2) the Sign of the Difference Test which assesses the

number of vehicles exhibiting an increase or decrease in emissions;

and (3) the Deteriorated Emissions Test which indicates whether

the waiver fuel will cause or contribute to a failure to meet emis-

sion standards by comparing deteriorated emissions with the emis-

13a

interpretation of the burden of proof required of an ap-

plicant under section 211(f) (4). Specifically, the EPA

states:

This burden, which Congress has imposed on the ap-

plicant, if interpreted literally, is virtually impos-

sible to meet as it requires proof of a negative

proposition, i.e., that no vehicle will fail to meet emis-

sion standards with respect to which it has been

certified. Taken literally, it would require the test-

ing of every vehicle. Recognizing that Congress con-

templated a workable waiver provision, mitigation

of this stringent burden was deemed necessary. For

purposes of the waiver provision, EPA has previously

indicated that reliable statistical sampling and fleet

testing protocols may be used to demonstrate that a

fuel under consideration would not cause or con-

tribute to a significant failure of emission standards

by vehicles in the national fleet.

Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,976; TBA Waiver,

44 Fed. Reg. at 10,530. Having determined that sample

testing of vehicles is an appropriate method for estab-

lishing that a fuel qualifies for a waiver under section

200(f) (4), the EPA then further considered which spe-

cific testing methods were appropriate in given cases.

The EPA concluded that bacx-to-back testing and sta-

tistical projections are sufficient where a fuel is predi-

cated to have only instantaneous effects, see supra note

9, and that 50,000-mile durability testing is only required

where a fuel is predicated to have long-term deteriora-

tive effects. See, e.g., Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at

48-976; TBA Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. at 10,351. The EPA

justifies this latter determination regarding the requisite

testing sufficient to qualify for a section 211(f) (4)

sion standards in lieu of actually having 50,000-mile emission data.

See Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,976 & Appendix A (de-

scribing statistical tests).

l4a

waiver on the ground that the legislative history of sec-

tion 211(f) (4) indicates that the EPA in evaluating the

long-term effects of a fuel is only required to take into

account “the deterioration factors employed in certifying

the engine.” Brief for EPA at 12 (citing H.R. Conf.

Rep. No. 564 at 161).%° The EPA asserts that the statis-

tical tests used to evaluate the emissions effect of a fuel

expected to have an instantaneous effect on emissions,

namely the Deteriorated Emissions Test, see supra note

9, takes full account of the deterioration factors used in

certifying the vehicles. The EPA further asserts that

it may apply sound technical judgment to determine

10 Specifically the passage relied upon by the EPA states:

The conferees also intend that the words “cause or contribute

to the failure of an emission control device or system to meet

emission standards over its useful life to which it has been

certified pursuant to section 206” mean the noncompliance of

an engine or device with emission levels to which it was certi-

fied, taking into account the deterioration factors employed in

certifying the engine.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 161 (1977).

The EPA further contends that the term “deterioration factors”

was drawn directly from the EPA’s regulations, and refers to the

manufacturer’s projection of the amount of emissions degradation

expected over a vehicle’s useful life. See Brief for EPA at 13

(citing 40 C.F.R. § 86.082-28 (a) ).

11 Specifically the Deteriorated Emissions Test takes account of

the deterioration factor or amount of projected emissions degrada-

tion over the vehicle’s 50,000-mile useful life as follows:

For each vehicle, the effect the waiver fuel or fuel additive had

on emissions is determined. This incremental effect, either

positive or negative, is added to the 50,000-mile certification

emission value of the certification emission vehicle which the

test vehicle presented. This incremental 50,000-mile emission

value is compared to emission standards to determine if it did

or did not exceed the standards. Either a pass or fail is as-

signed accordingly. The pass/fail results are analyzed using

a one-sided sign test.

Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,978.

l5a

whether a fuel is expected to have an instantaneous or

deteriorative effect on emissions and that, where alterna-

tive methodologies are available for evaluating the long-

term effects of a fuel, nothing in the Act or its legisla-

tive history precludes the use of these alternatives to the

costly and time-consuming method of actual 50,000-mile

testing. See Brief for EPA at 13-14.

We find merit in both petitioners’ and the EPA’s argu-

ments on this issue. We agree with petitioners that both

the language of section 211(f) (4) and its legislative his-

tory specifically provide that, for a fuel to qualify for a

waiver, the EPA must determine that the fuel wil! not

cause or contribute to a vehicle’s failure to meet the ap-

plicable standards at any time during its useful life. On

the other hand, we also find persuasive the EPA’s argu-

ment that actual 50,000-mile durability testing may not

always be required to make the requisite determination

that a fuel will not cause a vehicle to exceed emission

standards over its useful life. Clear evidence before the

EPA may allow it to conclusively rule out the possibility

of long-term, deteriorative effects, thus making the EPA’s

Deteriorated Emissions Test sufficient and obviating the

need for actually conducting costly and time-consuming

50,000-mile durability tests.’* Section 211(f) (4) only re-

quires that the EPA determine that a fuel will not cause

or contribute to a failure of an emission device to comply

with applicable emission standards during a vehicle’s

useful life, it does not specify that the EPA must base

this determination on actual 50,000-mile durability tests

in all cases. Nonetheless, given section 211(f) (4)’s clear

directive that the EPA must evaluate the effect of a fuel

ever the useful life of a vehicle, the EPA must have a

12 We note that there are exceptions to the 50,000-mile testing

requirement with respect to vehicle certification pursuant to sec-

tion 206 of the Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 86.081-13 (1984) (alternate

durability program) ; id. § 86.082-14 (1984) (exception for small

volume manufacturers).

16a

clearly sound basis for determining in a given case that

back-to-back testing provides an adequate and sufficient

means of evaluation in lieu of actual 50,000-mile testing.

In the present case, however, we are compelled to find

that the Administrator apparently lacked any rational

basis for concluding that Petrocoal will not cause or con-

tribute to a vehicle’s failure to comply with emission

standards over its useful life. The Administrator’s stated

rationale for concluding that Petrocoal will have only an

instantaneous, not deteriorative, effect on emissions, sim-

ply fails to withstand careful scrutiny. Moreover, even

if we accepted the validity of this conclusion, Petrocoal

failed—albeit marginally—the Deteriorated Emissions

Test performed in lieu of 50,000-mile testing. See infra

section III-B. Under these circumstances, we have no

doubt that the EPA abused its discretion in determining

that Petrocoal will not cause a vehicle to exceed the emis-

sion standards over its useful life.**

The Administrator’s stated rationale for concluding

that 50,000-mile durability testing was unnecessary for

Petrocoal rests entirely on three prior waiver decisions:

Experience with other oxygenated hydrocarbon addi-

tives similar to the alcohols contained in Petrocoal

has led EPA to believe that only an instantaneous

emission effect should be observed with Petrocoal.

Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,977 & n.6 (citing

waiver decisions for TBA, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,530 (1979),

MTBE, 44 Fed. Reg. 12,242 (1979), and Oxinal, 44 Fed.

Reg. 37,074 (1979)). The sufficiency of this rationale

18 Given our conclusion in this case that the Administrator lacked

a rational basis for determining that Petrocoal will not cause a

vehicle to fail to comply with emission standards over its useful

life, we find it unnecessary to speculate about the precise circum-

stances in which the EPA might permissibly conclude that a waiver

could be granted on the basis of back-to-back testing in the absence

of any 50,000-mile durability data.

17a

turns on whether the reasoning and data supporting the

three cited waivers can be generalized to reasonably sup-

port a conclusion that Petrocoal will have only instan-

taneous, not deteriorative, emission effects thus obviating

the need for 50,000-mile testing. Upon a review of the

three waiver decisions, we conclude that they fail either

singularly or in combination to provide a reasonably suf-

ficient basis for the EPA’s conclusion.

In the TBA waiver decision, the EPA granted ARCO

a waiver for a fuel additive, Arconol, in a concentration

of 0 to 7 volume percent, which consists primarily of

tertiary butyl aleohol (TBA). See TBA Waiver, 44 Fed.

Reg. at 10,530 & n.2. No. 50,000-mile durability testing

was conducted. The EPA concluded that back-to-back

testing would provide a reasonable estimate of a vehicle’s

emission performance on Arconol based on an examina-

tion of the available data on materials compatibility “

and the chemistry of Arconol. Jd. at 10,531 & n.9. The

EPA further noted that ARCO had been “using up to

5% Arconol since 1970 and up to 7% since 1974 without

apparent material compatibility problems. Therefore, the

vehicle manufacturers should have already accommo-

dated for Arconol in their design.” Jd. at 10,532 n.16.

In the MTBE waiver decision, the EPA granted ARCO

a waiver for methyl] tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) in a

concentration range of 0 to 7 volume percent. See MTBE

Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. at 12,248. As in the TBA waiver,

the EPA determined that 50,000-mile durability testing

was unnecessary based upon an examination of the avail-

able data on materials compatibility and the chemistry

of MTBE. Id. at n.10. The EPA’s conclusion here that

50,000-mile test data should not be required was, how-

ever, supported by limited durability data. Id. at 12,244

14 Materials compatibility testing refers to testing conducted to

determine the potential deteriorative effects of a fuel or fuel addi-

tive on the materials used in fuel and emission control systems.

18a

n.11. Specifically the EPA referenced a limited durabil-

ity test program conducted by Texaco using six vehicles,

each of which accumulated 20,000 miles on a dynamom-

eter.

Finally in the Oxinal waiver decision, the EPA granted

Sun Petroleum Products Company a waiver for a pro-

prietary oxygenated hydrocarbon fuel additive which pro-

vides no more than two percent oxygen in the fuel.

Oxinal Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,074. At the time of

the waiver grant, the composition of Oxinal was kept

confidential. The waiver was predicated, inter alia, upon

the condition that the Administrator could revoke the

waiver based on new data submitted after the public dis-

closure of Oxinal’s chemical composition. Jd. A subse-

quent disclosure notice revealed that Oxinal was com-

prised of a maximum of 2.75 percent by volume of TBA

and 2.75 percent by volume of methanol. See 45 Fed.

