Appendix — Clemente v. United States

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85 ion 6 8 » ¥ | Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

OCT 16 i968

JOSEPH F. 5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITE] STATE6i2p. — !*

October Term, 1985

No.

tee,

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, a

military department of the

United States of America,

with VERNE ORR, Secretary;

RONALD J. BISHOP, JR.; HAROLD

L. PRAY; CHARLES L. BROWER;

PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL; HARRY W.

JOHNSTONE; and JEFFREY W.

COOK,

Respondents.

i i ed

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

S. TIMOTHY BUYNAK, JR.

HATCH AND PARENT

21 E. Carrillo Street

Santa Barbara, CA 93101

(805) 963-9231

Attorneys for Petitioner

ie

*

oa.

a

*

7

"

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Appendix A:

Opinion, U.S. Court

of Appeals, Ninth

Circuit, dated July 24,

1985, reported at

766 F.2d 1358

Appendix B:

Decision, U.S. District

Court, Central District

of California, dated August

12, 1983, reported at

568 F.Supp. 1150

Judgment, U.S. District

Court, Central District

of California, dated

August 12, 1983

Memorandum, U.S.

Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit,

dated December 14,

1984

Decision and Order

Remanding Case and

Dismissing Without

Prejudice, U.S.

District Court, Central

District of California,

dated April 30, 1980

reported at 488 F.Supp.

854

38

138

145

151

Judgment Remanding

Proceeding for Admin-

istrative Processing

and Dismissing Complaint

Without Prejudice to

Reopening or to Filing of

New Complaint, U.S.

District Court, Central

District of California,

dated April 30, 1980 160

Notice of Reduction in

Force -- Job Offer,

Department of the Air

Force, dated May 12, 1977 165

Notice of Final Air

Force Decision,

Department of the Air

Force, dated November

19, 1980 170

Appendix C:

Judgment, U.S. Court

of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,

dated July 24, 1985 175

Appendix D:

Paragraph 33, Air Force

Regulation 40-713, dated

October 20, 1975 177

aiiea

APPENDIX A

FOR PUBLICATION

Filed July 24, 1985

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE, ) CA No. 83-6187

) DC No. 80-5746

Plaintiff/Appellee )

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, UNITED

STATES AIR FORCE, a

military department

of the United States of

America, with VERNE ORR,

Secretary, of the United

States Air Force,

RONALD J. BISHOP,

JR., HARO.D L. PRAY,

CHARLES L. BROWER,

PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL,

HARRY W. JOHNSTONE,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)OPINION

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

and JEFFREY W. COOK, )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendants/Appellants.

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

CA No. 83-6186

DC No. 79-3952

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, UNITED STATES

AIR FORCE, a military

department of the

United States of

America, with VERNE ORR,

ele

Secretary of the

United States Air Force,

RONALD J. BISHOP, JR.,

HAROLD L. PRAY; CHARLES

L. BROWER; PHILLIP G.

SENESCHAL; HARRY W.

JOHNSTONE; and JEFFREY

W. COOK,

Defendants/Appellants.

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

CA No. 83-6430

DC No. 80-5746

Plaintiff/Appellee

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF THE AIR FORCE AND

VERNE ORR, SECRETARY OF

THE UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF THE

AIR FORCE,

Defendants/Appellants.

ttt ttt ee ee ee ee eee

Appeal from the United States

District Court

for the Central District of California

Andrew A. Hauk, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 14, 1984 -

San Francisco, California

BEFORE: CHOY, CANBY AND NORRIS, CIRCUIT

JUDGES.

CANBY, CIRCUIT JUDGE:

Plaintiff, a white civilian Air Force

employee, brought an employment discrimina-

tion action after an Air Force “reduction

o2e

in force" (RIF) resulted in her reassign-

ment. She also asserted due process

violations arising out of the alleged

failure of Air Force officials fully to

process her discrimination claims.

Defendants challenge the district

court's rulings that plaintiff: (1) had

demonstrated retaliatory discrimination

entitling her to back pay and “seniority

relief;" and (2) had established a vio-

lation of her administrative due process

rights entitling her to "“Bivens-type"

compensatory and punitive damages against

the United States, the U.S. Air Force, the

Secretary of the Air Force, and named Air

Force officers and employees. Defendant

Secretary of the Air Force also chailenges

an order of the district court holding the

Secretary in contempt. We reverse the

judgment for damages and vacate the

contempt order.

o3e

Iie acclaim

BACKGROUND .

Plaintiff Lowene Clemente, a

Civilian Air Force employee, originally

filed an action in district court alleging

(1) reverse racial discrimination; (2)

coercive and retaliatory measures taken

against her for filing administrative

claims; (3) denial of reemployment priority

rights; and (4) improper implementation of

a reduction in force. The complaint was an

out growth of an EEO proceeding which began

in 1977, when Clemente appealed her RIF

reassignment, on race discrimination and

other grounds, to the Federal Employee

Appeals Authority (FEAA).

The FEAA notified the Air Force

that under applicable Civil Service

regulations, two alternative methods were

available to process Clemente's appeal:

that set forth in 5 C.F.R. Part 351 or that

in 5 C.F.R. Part 713. 7 A further

regulation then in effect provided that

she

If the appellant has not been

informed of the separate rights

of appeal, the Appeals Authority

shall refer the matter to the

agency so the agency may explain

the alternative rights of appeal

to the appellant as provided in §

713.236 of Part 713 of this

chapter and afford him the

opportunity, if appropriate, to

elect the avenue of appeal he

wishes to pursue.

5 C.F.R. section 772.306(a) (1977). The FEAA

requested the Air Force to secure plain-

tiff's election in writing. Clemente was

contacted by a representative of her

employing facility, Vandenberg Air Force

Base, and informed of the two options. On

advice of counsel, she failed to respond.

Meanwhile, the FEAA sent two letters

to Vandenberg in an effort to ascertain the

appellate option Clemente had elected. Upon

aRe

notification by Vandenberg that no response

had been received to its letter requesting

an election, the FEAA notified Clemente's

counsel that her "Part 351" appeal had been

cancelled.

Shortly thereafter, Clemente secured

new counsel. Her new attorney promptly

wrote the FEAA and Vandenberg, informing

each that Clemente assumed that her Part

713 appeal was still being processed. The

FEAA's response noted that the Part 351

appeal had been cancelled, and the Part 713

appeal was to be handled by officials at

Vandenberg.

Under Air Force regulations,

If the complainant elects to proceed

under FPM Chapter 713, after having

been specifically informed of his

right to use the other appellate

system, then the entire matter,

including the merits of the action,

will be reviewed under this regu-

lation.

AFR 40-713, section 33 (emphasis added).

Pursuant to this regulation, an EEO coun-

selor was assigned to interview Clemente

and explore her RIF and discrimination

claims. After the interview, Clemente was

notified of her right to file a formal

discrimination complaint, and she did so.

This formal complaint was rejected by the

Air Force as untimely. Her initial com-

plaint in district court followed.

In April 1980, the district court

issued a decision. Finding a failure by the

Air Force properly to process Clemente's

complaints, the court remanded the "com-

plaints of plaintiff as presented herein"

to Vandenberg AFB "for continuous and

diligent administrative processing by the

Defendants under applicable Air Force

regulations.” 568 F. Supp. at 1156. The

court admonished that "[s]aid processing

~

should be accomplished in strict compliance

with applicable Air Force regulations,

should involve all stages of administrative

processing entailed therein, and should be

conducted so as to insure Plaintiff her

full rights in said proceedings and a fair

adjudication of her complaints." Id.

Following the district court's remand

and this court's unpublished opinion

dismissing defendants’ appeal for lack of

finality, Clemente v. United States, No.

80-5508 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 1981), defendant

Johnstone was appointed by the Air Force to

investigate Clemente's claims. In an

initial meeting, Clemente and her counsel

presented Johnstone with <n outline of

Clemente's complaints and administrative

processing expectations. Johnstone re-

sponded that he could only process the

discrimination claim. An exchange of

correspondence followed in which Clemente's

counsel emphasized his disagreement with

aa

the limitations placed on the scope of the

investigation and the processing steps

undertaken, insisting that such limitations

were violative of the court's April remand

order. By letter, Johnstone informed

Clemente's counsel that the court had only

remanded the discrimination claim, that it

was not his responsibility to define the

issues accepted for investigation, and that

he had received nothing from the Air Force

indicating that he should broaden the scope

of his investigation.

Shortly thereafter, Clemente's counsel

arranged a meeting with defendant Brower,

Vandenberg's Legal Officer for Labor

Relations, and defendant Seneschal, Vanden-

berg's Civilian Personnel Officer. The

parties discussed the appropriate process-

ing of Clemente's RIF appeal, her priority

reemployment rights claim, and the reprisal

charges. Clemente's counsel made a request

that the Air Force produce certain

=Qoa

documents. Soon afterward, Seneschal sent

Clemente's counsel a letter indicating,

inter alia, that Clemente's document

requests would be honored.

Several weeks later, defendant Brower

informed Clemente's counsel that Air Force

headquarters had determined that no further

processing could be provided either through

the Air Force or the FEAA's successor

organization, the Merit Systems Protection

Board (MSPB) 3.

That same day, Clemente's counsel

wrote Johnstone complaining that none of

Clemente's witnesses had received interrog-

atories or been contacted, interrogatories

had not been sent to Clemente's counsel for

review as previously agreed, and the

request for documents was still outstand-

ing. Johnstone never answered this letter,

and the processing deficiencies referred to

remained unremedied. One week Rater,

Johnstone forwarded a report to

=10@

a

Vandenberg's base commander finding no dis-

crimination. Thereafter, Brower reconfirmed

to Clemente's counsel that there would be

no further processing of her claims.

One month later, defendant Pray, Chief

of Personnel at Vandenberg, issued a

"Notice of Proposed Disposition of Dis-

crimination Complaint" recommending cancel-

lation of Clemente's complaint. Upon

receipt of this notice, Clemente's counsel

wrote Pray alleging deficiencies in the Air

Force's processing of her claims, and

requesting combined adjudication of all

four issues. His letter -- copies of which

went to Brower and defendants’ attorney --

cited Air Force regulations, the purported

constitutional rights of plaintiff, and the

court's remand judgment. A similar letter

was sent directly to defendants' attorney,

again detailing alleged deficiencies in the

Air Force's processing of plaintiff's

claims, and stressing that this failure

alle

"diligently, promptly, and completely [to]

process Mrs. Clemente's claims thereby

"perfect[ed] causes of action for constitu-

tional violations against the Air Force as

well as any governmental official responsi-

ble for these actions." 568 F. Supp at

1158.

Several weeks later, defendant Bishop,

base commander at Vandenberg, issued a

"Notice of Final Decision" cancelling

Clemente's complaint, but asserting that

the Air Force had made a "good faith

attempt" to comply with the court's April

remand judgment.

Clemente thereupon reopened proceed-

ings in the district court and amended her

initial complaint to include a due process

claim against the United States and indi-

vidual defendants. The due process claim

was predicated upon the Air Force's refusal

to follow its own procedures, its refusal

to process three of Clemente's four

-12-

administrative claims, and its perfunctory

processing of the discrimination complaint.

Following a bench trial, the district

court found that while plaintiff had not

suffered racial discrimination, the evi-

dence was sufficient to establish retal-

iation in violation of Title VII. The court

awarded back pay and accorded seniority

relief (with training, if necessary). In

ruling on the constitutional claim, the

court found that both the United States and

the individual defendants had violated

Clemente's due process rights, and awarded

compensatory and punitive damages accord-

ingly. The district court also awarded

plaintiff attorneys' fees on both of her

successful claims. Subsequently, the

district court held the Secretary of the

Air Force in contempt of the order granting

relief to plaintiff on the merits. These

consolidated appeals of the district

court's orders followed.

«13<

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Constitutional Claim

A. United States as Defendant

In addition to finding liability by

individual defendants, the district court

awarded "Bivens-type" compensatory and

punitive damages against the United States

and the United States Air Force absent an

express waiver -- and despite the spirited

assertion -- of sovereign immunity. 568 F.

Supp. at 1171. We reverse.

The district court viewed its order

awarding damages directly against the.

United States as "the natural and logical

extension" of Supreme Court precedent

recognizing and extending liability for

so-called constitutional torts. 568 F.

Supp. at 1167. Relying upon both

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971), and subsequent cases concerning

-14-

the scope of 42 U.S.C. 1983, . the

district court held that

[n]ot overlooking the fact that the

Owens [sic] decision addressed the

issue of a municipality being held

liable in a §1983 action, the issue of

a federal sovereign violating its own

Constitution is indistinguishable.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the

federal government is not immune from

an action brought against it as a

result of its agents having violated

the Fifth Amendment rights of a United

States citizen.... We cannot help but

recognize and enforce the natural and

logical extension of Butz and Owens

[sic], which leads us inescapably to

conclude that just as state agencies

and state officers are both liable for

constitutional violations under 42

U.S.C. §1983, so also federal agencies

and federal officers should be and are

«1S

liable for constitutional violations

under Bivens.

568 F. Supp. at 1167 (emphasis in origi-

nal).

We cannot accept the district court's

proposition that Bivens and Owen logically

compel the United States to be held liable

in damages for the constitutional trots of

3 "It is axiomatic that the

its officers.

United States may not be sued without its

consent and that the existence of consent

is a prerequisite for jurisdiction."

United States v. Mitchell, 103 S.Ct. 2961,

2965 (1983). Admittedly, there is consid-

erable appeal to the proposition that a

remedy for a constitutional violation ought

not to be defeated by the common law

doctrine of sovereign immunity. 6 We

consider the issue foreclosed against

plaintiff, however, by a long line of

Supreme Court cases, see, @€.qg.,

Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.)

409, 413 (1850);

=16=

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207

(1882); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction

Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 318, 388 (1939);

Mitchell, supra. The proposition is also

contrary to the implication of our own

decision in Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d

1399, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1983), where we

held a Bivens remedy unavailable against

federal officials being sued, not in their

individual capacity for their individual

actions, but simply because of the offices

they hold. See also Arnsberg v. United

States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1984).

It follows that the district court's award

of compensatory and punitive damages

against the United States aiid the United

States Air Force must be reversed.

B. Individual Officials as Defendants

In awarding Bivens damages against

individual defendants, the district court

held that the failure of defendants fully

to process Clemente's discrimination claims

ol 7<

ee

violated her right to dve process as

secured by the fifth amendment. Defendants

contend that even if plaintiff's Bivens

claims are not precluded by Title VII, ,

they must fail because (1) civil service

administrative remedies provide the relief

for an alleged deprivation of protected

civil service statutes, and (2) plaintiff

has not otherwise demonstrated a depriva-

tion of liberty or property sufficient to

implicate the due process clause. We agree

with both of the defendants' contentions.

To the extent that the district court

based its due process Bivens ruling on

plaintiff's property interest in her "GS-7

position,” 568 F.Supp. at 1168, it is

contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in

Bush v. Lucas, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2417 (1983).

There, the Court held that the comprehen-

sive system established by Congress to

remedy violations of constitutional rights

in connection with federal employment and

i=

basa

personnel policy was exclusive; it could

not be augmented by non-statutory "Bivens-

type" relief. Bush v. Lucas accordingly

precludes Bivens relief based directly on

injury to plaintiff's interest in her GS-7

position.

The district court purported, however,

to find an independent property interest

arising from the court's order to process

plaintiff's complaint fully. See, e.g.,

568 F. Supp. at 1164, 1168 and 1169. A

mere command to follow certain procedures,

however, does not create an underlying

property interest, even when the command is

derived from the Constitution. Such an

interest must be "created by existing rules

or understandings that stem from an in-

dependent source such as state law -- rules

or understandings that secure certain

benefits and support claims of entitlement

to those benefits." Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The

o19=

district court's order creates no such

property interest. While violation of the

order might constitute contempt, it does

not give rise to a Bivens constitutional

tort claim.

The district court also grounded its

finding of a deprivation of due process in

the Air Force's failure to follow its own

regulations:

The Air Force established procedures

for evaluating combined RIF appeals

and discrimination complaints as well

as complaints of reprisal and reem-

ployment priority rights. See AFR

40-713.... Having once established

these procedures, they must be fol-

lowed or plaintiff's due process

rights will be violated.... The Air

Force, however, repeatedly failed to

abide by these procedures....

