Appendix — Medina v. United States
Supreme Court brief1985
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86-479 JUL 24 1985
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SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
OCTOBER 1985 TERM
ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA
PETITIONER
VS.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE NAVAL STATION,
ROOSEVELT ROADS, PUERTO RICO
ANTILLES CONSOLIDATES SCHOOL SYSTEM
RESPONDENTS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
APPENDIX
ROBERT J. WALSER. EQ).
GPO Box AL
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936
(809) 722-0111
Attorney for petitioner
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Order and Opinion US
Case 82-1702, 10 May
Memorandum and Order
Case 82-1702, 13 Jun
Order and Opinion US
Case 84-1644, 27 Mar
Court of Appeals
1983
1983
Court of Appeals
1985
page
34
36
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
82-1702
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA,
Plaintiff, Appellant
Ve
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
{[Hon. Carmen Cosuelo Cererezo, U.S.District Judge]
Before
Coffin, Circuit Judge,
Campbell and RBownes, Circuit Judges.
Robert J. Walser, for appellant.
OLA Skt MAEM! oes BOO 9 eB OTL he Bg A 0d
Alex H. Adkins Trial Attorney,
Department of the Navy, with whom-Daniel
Lopez Romo, United States Attorney,
and Osvaldo Carlo Linares, Assistant
United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellees.
May 10, 1983
oO EN Riera CEO OO At Ol we te
Re Ae tt I AME TL, Om
OL OE OGetpa: ee a,
CAMPBELL, Chief Judge. Appellant Andres
Serrano Medina ("Serrano") is a taxi
driver and former cook for the Antilles
Consolidated School System at the United
States Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads,
Puerto Rico. Because of the revocation
of his permit to enter the Naval Station,
he lost his job as a cook and his right
to operate his taxi on the base. He
brought this suit against the base comman-
der, the United States, and the _ school
system seeking reinstatement, back pay,
reissue of his identification cards,
and relief from the debarment' order.
The district court granted summary judge-
ment for the defendants.
On January 8, 1978, Serrano was
driving a United States marine onto
the base in his taxi. mis half brother,
Jose Medina, was also in the car. Acting
on a tip, Naval security agents stopped
them. They found three small bags of
marijuana on the marine, and several
more under the taxi where Jose had apparen-
tly thrown them. A search of Serrano
and, on his written consent, the car
turned up nothing. The agents’ asked
for Serrano's Navy identification card;
when he produced it they noticed a second
card in his wallet, which he also handed
them. One card for the cook's job, the
other for the taxi job. Although they
had been issued only three days apart,
*one was a reissue of two-year old card.
On one, Serrano was’ pictured with a
beard, while on the other he was clean
Shaven; the height and weight figures
given on the cards were
Page 3
Slightly inconsistent; and on one his
name was given as Andres Serrano, on
the other as Andres Serrano Medina.
The agents confiscated the identification
cards, which were destroyed five days
later, and turned Serrano and his half-
brother over to the Puerto Rico police.
A week later, Serrano and his
attorney met briefly with the executive,
officer of the Naval Station, lward
Serig, in an effort to obtain return
of the cards, without which Serrano
could not enter the base. Serig refused
to discuss the matter until the criminal
action was resolved. On March 30, while
the Puerto Rico criminal charges were
still pending, he issued a letter perma-
nently barring Serrano from the baee,*
l. The executive officer is the second
in command at the Station, For present
purposes, we shall consider his authority
coextensive with that of the commanding
officer, from whom seposibility for
this matter was delegated.
2. The letter read, in part,
On January 1978 you were appre-
hended by the Naval Station Security
Department when a substantial amount
of marijuana was discovered in the Naval
Station. You were also in possession
of two civilian worker's identification
cards issued to you on 19 and 22 August
1977. Both identification cards were
found to bear your photograph aithough
they were filed under different names
and contained dissimilar descriptions
of your physical characteristics. This
is in violation of Naval Station Regula-
tions and constitutes an act of fraud
against the United States Government.