Reg. 9766 (1980) (notice of disclosure of chemical »om-

position of fuel additive) ; see also 45 Fed. Reg. 75,755

(1980) (denial of petition to revoke waiver following

disclosure of chemical composition). This is the only

cited waiver decision which contained methanol, the prin-

cipal alcohol used in Petrocoal. Once again the EPA con-

cluded, based upon an examination of the available mate-

rials compatibility data and the chemistry of the fuel

additive, that 50,000-mile durability data testing was not

required. See Oxinal Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,076 &

n.10. The EPA also noted that limited durability test

data (one vehicle tested at the end of 20,000 miles) sup-

ported its conclusion. 7d. at n.11.

While we intimate no opinion as to the propriety of

the EPA’s conclusion that 50,000-mile durability testing

was not essential in these three waiver decisions, we find

the EPA’s bootstrap approach of relying on them to

support a conclusion that 50,000-mile testing was like-

wise not required for Petrocoal extremely troubling. Not

only were the TBA, MTBE, and Oxinal waiver decisions

19a

themselves predicated on a conclusion that 50,000-mile

testing was unnecessary but this conclusion in each case

was purportedly based on an evaluation of the materials

compatibility data available on and the chemical com-

position of the particular fuel or fuel additive at issue.”

Out of the three, only Oxinal contained methanol, the

principal alcohol in Petrocoal, and it contained only 2.75

percent by volume methanol whereas Petrocoal may con-

tain up to 12 percent by volume methanol.** We find this

factor particularly telling given the well-recognized spe-

cial concerns raised specifically with respect to the po-

15 We note that in determining that 50,000-mile durability test-

ing was not essential to the Petrocoal waiver, the EPA did not

similarly purport to rely on an evaluation of the materials com-

patibility data available with respect to Petrocoal. Given the Ad-

ministrator’s departure from the established practice of citing to

the materials compatibility data on the fuel at issue and the nature

of the materials compatibility data on Petrocoal, see infra section

III-D, we decline to infer that the Administrator relied on this data

in concluding that 50,000-mile durability testing was unnecessary.

See infra note 20.

16 Petrocoal also has an oxygen content of between 7 and 7%

percent which is considerably greater than that of other fuels for

which the EPA has granted section 211(f) (4) waivers (e.g., the

Oxinol waiver was conditioned on a maximum allowance oxygen

content of 2 percent). The EPA has specifically recognized in a

prior waiver decision that:

([D]riveability may be a problem at higher concentrations of

methanol because of the increased oxygen content of the fuel.

As oxygen content increases, the air/fuel ratio shifts outside

the design sepcifications (enleanment).

Denial of Beker Industries, Inc.’s Application for a Fuel Additive

Waiver, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,122, 26,134 (1980). The EPA has also

noted “[e]xperience with other waivers [has] demonstrated that.

increase in emissions, particularly oxides of nitrogen and evapora-

tive hydrocarbons, were proportional to oxygen content.” See

Grant of Application for a Fuel Waiver Submitted by Atlantic

Richfield Company (ARCO)—Decision of the Administrator, at 6

(Nov. 7, 1981) (granting waiver for a methanol blend fuel pro-

vided that the maximum oxygen content allowable is 3.5 percent),

reprinted in Brief for MVMA, Appendix N.

20a

tential adverse deteriorative effects of using methanol/

gasoline blend fuels. See generally J. Keller, G. Naka-

guchi, & J. Ware, Final Report: Methanol Fuel Modifi-

cation for Highway Vehicle Use, Prepared for U.S. Dep’t

of Energy (HCP/W3683-18) (July 1978) .**

Indeed, at the time the EPA granted the Petrocoal

waiver, it had denied two previous waiver applications

for methanol fuel additives. See Denial of Conservation

Consultants of New England, Inc.’s (“Conservation”)

Application for a Fuel Additive Waiver, 45 Fed. Reg.

53,861 (1980); Denial of Beker Industries, Inc.’s

(“Beker”) Application for a Fuel Additive Waiver, 45

Fed. Reg. 26,122 (1980).'* Particularly relevant is the

EPA’s general characterization and recognition of the

17 We note that in July 1983, the EPA issued a notice in the

Federal Register announcing that it would hold a public workshop

on methanol/unlesded gasoline blends with the purpose of helping

the EPA to “assess the meaning of existing data and to better

understand the concerns that may exist regarding the use of such

blends and the basis for these concerns.” See 48 Fed. Reg. 32,075

(1983).

18 Beker requested a waiver for crude methanol in unleaded gaso-

line from 0 to 15 percent by volume. Conservation requested a

‘waiver for a one-to-one mixture of methanol and ethanol at 10 per-

cent by volume (i.e., 5 percent methanol and 5 percent ethanol) to

be blended with 90 percent, by volume, unleaded gasoline. While in

both decisions, the EPA did state generally that “[e]xperience with

other oxygenated hydrocarbon additives leads EPA to believe

that [the mixture at issue] would probably have an instantaneous

effect [on emissions],” it gave no citation to any other waiver deci-

sion or supporting data. See Conservation Waiver, 45 Fed. Reg. at

53,862 n.3; Beker Waiver, 45 Fed. Reg. at 26,123 n.2. Moreover,

the EPA qualified this conclusion in beth decisions stating: “The

. .. mixture may also exhibit long-term deteriorative effects on fuel

system components. Therefore any future waiver application should

be supported with materials compatibility testing.” Jd. Both ap-

plications were denied on the ground that the applicant failed to

submit sufficient data to establish that the methanol/gasoline blend

would not cause or contribute to a vehicle’s failure to meet emission

standards over its useful life.

2la

potential problems associated with methanol/gaswiline

blends set forth in the Beker decision:

To summarize, the various data on methanol/gaso-

line mixtures are not encouraging. Generally such

mixtures exhibit only slight effects on tailpipe ex-

haust emissions, but they generally appear to have

appreciably greater evaporative emissions than gaso-

line. This is because of the higher voiatility of fuels

containing a significant amount (approximately

10%) of methanol. Methanol/gasoline mixtures are

also more chemically active than gasoline because of

the methanol. Thus, such mixtures may exhibit ma-

terials compatibility problems. Finally, driveability

may be a problem at higher concentrations cf metha-

nol because of the increased oxygen content of the

oo

These observations on methanol/gasoline fuels.

[sic] . . . are not intended as final judgments con-

cerning methanol, but to highlight EPA’s concerns

about methanol/gasoline fuels[. A waiver request

for such methanol/gasoline fuels] will have to be

supported by sufficient data to overcome the existing

data which suggest that methanol/gasoline mixtures

may cause or contribute to a failure of vehicles to

comply with emission standards over their useful

life.

Beker Waiver, 45 Fed. Reg. at 26,124.

In the context of evaluating the Petrocoal waiver re-

quest, a technical report was prepared which reviewed

the available literature on the compatibility effects of

methanol/gasoline blends containing 10-15 percent meth-

anol, with special attention to the beneficial effects of

inhibitors and four-carbon (“C-4’’) alcohols in compen-

sating for the adverse effects of methanol. See R. Garbe,

Technical Report: A Review of the Compatibility of

Methanol/Gasoline Blends with Motor Vehicle Fuel Sys-

22a

tems (May 1981), reprinted in Brief for MVMA, Ap-

pendix I. While not purporting to represent the EPA’s

final position or to be based on the specific testing of

Petrocoal, the report, nonetheless reached the following

general conclusion based on a review of data available on

methanol/gasoline blends: “[T]here appears to be no

available data, either in the published literature or sup-

plied by [American Methyl], which would conclusively

demonstrate that Petrocoal would be safe (from an emis-

sion control standpoint) to operate in currently available

motor vehicles over long time periods.” Jd. at 4. The

report recommended that emissions durability to 50,000

miles should be demonstrated. Jd. In- the Petrocoal

waiver decision itself, although concluding 59,000-mile

durability testing unnecessary, the EPA equivocated

stating:

In reviewing future waiver applications for fuel

containing high percentages of methanol without the

presence of cosolvents and special inhibitors some

long-term durability testing may be [required].

Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,977 (footnote

omitted). The EPA further said that such a determina-

tion would have to be made on a case-by-case basis. Jd.

at n.9.

As the foregoing discussion of the three waiver deci-

sions and the special concerns raised about methanol

blends amply illustrates, the TBA, MTBE, and Oxinal

waiver decisions can in no way be construed to provide a

reasonable basis for the EPA’s conclusion that Petrocoal

—a fuel containing up to 12 percent methanol—would

have only instantaneous, not deteriorative, effects. The

presence of undisclosed special inhibitors and cosolvents

in Petrocoal does not change this conclusion. The effec-

tiveness of the additives at preventing any potential

deteriorative effects resulting from the use of a metha-

nol blend fuel similar to Petrocoal was neither at issue

23a

nor established by the three cited waiver decisions. Cf.

infra p. 35 (discussing relevance of proprietary inhibitor

with respect to materials compatability).

If]. ANALYSIS OF THE TEST DATA SUBMITTED

ON PETROCOAL

We now turn to petitioners’ challenges to the sufficiency

of the emissions data which was submitted on Petrocoal

and the reasonableness of the EPA’s determination, based

upon its evaluation of the data, that Petrocoal will not

cause or contribute to a vehicle’s failure to meet the

applicable emission standards over its useful life.

A. Maximum Concentration Limits Are Not Supported

in the Record

The EPA determined that American Methyl had met

the burden established by section 211(f) (4) to qualify

for a waiver “provided the concentration of methanol in

the finished fuel does not exceed 12 percent, by volume,

the concentration of total alcohols in the fuel does not

exceed 15 percent, by volume, the ratio of methanol to

four-carbon alcohols in the finished fuel does not exceed

6.5 tol by volume... .” Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg.

at 48,976. Petitioners, however, contend that the record

is inconclusive as to whether this maximum concentration

fuel was ever tested. See Brief for MVMA at 34. The

19 American Methyl argues that this court has previously stated

that it would uphold an EPA decision setting a numerical standard

so long as the standard selected was within a “zone of reasonable-

ness” and was properly explained. See Brief for American Methyl

at 51 (citing Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 525). We find this argu-

ment unpersuasive. First, the maximum concentration levels set

by the EPA were not properly explained in this case. Second, the

EPA’s guidelines for section 211(f) (4) waivers for alcohol-gasoline

blends specifically etate:

[E]missions performance may be critically dependent upon its

concentration in use. Data submitted should encompass the

range of concentrations intended for use. No attempt by EPA

24a

EPA in its brief concedes that “the record does not ap-

pear to support these limits,” and asks the court for a

remand in order to reconsider the appropriate limits.