568 F. Supp. at 1168.

~200

Notwithstanding this finding that the

Air Force failed fully to follow its own

regulations, such procedural requirements,

without more, do not create constitution-

ally cognizable property interests. To hold

otherwis» would immediately incorporate

virtually every regulation into tne Consti-

tution. ’

This court has repeatedly held that

{[p] rocedura]. requirements ordinarily

do not transform a unilateral expecta-

tion into a constitutionally protected

property interest. A constitutionally

protected interest has been created

only if the procedural requirements

are intended to be a ‘significant

substantive restriction’ on...

decision making. If the procedures

required pose no significant limita-

tion on the discretion of the decision

maker, the expectation of a specific

decision is not enhanced enough to

aBLa

establish a constitutionally protected

interest in the procedures.

Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th

Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see also

Loehr v. Ventura County Community College

Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1984);

Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 657 (9th

Cir. 1983); Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d

177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980); Hayward v.

Henderson, 623 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir.

1980); Russell v. Landrieu, 621 F.2d 1037,

1040 (9th Cir. 1980). ©

Here, AFR 40-713 expressly provided

for review of "the entire matter, including

the merits of the action,” once a complain-

ant elects to proceed under Part 713. The

outcome of that review, however, is left to

the discretion of the base conmander. ’

Although the commander's decision is

appealable to the Civil Service Commission

ér the courts, A.F.R. 40-713, #28 & 29, the

regulation provides no/significant

aD%e

restrictions on the commander's decision-

making, Goodisman, 724 F.2d at 820, nor

does it provide articulable standards to

guide his discretion. Parks, 716 F.2d at

657. As a result, plaintiff cannot suc-

cessfully claim a constitutionally cogniza-

ble property interest arising from the Air

Force's regulation.

None of the foregoing should be read

as abrogating the well-settled rule that

regulations validly prescribed by an agency

are binding upon it. 10 See, e.g., Accardi

v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260. 267 (1954);

United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827, 834

(9th Cir. 1978); Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d

956, 959 (9th Cir. 1977); Mabey v. Reagan,

537 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1976); Note,

"Violations by Agencies of their Own Reg-

ulations,” 87 Harv.L.Rev. 629 (1974). Our

holding is simply that plaintiff has failed

to demonstrate the existence of a constitu-

tionally protected "property” interest,

af3=

deprivation of which would entitle her to

damages. See Hayward v. Henderson, 623

F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir.1980)

Much of what we have just said applies

as well to plaintiff's alleged liberty

interest. Clemente does not possess a

"liberty interest [in] her Civil Service

career. 568 F. Supp. at 1168. The mere fact

of dismissal does not cause a deprivation

of liberty. Loehr, 743 F.2d at 1310, 1317

(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 575; Bishop v.

Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976)). Instead,

""({t]o implicate constitutional liberty

interests, . . . the reasons for dismissal

must be sufficiently serious to 'stigma-

tize' or otherwise burden the individual so

that he is not able to take advantage of

other employment opportunities.'" Id.

(citing Bollow v. Federai Reserve Bank, 650

F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. i981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982)). No such

stigmatization has been shown here. The

~~;

pa Rls Pen Mt ve es Rs

district court's decision awarding Bivens

relief against the individual defendants

must accordingly be reversed.

II. Title VII

Appellants contend that the district

court applied the wrong legal standard in

holding that plaintiff had been a victim of

retaliation forbidden by Title VII. We

agree.

This court has held that "[o]nce the

plaintiff has established a prima facie

case, the burden of production devolves

upon the defendant to articulate some

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the

adverse action. The defendant need not

prove the absence of retaliatory intent or

motive; it simply must produce evidence

sufficient to dispel the inference of

retaliation raised by the plaintiff. If the

defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff

must then show that the asserted reason was

a pretext for retaliation. The ultimate

o2Se

burden of persuading the court that the

defendant unlawfully retaliated against her

remains at all times with the plaintiff."

Cohen v. Fred Mayer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793,

796-97 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).

We find no indication in the district

court's findings or opinion that it afford-

ed the defendants the full benefit of this

process. The Air Force offered non-

retaliatory explanations for its actions

but the district court, except for reject-

ing the Air Force's jurisdictional points,

did not address them. Because they were

not addressed, there was no consideration

of the question whether they were pretext-

ual. The full trial process envisaged by

Cohen was consequently short-circuited, and

plaintiff was essentially awarded a judg-

ment on the strength of her prima facie

case!? that the defendants had an inade-

quate opportunity to rebut.

othe

—————

Because the district court neither

applied the appropriate legal standards nor

"articulate[d] the standards by which it

evaluated the evidence and arrived at its

finding of liability,” id. at 797, its

finding of retaliation is reversed and the

issue remanded for reconsideration in

light of the applicable precedent. Id. at

mm, *

III. Attorneys' Fees

The district court awarded attorneys'

fees and costs against the United States in

connection with Clemente's constitutional

claims. 568 F. Supp. at 1171. The predicate

for an award of fees under 28 U.S.C. 42412

(EAJA), however, is that the party seeking

the award "prevailed." Since the district

court incorrectly found Bivens liability

against the United States absent an express

waiver of sovereign immunity, we vacate

this award of fees and costs. 13

= 2 Pan

Under 42 U.S.C. §%2000e-5(k), attor-

neys' fees are available to the prevailing

party in a Title VII action. Since we have

remanded on the issue of retaliaticn, we

also vacate the award of attorneys' fees

under Title VII pending reconsideration of

the retaliatory discrimination issue by the

district court.

IV. Contempt

The district court entered its judg-

ment in this action on August 12, 1983. See

568 F. Supp. at 1150. On October 3, it

found defendants Secretary of the Air Force

and Department of the Air Force guilty of

civil and criminal contempt for deliberate-

ly and contemptuously disobeying its order

of August 12. The district court assessed

cumulative fines of over $2,000 per day

from the entry of judgment in August

through October 3. Appellants contend that

the court abused its discretion in this

regard. We agree.

-28-

“here ... a judgment of contempt

contains an admixture of criminal and civil

elements, ‘the criminal aspect of the order

fixes its character for purposes of proce-

dure on review.'" Falstaff Brewing Corp.

v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778

(9th Cir. 1983). To sustain a judgment of

criminal contempt, willful disobedience

must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 782. "Willfulness" means, in this

context, a deliberate or intended violation

of the court's order. Id.

As the government notes, the sequence

of events here alone is sufficient to

establish that defendants were not in

willful disobedience of the district

court's August 12 order. Ten days after the

order was entered, defendants filed their

notice of appeal, and, on August 23,

conabtenety upon expiration of the automat-

ic stay provided by F. R. Civ. P. 62(a),

defendants moved in the district court for

=29-

a stay of the judgment. While that motion

was still before it, the district court

issued, on September 23, an order to show

cause why defendants should not be held in

contempt. Finally, on October 3, the

district court simultaneously held defen-

dants in contempt and denied their motion

for a stay pending appeal.

As appellants suggest, to find a

defendant guilty of "willful and deliberate

defiance of the court's order,” United

States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.

258, 303 (1947), when a stay has been

immediately sought would render neantnelene

the whole process by which parties invoke

the power of the courts to defer the effect

of their judgments. The Supreme Court has

recognized that “willfulness" may be

qualified “by a concurrent attempt on

defendants’ part to challenge the order by

motion to vacate or other appropriate

procedures." United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.

=30<

at 303. Appellant's motion to stay was an

“appropriate procedure." Accordingly, we

vacate the judgment of contempt.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court in

favor of plaintiff is in all respects

reversed. The rulings of the district

court holding the Secretary and the Depart-

ment of the Air Force in contempt are

vacated. The case is remanded to the

district court for further proceedings

relating to plaintiff's claim for retal-

iation in violation of Title VII, and any

other matters consistent with this

— 14

opinion.

=3le-

FOOTNOTES

he The facts in this case are more

fully set forth in the opinion of the

district court. See Clemente v. United

States, 568 F. Supp. 1150, 1152-59 ic...

Cal. 1983).

Zo Part 351, captioned "Reduction in

Force," specifies the procedures "[e]ach

agency shall follow ... when it releases a

competing employee from his competitive

level by separation, demotion, furlough

+++, OF reassignment...." 5 C.F.R. section

351.201 (a) (1977).

Part 713 “sets forth the regu-

ations under which an agency shall

establish a continuing affirmative program

for equal opportunity in employment and

personnel actions ... and under which the

Commission will review an agency's program

and entertain an appeal from a person

dissatisfied with an agency's decision or

other final action on his complaint of

discrimination...." 5 C.F.R. section

713.201(a) (1977)

3 The Air Force claimed that plaintiff's

appeal was an FEAA appeal, and there was no

saving clause allowing the MSPB to assume

appeals before the now-disbanded FEAA.

Thus, argued the Air Force, only the

discrimination complaint could be processed

administratively.

4. In Bivens, the Supreme Court implied a

damage remedy against federal officers for

the violation of plaintiff's fourth amend-

ment rights. 403 U.S. 390-97. The Bivens

doctrine has been progressively expanded to

embrace other constitutional violations.

See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979);

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); see

n320

eee

PEE. ee OS

generally K. Davis, Administrative Law

Treatise, §27:2 (1984). In Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Court

declined to "accord[] to federal officials

a higher degree of immunity from liability

when sued for a constitutional infringement

as authorized by Bivens than is accorded

state officials when sued for the identical

violation under §1983." Id. at 500. In

Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445

U.S. 622 (1980), the Court extended

liability for constitutional violations

under §1983 to municipalities.

5. First, the rationale for abrogating

municipal immunity in Owen is simply

inapposite. As the Court was careful to

make clear, "[({sJince colonial times,...

local governmental units were regularly

held to answer in damages for a wide range

of statutory and constitutional

violations...." Owen, 445 U.S. at 638-39.

The same is not true of the federal

sovereign. See note infra; Borchard,

"Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale L.

J. 1 (1924). Second, the governmental

immunity at stake in Butz and Bivens

differs from that at issue here. The

district court's order permits recovery for

damages from the United States; while

Bivens and Butz permit recovery against

governmental officials sued in their

individual capacities; neither case

contemplates damages against the government

itself. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 638 n.18.

Indeed, as the Court acknowledged in Butz,

"Bivens established that a citizen

suffering a compensable injury to a

constitutionally protected interest could

--- Obtain an award of monetary damages

against the responsible federal official"

precisely because "[t]he barrier of

sovereign immunity is frequently

o33<

impenetrable." 438 U.S. at 504 (emphasis

added).

6. At least one commentator has urged the

Supreme Court to extend Bivens to constitu-

tional violations by the government. See

K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,

27:26, at 147 & 154 ("Nothing in the Bivens

opinion limits the doctrine to a case in

which federal employees are the defendants.

The theory of the opinion is broad enough

to produce the same result if ... the

defendant is the United States or a local

government.... The Supreme Court should ...

make clear that any violator of the

Constitution is liable for damages in a

suit directly under the Constitution.")

(emphasis omitted). See also Borchard,

"Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale

L.J. 1 (1924) (classic attack on the

doctrine of federal sovereign immunity); W.

Blackstone, 3 Commentaries 23, 109, oe

in Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2

n.10 (1983) ("every right, when withheld,

must have a remedy, and every injury its

proper redress.").

7. To the extent that plaintiff's Bivens

claims are founded in actions proscribed by

Title VII, they may not be maintained

because Title VII provides the exclusive

remedy. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976);

White v. GSA, .52 F.2d 913, 917 (9th Cir.

1981); see Nolan v. Cleveland, 686 F.2d

806, 815 (9th Cir. 1982).

8. "It goes without saying that it would

be neither sound law nor desirable policy

to constitutionalize every state ...

regulation.” Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d

708, 712 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd

on other grounds, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461

U.S. 238 1383) See also Shango v. Jurich,

o34e

eee

ponbnincha tte Abe take awe nbs PaGameal me" eee b Qe 6

Pe EE

681 F.2d 1091, 1101 (7th Cir. 1982)

("Constitutionalizing every state

procedural right would stand any due

process analysis on its head. Instead of

identifying the substantive interest at

stake and then ascertaining what process is

due to the individual before he can be

deprived of that interest, the process is

viewed as a substantive end in itself. The

purpose of a procedural safeguard, however,

is the protection of a substantive interest

to which the individual has a legitimate

claim of entitlement.").

9. See A.F.R. 40-713,%%12(f), 24(c) (6),

25(b) (Oct. 20, 1975) (superseded by A.F.R.

40-713 (June 15, 1982)).

10. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "[a]n

executive agency must be rigorously held to

the standards by which it professes its

action to be judged. Accordingly, if

[agency action] is based on a defined

procedure, even though generous beyond the

requirements that bind such agency, that

procedure must be scrupulously observed.

This judicially evolved rule of adminis-

trative law is now firmly established and,

if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the

procedural sword shall perish with that

sword." Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,

546-47 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part). To

"perish" by the procedural sword, however,

is not to pay Bivens damages. The appropri-

ate remedy for the refusal of an agency to

follow its own regulations may be injunc-

tive relief, reversal of the agency action,

or reversal and remand with an order

requiring the agency to follow its

procedures. Indeed, the district court's

initial remand required appellants

diligently to process all of plaintiff's

=35-

Claims. 568 F.Supp. at 1156. Willful

failure to do so would arguably support a

finding of contempt; it does not, however, .

permit Bivens damages.

11. We note as well that the district

court erred in its articulation of the

requisites of a prima facie case of

retaliation. The district court stated

that a prima facie case is established by

showing knowledge by the employer that a

complaint has been filed, followed by

adverse employment action. 568 F. Supp. at

1160. The standard established by Cohen,

however, requires the showing of a causal

link between the protected activity and the

adverse action, by “evidence sufficient to

raise the inference that [plaintiff's]

protected activity was the likely reason

for the adverse action.” Cohen, 686 F.2d

at 796.

12. Our remand makes it unnecessary to

reach appellants’ contention that the

district court erred in excluding testimony

essential to an accurate calculation of

back pay and seniority rights. We note,

however, that the central objective of

Title VII is to "make whole” victims of

prohibited discrimination. See Franks v.

Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747,

774 (1976). Toward that end, a court may

certainly weigh expert testimony suggesting

what plaintiff would have earned on the

basis of hypothetical promotion schedules.

When an expert, however, is asked to assume

that plaintiff would occupy a particular

position but for improper retaliatory

actions, any correspondence between the

expert's calculations and the actual salary

loss suffered by plaintiff obviously will

depend upon the accuracy of this assump-

tion, an assumption which defendants are

-36-

;

5

-

¢

¢

4

4

.

4

:

acest we cet RE LMR LU AR RI I TN ENB ATE a

entitled to attempt to refute. Finally, we

note that damages under plaintiffs Title

VII claim must be confined to those caused

by unlawful retaliation, if retaliation is

proved upon remand. The district court

found against plaintiff on her cause of

race discrimination.

13. Our disposition of the sovereign

immunity issue makes it unnecessary to

reach appellants’ additional contention

that an award of fees and costs would be

unwarranted under the EAJA in any event. We

note, however, that the district court

expressly relied upon "the decision of

Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546 F.

Supp. 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1982), for the prop-

osition than an award of attorneys fees in

a Bivens action may be analogized to a

similar award in a §1983 action which is

authorized by 42 U.S.C. §1988." 568 F.Supp.

at 1171. This court recently reversed that

decision on precisely this point. Lauritzen

v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 554-55 (9th Cir.

1984).

14. In her amended complaint, plaintiff

asserted a claim that the RIF to which she

was subject was conducted in violation of

pertinent statutes and regulations. The

district court made no rulings regarding

that claim, probably because relief there-

for would have been subsumed in the relief

it ordered on the Title VII and constitu-

tional claims. We also do not reach the

merits of that claim, which may be addres-

sed by the district court on remand. We

express no opinion as to whether that claim

is in fact independent of any of plain-

tiff's other claims. Cf. Nolan v. Cleland,

686 F.2d 806, 815 (9th Cir. 1982) (constitu-

tional due process claim subsumed by Title

VII claim when factual predicate is same).

a37=

APPENDIX B

FILED August 12, 1983

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. CV-80-5746

AAH

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

Plaintiff,

DECISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, UNITED STATES

AIR FORCE, a military

department of the

United States of

America, with HANS

M. MARK, Secretary,

)

)

)

)

)

) (Por Plaintiff

)

)

)

RONALD J. BISHOP, JR., )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

and Against

Defendants)

HAROLD L. PRAY,

CHARLES L. BROWER,

PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL,

HARRY W. JOHNSTONE,

and JEFFREY W. COOK,

individually and as

officers and/or

employees of the United

States Air Force,

Defendants.

-38-

APPEARANCES :

HATCH & PARENT, by S. Timothy Buynak,

Jr., and Thomas D. Wise, Santa

Barbara, California, for plaintiff.

