Appendix — Clemente v. United States
Supreme Court brief1986
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85 ion 6 8 » ¥ | Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
OCT 16 i968
JOSEPH F. 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITE] STATE6i2p. — !*
October Term, 1985
No.
tee,
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, a
military department of the
United States of America,
with VERNE ORR, Secretary;
RONALD J. BISHOP, JR.; HAROLD
L. PRAY; CHARLES L. BROWER;
PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL; HARRY W.
JOHNSTONE; and JEFFREY W.
COOK,
Respondents.
i i ed
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
S. TIMOTHY BUYNAK, JR.
HATCH AND PARENT
21 E. Carrillo Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
(805) 963-9231
Attorneys for Petitioner
ie
*
oa.
a
*
7
"
INDEX TO APPENDIX
Appendix A:
Opinion, U.S. Court
of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit, dated July 24,
1985, reported at
766 F.2d 1358
Appendix B:
Decision, U.S. District
Court, Central District
of California, dated August
12, 1983, reported at
568 F.Supp. 1150
Judgment, U.S. District
Court, Central District
of California, dated
August 12, 1983
Memorandum, U.S.
Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit,
dated December 14,
1984
Decision and Order
Remanding Case and
Dismissing Without
Prejudice, U.S.
District Court, Central
District of California,
dated April 30, 1980
reported at 488 F.Supp.
854
38
138
145
151
Judgment Remanding
Proceeding for Admin-
istrative Processing
and Dismissing Complaint
Without Prejudice to
Reopening or to Filing of
New Complaint, U.S.
District Court, Central
District of California,
dated April 30, 1980 160
Notice of Reduction in
Force -- Job Offer,
Department of the Air
Force, dated May 12, 1977 165
Notice of Final Air
Force Decision,
Department of the Air
Force, dated November
19, 1980 170
Appendix C:
Judgment, U.S. Court
of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
dated July 24, 1985 175
Appendix D:
Paragraph 33, Air Force
Regulation 40-713, dated
October 20, 1975 177
aiiea
APPENDIX A
FOR PUBLICATION
Filed July 24, 1985
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE, ) CA No. 83-6187
) DC No. 80-5746
Plaintiff/Appellee )
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE, a
military department
of the United States of
America, with VERNE ORR,
Secretary, of the United
States Air Force,
RONALD J. BISHOP,
JR., HARO.D L. PRAY,
CHARLES L. BROWER,
PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL,
HARRY W. JOHNSTONE,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)OPINION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
and JEFFREY W. COOK, )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants/Appellants.
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CA No. 83-6186
DC No. 79-3952
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, UNITED STATES
AIR FORCE, a military
department of the
United States of
America, with VERNE ORR,
ele
Secretary of the
United States Air Force,
RONALD J. BISHOP, JR.,
HAROLD L. PRAY; CHARLES
L. BROWER; PHILLIP G.
SENESCHAL; HARRY W.
JOHNSTONE; and JEFFREY
W. COOK,
Defendants/Appellants.
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
CA No. 83-6430
DC No. 80-5746
Plaintiff/Appellee
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE AIR FORCE AND
VERNE ORR, SECRETARY OF
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE
AIR FORCE,
Defendants/Appellants.
ttt ttt ee ee ee ee eee
Appeal from the United States
District Court
for the Central District of California
Andrew A. Hauk, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 14, 1984 -
San Francisco, California
BEFORE: CHOY, CANBY AND NORRIS, CIRCUIT
JUDGES.
CANBY, CIRCUIT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, a white civilian Air Force
employee, brought an employment discrimina-
tion action after an Air Force “reduction
o2e
in force" (RIF) resulted in her reassign-
ment. She also asserted due process
violations arising out of the alleged
failure of Air Force officials fully to
process her discrimination claims.
Defendants challenge the district
court's rulings that plaintiff: (1) had
demonstrated retaliatory discrimination
entitling her to back pay and “seniority
relief;" and (2) had established a vio-
lation of her administrative due process
rights entitling her to "“Bivens-type"
compensatory and punitive damages against
the United States, the U.S. Air Force, the
Secretary of the Air Force, and named Air
Force officers and employees. Defendant
Secretary of the Air Force also chailenges
an order of the district court holding the
Secretary in contempt. We reverse the
judgment for damages and vacate the
contempt order.
o3e
Iie acclaim
BACKGROUND .
Plaintiff Lowene Clemente, a
Civilian Air Force employee, originally
filed an action in district court alleging
(1) reverse racial discrimination; (2)
coercive and retaliatory measures taken
against her for filing administrative
claims; (3) denial of reemployment priority
rights; and (4) improper implementation of
a reduction in force. The complaint was an
out growth of an EEO proceeding which began
in 1977, when Clemente appealed her RIF
reassignment, on race discrimination and
other grounds, to the Federal Employee
Appeals Authority (FEAA).
The FEAA notified the Air Force
that under applicable Civil Service
regulations, two alternative methods were
available to process Clemente's appeal:
that set forth in 5 C.F.R. Part 351 or that
in 5 C.F.R. Part 713. 7 A further
regulation then in effect provided that
she
If the appellant has not been
informed of the separate rights
of appeal, the Appeals Authority
shall refer the matter to the
agency so the agency may explain
the alternative rights of appeal
to the appellant as provided in §
713.236 of Part 713 of this
chapter and afford him the
opportunity, if appropriate, to
elect the avenue of appeal he
wishes to pursue.
5 C.F.R. section 772.306(a) (1977). The FEAA
requested the Air Force to secure plain-
tiff's election in writing. Clemente was
contacted by a representative of her
employing facility, Vandenberg Air Force
Base, and informed of the two options. On
advice of counsel, she failed to respond.
Meanwhile, the FEAA sent two letters
to Vandenberg in an effort to ascertain the
appellate option Clemente had elected. Upon
aRe
notification by Vandenberg that no response
had been received to its letter requesting
an election, the FEAA notified Clemente's
counsel that her "Part 351" appeal had been
cancelled.
Shortly thereafter, Clemente secured
new counsel. Her new attorney promptly
wrote the FEAA and Vandenberg, informing
each that Clemente assumed that her Part
713 appeal was still being processed. The
FEAA's response noted that the Part 351
appeal had been cancelled, and the Part 713
appeal was to be handled by officials at
Vandenberg.
Under Air Force regulations,
If the complainant elects to proceed
under FPM Chapter 713, after having
been specifically informed of his
right to use the other appellate
system, then the entire matter,
including the merits of the action,
will be reviewed under this regu-
lation.
AFR 40-713, section 33 (emphasis added).
Pursuant to this regulation, an EEO coun-
selor was assigned to interview Clemente
and explore her RIF and discrimination
claims. After the interview, Clemente was
notified of her right to file a formal
discrimination complaint, and she did so.
This formal complaint was rejected by the
Air Force as untimely. Her initial com-
plaint in district court followed.
In April 1980, the district court
issued a decision. Finding a failure by the
Air Force properly to process Clemente's
complaints, the court remanded the "com-
plaints of plaintiff as presented herein"
to Vandenberg AFB "for continuous and
diligent administrative processing by the
Defendants under applicable Air Force
regulations.” 568 F. Supp. at 1156. The
court admonished that "[s]aid processing
~
should be accomplished in strict compliance
with applicable Air Force regulations,
should involve all stages of administrative
processing entailed therein, and should be
conducted so as to insure Plaintiff her
full rights in said proceedings and a fair
adjudication of her complaints." Id.
Following the district court's remand
and this court's unpublished opinion
dismissing defendants’ appeal for lack of
finality, Clemente v. United States, No.
80-5508 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 1981), defendant
Johnstone was appointed by the Air Force to
investigate Clemente's claims. In an
initial meeting, Clemente and her counsel
presented Johnstone with <n outline of
Clemente's complaints and administrative
processing expectations. Johnstone re-
sponded that he could only process the
discrimination claim. An exchange of
correspondence followed in which Clemente's
counsel emphasized his disagreement with
aa
the limitations placed on the scope of the
investigation and the processing steps
undertaken, insisting that such limitations
were violative of the court's April remand
order. By letter, Johnstone informed
Clemente's counsel that the court had only
remanded the discrimination claim, that it
was not his responsibility to define the
issues accepted for investigation, and that
he had received nothing from the Air Force
indicating that he should broaden the scope
of his investigation.
Shortly thereafter, Clemente's counsel
arranged a meeting with defendant Brower,
Vandenberg's Legal Officer for Labor
Relations, and defendant Seneschal, Vanden-
berg's Civilian Personnel Officer. The
parties discussed the appropriate process-
ing of Clemente's RIF appeal, her priority
reemployment rights claim, and the reprisal
charges. Clemente's counsel made a request
that the Air Force produce certain
=Qoa
documents. Soon afterward, Seneschal sent
Clemente's counsel a letter indicating,
inter alia, that Clemente's document
requests would be honored.
Several weeks later, defendant Brower
informed Clemente's counsel that Air Force
headquarters had determined that no further
processing could be provided either through
the Air Force or the FEAA's successor
organization, the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB) 3.
That same day, Clemente's counsel
wrote Johnstone complaining that none of
Clemente's witnesses had received interrog-
atories or been contacted, interrogatories
had not been sent to Clemente's counsel for
review as previously agreed, and the
request for documents was still outstand-
ing. Johnstone never answered this letter,
and the processing deficiencies referred to
remained unremedied. One week Rater,
Johnstone forwarded a report to
=10@
a
Vandenberg's base commander finding no dis-
crimination. Thereafter, Brower reconfirmed
to Clemente's counsel that there would be
no further processing of her claims.
One month later, defendant Pray, Chief
of Personnel at Vandenberg, issued a
"Notice of Proposed Disposition of Dis-
crimination Complaint" recommending cancel-
lation of Clemente's complaint. Upon
receipt of this notice, Clemente's counsel
wrote Pray alleging deficiencies in the Air
Force's processing of her claims, and
requesting combined adjudication of all
four issues. His letter -- copies of which
went to Brower and defendants’ attorney --
cited Air Force regulations, the purported
constitutional rights of plaintiff, and the
court's remand judgment. A similar letter
was sent directly to defendants' attorney,
again detailing alleged deficiencies in the
Air Force's processing of plaintiff's
claims, and stressing that this failure
alle
"diligently, promptly, and completely [to]
process Mrs. Clemente's claims thereby
"perfect[ed] causes of action for constitu-
tional violations against the Air Force as
well as any governmental official responsi-
ble for these actions." 568 F. Supp at
1158.
Several weeks later, defendant Bishop,
base commander at Vandenberg, issued a
"Notice of Final Decision" cancelling
Clemente's complaint, but asserting that
the Air Force had made a "good faith
attempt" to comply with the court's April
remand judgment.
Clemente thereupon reopened proceed-
ings in the district court and amended her
initial complaint to include a due process
claim against the United States and indi-
vidual defendants. The due process claim
was predicated upon the Air Force's refusal
to follow its own procedures, its refusal
to process three of Clemente's four
-12-
administrative claims, and its perfunctory
processing of the discrimination complaint.
Following a bench trial, the district
court found that while plaintiff had not
suffered racial discrimination, the evi-
dence was sufficient to establish retal-
iation in violation of Title VII. The court
awarded back pay and accorded seniority
relief (with training, if necessary). In
ruling on the constitutional claim, the
court found that both the United States and
the individual defendants had violated
Clemente's due process rights, and awarded
compensatory and punitive damages accord-
ingly. The district court also awarded
plaintiff attorneys' fees on both of her
successful claims. Subsequently, the
district court held the Secretary of the
Air Force in contempt of the order granting
relief to plaintiff on the merits. These
consolidated appeals of the district
court's orders followed.
«13<
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Constitutional Claim
A. United States as Defendant
In addition to finding liability by
individual defendants, the district court
awarded "Bivens-type" compensatory and
punitive damages against the United States
and the United States Air Force absent an
express waiver -- and despite the spirited
assertion -- of sovereign immunity. 568 F.
Supp. at 1171. We reverse.
The district court viewed its order
awarding damages directly against the.
United States as "the natural and logical
extension" of Supreme Court precedent
recognizing and extending liability for
so-called constitutional torts. 568 F.
Supp. at 1167. Relying upon both
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), and subsequent cases concerning
-14-
the scope of 42 U.S.C. 1983, . the
district court held that
[n]ot overlooking the fact that the
Owens [sic] decision addressed the
issue of a municipality being held
liable in a §1983 action, the issue of
a federal sovereign violating its own
Constitution is indistinguishable.
Accordingly, this Court finds that the
federal government is not immune from
an action brought against it as a
result of its agents having violated
the Fifth Amendment rights of a United
States citizen.... We cannot help but
recognize and enforce the natural and
logical extension of Butz and Owens
[sic], which leads us inescapably to
conclude that just as state agencies
and state officers are both liable for
constitutional violations under 42
U.S.C. §1983, so also federal agencies
and federal officers should be and are
«1S
liable for constitutional violations
under Bivens.
568 F. Supp. at 1167 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
We cannot accept the district court's
proposition that Bivens and Owen logically
compel the United States to be held liable
in damages for the constitutional trots of
3 "It is axiomatic that the
its officers.
United States may not be sued without its
consent and that the existence of consent
is a prerequisite for jurisdiction."
United States v. Mitchell, 103 S.Ct. 2961,
2965 (1983). Admittedly, there is consid-
erable appeal to the proposition that a
remedy for a constitutional violation ought
not to be defeated by the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 6 We
consider the issue foreclosed against
plaintiff, however, by a long line of
Supreme Court cases, see, @€.qg.,
Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
409, 413 (1850);
=16=
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207
(1882); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction
Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 318, 388 (1939);
Mitchell, supra. The proposition is also
contrary to the implication of our own
decision in Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d
1399, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1983), where we
held a Bivens remedy unavailable against
federal officials being sued, not in their
individual capacity for their individual
actions, but simply because of the offices
they hold. See also Arnsberg v. United
States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1984).
It follows that the district court's award
of compensatory and punitive damages
against the United States aiid the United
States Air Force must be reversed.
B. Individual Officials as Defendants
In awarding Bivens damages against
individual defendants, the district court
held that the failure of defendants fully
to process Clemente's discrimination claims
ol 7<
ee
violated her right to dve process as
secured by the fifth amendment. Defendants
contend that even if plaintiff's Bivens
claims are not precluded by Title VII, ,
they must fail because (1) civil service
administrative remedies provide the relief
for an alleged deprivation of protected
civil service statutes, and (2) plaintiff
has not otherwise demonstrated a depriva-
tion of liberty or property sufficient to
implicate the due process clause. We agree
with both of the defendants' contentions.
To the extent that the district court
based its due process Bivens ruling on
plaintiff's property interest in her "GS-7
position,” 568 F.Supp. at 1168, it is
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Lucas, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2417 (1983).
There, the Court held that the comprehen-
sive system established by Congress to
remedy violations of constitutional rights
in connection with federal employment and
i=
basa
personnel policy was exclusive; it could
not be augmented by non-statutory "Bivens-
type" relief. Bush v. Lucas accordingly
precludes Bivens relief based directly on
injury to plaintiff's interest in her GS-7
position.
The district court purported, however,
to find an independent property interest
arising from the court's order to process
plaintiff's complaint fully. See, e.g.,
568 F. Supp. at 1164, 1168 and 1169. A
mere command to follow certain procedures,
however, does not create an underlying
property interest, even when the command is
derived from the Constitution. Such an
interest must be "created by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an in-
dependent source such as state law -- rules
or understandings that secure certain
benefits and support claims of entitlement
to those benefits." Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The
o19=
district court's order creates no such
property interest. While violation of the
order might constitute contempt, it does
not give rise to a Bivens constitutional
tort claim.
The district court also grounded its
finding of a deprivation of due process in
the Air Force's failure to follow its own
regulations:
The Air Force established procedures
for evaluating combined RIF appeals
and discrimination complaints as well
as complaints of reprisal and reem-
ployment priority rights. See AFR
40-713.... Having once established
these procedures, they must be fol-
lowed or plaintiff's due process
rights will be violated.... The Air
Force, however, repeatedly failed to
abide by these procedures....