Brief for EPA at 15; see also id. at 16 (“the record does

not appear to support key elements of the waiver’).

While we agree with intervenor American Methyl’s asser-

tion that we are not bound by the EPA’s concession but

may make our own independent judgment as to whether

the concession is warranted, our own review has un-

covered nothing which persuades us that the EPA’s con-

cession is unwarranted.”

Emissions data on Petrocoal were provided from three

sources. See Characterization Report—Anafuel Unlimited,

J.A. at 232, 233-34. American Methyl, in support of its

to extrapolate data to a permissible concentration level is

contemplated.

Guidelines for Section 211(f) Waivers for Alcohol-Gasoline Blends,

43 Fed. Reg. 24,131, 24,132 (1978).

20 Intervenor Americal Methyl attempts in its brief . rationalize

the Administrator’s decision by providing reasons and analysis not

stated in the decision. See, e.g., Brief for American Methyl at

50-55. American Methyl argues that although the Administrator

may not have fully articulated her path of analysis, the court may

uphold the agency if that path can reasonably be discerned from

the record. See id. at 53 (citing Bowman Trans., Inc. v. Arkansas-

Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974); Small Refiners,

705 F.2d at 533-34). While this court may indeed adopt such a

course of action in appropriate cases, this is not one. The evidence

in the record and the Administrator’s decision are simply not of

the nature which would warrant this court attributing to the Ad-

ministrator reasons not even hinted at in the decision. In Small

Refiners, 705 F.2d at 533-34, we recognize’ the settled rule that

neither the courts nor counsel may provide new or substitute rea-

sons for the agency’s action; we, however, noted:

[T]his is not a case where EPA failed to give any reasons or

gave unsupported reasons for its belief. ... Rather, EPA

merely failed to articulate its reasons in any detail... .

Id.

25a

waiver request for the use of Petrocoal, submitted back-

to-back Federal Test Procedure (FTP) data on eight

1970 or later model year light duty vehicles. General

Motors tested four 1980 or later model year vehicles us-

ing samples supplied by American Methyl containing 10

percent total alcohols. The EPA’s Office of Mobile Source

Air Pollution arranged for testing of four 1979 and later

model year vehicles using samples supplied by American

Methyl containing 13 percent total alcohols.

it is uncontested that neither the fuel tested by GM

nor by the EPA contained the maximum concentration

limits of total alcohols or the maximum percentage ratio

of methanol to C-4 alcohols allowed by the waiver.

Whether the fuel tested by American Methyl contained

the maximum concentrations is a matter of controversy.

American Methyl’s waiver application reported that the

fuel it tested contained “15% of [American Methy)’s]

proprietary oxygenated hydrocarbon.” Anafuel Un-

limited, Application for Waiver (Feb. 20, 1981), J.A. at

1, 6. No other information, such as the ratio of methanol

to C-4 alcohols, is provided. GM in its comments raised

the issue that American Methyl had informed GM that

the additive contained non-alcohol as well as alcohol hydro-

carbons, thus GM asserted that the fuel tested by Ameri-

can Methyl may have contained a total alcohol content of

less than 15 percent. See Comments of General Motors

Corporation on the Anafuel Unlimited Application for a

Fuel Additive Waiver (July 6, 1981) (“GM Comments”),

J.A. at 121, 124, 127, 1382. This issue was not addressed

in the Administrator’s decision. The EPA now concedes

that its “conclusion that the Petrocoal samples tested by

[American Methyl] contained 15% alcohol [citing the

Characterization Report, J.A. at 234-35] might have been

in error.” Brief for EPA at 15 n.21. We find no clear

and unequivocal verification in the record that the fuel

tested by American Methyl contained the maximum con-

centration levels or percentage ratio permitted by the

26a

waiver.”* Hence, as the EPA concedes, the record does

not support the maximum limits allowed by the waiver.

Moreover, the fact the “worst case” fuel might not have

been tested casts doubt on the confidence we may place in

any of the test results on Petrocoal cited to support the

waiver decision.

American Methyl filed a supplemental brief in this

case asserting that we should reject the EPA’s conces-

sion that the record does not support the maximum al-

cohol limits and percentage ratio specified in the waiver

hecause this court determined in American Methyl that

this very concession was a “make-weight” and “red

herring.” See Supplemental Brief for Intervenor Ameri-

can Methyl at 5-9. We find that the court’s statements

in American Methyl are limited to the context of that

case and have no bearing on the validity of the EPA’s

representations regarding the state of the record evi-

dence supporting the original waiver decision for Petro-

coal.

In American Methyl, this court held that the EPA had

no inherent authority to reconsider or revoke a waiver

under section 211(f) (4) but must instead proceed to pro-

hibit or regulate the fuel under section 211(c). American

Methyl, 749 F.2d at 831. The court explicitly stated that

the issue of the validity of the original waiver was not

before the court. Jd. at 837. In American Methyl, the

EPA conceded that it could not revoke a waiver under

section 211(f) (4) if correctly granted, but argued that

it could revoke a waiver under section 211(f) (4) if, upon

21 We note that even if Americal Methyl’s blend did contain the

maximum concentrations permitted by the waiver, its emissions

data standing alone would have counseled denial of the waiver.

When the Deteriorated Emissions Test was applied to the data

submitted on the eight vehicles tested by American Methyl, Petro-

coal failed the test for both tailpipe hydrocarbons and oxides of

nitrogen. Characterization Report, J.A. at 240; see infra section

III-B.

27a

re-examination. the record was found insufficient to sup-

port the waiver. Id. Accordingly, the EPA asserted that

the Petrocoal waiver was not correctly granted initially

because the maximum alcohol levels and percentage ratio

were not supported in the record.” The court determined

however, that the EPA’s actions and the chronology of

events leading up to the proposed revocation demonstrated

that the EPA’s real impetus for initiating the proposed

revocation was new evidence relating to Petrocoal’s effect

on evaporative emissions of hydrocarbons and not any

purported defects in the original waiver. Id. The court

then went on to characterize the EPA’s assertion of de-

ficiencies in the record supporting the original waiver

grant as “make-weights’ ’and “red herrings.” Id. at 837-

38. Contrary to American Methyl’s contention, however,

the court characterized the EPA’s claims that it sought

revocation due to the incorrectness of the original waiver

as “make-weights” and “red herrings,” not because the

claims per se lacked merit, but because they lacked

merit as purported reasons for the proposed revocation

proceeding.

The court’s purpose in discussing the relevant issues

in American Methyl was to demonstrate that since the

proposed revocation was motivated by new evidence, not

past error, the revocation would be unwarranted even on

22In its notice soliciting comments on whether to reconsider the

Petrocoal waiver, the EPA stated that

information indicates that the fuel tested by the applicant and

provided by the applicant to the Agency and to General Motors

Corporation for testing, may not have been the fuel described

in the waiver request.

48 Fed. Reg. 19,779, 19,780 (1983). In its notice of proposed

revocation, the EPA concluded:

Thus, the total alcohol, in one case might have reachd 15%

but some ambiguity still remains. It appears clear, however,

that the highest ratio of methanol to butanol was 4.5 to 1, not

6.5 to 1.

49 Fed. Reg. 11,879, 11,884 (1984).

28a

the EPA’s own view of the statute. Jd. at 838 (“EPA’s

primary reason for revoking American Methyl’s waiver

does not relate to a defect in the original grant; thus

under the EPA’s own interpretation of its powers, a

revocation proceeding is not warranted in this case.”).

This finding was clearly not essential to the court’s de-

cision, since the court held that the EPA had no author-

ity to revoke a waiver pursuant to section 211(f) regard-

less of whether or not the waiver was correctly granted

in the first instance. In sum, we find that the dicta in

American Methyl cited by intervenor American Methyl

has no bearing on our evaluation of whether the maxi-

mum alcohol levels and percentage ratio specified in the

Petrocoal waiver are supported by the record.

B. Petrocoal Failed the Deteriorated Emissions Test for

NO, Emissions

Having determined that Petrocoal was expected to have

an instantaneous effect on emissions, the EPA analyzed

the emissions data on Petrocoal using the Paired Differ-

ence Test, the Sign of the Difference Test, and the

Deteriorated Emissions Test. See supra note 9. All three

tests examine the emissions effect of the waiver fuel with

respect to the following pollutants: hydrocarbon (HC),

carbon monoxide (CO), and oxides of nitrogen (NO;,).

The EPA reported the test results on the combined data

from the eight vehicles tested by American Methyl, the

four vehicles tested by GM, and the four vehicles tested

by the EPA.

As discussed earlier, the Deteriorated Emissions Test

is the test used in lieu of 56,'40-mile durability data to

determine whether the waiver fuel will cause a vehicle

to fail to meet the applicable emission standards over its

useful life.** See supra note 11 (describing test). The

23 The EPA further indicates that the Deteriorated Emissions

Test is especially useful because it measures the emissions effect

of the waiver fuel with respect to each vehicle:

29a

number of vehicles whose projected 50,000-mile emission

values exceeded the applicable emission standards using

Petrocoal were:

ME SR PU tata Ai ed cil, Sic dts cases 1 out of 16

Since MRSS pR OL 9 BS Ty Oi A pean OP aoe nee ae 1 out of 16

ME Sater oy tod Fo re les as cavsdves 2 out of 16

Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,978. The Deterio-

rated Emissions Test is designed to provide a 90 percent

probability of failure of the test if 25 percent or more

of the vehicle fleet tested would fail to meet emission

standards using the waiver fuel or fuel additive. Jd.

For a sample of 16, as here, the failure of two or more

vehicles to meet the emission standards constitutes, a

failure of the test. Jd. at 48,979. Thus, Protocoal failed

the Deteriorated Emissions Test for NO. emissions.