As a result of your involvement
Page 4
in the aforementioned incident, you are
hereby barred from entering the Naval
Station, Roosevelt Roads.
The complaint alleges that the debarment
"is the direct cause that Serrano lost
his job as a cook in the school and
his business as a taxi driver."
Criminal charges arising out
of the January incident were brought
in Puerto Rico court. In April, the Navy
also brought charges against Serrano
in federal court when statements’ by
high school students on the base implica-
ted him in further drug transactions.
In may, after several continuances,
the Puerto Rico action was dismissed.
The United States Attorney later reques-
ted dismissal of the federal charges,
which was granted in July.
8
On November 7, and again on Novem-
ber af Serrano's attorney requested
in writing the return of the identification
cards; this was refused by a letter
from the commanding officer dated Decem-
eer 1, 1976. The letter acknowledged
that Serrano had “been absolved of any
guilt in the [criminal] charges," but
asserted that he "remained guilty" of
fraud against the government in posse-
ssing inconsistent identification cards.
It reiterated as a trespasser if he
were observed thereon. A week later
Serrano's attorney sent a letter reques-
ting a meeting with tie commanding officer;
this was refused. Fina.ly,
Page 5
on December 15, Serrano and his attorney
went to the base in an effort to speak
with the commanding officer. They were
denied admission. This followed in
January 1979,
I.
Several of appellant's arguments
may be quickly rejected. First, Serrano
claims he should have been allowed to
amend his complaint. The district court
did allow the vbhbiadie to be amended
once, in October 1979, More than two
years after the original complaint had
been filed, in March 1981, Serrano moved
to amend again by adding a number of
new defendants in support of a conspi-
racy theory. The motion was’ denied.
Serrano now appeals from that ruling, des-
cribing it as a denial of due process.
We fiad no error in the court's
denial of leave to amend, Plaintiff's
motion was unduly delayed. He claims
that he was not aware of the extent
of or participants in the alleged cons-
10
piracy until mid-1980. Yet the alleged
conspirators were the commander of the
base and the agents who stopped Serrano's
car. As early as February 1979 they
had been summoned as witnesses in the
Puerto Rico criminal action. Serrano
states that after he discovered the
conspiracy he was still obliged to put
off any amendment because of "an intolera-
ble personal situation," viz., fear
that amendment of the complaint = and
subsequent discovery would implicate
his half-brother and subject him to
criminal prosecution, Only once’ the
Page 6
Statute of limitations had run on the
criminal offense did Serrano seek leave
to amend the complaint. We do not think
his desire to hide the criminal behavior
of his half brother provided any proper
*
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justification for the further period
of delay. See Hayes v. New England
Millwork Distributors, Inc., 602 F.2d
15, 19=+20 (lst Cir. 1979). The district
court was entitled to believe that
allowance of the eleventh hour amendment
would result in undue prejudice to the
defendants as it added new parties
(at least some of whom were no longer even
in Puerto Rico), and by raising new
and separate claims would require addi-
tional research and discovery. We find
no abuse of discretion. See Johnston
he
v. Holiday Inns., 595 F2d 890, 896 (lst
Cir. 1979) (denial of leave to § amend
shall be reversed only for abuse of
discretion).
The district court alsc properly
found that it lacked jurisdiction over
the claims, all for money damages, against
the United States. No contractual claim
can ‘be made out under the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(2), as the United
States is not a party to the collective
bargaining agreement, the only contract
invlolved, and Serrano was paid out
of nonappropriated funds. See generally
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S.
481, 485 (1942); H.R. Rep. No. 933,
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3477, 3478-79,
Nor can Serrano recover in tort under
section
Page 7
1346(b). Debarment from a military
installation falls within the discretio-
mary function exceptionto the Federal
Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a)
Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d
626, 628 (7th Cir. 1972).