568 F. Supp. at 1168.
~200
Notwithstanding this finding that the
Air Force failed fully to follow its own
regulations, such procedural requirements,
without more, do not create constitution-
ally cognizable property interests. To hold
otherwis» would immediately incorporate
virtually every regulation into tne Consti-
tution. ’
This court has repeatedly held that
{[p] rocedura]. requirements ordinarily
do not transform a unilateral expecta-
tion into a constitutionally protected
property interest. A constitutionally
protected interest has been created
only if the procedural requirements
are intended to be a ‘significant
substantive restriction’ on...
decision making. If the procedures
required pose no significant limita-
tion on the discretion of the decision
maker, the expectation of a specific
decision is not enhanced enough to
aBLa
establish a constitutionally protected
interest in the procedures.
Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see also
Loehr v. Ventura County Community College
Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1984);
Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 657 (9th
Cir. 1983); Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d
177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980); Hayward v.
Henderson, 623 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir.
1980); Russell v. Landrieu, 621 F.2d 1037,
1040 (9th Cir. 1980). ©
Here, AFR 40-713 expressly provided
for review of "the entire matter, including
the merits of the action,” once a complain-
ant elects to proceed under Part 713. The
outcome of that review, however, is left to
the discretion of the base conmander. ’
Although the commander's decision is
appealable to the Civil Service Commission
ér the courts, A.F.R. 40-713, #28 & 29, the
regulation provides no/significant
aD%e
restrictions on the commander's decision-
making, Goodisman, 724 F.2d at 820, nor
does it provide articulable standards to
guide his discretion. Parks, 716 F.2d at
657. As a result, plaintiff cannot suc-
cessfully claim a constitutionally cogniza-
ble property interest arising from the Air
Force's regulation.
None of the foregoing should be read
as abrogating the well-settled rule that
regulations validly prescribed by an agency
are binding upon it. 10 See, e.g., Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260. 267 (1954);
United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827, 834
(9th Cir. 1978); Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d
956, 959 (9th Cir. 1977); Mabey v. Reagan,
537 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1976); Note,
"Violations by Agencies of their Own Reg-
ulations,” 87 Harv.L.Rev. 629 (1974). Our
holding is simply that plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate the existence of a constitu-
tionally protected "property” interest,
af3=
deprivation of which would entitle her to
damages. See Hayward v. Henderson, 623
F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir.1980)
Much of what we have just said applies
as well to plaintiff's alleged liberty
interest. Clemente does not possess a
"liberty interest [in] her Civil Service
career. 568 F. Supp. at 1168. The mere fact
of dismissal does not cause a deprivation
of liberty. Loehr, 743 F.2d at 1310, 1317
(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 575; Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976)). Instead,
""({t]o implicate constitutional liberty
interests, . . . the reasons for dismissal
must be sufficiently serious to 'stigma-
tize' or otherwise burden the individual so
that he is not able to take advantage of
other employment opportunities.'" Id.
(citing Bollow v. Federai Reserve Bank, 650
F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. i981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982)). No such
stigmatization has been shown here. The
~~;
pa Rls Pen Mt ve es Rs
district court's decision awarding Bivens
relief against the individual defendants
must accordingly be reversed.
II. Title VII
Appellants contend that the district
court applied the wrong legal standard in
holding that plaintiff had been a victim of
retaliation forbidden by Title VII. We
agree.
This court has held that "[o]nce the
plaintiff has established a prima facie
case, the burden of production devolves
upon the defendant to articulate some
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
adverse action. The defendant need not
prove the absence of retaliatory intent or
motive; it simply must produce evidence
sufficient to dispel the inference of
retaliation raised by the plaintiff. If the
defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff
must then show that the asserted reason was
a pretext for retaliation. The ultimate
o2Se
burden of persuading the court that the
defendant unlawfully retaliated against her
remains at all times with the plaintiff."
Cohen v. Fred Mayer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793,
796-97 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
We find no indication in the district
court's findings or opinion that it afford-
ed the defendants the full benefit of this
process. The Air Force offered non-
retaliatory explanations for its actions
but the district court, except for reject-
ing the Air Force's jurisdictional points,
did not address them. Because they were
not addressed, there was no consideration
of the question whether they were pretext-
ual. The full trial process envisaged by
Cohen was consequently short-circuited, and
plaintiff was essentially awarded a judg-
ment on the strength of her prima facie
case!? that the defendants had an inade-
quate opportunity to rebut.
othe
—————
Because the district court neither
applied the appropriate legal standards nor
"articulate[d] the standards by which it
evaluated the evidence and arrived at its
finding of liability,” id. at 797, its
finding of retaliation is reversed and the
issue remanded for reconsideration in
light of the applicable precedent. Id. at
mm, *
III. Attorneys' Fees
The district court awarded attorneys'
fees and costs against the United States in
connection with Clemente's constitutional
claims. 568 F. Supp. at 1171. The predicate
for an award of fees under 28 U.S.C. 42412
(EAJA), however, is that the party seeking
the award "prevailed." Since the district
court incorrectly found Bivens liability
against the United States absent an express
waiver of sovereign immunity, we vacate
this award of fees and costs. 13
= 2 Pan
Under 42 U.S.C. §%2000e-5(k), attor-
neys' fees are available to the prevailing
party in a Title VII action. Since we have
remanded on the issue of retaliaticn, we
also vacate the award of attorneys' fees
under Title VII pending reconsideration of
the retaliatory discrimination issue by the
district court.
IV. Contempt
The district court entered its judg-
ment in this action on August 12, 1983. See
568 F. Supp. at 1150. On October 3, it
found defendants Secretary of the Air Force
and Department of the Air Force guilty of
civil and criminal contempt for deliberate-
ly and contemptuously disobeying its order
of August 12. The district court assessed
cumulative fines of over $2,000 per day
from the entry of judgment in August
through October 3. Appellants contend that
the court abused its discretion in this
regard. We agree.
-28-
“here ... a judgment of contempt
contains an admixture of criminal and civil
elements, ‘the criminal aspect of the order
fixes its character for purposes of proce-
dure on review.'" Falstaff Brewing Corp.
v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778
(9th Cir. 1983). To sustain a judgment of
criminal contempt, willful disobedience
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 782. "Willfulness" means, in this
context, a deliberate or intended violation
of the court's order. Id.
As the government notes, the sequence
of events here alone is sufficient to
establish that defendants were not in
willful disobedience of the district
court's August 12 order. Ten days after the
order was entered, defendants filed their
notice of appeal, and, on August 23,
conabtenety upon expiration of the automat-
ic stay provided by F. R. Civ. P. 62(a),
defendants moved in the district court for
=29-
a stay of the judgment. While that motion
was still before it, the district court
issued, on September 23, an order to show
cause why defendants should not be held in
contempt. Finally, on October 3, the
district court simultaneously held defen-
dants in contempt and denied their motion
for a stay pending appeal.
As appellants suggest, to find a
defendant guilty of "willful and deliberate
defiance of the court's order,” United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 303 (1947), when a stay has been
immediately sought would render neantnelene
the whole process by which parties invoke
the power of the courts to defer the effect
of their judgments. The Supreme Court has
recognized that “willfulness" may be
qualified “by a concurrent attempt on
defendants’ part to challenge the order by
motion to vacate or other appropriate
procedures." United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
=30<
at 303. Appellant's motion to stay was an
“appropriate procedure." Accordingly, we
vacate the judgment of contempt.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court in
favor of plaintiff is in all respects
reversed. The rulings of the district
court holding the Secretary and the Depart-
ment of the Air Force in contempt are
vacated. The case is remanded to the
district court for further proceedings
relating to plaintiff's claim for retal-
iation in violation of Title VII, and any
other matters consistent with this
— 14
opinion.
=3le-
FOOTNOTES
he The facts in this case are more
fully set forth in the opinion of the
district court. See Clemente v. United
States, 568 F. Supp. 1150, 1152-59 ic...
Cal. 1983).
Zo Part 351, captioned "Reduction in
Force," specifies the procedures "[e]ach
agency shall follow ... when it releases a
competing employee from his competitive
level by separation, demotion, furlough
+++, OF reassignment...." 5 C.F.R. section
351.201 (a) (1977).
Part 713 “sets forth the regu-
ations under which an agency shall
establish a continuing affirmative program
for equal opportunity in employment and
personnel actions ... and under which the
Commission will review an agency's program
and entertain an appeal from a person
dissatisfied with an agency's decision or
other final action on his complaint of
discrimination...." 5 C.F.R. section
713.201(a) (1977)
3 The Air Force claimed that plaintiff's
appeal was an FEAA appeal, and there was no
saving clause allowing the MSPB to assume
appeals before the now-disbanded FEAA.
Thus, argued the Air Force, only the
discrimination complaint could be processed
administratively.
4. In Bivens, the Supreme Court implied a
damage remedy against federal officers for
the violation of plaintiff's fourth amend-
ment rights. 403 U.S. 390-97. The Bivens
doctrine has been progressively expanded to
embrace other constitutional violations.
See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); see
n320
eee
PEE. ee OS
generally K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise, §27:2 (1984). In Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Court
declined to "accord[] to federal officials
a higher degree of immunity from liability
when sued for a constitutional infringement
as authorized by Bivens than is accorded
state officials when sued for the identical
violation under §1983." Id. at 500. In
Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445
U.S. 622 (1980), the Court extended
liability for constitutional violations
under §1983 to municipalities.
5. First, the rationale for abrogating
municipal immunity in Owen is simply
inapposite. As the Court was careful to
make clear, "[({sJince colonial times,...
local governmental units were regularly
held to answer in damages for a wide range
of statutory and constitutional
violations...." Owen, 445 U.S. at 638-39.
The same is not true of the federal
sovereign. See note infra; Borchard,
"Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale L.
J. 1 (1924). Second, the governmental
immunity at stake in Butz and Bivens
differs from that at issue here. The
district court's order permits recovery for
damages from the United States; while
Bivens and Butz permit recovery against
governmental officials sued in their
individual capacities; neither case
contemplates damages against the government
itself. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 638 n.18.
Indeed, as the Court acknowledged in Butz,
"Bivens established that a citizen
suffering a compensable injury to a
constitutionally protected interest could
--- Obtain an award of monetary damages
against the responsible federal official"
precisely because "[t]he barrier of
sovereign immunity is frequently
o33<
impenetrable." 438 U.S. at 504 (emphasis
added).
6. At least one commentator has urged the
Supreme Court to extend Bivens to constitu-
tional violations by the government. See
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,
27:26, at 147 & 154 ("Nothing in the Bivens
opinion limits the doctrine to a case in
which federal employees are the defendants.
The theory of the opinion is broad enough
to produce the same result if ... the
defendant is the United States or a local
government.... The Supreme Court should ...
make clear that any violator of the
Constitution is liable for damages in a
suit directly under the Constitution.")
(emphasis omitted). See also Borchard,
"Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale
L.J. 1 (1924) (classic attack on the
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity); W.
Blackstone, 3 Commentaries 23, 109, oe
in Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2
n.10 (1983) ("every right, when withheld,
must have a remedy, and every injury its
proper redress.").
7. To the extent that plaintiff's Bivens
claims are founded in actions proscribed by
Title VII, they may not be maintained
because Title VII provides the exclusive
remedy. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976);
White v. GSA, .52 F.2d 913, 917 (9th Cir.
1981); see Nolan v. Cleveland, 686 F.2d
806, 815 (9th Cir. 1982).
8. "It goes without saying that it would
be neither sound law nor desirable policy
to constitutionalize every state ...
regulation.” Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d
708, 712 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238 1383) See also Shango v. Jurich,
o34e
eee
ponbnincha tte Abe take awe nbs PaGameal me" eee b Qe 6
Pe EE
681 F.2d 1091, 1101 (7th Cir. 1982)
("Constitutionalizing every state
procedural right would stand any due
process analysis on its head. Instead of
identifying the substantive interest at
stake and then ascertaining what process is
due to the individual before he can be
deprived of that interest, the process is
viewed as a substantive end in itself. The
purpose of a procedural safeguard, however,
is the protection of a substantive interest
to which the individual has a legitimate
claim of entitlement.").
9. See A.F.R. 40-713,%%12(f), 24(c) (6),
25(b) (Oct. 20, 1975) (superseded by A.F.R.
40-713 (June 15, 1982)).
10. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "[a]n
executive agency must be rigorously held to
the standards by which it professes its
action to be judged. Accordingly, if
[agency action] is based on a defined
procedure, even though generous beyond the
requirements that bind such agency, that
procedure must be scrupulously observed.
This judicially evolved rule of adminis-
trative law is now firmly established and,
if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the
procedural sword shall perish with that
sword." Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,
546-47 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). To
"perish" by the procedural sword, however,
is not to pay Bivens damages. The appropri-
ate remedy for the refusal of an agency to
follow its own regulations may be injunc-
tive relief, reversal of the agency action,
or reversal and remand with an order
requiring the agency to follow its
procedures. Indeed, the district court's
initial remand required appellants
diligently to process all of plaintiff's
=35-
Claims. 568 F.Supp. at 1156. Willful
failure to do so would arguably support a
finding of contempt; it does not, however, .
permit Bivens damages.
11. We note as well that the district
court erred in its articulation of the
requisites of a prima facie case of
retaliation. The district court stated
that a prima facie case is established by
showing knowledge by the employer that a
complaint has been filed, followed by
adverse employment action. 568 F. Supp. at
1160. The standard established by Cohen,
however, requires the showing of a causal
link between the protected activity and the
adverse action, by “evidence sufficient to
raise the inference that [plaintiff's]
protected activity was the likely reason
for the adverse action.” Cohen, 686 F.2d
at 796.
12. Our remand makes it unnecessary to
reach appellants’ contention that the
district court erred in excluding testimony
essential to an accurate calculation of
back pay and seniority rights. We note,
however, that the central objective of
Title VII is to "make whole” victims of
prohibited discrimination. See Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747,
774 (1976). Toward that end, a court may
certainly weigh expert testimony suggesting
what plaintiff would have earned on the
basis of hypothetical promotion schedules.
When an expert, however, is asked to assume
that plaintiff would occupy a particular
position but for improper retaliatory
actions, any correspondence between the
expert's calculations and the actual salary
loss suffered by plaintiff obviously will
depend upon the accuracy of this assump-
tion, an assumption which defendants are
-36-
;
5
-
¢
¢
4
4
.
4
:
acest we cet RE LMR LU AR RI I TN ENB ATE a
entitled to attempt to refute. Finally, we
note that damages under plaintiffs Title
VII claim must be confined to those caused
by unlawful retaliation, if retaliation is
proved upon remand. The district court
found against plaintiff on her cause of
race discrimination.
13. Our disposition of the sovereign
immunity issue makes it unnecessary to
reach appellants’ additional contention
that an award of fees and costs would be
unwarranted under the EAJA in any event. We
note, however, that the district court
expressly relied upon "the decision of
Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546 F.
Supp. 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1982), for the prop-
osition than an award of attorneys fees in
a Bivens action may be analogized to a
similar award in a §1983 action which is
authorized by 42 U.S.C. §1988." 568 F.Supp.
at 1171. This court recently reversed that
decision on precisely this point. Lauritzen
v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 554-55 (9th Cir.
1984).
14. In her amended complaint, plaintiff
asserted a claim that the RIF to which she
was subject was conducted in violation of
pertinent statutes and regulations. The
district court made no rulings regarding
that claim, probably because relief there-
for would have been subsumed in the relief
it ordered on the Title VII and constitu-
tional claims. We also do not reach the
merits of that claim, which may be addres-
sed by the district court on remand. We
express no opinion as to whether that claim
is in fact independent of any of plain-
tiff's other claims. Cf. Nolan v. Cleland,
686 F.2d 806, 815 (9th Cir. 1982) (constitu-
tional due process claim subsumed by Title
VII claim when factual predicate is same).
a37=
APPENDIX B
FILED August 12, 1983
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV-80-5746
AAH
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
Plaintiff,
DECISION
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, UNITED STATES
AIR FORCE, a military
department of the
United States of
America, with HANS
M. MARK, Secretary,
)
)
)
)
)
) (Por Plaintiff
)
)
)
RONALD J. BISHOP, JR., )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
and Against
Defendants)
HAROLD L. PRAY,
CHARLES L. BROWER,
PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL,
HARRY W. JOHNSTONE,
and JEFFREY W. COOK,
individually and as
officers and/or
employees of the United
States Air Force,
Defendants.