STEPHEN S. TROTT, United States

Attorney, FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.,

Assistant United States Attorney,

Chief, Civil Division, by and through

PETER R. OSINOFF and KATHRYN W. TATE,

Assistant United States Attorneys,

Los Angeles, California, for

defendants.

This matter came on for nonjury trial

on May 23, 1983, and continued thereafter

for 19 days until June 21, 1983, whereupon

argument was heard. Thereafter, the-Court

took the matter under consideration and

submission.

Plaintiff is a White Caucasion citizen

of the United States who, at all times

herein mentioned, was and now is employed

-39-

CO SS Ss Or ee

as a General Schedule (hereafter "GS")

civil service employee at Vandenberg Air

Force Base, California. Her positions have

been primarily in the computer and data

automation fields. By this action plain-

t. ff seeks two types of relief:

First, equitable reliet flowing from

alleged employment discrimination based on

race in connection with a reduction in

force (hereafter "RIF") that was effective

on July 17, 1977. It is also alleged that

reprisal discrimination occurred as a

result of the filing of a "RIF" appeal.

These claims are brought under 42 U.S.C.

section 2000e-16 (Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended) and 28

U.S.C. section 1331.

Secondly, and in addition to the above

claims, plaintiff contends that she is

entitled to damages for the alleged vio-

lation of her constitutional right to due

process arising out of the defendants’

-40-

failure to fully process her claims after

Judgment of this Court remanding to the Air

Force all proceedings on April 30, 1980.

The jurisdictional support for this claim

is also 28 U.S.C. section 1331.

The factual basis of this action is

extremely complex and may be effectively

analyzed only by focusing on three relevant

time periods.

I

FACTS PRIOR TO THE J’\2 1°, 1977 RIF

Plaintiff has been a Civil Servant of

the Federal Government since 1958 and has

been assigned to Vandenberg Air Force Base,

California since 1965. In 1968, plaintiff

was promoted to a GS-7, Computer Operator

position in Base Supply. In 1971, this

position was downgraded to a GS-6, Step 9,

as a result of a base-wide classification

downgrade for all computer operators. On

December 8, 1974, plaintiff was promoted to

the position of Electronic Accounting

agile

TT ae ne ee Ee ee

Machine (hereafter "EAM") Project Planner,

GS-362-07, with the 6596th Instrumentation

Squadron, Operations Support Branch. Her

grade level was that of a GS-7, Step 8.

Following this promotion, plaintiff per-

formed well in the opinion of her superiors

until the beginning of 1976.

In 1976, plain’ f£f's immediate super-

visors were changec and replaced by Black

individuals. Thereafter, plaintiff al~

leges, these individuals conspired and

attempted to undermine plaintiff and have

her removed from her position. It is

contended that this removal from office was

effectuated through a RIF, following a

period of tension between plaintiff and her

new superiors. The RIF was requested on

April 13, 1977 by Master Sergeant Bruce

Daniels, a Black. In anticipation of this

action, plaintiff filed a telegram appeal

with the Civil Service Commission on April

8, 1977. This appeal was dismissed on June

-42-

7, 1977, as being premature. Thereafter,

plaintiff retained Leonard A. Newton, Esq.,

an attorney in Santa Maria, California, to

assist in the processing of her complaint.

Newton advised plaintiff not to communicate

with Air Force personnel and indicated that |

he would assume responsibility for the

processing of her complaint. Plaintiff

testified that after retaining Newton and

receiving his advice, she “left the matter

fully in his hands."

The above-mentioned RIF was actuated

on May 12, 1977, and upon plaintiff's

acceptance of the only alternative position

offered, she was transferred into a tempo-

rary position at the Base Legal OFfice.

She remained at this position until July

17, 1977, the effective date of the RIF, at

which time she was placed in her present

position as a Computer Operator, GS-6, Step

10. On this same day Newton sent a tele-

gram to the Federal Employee Appeals

~ yo

ee ee

_— preter ."

Authority (hereafter "FEAA"), appealing the

RIF action, stating that the RIF was the

consequence of “inverse racial discrimina-

tion and personality dislikes on the part

of [plaintiff's] superiors." In addition

to this telegram, Newton sent a letter to

the FEAA charging that the plaintiff's

downgrade was the "result of an artifically

created reduction in force."

It

FACIS SUBSEQUENT TO THE RIF

On July 18, 1977, the FEAA correspond-

ed with Civilian Personnel Officer William

Coady of Vandenberg Air Force Base indicat-

ing that two alternative methods of appeal

were available to process plaintiff's

complaint, these methods being set forth in

Part 713 and Part 351 of the Civil Service

Commission's Regulations. The FEAA re-

quested the Civilian Personnel Office to

secure plaintiff's election to process

under one of these regulations "in

-44-

writing," and requested it to inform

plaintiff of certain rights she had and the

method of processing under each regulation.

Plaintiff's written election of the method

of processing was to be secured within ten

days of receipt of the July 18, 1977

letter to the Civilian Personnel Office.

On July 26, 1977, Civilian Personnel

Officer Coady forwarded the July 18, 1977

letter of the FEAA to plaintiff, requesting

her to make an election as to the procedure

under which she intended to proceed and

admonishing her that “further action on the

appeal is delayed until your choice of

procedures is provided to us in writing."

At satel. plaintiff testified that she

received Mr. Coady's letter with the FEAA

letter attached. She noted that Newton had

received a copy of the FEAA letter.

Thereafter plaintiff communicated with

Newton who advised her not to respond to

either of these letters and that a

-45-

resolution of the matter was forthcoming.

Plaintiff was not contacted again that year

by the Civilian Personnel Office despite

her continuing daily work presence at

Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Plaintiff was in contact with her

attorney, Newton, for the last time in

December, 1977, when he assured her that he

had filed a complaint and a hearing had

been set in the distant future. During the

period between July 26, 1977 and February

7, 1978, two requests were made by the FEAA

for a response from the Base to its letter

of July 18, 1977. ON February 7, 1978, Mr.

Coady responded to the FEAA stating that no

response had been received from the plain-

tiff to its request that she make an

election of procedures. Mr. Coady did not

make any further attempt to contact plain-

tiff or her attorney during this period.

On February 21, 1978, the FEAA sent a

letter to Newton notifying him that the

wie

plaintiff's "Part 351" appeal ( 5 C.F.R.,

Part 351) had been cancelled. The plain-

tiff also received this letter.

Plaintiff testified at trial that,

because of the repeated assurances of

Newton, she interpreted the Feoruary 21,

1978 letter from the FEAA to mean that her

"Part 713" appeal (5 C.F.R, Part 713) was

still progressing. However, subseqvent to

receiving this letter, she became suspi-

cious that her attorney was not handling

the case in a proper manner and attempted

to contact him. Following numerous at-

tempts to reach Newton by telephone and by

mail and receiving no response, plaintiff

engaged the services of her present attor-

ney, Timothy S. Buynak, Esq of Santa

Barbara. Thereafter, Buynak did a thorough

search of state and federal court records

to determine the status of plaintiff's

"case," as presumably filed by her first

attorney, Newton. Having no success in

wl te

locating any action filed on behalf of

plaintiff, Buynak endeavored to contact

Newton by telephone and numerous letters.

It was eventually discovered that Newton

was the subject of disbarment proceedings

before the California State Bar. Newton's

attorney in those proceedings was requested

to advise Newton to contact Buynak concern-

ing plaintiff's case. On October 2, 1978,

portions of plaintiff's file were sent to

her new attorney, Buynak, from Newton,

together with the information that the ‘only

filing that he had made was with the FEAA.

On October 25, 1978, Buynak wrote to

both the Civilian Personnel Office at

Vandenberg and the FEAA, informing each

that plaintiff assumed her claim was being

processed under Part 713. On October 27,

1978, the FEAA responded to this letter

stating that the Part 351 appeal had been

cancelled and that the Part 713 appeal was

to be handled by the employing agency,

-48-

namely, the U.S. Air Force at Vandenberg

Air Force Base. On November 6, 1978, Mr.

Coady, the Civilian Personnel Officer at

Vandenberg, replied to attorney Buynak's

October 25, 1978 letter advising him that

no action had been taken on the Part 713

appeal. Four days later Buynak responded

to Mr. Coady requesting that the agency

begin Part 713 processing because plaintiff

was “ready, willing and able to cooperate”

with the agency in processing her com-

plaint. Civilian Personnel Officer Van

Nice responded, directing that plaintiff

should contact Chief EEO Counselor Carol

McCool. After this was accomplished by

Buynak, Ms. McCool assigned Joanne Tomlin-

son as counselor in the matter. An initial

interview with plaintiff was held by Ms.

Tomlinson on February 2, 1979, at which

time plaintiff's claims of improper and

discriminatory RIF were considered, as well

as her secondary complaints of reprisal,

-49-

and denial of re-employment priority status

with respect to job vacancies at Vanden-

berg Air Force Base. Ms. Tomlinson

expressed to plaintiff her belief that the

original complaints would not be considered

timely and thereby affirmed that she would

concentrate on the issue of plaintiff's

priority rights. Ultimately, Ms. Tomlinson

did recommend placement through plaintiff's

priority rights so as to resolve her

complaints.

Subsequent to her final interview with

Ms. Tomi. ison, plaintiff received a "NOTICE

OF FINAL INTERVIEW WITH AN EEO COUNSELOR"

dated February 23, 1979, which informed her

that if she believed she had been discrim-

inated against on the basis of race, color,

religion, sex, national origin or age, a

discrimination complaint could be filed

within 15 days of receipt of the notice.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a formal dis-

crimination complaint, also on February 23,

—T

1979. The Air Force, on March 21, 1979,

rejected plaintiff's complaints as being

untimely. The Notice of Final Agency

Determination, however, was not sent by

certified mail as required by Air Force

Regulation (hereafter "AFR") 40-713,

Paragraph 23e, October 20, 1975. At trial,

plaintiff testified that she never received

this notice and thus has validly invoked

the jurisdiction of this Court by filing

her district court complaint 180 days after ~

the date of lodging a formal administrative

complaint with the Air Force.

On October ll, 1979, plaintiff filed

her initial complaint in district court,

asserting three causes of action and

alleging four claims. The claims consisted

of (1) reverse racial discrimination; (2)

coercive and retaliatory activity for

having filed administrative claims; (3)

denial of reemployment priority status; and

(4) improper RIF. After answering on

=e

February 25, 1980, defendants moved to

dismiss the action pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1) on

the basis that the Court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. This motion was heard

on April 21, 1980. Following this hearing,

the Court, on April 30, 1980, made and

entered its Decision, with Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment,

remanding all of plaintiff's claims to the

defendants for complete administrative

processing. That Decision states in

pertinent part:

DECISION Remanding Proceedings to Air Force

(4/30/80)

z & ®

Findings of Fact

The Court, having considered the

pleadings herein, the Certified

Administrative Record, the Memoranda

and Declarations submitted by both

x)

sides, and having heard oral argument

of counsel, finds that:

l. Plaintiff's failure to

discuss her case with an EEO Counselor is

not a jurisdictional defect;

2. Defendants through their

|

|

|

,

|

|

.

|

:

personnel at Vandenberg Air Force Base,

California, had an affirmative duty to

timely refer Plaintiff's complaints to an

EEO Counselor for consideration and to |

fully advise Plaintiff of the administra- |

tive processing requirement and her rights

therein, which Defendants failed to accom-

plish, although Plaintiff has been consis-

tently employed at Vandenberg Air Force

Base, California, since lodging her

complaints;

36 Because of these failures by

Defendants, Plaintiff's complaints were

never accepted and processed administra-

tively in accordance with Defendants’

regulations, which processing would aid

Sr : pas ‘J

immensely in the resolution of the diffi-

culties herein considered, which failure

constituted and constitute arbitrary,

capricious and unreasonable denial of the

due process of law rights of Plaintiff.

4. Jurisdiction of this Court

to hear discrimination complaints under 42

United States Code section 2000e-16 termi-

nates thirty days after receipt of the

final notice of agency determination by the

Plaintiff; otherwise, this Court has

continuing jurisdiction to entertain the

judicial complaint herein, beginning 180

days after Piaintiff filed her formal

initial charge with the agency;

5. Notice of the final agency

determination was never received by Plain-

tiff. Defendant Air Force, in violation of

its own regulations (A.F.R. 40-713, October

20, 1975, Para. 23e.), failed to send to

Plaintiff and her representative a written

decision by certified mail, return receipt

@84-

requested. And because 180 days have

elapsed between the filing of Plaintiff's

formal initial charge and the filing of the

complaint herein, this court has continuing

jurisdiction.

x & ®

Conclusions of Law

l. This Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over this action.

2. Defendants' motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-

diction should be denied.

36 In the interest of justice

and fairness to all parties, the complaints

of Plaintiff as presented herein should be

remanded to the Civilian Personnel Office

of Vandenberg Air Force Base, Californie;

for continuous and diligent administrative

processing by the Defendants under applica-

ble Air Force regulations to final deter-

mination by the Defendant Air Force and the

other said Defendants, all of said

-55-

processing to be initiated within sixty

(60) days of the date of entry of the

within Decision and Order.

4. Said processing should be

accomplished in strict compliance with

applicable Air Force regulations, should

involve all stages of administrative

processing entailed therein, and should be

conducted so as to insure Plaintiff her

full rights in said proceedings and a fair

adjudication of her complaints.

S. In addition to said rights

and privileges afforded by said regu-

lations, Plaintiff should be entitled to be

present at ali stages of the administrative

processing and to be represented thereat by

her legal representative.

6. Plaintiff should not be

questioned at any time without her legal

representative being present and Plain-

tiff's legal representative should receive

copies of all written communications

involved in this administrative processing.

7. If tiie Defendants fail to

initiate the said admiristrative processing ]

within sixty (60) days from the date of

entry of the within Decision and Order, or

to fully, properly and diligently process

said complaints of Plaintiff through all

stages to final determination by the Air

Force, this Court, upon motion by Plain-

tiff, should consider reopening of this

proceeding herein and granting the relief

prayed by the Plaintiff in her complaint on

file herein.

8. This proceeding and the

complaint herein should be dismissed

without prejudice to:

(a) the reopening of this

proceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the

Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-

trative processing within sixty (60) days

from the date of entry of this Decision and

oo

Order, or fail to fully, properly, and

diligently carry on said processing “o

final administrative determination in

strict compliance with the regulations of

Defendant Air Force; or

(b) the filing by Plaintiff

of a new complaint for review of the said

administrative processing and final deter-

mination if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or

has good legal cause to complain and seek

judicial review of any portion of said

administrative proceeding or final deter-

mination.

x * #®

Let Judgment Be Entered Accordingly.

x & &

JUDGMENT of Remand (4/30/80)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

denied.

-58-

The case and proceeding herein is”

remanded to Defendant Air Force, and the |

other Defendants, and particularly to the

Civilian Personnel Office of Vandenberg Air j

Force Base, California, for continuous and .

diligent administrative processing by

Defendants under applicable Air Force

regulations to final determination by the

Defendant Air Force and the other said

Defendants, such processing to be initiated j

within sixty (60) days of the entry of the

aforesaid Decision and Order and the within ;

Judgment.

Be The Court reserves its jurisdic-

tion and right to reopen the within pro-

ceeding, upon motion of Plaintiff, if

Defendants fail to initiate the said

administrative processing within said sixty

(60) day neriod, or fail to fully, properly

and diligently process Plaintiff's

-59-

complaints through all stages to final

determination by the Defendant Air Force,

in strict compliance with its regulations.

4. This proceeding and the complaint

herein are hereby dismissed, but without

prejudice to:

(a) the reopening of this

proceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the

Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-

trative processing within sixty (60) days

from the date of entry of this Judgment, or

fail to fully, properly and diligently

carry on said processing to final adminis-

trative determination in strict compliance

with the regulations of Defendant Air

Force; or

(b) the filing by Plaintiff of a

new complaint for review of said adminis-

trative processing and final determination

if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or has good

legal cause to complain and seek judicial

=-60-

review of any portion of said administra-

tive processing or final determination.

x & &

III

FACTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE

APRIL 30, 1980 REMAND JUDGMENT

On June 27, 1980, the Defendants,

United States of America and the United

States Air Force, through Hans M. Mark,

Secretary, appealed the order of this Court

remanding proceedings for administrative

processing and dismissing the complaint

without prejudice to reopening and to

filing a new complaint. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals heard oral argument on

this appeal on November 6, 1981 and issued

its Unpublished Opinion dismissing the

appeal for lack of finality on December 14,

1981. Clemente v. J.S.A., et al, No.

80-5508, Slip Op. (9th Cir. 1981). The

events occurring after the Remand Judgment

of the District Court on April 30, 1980,

=¢j<

and after the 9th Circuit Opinion dismiss-

ing the appeal therefrom on December 14,

1981, constitute the main bases for plain-

tiff's constitutional claims of procedural

due process denials.

