Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Della Porta v. Department of Transportation

Supreme Court brief1985

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In The

Supreme Court of the United

October Term, 1985

DONALD DELLA PORTA,

Petitioner,

VS.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, F.A.A.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

JOEL A. MOTT, JR.

MOTT AND MOTT

Attorneys for Petitioner

Ten Hundred West Avenue

P.O. Box 385

Ocean City, New Jersey 08226-0385

(609) 399-7577

2818

tz —_ *NJ (201) 257-6850°NY (212) 840-9494ePA (215) 563-5587

mters,ime. MA (617) 542-1114*DC (202) 783-7288¢USA (800) 5 APPEAL

—

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether petitioner, an air traffic controller, has been deprived

of his procedural due process rights under the United States

Constitution when the Chief Controller failed to consider a timely

filed answer prior to rendering his decision.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90S. Ct.

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Jones v. TVA MSPF, Dkt. AT07528110307 (1982) ......

United States v. Hagerty, 528 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Colorado

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Statutes Cited:

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Contents

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APPENDIX

Decision of the United Siates Court of Appeals for the

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Decision of Merit Systems Protection Board ............ Sa

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

+

October Term, 1985

DONALD DELLA PORTA,

Petitioner,

VS.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, F.A.A.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

OPINIONS BELOW

This action was commenced on September 10, 1981 by an

appeal filed on behalf of the petitioner, Donald Della Porta, to

the Merit Systems Protection Board from the decision of the Chief

Controller of the Atlantic City Tower FAA Facility Department

of Transportation, removing him from the position of Air Traffic

Controller Specialist G.S.-2152-12 for the reason that he had

violated 5 U.S.C. § 7311 ‘‘an individual may not accept or hold

a position in the Government of the United States if he participated

in a strike aqainst the L'nited States and 18 U.S.C. § 1918 which

makes participation ir 1 strike against the Government of the

United States a crime of which a sentence of imprisonment can

be imposed.’’ The second reason for his removal was on the basis

of an unauthorized absence alleging that on the 1548 p.m.-2348

p.m. shift of August 4, 1981, he failed to report for a scheduled

tour of duty and alleging that on August 3, 1981 a telegram was

sent stating that an illegal strike was in progress, that ‘‘you must

return to duty for your regular scheduled shift.’’ The petition

for appeal contained a statement by petitioner setting forth the

reason for his having been absent from the Atlantic City Tower

during the period of time from August 4, 1981 to August 7, 1981,

in that he was on annual leave. The petition contained a copy

of the Atlantic City Watch Tower Schedule which indicated that

D. Della Porta was scheduled for annual leave for this period

of time. The FAA failed to answer to the appeal under date of

November 12, 1981, denying any and all allegations made by the

petitioner in the appeal petition.

On March 29, 1982, petitioner filed a motion for summary

judgment relying upon answers to the agency’s interrogatories,

the petitioner’s request for admissions, Article 7 of the Provisions

of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Professional

Air Traffic Controllers Organization and the Federal Aviation

Administration revision dated October 1979, the Watch Tower

Schedule and the affidavits of both Robert Testa and the petitioner.

Upon consideration, the hearing officer, Mitchell Kastner, entered

an order denying the motion.

The case came on for hearing and trial before the Honorable

Roger A. Schwartz, Presiding Official of the United States of

America, Merit Systems Protection Board, Philadelphia Regional

Office, without a jury, at the Federal Aviation Admissions Atlantic

City Tower following which the Board filed a written opinion

and decision. The Board found that the petitioner’s leave was

cancelled by his supervisor on August 1, 1981, relying on the

testimony of the Chief Controller. Since he had been advised that

if a strike occurred his leave would be cancelled, the agency had

established a prima facie case that the petitioner was striking

against the federal government on the dates of August 4, 5 and

6, 1981. The Board also found that prior to the strike, the

petitioner was scheduled for leave from August 3-August 7, 1981

and that this leave had been cancelled in the event of a strike.

The petitioner makes the argument that the agency did not

formally declare an operational emergency before cancelling the

petitioner’s leave as required by the Collective Bargaining

Agreement and contract between PATCO and the FAA. It then

found as a fact that the agency did not declare an operational

emergency as required by the agreement and asserts that the proper

action would have been to terminate his vacation, appear for work,

and then grieve the agency action later. The Board then found

as follows: The deciding official did not consider a written reply

to the advanced notice of proposed removal which was filed by

the petitioner within the time permitted. Even though the Board

found that the failure to consider the bona fide reply is clearly

procedural error, it stated the evidence ir this case did not show

that a proper consideration of the reply would have changed Mr.