-38-
APPEARANCES :
HATCH & PARENT, by S. Timothy Buynak,
Jr., and Thomas D. Wise, Santa
Barbara, California, for plaintiff.
STEPHEN S. TROTT, United States
Attorney, FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.,
Assistant United States Attorney,
Chief, Civil Division, by and through
PETER R. OSINOFF and KATHRYN W. TATE,
Assistant United States Attorneys,
Los Angeles, California, for
defendants.
This matter came on for nonjury trial
on May 23, 1983, and continued thereafter
for 19 days until June 21, 1983, whereupon
argument was heard. Thereafter, the-Court
took the matter under consideration and
submission.
Plaintiff is a White Caucasion citizen
of the United States who, at all times
herein mentioned, was and now is employed
-39-
CO SS Ss Or ee
as a General Schedule (hereafter "GS")
civil service employee at Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California. Her positions have
been primarily in the computer and data
automation fields. By this action plain-
t. ff seeks two types of relief:
First, equitable reliet flowing from
alleged employment discrimination based on
race in connection with a reduction in
force (hereafter "RIF") that was effective
on July 17, 1977. It is also alleged that
reprisal discrimination occurred as a
result of the filing of a "RIF" appeal.
These claims are brought under 42 U.S.C.
section 2000e-16 (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended) and 28
U.S.C. section 1331.
Secondly, and in addition to the above
claims, plaintiff contends that she is
entitled to damages for the alleged vio-
lation of her constitutional right to due
process arising out of the defendants’
-40-
failure to fully process her claims after
Judgment of this Court remanding to the Air
Force all proceedings on April 30, 1980.
The jurisdictional support for this claim
is also 28 U.S.C. section 1331.
The factual basis of this action is
extremely complex and may be effectively
analyzed only by focusing on three relevant
time periods.
I
FACTS PRIOR TO THE J’\2 1°, 1977 RIF
Plaintiff has been a Civil Servant of
the Federal Government since 1958 and has
been assigned to Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California since 1965. In 1968, plaintiff
was promoted to a GS-7, Computer Operator
position in Base Supply. In 1971, this
position was downgraded to a GS-6, Step 9,
as a result of a base-wide classification
downgrade for all computer operators. On
December 8, 1974, plaintiff was promoted to
the position of Electronic Accounting
agile
TT ae ne ee Ee ee
Machine (hereafter "EAM") Project Planner,
GS-362-07, with the 6596th Instrumentation
Squadron, Operations Support Branch. Her
grade level was that of a GS-7, Step 8.
Following this promotion, plaintiff per-
formed well in the opinion of her superiors
until the beginning of 1976.
In 1976, plain’ f£f's immediate super-
visors were changec and replaced by Black
individuals. Thereafter, plaintiff al~
leges, these individuals conspired and
attempted to undermine plaintiff and have
her removed from her position. It is
contended that this removal from office was
effectuated through a RIF, following a
period of tension between plaintiff and her
new superiors. The RIF was requested on
April 13, 1977 by Master Sergeant Bruce
Daniels, a Black. In anticipation of this
action, plaintiff filed a telegram appeal
with the Civil Service Commission on April
8, 1977. This appeal was dismissed on June
-42-
7, 1977, as being premature. Thereafter,
plaintiff retained Leonard A. Newton, Esq.,
an attorney in Santa Maria, California, to
assist in the processing of her complaint.
Newton advised plaintiff not to communicate
with Air Force personnel and indicated that |
he would assume responsibility for the
processing of her complaint. Plaintiff
testified that after retaining Newton and
receiving his advice, she “left the matter
fully in his hands."
The above-mentioned RIF was actuated
on May 12, 1977, and upon plaintiff's
acceptance of the only alternative position
offered, she was transferred into a tempo-
rary position at the Base Legal OFfice.
She remained at this position until July
17, 1977, the effective date of the RIF, at
which time she was placed in her present
position as a Computer Operator, GS-6, Step
10. On this same day Newton sent a tele-
gram to the Federal Employee Appeals
~ yo
ee ee
_— preter ."
Authority (hereafter "FEAA"), appealing the
RIF action, stating that the RIF was the
consequence of “inverse racial discrimina-
tion and personality dislikes on the part
of [plaintiff's] superiors." In addition
to this telegram, Newton sent a letter to
the FEAA charging that the plaintiff's
downgrade was the "result of an artifically
created reduction in force."
It
FACIS SUBSEQUENT TO THE RIF
On July 18, 1977, the FEAA correspond-
ed with Civilian Personnel Officer William
Coady of Vandenberg Air Force Base indicat-
ing that two alternative methods of appeal
were available to process plaintiff's
complaint, these methods being set forth in
Part 713 and Part 351 of the Civil Service
Commission's Regulations. The FEAA re-
quested the Civilian Personnel Office to
secure plaintiff's election to process
under one of these regulations "in
-44-
writing," and requested it to inform
plaintiff of certain rights she had and the
method of processing under each regulation.
Plaintiff's written election of the method
of processing was to be secured within ten
days of receipt of the July 18, 1977
letter to the Civilian Personnel Office.
On July 26, 1977, Civilian Personnel
Officer Coady forwarded the July 18, 1977
letter of the FEAA to plaintiff, requesting
her to make an election as to the procedure
under which she intended to proceed and
admonishing her that “further action on the
appeal is delayed until your choice of
procedures is provided to us in writing."
At satel. plaintiff testified that she
received Mr. Coady's letter with the FEAA
letter attached. She noted that Newton had
received a copy of the FEAA letter.
Thereafter plaintiff communicated with
Newton who advised her not to respond to
either of these letters and that a
-45-
resolution of the matter was forthcoming.
Plaintiff was not contacted again that year
by the Civilian Personnel Office despite
her continuing daily work presence at
Vandenberg Air Force Base.
Plaintiff was in contact with her
attorney, Newton, for the last time in
December, 1977, when he assured her that he
had filed a complaint and a hearing had
been set in the distant future. During the
period between July 26, 1977 and February
7, 1978, two requests were made by the FEAA
for a response from the Base to its letter
of July 18, 1977. ON February 7, 1978, Mr.
Coady responded to the FEAA stating that no
response had been received from the plain-
tiff to its request that she make an
election of procedures. Mr. Coady did not
make any further attempt to contact plain-
tiff or her attorney during this period.
On February 21, 1978, the FEAA sent a
letter to Newton notifying him that the
wie
plaintiff's "Part 351" appeal ( 5 C.F.R.,
Part 351) had been cancelled. The plain-
tiff also received this letter.
Plaintiff testified at trial that,
because of the repeated assurances of
Newton, she interpreted the Feoruary 21,
1978 letter from the FEAA to mean that her
"Part 713" appeal (5 C.F.R, Part 713) was
still progressing. However, subseqvent to
receiving this letter, she became suspi-
cious that her attorney was not handling
the case in a proper manner and attempted
to contact him. Following numerous at-
tempts to reach Newton by telephone and by
mail and receiving no response, plaintiff
engaged the services of her present attor-
ney, Timothy S. Buynak, Esq of Santa
Barbara. Thereafter, Buynak did a thorough
search of state and federal court records
to determine the status of plaintiff's
"case," as presumably filed by her first
attorney, Newton. Having no success in
wl te
locating any action filed on behalf of
plaintiff, Buynak endeavored to contact
Newton by telephone and numerous letters.
It was eventually discovered that Newton
was the subject of disbarment proceedings
before the California State Bar. Newton's
attorney in those proceedings was requested
to advise Newton to contact Buynak concern-
ing plaintiff's case. On October 2, 1978,
portions of plaintiff's file were sent to
her new attorney, Buynak, from Newton,
together with the information that the ‘only
filing that he had made was with the FEAA.
On October 25, 1978, Buynak wrote to
both the Civilian Personnel Office at
Vandenberg and the FEAA, informing each
that plaintiff assumed her claim was being
processed under Part 713. On October 27,
1978, the FEAA responded to this letter
stating that the Part 351 appeal had been
cancelled and that the Part 713 appeal was
to be handled by the employing agency,
-48-
namely, the U.S. Air Force at Vandenberg
Air Force Base. On November 6, 1978, Mr.
Coady, the Civilian Personnel Officer at
Vandenberg, replied to attorney Buynak's
October 25, 1978 letter advising him that
no action had been taken on the Part 713
appeal. Four days later Buynak responded
to Mr. Coady requesting that the agency
begin Part 713 processing because plaintiff
was “ready, willing and able to cooperate”
with the agency in processing her com-
plaint. Civilian Personnel Officer Van
Nice responded, directing that plaintiff
should contact Chief EEO Counselor Carol
McCool. After this was accomplished by
Buynak, Ms. McCool assigned Joanne Tomlin-
son as counselor in the matter. An initial
interview with plaintiff was held by Ms.
Tomlinson on February 2, 1979, at which
time plaintiff's claims of improper and
discriminatory RIF were considered, as well
as her secondary complaints of reprisal,
-49-
and denial of re-employment priority status
with respect to job vacancies at Vanden-
berg Air Force Base. Ms. Tomlinson
expressed to plaintiff her belief that the
original complaints would not be considered
timely and thereby affirmed that she would
concentrate on the issue of plaintiff's
priority rights. Ultimately, Ms. Tomlinson
did recommend placement through plaintiff's
priority rights so as to resolve her
complaints.
Subsequent to her final interview with
Ms. Tomi. ison, plaintiff received a "NOTICE
OF FINAL INTERVIEW WITH AN EEO COUNSELOR"
dated February 23, 1979, which informed her
that if she believed she had been discrim-
inated against on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin or age, a
discrimination complaint could be filed
within 15 days of receipt of the notice.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a formal dis-
crimination complaint, also on February 23,
—T
1979. The Air Force, on March 21, 1979,
rejected plaintiff's complaints as being
untimely. The Notice of Final Agency
Determination, however, was not sent by
certified mail as required by Air Force
Regulation (hereafter "AFR") 40-713,
Paragraph 23e, October 20, 1975. At trial,
plaintiff testified that she never received
this notice and thus has validly invoked
the jurisdiction of this Court by filing
her district court complaint 180 days after ~
the date of lodging a formal administrative
complaint with the Air Force.
On October ll, 1979, plaintiff filed
her initial complaint in district court,
asserting three causes of action and
alleging four claims. The claims consisted
of (1) reverse racial discrimination; (2)
coercive and retaliatory activity for
having filed administrative claims; (3)
denial of reemployment priority status; and
(4) improper RIF. After answering on
=e
February 25, 1980, defendants moved to
dismiss the action pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1) on
the basis that the Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. This motion was heard
on April 21, 1980. Following this hearing,
the Court, on April 30, 1980, made and
entered its Decision, with Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment,
remanding all of plaintiff's claims to the
defendants for complete administrative
processing. That Decision states in
pertinent part:
DECISION Remanding Proceedings to Air Force
(4/30/80)
z & ®
Findings of Fact
The Court, having considered the
pleadings herein, the Certified
Administrative Record, the Memoranda
and Declarations submitted by both
x)
sides, and having heard oral argument
of counsel, finds that:
l. Plaintiff's failure to
discuss her case with an EEO Counselor is
not a jurisdictional defect;
2. Defendants through their
|
|
|
,
|
|
.
|
:
personnel at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California, had an affirmative duty to
timely refer Plaintiff's complaints to an
EEO Counselor for consideration and to |
fully advise Plaintiff of the administra- |
tive processing requirement and her rights
therein, which Defendants failed to accom-
plish, although Plaintiff has been consis-
tently employed at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California, since lodging her
complaints;
36 Because of these failures by
Defendants, Plaintiff's complaints were
never accepted and processed administra-
tively in accordance with Defendants’
regulations, which processing would aid
Sr : pas ‘J
immensely in the resolution of the diffi-
culties herein considered, which failure
constituted and constitute arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable denial of the
due process of law rights of Plaintiff.
4. Jurisdiction of this Court
to hear discrimination complaints under 42
United States Code section 2000e-16 termi-
nates thirty days after receipt of the
final notice of agency determination by the
Plaintiff; otherwise, this Court has
continuing jurisdiction to entertain the
judicial complaint herein, beginning 180
days after Piaintiff filed her formal
initial charge with the agency;
5. Notice of the final agency
determination was never received by Plain-
tiff. Defendant Air Force, in violation of
its own regulations (A.F.R. 40-713, October
20, 1975, Para. 23e.), failed to send to
Plaintiff and her representative a written
decision by certified mail, return receipt
@84-
requested. And because 180 days have
elapsed between the filing of Plaintiff's
formal initial charge and the filing of the
complaint herein, this court has continuing
jurisdiction.
x & ®
Conclusions of Law
l. This Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over this action.
2. Defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction should be denied.
36 In the interest of justice
and fairness to all parties, the complaints
of Plaintiff as presented herein should be
remanded to the Civilian Personnel Office
of Vandenberg Air Force Base, Californie;
for continuous and diligent administrative
processing by the Defendants under applica-
ble Air Force regulations to final deter-
mination by the Defendant Air Force and the
other said Defendants, all of said
-55-
processing to be initiated within sixty
(60) days of the date of entry of the
within Decision and Order.
4. Said processing should be
accomplished in strict compliance with
applicable Air Force regulations, should
involve all stages of administrative
processing entailed therein, and should be
conducted so as to insure Plaintiff her
full rights in said proceedings and a fair
adjudication of her complaints.
S. In addition to said rights
and privileges afforded by said regu-
lations, Plaintiff should be entitled to be
present at ali stages of the administrative
processing and to be represented thereat by
her legal representative.
6. Plaintiff should not be
questioned at any time without her legal
representative being present and Plain-
tiff's legal representative should receive
copies of all written communications
involved in this administrative processing.
7. If tiie Defendants fail to
initiate the said admiristrative processing ]
within sixty (60) days from the date of
entry of the within Decision and Order, or
to fully, properly and diligently process
said complaints of Plaintiff through all
stages to final determination by the Air
Force, this Court, upon motion by Plain-
tiff, should consider reopening of this
proceeding herein and granting the relief
prayed by the Plaintiff in her complaint on
file herein.
8. This proceeding and the
complaint herein should be dismissed
without prejudice to:
(a) the reopening of this
proceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the
Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-
trative processing within sixty (60) days
from the date of entry of this Decision and
oo
Order, or fail to fully, properly, and
diligently carry on said processing “o
final administrative determination in
strict compliance with the regulations of
Defendant Air Force; or
(b) the filing by Plaintiff
of a new complaint for review of the said
administrative processing and final deter-
mination if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or
has good legal cause to complain and seek
judicial review of any portion of said
administrative proceeding or final deter-
mination.
x * #®
Let Judgment Be Entered Accordingly.
x & &
JUDGMENT of Remand (4/30/80)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
denied.
-58-
The case and proceeding herein is”
remanded to Defendant Air Force, and the |
other Defendants, and particularly to the
Civilian Personnel Office of Vandenberg Air j
Force Base, California, for continuous and .
diligent administrative processing by
Defendants under applicable Air Force
regulations to final determination by the
Defendant Air Force and the other said
Defendants, such processing to be initiated j
within sixty (60) days of the entry of the
aforesaid Decision and Order and the within ;
Judgment.
Be The Court reserves its jurisdic-
tion and right to reopen the within pro-
ceeding, upon motion of Plaintiff, if
Defendants fail to initiate the said
administrative processing within said sixty
(60) day neriod, or fail to fully, properly
and diligently process Plaintiff's
-59-
complaints through all stages to final
determination by the Defendant Air Force,
in strict compliance with its regulations.
4. This proceeding and the complaint
herein are hereby dismissed, but without
prejudice to:
(a) the reopening of this
proceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the
Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-
trative processing within sixty (60) days
from the date of entry of this Judgment, or
fail to fully, properly and diligently
carry on said processing to final adminis-
trative determination in strict compliance
with the regulations of Defendant Air
Force; or
(b) the filing by Plaintiff of a
new complaint for review of said adminis-
trative processing and final determination
if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or has good
legal cause to complain and seek judicial
=-60-
review of any portion of said administra-
tive processing or final determination.
x & &
III
FACTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE
APRIL 30, 1980 REMAND JUDGMENT
On June 27, 1980, the Defendants,
United States of America and the United
States Air Force, through Hans M. Mark,
Secretary, appealed the order of this Court
remanding proceedings for administrative
processing and dismissing the complaint
without prejudice to reopening and to
filing a new complaint. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard oral argument on
this appeal on November 6, 1981 and issued
its Unpublished Opinion dismissing the
appeal for lack of finality on December 14,
1981. Clemente v. J.S.A., et al, No.
80-5508, Slip Op. (9th Cir. 1981). The
events occurring after the Remand Judgment
of the District Court on April 30, 1980,
=¢j<
and after the 9th Circuit Opinion dismiss-
ing the appeal therefrom on December 14,
1981, constitute the main bases for plain-
tiff's constitutional claims of procedural
due process denials.