During the interim between the Dis-

trict Court hearing on the Motion to

Dismiss on April 21, 1980, and the Remand

Judgment on April 30, 1980, plaintiff's

attorney Buynak wrote to Civilian Personnel

Officer Phillip Seneschal of Vandenberg Air

Force Base encouraging the Base to promptly

initiate the administrative process in

plaintiff's case, requesting full and

complete processing of all claims, a pro-

posed schedule for processing, an outline

of all processing steps, and copies of all

applicable regulations, documents requested

by motions to produce and answers to

interrogatories. On May 2, 1980, Assistant

U.S. Attorney Peter Osinaff, attorney for

the defendants, admonished Buynak that all

a8 2<

communications should be sent directly to

him. In response to this admonition,

Buynak on May 6, 1980, wrote to Osinoff

demanding that administrative processing

commence immediately and warning that any

further delay would evidence a "wilful

intent to extend these proceedings and

arbitrarily deny the due process rights of

[plaintiff]," citing Owen v. City of

Independence Missouri, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)

On May 23, 1980, EEO Counselor Hattie

Hall requested the services of an Air Force

Investigator, which request began the

administrative processing of plaintiff's

discrimination claim. Upon receiving

notification of that request, Buynak wrote

to Osinoff urging that he advise Vandenberg

Air Force Base to comply with this Court's

April 30, 1980 Judgment. On June 27, 1980,

Osinoff authorized Buynak to correspond.

directly with the Air Force, stating that

the United States Attorney's Office “has no

a63e

involvement in administrative proceedings

of the Air Force... ." Osinoff also

enclosed a Notice Of Appeal to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals and insisted that

this Court's April 30, 1980 Judgment was

stayed by the same.

Subsequent to the above, plaintiff and

Buynak met with Air Force Investigator

Harry W. Johnstone, and presented him with

an outline of plaintiff's complaints, her

administrative processing expectations and

a declaration with a substantial number of

exhibits attached. At that time Mr.

Johnstone stated that he could only process

the discrimination claim of plaintiff and

none of the other claims. On July 22,

1980, Buynak emphasized his disagreement

with the limitations placed on the scope of

the investigation and the processing steps

undertaken, relying on his belief that such

limitations were violative of this Court's

Remand Judgment. On July 25, 1980, Mr.

=-64-

Johnstone replied to this correspondence

stating that this Court had remanded the

discrimination claim only, and further

insisting that it was not his responsibil-

ity to define the issues which had been

accepted for investigation and that he had

received no guidance from the Air Force

indicating that he should broaden the scope q

of his investigation. Attached to this

letter was a schedule outlining accom-

plished or anticipated processing steps,

along with the actual and estimated dates

of compietion of each step.

Buynak also addressed a letter to

Major Charles S. Brower, Legal Officer for

Labor Relations at Vandenberg, outlining

the difficulties encountered in processing,

and requesting a meeting on July 30, 1980.

Buynak concluded by charging that the

agency either did not know what it was

doing or was wilfully violating the orders

of this Court. The meeting took place, as

@65<

scheduled, on July 30, 1980, with Major

Brower, Mr. Seneschal and Buynak in atten-

dance. Various alternatives were discussed

concerning the processing of plaintiff's

RIF appeal, her priority re-employment

rights claim and the reprisal charges. On

August 8, 1980, Mr. Seneschal memorialized

the substance of the June 30, 1980 meeting

in a letter directed to Buynak, acknowledg-

ing the request for documents and assuring

the latter that this request would be

complied with. On September 16, 1980,

Major Brower related to Buynak that Air

Force Headquarters had reached the deter-

mination that no further administrative

processing could be afforded, either

directly through the Air Force or indirect-

ly through the FEAA or the Merit Systems

Protection Board (hereafter "MSPB*). This

decision was assertedly based on the claim

by the Air Force that plaintiff's appeal

was an FEAA appeal and that there was no

=€6

savings clause allowing the MSPB to assume

appeals before the FEAA. The FEAA had been

disbanded and would be unable to consider

the claims. Thus, concluded the Air Force,

plaintiff's claims, apart from her dis-

crimination claim could not be administra-

tively processed. On September 16, 1980,

Buynak again wrote to Investigator

Johnstone, requesting a report on the

status of the investigation and bringing to

the latter's attention that none of the

plaintiff's witnesses had been contacted or

interrogatories set to them. interroga-

tories hac not been sent to be reviewed by

Buynak as previously agreed, and the

request for documents was still outstand-

ing. This correspondence was never an-

swered. On September 22, 1980, Mr. John-

stone forwarded his Report Of Investigation

to the Base Commander at Vandenberg,

finding no discrimination. Thereafter,

Major Brower reconfirmed to Buynak that

=a¢7J<

there would be no further processing of the

plaintiff's claims.

On October 17, 1980, Lieutenant

Colonel Pray, Chief of Personnel at Vanden-

berg, issued a “Notice of Proposed Disposi-

tion of Discrimination Complaint = Lowene

R. Clemente,” recommending cancellation of

plaintiff's complaint. Upon receipt of

this notice, Buynak, on October 31, 1980,

wrote to Lt. Col. Pray alleging failures in

the processing of plaintiff's claims as

required by this Court's Judgment of

Remand, and requesting combined adju-

dication of all four claims. This request

made specific reference to the Air Force's

own regulations; the constitutional rights

of plaintiff; this Court's Remand Judgment;

and the decision of Owen v. City of Inde-

pendence, supra, which was attached to the

letter along with the Motion of plaintiff

before the Court of Appeals “To Dismiss the

Appeal or Affirm, And for Equitable and

-68-

Constitutional Relief." This letter was

also sent to Major Brower and to Osinoff,

defendants' attorney. On October 31, 1980,

Suynak again wrote Osinoff stressing that

defendants failed to “diligently, promptly

and completely process Ms. Clemente's

claims," there*y “perfecting causes of

action for constitutional violations

against the Air Force as well as any

governmental official responsible for these |

actions," again citing Owen v. City of

Independence, supra.

Finally, on November 19, 1980, a

"Notice of Final Decision" was rendered by

Colonel Ronald J. Bishop, Jr., Base Com-

mander of Vandenberg Air Force Base. This

eesisien cancelled the plaintiff's com-

plaint and added, self-servingly, that the

Air Force had made a “good faith attempt”

to comply with the Remand Judgment of this

Court.

-69-

After receiving the final Air Force

decision, plaintiff filed motions before

this Court to reopen proceedings and for

leave to file an amended and supplemental

complaint. It was at this time that

plaintiff's attorney added‘ the causes of

action for constitutional violations in

addition to the Title VII claims. These

motions were granted and, in addition, this

Court ordered that defendants maintain the

status quo with respect to plaintiff's

employment and provide her with RIF priori-

ty rights. Thereafter, on August 16, 1982,

cross-motions for summary judgment were

heard by the Court. Plaintiff asserted the

deprivation of constitutional rights of

administrative due process, equitable

estoppel, right to equitable relief, and

improper RIF. Defendants contended that,

under Rules 12(c) and 56 of Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's claims were

time barred and that the Court lacked

@70@

jurisdiction over matters not encompassed

by the administrative complaint. In

addition, defendants argued that the

plaintiff had not charged a proper defen-

dant with the Title VII violations, to wit,

Hans M. Mark, the Secretary of the Air

Force. All cross-motions were dened and

the first three causes of action of the

complaint were amended so that the Secre-

tary of the Air Force would be the only

defendant named and charged in these Title

VII causes of action.

The last pre-trial motion was heard on

April 4, 1980, at which time this Court

determined that the defendants named in the

last three causes of action were entitled

to neither absolute nor qualified immunity

from suit. The triable issues having been

established, this matter proceeded to

nonjury trial before the Court on May 23,

1983.

aie

IV

DISCUSSION

Turning to the legal issues raised by

the pleadings in this case, plaintiff's

claims under Title VII and the Constitution

will be considered separately, as well as

all defenses to each such claim, setting

forth the fact findings and legal con-

clusions which compel and support a Judg-

ment for plaintiff and against defendants

as hereinafter ordered.

Le Plaintiff's Title VII Claim, 42

U.S.C. section 2000 e, et seg.

Plaintiff's Title VII claims flow from

alleged in’ erse racial discrimination which

ultimately resulted in the RIF and in

retaliatory action against plaintiff in

connection with her filing of a discrimina-

tion complaint. At trial, the Court found

the evidence insufficient to support

plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination

as such. A finding of discrimination,

oF2ea

however, is not a necessary condition

precedent to recover under Title VII if

there is a showing of retaliation by the

defendant against the plaintiff for having

filed a discrimination complaint. See

Shelei and Grossman, Employment Discrimina-

tion Law, 426-33 (BNA 1976). The basis for

an action challenging the alleged retal-

iatory activity of an employer is found in

42 U.S.C. section 2000e-3(a) which provides

in pertinent part:

(a) It shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against any of his

employees . . . because he has opposed

any practice made an unlawful employ-

ment practice by this subchapter, or

because he has made a charge, tes-

tified, assisted, or participated in

any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.

oF3e

ee ee

The issue retaliation is raised in the

amended cuuwoOlaint which alleges the follow-

ing retaliatory acts to have been committed

by and through the agents of defendants

Hans M. Mark, Secretary of the Air Force:

!

(a) erosion and change of

position, responsibilities and duties;

(b) removal of plaintiff into an

office by herself and separation from

her employment section;

(c) removal of plaintiff into an

interim position at the grade of GS-5

even before the effective date of the

RIF action;

(d) undermining plaintiff's

supervisorial authority and controls;

(e) refusal to inform plaintiff

of matters regarding the performance

of responsibilities and duties;

(f) refusal to consider plain-

tiff's allegations in good faith, fair

resolution, and

aFa=

(g) refusal to provide super-

visory direction for plaintiff.

The filing of a discrimination com-

plaint is a protected etme. As provided

in the Air Force's own Regulations, 5 CFR

section 713.261 (1977):

Complainants .. . shall be free

from restraint, iitertetence, dis-

crimination or reprisal at any stage

of the presentation and processing of

a complaint, including the counseling

stage under Section 713 or any time

thereafter.

The evidence necessary to show retaliation

is (1) knowledge by the employer that the

complainant has or will file a charge; and

(2) different conditions of employment,

before and after the filing of a complaint,

with negative conditions first appearing at

or after the filing of a complaint. See

Pettyway v. American Cast Iron Company, 41ll

F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969); Barlea v. United

j=

Nuclear Corporation 462 F.2s 149 (10th

Cir.) 1972). The burden of proof on the

employee is only a showing by a fair

preponderance of credible evidence. EEOC

v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc. 41ll F. Supp.

66 (SDNY 1975), aff'd 559 F.2d 1203 (2d

Cir. 1977).

At trial there was credible evidence

to support a finding of retaliation on the

part of the Air Force. This evidence,

inter alia, consisted of the government's

destruction of relevant documents prior to

this matter proceeding to trial and the

cover-up of the same. . Moreover, this was

accompanied by the callous disregard of

plaintiff's right to have her grievances

aired before the appropriate administrative

body by failing to advise her, as urged by

the FEAA, of her need to elect between

complex procedural remedial schemes, and

the ultimate cancellation of her adminis-

trative complaint and failure to provide

=%6<

further processing with respect to all but

one of plaintiff's claims because of her

alleged failure to make the required

election and see an EEO counselor within

the time prescribed by regulation. In

addition, it was demonstrated at trial that

plaintiff was removed from office into an

interim GS-5 position even before the

effective date of the RIF, and had also

been segregated from her fellow employees

in an isolated office at an even earlier

point in time. The transparent purpose of

these retaliatory actions was to punish

plaintiff - a troublemaker, a purpose

which, in the opinion of this Court,

stemmed in part from plaintiff's clear and

prompt indications of her intent to file a

discrimination complaint against her Air

Force employer. These indications com-

menced as early as late 1976, when the

plaintiff initiated contact with an indi-

vidual she believed to be an EEO counselor,

aITe

&

and continued through April 8, 1977, when

she filed her “telegram appeal" with the

Civil Service Commission. This notice,

when coupled with the subsequent actions of

the defendant Air Force, is sufficient to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation

under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-3(a).

Defendant Air Force contends that the

Court is without jurisdiction to dispose of

plaintiff's claims under Title VII due to

her failure to comply with the 30 day

"statute of limitations" established by 42

U.S.C. section 2000e-16(c). See, Brown v.

General Services Administration, 425 U.S.

820 (1976). In Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d

1396 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit

held that the 30 day time limit found in

section 2000e-16(c) begins to run from the

time the plaintiff receives the “right to

sue" letter from the agency.

While the Air Force is correct in its

conclusion that a district court complaint

=7§-

must be filed within 30 days of notice of

final agency decision, this rule is subject ©

to the requirement that the complainant

actually receive notice. The evidence in

this case establishes beyond any question

that neither the plaintiff nor her attorney

received the requisite notice. Thus the

jurisdiction of this Court is proper, and

attached when she filed her complaint after

the lapse of 30 days following the date of

lodging her formal complaint with the

agency. 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-16 (c).

Accordingly, the plaintiff's failure to

comply with the 30 day limitation period is

excused.

In addition to suggesting that plain-

tiff's federal court action was not timely

filed, defendant Air Force further contends

that the plaintiff should be foreclosed

from prosecuting this action because of her

failure to bring her discrimination com-

plaint to the attention of an EEO counselor

aF9-

within the 30 day time limit prescribed by

regulation. See 5 C.F.R. section

713.214(a) (1) (1977); 29 C.F.R. section

1613.214(a) (1) (1979). For the reasons

expressed below, these arguments of of the

defendant Air Force completely fail to

counter or rebut the Title VII claims of

plaintiff for retaliatory actions taken

against her.

Plaintiff herein should not be held

accountable for any technical noncompliance

with procedural formalities, however

dilatory her actions may appear at first

glance. Plaintiff should not be penalized

for her misguided reliance on her first

attorney, Newton. The Court determined,

even before this matter came to trial, that

plaintiff was excused for her inaction

because of the ineffective assistance of

her then counsel, Newton. Moreover, the

Air Force received prompt, even premature

notice of plaintiff's claims by the

-80-

latter's telegrams of April 8, 1977 and

July 17, 1977. These telegrams more than

satisfy the policy of “equitable extension"

of filing periods as articulated in Cooper

v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1980).

See also Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631

(D.C. Cir. 1978). In Cooper, plaintiff was

granted an equitable extension of the

period in which to file a discriminaticn

charge because of his reliance on improper

advice given to him by a government

personnel officer. If the plaintiff's

conduct in Cooper is excusable where no

discrimination complaint, formal or

informal, was filed, then a fortiori the

deficiencies in plaintiff's efforts to have

her grievance disposed of should be excus-

ed. The Air Force simply cannot be said to |

have been without notice of Mrs. Clemente's —

charge.

The Air Force was also seriously

derelict in its duty to inform plaintiff of

-8l-

the avenues available to process her

complaints. As mentioned above, the

plaintiff filed her RIF appeal with the

Civil Service Commission and combined her

discrimination complaint with the appeal.

The case was thus referred by the Commis-

sion to the agency to determine under which

procedure, as between the RIF appeal system

and the discrimination complaints system,

this entire matter would be resolved. As

provided for in 5 C.F.R. section

772.306(a),

If the appellant has not been informed

of the separate rights of appeal, the

Appeals Authority shall refer the

matter to the agency so the agency may

explain the alternate rights of appeal

to the appellant as provided in

section 713.236 of Part 713 of this

chapter and afford him the opportuni-

ty, if appropriate, to elect the

avenue of appeal he wishes to pursue.

-82-

Paragraph 33 of AFR 40-713 addresses this

subject matter:

Where the basis of a complaint of

discrimination is an action which may

be appealed directly to the Civil

Service Commission the complainant

should be informed of the requirement

to specify under which part of the

regulations the issue of discrimina-

tion is to be processed...

(2) If the complainant elects to

proceed under FPM Chapter 713, after

having been specifically informed of

his right to use the other appellate

system, then the entire matter,

including the merits of action, will

be reviewed under this regulation.

b. - « « any investigation requested

by the Commission shall be conducted

in accordance with the Commission's

specific written instructions.

=§3~<

The obvious purpose of these combined

regulations is to avoid dual processing of

complaints covering the same factual

matters.