It is also clear that the district
court properly dismissed Serrano's claim
under 42 U.S.C. S 1985, The complaint
9lst
does not mention a conspiracy or state
facts from which the existance of a
conspiracy might be inferred. See Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 405 U.S. 88, 102-103
(1971).
ifs
This bring us to Serrano's prin-
cipal allegations: that the debarment
involved a denial of due process and
was so arbitrary that it cannot stand.
The district court found that no liberty
Or property interest existed to trigger
due process protections, and that the
debarment was not patently arbitrary.
Because these conclutions were necessarily
based in part on submissions outside
the pleadings, we treat the decision
below as a grant of summary judgement.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c); id. 56. We
may affirm only if, looking at the record
ie
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in the light most favorable to appellant,
there is no genuine issue of material
fact and appellee is entitled to judge-
ment as a matter of law. E.e@., ahs
v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461,464 (lst Cir.
1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 904 (1976) .
Page 8
A. Military Discretion
Our law has accorded significant
autonomy to the military with respect
to civilian and judicial interference.
The military “constitutes a specialized
community governed. by a separate discipli-
ne from ,that of the civilian," Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 8394 (1953).
The "overriding demands of discipline
and duty" render it "a specialized society
separate from civilian society." Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974).
See also Department of the Air Force
¥.° Rene, 425 U.S. 733, 743-66 (1974).
15
Of necessity, the military constitutes
a system that stands apart from and
outside of many of the rules that govern
civilian life in our country." Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (Powell,
J., Concurring).
This status creates’ particular
tensions when the military and civilian
realms conjoin. Frequently, itis the
civilian that must yield to the hichee
for "the special character of the military
requires civilian authorities to accord
military commanders some flexibility
in dealing with matters that affect
internal discipline and morale." Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980) (up-
holding Air Force regulations requiring
commanding officer's approval before
petitions may be circulated on the base);
see _ also Secretary of the Navy v. Huff,
444 U.S. 453 (1980) (upholding equivalent
Navy regulations): Greer v. Spock,
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Page 9
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding exclusion
of politically oriented speakers’ from
Army base). In particular, the commanding
officer of a military basg has broad
authority and discretion to exclude
civilians from the base. Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893
(1961); United States v. May, 622 F.2d
1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
984 (1980); 32 C.F.R. SS 700.702(a),
700.715; H. Moyer, Justice and the milita
ry S 4-520 at 521 (1970).
In Cafeteria Workers Rachel
Brawner, a cook at the Naval Gun Factory,
was relieved of her identification badge
and denied access to the base, without
notice or hearing, because of an unspeci-
fied failure to meet security require-
ments. Noting "the historically unques-
tioned power of a commanding officer
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17
summarily to exclude civilians from
the area of his command, "267 U.S. at
893, and the regulatory provision, still
in existence, that civilians employees
were to be admitted only as authorized
by the commanding officer, the Court
found that the commanding officer clearly
had the authority to exclude Mrs. Brawner.
Nor was the summary procedure a denial
of due process. The Court balanced
the government's traditionally unres-
trained control of its own internal
affairs against Mrs. Brawner's pcsivate
interest in pursuing her job at that
location -- “a mere privilege subject
to the Executive's plenary power," id.
at 895 -- and concluded that no process
was due.
Page 10
The only glimmer of encouragement
in Cafeteria Workers to persons situated
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18
like appellant occurs in its acknowledge-
ment that state and federal governments
"do not constitutionally have the complete
freedom of action enjyed by private
employer." Id. at 898. The Court went
on to say in this regard,
We may assume that Rachel Brawner
could not constitutionally have
been excluded from the Gun Factory
if the announced grounds’ for
the exclusion had been patently
arbitrary or discriminatory-
--that she could not have been
kept out because she was a Democrat
or .a Methodist. It does not
follow, however, that she was
entitled to notice and a hearing
when the reason advanced _ for
her exclusion was, ‘as cious
entirely rational and in accord
with the contract with M&M.