During the interim between the Dis-
trict Court hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss on April 21, 1980, and the Remand
Judgment on April 30, 1980, plaintiff's
attorney Buynak wrote to Civilian Personnel
Officer Phillip Seneschal of Vandenberg Air
Force Base encouraging the Base to promptly
initiate the administrative process in
plaintiff's case, requesting full and
complete processing of all claims, a pro-
posed schedule for processing, an outline
of all processing steps, and copies of all
applicable regulations, documents requested
by motions to produce and answers to
interrogatories. On May 2, 1980, Assistant
U.S. Attorney Peter Osinaff, attorney for
the defendants, admonished Buynak that all
a8 2<
communications should be sent directly to
him. In response to this admonition,
Buynak on May 6, 1980, wrote to Osinoff
demanding that administrative processing
commence immediately and warning that any
further delay would evidence a "wilful
intent to extend these proceedings and
arbitrarily deny the due process rights of
[plaintiff]," citing Owen v. City of
Independence Missouri, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)
On May 23, 1980, EEO Counselor Hattie
Hall requested the services of an Air Force
Investigator, which request began the
administrative processing of plaintiff's
discrimination claim. Upon receiving
notification of that request, Buynak wrote
to Osinoff urging that he advise Vandenberg
Air Force Base to comply with this Court's
April 30, 1980 Judgment. On June 27, 1980,
Osinoff authorized Buynak to correspond.
directly with the Air Force, stating that
the United States Attorney's Office “has no
a63e
involvement in administrative proceedings
of the Air Force... ." Osinoff also
enclosed a Notice Of Appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and insisted that
this Court's April 30, 1980 Judgment was
stayed by the same.
Subsequent to the above, plaintiff and
Buynak met with Air Force Investigator
Harry W. Johnstone, and presented him with
an outline of plaintiff's complaints, her
administrative processing expectations and
a declaration with a substantial number of
exhibits attached. At that time Mr.
Johnstone stated that he could only process
the discrimination claim of plaintiff and
none of the other claims. On July 22,
1980, Buynak emphasized his disagreement
with the limitations placed on the scope of
the investigation and the processing steps
undertaken, relying on his belief that such
limitations were violative of this Court's
Remand Judgment. On July 25, 1980, Mr.
=-64-
Johnstone replied to this correspondence
stating that this Court had remanded the
discrimination claim only, and further
insisting that it was not his responsibil-
ity to define the issues which had been
accepted for investigation and that he had
received no guidance from the Air Force
indicating that he should broaden the scope q
of his investigation. Attached to this
letter was a schedule outlining accom-
plished or anticipated processing steps,
along with the actual and estimated dates
of compietion of each step.
Buynak also addressed a letter to
Major Charles S. Brower, Legal Officer for
Labor Relations at Vandenberg, outlining
the difficulties encountered in processing,
and requesting a meeting on July 30, 1980.
Buynak concluded by charging that the
agency either did not know what it was
doing or was wilfully violating the orders
of this Court. The meeting took place, as
@65<
scheduled, on July 30, 1980, with Major
Brower, Mr. Seneschal and Buynak in atten-
dance. Various alternatives were discussed
concerning the processing of plaintiff's
RIF appeal, her priority re-employment
rights claim and the reprisal charges. On
August 8, 1980, Mr. Seneschal memorialized
the substance of the June 30, 1980 meeting
in a letter directed to Buynak, acknowledg-
ing the request for documents and assuring
the latter that this request would be
complied with. On September 16, 1980,
Major Brower related to Buynak that Air
Force Headquarters had reached the deter-
mination that no further administrative
processing could be afforded, either
directly through the Air Force or indirect-
ly through the FEAA or the Merit Systems
Protection Board (hereafter "MSPB*). This
decision was assertedly based on the claim
by the Air Force that plaintiff's appeal
was an FEAA appeal and that there was no
=€6
savings clause allowing the MSPB to assume
appeals before the FEAA. The FEAA had been
disbanded and would be unable to consider
the claims. Thus, concluded the Air Force,
plaintiff's claims, apart from her dis-
crimination claim could not be administra-
tively processed. On September 16, 1980,
Buynak again wrote to Investigator
Johnstone, requesting a report on the
status of the investigation and bringing to
the latter's attention that none of the
plaintiff's witnesses had been contacted or
interrogatories set to them. interroga-
tories hac not been sent to be reviewed by
Buynak as previously agreed, and the
request for documents was still outstand-
ing. This correspondence was never an-
swered. On September 22, 1980, Mr. John-
stone forwarded his Report Of Investigation
to the Base Commander at Vandenberg,
finding no discrimination. Thereafter,
Major Brower reconfirmed to Buynak that
=a¢7J<
there would be no further processing of the
plaintiff's claims.
On October 17, 1980, Lieutenant
Colonel Pray, Chief of Personnel at Vanden-
berg, issued a “Notice of Proposed Disposi-
tion of Discrimination Complaint = Lowene
R. Clemente,” recommending cancellation of
plaintiff's complaint. Upon receipt of
this notice, Buynak, on October 31, 1980,
wrote to Lt. Col. Pray alleging failures in
the processing of plaintiff's claims as
required by this Court's Judgment of
Remand, and requesting combined adju-
dication of all four claims. This request
made specific reference to the Air Force's
own regulations; the constitutional rights
of plaintiff; this Court's Remand Judgment;
and the decision of Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, supra, which was attached to the
letter along with the Motion of plaintiff
before the Court of Appeals “To Dismiss the
Appeal or Affirm, And for Equitable and
-68-
Constitutional Relief." This letter was
also sent to Major Brower and to Osinoff,
defendants' attorney. On October 31, 1980,
Suynak again wrote Osinoff stressing that
defendants failed to “diligently, promptly
and completely process Ms. Clemente's
claims," there*y “perfecting causes of
action for constitutional violations
against the Air Force as well as any
governmental official responsible for these |
actions," again citing Owen v. City of
Independence, supra.
Finally, on November 19, 1980, a
"Notice of Final Decision" was rendered by
Colonel Ronald J. Bishop, Jr., Base Com-
mander of Vandenberg Air Force Base. This
eesisien cancelled the plaintiff's com-
plaint and added, self-servingly, that the
Air Force had made a “good faith attempt”
to comply with the Remand Judgment of this
Court.
-69-
After receiving the final Air Force
decision, plaintiff filed motions before
this Court to reopen proceedings and for
leave to file an amended and supplemental
complaint. It was at this time that
plaintiff's attorney added‘ the causes of
action for constitutional violations in
addition to the Title VII claims. These
motions were granted and, in addition, this
Court ordered that defendants maintain the
status quo with respect to plaintiff's
employment and provide her with RIF priori-
ty rights. Thereafter, on August 16, 1982,
cross-motions for summary judgment were
heard by the Court. Plaintiff asserted the
deprivation of constitutional rights of
administrative due process, equitable
estoppel, right to equitable relief, and
improper RIF. Defendants contended that,
under Rules 12(c) and 56 of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's claims were
time barred and that the Court lacked
@70@
jurisdiction over matters not encompassed
by the administrative complaint. In
addition, defendants argued that the
plaintiff had not charged a proper defen-
dant with the Title VII violations, to wit,
Hans M. Mark, the Secretary of the Air
Force. All cross-motions were dened and
the first three causes of action of the
complaint were amended so that the Secre-
tary of the Air Force would be the only
defendant named and charged in these Title
VII causes of action.
The last pre-trial motion was heard on
April 4, 1980, at which time this Court
determined that the defendants named in the
last three causes of action were entitled
to neither absolute nor qualified immunity
from suit. The triable issues having been
established, this matter proceeded to
nonjury trial before the Court on May 23,
1983.
aie
IV
DISCUSSION
Turning to the legal issues raised by
the pleadings in this case, plaintiff's
claims under Title VII and the Constitution
will be considered separately, as well as
all defenses to each such claim, setting
forth the fact findings and legal con-
clusions which compel and support a Judg-
ment for plaintiff and against defendants
as hereinafter ordered.
Le Plaintiff's Title VII Claim, 42
U.S.C. section 2000 e, et seg.
Plaintiff's Title VII claims flow from
alleged in’ erse racial discrimination which
ultimately resulted in the RIF and in
retaliatory action against plaintiff in
connection with her filing of a discrimina-
tion complaint. At trial, the Court found
the evidence insufficient to support
plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination
as such. A finding of discrimination,
oF2ea
however, is not a necessary condition
precedent to recover under Title VII if
there is a showing of retaliation by the
defendant against the plaintiff for having
filed a discrimination complaint. See
Shelei and Grossman, Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 426-33 (BNA 1976). The basis for
an action challenging the alleged retal-
iatory activity of an employer is found in
42 U.S.C. section 2000e-3(a) which provides
in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, tes-
tified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
oF3e
ee ee
The issue retaliation is raised in the
amended cuuwoOlaint which alleges the follow-
ing retaliatory acts to have been committed
by and through the agents of defendants
Hans M. Mark, Secretary of the Air Force:
!
(a) erosion and change of
position, responsibilities and duties;
(b) removal of plaintiff into an
office by herself and separation from
her employment section;
(c) removal of plaintiff into an
interim position at the grade of GS-5
even before the effective date of the
RIF action;
(d) undermining plaintiff's
supervisorial authority and controls;
(e) refusal to inform plaintiff
of matters regarding the performance
of responsibilities and duties;
(f) refusal to consider plain-
tiff's allegations in good faith, fair
resolution, and
aFa=
(g) refusal to provide super-
visory direction for plaintiff.
The filing of a discrimination com-
plaint is a protected etme. As provided
in the Air Force's own Regulations, 5 CFR
section 713.261 (1977):
Complainants .. . shall be free
from restraint, iitertetence, dis-
crimination or reprisal at any stage
of the presentation and processing of
a complaint, including the counseling
stage under Section 713 or any time
thereafter.
The evidence necessary to show retaliation
is (1) knowledge by the employer that the
complainant has or will file a charge; and
(2) different conditions of employment,
before and after the filing of a complaint,
with negative conditions first appearing at
or after the filing of a complaint. See
Pettyway v. American Cast Iron Company, 41ll
F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969); Barlea v. United
j=
Nuclear Corporation 462 F.2s 149 (10th
Cir.) 1972). The burden of proof on the
employee is only a showing by a fair
preponderance of credible evidence. EEOC
v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc. 41ll F. Supp.
66 (SDNY 1975), aff'd 559 F.2d 1203 (2d
Cir. 1977).
At trial there was credible evidence
to support a finding of retaliation on the
part of the Air Force. This evidence,
inter alia, consisted of the government's
destruction of relevant documents prior to
this matter proceeding to trial and the
cover-up of the same. . Moreover, this was
accompanied by the callous disregard of
plaintiff's right to have her grievances
aired before the appropriate administrative
body by failing to advise her, as urged by
the FEAA, of her need to elect between
complex procedural remedial schemes, and
the ultimate cancellation of her adminis-
trative complaint and failure to provide
=%6<
further processing with respect to all but
one of plaintiff's claims because of her
alleged failure to make the required
election and see an EEO counselor within
the time prescribed by regulation. In
addition, it was demonstrated at trial that
plaintiff was removed from office into an
interim GS-5 position even before the
effective date of the RIF, and had also
been segregated from her fellow employees
in an isolated office at an even earlier
point in time. The transparent purpose of
these retaliatory actions was to punish
plaintiff - a troublemaker, a purpose
which, in the opinion of this Court,
stemmed in part from plaintiff's clear and
prompt indications of her intent to file a
discrimination complaint against her Air
Force employer. These indications com-
menced as early as late 1976, when the
plaintiff initiated contact with an indi-
vidual she believed to be an EEO counselor,
aITe
&
and continued through April 8, 1977, when
she filed her “telegram appeal" with the
Civil Service Commission. This notice,
when coupled with the subsequent actions of
the defendant Air Force, is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-3(a).
Defendant Air Force contends that the
Court is without jurisdiction to dispose of
plaintiff's claims under Title VII due to
her failure to comply with the 30 day
"statute of limitations" established by 42
U.S.C. section 2000e-16(c). See, Brown v.
General Services Administration, 425 U.S.
820 (1976). In Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit
held that the 30 day time limit found in
section 2000e-16(c) begins to run from the
time the plaintiff receives the “right to
sue" letter from the agency.
While the Air Force is correct in its
conclusion that a district court complaint
=7§-
must be filed within 30 days of notice of
final agency decision, this rule is subject ©
to the requirement that the complainant
actually receive notice. The evidence in
this case establishes beyond any question
that neither the plaintiff nor her attorney
received the requisite notice. Thus the
jurisdiction of this Court is proper, and
attached when she filed her complaint after
the lapse of 30 days following the date of
lodging her formal complaint with the
agency. 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16 (c).
Accordingly, the plaintiff's failure to
comply with the 30 day limitation period is
excused.
In addition to suggesting that plain-
tiff's federal court action was not timely
filed, defendant Air Force further contends
that the plaintiff should be foreclosed
from prosecuting this action because of her
failure to bring her discrimination com-
plaint to the attention of an EEO counselor
aF9-
within the 30 day time limit prescribed by
regulation. See 5 C.F.R. section
713.214(a) (1) (1977); 29 C.F.R. section
1613.214(a) (1) (1979). For the reasons
expressed below, these arguments of of the
defendant Air Force completely fail to
counter or rebut the Title VII claims of
plaintiff for retaliatory actions taken
against her.
Plaintiff herein should not be held
accountable for any technical noncompliance
with procedural formalities, however
dilatory her actions may appear at first
glance. Plaintiff should not be penalized
for her misguided reliance on her first
attorney, Newton. The Court determined,
even before this matter came to trial, that
plaintiff was excused for her inaction
because of the ineffective assistance of
her then counsel, Newton. Moreover, the
Air Force received prompt, even premature
notice of plaintiff's claims by the
-80-
latter's telegrams of April 8, 1977 and
July 17, 1977. These telegrams more than
satisfy the policy of “equitable extension"
of filing periods as articulated in Cooper
v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1980).
See also Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631
(D.C. Cir. 1978). In Cooper, plaintiff was
granted an equitable extension of the
period in which to file a discriminaticn
charge because of his reliance on improper
advice given to him by a government
personnel officer. If the plaintiff's
conduct in Cooper is excusable where no
discrimination complaint, formal or
informal, was filed, then a fortiori the
deficiencies in plaintiff's efforts to have
her grievance disposed of should be excus-
ed. The Air Force simply cannot be said to |
have been without notice of Mrs. Clemente's —
charge.
The Air Force was also seriously
derelict in its duty to inform plaintiff of
-8l-
the avenues available to process her
complaints. As mentioned above, the
plaintiff filed her RIF appeal with the
Civil Service Commission and combined her
discrimination complaint with the appeal.
The case was thus referred by the Commis-
sion to the agency to determine under which
procedure, as between the RIF appeal system
and the discrimination complaints system,
this entire matter would be resolved. As
provided for in 5 C.F.R. section
772.306(a),
If the appellant has not been informed
of the separate rights of appeal, the
Appeals Authority shall refer the
matter to the agency so the agency may
explain the alternate rights of appeal
to the appellant as provided in
section 713.236 of Part 713 of this
chapter and afford him the opportuni-
ty, if appropriate, to elect the
avenue of appeal he wishes to pursue.
-82-
Paragraph 33 of AFR 40-713 addresses this
subject matter:
Where the basis of a complaint of
discrimination is an action which may
be appealed directly to the Civil
Service Commission the complainant
should be informed of the requirement
to specify under which part of the
regulations the issue of discrimina-
tion is to be processed...
(2) If the complainant elects to
proceed under FPM Chapter 713, after
having been specifically informed of
his right to use the other appellate
system, then the entire matter,
including the merits of action, will
be reviewed under this regulation.
b. - « « any investigation requested
by the Commission shall be conducted
in accordance with the Commission's
specific written instructions.