In accordance with these regulations,

the Civil Service Commission directed the

Civilian Personnel Office at Vandenberg to

gain a written election of procedures from

the plaintiff. The Commission's letter of

July 18, 1977, states in relevant part:

Section 772.306 of the Commission's

regulations provides that when an

allegation of prohibited discrimina-

tion is raised in connection with a

timely appeal, this Authority shall

refer the matter to the agency for an

explanation of alternative rights of

appeal either under Part 713 or under

Part 351 of the regulations and to

secure appellant's election in writ-

ing.

Please inform appellant that this

-84-

action can be pursued within your

agency as a complaint of discrimina-

tion under Part 713 of the Civil

Service Regulations. Explain in

detail how such a complaint is pro-

cessed to completion, including the

role of the counselor, the inves-

tigation, the provisions of informal

resolution, the notice of proposed

disposition, the right of hearing

before a complaints examiner assigned

by the Civil Service Commission, the

recommended decision of the examiner,

the final decision of the head of the

agency, and the appeal right to the

Appeals Review Board of the Commis-

sion, and to the U.S. District Court

as appropriate. ...

As clearly indicated by the Commission's

directive to the Air Force, the burden was

on the latter to secure the written elec

tion of procedures from the plaintiff and

~§S<

ih Dace ea

Sere ee

inform her, in detail, of the various

processing steps. The Air Force failed to

execute this duty by first neglecting to

explain, in any comprehensible fashion, the

alternative procedures available to plain-

tiff and then failing to gain her written

election of procedures despite having |

received at least two subsequent requests

Ee

from the FEAA to do so. The consequence of

the Air Force's malfeasance was that the

plaintiff's appeal was hopelessly lost in

administrative limbo until it was ultimate-

ly resurrected by her newly retained

counsel, Attorney Buynak, and was finally

referred to an EEO counselor. Given the

complex and incomprehensible maze of

procedures and elections sufficient to

confound most lawyers and even this Court,

plaintiff, a humble civil servant, can

hardly be expected to make an informed

election of procedure without ac»-quate

guidance. Plaintiff's delay in contacting

-86-

an EEO counselor is obviously explainable

and executed for these reasons alone.

But even more persuasive to this Court

than the above-stated reasons is the fact

that technical compliance with the 30 day

limitation period was actually achieved by

plaintiff. Defendants have admitted that

the Civilian Personnel Officer is the Chief

EEO Counselor. Indirectly, through the

FEAA, Civilian Personnel Officer Coady, as

declared in his letter to plaintiff of July

26, 1977, actually received Mrs. Clemente's

claims within the 30 day time limit for

initial contact. It is thus undeniable

that the timeliness of plaintiff's claims

cannot reasonably be questioned.

Defendants further assert that this

Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's

RIF appeal and reprisal complaints due to

the latter's failure to exhaust her admin-

istrative remedies with respect to these

claims. This argument of defendants,

aQF~

however, again misses the mark, inasmuch as

the demand to process these claims was made

on numerous occasions by Buynak. The Air

Force, enabled by its own regulation, had

the ability to process all of the claims

asserted. As set out in greater detail

above, AFR 40-713 provides in pertinent

part:

(2) If the complainant elects to

proceed under FPM Chapter 713, after

having been specifically informed of

his right to use the other appellate

system, then the entire matter,

including the merits of the action,

will be reviewed under this regu-

lation. . . . (emphasis added)

Recently, the Ninth Circuit confirmed in

Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.

1982), that the above language is to be

interpreted to mean that the substance of

the plaintiff's non-EEO claims are to be

considered in the review of the EEO claims.

-88-

Therefore, the Air Force not only had the

ability but the obligation to process all

of Mrs. Clemente's claims under this

section, and was not limited to her dis-

crimination complaint only. Hence, plain-

tiff's alleged failure to exhaust her

administrative remedies with respect to her

RIF and reprisal claims is a deficiency fc-

which the defendant Air Force is solely

responsible.

To punish plaintiff for her failure to

overcome all of the obstacles the Air Force

placed in her path to having her complaints

administratively processed would be to

create a gross injustice. Plaintiff's

plight has not been dissimilar to that of

plaintiff in Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d

631 (D.C. Cir. 1978). To borrow the words

of Judge Robinson:

In sum, Bethel reasonably attempted to

bring his complaint before the admin-

istrative tribunal and it unreasonably

-89-

Ee ee Pe ee eT

refused to consider his claims. He

could have done little more, and the

agency could hardly have done less.

Id. at 645. Having considered the various

defenses raised in opposition to the

granting of judgment in favor of plaintiff

on her claims and finding no merit in the

opposition, it is now necessary to turn to

the issue of the appropriate remedy or

remedies.

The remedial provisions of Title VII

allow for injunctive relief, reinstatement,

back pay or "other equitable relief as the

court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.

section 2000e-5(g). The Court finds, as

established by expert testimony, that

plaintifé, by reason of the retaliatory

activities of the defendant Air Force and

its employees and agents, has been deprived

of an is entitled to back pay of

$27,480.24. This award represents the

period of July 17, 1977, the effective date

-90-

of the RIF, to May 23, 1983, the date of

trial. In addition, the evidence at trial 7

demonstrated that had the plaintiff not

encountered purposeful and continued

retaliatory resistance to her upward

mobility, she would presently occupy ,the

station of GS-12, step 4. At least two

alternatives can be entertained in assuring

that the plaintiff is restored to her

"rightful place." First, courts have

recognized an award of "front pay," or pay

representing the time it would take the

plaintiff to train and secure the position

he or she was denied as a result of the

prohibited conduct. See, James v. Stockham

Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th

Cir. 1977); Montoya v. Anderson, 5ll

F.Supp. 523 (D.C. Colo. 1981). Nor does a

front pay award granted against the govern-

ment violate the doctrine of sovereign

immunity. Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471 F.

Supp. 767 (D.C.D.C. 1979). A second

=9]=

alternative, in lieu of front pay, is

"seniority relief," where the plaintiff is

ordered to be put in the position he or she

would have occupied but for the illegal

conduct. See Franks v. Bowman Transporta-

tion, 422 U.S. 747 (1976); Richerson v.

Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3rd Cir. 1977). To

better facilitate and insure plaintiff's

delivery from her present and long-static

position, this Court should elect to

enforce the latter remedy, and to order the

Air Force to place plaintiff in a GS-12,

step 4 station. Moreover, because plain-

tiff may not yet be qualified for this

position, the Court should enjoin defendant

Air Force to train plaintiff so that her

qualifications will match her new assign-

ment.

Plaintiff concedes that interest is

unavailable against the government because

of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See

Saunders v. Claytor, 629 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.

=92<

seats cee memati

1980). The Court, however, does find that

an award of attorneys fees and costs is

appropriate under 42 U.S.C. section

2000e-5(k), since plaintiff has prevailed

on the merits. The amount of attorneys

fees and costs will be established in a

separate hearing to be held at a future

date, the Court retaining jurisdiction for

this purpose.

In addition to the above, this Court

should enjoin defendants from taking

further unlawful employment or retaliatory

action against plaintiff, and should order

that the personnel files of plaintiff for

the period of July 17, 1977, to April 2l,

1980 be purged by the elimination of all

derogatory references to piuintiff and the

insertion and substitution of appropriate

records of this case and proceeding.

Furthermore, this Court should retain and

reserve jurisdiction of this case and

-93-

ee iat palais

proceeding in order to insure the implemen-

tation of these orders.

y Plaintiff's Due Process Claims.

As indicated above, on April 30, 1980,

an order was entered by this Court remand-

ing this case to the Air force to adminis-

tratively process all of plaintiff's

complaints. The order provided that

plaintiff be permitted to be present at all

stages of the administrative process and be

represented by her attorney, that she not

be questioned without her attorney present

and that her attorney receive copies of all

written communication involved in the

processing.

The defendants, apparently under the

pretext of attempting to comply with the

Remand Judgment, agreed to produce certain

documents, contact witnesses identified to

be favorable to the plaintiff and establish

an investigation schedule so as to provide

notice of when the various steps of the

-94-

investigation would proceed. In direct

defiance of the Court's Remand Judgment as

well as the constant and unambiguous

demands of plaintiff's counsel urging them

to comply with the same, defendants

contumaciously refused to process all but

one of plaintiff's complaints, and this in

summary fashion. The responsibility for

this gross dereliction in duty does not

rest solely on any one person but can be

attributed, in varying degrees, to the acts

and omissions of the six individually named

defendants. The record of this matter is —

replete with examples of Air Force person-

nel literally turning their heads and

stubbornly ignoring the Court's April 30,

1980 Remand Judgment. For example, on

April 25, 1980, following the oral orders

of this Court which were ultimately memori-

alized as the Remand Judgment entered by

the Court on April 30, 1980, plaintiff's

counsel wrote to Civilian Personnel Officer

-95-

ee

Phillip Seneschal, encouraging the Base to

administratively process plaintiff's

complaint and specifically requesting:

(1) full, complete processing of all

claims;

(2) a proposed schedule for process-

ing;

(3) an outline of processing steps;

(+) copies of all applicable regu-

latior:s;

(5S) documents requested by motions to

produce; and

(6) answers to interrogatories

proposed in conformance with the oral

orders of Judge Hauk.

Thereafter, defendants' attorney, Osinoff,

contacted plaintiff's counsel directing

that all communication should be sent

directly to him rather than the Air Force.

Buynak responded to this directive, citing

Owen v. City of Independence, supra, 445

U.S. 622 (1980), and warning that any

-96-

further delay in processing would evidence

a "wilful intent to extend these proceed-

ings and arbitrarily deny the due process

rights of plaintiff." Subsequent to this

correspondence the Air Force dispatched an

investigator to commence review of plain-

tiff's discrimination claim only. Upon

receiving notification of the Air Force's

request for an investigator, Buynak again

wrote to Osinoff urging him to have his

client fully comply with this Court's

Remand Judgment, to which the latter

responded that the United States Attorney's

Office "has no involvement in administra-

tive proceedings of the Air Force."

Thereafter, Buynak met with Investiga-

tor Johnstone outlining plaintiff's com-

plaints and her administrative processing

expectations. Johnstone reiterated his

intention to investigate the discrimination

charge only, and was advised by plaintiff's

counsel tnat any such limitation would be

=$7o

ee eT

ea Rl erat cn ome

in violation of the April 30, 1980 Remand

Judgment of this Court.

Subsequent to this meeting, Buynak

also met with Major Brower and Mr.

Seneschal at which time various alterna-

tives were discussed to bring about the

processing of the three complaints of

plaintiff yet outstanding. The follow-up

to this meeting consisted of a confirmation

that documents requested by Buynak of Mr.

Seneschal would be produced along with a

recommendation that plaintiff's three

remaining complaints would be directed to

the Merit System Protection Board (hereaf-

ter "MSPB"). Buynak's request for docu-

ments was never fully complied with and the

suggestion to process plaintiff's claims

through the MSPB pioved unproductive, since

the latter was not authorized to assume

FEAA appeals. ‘ Thus, according to Major

Brower, no further administrative process-

ing could be afforded.

-98-

At approximately the same point in

time, Buynak again contacted Investigator

Johnstone, requesting a status report on

his investigation and pointing out that:

(1) none of plaintiff's witnesses had

been contacted or interrogatories sent to

them;

(2) interrogatories had not been

reviewed with plaintiff's counsel as

previously agreed; and

(3) the request for documents and

answers were still outstanding.

Without responding to this letter from

plaintiff's counsel, Investigator Johnstone

on September 22, 1980 forwarded his final

Report of Investigation" to the Base

Commander finding no discrimination. As is

evident, this conclusion was reached by

contacting only those witnesses who were

hostile to plaintiff's position, igncering

document requests perceived to be crucial

by the plaintiff, failing to propound

-~99~

sel

oe et

alte pint th ett 6 IRR olen

eat Vii

potentially significant interrogatories and

igvotviac plaintiff in tie investigation to

the least extent possible.

Following the submission of the

investigation report to Lieutenant Colonel

Pray, Chief of Personnel at Vandenberg, the

recommendation of Investigator Johnstone

was essentially "rubber stamped” and a

"Notice of Pronosed Disposition of Dis-

crimination Complaint" issued, proposing

cancellation of the complaint. Upon

receipt of this notice, Buynak wrote to

Lieutenant Colonel Pray, outlining the

failures in the processing of plaintiff's

claims as required by this Court's oral

in-Court remand orders of April 21, 1983,

and its written Remand Judgment of April

30, 1983, and requesting combined adjudica-

tion of all four claims. This request made

specific reference to Air Force Regula-

tions, the constitutional rights of the

plaintiff, the orders of this Court and the

-100-

decision of Owen v. City of Independence,

supra, which was attached, as well as the

motion before the Court of Appeals which

outlined constitutional violations. This

letter was also sent to defendants’ counsel |

and Major Brower.

In lieu of responding to the above

correspondence, on November 19, 1980,

Colonel Bishop, Base Commander at Vanden-

berg, issued a "Notice of Final Decision”

which cancelled Mrs. Clemente's complaint.

Colonel Bishop's final decision concluded

that the Air Force was not waiving the

thirty day statute of limitations 3 and

that the "Air Force has simply in good

faith attempted to comply with Judge Hauk's

order."

Plaintiff clearly states a cause of

action for violations of procedural due

process under the Fifth Amendment of the

Constitution. These constitutional claims

flow from denying plaintiff any opportunity

-101-

to be heard on three of her four adminis-

trative claims and the disposal of her

discrimination claim in a grossly inade-

quate and highly superficial manner. The

set

remedial basis for claims predicated upon

violations of the U.S. Constitution by

federal agents is found in Bivens v. Six

Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.

388 (1971). See also, Carlson v. Green,

¢ 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Owen v. City of Inde-

pendence, supra; Jacobsen v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.

1977).

In Bivens, the principle was estab-

lished that victims of constitutional

violations by federal officials have a

right to recover damages in federal court

despite the absence of any statute confer-

ring such right. In this regard, Bivens

actions can be analogized to 42 U.S.C.

section 1983, their state action counter-

part, which provides:

-102-

Every person, who, under color of any

statute, « dinance, regulation, custom

or usage of any state or territory,

subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction

thereof, to the depriviation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution of laws,

shall be liable to the party injured

in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceedings for

redress.

Section 1983 and Bivens cases have been

used interchangeably wy the Supreme Court.

As stated by Justice White in Butz v.

Economou, 4 U.S. 478, 504 (1978);

The section 1983 action was provided

to vindicate federal constitutional

rights. That Congress decided, after

passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,

to enact legislation specifically

-103-

St ida SR A aE RE BU RCE RAED

requiring state officials to respond

in federal court for their failures to

observe the constitutional limitations

in their powers is hardly a reason for

excusing their federal counterparts

for the identical constitutional

transgressions. To create a system in

which the Bill of Rights monitors more

closely the conduct of state officials

than it does that of federal officials

is to stand the constitutional design

on its head.

The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has urged

federal courts to be mindful of the need to

be inventive and resourceful in protecting

constitutional guarantees. In Jacobsen v.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d

928 (9th Cir. 1977), the court stated:

No man in this country is so high that

he is above the law. No officer of

the law may set that law at defiance

with impunity. All the officers of

-104-

government, from the highest to the

lowest, are creatures of the law and

are bound to obey it... .

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was one of the

vehicles whereby Congress sought to enforce

the provisions of the then recently enacted

Fourteenth Amendment. Congress intended to

provide victims of constitutional depriva-

tions a constitutional remedy whereby the

state tort remedy, although available in

theory, was not available in practice.

Thus, section 1983 and Fifth Amendment

relief must be read against the background

of tort liability that makes a man respor

sible for the natural consequences of his

actions. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 103

(1961).

In extending this liability to govern-

mental entities themselves, the United

States Supreme Court in Owen v. City of

Independence, Missouri, supra, emphasized,

-105-

1 -. we. re Ss

How ‘uniquely amiss' it would be,

therefore, if the government itself --

"the social organ to which all of our

society look for the promotion of

liberty, justice, fair and equal

treatment and the setting of worthy

norms and goals for social conduct' --

were permitted to disavow liability

for the injury it has begotten...

A damages remedy against the offending

party is a vital component of any

Foe nS ne, aa ee EC i!

scheme for vindicating cherished

constitutional guarantees, and the

importance of assuring its efficacy is

only accentuated when the wrongdoer

is the institution that has been

established to protect the very rights

ae eee ees

it has transgressed. [Citations

omitted]

445 U.S. at 651.

The Court added:

-106-

Doctrines of tort law have changed

significantly over the past century,

and our notions of governmental

responsibility should prope::ly reflect

that evolution. No longer is indi-

vidual 'blameworthiness' the acid test

of liability; the principles of

equitable loss-spreading has jointed

fault as a factor in distributing the

cost of official misconduct.