18A
id. Beside the above, the Court suggested
only one other circumstance giving rise
to a constitutional claim --"where govern-
ment action has operated to bestow a
badge of disloyalty or infamy, with
an attendant foreclosure from other
employment opportunity.” Id.
B. Due Process
Cafeteria Worker is frequently
cited for the proposition that a command-
ding officer may summarily exclude civilians
from his base. E.q., Tokar v. Hearne, 699
F.2d 753, 756 (Sth Cir. 1983)3 United
States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785, -786-
87 (10th Cir. 1973) ("well recognized
that the commander of a military installa-
tion has and must have the broad authori-
ty and discretion to summarily exclude
persons therefrom"); Government of the
Page 11
Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 F2d 346, 347
(5th Cir. 1970) (well established that
19
commanding officer "has the right to
summary exclude civilians from the insta-
llation without violating the requirements
of the due process clause"); United
States v. Jelinski, 411 F.2d 476, 477 (5th
Cir.) (mo due process violation where
subject barred without notice or hearing)
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969); H.
Moyer, Justice and the Military S 4-
521 (1970). Despite Cafeteria Worker's
clear holding and this consistent line
of precedent, > appellant contends that
he has a fifth amendment right to notice
and a hearing before being disbarred.
It is quite clear that he received neither.
However, we agree with the district
court that he hed no right there to.
This case is squarely within the explicit
holding of Cafeteria
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20
Je The one possible exception to this
line of cases that we have found is
Kiiskila vv. United States, S32 6 -Ve«ae
745 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc). which found
a bar order invalid because it was issued
in response to Kiiskila's exercise of
her first amendment rights. The court
stated in dictum that "[a] absent explicit
authorization, a military commander
may not exclude a civilian employee
from a military installation without a
hearing." Id. at 747 n.1. (citing Cafete-
ria Workers). Even if this were true,
such explicit authorization may be assumed
to exist here as the relevant regulations
are exactly those relied on by the Court
in Cafeteria
Page 12
Workers and its progeny.
It is true that due _ process
jurisprudence has gone significant changes
sophenterarermstirysth We eeencrs'e
te oe
21
since Cafeteria Workers, which was decide
in 1960, and that that case makes use
of the right/privilege distinction sub-
sequently abandoned by the Court. Compare
Cafeteria Workers, ar . Does at G95,
with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564,571 & n.9 (1972). Nonetheless,
the factors that persuaded the Court
that presence on the base was a mere "pri-
vilege" persuade us that Serrano did
not have a “legitimate claim of enti-
tlement" to continued admission to _ the
base. No statute, regulation, or contract
appears fo establish such an entitlement.
See generally Perkins v. Board of Direc-
Bere, G66 F.2d 49 (list Cir. 1982).
To the contrary, admission to the base
is contigent on the commanding officer's
authorization. See 32 C.F.R. SS 700.714,
700.715. The commanding officer's respon
sibility is "absolute," and his "author-
ity...is commensurate with his responsibil-
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pnt 2 aig se tment ra Sommer ge aaa
(aa ALA | oi jin rae ts Chet
22
tty.” 3a, »- S706. 02a). Nor is there
any allegation of a de facto system
of continuing admission. See Beitzel
v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870 (lst Cir. 1981).
We therefore think that the
4. Appellant argues that Cafeteria
Workers applies only when the debarment
is based on security concerns. The
distinction is hardly helpful § here--
keeping drugs off base may be as much
a "security" concern as keeping out
spies. Nothing in Cafeteria Workers
or subsequent case law suggests’ that
the commander's authority is less exten-
Sive in situations not involving classi-
fied information. See Toker v. Hearne,
699 F.2d at 757.
Page 13
district court correctly concluded that
Serrano enjoyed no property right requir-
23
ing the protections of due _ process.
See Bleeker v. Dukakis, 665 F2d 401
(lst Cir. 1981).
Appellant asserts, however,
that he has at least a liberty interest,
affected by his disbarment, requiring
due process protection. While a public
charge of drug selling is the sort of
serious charge that res infringe upon a
liberty interest, see Ventetuolo v.