Testa’s mind on the removal action. Since these arguments have

been determined by the Board and would not be sufficient to

change the outcome of the removal action, the Board made a

determination.

This petition appeal followed to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The case was heard and considered

and the judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board was

affirmed on June 24, 1985 (Appendix, infra at 2a). The judgment

was issued as a mandate on July 16, 1985 (4a).

JURISDICTION

Donald Della Porta, petitioner, seeks a writ of certiorari from

the final judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit dated June 24, 1985. The decision was issued as

a mandate on July 16, 1985 (1a). The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1)(A), 7512(1) aad 7513¢d)

which provides that an employee in the competitive serw:ce who

is not serving a probationary period may appeal an action rts "ing

him from the federal service; and the first section of the Fourteenti:

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Donald Della Porta, is a veteran with 14 years

of government service and for the past 11% years has been a

professional Air Traffic Controller. He has been a member of

PATCO since 1971 and the treasurer of Local Chapter #213 of

that organization since April of 1981.

On August 1, 1981, he was a GS12 Air Traffic Controller

Specialist with an annual salary of $35,033 per year assigned to

the Atlantic City New Jersey Tower. He had a good reputation

as a controller and had never previously received any disciplinary

action. His working ability was satisfactory. He had received no

criticism, only good comments. In April or May of 1981, his

supervisor, Edward Murzyn, granted him annual leave, a portion

of which was to commence on August 4, 1981.

On August 2 and 3 of 1981, petitioner was absent from his

place of employment on his regular days off, and on August 4,

1981, his annual leave commenced, which annual leave extended

up to and including midnight of August 8, 1981. The duty schedule

called for him to report for work for the shift commencing at

midnight following the evening of August 7, 1981, until 8 a.m.

of August 8, 1981. At approximately 7 p.m. EDT on August 3,

1981, a nationwide strike of Air Traffic Controllers occurred.

At 9:10 a.m. Friday morning, August 7, 1981, petitioner wen’

to the FAA Air Traffic Facility. Petitioner was told by Robert

Testa, Chief Controller of the Atlantic City Tower that he could

not return to work, that his proposal to remove letter had been

prepared and would be delivered to him and was specifically told

that he could not return to work for his regular shift as his

moratorium period had expired.

By communication dated August 7, 1981, petitioner was

advised that Robert C. Testa, the Chief Controller at the Atlantic

City Tower, intended to remove him from his position, in that

he had participated in a strike against the government of the United

States, which was a crime, in that he failed to report for duty

at 1548 p.m. on August 4, 1981, that he had an unauthorized

absence from the 1548 p.m. to 2348 p.m. shift of August 3, 1981,

and that he had seven days from receipt of said notice in which

to reply. This notice was received by him on August 12, 1981.

Under date of August 11, 1981, petitioner, denying that he

had committed a crime, requested a 20-day extension of time to

file a response and requested a review of all materials relied upon

by the FAA to support its proposed action. On the same date,

he requested the production of the documents suprorting any

adverse personal action under the Freedom of Information Act,

together with a response to the proposed removal action, indicating

that confusion and ambiguity existed with reference to the 24-hour

amnesty and reasserting that on August 4, 1981 from 1548 p.m.

to 2348 p.m. was not his next assigned shift to work. At 1:22

p.m. on August 14, 1981, Robert C. Testa sent a mailgram to

petitioner denying the request for extension of time and indicated

that if he wished to make a reply, he could review the materials

relied upon and would be given a reasonable amount of time to

submit a written response, as long as the response was submitted

prior to the expiration of the seven-day period. Thirteen minutes

later, at 1:35 p.m. on August 14, 1981, Mr. Testa forwarded

another mailgram, indicating that his original letter of intent of

removal was self-explanatory and that he would not elaborate

on the same, and reminded petitioner that any reply must be

presented or scheduled within the seven-day calendar limit. Under

date of August 16, 1981, Donald Della Porta submitted a written

reply to Mr. Testa, asking him to forward him a copy of the posted

two-week watch schedule, which included the week of August

2-8, indicating that he was on approved annual leave from August

4 to the 7th and was not scheduled to return to work until midnight

of August 7, 1981. This reply was received by Robert Testa on

August 19, 1981, but was ignored and not considered by him in

arriving at his decision of removal which was rendered on the

same day.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Under the provisiors of the Merit Systems Protection Board,

an employee who is intended to be removed from his position

by his employer must be given a reasonable time in which to file

an answer to the employer’s charges and complaints against him.