Id. at 657.

The Court wound up with these thoughts on

cost-sharing:

We believe that today's decision

together with prior precedents in this

area, properly allocates these costs

among the three principals in the

scenario of the 1983 cause of action: |

The victim of the constitutional

deprivation; the officer whose conduct

caused the injury; and the public, as

represented by the municipal entity.

-107-

The innocent individual who is harmed

*

by an abuse of governmental authority

is assured that he will be compensated

does.

for his injury. The offending offi-

cial, so long as he conducts himself

in good faith, may go about his

business secure in the knowledge that

a qualified immunity will protect him

from personal liability for damages

that are more appropriately chargeable

to the populace as a whole. And the

public will be forced to bear only the

costs of injury inflicted by the

‘le aka a Wy Ap meng aah aD sr ls atl RR a ts see RH I ae Nl A hath Lhe Ss Secediohe

"execution of a government's policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers

or by those whose edicts and acts may

fairly be said to represent official

policy."

Upon careful and painstaking review of

the evidence and the testimony heard at

trial, it is the conclusion of this Court

-108-

that the purposefully evasive, imprecise

and haphazard manner in which plaintiff's

grievances were processed constitute a

customary practice and policy of the

defendant Air Force. Not overlooking the

fact that the Owens decision addressed the

issue of a municipality being held liable

in a section 1983 action, the issue of a

federal sovereign violating its own Consti-

tution is indistinguishable. Accordingly,

this Court finds that the federal govern-

ment is not immune from an action being

brought against it as a result of its

agents having violated the Fifth Amendment

rights of a United States citizen. The

Supreme Court has firmly held that “it

deems it untenable to draw a distinction

for purpose of immunity law between suits

brought against state officials under

section 1983 and suits brought directly

under the Constitution against federal

officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.

-109-

AF ae ARR Its ei 1 A Ae ed

478, 504 (1978). We cannot help but

recognize and enforce the natural and

logical extension of Butz and Owens, which

leads us inescapably to conclude that just

as state agencies and state officers are

both liable for constitutional violations

under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, so also

federal agencies and federal officers

should be and are liable for constitutional

violations under Bivens.

The defendants argue that plaintiff's

due process argument is without basis as

she has not been deprived of any liberty or

property interest within the protections of

the Fifth Amendment. The Court, however,

takes issue with these contentions. The

right to hold specific employment and to

follow a chosen career free from unreason-

able governmental interference comes within

the liberty and property concepts of the

Fifth Amendment: "property" consisting of

the employment itself and “liberty”

-110-

consisting of the freedom to follow a

chosen career. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467

F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

The property interest involved herein

is plaintiff's GS-7 position and the

liberty interest her Civil Service career.

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959);

Horn v. MSPB, 684 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir.

1982); Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755

(D.C. Cir. 1972). The action of the agency

and its agents in effectuating the RIF and

thereafter not providing plaintiff with a

forum in which to contest that action has

seriously prejudiced and realistically

destroyed her ability to obtain other

employment or to properly pursue her Civil

Service career. Owen v. City fo Indepen-

dence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry

v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The Air

Force established procedures for evaluating

|

combined RIF appeals and discrimination

-lll-

nee st Pe

complaints as well as complaints of re-

prisal and reemployment priority rights.

See AFR 40-713. See also Nolan v. Cleland,

supra.. Having once established these

procedures, they must be followed or plain-

tiff's due process rights will be violated.

See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 35

(1959). The Air Force, however, repeatedly

failed to abide by these procedures, even

after mandatory orders of this Court. A

more fundamental and extreme denial of

plaintiff's right to be heard cannot be

imagined. As stated by Justice Burton in

Joint Anti-Facists Refugee Committee v.

McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951):

The requirement of "due process” is

not a fairweather or timid assurance.

It must be ecabannet in times of calm

and in times of trouble; it protects

aliens as well as citizens. But "due

process," unlike some legal rules, is

not a technical cecnception with a

-112-

fixed content unrelated to time, place

and circumstances. Expressing as it

does in its ultimate analysis respect

enforced by law for that feeling of

just treatment which has been evolved

through centuries of Anglo-American

history and civilization, "due pro-

cess" cannot be imprisoned within the

treacherous limits of any formula.

Representing a profound attitude of

fairness between man and man and more

particularly between the individual

and government, “due process" is

compounded of history, reason, the

past course of decisions, and stout

confidence in the strength of the

democratic faith which we profess.

Due process is not a mechanical

instrument. It is not a yardstick.

It isa process. It is a delicate

process of adjustment inescapably

evolving the exercise of judgment by

-113-

ele aiebiche niente aesns sien Kee

those whom the Constitution entrusted

with the unfolding of the process.

While this Court is thoroughly convinced

that the due process rights of plaintiff

were violated, there still remain several

threshold issues which must be confronted

before liability may be imposed.

The first challenge defendants make to

plaintiff's due process claims is jurisdic-

tional, arguing that Title VII provides the

exclusive remedy to any complaint where

discrimination in federal employment is

claimed. See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820,

835 (1976). Defendants also cite the

recently decided Supreme Court decision of

Bush v. Lucas, 51 U.S.L.W. 4752 (1983), for

the proposition that the existence of a

Title VII remedy is a “special factor

counselling hesitation" or an “adequate

alternative remedy" within the meaning of

Bivens, thus precluding an award of consti-

tutional damages. The Ninth Circuit has

-114-

also had opportunity to deci‘e whether

Title VII and Bivens claims could peaceful-

ly coexist in Noland v. Cleland 686 F.2d

806 (9th Cir. 1982). As observed by Judge

Hoffman in that case:

The holding of Brown, supra, is

controlling on this issue and we feel

that such holding cannot be

circumvented where the factual

predicate for Nolan's due process

claim is the discrimination which is

the- basis of her Title VII claim. The

threshold question in Nolan's action

is the constructive discharge claim

and she would not be able to recover

on the due process claim due to the

identical factual basis, and,

therefore, the district court

correctly dismissed the due process

count and approached the action solely

as a Title VII action pursuant to

Brown, supra. (Emphasis added)

-115-

ni aR SR edna oe pee RN

Id. at 815. While this Court has been

unable to locate a case where Title VII and

Bivens actions have been concurrently

maintained, it is apparent that the instant

action is factually and legally distin-

guishable from the Brown, Bush and Nolan

holdings.

Plaintiff's due process and Title VII

claims flow from entirely distinct factual

occurrences, involve different individuals

and occurred at separate points in time.

The substance of the Title VII action dealt

with retaliatory activity, the factual

basis of which consisted of base officials

circumventing their duty of advising

plaintiff how to proceed within a complex

regulatory system, des rcoying documents

that tended to support claims stated under

Title VII, covering up the same, ~emoving

plaintiff from her office prematurely and

isolating her from her peers. All of this

occurred after supervisory and other

-116-

personnel became aware of plaintiff's

intention to file a discrimination com-

plaint. On the other hand, plaintiff's due

process claims arose long after her initial

Title VII complaint was filed in district

court, this Court had by its Remand Judg-

ment mandated full processing of all of

plaintiff's grievances, and entirely

different Base officials failed and refused

to accomplish the same. By no stretch of

the imagination could these due process

complaints be considered compensable under

Title VII, since no discriminatory basis or

retaliatory motive can be shown.

It must follow, therefore, that Title

VII does not and cannot provide the exclu-

sive remedy under these circumstances. The

coexistence of Bivens and Title VII claims

is justified by the clear distinction

between the factual contexts in the instant

case and the factual contents in the cases

which have disallowed concurrent Bivens

-117-

a

hala eae ed ir AM DoT whi aie

Pie ged osierald a ep aralie iad s

constitutional claims and Title VII claims.

As we have pointed out, the Brown and Nolan

courts could not reconcile constitutional

and Title VII claims in the same action

when these claims shared the same factual

predicate. But this is simply not the case

in the instant action where the factual

predicates are completely different in

time, activities and actors.

With respect to the recent Bush

holding, plaintiff, unlike Mr. Bush, is not

trying to supplement what she perceives to

be an inadequate remedy for the wrong she

has suffered. Rather, plaintiff is seeking

damages for an entirely independent wrong.

Another point of distinction between this

action and Bush is that the latter action,

the petitioner's constitutional claims were

based upon the abridgement of his First

Amendment rights. The Court found that

retaliatory action for exercising one's

First Amendment rights had been prohibited

-118-

by the regulatory scheme under which Mr.

Bush had proceeded; and since he had

already received a viabie, adequate and

meaningful alternative remedy under that

regulatory scheme he was precluded from

augmenting that recovery by pursuing a

Bivens claim. It would be ound to

suggest that the same rationale could apply

to Mrs. Clemente. Obviously the regulatory

scheme under which she attempted to proceed

does not allow or permit the failure or

refusal of its administrators to execute

its mandates without giving administrative

due process. Thus plaintiff had no viable,

adequate or meaningful remedy under the

regulations of either the Civil Service or

the Air Force to redress the failure and

refusal to provide her administrative due

process.

Accordingly, this Court holds that

Title VII did not provide the exclusive

remedy in this case, that plaintiff did not

-119-

Bi me GaRa apse tnear sR aoamnacain a MANE Te NTR WANES PAC

have a viable, adequate or meaningful

alternative remedy, and that the Court has

jurisdiction over plaintiff's due process

claims.

The defendants’ next point of con-

tention deals with immunity from suit.

Having already decided that the Air Force

is not immune, given the holding of Owens

v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622

(1980), the question of any inaunity of the

individual defendants is now taken up.

Initially, defendants assert that they

are entitled to absolute immunity under the

rationale of Butz v. Economou, supra, 438

U.S. 478 (1978), where a functional ap-

proach to immunity was employed. This

approach, simply stated, would allow

officials, notably judges and prosecutors,

to receive a full exemption from liability

"because of the special nature of their

responsibilities.” Id. at 51l. This

approach was recently upheld by the Supreme

-120-

Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct.

2690 (1982). Upon review of the official

duties of the defendants named individually

herein, this Court finds that none of thes:

individuals has responsibilities in the

administrative process that even approxi-

mate that of judge or prosecutor and that

the nature of their responsibilities is not

so special as to totally shield them from

civil liability. See also, Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982).

While it is evident that the functions

of the individual defendants are not

sufficiently sensitive so as to entitle

them to absolute immunity, the more crit-

ical inquiry is whether they should be

protected by any qualified immunity. The

test for qualified immunity, as articulated

in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, is whether

the government official claiming immunity

violated “clearly established" statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable

-121-

person would have known while in the course

of performing a discretionary function.

Id. If the law is clearly established, the

immunity defense should generally fail

unless the official claims extraordinary

circumstances and can prove that he neither

knew nor should have known of the relevant

legal standard. Id.

The conduct, or more properly, the

refusal to act, of the individual defen-

dants herein evidenced a purposeful, wilful

and deliberate disregard of the due process

rights of Mrs. Clemente, and contempt for

and refusal to obey the Remand Judgment of

this Court. Plaintiff's counsel explained

in writing and orally, time and again, from

April 25, 1980 until June 27, 1980, plain-

tiff's rights to due process and the

obligations of defendants thereunder. Each

of the individual defendants was thoroughly

informed with respect to Mrs. Clemente's

rights and legally justified claims and

-122-

demands. A copy of this Court's Judgment,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

the Owens decision and the motion made

before the Court of Appeal:; were all sent

to these defendants. How it can now be

claimed that the defendants did not know

that their conduct was in violation of the

administrative due process rights of

plaintiff is incredible. It is thus the

conclusion of this Court that the individu-

al defendants charged wath violations of

plaintiff's constitutional rights are not

entitled to immunity, qualified or abso-

lute.

Having determined that the plaintiff's

due process claims are properly before this

Court, it is now necessary to decide upon

an appropriate remedy or remedies.

As previously stated, an action for

constitutional damages is in the nature of

an action in tort, and therefore damages

are awardable. Thus, a judgment for

-123-

6 A he Nel 4 tee ei nt sheathed

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iota igi de tees bits A Nila ada shad nile baba eset

compensatory damages is permissible and

appropriate. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal

Narcotics Agents, supra. Evidence was

introduced at trial sufficient to demon-

strate that plaintiff suffered special

damages in the amount of $1,000.00. In

addition, it is the conclusion of this

Court that plaintiff was damaged generally

in the amount of $25,000.00, this amount

representing the physical and mental

anguish she suffered as a result of her

administrative ordeal.

Apart from these damages to compensate

plaintiff for the wrongs she suffered, it

is also this Court's opinion, finding and

conclusion that exemplary damages are

necessary to deter these defendants, and

others similarly situated, from further

engaging in such irresponsible and injur-

uous activity. The recent decision of

Smith v. Wade, 51 U.S.L.W. 4407 (1983),

provides the legal basis for imposing

-124-

punitive damages for official misconduct.

The standard for such an award under Smith

is a showing of "reckless or callous

indifference to the plaintiff's federally

protected rights." This standard, indeed,

was the watchword here by which all of the

defendants seemed to govern their actions

toward plaintiff, and thus exemplary

damages are both justifiable and appropri-

ate. Punitive damages will be imposed upon

each defendant according to his and its

degree of responsibility in undermining and

flouting the federally protected due

process rights of Mrs. Clemente, rights to

administrative due process which the

defendants arrogantly trampled upon and

crushed.

A final issue to be disposed of is the

matter of attorneys fees and costs in

connection with these constitutional

actions and claims. Plaintiff argues that

fees and costs should be awarded against

-125-

the government under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2412(b).

This section provides, in effect, that any

award of attorney's fees and costs properly

chargeable to an individual may be charged

to the government under appropriate circum-

stances. Plaintiff cites the decision of

Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546

F.Supp. 1221 (C.D.Cal. 1982), for the

proposition that an award of attorneys fees

in a Bivens action may be analogized to a

Similar award in a section 1938 action

which is authorized by 42 U.S.C. section

1988. Finding the reasoning of Lauritzen

to be persuasive, this Court finds an award

of attorneys fees and costs incurred in

connection with the prosecution of plain-

tiff's constitutional claims here is

appropriate and should be made.

The foregoing shall constitute the

findings of fact and conclusions of law as

-126-

required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED THAT

Under Plaintiff's Title Vll Claims, 42

U.S.C. section 2000e, et seq.:

(1) Plaintiff should be awarded back

pay in the amount of $27,480.24 pursuant to

42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(g).

(2) Plaintiff should be promoted to a

GS-12, step 4 position and given appropri-

ate training to prepare her for the same

under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(g).

(3) Plaintiff should be awarded

attorneys fees and costs of suit under 42

U.S.C. section 2000e-5(k) in connection

with the prosecution of her Title VII

claims in an amount to be determined at a

future hearing.

-127-

(4) Defendants should be enjoined

from taking any further unlawful employment

or retaliatory action against plaintiff.

(5) The personnel files of plaintiff

for the period of July 17, 1977 to April

21, 1980, should be purged by the elimina-

tion of all derogatory references to

plaintiff and the insertion and substitu-

tion of appropriate records of this case

and proceeding.

Under Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims

(6) Plaintiff should be awarded

compensatory general and special damages in

the amount of $26,000.00.

(7) Exemplary damages and punitive

damages should be imposed against the

defendant Secretary of the Air Force and

the Air Force in the amount of $150,000.00.

(8) Exemplary and punitive damages

should be imposed against defendant Ronald

J. Bishop, Jr. in the amount of $1,000.00.

-128-

(9) Exemplary and punitive damages

should be imposed against defendant Harold

L. Pray in the amount of $1,000.00.

(10) Exemplary and punitive damages

should be imposed against defendant Charles

L. Brower in the amount of $2,500.00.

(11) Exemplary and punitive damages

should be imposed against defendant Phillip

G. Seneschal in the amount of $2,500.00.

(12) Exemplary and punitive damages

should be imposed against defendant Harry

W. Johnstone in the amount of $2,500.00.

(13) Exemplary and punitive damages

should be imposed against defendant Jeffrey

W. Cook in the amount of $1,000.00.

(14) Plaintif* should be awarded

attorneys fees in connection with the

prosecution of her constitutional claims

under 28 U.S.C. section 2412(b), as well as

costs under 28 U.S.C. section 2412(a), in

amounts to be determined at a future

hearing. In this connection, and in

-129-

accordance with the Court's Order of July

15, 1983, defendants’ opposition to plain-

tiff's application for attorneys fees,

expenses and costs should be filed within

30 days after receipt by the U.S. Attor-

ney’s office of this Decision and the

accompanying Judgment, and counsel for

plaintiff and for defendants should confer

with the Courtroom Deputy Clerk to obtain

the earliest Court hearing date, which date

should be noted by defendants’ counsel on

the Opposition papers title page.