Burke, 596 F.2d 476, 484 & n.13 (1st
Cir. 1979), this charge was never speci-
fically articulated or made public,see
id. As the district court noted, Navy
regulations protect personnel records
from public disclosure, and there is
no evidence of public stigma here,
Harrington v. United States, 673 F.2d
7, 11 (lst Cir. 1982).
We do not believe the district
court erred in finding that there was
24
no protected interest infringed by appel-
lant's summary debarment, While the
commanding officer or his’ subordinate
might have handled the incident with
greater fairness and tact, tt’. power
to exclude civilians aummarily has been
acknowledged by almost every court to
consider the matter. And for good reason,
as it "is a necessary concomitant of
thebasic function of a military installa-
tion,” Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 838,
and “of the commander's duty to.maintain
the order, security, and discipline
necessary to military operations," United
States wv. Gourley, 502 F.2d at 786-87.
Page 14
C. Arbitrariness
Although appellant had no right
to continued admission to the base,
he could not have been excluded for
reasons that were patently arbitrary
25
or discriminatory; for example, on the
grounds of race or religion. See Cafete-
ria Workers, 367 U.S. at 897-98: Weiman
Vo Bedearatt. 344 ..U.<S- 863, 292 (i9eere
The same standards would not apply if it
appeared that appellant had been excluded
for the exercise of first amendment
or other constitutional rights. See, e.q.,
Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197
(1972); Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d
745 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc). However,
the only claimed arbitrariness here
is the lack of an adequate factual basis
for the exclusion.
The language in Cafeteria Workers
indicates that the factual basis behind
the commander's allegations is not sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny. The Court
"
Was not willing to look behind the “an-
nounced grounds” for the exclusion;
it upheld the exclusion because the
reason advanced” was “entirely rational.”
mI
=>
“oe
a
ee
26
367 U.S. at 898 (emphasis added). Thus,
Cafeteria Workers would seem, at most, to
allow us only to “question whether the al-
legations, assumed to be true, are such
as would constitutionally permit an
exclusion order to stand; that is, whether
the assumed facts may constitutionally
be the basis for the judgement that"Serra-
no merits exclusion. Lieberman, Cafeteric
Workers Revisited; Does the Commander
Page 15
Have Plenary Power to Control Access
to his Base, 25 JAG J. 53,56 (1970).
To delve into the truth or falsity
of the facts behind the exclusion would
be to require the very hearing that
appellant has been found not entitled to.
It is true that circuit court
decisions subsequent to Cafeteria Workers
have often seemed willing to question,
within limits, not only whether the
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asserted reason for exclusion is sufficient
but also whether that reason has a basis
in fact. They phrase the issue as whether
the exclusion itself, not just the proffer
ed reason, is patently arbitrary or discri-
minatory. See, e.qg., United States v.
May, 622 F.2d at 1006; Bridges v. Davis
443 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1971) (scope
of review in challenge to debarment
"extremely limited," but commander's
wide discretion does not extend to patent
ly arbitrary or discriminatory exclu-
sions), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972);
Committee to Free the Fort Dix 38 v.
Collins 429 F.2d 807, 811 (3d Cir.