In no event can this time be less than 7 days from the receipt

by the employee of the Notice of the Intention to Remove, 5

U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2). On August 7, 1981 the Federal Aviation

Administration by Robert C. Testa, their Chief Controller at the

Atlantic City Tower forwarded a Notice of Incention to Remove

the petitioner from his position of employment. The letter

contained the following language: ‘‘Therefore, you may reply to

this Notice personally, in writing, or both, and furnish Affidavits

and other documentary evidence in support of your answer to

me, within 7 calendar days after you receive this letter.’’ This

letter was sent by certified mail on that date and was received

by petitioner on August 12, 1981.

a

By letter dated August 11, 1981, petitioner requested an

extension of time, requested the production of information that

would permit him to prepare a defense and denied the charges

against him. Then by separate typewritten letter dated August

16, 1981, which was received by Robert Testa on August 19, 1981, |

within the 7 days statutory limitation, petitioner made a further

request for the Watch Schedule and set forth with particularity

that there had been no communication to him that he was to report

for duty at any time prior to midnight of August 7, 1981.

At the hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board,

the presiding official found as a fact that the deciding official

did not consider the second written reply and that failure to

consider the reply was clearly procedural error. He then went on

to say that he did not think it was harmful error because, ‘‘The

evidence in this case does not show that proper consideration of

this reply would have changed Mr. Testa’s mind on the removal

action.”’

It is respectfully submitted that from the sworn testimony

and an actual inspection of t ¢ documentation in the iorm of

the duty schedule, the personal log, and the T and A Report,

it is clearly shown that a return to duty time prior to midnight

of August 7, 1981 had never been communicated to the employee

or could possibly have been made known to him. For the presiding

official to say that it is perfectly alright for the decision officer

to ignore the facts set forth in the employee’s answer on the

proposition that, ‘‘Do not confuse me with the facts, my mind

is already made up,”’ is untenable. Such a proposition is also

contrary to both the prior decision of the Board in the case of

Jones v. TVA, MSPF, Dkt. AT07528110307 (1982), and the

statutory mandate that the Merit Systems Protection Board affirm

an agency decision that shows harmful error. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7701(c)(2). One must ask the question, ‘‘Why the haste, if the

matter of the removal of Mr. Della Porta is not the sandbagging

of an individual on the pre-existing hit list?’’ Such a list was found

to exist in the case of United States v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp.

1286 (D. Colorado 1981). What is more harmful error than to

fail to carefully consider all of the facts and circumstances set

forth in an answer. The facts should be deliberated not eliminated.

The entire manner in which the decision-maker herein acted

is repugnant to Justice Brennan’s opinion in the case of Goldberg

v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970),

- which held that the decision must rest solely on the legal rules

and evidence adduced at the time of the hearing. An impartial

decision-maker is essential. Prior involvement in some aspects of

a case will not necessarily bar an official from acting as a decision-

maker. He should not, however, have participated in making the

determination under review. This is a fundamental problem in

the instant case. Chief Testa, the decision-maker, states that he

gave an unequivocal order to cancell Mr. Della Porta’s leave and

in his mind he believes that to be unequivocally true. The recipient

of the order, Superintendant Murzyn, says that he received a

conditional equivocal order cancelling the leave only when and

if there is a strike. As a decision-maker by reason of the prior

involvement, how can he possibly be objective? Under the Supreme

Court’s standard for procedural due process, Chief Testa should

have not participated in making the determination presently under

review.

In addressing the question of the 7-day notice as it applied

to the procedure followed by the City of New York, Justice

Brennan said:

*“We are not prepared to say that the seven-day

notice currently provided by New York City is

constituticnally insufficient per se, although there

may be cases where fairness would require that

a longer time be given.’’

Under what other circumstances would it be more important

to receive appropriate juridical demeanor than the termination

of an employee’s career after 14 years of faithful service.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should grant this writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

JOEL A. MOTT, JR.