The Administrator acknowledged Petrocoal’s failure

for NOx emissions but nevertheless granted the waiver

stating:

In this case, Petrocoal just fails (by one vehicle) this

Test for NO.. Nevertheless, because the failure was

borderline, i.e, small changes to the test criteria

would result in a pass, coupled with the small in-

crease in NO, emissions found in Test 1, I conclude

that this problem is not significant enough to war-

rant a disapproval of the waiver request. In reach-

ing this conclusion, I considered all the information

It is useful to perform this analysis even if the first two anal-

yses indicate the waiver fuel or fuel additive has no adverse

effect. The analysis indicates whether the emissions from any

particular type »* vehicles or special emission control tech-

nologies are uniquely sensitive to the waiver fuel or fuel addi-

tive, thus causing vehicles to fail to meet emission standards.

This effect could be masked in the previous analyses which

consider the emissions results as a group without distinguish-

ing the emissions impact on subgroups.

Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,978.

30a

before me including the EEA report submitted by

Anafuel.

Id. Hence, although the EPA has established specific sta-

tistical criteria for determining whether a fuel will cause

a vehicle to exceed emission standards, the Administrator

determined that it was appropriate to deviate from those

criteria and grant a waiver for Petrocoal despite its clear

failure of the Deteriorated Emissions Test for NO. emis-

sions. As far as we know, based on the information sup-

plied by the parties and our own research, the EPA has

never before granted a waiver in spite of a fuel’s failure

to pass the Deteriorated Emissions Test. Indeed, given

the straightforward nature of the Deteriorated Emissions

Test coupled with the fact that the test itself is conducted

in lieu of actual 50,000-mile durability data, based on

the a priori assumption that the fuel will have only an

instantaneous effect, we find it difficult to conceive of any

circumstances which would justify deviating from the

established criteria.** While we do not totally reject the

possibility that the Administrator might in some other

instance be able to articulate a reasoned explanation for

deviating from the established criteria, she certainly has

not done so in this case. At oral argument, even the EPA,

while arguing that the Administrator could deviate from

the established criteria given a reasoned explanation, con-

ceded that the Administrator gave no such reasoned

explanation in this case.

The EPA’s criteria provide specific cut-off points based

on sample size for determining whether a fuel will cause

a vehicle to exceed emission standards for each pollutant.

The fact that Petrocoal failed for NO: emissions on the

basis of the minimum number of vehicles constituting a

failure (7.e., 2 out of 16) and thus “small changes to the

24 This is especially true in the present case where at least half

the sample of vehicles tested, and possibly all, were not tested on

the “worst case” fuel allowed by the waiver. See supra p. 26.

3la

test criteria would result in a pass,” id., does not in our

view provide any reasoned explanation for why this

failure—albeit marginal—should not be regarded as a

failure. There is no question that if the test criteria

were changed, Petrocoal could pass the test. The question

is why a special exception should be made to accommo-

date Petrocoal’s failure under the established test cri-

teria. Equally unavailing is the Administrator’s notation

that the Paired Difference Test indicated only a small

increase in NO. emissions. The point of the Deteriorated

Emissions Test is to project, in the absence of actual

50,000-mile durability data indicating the emissions deg-

radation resulting over the vehicle’s useful life, whether

the identified increase due to the use cf Petrocoal will

cause the vehicle to exceed emission standards at any

point during its useful life. In sum, we find that the

Administrator has failed to articulate any plausible rea-

son why the established test criteria do not accurately

reflect the emissions effects due to Petrocoal.*

25 The Administrator further stated that she considered all the

information before her including “the EEA Report” submitted by

American Methyl. Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,978. The

“EEA Report” cited is a report prepared for American Methy] by

Energy and Environmental Analysis (“EEA”). EEA, utilizing its

own methodology, concluded that Petrocoal satisfied the waiver con-

ditions related to its impact on tailpipe emissions. See Energy and

Environmental Analysis, Analysis of Emissions Data from Ve-

hicles Tested with Petrocoal (Sept. 8, 1981), J.A. at 161, 163. In

choosing to apply a different statistical test to evaluate the emis-

sions data on Petrocoal, the EEA stated:

The small sample of cars tested, the variation in baseline fuels

and Petrocoal blends used, and the differences in emission con-

trol technologies within the sample of cars tested are factors

that detract from the significance of EPA’s analysis. In addi-

tion, EPA’s Deteriorated Emissions Test is of questionable

validity, since it judges compliance with emission standards

by adding the incremental emissions (between vehicles fueled

with baseline fuel and Petrocoal) obtained from tests on pro-

duction cars to emissions prototype certification cars fueled with

Indolene. A more statistically and technically valid test is to

32a

The EPA may not grant a section 211(f) (4) waiver

unless the applicant has established that the fuel will

not cause or contribute to the failure of any emission

control device to achieve compliance with emission stand-

ards over the useful life of the vehicle. See supra p. 11.

The EPA’s alcohol-gasoline waiver guidelines expressly

state: “Where the potential for such harm is evidenced,

the applicant has the burden of proving that such harm

will not occur.” Guidelines for Section 211(f) (4) Waiv-

ers for Alcohol-Gasoline Blends, 43 Fed. Reg. at 24,132.

Certainly, Petrocoal’s failure for NOx emissions indicates

a potential for harmful emission effects absent some

reasoned explanation to the contrary. The Administrator

may not simply subjectively without a reasoned explana-

tion conclude that a failure of the EPA’s established

criteria is not significant. Section 211(f) (4) speaks in

terms of “a failure’ to achieve compliance with the

emission standards. We find nothing in the Act or its

legislative history to support the Administrator’s added

gloss that the relevant question is whether the fuel will

cause or contribute to a “significant failure.” See Petro-

coal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,977. We conclude that

on the record in this case the Administrator acted arbi-

trarily, capriciously, and abused her discretion in grant-

ing the Petrocoal waiver despite Petrocoal’s failure of the

Deteriorated Emissions Test for NO. emissions.

add average incremental emissions for the test fleet to the

average emissions for equivalent certification cars ... and

check for compliance with the standard.

Id. at 168. Whatever the merits of the EEA’s conclusions, the Ad-

ministrator’s mere statement that she considered the report does

not constitute a reasoned explanation of what factors or circum-

stances the Administrator relied on as justification for her devia-

tion from the established criteria in the case of Petrocoal. Indeed,

the EEA report may be viewed as casting doubt on the reliability

and sufficiency of the emissions data available on Petrocoal as well

as questioning the per se validity of the EPA’s Deteriorated Emis-

sions Test.

33a

C. Evaporative Emissions

The petitioners also contend that the Administrator’s

conclusion that the increased evaporative emissions

caused by Petrocoal could be controlled by controlling

the volatility of the blended fuel was arbitrary and

capricious. See Brief for WVMA at 45. The Adminis-

trator, in the Petrocoal waiver decision, stated that the

relationship between fuel volatility characteristics (pri-

marily the Front End Volatility Index (FEVI)) and

evaporative emissions had been clearly established for

fuels composed entirely of hydrocarbon components and

had been demonstrated to apply for fuels containing

“some relatively small percentage of the oxgenated

hydrocarbons” TBA, MTBE and Oxinal. Petrocoal

Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,977. Although noting thai

the data available on Petrocoal at the higher percentages

of alcoho! was incomplete, the Administrator concluded

that the relationship between fuel volatility and evapora-

tive emissions appeared to hold for Petrocoal based on

the data in the record with respect to Petrocoal’s FEVI

and evaporative emissions.

The Administrator in past waiver decisions has con-

sistently relied on the assumption that fuel volatility

restrictions will adequately control evaporative emission

increases; generally, however, the assumption has been

supported by at least some confirmatory test data on the

fuel at issue. See, e.g., Oxinal Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. at

37,076; MTBE Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. at 12,245; TBA

Waiver, 44 Fed. Reg. at 10,532. While we harbor some

doubts as to the wisdom of the Administrator’s applica-

tion of this assumption in the specific case of Petrocoal

with its higher methanol, total alcohol, and oxygen

vontent, we decline to find the Administrator’s action

arbitrary and capricious. The data cited by MVMA

indicating that controlling volatility will not solve the

evaporative emissions problem caused by Petrocoal was

submitted as a supplement to MVMA’s petition for

34a

administrative reconsideration. See Brief for MVMA at

48 & n.38. While this new data may indicate that the

Administrator’s reliance on the assumed relationship

between fuel volatility and evaporative emissions was

in error, this evidence was not in the record at the time

the waiver was granted, and thus we will not rely on it

to undercut the Administrator’s conclusions on review.

See American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176,

1186 n.8 (D.C, Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034

(1982).

D. Materials Compatibility and Driveability

Finally, petitioners argue that the Administrator erred

in concluding that Petrocoal does not present materials

compatibility or driveability problems. See Brief for

MVMA at 49-56. The Administrator observes in the

Petrocoal waiver decision that both materials compati-

bility and driveability are important criteria in evalu-

ating a waiver request. See Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed.

Reg. at 48,977. “Materials incompatibility can contribute

or cause the failure of vehicles to meet either their

exhaust or evaporative emission standards . . . because

a fuel . . . may cause changes in the components in

carburetors or fuel systems which exceed the tolerances

specified by the manufacturer.” Jd. “Driveability infor-

mation is important because poor driveability can di-

rectly result in increased emissions due to constant

misfires and repeated stalling, and possibly lead to tam-

pering with the emission controls of the vehicle.” Id.

The Administrator concluded that based on the informa-

tion developed in the record that Petrocoal presented

neither materials compatibility problems nor significant

driveability problems affecting emissions.

Since we have already found on the basis of peti-

tioners’ other challenges that the Administrator acted

arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused her discretion in

granting the Petrocoal waiver, we find it unnecessary

to determine expressly whether the Administrator also

35a

acted arbitrarily and capricious'y in concluding that

Petrocoal resulted in no significant materials compati-

bility or driveabality problems.** We are compelled, how-

ever, to express our doubts about the adequacy of the

Administrator’s findings with respect to materials com-

patibility problems. The EPA, itself, has recognized that

materials compatibility is a particlularly salient concern

with methanol blends. See supra p. 21. Yet, the record

data on materials compatibility problems associated with

Petrocoal is rendered suspect by the lack of any unequiv-

ocal evidence that the effects of the “v vst case” fuel

allowed by the waiver were ever tested. See supra p. 26.