=§3~<
The obvious purpose of these combined
regulations is to avoid dual processing of
complaints covering the same factual
matters.
In accordance with these regulations,
the Civil Service Commission directed the
Civilian Personnel Office at Vandenberg to
gain a written election of procedures from
the plaintiff. The Commission's letter of
July 18, 1977, states in relevant part:
Section 772.306 of the Commission's
regulations provides that when an
allegation of prohibited discrimina-
tion is raised in connection with a
timely appeal, this Authority shall
refer the matter to the agency for an
explanation of alternative rights of
appeal either under Part 713 or under
Part 351 of the regulations and to
secure appellant's election in writ-
ing.
Please inform appellant that this
-84-
action can be pursued within your
agency as a complaint of discrimina-
tion under Part 713 of the Civil
Service Regulations. Explain in
detail how such a complaint is pro-
cessed to completion, including the
role of the counselor, the inves-
tigation, the provisions of informal
resolution, the notice of proposed
disposition, the right of hearing
before a complaints examiner assigned
by the Civil Service Commission, the
recommended decision of the examiner,
the final decision of the head of the
agency, and the appeal right to the
Appeals Review Board of the Commis-
sion, and to the U.S. District Court
as appropriate. ...
As clearly indicated by the Commission's
directive to the Air Force, the burden was
on the latter to secure the written elec
tion of procedures from the plaintiff and
~§S<
ih Dace ea
Sere ee
inform her, in detail, of the various
processing steps. The Air Force failed to
execute this duty by first neglecting to
explain, in any comprehensible fashion, the
alternative procedures available to plain-
tiff and then failing to gain her written
election of procedures despite having |
received at least two subsequent requests
Ee
from the FEAA to do so. The consequence of
the Air Force's malfeasance was that the
plaintiff's appeal was hopelessly lost in
administrative limbo until it was ultimate-
ly resurrected by her newly retained
counsel, Attorney Buynak, and was finally
referred to an EEO counselor. Given the
complex and incomprehensible maze of
procedures and elections sufficient to
confound most lawyers and even this Court,
plaintiff, a humble civil servant, can
hardly be expected to make an informed
election of procedure without ac»-quate
guidance. Plaintiff's delay in contacting
-86-
an EEO counselor is obviously explainable
and executed for these reasons alone.
But even more persuasive to this Court
than the above-stated reasons is the fact
that technical compliance with the 30 day
limitation period was actually achieved by
plaintiff. Defendants have admitted that
the Civilian Personnel Officer is the Chief
EEO Counselor. Indirectly, through the
FEAA, Civilian Personnel Officer Coady, as
declared in his letter to plaintiff of July
26, 1977, actually received Mrs. Clemente's
claims within the 30 day time limit for
initial contact. It is thus undeniable
that the timeliness of plaintiff's claims
cannot reasonably be questioned.
Defendants further assert that this
Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's
RIF appeal and reprisal complaints due to
the latter's failure to exhaust her admin-
istrative remedies with respect to these
claims. This argument of defendants,
aQF~
however, again misses the mark, inasmuch as
the demand to process these claims was made
on numerous occasions by Buynak. The Air
Force, enabled by its own regulation, had
the ability to process all of the claims
asserted. As set out in greater detail
above, AFR 40-713 provides in pertinent
part:
(2) If the complainant elects to
proceed under FPM Chapter 713, after
having been specifically informed of
his right to use the other appellate
system, then the entire matter,
including the merits of the action,
will be reviewed under this regu-
lation. . . . (emphasis added)
Recently, the Ninth Circuit confirmed in
Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.
1982), that the above language is to be
interpreted to mean that the substance of
the plaintiff's non-EEO claims are to be
considered in the review of the EEO claims.
-88-
Therefore, the Air Force not only had the
ability but the obligation to process all
of Mrs. Clemente's claims under this
section, and was not limited to her dis-
crimination complaint only. Hence, plain-
tiff's alleged failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies with respect to her
RIF and reprisal claims is a deficiency fc-
which the defendant Air Force is solely
responsible.
To punish plaintiff for her failure to
overcome all of the obstacles the Air Force
placed in her path to having her complaints
administratively processed would be to
create a gross injustice. Plaintiff's
plight has not been dissimilar to that of
plaintiff in Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d
631 (D.C. Cir. 1978). To borrow the words
of Judge Robinson:
In sum, Bethel reasonably attempted to
bring his complaint before the admin-
istrative tribunal and it unreasonably
-89-
Ee ee Pe ee eT
refused to consider his claims. He
could have done little more, and the
agency could hardly have done less.
Id. at 645. Having considered the various
defenses raised in opposition to the
granting of judgment in favor of plaintiff
on her claims and finding no merit in the
opposition, it is now necessary to turn to
the issue of the appropriate remedy or
remedies.
The remedial provisions of Title VII
allow for injunctive relief, reinstatement,
back pay or "other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.
section 2000e-5(g). The Court finds, as
established by expert testimony, that
plaintifé, by reason of the retaliatory
activities of the defendant Air Force and
its employees and agents, has been deprived
of an is entitled to back pay of
$27,480.24. This award represents the
period of July 17, 1977, the effective date
-90-
of the RIF, to May 23, 1983, the date of
trial. In addition, the evidence at trial 7
demonstrated that had the plaintiff not
encountered purposeful and continued
retaliatory resistance to her upward
mobility, she would presently occupy ,the
station of GS-12, step 4. At least two
alternatives can be entertained in assuring
that the plaintiff is restored to her
"rightful place." First, courts have
recognized an award of "front pay," or pay
representing the time it would take the
plaintiff to train and secure the position
he or she was denied as a result of the
prohibited conduct. See, James v. Stockham
Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th
Cir. 1977); Montoya v. Anderson, 5ll
F.Supp. 523 (D.C. Colo. 1981). Nor does a
front pay award granted against the govern-
ment violate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471 F.
Supp. 767 (D.C.D.C. 1979). A second
=9]=
alternative, in lieu of front pay, is
"seniority relief," where the plaintiff is
ordered to be put in the position he or she
would have occupied but for the illegal
conduct. See Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion, 422 U.S. 747 (1976); Richerson v.
Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3rd Cir. 1977). To
better facilitate and insure plaintiff's
delivery from her present and long-static
position, this Court should elect to
enforce the latter remedy, and to order the
Air Force to place plaintiff in a GS-12,
step 4 station. Moreover, because plain-
tiff may not yet be qualified for this
position, the Court should enjoin defendant
Air Force to train plaintiff so that her
qualifications will match her new assign-
ment.
Plaintiff concedes that interest is
unavailable against the government because
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See
Saunders v. Claytor, 629 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.
=92<
seats cee memati
1980). The Court, however, does find that
an award of attorneys fees and costs is
appropriate under 42 U.S.C. section
2000e-5(k), since plaintiff has prevailed
on the merits. The amount of attorneys
fees and costs will be established in a
separate hearing to be held at a future
date, the Court retaining jurisdiction for
this purpose.
In addition to the above, this Court
should enjoin defendants from taking
further unlawful employment or retaliatory
action against plaintiff, and should order
that the personnel files of plaintiff for
the period of July 17, 1977, to April 2l,
1980 be purged by the elimination of all
derogatory references to piuintiff and the
insertion and substitution of appropriate
records of this case and proceeding.
Furthermore, this Court should retain and
reserve jurisdiction of this case and
-93-
ee iat palais
proceeding in order to insure the implemen-
tation of these orders.
y Plaintiff's Due Process Claims.
As indicated above, on April 30, 1980,
an order was entered by this Court remand-
ing this case to the Air force to adminis-
tratively process all of plaintiff's
complaints. The order provided that
plaintiff be permitted to be present at all
stages of the administrative process and be
represented by her attorney, that she not
be questioned without her attorney present
and that her attorney receive copies of all
written communication involved in the
processing.
The defendants, apparently under the
pretext of attempting to comply with the
Remand Judgment, agreed to produce certain
documents, contact witnesses identified to
be favorable to the plaintiff and establish
an investigation schedule so as to provide
notice of when the various steps of the
-94-
investigation would proceed. In direct
defiance of the Court's Remand Judgment as
well as the constant and unambiguous
demands of plaintiff's counsel urging them
to comply with the same, defendants
contumaciously refused to process all but
one of plaintiff's complaints, and this in
summary fashion. The responsibility for
this gross dereliction in duty does not
rest solely on any one person but can be
attributed, in varying degrees, to the acts
and omissions of the six individually named
defendants. The record of this matter is —
replete with examples of Air Force person-
nel literally turning their heads and
stubbornly ignoring the Court's April 30,
1980 Remand Judgment. For example, on
April 25, 1980, following the oral orders
of this Court which were ultimately memori-
alized as the Remand Judgment entered by
the Court on April 30, 1980, plaintiff's
counsel wrote to Civilian Personnel Officer
-95-
ee
Phillip Seneschal, encouraging the Base to
administratively process plaintiff's
complaint and specifically requesting:
(1) full, complete processing of all
claims;
(2) a proposed schedule for process-
ing;
(3) an outline of processing steps;
(+) copies of all applicable regu-
latior:s;
(5S) documents requested by motions to
produce; and
(6) answers to interrogatories
proposed in conformance with the oral
orders of Judge Hauk.
Thereafter, defendants' attorney, Osinoff,
contacted plaintiff's counsel directing
that all communication should be sent
directly to him rather than the Air Force.
Buynak responded to this directive, citing
Owen v. City of Independence, supra, 445
U.S. 622 (1980), and warning that any
-96-
further delay in processing would evidence
a "wilful intent to extend these proceed-
ings and arbitrarily deny the due process
rights of plaintiff." Subsequent to this
correspondence the Air Force dispatched an
investigator to commence review of plain-
tiff's discrimination claim only. Upon
receiving notification of the Air Force's
request for an investigator, Buynak again
wrote to Osinoff urging him to have his
client fully comply with this Court's
Remand Judgment, to which the latter
responded that the United States Attorney's
Office "has no involvement in administra-
tive proceedings of the Air Force."
Thereafter, Buynak met with Investiga-
tor Johnstone outlining plaintiff's com-
plaints and her administrative processing
expectations. Johnstone reiterated his
intention to investigate the discrimination
charge only, and was advised by plaintiff's
counsel tnat any such limitation would be
=$7o
ee eT
ea Rl erat cn ome
in violation of the April 30, 1980 Remand
Judgment of this Court.
Subsequent to this meeting, Buynak
also met with Major Brower and Mr.
Seneschal at which time various alterna-
tives were discussed to bring about the
processing of the three complaints of
plaintiff yet outstanding. The follow-up
to this meeting consisted of a confirmation
that documents requested by Buynak of Mr.
Seneschal would be produced along with a
recommendation that plaintiff's three
remaining complaints would be directed to
the Merit System Protection Board (hereaf-
ter "MSPB"). Buynak's request for docu-
ments was never fully complied with and the
suggestion to process plaintiff's claims
through the MSPB pioved unproductive, since
the latter was not authorized to assume
FEAA appeals. ‘ Thus, according to Major
Brower, no further administrative process-
ing could be afforded.
-98-
At approximately the same point in
time, Buynak again contacted Investigator
Johnstone, requesting a status report on
his investigation and pointing out that:
(1) none of plaintiff's witnesses had
been contacted or interrogatories sent to
them;
(2) interrogatories had not been
reviewed with plaintiff's counsel as
previously agreed; and
(3) the request for documents and
answers were still outstanding.
Without responding to this letter from
plaintiff's counsel, Investigator Johnstone
on September 22, 1980 forwarded his final
Report of Investigation" to the Base
Commander finding no discrimination. As is
evident, this conclusion was reached by
contacting only those witnesses who were
hostile to plaintiff's position, igncering
document requests perceived to be crucial
by the plaintiff, failing to propound
-~99~
sel
oe et
alte pint th ett 6 IRR olen
eat Vii
potentially significant interrogatories and
igvotviac plaintiff in tie investigation to
the least extent possible.
Following the submission of the
investigation report to Lieutenant Colonel
Pray, Chief of Personnel at Vandenberg, the
recommendation of Investigator Johnstone
was essentially "rubber stamped” and a
"Notice of Pronosed Disposition of Dis-
crimination Complaint" issued, proposing
cancellation of the complaint. Upon
receipt of this notice, Buynak wrote to
Lieutenant Colonel Pray, outlining the
failures in the processing of plaintiff's
claims as required by this Court's oral
in-Court remand orders of April 21, 1983,
and its written Remand Judgment of April
30, 1983, and requesting combined adjudica-
tion of all four claims. This request made
specific reference to Air Force Regula-
tions, the constitutional rights of the
plaintiff, the orders of this Court and the
-100-
decision of Owen v. City of Independence,
supra, which was attached, as well as the
motion before the Court of Appeals which
outlined constitutional violations. This
letter was also sent to defendants’ counsel |
and Major Brower.
In lieu of responding to the above
correspondence, on November 19, 1980,
Colonel Bishop, Base Commander at Vanden-
berg, issued a "Notice of Final Decision”
which cancelled Mrs. Clemente's complaint.
Colonel Bishop's final decision concluded
that the Air Force was not waiving the
thirty day statute of limitations 3 and
that the "Air Force has simply in good
faith attempted to comply with Judge Hauk's
order."
Plaintiff clearly states a cause of
action for violations of procedural due
process under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. These constitutional claims
flow from denying plaintiff any opportunity
-101-
to be heard on three of her four adminis-
trative claims and the disposal of her
discrimination claim in a grossly inade-
quate and highly superficial manner. The
set
remedial basis for claims predicated upon
violations of the U.S. Constitution by
federal agents is found in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). See also, Carlson v. Green,
¢ 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, supra; Jacobsen v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.
1977).
In Bivens, the principle was estab-
lished that victims of constitutional
violations by federal officials have a
right to recover damages in federal court
despite the absence of any statute confer-
ring such right. In this regard, Bivens
actions can be analogized to 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, their state action counter-
part, which provides:
-102-
Every person, who, under color of any
statute, « dinance, regulation, custom
or usage of any state or territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction
thereof, to the depriviation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution of laws,
shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceedings for
redress.
Section 1983 and Bivens cases have been
used interchangeably wy the Supreme Court.
As stated by Justice White in Butz v.
Economou, 4 U.S. 478, 504 (1978);
The section 1983 action was provided
to vindicate federal constitutional
rights. That Congress decided, after
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to enact legislation specifically
-103-
St ida SR A aE RE BU RCE RAED
requiring state officials to respond
in federal court for their failures to
observe the constitutional limitations
in their powers is hardly a reason for
excusing their federal counterparts
for the identical constitutional
transgressions. To create a system in
which the Bill of Rights monitors more
closely the conduct of state officials
than it does that of federal officials
is to stand the constitutional design
on its head.
The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has urged
federal courts to be mindful of the need to
be inventive and resourceful in protecting
constitutional guarantees. In Jacobsen v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d
928 (9th Cir. 1977), the court stated:
No man in this country is so high that
he is above the law. No officer of
the law may set that law at defiance
with impunity. All the officers of
-104-
government, from the highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it... .
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was one of the
vehicles whereby Congress sought to enforce
the provisions of the then recently enacted
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress intended to
provide victims of constitutional depriva-
tions a constitutional remedy whereby the
state tort remedy, although available in
theory, was not available in practice.
Thus, section 1983 and Fifth Amendment
relief must be read against the background
of tort liability that makes a man respor
sible for the natural consequences of his
actions. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 103
(1961).
In extending this liability to govern-
mental entities themselves, the United
States Supreme Court in Owen v. City of
Independence, Missouri, supra, emphasized,
-105-
1 -. we. re Ss
How ‘uniquely amiss' it would be,
therefore, if the government itself --
"the social organ to which all of our
society look for the promotion of
liberty, justice, fair and equal
treatment and the setting of worthy
norms and goals for social conduct' --
were permitted to disavow liability
for the injury it has begotten...
A damages remedy against the offending
party is a vital component of any
Foe nS ne, aa ee EC i!
scheme for vindicating cherished
constitutional guarantees, and the
importance of assuring its efficacy is
only accentuated when the wrongdoer
is the institution that has been
established to protect the very rights
ae eee ees
it has transgressed. [Citations
omitted]
445 U.S. at 651.
The Court added:
-106-
Doctrines of tort law have changed
significantly over the past century,
and our notions of governmental
responsibility should prope::ly reflect
that evolution. No longer is indi-
vidual 'blameworthiness' the acid test
of liability; the principles of
equitable loss-spreading has jointed
fault as a factor in distributing the
cost of official misconduct.