MOTT AND MOTT

Attorneys for Petitioner

la

DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Note: This opinion will not be published in a

printed volume because it does not add significantly

to the body of law and is not of widespread legal

interest. It is a public record. It is not citable as

precedent. The decision will appear in tables

published periodically.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL

CIRCUIT

Appeal No. 83-1297

DONALD DELLA PORTA,

Petitioner,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

DECIDED: June 24, 1985

Before FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge, Miller,* Senior Circuit Judge,

and NIES, Circuit Judge.

* Judge Miller assumed senior status on June 6, 1985.

2a

Decision

NIES, Circuit Judge.

DECISION

The decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in Case

No. NY075281F1326, sustaining the removal of petitioner by the

Department of Transportation, FAA (agency) for striking against

the United States Government and absence without leave from

August 4 to August 7, 1981, is affirmed.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that, under the union contract, his annual

leave was not legally cancelled since the agency never formally

declared the existence of an ‘‘operational emergency.’’ This

argument was specifically rejected in Letenyei v. Department of

Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 528, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1984), wherein

this court held that the threat of a national strike by air traffic

controllers constituted an operational emergency, justifying the

cancellation of annual leave.

Petitioner also raises, apparently for the first time on appeal,

an issue regarding the sufficiency of his leave cancellation. The

presiding official found that petitioner was advised by the agency

on at least three occasions that his annual leave would be cancelled

in the event of a strike. Petitioner argues, however, that the

agency’s cancellation of his leave was ineffective since the agency

never actually contacted him on the day of the strike to notify

him that his leave had been cancelled and that he was to report

for work at a certain time and hour. The argument ignores that

the strike was one of general knowledge. Schapansky v.

Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 477, 482 (Fed.

Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 432 (1984). Petitioner introduced

3a

Decision

no evidence indicating either that he was unaware that a strike

was in progress or that he had misunderstood the agency’s repeated

warnings that his leave would be cancelled if a strike occurred.

Accordingly, the agency’s prima facie case of strike participation

stands unrebutted.

Regarding the deciding official’s failure to consider

petitioner’s second written response, the presiding official

concluded that such error was harmless. The second response

merely argued the legal issue of the propriety of the agency’s

cancellation of leave under the union agreement. The deciding

official testified that the argument did not change his mind and,

indeed, the agency’s contrary position on this issue is basic to

the action taken against petitioner. Moreover, we have specifically

rejected the union contract argument, as discussed above.

Finally, petitioner argues that the agency improperly used

**selective enforcement’’ by rehiring certain air traffic controllers

but not petitioner. The FAA, however, had the authority to assess

its litigative risk in individual cases and is under no obligation

to rehire petitioner simply because other cases have been settled.

4a

Decision

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL

CIRCUIT

NO. 83-1297

NY075281F 1326

DONALD DELLA PORTA,

Petitioner,

Vv.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA,

Respondent.

JUDGMENT

ON APPEAL from the Merit Systems Protection Board

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is ORDERED

and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED.

ENTERED BY OXDER OF THE

COURT

George E. Hutchinson, Clerk

/s/George E. Hutchinson

DATED June 24, 1985

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: JULY 16, 1985

COSTS: Against, Petitioner, Donald Della Porta

PRINTING $26.08

TOTAL $26.08

Sa

DECISION OF MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE

DONALD DELLA PORTA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Initial Decision Number: NY075281F1326

Date: 26 Oct. 1982

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Donald Della Porta appealed on September 10, 1982

_ from an action taken by the Department of Transportation,

Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City Airport Tower,

to remove him from the position of Air Traffic Controller, GS-12,

effective September 2, 1981. An evidentiary hearing was held on

this appeal on September 2, 1982.

JURISDICTION

Under 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(a) an employee may appeal to

the Merit Systems Protection. Board from any action which is

made appealable to the Board under any iaw, rule, or regulation.

Applicable law provides that an employee in the competitive

service, who is not serving a probationary period may appeal an

action removing him from the Federal service. 5 U.S.C. Section

7511(a)(1)(A), 7512(1) and 7513(d).