1970); Weissman Ve United States,
387 F.2d ark: 273 (20th Cir. 1967)
("The question...is whether the order
was rational."); Lloyd, Unlawful Entry
and Re-entry into Military Reservations
in Violation of 18 U.S.C, S$ 1382, 53
28
Mil. L. Rev. 136, 142 (1971) (bar can
not be “arbitrary or capricious," citing
Digs. Ops. JAG 1912, p. 267). Indeed, in
the most recent of these cases the plain-
tiff received a full bench trial on
the merits. The district court concluded
the bar crder was reasonable, and
Page 16
the circuit cour. agreed that "there
was ample evidence to support [the comman-
der's] actions." Tokar v. Hearne, 699
9 F.2d at 757.
We need not now decide whether
this willingness to look at the under-
lying factual support for a bar order
is proper. The district court’ here
determined that the commanding officer
"had valid grounds for suspecting plain-
btiff and for deciding that it was best
for his command area that he be excluded
therefrom." Though the question is
29
fairly close, the record revealing more
than a little confusion on the part
of the Navy, we would agree with the
district court. The charge of identifica-
tion card fraud seems insubstantial,
but the concern as to appellant's invol-
vement in drug sales is adequately suppor-
ted. The circumstances were ‘plainly
suspicious; Serrano was accompanied
In his taxi not only by a passenger
who possessed marijuana bvt by a half-
brother widely identified as _ dealing
in drugs who apparently tried
to get rid of some marijuana when the
Stop occurred. While a taxi driver
might not always be expected to vouch
for every passenger, the presence of
his half-brother in the taxi put matters
in a different light. The record also
contains three sworn statements by separ-
te individuals identifying appellant
as a drug supplier. A base commander
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has wide discretion as to whom he may
exclude from the base, and there is
evidence in the form of the current
regulationsthat the
Page 17
military was deeply troubled by the
trafficking in drugs on bases. We cannot
say the exclusion of plaintiff in these
circumstances was patently arbittses
or discriminatory. See Bridges v. Davis,
433 F.2d at 974 (Koelsch, J., concurring)
("substantial proof of actual misconduct"
not required; bar orders’ should stand
"even though the result of gossip and
unconfirmed rumor").
31
Saks
The complaint named not- only
the United States and the base commander
as defendants, but also the school system
in whose cafeteria Serrano had _ been
employed. Appellant states that regard-
less of the outcome of his action against
the United States, he has an independent
and viable action against the_~ school
System for back pay and reemployment,
if only at another facility. The district
court did not address this claim in
its opinion. It did, however, dismiss
the action "as to all defendants."
It is not easy to discern the
legal theory or factual basis on which
appellant seeks to proceed against the
school system. hi .0oes allege a breach
of the collective bargaining agreement
between the school system and his union.
Yet the provision of the agreement to
~~
‘32
which he cites does not seem ‘to exist.
Moreover, in his brief he asserts that
the agreement "expired on 25 August
1977, had not been renewed or otherwise
kept in force, and was not in effect
during any of the time
Page 18
period of this case." Adding to. the
confusion is the fact that the school
system itself denies that Serrano was
even discharged.
Notwithstanding the above, and
without meaning to intimate that the
claim has any merit, we do not at this
time sustainthe dismissal as_ to. the
claim against the school system arising
out of the employment relationship.
The district court did not discuss
the matter in its opinion, and we think
Serrano should have an opportunity to
justify the claim, if he can, upon a
proper motion for summary judgement
33
focusing on that issue. Accordingly
while affirming the district court's
judgement in ail other’ respects, we
vacate and remand as to so much of it
as dismisses Serrano's claim for. back
pay from and reemployment in the school
system,
So ordered.
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34
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 82-1702
ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA
Plaintiff, Appellant,
Ve
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees,
Before
Campbell, Chief Judge
Coffin and Bowes, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Entered June 13, 1983
The petition for the rehearing
is denied. The opinion is amended as
follows:
1) The sentence beginning - on
line 13 of page 2 is changed to "His
brother, Jose Serrano Medina, was also
in the car."
2) On page 16, line 8, 9, and
10 from the bottom are changed to "passen-
ger who possessed marijuana but by his
brother, who apparently tried to get
rid of some marijuana when the stop
occurred. While a taxi...."
3) In line 6 from the bottom
on page 16, “half-brother is’ changed
to "brother."
By the Court,
Francis P. Scigliano
Clerk.
[cc: Messrs. Walser and Adkins
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the First Circuit
No. 84-1644
ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon.Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. DistrictJudge |]
Before
Coffin, Circuit Judged
Wisdom, *Senior Circuit Judge.
and Bownes, Circuit Judge.
Robert J. Walser for appellant.