Nor do we find the mere presence in P.trocoal of a pro-

prietary inhibitor, which purportedly inhibits materials

compatibility problems, a sufficient basis for concluding

that materials compatibility will not be a problem in the

absence of data supporting the actual effectiveness of

the inhibitor.”

26 We likewise find it unnecessary to address petitioners’ conten-

tions that the Administrator erred by failing to consider the phase

separation problems associated with Petrocoal.

27 We note that the Administrator’s decision does refer to the

materials compatibility data submitted by American Methyl. The

Administrator states:

[American Methyl] performed immersion tests on several

metallic parts and elastomeric parts commonly found in car-

buretors and full systems. The results from [American

Methyl’s] testing indicated that the corrosion of metallic parts

due to Petrocoal would be no worse than that of gasoline. The

results for the elastomeric parts indicated that while some

components changed in characteristics such changes were not

significantly different than those with gasoline.

Petrocoal Waiver, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,977. Comments from GM,

however, pointed out not only that ii was unclear whether any tests

had been run using the “worst case” fuel permitted but also sev-

era) other shortcomings in the tests. According to GM, American

Methyl erred in identifying certain materials used in some fuel

system components and conducted all of its tests at room tempera-

ture despite the recognized fact that temperature can be a factor

in the corrosion of metals. GM Comments, J.A. at 145-46. GM

36a

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Adminis-

trator acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused her

discretion in granting the Petrocoal waiver. We have

addressed the EPA’s and American Methyl’s principal

arguments in support of the waiver; any arguments not

specifically addressed herein were duly considered and

found unpersuasive. Accordingly, we vacate the Adminis-

trator’s decision granting a waiver for Petrocoal, and

remand to the EPA for further proceedings consistent

with this decision. While we doubt that it is possible

for the Administrator to make a reasoned decision to

grant the Petrocoal waiver on the basis of the existing

record, we, nonetheless, remand to the agency to make

this determination.* Should the Administrator conclude

that the existing record does not contain sufficient data

to support a section 211(f)(4) waiver for Petrocoal,

American Methyl remains free to rehabilitate the admin-

istrative record by reapplying for a waiver with addi-

tional data on the emission effects of Petrocoal.

It is so ordered.

conducted its own materials compatibility testing with Petrocoal

and concluded :

These short-term laboratory tests have indicated that Petrocoal

should not cause rapid, catastrophic failures of the elastomers

which were tested. However, they do suggest that there is a

potential for problems related to the large volume swell of

nitrile rubber.

Id. at 144 (emphasis in original). GM further noted that it believed

its Petrocoal contained a 2:1 ratio of methanol to butyl alcohols

and that a higher ratio “could be more detrimental in certain areas

such as evaporative emissions and materials compatability.” Id.

at 147. The Administrator fails to address any of these concerns.

% Contrary to American Methyl’s contentions, nothing in our de-

cision in American Methyl or in section 211(f)(5), 42 U.S.C.

§ 7545(f) (5), prohibiting a stay of the EPA’s action under section

211(f) pending judicial review precludes us from remanding this

proceeding to the EPA.

37a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1984

No. 81-2276

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE

UNITED STATES, INC., et al.,

Petitioners

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent

AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,

Intervenor

No. 81-2279

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Petitioner

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent

AMERICAN METHYL CORPORATION,

Intervenor

[Filed July 26, 1985]

38a

Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Before: TAMM, WALD and MIKVA, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

These causes came on to be heard on the petitions for

review of an order of the Environmental Protection

Agency, and were argued by counsel. On consideration

thereof, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, by this Court, that the

order of the Environmental Protection Agency is vacated

and these cases are hereby remanded for further pro-

ceedings consistent with the Opinion for the Court filed

herein this date.

Per Curiam

For The Court

/s/ George A. Fisher

GEORGE A. FISHER

Clerk

Date: July 26, 1985

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

39a

APPENDIX C

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL - ]

Grant of Application for a Fuel Waiver

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

ACTION: Notice

SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 211(f) of the Clean Air

Act (Act), the Administrator of EPA is conditionally

granting the waiver requested by Anafuel Unlimited

(Anafuel), for a proprietary fuel known as ‘“Petrocoal”

which consists of up to 12 percent, by volume, methanol,

up to six percent, by volume, of certain four-carbon

alcohols, in the presence of a proprietary inhibitor of not

less than 0.023 grams per gallon (gpg) and not more

than 0.033 gpg in unleaded gasoline. The waiver is be-

ing granted based on the Administrator’s determination

that Petrocoal will not cause or contribute to a failure

of any 1975 or subsequent model year vehicle or engine

to comply with the emission standards with respect to

which it was certified under section 206 of the Act.

PUBLIC DOCKET: Copies of all public information on this

waiver application are available for inspection in public

docket EN-81-8 at the Central Docket Section (A-130)

of the Environmental Protection Agency, Gallery I-West

Tower, 401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460,

(202) 755-0245, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and

4:00 p.m. As provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 2, a reasonable

fee may be charged for copying services.

FoR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James W. Cald-

well, Chief, Fuels Section, Field Operations and Support

Division (EN-397), Environmental Protection Agency,

401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460, (202)

382-2635.

40a

I. Introduction

Section 211(f)(1) of the Clean Air Act (Act), 42

U.S.C. 7545(f) (1), states that effective upon March 31,

1977, it shall be unlawful for any manufacturer of any

fuel or fuel additive to first introduce into commerce, or

to increase the concentration in use of, any fuel or fuel

additive for general use in light duty motor vehicles

manufactured after model year 1974 which is not sub-

stantially similar’ to any fuel or fuel additive utilized

in the certification of any model year 1975, or subsequent

model year, vehicle or engine under section 206 of the

Act.2 Section 211(f) (4) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(f)

(4), provides that the Administrator of the EPA, upon

application of any manufacturer of any fuel or fuel

additive, may waive the prohibitions established under

section 211(f) (1),* if the Administrator determines that

the applicant has established that such fuel or fuel ad-

ditive or a specified concentration thereof, or the emis-

sion products of such fuel or additive or specified con-

centration thereof, will not cause or contribute to a fail-

ure of any emission control device or system (over the

useful life of any vehicle in which such device or system

is used) to achieve compliance by the vehicle with the

emission standards with respect to which it has been

certified pursuant to section 206 of the Act. If the Ad-

ministrator does not act to grant or deny an application

within 180 days of receipt of the application, the waiver

authorized by section 211(f)(4) shall be treated as

granted.

1 The revised definition of “substantially similar” was published

in the Federal Register on July 28, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 38582.

2 Section 206 of the Act sets forth the certification requirement

which vehicle manufacturers must comply with in order to intro-

duce into commerce new model year motor vehicles.

3 The Administrator may also waive the prohibitions or limita-

tions contained in sections 211 (f) (2) and (3).

4la

Anafuel submitted an application for a waiver for a

proprietary fuel known as “Petrocoal” on February 20,

1981. A Federal Register notice was published April

13, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 21695, acknowledging receipt of

the application and scliciting comments. The 180-day re-

view period provided by section 211(f) (4), scheduled to

expire on August 19, 1981, was initially extended by

thirty days until September 18, 1981 with the consent

of Anafuel and EPA pursuant to a request from the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for additional

time to review EPA’s proposed action under Executive

Order 12291 and was subsequently extended an addi-

tional ten days until September 28, 1981 by the consent

of Anafuel and EPA.*

Anafuel stated in its application that Petrocoal con-

sists of up to 12 percent, by volume, methanol, up to

6 percent, by volume, certain four-carbon alcohols in

the presence of 2 proprietary inhibitor of not less than

0.023 grams per gallon (gpg) and not more than 0.033

gpg in unleaded gasoline.® The actual C-4 alcohols uti-

lized and the chemical composition of the inhibitor have

been made available to EPA but are not publicly avail-

able pursuant to the business confidentiality provisions

at 40 C.F.R. Part 2.

In making a determination on an application, EPA

endeavors to gather as much information as possible

about a fuel or fuel additive. Thus, it is preferred that

the chemical composition of the fuel or fuel additive be

made public allowing other interested parties the oppor-

tunity to test and comment on the emissions impact of

the fuel or fuel additive. When the applicant has a

4See Federal Register notices 46 Fed. Reg. 48082, August 26,

1981, and 46 Fed. Reg. , September —, 1981.

5 Petrocoal as defined in this application is not “substantially

similar” to any fuel utilized in certification under section 206 of

the Act as that term is defined, supra.

42a

legitimate business confidentiality claim, EPA will honor

such claim, but insists that the applicant make the fuel

or fuel additive available for testing by interested parties

subject to appropriate confidentiality agreements.

Anafuel asserted a claim of business confidentiality

over the particular C-4 alcohols utilized, the chemical

composition of the inhibitor, and the exact formulation

respecting the ratio of alcohols and inhibitor in any par-

ticular blend of fuel. The procedure for maintaining

confidentiality and providing sample test fuel outlined

above was followed. Two parties, General Motors and

EPA, obtained Petrocoal samples from Anafuel and each

conducted a series of tests.

Anafuel supplied test data with its waiver application.

Anafuel concluded that that data would demonstrate that

Petrocoal would not cause or contribute to a failure of

any emission control device or system (over the useful

life of any vehicle in which such device or system is

used) to achieve compliance by the vehicle with the

emission standards with respect to which it has been

certified pursuant to section 206 of the Act.

II. Summary of the Decision

I have determined that Anafuel has met the burden

established under section 211(f) (4) necessary to obtain

a waiver for Petrocoal provided the concentration of

methanol in the finished fuel does not exceed 12 percent,

by volume, the concentration of total alcohols in the fuel

does not exceed 15 percent, by volume, the ratio of

methanol to four-carbon alcohols in the finished fuel does

not exceed 6.5 to 1, by volume and the finished fuel is

blended such that it meets the American Society for

Testing and Materials (ASTM) fuel volatility specifica-

tions for the area and time of year in which it is sold.

In reaching this decision, I have considered all the avail-

able information and data including that provided by

persons other than the applicant.

48a

III. Method of Review

In order to obtain a waiver for a fuel or fuel additive

(hereinafter, fuel or fuel additive will be collectively

referred to as “fuel’’) the applicant must establish that

the fuel and its emission products will not cause or con-

tribute to a failure of any emission control device or

system (over the useful life of any vehicle in which such

device or system is used) to achieve compliance by the

vehicle with the emission standards with respect to which

it has been certified pursuant to section 206 of the Act.