6a

Decision

The record shows that the appellant was an employee in the

competitive service, that he was not serving in a probationary

period, and that he was removed from his position with the Federal

Aviation Administration. Accordingly, I find that this appeal is

acceptable for adjudication.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The agency effected this action based on the charges that

appellant was striking against the Federal Government from

August 4 to August 7, 1981; and that he was absent without leave

for those dates. Since this agency action was taken in accordance

with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. Section 7512 and Part 752, Subpart

C of the Office of Personnel Management Regulations, 5 C.F.R.

752.301, the burden of proof imposed upon the agency must

comply with that established by 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(c)(1)(B).

That is, the agency must support its case by a preponderance of

the evidence before the MSPB can affirm the agency action on

appeal. A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant

evidence which a reasonable mind, considering the record as a

whole, might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion that

the matter asserted is more likely to be true than not true, 5 C.F.R.

~ 1201.56(c)(2).

In addition to proving its case by a preponderance of the

evidence, the agency must also prove that its actions were taken

for such cause as promotes the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C.

Section 7513(a). See Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007, 1010-11

(4th Cir. 1978); Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1257 (7th

Cir. 1977); Allen v. United States Postal Service, 2 MSPB 582

(1980); Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Norton

v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). As a separate element

of this analysis it is also necessary to detemine the reasonableness

7a

Decision

of the penalty chosen under the facts and circumstances of the

case; even if it is found that the action was taken for the efficiency

of the service, as required by statute. See Dougias v. Veterans

Administration, MSPB Dkt. No. AT075299006 (April 10, 1981);

Snipes v. United States Postal Service, MSPB Dkt. No.

AT075209206 (May 19, 1981); Wanner v. United States Postal

Service, MSPB Dkt. No. CH07528010032 (June 10, 1981). Thus,

my decision will first reflect an analysis of the evidence, whether

the acticn taken was for such cause as promotes the efficiency

of the service and finally whether the penalty chosen was

reasonable under the circumstances of the case factors cited in

Douglas, supra.

An employee is striking against his/her employer when he/she

refuses, in concert with others, to provide services to that employer.

United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879

(D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802, 92 S. Ct. 80 (1971). Such refusal,

as a matter of intent, is usually proven by circumstantial evidence.

See Tucker v. United States, 624 F.2d 1029 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Filson

v. Department of Transporation, MSPB Dkt. No. DC07528010253

(December 2, 1981). In proving that an employee struck against

the government, the agency has the initial burden of establishing

a prima facie case that appellant was, in fact, striking on the dates

| charged in the advance notice. A prima facie case is established

| by showing that a strike was called, that appellant was a member

of the striking union, that appellant did not appear for work as

scheduled; that he did not advise the agency why he was absent

or that his excuse for his absence was unreasonable. See Jones

v. TVA, MSPB Dkt. No. AT07528010300 (February 19, 1982);

Duckett and Yardley v. TVA, MSPB Dkt. No. AT07528010325

(February 19, 1982); TVA v. Bailey, 495 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Tenn.

1980). In analyzing the prima facie case, one can consider evidence

of an appellant's presence on a picket line, but such presence does

a

8a

Decision

not, by itself, establish that appellant refused, in concert with

others, to provide services to his employer. See Bailey, supra.

Once the prima facie showing is made, the appellant then has

the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut it, although,

of course, the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion always

remains with the agency. See Jones, supra.

5 C.F.R. 1201.56 provides that a Presiding Official may take

official notice of matters of common knowledge, or matters that

can be verified. The Board itself discussed at length the propriety

of taking official notice of the commencement and duration of

the strike action in question in this appeal, Ketchem v. FAA,

MSPB Dkt. No. DA075281F0713 (May 28, 1982). That case

concluded by taking official notice that an unlawful strike of air

traffic controllers occurred from August 3, 1981 through August

6, 1981. Jd. at 9. That decision also noted, however, that for

individual cases, wherein the issue of an appellant’s strike activity

after that date comes into question, it was inappropriate to take

official notice of the continuation of the strike beyond August

6; and that it was subject to proof by the agency. Jd. at 6. The

agency has produced no evidence that as to this appellant, the

strike went past August 6, 1981. In fact, the evidence establishes

that this appellant attempted to return to work on August 7, 1981,

H.T. pp. 16, 17, 36-38, but was denied entrance onto duty.

The agency produced evidence showing that appellant was

counseled by his supervisor on the illegality and probable

consequences of striking against the Federal Government, and

the meaning of PL 191 which prohibits that action, H.T. pp.