Id. at 657.
The Court wound up with these thoughts on
cost-sharing:
We believe that today's decision
together with prior precedents in this
area, properly allocates these costs
among the three principals in the
scenario of the 1983 cause of action: |
The victim of the constitutional
deprivation; the officer whose conduct
caused the injury; and the public, as
represented by the municipal entity.
-107-
The innocent individual who is harmed
*
by an abuse of governmental authority
is assured that he will be compensated
does.
for his injury. The offending offi-
cial, so long as he conducts himself
in good faith, may go about his
business secure in the knowledge that
a qualified immunity will protect him
from personal liability for damages
that are more appropriately chargeable
to the populace as a whole. And the
public will be forced to bear only the
costs of injury inflicted by the
‘le aka a Wy Ap meng aah aD sr ls atl RR a ts see RH I ae Nl A hath Lhe Ss Secediohe
"execution of a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts and acts may
fairly be said to represent official
policy."
Upon careful and painstaking review of
the evidence and the testimony heard at
trial, it is the conclusion of this Court
-108-
that the purposefully evasive, imprecise
and haphazard manner in which plaintiff's
grievances were processed constitute a
customary practice and policy of the
defendant Air Force. Not overlooking the
fact that the Owens decision addressed the
issue of a municipality being held liable
in a section 1983 action, the issue of a
federal sovereign violating its own Consti-
tution is indistinguishable. Accordingly,
this Court finds that the federal govern-
ment is not immune from an action being
brought against it as a result of its
agents having violated the Fifth Amendment
rights of a United States citizen. The
Supreme Court has firmly held that “it
deems it untenable to draw a distinction
for purpose of immunity law between suits
brought against state officials under
section 1983 and suits brought directly
under the Constitution against federal
officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
-109-
AF ae ARR Its ei 1 A Ae ed
478, 504 (1978). We cannot help but
recognize and enforce the natural and
logical extension of Butz and Owens, which
leads us inescapably to conclude that just
as state agencies and state officers are
both liable for constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, so also
federal agencies and federal officers
should be and are liable for constitutional
violations under Bivens.
The defendants argue that plaintiff's
due process argument is without basis as
she has not been deprived of any liberty or
property interest within the protections of
the Fifth Amendment. The Court, however,
takes issue with these contentions. The
right to hold specific employment and to
follow a chosen career free from unreason-
able governmental interference comes within
the liberty and property concepts of the
Fifth Amendment: "property" consisting of
the employment itself and “liberty”
-110-
consisting of the freedom to follow a
chosen career. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467
F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The property interest involved herein
is plaintiff's GS-7 position and the
liberty interest her Civil Service career.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959);
Horn v. MSPB, 684 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755
(D.C. Cir. 1972). The action of the agency
and its agents in effectuating the RIF and
thereafter not providing plaintiff with a
forum in which to contest that action has
seriously prejudiced and realistically
destroyed her ability to obtain other
employment or to properly pursue her Civil
Service career. Owen v. City fo Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry
v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The Air
Force established procedures for evaluating
|
combined RIF appeals and discrimination
-lll-
nee st Pe
complaints as well as complaints of re-
prisal and reemployment priority rights.
See AFR 40-713. See also Nolan v. Cleland,
supra.. Having once established these
procedures, they must be followed or plain-
tiff's due process rights will be violated.
See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 35
(1959). The Air Force, however, repeatedly
failed to abide by these procedures, even
after mandatory orders of this Court. A
more fundamental and extreme denial of
plaintiff's right to be heard cannot be
imagined. As stated by Justice Burton in
Joint Anti-Facists Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951):
The requirement of "due process” is
not a fairweather or timid assurance.
It must be ecabannet in times of calm
and in times of trouble; it protects
aliens as well as citizens. But "due
process," unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical cecnception with a
-112-
fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances. Expressing as it
does in its ultimate analysis respect
enforced by law for that feeling of
just treatment which has been evolved
through centuries of Anglo-American
history and civilization, "due pro-
cess" cannot be imprisoned within the
treacherous limits of any formula.
Representing a profound attitude of
fairness between man and man and more
particularly between the individual
and government, “due process" is
compounded of history, reason, the
past course of decisions, and stout
confidence in the strength of the
democratic faith which we profess.
Due process is not a mechanical
instrument. It is not a yardstick.
It isa process. It is a delicate
process of adjustment inescapably
evolving the exercise of judgment by
-113-
ele aiebiche niente aesns sien Kee
those whom the Constitution entrusted
with the unfolding of the process.
While this Court is thoroughly convinced
that the due process rights of plaintiff
were violated, there still remain several
threshold issues which must be confronted
before liability may be imposed.
The first challenge defendants make to
plaintiff's due process claims is jurisdic-
tional, arguing that Title VII provides the
exclusive remedy to any complaint where
discrimination in federal employment is
claimed. See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820,
835 (1976). Defendants also cite the
recently decided Supreme Court decision of
Bush v. Lucas, 51 U.S.L.W. 4752 (1983), for
the proposition that the existence of a
Title VII remedy is a “special factor
counselling hesitation" or an “adequate
alternative remedy" within the meaning of
Bivens, thus precluding an award of consti-
tutional damages. The Ninth Circuit has
-114-
also had opportunity to deci‘e whether
Title VII and Bivens claims could peaceful-
ly coexist in Noland v. Cleland 686 F.2d
806 (9th Cir. 1982). As observed by Judge
Hoffman in that case:
The holding of Brown, supra, is
controlling on this issue and we feel
that such holding cannot be
circumvented where the factual
predicate for Nolan's due process
claim is the discrimination which is
the- basis of her Title VII claim. The
threshold question in Nolan's action
is the constructive discharge claim
and she would not be able to recover
on the due process claim due to the
identical factual basis, and,
therefore, the district court
correctly dismissed the due process
count and approached the action solely
as a Title VII action pursuant to
Brown, supra. (Emphasis added)
-115-
ni aR SR edna oe pee RN
Id. at 815. While this Court has been
unable to locate a case where Title VII and
Bivens actions have been concurrently
maintained, it is apparent that the instant
action is factually and legally distin-
guishable from the Brown, Bush and Nolan
holdings.
Plaintiff's due process and Title VII
claims flow from entirely distinct factual
occurrences, involve different individuals
and occurred at separate points in time.
The substance of the Title VII action dealt
with retaliatory activity, the factual
basis of which consisted of base officials
circumventing their duty of advising
plaintiff how to proceed within a complex
regulatory system, des rcoying documents
that tended to support claims stated under
Title VII, covering up the same, ~emoving
plaintiff from her office prematurely and
isolating her from her peers. All of this
occurred after supervisory and other
-116-
personnel became aware of plaintiff's
intention to file a discrimination com-
plaint. On the other hand, plaintiff's due
process claims arose long after her initial
Title VII complaint was filed in district
court, this Court had by its Remand Judg-
ment mandated full processing of all of
plaintiff's grievances, and entirely
different Base officials failed and refused
to accomplish the same. By no stretch of
the imagination could these due process
complaints be considered compensable under
Title VII, since no discriminatory basis or
retaliatory motive can be shown.
It must follow, therefore, that Title
VII does not and cannot provide the exclu-
sive remedy under these circumstances. The
coexistence of Bivens and Title VII claims
is justified by the clear distinction
between the factual contexts in the instant
case and the factual contents in the cases
which have disallowed concurrent Bivens
-117-
a
hala eae ed ir AM DoT whi aie
Pie ged osierald a ep aralie iad s
constitutional claims and Title VII claims.
As we have pointed out, the Brown and Nolan
courts could not reconcile constitutional
and Title VII claims in the same action
when these claims shared the same factual
predicate. But this is simply not the case
in the instant action where the factual
predicates are completely different in
time, activities and actors.
With respect to the recent Bush
holding, plaintiff, unlike Mr. Bush, is not
trying to supplement what she perceives to
be an inadequate remedy for the wrong she
has suffered. Rather, plaintiff is seeking
damages for an entirely independent wrong.
Another point of distinction between this
action and Bush is that the latter action,
the petitioner's constitutional claims were
based upon the abridgement of his First
Amendment rights. The Court found that
retaliatory action for exercising one's
First Amendment rights had been prohibited
-118-
by the regulatory scheme under which Mr.
Bush had proceeded; and since he had
already received a viabie, adequate and
meaningful alternative remedy under that
regulatory scheme he was precluded from
augmenting that recovery by pursuing a
Bivens claim. It would be ound to
suggest that the same rationale could apply
to Mrs. Clemente. Obviously the regulatory
scheme under which she attempted to proceed
does not allow or permit the failure or
refusal of its administrators to execute
its mandates without giving administrative
due process. Thus plaintiff had no viable,
adequate or meaningful remedy under the
regulations of either the Civil Service or
the Air Force to redress the failure and
refusal to provide her administrative due
process.
Accordingly, this Court holds that
Title VII did not provide the exclusive
remedy in this case, that plaintiff did not
-119-
Bi me GaRa apse tnear sR aoamnacain a MANE Te NTR WANES PAC
have a viable, adequate or meaningful
alternative remedy, and that the Court has
jurisdiction over plaintiff's due process
claims.
The defendants’ next point of con-
tention deals with immunity from suit.
Having already decided that the Air Force
is not immune, given the holding of Owens
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980), the question of any inaunity of the
individual defendants is now taken up.
Initially, defendants assert that they
are entitled to absolute immunity under the
rationale of Butz v. Economou, supra, 438
U.S. 478 (1978), where a functional ap-
proach to immunity was employed. This
approach, simply stated, would allow
officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
to receive a full exemption from liability
"because of the special nature of their
responsibilities.” Id. at 51l. This
approach was recently upheld by the Supreme
-120-
Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct.
2690 (1982). Upon review of the official
duties of the defendants named individually
herein, this Court finds that none of thes:
individuals has responsibilities in the
administrative process that even approxi-
mate that of judge or prosecutor and that
the nature of their responsibilities is not
so special as to totally shield them from
civil liability. See also, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982).
While it is evident that the functions
of the individual defendants are not
sufficiently sensitive so as to entitle
them to absolute immunity, the more crit-
ical inquiry is whether they should be
protected by any qualified immunity. The
test for qualified immunity, as articulated
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, is whether
the government official claiming immunity
violated “clearly established" statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
-121-
person would have known while in the course
of performing a discretionary function.
Id. If the law is clearly established, the
immunity defense should generally fail
unless the official claims extraordinary
circumstances and can prove that he neither
knew nor should have known of the relevant
legal standard. Id.
The conduct, or more properly, the
refusal to act, of the individual defen-
dants herein evidenced a purposeful, wilful
and deliberate disregard of the due process
rights of Mrs. Clemente, and contempt for
and refusal to obey the Remand Judgment of
this Court. Plaintiff's counsel explained
in writing and orally, time and again, from
April 25, 1980 until June 27, 1980, plain-
tiff's rights to due process and the
obligations of defendants thereunder. Each
of the individual defendants was thoroughly
informed with respect to Mrs. Clemente's
rights and legally justified claims and
-122-
demands. A copy of this Court's Judgment,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
the Owens decision and the motion made
before the Court of Appeal:; were all sent
to these defendants. How it can now be
claimed that the defendants did not know
that their conduct was in violation of the
administrative due process rights of
plaintiff is incredible. It is thus the
conclusion of this Court that the individu-
al defendants charged wath violations of
plaintiff's constitutional rights are not
entitled to immunity, qualified or abso-
lute.
Having determined that the plaintiff's
due process claims are properly before this
Court, it is now necessary to decide upon
an appropriate remedy or remedies.
As previously stated, an action for
constitutional damages is in the nature of
an action in tort, and therefore damages
are awardable. Thus, a judgment for
-123-
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iota igi de tees bits A Nila ada shad nile baba eset
compensatory damages is permissible and
appropriate. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, supra. Evidence was
introduced at trial sufficient to demon-
strate that plaintiff suffered special
damages in the amount of $1,000.00. In
addition, it is the conclusion of this
Court that plaintiff was damaged generally
in the amount of $25,000.00, this amount
representing the physical and mental
anguish she suffered as a result of her
administrative ordeal.
Apart from these damages to compensate
plaintiff for the wrongs she suffered, it
is also this Court's opinion, finding and
conclusion that exemplary damages are
necessary to deter these defendants, and
others similarly situated, from further
engaging in such irresponsible and injur-
uous activity. The recent decision of
Smith v. Wade, 51 U.S.L.W. 4407 (1983),
provides the legal basis for imposing
-124-
punitive damages for official misconduct.
The standard for such an award under Smith
is a showing of "reckless or callous
indifference to the plaintiff's federally
protected rights." This standard, indeed,
was the watchword here by which all of the
defendants seemed to govern their actions
toward plaintiff, and thus exemplary
damages are both justifiable and appropri-
ate. Punitive damages will be imposed upon
each defendant according to his and its
degree of responsibility in undermining and
flouting the federally protected due
process rights of Mrs. Clemente, rights to
administrative due process which the
defendants arrogantly trampled upon and
crushed.
A final issue to be disposed of is the
matter of attorneys fees and costs in
connection with these constitutional
actions and claims. Plaintiff argues that
fees and costs should be awarded against
-125-
the government under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2412(b).
This section provides, in effect, that any
award of attorney's fees and costs properly
chargeable to an individual may be charged
to the government under appropriate circum-
stances. Plaintiff cites the decision of
Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546
F.Supp. 1221 (C.D.Cal. 1982), for the
proposition that an award of attorneys fees
in a Bivens action may be analogized to a
Similar award in a section 1938 action
which is authorized by 42 U.S.C. section
1988. Finding the reasoning of Lauritzen
to be persuasive, this Court finds an award
of attorneys fees and costs incurred in
connection with the prosecution of plain-
tiff's constitutional claims here is
appropriate and should be made.
The foregoing shall constitute the
findings of fact and conclusions of law as
-126-
required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT
Under Plaintiff's Title Vll Claims, 42
U.S.C. section 2000e, et seq.:
(1) Plaintiff should be awarded back
pay in the amount of $27,480.24 pursuant to
42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(g).
(2) Plaintiff should be promoted to a
GS-12, step 4 position and given appropri-
ate training to prepare her for the same
under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(g).
(3) Plaintiff should be awarded
attorneys fees and costs of suit under 42
U.S.C. section 2000e-5(k) in connection
with the prosecution of her Title VII
claims in an amount to be determined at a
future hearing.
-127-
(4) Defendants should be enjoined
from taking any further unlawful employment
or retaliatory action against plaintiff.
(5) The personnel files of plaintiff
for the period of July 17, 1977 to April
21, 1980, should be purged by the elimina-
tion of all derogatory references to
plaintiff and the insertion and substitu-
tion of appropriate records of this case
and proceeding.
Under Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims
(6) Plaintiff should be awarded
compensatory general and special damages in
the amount of $26,000.00.
(7) Exemplary damages and punitive
damages should be imposed against the
defendant Secretary of the Air Force and
the Air Force in the amount of $150,000.00.
(8) Exemplary and punitive damages
should be imposed against defendant Ronald
J. Bishop, Jr. in the amount of $1,000.00.
-128-
(9) Exemplary and punitive damages
should be imposed against defendant Harold
L. Pray in the amount of $1,000.00.
(10) Exemplary and punitive damages
should be imposed against defendant Charles
L. Brower in the amount of $2,500.00.
(11) Exemplary and punitive damages
should be imposed against defendant Phillip
G. Seneschal in the amount of $2,500.00.
(12) Exemplary and punitive damages
should be imposed against defendant Harry
W. Johnstone in the amount of $2,500.00.
(13) Exemplary and punitive damages
should be imposed against defendant Jeffrey
W. Cook in the amount of $1,000.00.
(14) Plaintif* should be awarded
attorneys fees in connection with the
prosecution of her constitutional claims
under 28 U.S.C. section 2412(b), as well as
costs under 28 U.S.C. section 2412(a), in
amounts to be determined at a future
hearing. In this connection, and in
-129-
accordance with the Court's Order of July
15, 1983, defendants’ opposition to plain-
tiff's application for attorneys fees,
expenses and costs should be filed within
30 days after receipt by the U.S. Attor-
ney’s office of this Decision and the
accompanying Judgment, and counsel for
plaintiff and for defendants should confer
with the Courtroom Deputy Clerk to obtain
the earliest Court hearing date, which date
should be noted by defendants’ counsel on
the Opposition papers title page.