This burden, which Congress has imposed on the appli-

cant, if interpreted literally, is virtually impossible to

meet as it requires the proof of a negative proposition,

i.e., that no vehicle will fail to meet emission standards

with respect to wh..: it has been certified. Taken lit-

erally, it would require the testing of every vehicle. Rec-

ognizing that Congress contemplated a workable waiver

provision, mitigation of this stringent burden was deemed

necessary. For purposes of the waiver provision, EPA

has previously indicated that reliable statistical sampling

and fleet testing protocols may be used to demonstrate

that a fuel under consideration would not cause or con-

tribute to a significant failure of emission standards by

vehicles in the national fleet (see, Waiver Decision on

Tertiary Butyl Alcohol (TBA), 44 Fed. Reg. 105380

(1979) ).

Emission data submitted with respect to a waiver

request are analyzed by appropriate statistical methods

in order to characterize the effect that a fuel will have

on emissions. Which tests are appropriate to character-

ize the emission effects of a fuel depends on whether

the fuel is predicted to have an instantaneous effect or

a long-term deteriorative effect on emissions or both.

If the fuel is predicted to have only an instantaneous

effect, i.e., the fuel causes an instantaneous incremental

shift in the emission levels relative to a base fuel and

that shift remains constant throughout the useful life

44a

of the vehicle, then “back-to-back” emissions testing will

suffice. If, however, a long-term deteriorative effect is

predicted, then 50,000-mile durability testing would be

required.”

The statistical tests applied to emissions data provided

with respect to a waiver request for a fuel expected to

have an instantaneous emission effect are: a Paired

Difference Test, a Sign of Difference Test, and a De-

teriorated Emissions Test (a test which compares the de-

teriorated emissions with the emissions standards in lieu

of actually having 50,000-mile emissions data). These

statistical tests are described in Appendix A to this

decision.

An alternative to providing the amount of data neces-

sary to meet the statistical requirements, is to make judg-

ments based upon a reasonable theory regarding emis-

sion effects supported by confirmatory testing. If there

xists a reasonable theory which predicts the emission

effects of a fuel, an applicant may only need to conduct

a sufficient amount of testing to demonstrate the va-

lidity of such theery. This theory and confirmatory test-

ing then form the basis from which the Administrator

may exercise his judgment on whether the additive will

cause or contribute to a significant failure of any emis-

sion control devices or system which results in a failure

by the vehicle to achieve compliance with emission stand-

ards. In addition to emission data, EPA also reviews

data on materials compatibility, driveability, fuel com-

® Back-to-back emission testing involves testing a vehicle on a

base fuel, then testing that same vehicle on the waiver fuel. The

difference in emission levels is attributed to the waiver fuel.

7 50,000-mile durability testing involves operating a matched set

of vehicles for 50,000 miles and testing each vehicle for its emissions

at 5,000-mile intervals. This is essentially the same testing pattern

which each automobile manufacturer must do for new motor ve-

hicle certification under section 206 of the Act.

45a

position, and specifications. This information is neces-

sary to fully characterize a fuel, and to determine whether

such additive will cause or contribute to a significant

failure of vehicles to comply with appropriate emission

standards.

Such failure could result from any of the above fac-

tors. For example, driveability problems such as lean

misfire and repeated stalling lead to increased emissions.

Materials compatibility problems could lead to failure of

fuel systems which are designed to precise tolerances.

Deviations beyond the tolerances could result in greater

emissions. Volatility specifications could demonstrate a

tendency for high evaporative losses.

Analysis

A. Exhaust Emission Data

Experience with other oxygenated hydrocarbon addi-

tives similar to the alcohols contained in Petrocoal has

led EPA to believe that only an instantaneous emission

effect should be observed with Petrocoal.2 Thus, the emis-

sion data were analyzed presuming Petrocoal exhibited

only instantaneous emission effects. In reviewing future

waiver applications for fuels containing high percent-

ages of methanol without the presence of cosolvents and

special inhibitors some long-term durability testing may

be required.®

8 See Waiver Decisions for TBA, 44 Fed. Reg. 10530; MTBE,

44 Fed. Reg. 12242; and Oxinol, 44 Fed. Reg. 37074.

®General Motors (GM), in its comments on this application

(Docket EN-81-8, Document I-D-6), contends that 50,000-mile

durability testing should be required before any waiver could be

granted. EPA does not fully embrace this position. This does not

mean that in the appropriate circumstances long-term durability

testing would not be required. Such a decision would have to be

made on a case-by-case basis.

46a

Exhaust emission data were available on 16 vehicles

tested on Petrocoal and a base unleaded gasoline.” Nu-

merical results of the statistical tests are summarized in

Appendix B. The Paired Difference Test (Test 1) and

the Sign of Difference Test (Test 2) are used to test the

directional effect and the magnitude of the effect which

Petrocoal has on emissions and could be used to deter-

mine if it contributes to a failure of vehicles to meet

emission standards. The Deteriorated Emissions Test

(Test 8) is used in lieu of 50,000-mile durability test re-

sults and could be used to determine if Petrocoal will

cause a failure of vehicles to meet emission standards

over their =:seful life.

The results from the Paired Difference Test (Test 1)

and the Sign of Difference Test (Test 2) indicates that

exhaust hydrocarbons (HC) do not increase, carbon mo-

noxide (CO) emissions decrease, and oxides of nitrogen

(NOx) likely increase, although the amount of the in-

crease is modest. The Deteriorated Emissions Test (Test

3) indicates that there would not be any significant fail-

ure of vehicles to meet HC, CO, or NOx standards.

The conclusion of these statistical tests is that Petro-

coal reduces CO emissions and has essentially no effect

on HC emissions. While it does cause NOx emissions

to increase modestly, it is not likely to cause a significant

failure of vehicles to meet NOx emission standards (see

Appendix B and discussion of the Energy and Environ-

mental Analysis, Inc. (EEA) report).

B. Evaporative Emissions

Anafuel asserted that evaporative emissions are di-

rectly related to fuel volatility characteristics, primarily

10For a more detailed list see the Characterization Report—

Anafuel Unlimited (Docket. EN-81-8). A fifth vehicle was tested

by EPA but was not included in this analysis because the results

were not available for public comment and would not have altered

the results.

47a

the Front End Volatility Index (FEVI)." This rela-

tionship has been clearly established when the fuel is

composed entirely of hydrocarbon components. It has also

been demonstrated to apply when the fuel contains more

relatively small percentages of the oxygenated hydro-

carbons tertiary butyl alcohol (TBA), methyl tertiary

butyl ether (MTBE), and a mixture of TBA and metha-

nol (Oxinol).2 While the data available on Petrocoal

at the higher percentages of alcohols are not complete,

the relationship appears to hold also as evidenced by data

in the record of Petrocoal’s FEVI and the evaporative

emission data. Thus, controlling the volatility of Petro-

coal within ASTM volatility specifications should ade-

quately control evaporative emissions and they should

be no worse than those of commercially available fuels.

It would be discriminatory to require the applicant’s

fuel to meet a more stringent volatility limit in order to

control evaporative emissions than is characteristic of

commercially available fuels.“ The volatility of commer-

cially available gasoline varies over a substantial range,

and indeed must be blended with the correct volatility

for the particular geographic area and time of year.

Therefore, I conclude that Petrocoal will not cause or

contribute to the failure of vehicles to meet evaporative

emission standards provided it is blended to meet the

ASTM volatility specifications appropriate for the area

and the time of year as provided in this waiver.

C. Other Technical Issues

1. Materials Compatibility

Materials compatability is an important factor when

reviewing a waiver request. Materials incompatibility

11 FEVI is equal to the Reid Vapor Pressure (partial pressure

at 158° F, ASTM D439-78) plus 0.13 times the numerical percent-

age of fuel evaporated at 158° F.

12 See Waiver Decisions for TBA, 44 Fed. Reg. 10530; MTBE,

44 Fed. Reg. 12242; and Oxinol, 44 Fed. Reg. 37074.

18 See Waiver Decision for Oxino!, 44 Fed. Reg. 37074.

48a

can contribute or cause the failure of vehicles to meet

either their exhaust or evaporative emission standards.

This can occur because a fuel or additive may cause

changes in the components in carburetors or fuel systems

which exceed the tolerances specified by the manufac-

turer. Such changes can impair the performance of the

vehicle to the point that emissions are adversely affected.

Unfortunately, materials compatibility data are not as

easily subjected to quantitative analysis as are emission

data.

Anafuel was cognizant of this concern about materials

compatibility and added a special corrosion inhibitor to

ameliorate these problems. Anafuel also performed test-

ing to demonstrate the lack of materials compatibility

problems with Petrocoal.

Anafuel performed immersion tests on several metallic

parts and elastomeric parts commonly found in carbure-

tors and fuel systems. The results from Anafuel’s test-

ing indicated that the corrosion of metallic parts due to

Petroocal would be no worse than that of gasoline. The

results for the elastometric parts indicated that while

some components changed in characteristics such changes

were not significantly different than for those with gaso-

line.

Based on these data and our judgment, I conclude

that Petrocoal containing the methanol and total alcohols

specified and in the presence of the proprietary inhibitor

in the conditions of this waiver does not present a ma-

terials compatibility problem affecting emissions with

the fuel systems currently in use.

2. Driveability

Driveability is also an important criterion in judging

a waiver application, but is also difficult to objectively

quantify. Driveability information is important because

poor driveability can directly result in increased emis-

49a

sions due to constant misfires and repeated stalling, and

possibly lead to tampering with the emission controls

of the vehicle.

The information developed by Anafuel, EPA, and

other commenters on driveability, in conjunction with

market demands placed on a fuel manufacturer for an

acceptable fuel, lead me to conclude that driveability is

not a significant problem with Petrocoal.

V. Findings and Conclusion

I have determined that Anafuel has established that

Petrocoal will not cause or contribute to a failure of any

emission control device or system (over the useful life

of any vehicle in which such device or system is used)

to achieve compliance by the vehicle with the emission

standards with respect to which it has been certified pur-

suant to section 206 of the Act.