20, 21, 35. It was apparent that appellant understood his

supervisor’s remarks, H.T. p. 21. Appellant was advised on at

least three occasions that any leave he had would be canceled

should a strike occur, H.T. pp. 64-66, 74, 77-80. Appellant’s leave,

9a

Decision

during the period August 4-8, 1981, was canceled by his supervisor

on August 1, 1981, H.T. pp. 12-:1v. When a strike was called

by appellant’s union, neither the appellant, nor any other air traffic

controller showed up for work on August 3, 4, 5, 1981, H.T.

pp. 8, 9, 86. The appellant did not contact the agency during

this period to give an explanation for his absence, H.T. p. 17.

After his removal was proposed, appellant gave a standard

PATCO written response to the notice without giving any

explanation for his absence on the days in question, H.T. p. 19.

Appellant did not give any oral reply to the advance notice, H.T.

p. 19.

From this evidence, I conclude that the agency has established

a prima facie case that appellant was striking against the Federal

Government on August 4, 5, 6, 1981.

The appellant did not offer any rebuttal testimony to this

charge. An appellant’s failure to defend, taken alone, does not

satisfy the agency’s burden of proving its case; however, an

appellant’s silence in an administrative proceeding can be used

as one factor to help evaluate the weight of the evidence without

offending Fifth Amendment guarantees against self-incrimination.

This does not amount to compulsion prohibited by the amendment

because the silence, in and of itself, is insufficient to support an

adverse decision. Book v. United States Postal Service, MSPB

Dkt. No. SL07528010067 (May 26, 1981), affirmed 675 F.2d 158

(8th Cir. 1982).

Inasmuch as the agency has shown its prima facie case and

the appellant has not successfully rebutted it, I find that the charge

of striking is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence, for

August 4, 5, 6, 1981.

10a

Decision

As to the second charge, in order to prove that an employee

is AWOL, the agency must show that the individual was absent

from duty on the dates specified in the advance notice; Conner

v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Dkt. No. DC07528101166 (March

16, 1981); that his/her absence was not authorized or that a request

for leave was not authorized or properly canceled, so as to deprive

the employee of proper notice of the agency cancellation. See

In Re Van Sciver, 1 MSPB 94 (1979) Chiriaco v. United States,

234 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ala. 1963); Greene v. Department of

the Navy, MSPB Dkt. No. AT075209273 (April 28, 1981); and

circumstances beyond his/her control did not prevent the

individual’s appearance at work; Kramer v. Department of the

Navy, MSPB Dkt. No. SE07528010066 (May 14, 1981).

Prior to the strike, appellant had regularly scheduled leave

for August 3 to 7, 1981, and would have normally been expected

back on duty on August 8, H.T. p. 11. Nonetheless, the evidence

is clear that appellant was notified orally and by agency documents

that his leave would be canceled in the event of a strike, H.T.

pp. 28, 29; although he was never actually contacted on the day

of the strike to come in, H.T. pp. 81, 82, 84, 85. The appellant

shows no evidence that he was unaware that a strike had been

called on August 3. In addition, the wide publicity given this event,

as well as appellant’s subsequent efforts to return to work on

August 7, indicate that appellant had knowledge that a strike was

in progress. He also shows no evidence that circumstances beyond

his control prevented him from returning to work.

Notwithstanding the above, appellant makes the argument

that his leave was not properly canceled, in accordance with Article

28, Section 1 of PATCO’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. The

evidence does show that the agency did not formally declare an

operational emergency before canceling appellant’s leave, as

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Decision

required by the agreement, H.T. pp. 54-61, 96. However, the

proper action for appellant in this case would have been to appear

for work, even though he had annual leave and it appeared to

be improperly canceled; and then grieve the agency action later,

according to the established collective bargaining agreement, or

other regulatory grievance scheme that existed in the agency. ‘‘To

find otherwise would have the effect of undermining the statutorv

scheme established to preserve employee rights without

unreasonably preventing agencies from carrying out their

missions.’’ Gragg v. United States Air Force, MSPB Dkt. No.

DA07528101034 (September 16, 1982); see Walker v. Birmingham,

388 U.S. 307 (1967). The appellant’s allegation, therefore, presents

no viable defense to this matter. Regardless of the propriety of

the agency action he had an obligation to appear at work.

Consequently, I find he was absent without leave, as charged.