(15) This Court should retain and

reserve jurisdiction of this case and

proceeding in order to insure the implemen-

tation of these orders.

(16) It should be further ordered that

the Clerk of Court shall forthwith file and

enter this Decision and accompanying

Judgment, and serve copies thereof on all

counsel of record for all parties herein,

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

-130-

Dated: August 12, 1983

2:10 p.m.

/s/ A. Andrew Hauk

A. ANDREW HAUK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-131-

FOOTNOTES

Footnote l Reference page 76

An especially disturbing instance of

document destruction and alteration --

a veritable "gate" type of coverup so

egregious that this Court quite almost

by reflex action termed it the

"Vandenberg-gate" episode -- was

demonstrated by what happened to Ex.

167, p. 6. This was a photocopy of

"Form 52" - "Request For Personnel

Action" dated April 13, 1977, by which

employees of defendants, having

ip aCe Se ccm 2s Ae

previously made up their collective,

if not conspiratorial, minds to

> aR Cem Re aap ee dee Pes

retaliate against plaintiff by

-

De kde o>

‘cancelling out her position as EAM

aa aut

Project Planner (Grade 7) and

"busting” or downgrading her to Clerk

Typist (Grade 4), attempted to

oe Heine Ree RD BGR

accomplish their planned reprisal.

-132-

But this backfired when all the

government could produce was this

photocopy, which did not even have

plaintiff's name on it, was rife with

illegible handwritten notations, and

covered with blank spaces obviously

rendered blank, before photocopying,

but the use of opaque tapes and

erasures. These outrageous and

transparent ex post facto, but

-ultimately self-defeating, alterations

were only the worst of the several

efforts made at Vandenberg Air Force

Base in the vain undertaking to

legitimize the reprisals and

retaliatory activity taken against

plaintiff. When the government

finally had to admit that the original

of this Form 52 could not be found

hecause it had probably been destroyed

in violation of Air Force rules and

-133-

regulations, the misconduct of

defendants was sealed.

-134-

Footnote 2 Reference page 98

As previously described in greater

detail, the combined claims and

complaints of plaintiff could hae

been effectively processed under Air

Force Regulations, particularly AFR

40-713, thereby dispensing with the

need of an appeal to any outside

agency. Rather than looking upon the

failure and refusal to process three

of plaintiff's claims and complaints

as a forced and therefore excusable

inability to accomplish the processing

under Air Force Regulations, it is the

firm conclusion of this Court, follow-

ing its extensive review of the

exhibits in evidence and the testimony

at trial, that plaintiff's grievances

were all matters with which the Air

Force simply, stubbornly, and

contemptuously chose not to deal.

-135-

Footnote 3 Reference page 101

As the Ninth Circuit, in its

unpublished opinion of December 14,

1981, dismissing the earlier appeal of

this case, observed:

Not to be outdone by the confused

state of the proceedings, the govern-

ment seems to have changed theories of

defense at every turn. It rejected

Mrs. Clemente's first complaint as

premature and her second complaint as

untimely. Similarly, its brief on

appeal argues that Mrs. Clemente's

failure to contact an EEOC counselor

within 30 days precluded district

court jurisdiction, but at oral

argument the government contended that

her failure to exhaust administrative

remedies prevents review. Clemente v.

United States of America, et al., No.

80-5508, Slip Op. at 1 (9th Cir.

1981).

-136-

Footnote 4 Reference page 110

The Court recognizes that this

assertion is directly contrary to

justice Powell's dissenting opinion in.

Owens at 445 U.S. 622, 670 n. 12.

However, the principles articulated by

the majority in Owen should be and are

extended here to the federal govern-

ment which, as conceded by Justice

Powell, has a much greater financial

| ability to absorb such judgments than

a municipal government. Id. at 670.

-137-

FILED Aug 12, 1980

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

Plaintiff,

-V=

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, and UNITED

STATES AIR FORCE, a

military department of

the United States of

America, with HANS

M. MARK, Secretary;

RONALD J. BISHOP,

JR., HAROLD L. PRAY,

CHARLES L. BROWER,

PHILLIP G. SENESCHAL,

HARRY W. JOHNSTONE,

and JEFFREY W. COOK,

individually and as

officers and/or

employees of the

United States Air

Force,

Defendants.

No. CV-80-5746

AAH

JUDGMENT

(For Plaintiff

and Against

Defendants)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

The above entitled matter came on

regularly for non-jury trial in this Court

on May 23, 1983, and continued from day to

day thnreafter for 19 days until June 2l,

1983, whereupon argument was heard upon the

matter, including facts and law, for two

hours on each side. Thereafter the Court

took the matter under consider’tion and

submission and now after havii.g made,

signed and entered its Decision, including

its finings of fact, conclusions of law and

Order for judgment renders its Judgment:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as

follows:

Under Plaintiff's Title VII Claims,

43 U.S.C. section 2000e, et seq.

l. Plaintiff shall have and recover

against and from defendant, Hans M. Mark,

Secretary of the Department of the Untied

States Air Force (Secretary), the sum of

$27,480.24, awarded as and for back pay, 42

U.S.C. section 2000e-5(g).

-139-

Y Defendant Secretary shall forth-

with promote plaintiff to the GS-12, step

4, position, and shall give her appropriate

training so that she can be prepared to be

designated to and adequé cely fulfill the

duties of such position, 42 U.S.C. section

2000e-5(g).

3 Defendant Secretary is prohibited

and enjoined from taking any or further

unlawful employment or retaliatory action

against plaintiff.

4. Defendant Secretary shall forth-

with purge and eliminate from plaintiff's

personnel file or files covering the period

July 17, 1977, to and including April 2l,

1980, all derogatory references to plain-

tiff, and shall insert and substitute in

said files covering said period appropriate

records of this case and proceeding, to

wit, the Decision and Judgment herein made,

signed, filed and entered.

-140-

5. Plaintiff shall have and recover

from defendant Secretary her reasonable

attorney's fees as part of costs hereby

awarded to plaintiff in connection with the

prosecution of her Title VII claims, 42

U.S.C. section 2000e-5(k), which fees and

costs will be determined by the Court at a

future hearing to be set in accordance with

the procedures hereinafter in paragraph 8

set forth.

Under Plaintiff's Constitutional Due

Process Claims

6. Plaintiff shall have and recover

against and from defendants Secretary of

the Air Force, United States of America

(U.S.A.), and United States Air Force

(U.S.A.F.), and all the other named defen-

dants, the sum of $26,000.00, awarded as

and for compensatory damages.

7° Plaintiff shall have and recover

against the following named defendants the

-141-

following sums, awarced as and for punitive

and exemplary damages:

(a) defendant Secretary of the

Air Force, U.S.A., and U.S.A.F. -

150,000.00

(b) defendant Ronald J. Bishop -

$1,000.00

(c) defendant Harold L. Pray -

$1,000.00

(d) detendant Charles L. Brower -

$2,500.00

(e) defendant Phillip G. Sene-

schal - $2,500.00

(f) defendant Harry W. Johnstone

- $2,500.00

(g) defendant Jeffrey W. Cook -

$1,000.00

8. Plaintiff shall have and recover

against and from defendants Secretary of

the Air Force, U.S.A. and U.S.A.F., and

other named defendants herein, reasonable

attorneys fees and expenses in connection

-142-

with the prosecution of her constitutional

due process claims, 28 U.S.C. section

2412(b) and (da), as well as costs under 28

U.S.C. section 2412(a) as enumerated in 28

U.S.C. section 1920 in amounts to be

determined at a future hearing. In this

connection, and in accordance with the

Court's order of July 5, 1982, defendants’

opposition to plaintiff's Application for

attorneys fees, expenses and costs of suit

shall be filed and served within 30 days

after receipt by the United States Attor-

ney's Office of this Judgment and accompa-

nying Decision, and counsel for plaintiff

and counsel for defendants shall confer

with the Courtroom Deputy Clerk to obtain

the earliest Court hearing date, which date

shall be noted by defendants’ counsel on

the Opposition papers title page.

Under Both Sets of Plaintiff's Claims

9. This Court retains and reserves

jurisdiction over this case and proceeding

-143-

to insure implementation of its Judgment

and Orders herein.

10. The Clerk of the Court shall

forthwith file and enter this judgment and

accompanying Decision, and serve copies

thereof upon all counsel of record for all

parties herein.

Dated: August 12, 1983

/s/ A. Andrew Hauk

A. ANDREW HAUK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2:12 p.m.

~144-

FILED

DEC 14, 1984

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 80-5508

DC No. 79-

3952-AAH (Sx)

vs.

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA; and UNITED

STATES AIR FORCE, a

military department

of the United States of

America, with HANS M.

MARK, Secretary,

MEMORANDUM

Defendants~Appellants.

me me me re ee re eee ee ee ee eet ee ee See ee?

Appeal from the United States

District Court

For the Central District of California

Chief Justice Judge A. Andrew Hauk,

Presiding

-145-

[Argued and Submitted November 6, 1981]

Before: WRIGHT, WALLACE and ANDERSON,

Circuit Judges.

Mrs. Clemente first challenged her job

reassignment on April 8, 1977. By the time

of oral argument in this court, her action

had been rejected twice by the Air Force,

and actions were pending both in this court

and the district court.

Not to be outdone by the confused

state of the proceedings, the government

seems to have changed theories of defense

at every turn. It rejected Mrs. Clemente's

first complaint as premature and her second

complaint as untimely. Similarly, its

brief on appeal argues that Mrs. Clemente's

failure to contact an EEOC counselor within

30 days precluded district court jurisdic-

tion, but at oral argument the government

cnttintin that her failure to exhaust

administrative remedies prevents review.

-146-

Mrs. Clemente's contentions also have

lacked consistency. Her first challenge

alleged a discriminatory RIF action, while

her latest district court complaint in-

cludes constitutional claims as well.

This description of the case makes

clear that we lack jurisdiction to review

the merits of this appeal. The district

court remanded these issues for administra-

tive processing, apparently not considering

them final and appealable. Consequently,

several of the claims and defenses now

before us have yet to be evaluated below.

Without such a consideration by the

district court, these issues are not ripe

for review in this court. They require

refinement in light of any additional

underlying facts, which may develop if the

district court deems further hearings

necessary. See SEC v. Lincoln Thrift

Ass'n, 557 F.2d 1274, 1279 (9th Cir. 1977).

-147-

Those defenses already rejected and

those claims already determined, in light

of the peculiar posture of this case, fail

sufficiently to dispose of the entire

action. We do not find the necessary

finality to permit our review. 28 U.S.C.

section 1291; see Cobbledick v. United

States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Branch v.

Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2a 877 (5th

Cir. 1981).

We reman” to the district court where,

at the discretion of the judge and as

appropriate, all of the appellee's claims

will be considered and each of appellant's

defenses will be evaluated. The district

court should determine, as it deems appro-

priate, whether: (1) Mrs. Clemente's com-

plaint should be dismissed for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies; (2) her

failure to comply with applicable statutory

or administrative filing time limits should

be excused; (3) the district court has

-148-

jurisdiction to hear the various issues,

considering that the government continues

to claim that an untimely initial contact

with an EEOC counselor is a juriscictional

defect; (4) the court's prior remand order

retains vitality, and if so, whether the

Air Force complied; and 15} other issues

should be determined or further hearings

conducted.

After whatever pzoceedings the dis-

trict judge considers necessary and appro-

priate, the judge will render a final

decision. Only then can this court conduct

a meaningful review.

The district court's remand order

granted attorneys' fees of $2,500 to

plaintiff's attorney. We vacate the award

of attorneys’ fees. Hanrahan v. Hampton,

446 U.S. 754 (1980; cf. Manhart v. City of

Los Angeles, 652 F.2d 904, 906-07 (9th Cir.

1981) (Title VII of plaintiff who secures

injunctive relief is a prevailing party).

-149-

Mrs. Clemente has yet to prevail on

the merits of any of her claims, but only

has succeeded in preserving a cause of

action. If Mrs. Clemente eventually

prevails, any award of attorneys' fees will

require consideration of the guidelines

announced by this court in Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951

(1976).

We dismiss the appeal in part and

vacate the portion of the district court's

order awarding attorneys fees.

-150-

FILED April 30, 1980

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE, ) No. CV=-79=-3952-

) AAH (Sx)

Plaintiff, )

) DECISION AND

UNITED STATES OF ) ORDER REMAND-

AMERICA, and UNITED ) ING CASE AND

STATES AIR FORCE, a ) DISMISSAL

military department of ) WITHOUT

the United States of ) PREJUDICE

America, with HANS M. )

)

)

)

)

MARK, Secretary,

Defendants.

The Motion of Defendants to Dismiss

this action, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, came

-15l-

on regularly for hearing before the Honor-

able A. ANDREW HAUK, United States District

Judge, on the 2lst date of April, 1980.

The Plaintiff LOWENE R. CLEMENTE appeared

and was represented by her attorney, S.

TIMOTHY BUYNAK, JR.; and Defendants ap-

peared through their attorney, ANDREA

SHERIDAN ORDIN, United States Attorney,

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR., Assistant United

States Attorney, Chief, Civil Division, and

PETER R. OSINOFF, Assistant United States

Attorney, by PETER R. OSINOFF.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court, having considered the

pleadings herein, the Certified Administra-

tive Record, the Memoranda and Declarations

submitted by both sides, and having heard

oral argument of counsei, finds that:

l. Plaintiff's failure to discuss her

case with an EEO Counsellor is not a

jurisdictional defect;

-152-

2 Defendants through their personnel

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,

had an affirmative duty to timely refer

Plaintiff's complaints to an EEO Counsellor

for consideration and to fully advise

Plaintiff of the administrative processing

requirement and her rights therein, which

Defendants failed to accomplish, although

Plaintiff has been consistently employed at

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,

since lodging her complaints;

3 Because of these failures by

Defendants, Plaintiff's complaints were

never accepted and processed administra-

tively in accordance with Defendants'

regulations, which processing would aid

immensely in the resolution of the diffi-

culties herein considered, which failure

constituted and constitute arbitrary,

capricious and unreasonable denial of the

due process of law rights of Plaintiff.

-153-

4. Jurisdiction of this Court to hear

discrimination complaints under 42 United

States Code section 2000e-16 terminates

thirty days after receipt of the final

notice of agency determination by the

Plaintiff; otherwise, this Court has

continuing jurisdiction to entertain the

judicial complaint herein, beginning 180

days after Plaintiff filed her formal

initial charge with the agency;

Se Notice of the final agency deter-

mination was never received by Plaintiff.

Defendant Air Force, in violation of its

own regulations (A.F.R. 40-713, October 20,

1975, Par. 23e.), failed to send to Plain-

tiff and her representative a written

decision by certified mail, return receipt

requested. And because 180 days have

elapsed between the filing of Plaintiff's

formal initia auarge and the filing of the

complaint herein, this Court has continuing

jurisdiction.

-154-

6. Any conclusion of law deemed as or

properly constituting a finding of fact is

hereby adopted as a finding of fact.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i. This Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over this action.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction should

be denied.

as In the interest of justice and

fairness to all parties, the complaints of

Plaintiff as presented herein should be

remanded to tie Civilian Personnel Office

of Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,

for continuous and diligent administrative

processing by the Defendants under applica-

ble Air Force regulations to final deter-

mination by the Defendant Air Force and the

other said Defendants, all of said process-

ing to be initiated within sixty (60) days

-155-

—eee

of the date of entry of the within Decision

and Order.

4. Said processing should be accom-

plished in strict compliance with applica-

ble Air Force regulations, should involve

all stages of administrative processing

entailed therein, and should be conducted

so as to insure plaintiff her full rights

in said proceedings and a fair adjudication

of her complaints.

DB. In addition to said rights and

privileges afforded by said regulations,

Plaintiff should be entitled to be present

at all states of the administrative pro-

cessing and to be represented thereat by

her legal representative.

6. Plaintiff should not be questioned

at any time without her legal representa-

tive being present and Plaintiff's legal

representative should receive copies of all

written communications involved in this

administrative processing.