(15) This Court should retain and
reserve jurisdiction of this case and
proceeding in order to insure the implemen-
tation of these orders.
(16) It should be further ordered that
the Clerk of Court shall forthwith file and
enter this Decision and accompanying
Judgment, and serve copies thereof on all
counsel of record for all parties herein,
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
-130-
Dated: August 12, 1983
2:10 p.m.
/s/ A. Andrew Hauk
A. ANDREW HAUK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-131-
FOOTNOTES
Footnote l Reference page 76
An especially disturbing instance of
document destruction and alteration --
a veritable "gate" type of coverup so
egregious that this Court quite almost
by reflex action termed it the
"Vandenberg-gate" episode -- was
demonstrated by what happened to Ex.
167, p. 6. This was a photocopy of
"Form 52" - "Request For Personnel
Action" dated April 13, 1977, by which
employees of defendants, having
ip aCe Se ccm 2s Ae
previously made up their collective,
if not conspiratorial, minds to
> aR Cem Re aap ee dee Pes
retaliate against plaintiff by
-
De kde o>
‘cancelling out her position as EAM
aa aut
Project Planner (Grade 7) and
"busting” or downgrading her to Clerk
Typist (Grade 4), attempted to
oe Heine Ree RD BGR
accomplish their planned reprisal.
-132-
But this backfired when all the
government could produce was this
photocopy, which did not even have
plaintiff's name on it, was rife with
illegible handwritten notations, and
covered with blank spaces obviously
rendered blank, before photocopying,
but the use of opaque tapes and
erasures. These outrageous and
transparent ex post facto, but
-ultimately self-defeating, alterations
were only the worst of the several
efforts made at Vandenberg Air Force
Base in the vain undertaking to
legitimize the reprisals and
retaliatory activity taken against
plaintiff. When the government
finally had to admit that the original
of this Form 52 could not be found
hecause it had probably been destroyed
in violation of Air Force rules and
-133-
regulations, the misconduct of
defendants was sealed.
-134-
Footnote 2 Reference page 98
As previously described in greater
detail, the combined claims and
complaints of plaintiff could hae
been effectively processed under Air
Force Regulations, particularly AFR
40-713, thereby dispensing with the
need of an appeal to any outside
agency. Rather than looking upon the
failure and refusal to process three
of plaintiff's claims and complaints
as a forced and therefore excusable
inability to accomplish the processing
under Air Force Regulations, it is the
firm conclusion of this Court, follow-
ing its extensive review of the
exhibits in evidence and the testimony
at trial, that plaintiff's grievances
were all matters with which the Air
Force simply, stubbornly, and
contemptuously chose not to deal.
-135-
Footnote 3 Reference page 101
As the Ninth Circuit, in its
unpublished opinion of December 14,
1981, dismissing the earlier appeal of
this case, observed:
Not to be outdone by the confused
state of the proceedings, the govern-
ment seems to have changed theories of
defense at every turn. It rejected
Mrs. Clemente's first complaint as
premature and her second complaint as
untimely. Similarly, its brief on
appeal argues that Mrs. Clemente's
failure to contact an EEOC counselor
within 30 days precluded district
court jurisdiction, but at oral
argument the government contended that
her failure to exhaust administrative
remedies prevents review. Clemente v.
United States of America, et al., No.
80-5508, Slip Op. at 1 (9th Cir.
1981).
-136-
Footnote 4 Reference page 110
The Court recognizes that this
assertion is directly contrary to
justice Powell's dissenting opinion in.
Owens at 445 U.S. 622, 670 n. 12.
However, the principles articulated by
the majority in Owen should be and are
extended here to the federal govern-
ment which, as conceded by Justice
Powell, has a much greater financial
| ability to absorb such judgments than
a municipal government. Id. at 670.
-137-
FILED Aug 12, 1980
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
Plaintiff,
-V=
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, and UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE, a
military department of
the United States of
America, with HANS
M. MARK, Secretary;
RONALD J. BISHOP,
JR., HAROLD L. PRAY,
CHARLES L. BROWER,
PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL,
HARRY W. JOHNSTONE,
and JEFFREY W. COOK,
individually and as
officers and/or
employees of the
United States Air
Force,
Defendants.
No. CV-80-5746
AAH
JUDGMENT
(For Plaintiff
and Against
Defendants)
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The above entitled matter came on
regularly for non-jury trial in this Court
on May 23, 1983, and continued from day to
day thnreafter for 19 days until June 2l,
1983, whereupon argument was heard upon the
matter, including facts and law, for two
hours on each side. Thereafter the Court
took the matter under consider’tion and
submission and now after havii.g made,
signed and entered its Decision, including
its finings of fact, conclusions of law and
Order for judgment renders its Judgment:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
Under Plaintiff's Title VII Claims,
43 U.S.C. section 2000e, et seq.
l. Plaintiff shall have and recover
against and from defendant, Hans M. Mark,
Secretary of the Department of the Untied
States Air Force (Secretary), the sum of
$27,480.24, awarded as and for back pay, 42
U.S.C. section 2000e-5(g).
-139-
Y Defendant Secretary shall forth-
with promote plaintiff to the GS-12, step
4, position, and shall give her appropriate
training so that she can be prepared to be
designated to and adequé cely fulfill the
duties of such position, 42 U.S.C. section
2000e-5(g).
3 Defendant Secretary is prohibited
and enjoined from taking any or further
unlawful employment or retaliatory action
against plaintiff.
4. Defendant Secretary shall forth-
with purge and eliminate from plaintiff's
personnel file or files covering the period
July 17, 1977, to and including April 2l,
1980, all derogatory references to plain-
tiff, and shall insert and substitute in
said files covering said period appropriate
records of this case and proceeding, to
wit, the Decision and Judgment herein made,
signed, filed and entered.
-140-
5. Plaintiff shall have and recover
from defendant Secretary her reasonable
attorney's fees as part of costs hereby
awarded to plaintiff in connection with the
prosecution of her Title VII claims, 42
U.S.C. section 2000e-5(k), which fees and
costs will be determined by the Court at a
future hearing to be set in accordance with
the procedures hereinafter in paragraph 8
set forth.
Under Plaintiff's Constitutional Due
Process Claims
6. Plaintiff shall have and recover
against and from defendants Secretary of
the Air Force, United States of America
(U.S.A.), and United States Air Force
(U.S.A.F.), and all the other named defen-
dants, the sum of $26,000.00, awarded as
and for compensatory damages.
7° Plaintiff shall have and recover
against the following named defendants the
-141-
following sums, awarced as and for punitive
and exemplary damages:
(a) defendant Secretary of the
Air Force, U.S.A., and U.S.A.F. -
150,000.00
(b) defendant Ronald J. Bishop -
$1,000.00
(c) defendant Harold L. Pray -
$1,000.00
(d) detendant Charles L. Brower -
$2,500.00
(e) defendant Phillip G. Sene-
schal - $2,500.00
(f) defendant Harry W. Johnstone
- $2,500.00
(g) defendant Jeffrey W. Cook -
$1,000.00
8. Plaintiff shall have and recover
against and from defendants Secretary of
the Air Force, U.S.A. and U.S.A.F., and
other named defendants herein, reasonable
attorneys fees and expenses in connection
-142-
with the prosecution of her constitutional
due process claims, 28 U.S.C. section
2412(b) and (da), as well as costs under 28
U.S.C. section 2412(a) as enumerated in 28
U.S.C. section 1920 in amounts to be
determined at a future hearing. In this
connection, and in accordance with the
Court's order of July 5, 1982, defendants’
opposition to plaintiff's Application for
attorneys fees, expenses and costs of suit
shall be filed and served within 30 days
after receipt by the United States Attor-
ney's Office of this Judgment and accompa-
nying Decision, and counsel for plaintiff
and counsel for defendants shall confer
with the Courtroom Deputy Clerk to obtain
the earliest Court hearing date, which date
shall be noted by defendants’ counsel on
the Opposition papers title page.
Under Both Sets of Plaintiff's Claims
9. This Court retains and reserves
jurisdiction over this case and proceeding
-143-
to insure implementation of its Judgment
and Orders herein.
10. The Clerk of the Court shall
forthwith file and enter this judgment and
accompanying Decision, and serve copies
thereof upon all counsel of record for all
parties herein.
Dated: August 12, 1983
/s/ A. Andrew Hauk
A. ANDREW HAUK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2:12 p.m.
~144-
FILED
DEC 14, 1984
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 80-5508
DC No. 79-
3952-AAH (Sx)
vs.
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; and UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE, a
military department
of the United States of
America, with HANS M.
MARK, Secretary,
MEMORANDUM
Defendants~Appellants.
me me me re ee re eee ee ee ee eet ee ee See ee?
Appeal from the United States
District Court
For the Central District of California
Chief Justice Judge A. Andrew Hauk,
Presiding
-145-
[Argued and Submitted November 6, 1981]
Before: WRIGHT, WALLACE and ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.
Mrs. Clemente first challenged her job
reassignment on April 8, 1977. By the time
of oral argument in this court, her action
had been rejected twice by the Air Force,
and actions were pending both in this court
and the district court.
Not to be outdone by the confused
state of the proceedings, the government
seems to have changed theories of defense
at every turn. It rejected Mrs. Clemente's
first complaint as premature and her second
complaint as untimely. Similarly, its
brief on appeal argues that Mrs. Clemente's
failure to contact an EEOC counselor within
30 days precluded district court jurisdic-
tion, but at oral argument the government
cnttintin that her failure to exhaust
administrative remedies prevents review.
-146-
Mrs. Clemente's contentions also have
lacked consistency. Her first challenge
alleged a discriminatory RIF action, while
her latest district court complaint in-
cludes constitutional claims as well.
This description of the case makes
clear that we lack jurisdiction to review
the merits of this appeal. The district
court remanded these issues for administra-
tive processing, apparently not considering
them final and appealable. Consequently,
several of the claims and defenses now
before us have yet to be evaluated below.
Without such a consideration by the
district court, these issues are not ripe
for review in this court. They require
refinement in light of any additional
underlying facts, which may develop if the
district court deems further hearings
necessary. See SEC v. Lincoln Thrift
Ass'n, 557 F.2d 1274, 1279 (9th Cir. 1977).
-147-
Those defenses already rejected and
those claims already determined, in light
of the peculiar posture of this case, fail
sufficiently to dispose of the entire
action. We do not find the necessary
finality to permit our review. 28 U.S.C.
section 1291; see Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Branch v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2a 877 (5th
Cir. 1981).
We reman” to the district court where,
at the discretion of the judge and as
appropriate, all of the appellee's claims
will be considered and each of appellant's
defenses will be evaluated. The district
court should determine, as it deems appro-
priate, whether: (1) Mrs. Clemente's com-
plaint should be dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies; (2) her
failure to comply with applicable statutory
or administrative filing time limits should
be excused; (3) the district court has
-148-
jurisdiction to hear the various issues,
considering that the government continues
to claim that an untimely initial contact
with an EEOC counselor is a juriscictional
defect; (4) the court's prior remand order
retains vitality, and if so, whether the
Air Force complied; and 15} other issues
should be determined or further hearings
conducted.
After whatever pzoceedings the dis-
trict judge considers necessary and appro-
priate, the judge will render a final
decision. Only then can this court conduct
a meaningful review.
The district court's remand order
granted attorneys' fees of $2,500 to
plaintiff's attorney. We vacate the award
of attorneys’ fees. Hanrahan v. Hampton,
446 U.S. 754 (1980; cf. Manhart v. City of
Los Angeles, 652 F.2d 904, 906-07 (9th Cir.
1981) (Title VII of plaintiff who secures
injunctive relief is a prevailing party).
-149-
Mrs. Clemente has yet to prevail on
the merits of any of her claims, but only
has succeeded in preserving a cause of
action. If Mrs. Clemente eventually
prevails, any award of attorneys' fees will
require consideration of the guidelines
announced by this court in Kerr v. Screen
Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951
(1976).
We dismiss the appeal in part and
vacate the portion of the district court's
order awarding attorneys fees.
-150-
FILED April 30, 1980
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE, ) No. CV=-79=-3952-
) AAH (Sx)
Plaintiff, )
) DECISION AND
UNITED STATES OF ) ORDER REMAND-
AMERICA, and UNITED ) ING CASE AND
STATES AIR FORCE, a ) DISMISSAL
military department of ) WITHOUT
the United States of ) PREJUDICE
America, with HANS M. )
)
)
)
)
MARK, Secretary,
Defendants.
The Motion of Defendants to Dismiss
this action, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, came
-15l-
on regularly for hearing before the Honor-
able A. ANDREW HAUK, United States District
Judge, on the 2lst date of April, 1980.
The Plaintiff LOWENE R. CLEMENTE appeared
and was represented by her attorney, S.
TIMOTHY BUYNAK, JR.; and Defendants ap-
peared through their attorney, ANDREA
SHERIDAN ORDIN, United States Attorney,
FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR., Assistant United
States Attorney, Chief, Civil Division, and
PETER R. OSINOFF, Assistant United States
Attorney, by PETER R. OSINOFF.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court, having considered the
pleadings herein, the Certified Administra-
tive Record, the Memoranda and Declarations
submitted by both sides, and having heard
oral argument of counsei, finds that:
l. Plaintiff's failure to discuss her
case with an EEO Counsellor is not a
jurisdictional defect;
-152-
2 Defendants through their personnel
at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,
had an affirmative duty to timely refer
Plaintiff's complaints to an EEO Counsellor
for consideration and to fully advise
Plaintiff of the administrative processing
requirement and her rights therein, which
Defendants failed to accomplish, although
Plaintiff has been consistently employed at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,
since lodging her complaints;
3 Because of these failures by
Defendants, Plaintiff's complaints were
never accepted and processed administra-
tively in accordance with Defendants'
regulations, which processing would aid
immensely in the resolution of the diffi-
culties herein considered, which failure
constituted and constitute arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable denial of the
due process of law rights of Plaintiff.
-153-
4. Jurisdiction of this Court to hear
discrimination complaints under 42 United
States Code section 2000e-16 terminates
thirty days after receipt of the final
notice of agency determination by the
Plaintiff; otherwise, this Court has
continuing jurisdiction to entertain the
judicial complaint herein, beginning 180
days after Plaintiff filed her formal
initial charge with the agency;
Se Notice of the final agency deter-
mination was never received by Plaintiff.
Defendant Air Force, in violation of its
own regulations (A.F.R. 40-713, October 20,
1975, Par. 23e.), failed to send to Plain-
tiff and her representative a written
decision by certified mail, return receipt
requested. And because 180 days have
elapsed between the filing of Plaintiff's
formal initia auarge and the filing of the
complaint herein, this Court has continuing
jurisdiction.
-154-
6. Any conclusion of law deemed as or
properly constituting a finding of fact is
hereby adopted as a finding of fact.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
i. This Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this action.
2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction should
be denied.
as In the interest of justice and
fairness to all parties, the complaints of
Plaintiff as presented herein should be
remanded to tie Civilian Personnel Office
of Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,
for continuous and diligent administrative
processing by the Defendants under applica-
ble Air Force regulations to final deter-
mination by the Defendant Air Force and the
other said Defendants, all of said process-
ing to be initiated within sixty (60) days
-155-
—eee
of the date of entry of the within Decision
and Order.
4. Said processing should be accom-
plished in strict compliance with applica-
ble Air Force regulations, should involve
all stages of administrative processing
entailed therein, and should be conducted
so as to insure plaintiff her full rights
in said proceedings and a fair adjudication
of her complaints.
DB. In addition to said rights and
privileges afforded by said regulations,
Plaintiff should be entitled to be present
at all states of the administrative pro-
cessing and to be represented thereat by
her legal representative.
6. Plaintiff should not be questioned
at any time without her legal representa-
tive being present and Plaintiff's legal
representative should receive copies of all
written communications involved in this
administrative processing.