An agency may take an action against an employee under

5 U.S.C. Chapter 75 only for such cause as will promote

the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. Section 7513(a)

(1980). In prior decisions, the Board has held that unauthorized

absence from duty constitutes proper grounds for removal

since, by its very nature, it disrupts the efficiency of the

service. Bolling v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB

Dkt. No. NY07528090034 (December 28, 1981); Desiderio v.

Department of the Navy, 4 MSPB 171 (1980). In addition,

the appellant’s willful participation in a strike, an activity

which is defined as a concerted stoppage of work by employees,

likewise, by its very nature disrupted the efficiency of the

Federal Aviation Administration in completing its important

mission of controlling air traffic throughout the United

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Decision

—

States.‘ Therefore, I conclude that this agency action was taken

for such cause as promotes the efficiency of the service.

Notwithstanding the above, however, it is still necessary for

the agency to show that the particular penalty in the case at hand

was appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances of this

case. In this regard, the purpose of the Board’s review of the

penalty is to assure that the agency conscientiously considered

the relevant factors, and, in choosing the penalty struck a

responsible balance within the limits of reasonableness. See Snipes

v. United States Postal Service, MSPB Dkt. No. AT075209206

at 2-3 (May 19, 1981); Wanner v. United States Postal Service,

MSPB Dkt. No. CH07528010032 (June 10, 1981); Lancaster v.

Department of the Navy, MSPB Dkt. No. PH07528010056 (June

9, 1981).

The evidence is clear that the most relevant factor relied upon

by the agency and the deciding official in this case is the statutory

provision of 5 U.S.C. Section 7311(3) (1980) that: ‘‘An individual

may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United

States ...if he... (3) participates in a strike . . . against the

Government of the United States . . .”” See Advance Notice. Thus,

the plain language of the statute prohibits a person who participates

in a strike against the Federal Government from holding a position

in the Government. Although the statute does not specifically

provide for a removal action against such ar employee, removal

1. In United States v. Restor, et al., Crim. No. 81-187 Slip Op. at 8-9 (W.D.

Pa. January 13, 1981), Judge Diamond took judicial notice that the strike by

the air traffic controllers resulted in hardship and inconvenience to the public,

increased unemployment of innocent people and a loss of millions of dollars

in the airline industry. He stated that the controllers’ conduct was ‘‘uniquely

anti-social’’.

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Decision

is obviously the only penalty which can produce the result of having

the striking person not ‘‘hold a position’? in the Federal

Government. Since the language in the statute is plain, it controls,

unless there is a ‘‘clearly expressed legislative intention to the

contrary;’’ Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980), or unless it would lead to

absurd results. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965).

As Ketchem, supra, notes:

The Board finds, . . . that a long line of judicial

precedent mandates the conclusion that the strike

by air traffic controllers was indeed unlawful under

5 U.S.C. Section 7311 and 18 U.S.C. Section

1918 . . . These statutory prohibitions of strikes

against the Government of the United States were

carefully examined and held to be Constitutional

by a three-judge panel of the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia and such

holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court...

[Ketchem cites the following cases for its

conclusions: U.S. v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp. at

1290; Air Transport Association v. PATCO, 516

F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. N.Y.), affirmed, 667 F.2d

316, 321 (2d Cir. 1981); TVA v. Bailey, 495 F.

Supp. 711, 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Air Transport

Association v. PATCO, 453 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D.

N.Y. 1978); United Federation v. Blount, 325 F.

Supp. 879, 885 (D.D.C.), affirmed, 404 U.S. 802

(1971)]

The most recent case yet on point in this regard is American

Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 80-4250 (9th

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Decision

Cir. June 8, 1982). In this case, the court addressed the question

of whether an arbitrator’s decision requiring the Postal Service

to reinstate an employee who had been removed for striking was

illegal. The court evaluated the facts of the case and concluded

that the removed employee had participated in the strike and that

his reinstatement would violate 5 U.S.C. 7311. Thus, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute to require

appellant’s removal.

In similar statutory penalty cases, the Board has observed

that agencies may not impose and the Board may not aporove

lesser penalties than those prescribed by statute. In reviewing a

case involving violation of 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) (misuse of a

government vehicle), the Board noted that the agency could not

properly impose a lesser penalty than that provided by the statute.

Woody v. General Services Administration, MSPB Docket No.