Osvaldo Carlo Linares, assistant United
36
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37
States Attorney, with whom Daniel F. Lo-
pez Romo, United States Attorny, was no
brief for appellees.
March 27, 1985
38
Per curiam, Appellant, Andres Serrano
Medina, challenges a grant of summary
judgement, dismissing his claim that
appelee, the Antilles Consolidated School
System, had terminated his employment
as a cook without cause and thereby
violated his due process rights. For
the reasons outlined below, we affirm
district court's decision,
The district court entertained
cross-motions for summary judgement
in response to our earlier decision
in this case, Serrano Medina v. United
States, 709 F.2d 104 (ist Cir. 1983).
There we upheld the district court's
dismissal of appellant's primary claim,
which was that the commanding officer
of the United States Naval Station at
Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, had violated
appellant's due process and equal protec-
tionrights by permanently barring him
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from the naval station. Id. at 108-
110, For a number of years’ preceding
the issuance of the bar order, appellant
had worked at the naval station in two
Capacities, as an independent taxi driver
and as a cook for the school system,
Although not unsympathetic to appellant's
plight, we held that the commanding
officer's exclusion of appellant from
the naval station had neither violated
his constitutional rights nor been "arbi -
trary or discriminatory."! Id.
At the same time, we remanded
for further consideration what
I. Having rejected the claim against
the commanding officer in our earlier
decision, we find that part of appellant's
brief which concerns the facts under
lying the bar order largely, if not
entirely, irrelevant at this juncture.
So Ronee gee: PERNA aae here NR RL
For a complete summary of these facts,
40
see Serrano Medina »s. United States,
709 F.2d 104, 105-106 (lst Cir.
Page 3
appeared to be a- possible’ secondary
; ; 2
claim against the school system, which
operates as a somewhat autonomous entity
at this and two other military bases.
"
While we noted that it was not easy
to discern the legal theory or factual
basis on which appellant seeks to proceed
against the school system" for _ back
pay and re-employment, we thought it
best that the district court give appel-
lant an opportunity to justify what
ever claim he might have. Id. at 110.
After considering the cross-
motions for summary judgement that were
subsequently filed, the district court
dismissed appellant's claim against
the school system for a number of reasons,
'
>
,
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-
41
including: (1) the fact that appellant
was unable to point to any collective
bargaining agreement, contract, or statute
that required the school to prove that
it had cause to terminate someone in
appellant's position; (2) the fact
that the school system had ample cause
to terminate him in that it was impossible
for him to report to work as a result
of the bar order; and (3) the fact that
there was no evidence that the school
System had injured his’ reputation by
publishing any defamatory statements
about him.
In reviewing the district court's
decision, we focus solely upon the second
and third grounds, which, by tnemselves,
are sufficient to dispose of this appeal.
The evidence unmistakably shows” that
appellant was dismissed in large part
because he was unable to report to work.
Appellant concedes both in his amended
2. As the district court has subsequent-
ly noted, none of the specific charges
set forth in the amended complaint spe-
cifically identifies tthe school system
as the wrongdoer.
Page 4
complaint and in the "Stipulated Statement
of Facts" signed by counsel for both
parties that his "employment as_ cook
in the school cafeteria [was] terminated
' Moreover,
because of the debarment order.'
the termination letter itself states
in pertinent part:' "Due to the barment
from entering Roosevelt Roads Naval
Station, you became ineligible to perform
the duties of your position. This may
not be controverted since employees
must be ready, willing and able to work."
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These facts fully support the district
court's conclusion that even if appellant
was correct in his contention that he
could only be terminated ‘for cause,
the school system had more than sufficent
cause to terminate him.
Similarly, the evidence on record
fully supports the district court's deter-
mination that any damage to appellant's
reputation was caused not by the school
system but by the commanding officer.
Appellant makes no allegation, and points
to no evidence which would support an
allegation, that the schol system disclosa
to the public any defamatory comment, eva-
luation, or letter.
Accordingly, the decision of
the district court is affirmed.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.