-156-
ae If the defendants fail to initiate
the said administrative processing within
sixty (60) days from the date of entry of
the within Decision and Order, or to fully,
properly and diligently process said
complaints of Plaintiff through all stages
to final determination by the Air Force,
this Court, upon motion by Plaintiff,
should consider reopening of this proceed-
ing herein and granting the relief prayed
by the Plaintiff in her Complaint on file
herein.
8. This proceeding and the complaint
herein should be dismissed without preju-
dice to:
(a) the reopening of this pro-
‘ceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the
Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-
trative processing within sixty (6C) days
from the date of entry of this Decision and
Order, or fail to fully, properly and
diligently carry on said processing to
-157-
final administrative determination in
strict compliance with the regulitions of
Defendant Air Force; or
(b) the filing by Plaintiff of a
new complaint for review of the said
administrative processing and final deter-
mination if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or
has good legal cause to complain and seek
judicial review of any portion of said
administrative processing or final deter-
mination.
9. Any finding of fact deemed as or
properly constituting a conclusion of law
is hereby adopted as a conclusion of law.
10. The Clerk of this Court should
forthwith serve copies of this Decision and
Order upon counsel for all parties herein.
-158-
ORDER
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
Dated: April 30, 1980
/s/ A. Andrew Hauk
A. ANDERW HAUK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
~159-
FILED April 30,
1980
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
Plaintiff,
-V=—
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, and UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE,
a military department
of the United States
of America, with HANS
M. MARK, Secretary
Defendants.
)
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No. CV-79=-3952-
AAH (Sx)
JUDGMENT
REMANDING PRO-
CEEDING FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESSING,
AND DISMISSING
COMPLAINT
WITHOUT PREJ-
UDICE TO RE-
OPENING OR TO
FILING OF NEW
COMPLAINT
The Court having made and entered its
Decision and Order Remanding Case and for
-160-
Dismissal Without Prejudice in this matter,
and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
l. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
denied.
as The case and proceeding herein is
remanded to Defendai.t Air Force, and *he
other Defendants, and particularly to the
Civilian Personnel Office of Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California, for continuous and
diligent administrative processing by
Defendants under applicable Air Force
regulations to final determination by the
Defendant Air Force and the other said
Defendants, such processing to be initiated
within sixty (60) days of the entry of the
aforesaid Decision and Order and the within
Judgment.
3. The Court reserves its
jurisdiction and right to reopen the within
-161-
proceeding, upon motion of Plaintiff, if
Defendants fail to initiate the said
administrative processing within said sixty
(60) day period, or fail to fully, properly
and diligently process Plaintiff's
complaints through all stages to final
determination by the Defendant Air Force,
in strict compliance with its regulations.
4. This proceeding and the complaint
herein are hereby dismissed, but without
prejudice to:
(a) the reopening of this pro-
ceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the
Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-
trative processing within sixty (60) days
from the date of entry of this Judgment, or
fail to fully, properly and diligently
carry on said processing to final adminis-
trative determination in strict compliance
with the regulations of Defendant Air
Force; or
-162-
(b) the filing by Plaintiff of a
new complaint for review of the said
administrative processing and final deter-
mination if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or
has good legal cause to complain and seek
judicial review of any portion of said
administrative processing or final deter-
mination.
5. Plaintiff shall have and receive
her costs of suit incurred herein which are
hereby taxed in the amount of
$ , and her reasonable attor-
ney's fees which are hereby determined and
fixed in the amount of Twenty Five Hundred
Dollars ($2,500.00), all pursuant to 42
United States Code section 2000e-5(k).
6. The Clerk shall forthwith serve
copies of this Judgment and the aforesaid
Decision and Order upon counsel for all
-163-
parties herein.
Dated: April 30, 1980
/s/ A. Andrew Hauk
A. ANDREW HAUK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-164-
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 4392D AEROSPACE
SUPPORT GROUP (SAC)
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 93437
12 May 1977
Reply to
Attn of: DPCD
Subject: Notice of Reduction in Force -
Job Offer
To: 65961S/DOU/Lowene R. Clemente
l. We regert to advise you that a re-
duction-in-force will require your release
from your competitive level. The reason
for the reduction in force is: The recent
acquisition of Olivetti Word Processing
equipment has resulted in a reorganization
in the Data Processing Section. The
requirement for an EAM Project Planner no
longer exists. Therefore, the position you
now occupy has been identified tc be
abolished.
2. Your retention rights have been
compared with other base employees to
determine the best available position that
can be offered to you. You are offered the
position of Computer Operator, GS-332-06,
4392ASG/LGS. If you accept this offer, you
will be changed to lower grade to the
position not earlier than 17 Jul 1977. If
you decline the position you will be
separated on 15 Jul 1977.
3. The following information was used in
deternining your retention rights:
-165-
a. Competitive Area: Vandenberg,
AFB, Ca.
b. Your Competitive Level is:
GS-362-07P
c. Your position is: EAM Project
Planner
d. Your Retention Subgroup is: IB
e. Your Service Computation Date is:
1960-03-05
4. If you have any reason to believe the
above information is incorrect or if you
wish to review regulations or reduction in
force records, please call Mrs. Leidecker,
276-4714. She will be glad to answer your
questions and assist you in any way possi-
ble. Records are available in the Civilian
Personnel, Office, Bldg. 1:777.
5. Should you be separated, you may be
entitled to severance pay, employment
assistance and other benefits. Attached is
a summary of benefits and assistance
available in your case. Also attached is
an explanation of your right to appeal if,
after review, you feel that appropriate
regulations have not been followed.
6. You must accept or refuse the position
offered within five workdays after receipt
of this notice. If you refuse the position
or fail to reply within the time limit, you
will be separated by reduction in force on
the date specified above. If special
circumstances warrant, you may make a
written request for extension of the notice
period to allow retention in a leave
without pay status beyond that date.
-166-
7. We sincerely regret the need for this
action. It does not, of course, reflect in
_any way on your conduct or performance.
You will be continued in a pay status
during the notice period and we will try to
give you whatever assistance you may need.
WILLIAM M. COADY 2 attachments
Chief, Civilian 1. Appeal Rights
Personnel Branch 2. Supplemental
Information
Receipt acknowledged:
Lowene R. Clemente 5/13/77
( ) I accept the offer contained in
paragraph 1 of this letter.
( ) I decline the offer contained in
paragraph 1 and understand I will
be separated from Air Force
employment on the date set in
paragraph 2 of this letter.
NAME ~~ DATE
-167-
APPEAL RIGHTS
l. You have the rights to review all
records pertaining to this action and to
see copies of Air Force and Civil Service
regulations pertaining to Reduction in
Force. This includes the retention regis-
ter for your competitive level and those
for other positions for which you believe
you are qualified, down to and including
those in the same or equivalent grade (if
any) which constitutes your “best offer."
If separation is proposed, this includes
all positions equal to, and below, the
grade of your current position.
Ze If, after this review, you believe
that the provisions of Air Force or Civil
Services regulations (specifically AFR
40-351 and FPM, Chapter 351) have not been
followed, you should discuss any questions
you have with a member of the Civilian
Personnel Office staff. If, after such
discussion, you still believe that the
action does not comply with regulations,
you may submit an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. The appeal may be
submitted at any time after receipt of this
notice, but not later than 15 calendar days
after the effective date of the action.
Se If you are separated by reduction in
force and are eligible for the reemployment
priority l‘st (RPL), you may request,
during your period of eligibility, to
review records of position vacancies at Air
Force activities in the locality which were
filled by other than Air Force employees.
If you belief that you should have been
offered a vacancy instead of a person
appointed or transferred, you should
discuss the action with an appropriate
-168-
member of the Civilian Personnel Office.
If, after discussion, you disagree with an
action, you may submit an appeal to the
Civil Service Commission.
4. Any appeal from this reduction in
force action, or subsequent action while
you have reemployment priority, should be
addressed to:
United States Civil Service Commission
Federal Employee Appeals Authority
San Francisco Field Office
450 Golden Gate Ave
San Francisco, CA 94102
A copy of this notice should be included
with the appeal letter.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 4392D AEROSPACE
SUPPORT GROUP (SAC)
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 93437
19 NOV 1980
Reply to
Attn of: CC
Subject: Notice of Final Air Force
Decision - Lowene R. Clemente
To: S. Timothy Buynak
Hatch and Parent
21 East Carrillo Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
| By letter, dated 17 October 1980,
which you received 22 October 1980, Lt Col
Harold L. Pray, Chief, Personnel Division,
proposed to adoyt the findings of Mr Harry
W. Johnstone in his report of investigation
into Ms Clemente's case. Mr Johnstone q
found that the complainant's race was not a
factor in the decision to abolish her
position or in the manner in which she was
treated incident thereto. Lt Col Pray
proposed cancellation of the complaint.
Ze In that 17 October letter you were
informed that if you are dissatisfied with
the proposed disposition, you may (1)
request a hearing before an Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Com-
plaints Examiner, followed by a decision by
the Air Force Director of EEO, or (2)
request a decision by the Air Force Direc-
tor of EEO, without a hearing, based upon
the evidence present in the complaint file.
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Lt Col Pray further explained to you that
such a request should be submitted to Ms
Carolyn McCool, the Chief EEO Counselor at
Vandenberg, within 15 calendar days of
receipt of the Notice of Proposed Decision.
3. As of this date you have neither
notified Ms McCool of your desire for an
EEOC hearing, nor have you informed Lt Col
Pray of your specific wishes. Rather, in
your 31 October 1980 reply to the Notice of
Proposed Disposition -- a reply which,
incidentally, did not reach Lt Col Pray or
Major Brower until 7 November 1980, "16
calendar days after your receipt of the
Notice of Proposed Disposition -- you
reject the EEOC hearing on the erroneous
belief that its scope would be limited to
the scope of Mr. Johnstone's evaluation,
and you inform Lt Col Pray that he may, at
his "option," make a final agency decision
or forward the case to the Air Force
Director of EEO "or whomever you like.”
Neither Lt Col Pray nor I can make this
decision for you. That is an election
which, as was explained in the 17 October
1980 letter, you and your client must make.
4. In view of the fact that you have
failed to make the election offered in the
17 October 1980 letter, as well as the fact
that your reply to the 17 October 1980
letter was late, this letter will provide
notice to you that I have adopted the
proposed disposition, i.e., cancellation of
the complaint., as the final Air Force
decision in Ms Clemente's case. You now
have the following options:
a. You may appeal to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission within 20
calendar days of receipt of this decision.
Your appeal to the Commission should be
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addressed to the Director, Office of
Appeals’ and Review, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 2401 E Street,
N.W., Washington, DC 20506. The appeal and
any representation in support thereof must
be submitted in duplicate.
(1) Except as provided in the
following paragraph of this letter, a
complainant may file a notice of appeal at
any time up to 20 calendar days after
receipt of the Air Force Notice of Final
Decision and his/her complaint. An appeal
shall be deemed filed on the date it is
postmarked or, in the absence of a post-
mark, on the date it is received by the
Commission. Any statement or brief in
support of the appeal must be submitted to
the Commission and to the Air Force within
30 days of filing the Notice of Appeal.
(2) The 20-day time limit within
which a Notice of Appeal must be filed will
not be extended by the Commission unless,
based upon a written showing by the com-
plaint that he/she was not notified of the
prescribed time limit and was not otherwise
aware of it or that circumstances beyond
his/her control prevented the filing of a
Notice of Appeal within the prescribed time
limit, the Commission exercises its dis-
cretion to extend the time limit and accept
the appeal.
b. In lieu of an appeal to the
Commission, you may in accordance with
Judge Hauk's remand order, file in U.S.
District Court for the Central District of
California a new complaint for review of
this administrative processing. It is the
Air Force's view that such a complaint must
be filed within 30 days of your receipt of
this final decision. If you elect to
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appeal to the Commission's Office of
Appeals and Review, you may file your
complaint within 30 days of receipt of the
decision.
(1) A civil action may also be
filed anytime after 180 days of the date of
initial appeal to the Commission, if a
final decision has not been rendered.
Se I should also like to comment on
misconceptions you seem to hold as indicat-
ed by your 31 October 1980 reply. First,
it is not true that the EEOC hearing is
limited to the scope of Mr. Johnstone's
investigation, and at no time has either
Major Brower, Lt Col Pray, Mr. Phillip
Seneschal or Mr Johnstone held that opin-
ion. Rather, Title 29 CFR Part 1613, which
prescribes the rules for such hearings,
allows a Complaints Examiner to expand the
scope of the hearing by either remanding to
the agency for further investigation or by
arranging for the appearance of additional
witnesses. 29 CFR 1613.218. Second, you
are mistaken in your belief that Mr.
Johnstone considers the RIF to be unsup-
ported. He has made no such assertion
either in his report or off the record.
Third, you continue to insist that Ms
Clemente is entitled to a "combined hearing
on all of her complaints,” i.e. the RIF
appeal, discrimination claim, post-RIF
priority rights grievance and reprisal
complaint. This argument ignores the fact
that Ms Clemente's formal EEO complaint,
which provides the basis for Part 713
processing, very cimply alleges that the
"RIF action taken [was] a result of reverse
racial discrimination." Mr Johnstone's
investigation appropriately focused on that
limited allegation.
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6. Regarding your 10 November 1980
request to “initiate processing through
(the MSPB)," as you are already aware, the
Air Force position on this matter is that
the MSPB has no jurisdiction to hear your
case, even if it does, you, not the Air
Force, must file your own petition with the
MSPB. MSPB made this clear to you in its
29 October 1980 letter to you.
i Finally, I must remind you that
throughout this administrative process the
Air Force has acted, and continues to act,
under compulsion of court order. The Air
Force continues to assert that Ms
Clemente's complaint is untimely inasmuch
as it was not filed within the 30 days
prescribed by 5 CFR Part 713 (now 29 CFR
Part 1613). Therefore, nothing in this
letter, or in any previous correspondence
or investigation, should be interpreted as
a waiver of the 30-day statute of limita-
tions. The Air Force has simply in good
faith attempted to comply with Judge Hauk's
order. :
RONALD J. BISHOP, JR. Cy to: Carolyn
Colonel, USAF Commander McCool
4392 AEROSG/JA
(Major Brower)
Ms Clemente
Mr Peter Osinoff,
(Asst U.S.
Attorney)
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APPENDIX C
Aug 16, 1985
MANDATE ISSUED
ARMS UNIT
Aug 19, 1985
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 83-6187
) 83-6188
vs. ) No. 83-6430
)
UNITED STATES OF ) CV 80-5746
AMERICA, UNITED STATES ) 79-3952
AIR FORCE, ET AL., ) 80-5746
)
)
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEAL from the United States District
Court for the
District of ‘
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the
Transcript of the Record from the United
States District Court for the Central
District of California and was duly
submitted.
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ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now
here ordered and adjudged by this Court,
that the judgment of the said district
Court in this Cause be, and hereby is
REVERSED, VACATED AND REMANDED.
Filed and entered July 24, 1985
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APPENDIX D
AIR FORCE REGULATION 40-713,
October 20, 1975
33. Relationship to Appeal and Grievance
Procedures:
a. When the basis of a complaint of
discrimination is an action which may be
appealed directly to the Civil Service
Commission (for example, reduction-in-force
and certain adverse actions) the
complainant should be informed of the
requirement to specify under which part of
the regulations (FPM Chapter 713 or the
other appeal system) the issue of
discrimination is to be processed.
(1) If the complainant decides to
proceed by appeal to the Commission, he
must make this election in writing, signed
and dated, and a copy is furnished to the
Commission office having jurisdiction over
the appeal and the activity will close out
the discrimination complaint and thereafter
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act in the matter under instructions from
the Commission.
(2) If the complainant elects to
proceed under FPM chapter 713, after having
been specifically informed of his right to
use the other appellate system, then the
entire matter, including the merits of the
action, will be reviewed under this regu-
lation.
b. If an allegation of discrimination
is made in connection with a matter that
already has been appealed to the Civil
Service Commission, the activity must
notify the Commission's appellate office
ana that office will determine whether the
agency will make an investigation. Any
investigation requested by the Commission
shall be conducted in accordance with the
Commission's specific written instructions.
C. When an employee makes an allega-
tion of discrimination in connection with a
matter that would normally be subject to
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the Air Force grievance system, the matter
will be processed under this regulation
(see also AFR 40-771, section C).
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.