I am conditioning this waiver to maintenance of a

maximum ratio of methanol to four-carbon alcohols of

6.5 to 1.

I hereby grant the waiver requested by Anafuel for its

proprietary fuel Petrocoal provided the following condi-

tions are met:

1. The proprietary fuel is blended such that the con-

centration of methanol in the finished fuel does not ex-

ceed 12 percent, by volume, and the concentration of total

alcohols in the finished fuel does not exceed 15 nercent,

by volume; and

2. The proprietary fuel is blended such that the ratio

of methanol to the four-carbon alcohols in the finished

fuel does not exceed 6.5 to 1, by volume; and

3. The proprietary “uel is blended such that it meets

the American Society Testing and Materials (ASTM)

fuel volatility specifications for the area and time of

year in which it is marketed; and

50a

4. The proprietary fuel is subject to all of the regu-

lations applicable to unleaded gasoline in Title 40 of the

Code of Federal Regulations Parts 79 and 80. This fuel

may also be offered at retail in lieu of unleaded gasoline

as required by the above regulations.

This action was submitted to the Office of Manage-

ment and Budget (OMB) for review pursuant to Execu-

tive Order 12291. Any comments received from OMB

are located in Public Docket EN-81-8.

This action is not a “rule” as defined in 5 U.S.C.

601(2) because EPA is not required to undergo “notice

and comment” under section 553(b) of the Administra-

tive Procedure Act, or other law. Therefore, EPA has

not prepared a supporting regulatory flexibility analysis

addressing the impact of this action on small business

entities.

This is final Agency action of national applicability.

Jurisdiction to review this action lies exclusively in the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit. Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act

judicial review of this action is available only by the

filing of a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit within 60 days

of [the date of publication]. Under section 307(b) (2),

today’s action may not be challenged later in a separate

judicial proceeding brought by the Agency to enforce the

statutory prohibitions.

9/28/81

Date

By /s/ John W. Hernandez

ANNE M. GoRsSUCH

Administrator

5la

APPENDIX A

STATISTICAL CRITERIA

The following is a brief description of the statistical

tests used to characterize the emission effects of a fuel

or fuel additive:

(1) The Paired Difference Test

For each vehicle tested on a base fuel and on the

waiver fuel or fuel additive, the difference between the

waiver fuei or fuel additive emissions and the base fuel

emission is calculated. A 90% confidence interval is

constructed for the mean differences. If the resulting

interval lies entirely below zero it is indicative of no

adverse effect from this waiver fuel or fuel additive. If

the entire interval is above zero, it is indicative of an

adverse effect from the waiver fuel or fuel additive. If

the interval contains zero, there is arguably no differ-

ence between the base fuel and the waiver fuel or fuel

additive with regard to emissions provided the confidence

interval is small.

(2) The Sign of Difference Test

For each vehicle tested with a base fuel and the

waiver fuel or fuel additive, the sign of the emission

difference between the waiver fuel or fuel additive emis-

sions and a base fuel emissions is ascertained. This test

is designed to determine whether the number of vehicles

demonstrating an increase (+) in emissions with the

waiver fuel or fuel additive significantly (at a 90 per-

cent confidence level) exceeded those showing a decrease

(—) in emissions with the waiver fuel or fuel additive.

(3) The Deteriorated Emissions Test

For each vehicle, the effect the waiver fuel or fuel

additive had no emissions is determined. This incre-

52a

mental effect, either positive or negative, is added to the

50,000-mile certification emission value of the certifica-

tion emission vehicle which the test vehicle represented.

This incremented 50,000-mile emission value is compared

to emissions standards to determine if it did or did not

exceed the standards. Either a pass or fail is assigned

accordingly. The pass/fail results are analyzed using a

one-sided sign test.

The first two methods of analysis are designed to de-

termine whether the waiver fuel or fuel additive has an

adverse effect on emissions as compared to the base

fuel. Each characterizes a different aspect of adverse

effect. The Paired Difference Test determines the mean

difference in emissions between the base fuel and the

waiver fuel or fuel additive. The Sign of Difference Test

assesses the number of vehicles indicating an increase

or decrease in emissions. The two tests are considered

together in evaluating whether an adverse effect exists

to assure that a mean difference determination is not

unduly influenced by very high or very low emission re-

sults from only a few vehicles.

The Deteriorated Emissions Test analysis indicates

whether the waiver fuel or fuel additive causes a vehicle

to fail to meet emission standards. This test examines

each vehicle’s emission performance as compared to each

pollutant standard. Jt is useful to perform this analysis

even if the first two analyses indicate the waiver fuel

or fuel additive has no adverse effect. The analysis in-

_dicates whether the emissions from any particular type

of vehicles or special emission control technologies are

uniquely sensitive to the waiver fuel or fuel additive,

thus causing vehicles to fail to meet emission standards.

This effect could be masked in the previous analyses

which consider the emissions results as a group without

distinguishing the emissions impact on subgroups.

53a

APPENDIX B

NUMERICAL RESULTS OF THE DATA

The results of the statistical tests described above are

summarized here:

(1) The Paried Difference Test—The 90 percent con-

fidence intervals around the mean difference between the

base fuel and Petrocoal for each pollutant are:

IE CLD bsscsctinevsinicsssichone —0.11 to +-0.05

Carbon Monoxide (CO) .........:c.se —2.60 to —0.78

Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx) ............ +-0.01 to +0.16

(2) Sign of Difference Test—We list the confidence

that Petrocoal will cause an increase in emissions over

the base fuel based on the observed increases out of the

total vehicles tested:

CONFIDENCE OF INCREASE

Percent

| it EIU REO TREE IE Be venveessccsces een 60

S| reer oer Ce SESE Oo es eee eee

Wiese nciehinlaccinniitasaisok -¢ "gp SARS eRe eeeann 90

(3) Deteriorated Emissions Test—The number of vehi-

cles whose incremented 50,000-mile emission values ex-

ceed applicable standards is:

Sn i a 1 out of 16.

SEES SE Ei at CCD LEO TOE TO 1 out of 16.

I i a ee 2 out of 16.

The statistical Deteriorated Emissions Test is designed

to provide a 90 percent probability of failure of the Test

if 25 percent or more of the vehicle fleet would fail to

meet emission standards using the applicant’s fuel or

fuel additive. For a 16-vehicle sample, the Test dictates

that one vehicle failure constitutes a pass, two or more

constitute a failure. In this case, Petrocoal just fails

(by one vehicle) this Test for NO,:. Nevertheless, because

54a

the failure was borderline, i.e., small changes to the test

criteria would result in a pass, coupled with the small

increase in NO, emissions found in Test 1, I conclude

that this problem is not significant enough to warrant a

disapproval of the waiver request. In reaching this con-

clusion, I considered all the information before me in-

cluding the EEA report submitted by Anafuel.

55a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1984

No. 81-2276

MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE

UNITED STATES, INC., et al.

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

And Consolidated Case No. 81-2279

[Filed Sept. 18, 1985]

Before: TAMM, WALD and MIKVA, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of Intervenor American Methyl

Corporation’s petition for rehearing, it is

ORDERED, by the Court, that the petition is denied.

Per Curiam -

FOR THE CouRT

GEORGE A. FISHER

Clerk

By: /s/ Robert A. Bonner

ROBERT A. BONNER

Chief Deputy Clerk

56a

APPENDIX E

UNI1«D STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DiSTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1984

No. 81-2276

MoTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE

UNITED STATES, INC., et ai.

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

And Consolidated Case No. 81-2279

[Filed Sept. 18, 1985]

Before: ROBINSON, Chief Judge; WRIGHT, TAMM,

WALD, MIKVA, EDWARDS, GINSBURG, BORK,

SCALIA and STARR, Circuit Judges

ORDER

The suggestion for rehearing en banc of intervenor

American Methyl Corporation has been circulated to the

full Court and no member has requested the taking o* a

vote thereon. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED, by the Court en banc, that the suggestion

is denied.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT

GEORGE A. FISHER

Clerk

By: /s/ Robert A. Bonner

ROBERT A. BONNER

Chief Deputy Clerk

ee

eS ee ey

57a

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1985

No. 81-2276

MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE

UNITED STATES, INC., et al.

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

And Consolidated Case No. 81-2279

[Filed Oct. 1, 1985]

Before: WALD and MIkva, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the motion of Intervenor Ameri-

can Methyl Corporation to stay issuance of the mandate,

it is

ORDERED, by the Court, that the motion is granted

and the Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the

Court’s mandate through October 25, 1985.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT

/s/ George A. Fisher

GEORGE A. FISHER

Clerk

58a

APPENDIX G

§ 7545. Regulation of fuels

(a) Authority of Administrator to regulate

The Administrator may by regulation designate any

fuel or fuel additive and, after such date or dates as may

be prescribed by him, no manufacturer or processor of

any such fuel or additive may sell, offer for sale, or in-

troduce into commerce such fuel or additive unless the

Administrator has registered such fuel or additive in

accordance with subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Registration requirement

(1) For the purpose of registration of fuels and fuel

additives, the Administrator shall require—

(A) the manufacturer of any fuel to notify him

as to the commercial identifying name and man-

_ ufacturer of any additive contained in such fuel;

the range of concentration of any additive in the

fuel; and the purpose-in-use of any such additive;

and

(B) the manufacturer of any additive to notify

him as to the chemical composition of such additive.

(2) For the purpose of registration of fuels and fuel

additives, the Administrator may also require the manu-

facturer of any fue! or fuel additive—

(A) to conduct tests to determine potential public

health effects of such fuel or additive (including, but

not limited to, carcinogenic, teratogenic, or muta-

genic effects), and

(B) to furnish the description of any analytical

technique that can be used to detect and measure any

additive in such fuel, the recommended range of con-

59a

centration of such additive, and the recommended

purpose-in-use of such additive, and such other in-

formation as is reasonable 'and necessary to deter-

mine the emissions resulting from the use of the fuel

or additive contained in such fuei, the effect of such

fuel or additive on the emission control perform-

ance of any vehicle or vehicle engine, or the extent

to which such emissions affect the public health or

welfare.

Tests under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted in con-

formity with test procedures and protocols established by

the Administrator. The result of such tests shall not be

considered confidential.