SF07528110028 (June 2, 1981). In a settled case, the Board refused

to approve an agreement reached by the parties because the

settlement contemplated a penalty less than that required by

statute. Special Counsel v. Dukes, MSPB Docket No. HQ12060020

(October 29, 1981).

The agency asserts that once it found the appellant to be

a striking employee it had no other choice but to effect his removal

by adverse action procedures. The law supports this argument.

Therefore, the penalty chosen for charge 1 was appropriate and

reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

Likewise, unauthorized absence from duty has been held to

be proper grounds for removal, Desiderio, supra, and this is

especially true when the absence is prolonged, with no foreseeable

end in sight. See McKenzie v. U.S. Postal Service, 1 MSPB 480,

481 (1980); Dornan v. Internal Revenue Service, MSPB Dkt. No.

ee

15a

Decision

NY07528110014 (September 1, 1981). Therefore, I find that

appellant’s removal on the combined charges of striking and

AWOL was not unreasonable in this case.

The appellant makes a procedural argument that the deciding

official, Mr. Testa, did not consider a second written reply by

the appellant, to the advance notice of proposed removal, dated

August 19, 1981. The final decision letter, dated August 19, 1981,

anc. Mr. Testa’s testimony bears this out, H.T. pp. 45-48. Failure

to consider a bona fide reply to the advance notice is clearly

procedural error, Jones v. TVA, MSPB Dkt. No. AT07528110307

(August 23, 1982).

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(c)(2), MSPB may

not affirm an agency decision that shows harmful error in the

application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at a decision.

This reason for reversal of an agency decision is considered to

be an affirmative defense afforded the appellant, and, in

accordance with MSPB Regulation, 5 C.F.R. 1201.56, the burden

of proof must be carried by a preponderance of the evidence.

Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 MSPB 489 (1980). Further,

any error so shown must be likely to have had a harmiu: effect

upon the outcome before the agency, thereby being prejudicial.

See Parker at 493.

In judging the harmfulness of the error, Parker states:

Application of the harmful error standard may be

relatively simple when subsequent events make

obvious the error’s actual effect ... But when

subsequent events do not reveal with clarity

whether the error was actually prejudicial, the

| probable effect of the error must be determined

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Decision

in light of all the evidence in the circumstances

of the particular case. Parker v. Defense Logistics

Agency, 1 MSPB 489 (1980) at 493.

The evidence in this case does not show that proper

consideration of this reply would have changed Mr. Testa’s mind

on the removal action. See H.T. pp. 45-48. Examination of the

letter merely shows that appellant made his argument that he had

advance annual leave and that it was not canceled properly. These

arguments have been already addressed and have been shown to

be insufficient to change the outcome of appellant’s removal

action. Therefore, this affirmative defense must fail.

Accordingly, having reviewed all the evidence of record, and

having found that the charges are sustained by the preponderance

of the evidence; further, noting the penalty as reasonable, in this

case, the agency removal action is affirmed.

DECISION

The agency removal action is affirmed.

NOTICE

This decision is an initial decision and will become a final

decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board on 30 Nov. 1982

unless a petition for review is filed with the Board or the Board

reopens the case on its own motion.

Any party to this appeal, the Director of the Office of

Personnel Management, or the Special Counsel may file a petition

for review of this decision with the Merit Systems Protection

Board. The petition for review must set forth specific objections

17a

Decision

to the initial decision, supported by references to applicable laws

or regulation, and with specific reference to the record. The

petition for review must be filed with the Secretary of the Merit

Systems Pretection Board, Washington, D. C. 20419 no later than

the date set forth above.

After providing an opportunity for response by other parties,

the Board may grant a petition for review when it is established

that:

(1) New and material evidence is available that,

despite due diligence, was not available when the

record was closed; or

(2) The decision of the Presiding Official is based

on an erroneous interpretation of statute or

regulation. |

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 7703(b)(1)', the appellant has the

right to seek judicial review of the Board’s final decision on this

appeal. A petition requesting such review must be filed with the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit no later

than thirty (30) days after appellant’s receipt of the Board’s final

decision or order.

For the Board:

/s/ Roger A. Schwartz

Roger A. Schwartz

Presiding Official

1. As modified by Section 127 of the Federal Court Improvement Act of

1982, to be codified at 28 U.S.C. Section 1295(a)(9).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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