-156-

ae If the defendants fail to initiate

the said administrative processing within

sixty (60) days from the date of entry of

the within Decision and Order, or to fully,

properly and diligently process said

complaints of Plaintiff through all stages

to final determination by the Air Force,

this Court, upon motion by Plaintiff,

should consider reopening of this proceed-

ing herein and granting the relief prayed

by the Plaintiff in her Complaint on file

herein.

8. This proceeding and the complaint

herein should be dismissed without preju-

dice to:

(a) the reopening of this pro-

‘ceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the

Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-

trative processing within sixty (6C) days

from the date of entry of this Decision and

Order, or fail to fully, properly and

diligently carry on said processing to

-157-

final administrative determination in

strict compliance with the regulitions of

Defendant Air Force; or

(b) the filing by Plaintiff of a

new complaint for review of the said

administrative processing and final deter-

mination if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or

has good legal cause to complain and seek

judicial review of any portion of said

administrative processing or final deter-

mination.

9. Any finding of fact deemed as or

properly constituting a conclusion of law

is hereby adopted as a conclusion of law.

10. The Clerk of this Court should

forthwith serve copies of this Decision and

Order upon counsel for all parties herein.

-158-

ORDER

Let Judgment be entered accordingly.

Dated: April 30, 1980

/s/ A. Andrew Hauk

A. ANDERW HAUK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT

~159-

FILED April 30,

1980

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

Plaintiff,

-V=—

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, and UNITED

STATES AIR FORCE,

a military department

of the United States

of America, with HANS

M. MARK, Secretary

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-79=-3952-

AAH (Sx)

JUDGMENT

REMANDING PRO-

CEEDING FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCESSING,

AND DISMISSING

COMPLAINT

WITHOUT PREJ-

UDICE TO RE-

OPENING OR TO

FILING OF NEW

COMPLAINT

The Court having made and entered its

Decision and Order Remanding Case and for

-160-

Dismissal Without Prejudice in this matter,

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

l. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

denied.

as The case and proceeding herein is

remanded to Defendai.t Air Force, and *he

other Defendants, and particularly to the

Civilian Personnel Office of Vandenberg Air

Force Base, California, for continuous and

diligent administrative processing by

Defendants under applicable Air Force

regulations to final determination by the

Defendant Air Force and the other said

Defendants, such processing to be initiated

within sixty (60) days of the entry of the

aforesaid Decision and Order and the within

Judgment.

3. The Court reserves its

jurisdiction and right to reopen the within

-161-

proceeding, upon motion of Plaintiff, if

Defendants fail to initiate the said

administrative processing within said sixty

(60) day period, or fail to fully, properly

and diligently process Plaintiff's

complaints through all stages to final

determination by the Defendant Air Force,

in strict compliance with its regulations.

4. This proceeding and the complaint

herein are hereby dismissed, but without

prejudice to:

(a) the reopening of this pro-

ceeding upon motion of Plaintiff if the

Defendants fail to initiate said adminis-

trative processing within sixty (60) days

from the date of entry of this Judgment, or

fail to fully, properly and diligently

carry on said processing to final adminis-

trative determination in strict compliance

with the regulations of Defendant Air

Force; or

-162-

(b) the filing by Plaintiff of a

new complaint for review of the said

administrative processing and final deter-

mination if Plaintiff is dissatisfied or

has good legal cause to complain and seek

judicial review of any portion of said

administrative processing or final deter-

mination.

5. Plaintiff shall have and receive

her costs of suit incurred herein which are

hereby taxed in the amount of

$ , and her reasonable attor-

ney's fees which are hereby determined and

fixed in the amount of Twenty Five Hundred

Dollars ($2,500.00), all pursuant to 42

United States Code section 2000e-5(k).

6. The Clerk shall forthwith serve

copies of this Judgment and the aforesaid

Decision and Order upon counsel for all

-163-

parties herein.

Dated: April 30, 1980

/s/ A. Andrew Hauk

A. ANDREW HAUK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-164-

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 4392D AEROSPACE

SUPPORT GROUP (SAC)

VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 93437

12 May 1977

Reply to

Attn of: DPCD

Subject: Notice of Reduction in Force -

Job Offer

To: 65961S/DOU/Lowene R. Clemente

l. We regert to advise you that a re-

duction-in-force will require your release

from your competitive level. The reason

for the reduction in force is: The recent

acquisition of Olivetti Word Processing

equipment has resulted in a reorganization

in the Data Processing Section. The

requirement for an EAM Project Planner no

longer exists. Therefore, the position you

now occupy has been identified tc be

abolished.

2. Your retention rights have been

compared with other base employees to

determine the best available position that

can be offered to you. You are offered the

position of Computer Operator, GS-332-06,

4392ASG/LGS. If you accept this offer, you

will be changed to lower grade to the

position not earlier than 17 Jul 1977. If

you decline the position you will be

separated on 15 Jul 1977.

3. The following information was used in

deternining your retention rights:

-165-

a. Competitive Area: Vandenberg,

AFB, Ca.

b. Your Competitive Level is:

GS-362-07P

c. Your position is: EAM Project

Planner

d. Your Retention Subgroup is: IB

e. Your Service Computation Date is:

1960-03-05

4. If you have any reason to believe the

above information is incorrect or if you

wish to review regulations or reduction in

force records, please call Mrs. Leidecker,

276-4714. She will be glad to answer your

questions and assist you in any way possi-

ble. Records are available in the Civilian

Personnel, Office, Bldg. 1:777.

5. Should you be separated, you may be

entitled to severance pay, employment

assistance and other benefits. Attached is

a summary of benefits and assistance

available in your case. Also attached is

an explanation of your right to appeal if,

after review, you feel that appropriate

regulations have not been followed.

6. You must accept or refuse the position

offered within five workdays after receipt

of this notice. If you refuse the position

or fail to reply within the time limit, you

will be separated by reduction in force on

the date specified above. If special

circumstances warrant, you may make a

written request for extension of the notice

period to allow retention in a leave

without pay status beyond that date.

-166-

7. We sincerely regret the need for this

action. It does not, of course, reflect in

_any way on your conduct or performance.

You will be continued in a pay status

during the notice period and we will try to

give you whatever assistance you may need.

WILLIAM M. COADY 2 attachments

Chief, Civilian 1. Appeal Rights

Personnel Branch 2. Supplemental

Information

Receipt acknowledged:

Lowene R. Clemente 5/13/77

( ) I accept the offer contained in

paragraph 1 of this letter.

( ) I decline the offer contained in

paragraph 1 and understand I will

be separated from Air Force

employment on the date set in

paragraph 2 of this letter.

NAME ~~ DATE

-167-

APPEAL RIGHTS

l. You have the rights to review all

records pertaining to this action and to

see copies of Air Force and Civil Service

regulations pertaining to Reduction in

Force. This includes the retention regis-

ter for your competitive level and those

for other positions for which you believe

you are qualified, down to and including

those in the same or equivalent grade (if

any) which constitutes your “best offer."

If separation is proposed, this includes

all positions equal to, and below, the

grade of your current position.

Ze If, after this review, you believe

that the provisions of Air Force or Civil

Services regulations (specifically AFR

40-351 and FPM, Chapter 351) have not been

followed, you should discuss any questions

you have with a member of the Civilian

Personnel Office staff. If, after such

discussion, you still believe that the

action does not comply with regulations,

you may submit an appeal to the Civil

Service Commission. The appeal may be

submitted at any time after receipt of this

notice, but not later than 15 calendar days

after the effective date of the action.

Se If you are separated by reduction in

force and are eligible for the reemployment

priority l‘st (RPL), you may request,

during your period of eligibility, to

review records of position vacancies at Air

Force activities in the locality which were

filled by other than Air Force employees.

If you belief that you should have been

offered a vacancy instead of a person

appointed or transferred, you should

discuss the action with an appropriate

-168-

member of the Civilian Personnel Office.

If, after discussion, you disagree with an

action, you may submit an appeal to the

Civil Service Commission.

4. Any appeal from this reduction in

force action, or subsequent action while

you have reemployment priority, should be

addressed to:

United States Civil Service Commission

Federal Employee Appeals Authority

San Francisco Field Office

450 Golden Gate Ave

San Francisco, CA 94102

A copy of this notice should be included

with the appeal letter.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 4392D AEROSPACE

SUPPORT GROUP (SAC)

VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 93437

19 NOV 1980

Reply to

Attn of: CC

Subject: Notice of Final Air Force

Decision - Lowene R. Clemente

To: S. Timothy Buynak

Hatch and Parent

21 East Carrillo Street

Santa Barbara, CA 93101

| By letter, dated 17 October 1980,

which you received 22 October 1980, Lt Col

Harold L. Pray, Chief, Personnel Division,

proposed to adoyt the findings of Mr Harry

W. Johnstone in his report of investigation

into Ms Clemente's case. Mr Johnstone q

found that the complainant's race was not a

factor in the decision to abolish her

position or in the manner in which she was

treated incident thereto. Lt Col Pray

proposed cancellation of the complaint.

Ze In that 17 October letter you were

informed that if you are dissatisfied with

the proposed disposition, you may (1)

request a hearing before an Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Com-

plaints Examiner, followed by a decision by

the Air Force Director of EEO, or (2)

request a decision by the Air Force Direc-

tor of EEO, without a hearing, based upon

the evidence present in the complaint file.

-170-

Lt Col Pray further explained to you that

such a request should be submitted to Ms

Carolyn McCool, the Chief EEO Counselor at

Vandenberg, within 15 calendar days of

receipt of the Notice of Proposed Decision.

3. As of this date you have neither

notified Ms McCool of your desire for an

EEOC hearing, nor have you informed Lt Col

Pray of your specific wishes. Rather, in

your 31 October 1980 reply to the Notice of

Proposed Disposition -- a reply which,

incidentally, did not reach Lt Col Pray or

Major Brower until 7 November 1980, "16

calendar days after your receipt of the

Notice of Proposed Disposition -- you

reject the EEOC hearing on the erroneous

belief that its scope would be limited to

the scope of Mr. Johnstone's evaluation,

and you inform Lt Col Pray that he may, at

his "option," make a final agency decision

or forward the case to the Air Force

Director of EEO "or whomever you like.”

Neither Lt Col Pray nor I can make this

decision for you. That is an election

which, as was explained in the 17 October

1980 letter, you and your client must make.

4. In view of the fact that you have

failed to make the election offered in the

17 October 1980 letter, as well as the fact

that your reply to the 17 October 1980

letter was late, this letter will provide

notice to you that I have adopted the

proposed disposition, i.e., cancellation of

the complaint., as the final Air Force

decision in Ms Clemente's case. You now

have the following options:

a. You may appeal to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission within 20

calendar days of receipt of this decision.

Your appeal to the Commission should be

-171-

addressed to the Director, Office of

Appeals’ and Review, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, 2401 E Street,

N.W., Washington, DC 20506. The appeal and

any representation in support thereof must

be submitted in duplicate.

(1) Except as provided in the

following paragraph of this letter, a

complainant may file a notice of appeal at

any time up to 20 calendar days after

receipt of the Air Force Notice of Final

Decision and his/her complaint. An appeal

shall be deemed filed on the date it is

postmarked or, in the absence of a post-

mark, on the date it is received by the

Commission. Any statement or brief in

support of the appeal must be submitted to

the Commission and to the Air Force within

30 days of filing the Notice of Appeal.

(2) The 20-day time limit within

which a Notice of Appeal must be filed will

not be extended by the Commission unless,

based upon a written showing by the com-

plaint that he/she was not notified of the

prescribed time limit and was not otherwise

aware of it or that circumstances beyond

his/her control prevented the filing of a

Notice of Appeal within the prescribed time

limit, the Commission exercises its dis-

cretion to extend the time limit and accept

the appeal.

b. In lieu of an appeal to the

Commission, you may in accordance with

Judge Hauk's remand order, file in U.S.

District Court for the Central District of

California a new complaint for review of

this administrative processing. It is the

Air Force's view that such a complaint must

be filed within 30 days of your receipt of

this final decision. If you elect to

-172-

appeal to the Commission's Office of

Appeals and Review, you may file your

complaint within 30 days of receipt of the

decision.

(1) A civil action may also be

filed anytime after 180 days of the date of

initial appeal to the Commission, if a

final decision has not been rendered.

Se I should also like to comment on

misconceptions you seem to hold as indicat-

ed by your 31 October 1980 reply. First,

it is not true that the EEOC hearing is

limited to the scope of Mr. Johnstone's

investigation, and at no time has either

Major Brower, Lt Col Pray, Mr. Phillip

Seneschal or Mr Johnstone held that opin-

ion. Rather, Title 29 CFR Part 1613, which

prescribes the rules for such hearings,

allows a Complaints Examiner to expand the

scope of the hearing by either remanding to

the agency for further investigation or by

arranging for the appearance of additional

witnesses. 29 CFR 1613.218. Second, you

are mistaken in your belief that Mr.

Johnstone considers the RIF to be unsup-

ported. He has made no such assertion

either in his report or off the record.

Third, you continue to insist that Ms

Clemente is entitled to a "combined hearing

on all of her complaints,” i.e. the RIF

appeal, discrimination claim, post-RIF

priority rights grievance and reprisal

complaint. This argument ignores the fact

that Ms Clemente's formal EEO complaint,

which provides the basis for Part 713

processing, very cimply alleges that the

"RIF action taken [was] a result of reverse

racial discrimination." Mr Johnstone's

investigation appropriately focused on that

limited allegation.

-173-

6. Regarding your 10 November 1980

request to “initiate processing through

(the MSPB)," as you are already aware, the

Air Force position on this matter is that

the MSPB has no jurisdiction to hear your

case, even if it does, you, not the Air

Force, must file your own petition with the

MSPB. MSPB made this clear to you in its

29 October 1980 letter to you.

i Finally, I must remind you that

throughout this administrative process the

Air Force has acted, and continues to act,

under compulsion of court order. The Air

Force continues to assert that Ms

Clemente's complaint is untimely inasmuch

as it was not filed within the 30 days

prescribed by 5 CFR Part 713 (now 29 CFR

Part 1613). Therefore, nothing in this

letter, or in any previous correspondence

or investigation, should be interpreted as

a waiver of the 30-day statute of limita-

tions. The Air Force has simply in good

faith attempted to comply with Judge Hauk's

order. :

RONALD J. BISHOP, JR. Cy to: Carolyn

Colonel, USAF Commander McCool

4392 AEROSG/JA

(Major Brower)

Ms Clemente

Mr Peter Osinoff,

(Asst U.S.

Attorney)

-174-

APPENDIX C

Aug 16, 1985

MANDATE ISSUED

ARMS UNIT

Aug 19, 1985

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOWENE R. CLEMENTE,

)

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 83-6187

) 83-6188

vs. ) No. 83-6430

)

UNITED STATES OF ) CV 80-5746

AMERICA, UNITED STATES ) 79-3952

AIR FORCE, ET AL., ) 80-5746

)

)

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL from the United States District

Court for the

District of ‘

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the

Transcript of the Record from the United

States District Court for the Central

District of California and was duly

submitted.

-175-

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now

here ordered and adjudged by this Court,

that the judgment of the said district

Court in this Cause be, and hereby is

REVERSED, VACATED AND REMANDED.

Filed and entered July 24, 1985

-176-

APPENDIX D

AIR FORCE REGULATION 40-713,

October 20, 1975

33. Relationship to Appeal and Grievance

Procedures:

a. When the basis of a complaint of

discrimination is an action which may be

appealed directly to the Civil Service

Commission (for example, reduction-in-force

and certain adverse actions) the

complainant should be informed of the

requirement to specify under which part of

the regulations (FPM Chapter 713 or the

other appeal system) the issue of

discrimination is to be processed.

(1) If the complainant decides to

proceed by appeal to the Commission, he

must make this election in writing, signed

and dated, and a copy is furnished to the

Commission office having jurisdiction over

the appeal and the activity will close out

the discrimination complaint and thereafter

-177-

act in the matter under instructions from

the Commission.

(2) If the complainant elects to

proceed under FPM chapter 713, after having

been specifically informed of his right to

use the other appellate system, then the

entire matter, including the merits of the

action, will be reviewed under this regu-

lation.

b. If an allegation of discrimination

is made in connection with a matter that

already has been appealed to the Civil

Service Commission, the activity must

notify the Commission's appellate office

ana that office will determine whether the

agency will make an investigation. Any

investigation requested by the Commission

shall be conducted in accordance with the

Commission's specific written instructions.

C. When an employee makes an allega-

tion of discrimination in connection with a

matter that would normally be subject to

-178-

the Air Force grievance system, the matter

will be processed under this regulation

(see also AFR 40-771, section C).

-179-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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