(3) Upon compliance with the provision of this sub-

section, including assurances that the Administrator will

receive changes in the information required, the Admin-

istrator shall register such fuel or fuel additive.

(c) Offending fuels and fuel additives;

control; prohibition

(1) The Administrator may, from time to time on the

basis of information obtained under subsection (b) of

this section or other information available to him, by

regulation, control or prohibit the manufacture, intro-

duction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any

fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle or motor

vehicle engine (A) if in the judgment of the Adminis-

trator any emission product of such fuel or fuel additive

causes, or contributes, to air pollution which may rea-

sonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or

welfare, or (B) if emission products of such fuel or fuel

additive will impair to a significant degree the perform-

ance of any emission control device or system which is in

general use, or which the Administrator finds has been

developed to a point where in a reasonable time it would

be in general use were such regulation to be promulgated.

60a

(2) (A) No fuel, class of fuels, or fuel additive may

be controlled or prohibited by the Administrator pur-

suant to clause (A) of paragraph (1) except after con-

sideration of all relevant medical and scientific evidence

available to him, including consideration of other tech-

nologically or economically feasible means of achieving

emission standards under section 7521 of this title.

(B) No fuel or fuel additive may be controlled or pro-

hibited by the Administrator pursuant to clause (B) of

paragraph (1) except after consideration of available

scientific and economic data, including a cost benefit

analysis comparing emission control devices or systems

which are or will be in general use and require the pro-

posed control or prohibition with emission control devices

or systems which are or will be in general use and do

not require the proposed control or prohibition. On re-

quest of a manufacturer of motor vehicles, motor vehicle

engines, fuels, or fuel additives submitted within 10 days

of notice of proposed rulemaking, the Administrator shall

hold a public hearing and publish findings with respect

to any matter he is required to consider under this para-

graph. Such findings shall be published at the time of

promulgation of final regulations.

(C) No fuel or fuel additive may be prohibited by the

Administrator under paragraph (1) unless he finds, and

publishes such finding, that in his judgment such pro-

hibition will not cause the use of any other fuel or fuel

additive which will produce emissions which will en-

danger the public health or welfare to the same or greater

degree than the use of the fuel or fuel additive proposed

to be prohibited.

(3) (A) For the purpose of obtaining evidence and

data to carry out paragraph (2), the Administrator may

require the manufacturer of any motor vehicle or motor

vehicle engine to furnish any information which has been

developed concerning the emissions from motor vehicles

6la

resulting from the use of any fuel or fuel additive, or

the effect of such use on the performance of any emis-

sion control device or system.

(B) In obtaining information under subparagraph

(A), section 7607(a) of this title (relating to subpenas)

shall be applicable.

(4)(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph

(B) or (C), no State (or political subdivision thereof)

may prescribe or attempt to enforce, for purposes of motor

vehicle emission control, any control or prohibition re-

specting use of a fuel or fuel additive in a motor ve-

hicle or motor vehicle engine—-

(i) if the Administrator has found that no con-

trol or prohibition under paragraph (1) is necessary

and has published his finding in the Federal Regis-

ter, or

(ii) if the Administrator has prescribed under

paragraph (1) a control or prohibition applicable to

such fuel or fuel additive, unless State prohibition

or control is identical to the prohibition or control

prescribed by the Administrator.

(B) Any State for which application of: section 7543

(a) of this title has at any time been waived under sec-

tion 7543(b) of this title may at any time prescribe and

enforce, for the purpose of motor vehicle emission con-

trol, a control or prohibition respecting any fuel or fuel

additive.

(C) A State may prescribe and enforce, for purposes

of motor vehicle emission control, a control or prohibi-

tion respecting the use of a fuel or fuel additive in a

motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine if an applicable

implementation plan for such State under section 7410

_ of this title so provides. The Administrator may approve

such provision in an implementation plan, or promulgate

an implementation plan containing such a provision, only

62a

if he finds that the State control or prohibition is neces-

sary to achieve the national primary or secondary am-

bient air quality standard which the plan implements.

(d) Penalty

Any person who violates subsection (a) or (f) of this

section or the regulations prescribed under subsection

(c) of this section or who fails to furnish any informa-

tion required by the Administrator under subsection (b)

of this section shall forfeit and pay to the United States

a civil penalty of $10,000 for each and every day of t-«

continuance of such violation, which shall accrue to the

United States and be recovered in a civil suit in the

name of the United States, brought in the district where

such person has his principal office or in any district in

which he does business. The Administrator may, upon

application therefor, remit or mitigate any forfeiture

provided for in this subsection and he shall have author-

ity to determine the facts upon all such applications.

(e) Testing of fuels and fuel additives

(1) Not later than one year after August 7, 1977,

and after notice and opportunity for a public hearing,

the Administrator shall promulgate regulations which

implement the authority under subsection (b) (2) (A)

and (B) of this section with respect to each fuel or fuel

additive which is registered on the date of promulgation

of such regulations and with respect to each fuel or fuel

additive for which an application for registration is filed

thereafter.

(2) Regulations under subsection (b) of this section

to carry out this subsection shall require that the requi-

site information be provided to the Administrator by

each such manufacturer—

(A) prior to registration, in the case of any fuel

or fuel additive which is not registered on the date

of promulgation of such regulations; or

63a

(B) not later than three years after the date of

promulgation of such regulations, in the case of any

fuel or fuel additive which is registered on such

date.

(3) In promulgating such regulations, the Adminis-

trator may—

(A) exempt any small business (as defined in

such regulations) from or defer or modify the re-

quirements of, such regulations with respect to any

such small business;

(B) provide for cost-sharing with respect to the

testing of any fuel or fuel additive which is manu-

factured or processed by two or more persons or

otherwise provide for shared responsibility to meet

the requirements of this section without duplication;

or

(C) exempt any person fiom such regulations

with respect to a particular fuel or fuel additive

upon a finding that any additional testing of such

fuel or fuel additive would be duplicative of ade-

quate existing testing.

(f) New fuels and fuel additives

(1) Effective upon March 31, 1977, it shall be unlaw-

ful for any manufacturer of any fuel or fuel additive

to first introduce into commerce, or to increase the con-

centration in use of, any fuel or fuel additive for general

use in light duty motor vehicles manufactured after

model year 1974 which is not substantially similar to

any fuel or fuel additive utilized in the certification of

any model year 1975, or subsequent model year, vehicle

or engine under section 7525 of this title.

(2) Effective November 30, 1977, it shall be unlawful

for any manufacturer of any fuel to introduce into com-

merce any gasoline which contains a concentraticn of

64a

manganese in excess of .0625 grams per gallon of fuel,

except as otherwise provided pursuant to a waiver under

paragraph (4).

(3) Any manufacturer of any fuel or fuel additive

which prior to March 31, 1977, and after January 1,

1974, first introduced into commerce or increased the

concentration in use of a fuel or fuel additive that would

otherwise have been prohibited under paragraph (1) if

introduced on or after March 31, 1977 shall, not later

than September 15, 1978, cease to distribute such fuel

or fuel additive in commerce. During the period begin-

ning 180 days after August 7, 1977, and before Septem-

ber 15, 1978, the Administrator shall prohibit, or restrict

the concentration of any fuel additive which he deter-

mines will cause or contribute to the failure of an emis-

sion control device or system (over the useful life of any

vehicle in which such device or system is used) to achieve

compliance by the vehicle with the emission standards

with respect to which it has been certified under section

7525 of this title.

(4) The Administrator, upon application of any man-

ufacturer of any fuel or fuel additive, may waive the

prohibitions established under paragraph (1) or (3) of

this section or the limitation specified in paragraph (2)

of this subsection, if he determines that the applicant

has established that such fuel or fuel additive or a speci-

fied concentration thereof, and the emission products of

such fuel or additive or specified concentration thereof,

will not cause or contribute to a failure of any emission

control device or system (over the useful life of any ve-

hicle in which such device or system is used) to achieve

compliance by the vehicle with the emission standards

with respect to which it has been certified pursuant to

section 7525 of this title. If the Administrator has not

65a

acted to grant or deny an application under this para-

graph within one hundred and eighty days of receipt of

such application, the waiver authorized by this paragraph

shall be treated as granted.

(5) No action of the Administrator under this section

may be stayed by any court pending judicial review of

such action.

(g) Small refiners

(1) For the purposes of this subsection:

(A) The terms “gasoline” and “refinery” have

the meaning provided under regulations of the Ad-

ministrator promulgated under this section.

(B) The term “small refinery” means a refinery

or a portion of refinery producing gasoline—

(i) the gasoline ; oducing capacity of which

was in operation or under consideration at any

time during the one-year period immediately

preceding October 1, 1976, and

(ii) which has a crude oil or bona fide feed

stock capacity (as determined by the Adminis-

trator) of 50,000 barrels per day or less, and

(iii) which is owned or controlled by a re-

finer with a total combined crude oil or bona

fide feed stock capacity (as determined by the

Administrator) of 173,500 barrels per day or

less.

(2) No regulations of the Administrator under this

section (or any amendment or revision thereof) respect-

ing the control or prohibition of lead additives in gaso-

line shall require a small refinery prior to October 1,

1982, to reduce the average lead content per gallon of

66a

gasoline refined at such refinery below the applicable

amount specified in the table below:

If the average gasoline production of the

small refinery for the immediately pre-

ceding calendar year (or, in the case of

refineries under construction, half the

designed crude oil capacity) was (in The applicable amount is

barrels per day) : (in grams per gallon)

5,000 or under 2.65.

5,001 to 10,000 2.15.

BO BGL BO ROOD aciceecectinrcrevteat 1.65.

15,001 to 20,000 1.30.

20,001 to 25,000 ........... 80.

25,001 or over as prescribed by the Ad-

ministrator, but not

greater than 0.80.

The Administrator may promulgate such regulations as

he deems appropriate with respect to the reduction of

the average lead content of gasoline refined by small

refineries on and after October 1, 1982, taking into ac-

count the experience under the preceding provisions of

this paragraph.

(3) Effective on August 7, 1977, the regulations of

the Administrator under this section respecting fuel ad-

ditives (40 CFR part 80) shall be deemed amended to

comply with the requirement contained in paragraph

(2).

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to pre-

empt the right of any State to take action as permitted

by subsection (c) (4) of this section.

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