Appendix — Medina v. United States

Supreme Court brief1985

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86-479 JUL 24 1985

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SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 1985 TERM

ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA

PETITIONER

VS.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE NAVAL STATION,

ROOSEVELT ROADS, PUERTO RICO

ANTILLES CONSOLIDATES SCHOOL SYSTEM

RESPONDENTS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

ROBERT J. WALSER. EQ).

GPO Box AL

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936

(809) 722-0111

Attorney for petitioner

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order and Opinion US

Case 82-1702, 10 May

Memorandum and Order

Case 82-1702, 13 Jun

Order and Opinion US

Case 84-1644, 27 Mar

Court of Appeals

1983

1983

Court of Appeals

1985

page

34

36

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

82-1702

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA,

Plaintiff, Appellant

Ve

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

{[Hon. Carmen Cosuelo Cererezo, U.S.District Judge]

Before

Coffin, Circuit Judge,

Campbell and RBownes, Circuit Judges.

Robert J. Walser, for appellant.

OLA Skt MAEM! oes BOO 9 eB OTL he Bg A 0d

Alex H. Adkins Trial Attorney,

Department of the Navy, with whom-Daniel

Lopez Romo, United States Attorney,

and Osvaldo Carlo Linares, Assistant

United States Attorney, were on brief, for

appellees.

May 10, 1983

oO EN Riera CEO OO At Ol we te

Re Ae tt I AME TL, Om

OL OE OGetpa: ee a,

CAMPBELL, Chief Judge. Appellant Andres

Serrano Medina ("Serrano") is a taxi

driver and former cook for the Antilles

Consolidated School System at the United

States Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads,

Puerto Rico. Because of the revocation

of his permit to enter the Naval Station,

he lost his job as a cook and his right

to operate his taxi on the base. He

brought this suit against the base comman-

der, the United States, and the _ school

system seeking reinstatement, back pay,

reissue of his identification cards,

and relief from the debarment' order.

The district court granted summary judge-

ment for the defendants.

On January 8, 1978, Serrano was

driving a United States marine onto

the base in his taxi. mis half brother,

Jose Medina, was also in the car. Acting

on a tip, Naval security agents stopped

them. They found three small bags of

marijuana on the marine, and several

more under the taxi where Jose had apparen-

tly thrown them. A search of Serrano

and, on his written consent, the car

turned up nothing. The agents’ asked

for Serrano's Navy identification card;

when he produced it they noticed a second

card in his wallet, which he also handed

them. One card for the cook's job, the

other for the taxi job. Although they

had been issued only three days apart,

*one was a reissue of two-year old card.

On one, Serrano was’ pictured with a

beard, while on the other he was clean

Shaven; the height and weight figures

given on the cards were

Page 3

Slightly inconsistent; and on one his

name was given as Andres Serrano, on

the other as Andres Serrano Medina.

The agents confiscated the identification

cards, which were destroyed five days

later, and turned Serrano and his half-

brother over to the Puerto Rico police.

A week later, Serrano and his

attorney met briefly with the executive,

officer of the Naval Station, lward

Serig, in an effort to obtain return

of the cards, without which Serrano

could not enter the base. Serig refused

to discuss the matter until the criminal

action was resolved. On March 30, while

the Puerto Rico criminal charges were

still pending, he issued a letter perma-

nently barring Serrano from the baee,*

l. The executive officer is the second

in command at the Station, For present

purposes, we shall consider his authority

coextensive with that of the commanding

officer, from whom seposibility for

this matter was delegated.

2. The letter read, in part,

On January 1978 you were appre-

hended by the Naval Station Security

Department when a substantial amount

of marijuana was discovered in the Naval

Station. You were also in possession

of two civilian worker's identification

cards issued to you on 19 and 22 August

1977. Both identification cards were

found to bear your photograph aithough

they were filed under different names

and contained dissimilar descriptions

of your physical characteristics. This

is in violation of Naval Station Regula-

tions and constitutes an act of fraud

against the United States Government.

As a result of your involvement

Page 4

in the aforementioned incident, you are

hereby barred from entering the Naval

Station, Roosevelt Roads.

The complaint alleges that the debarment

"is the direct cause that Serrano lost

his job as a cook in the school and

his business as a taxi driver."

Criminal charges arising out

of the January incident were brought

in Puerto Rico court. In April, the Navy

also brought charges against Serrano

in federal court when statements’ by

high school students on the base implica-

ted him in further drug transactions.

In may, after several continuances,

the Puerto Rico action was dismissed.

The United States Attorney later reques-

ted dismissal of the federal charges,

which was granted in July.

8

On November 7, and again on Novem-

ber af Serrano's attorney requested

in writing the return of the identification

cards; this was refused by a letter

from the commanding officer dated Decem-

eer 1, 1976. The letter acknowledged

that Serrano had “been absolved of any

guilt in the [criminal] charges," but

asserted that he "remained guilty" of

fraud against the government in posse-

ssing inconsistent identification cards.

It reiterated as a trespasser if he

were observed thereon. A week later

Serrano's attorney sent a letter reques-

ting a meeting with tie commanding officer;

this was refused. Fina.ly,

Page 5

on December 15, Serrano and his attorney

went to the base in an effort to speak

with the commanding officer. They were

denied admission. This followed in

January 1979,

I.

Several of appellant's arguments

may be quickly rejected. First, Serrano

claims he should have been allowed to

amend his complaint. The district court

did allow the vbhbiadie to be amended

once, in October 1979, More than two

years after the original complaint had

been filed, in March 1981, Serrano moved

to amend again by adding a number of

new defendants in support of a conspi-

racy theory. The motion was’ denied.

Serrano now appeals from that ruling, des-

cribing it as a denial of due process.

We fiad no error in the court's

denial of leave to amend, Plaintiff's

motion was unduly delayed. He claims

that he was not aware of the extent

of or participants in the alleged cons-

10

piracy until mid-1980. Yet the alleged

conspirators were the commander of the

base and the agents who stopped Serrano's

car. As early as February 1979 they

had been summoned as witnesses in the

Puerto Rico criminal action. Serrano

states that after he discovered the

conspiracy he was still obliged to put

off any amendment because of "an intolera-

ble personal situation," viz., fear

that amendment of the complaint = and

subsequent discovery would implicate

his half-brother and subject him to

criminal prosecution, Only once’ the

Page 6

Statute of limitations had run on the

criminal offense did Serrano seek leave

to amend the complaint. We do not think

his desire to hide the criminal behavior

of his half brother provided any proper

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justification for the further period

of delay. See Hayes v. New England

Millwork Distributors, Inc., 602 F.2d

15, 19=+20 (lst Cir. 1979). The district

court was entitled to believe that

allowance of the eleventh hour amendment

would result in undue prejudice to the

defendants as it added new parties

(at least some of whom were no longer even

in Puerto Rico), and by raising new

and separate claims would require addi-

tional research and discovery. We find

no abuse of discretion. See Johnston

he

v. Holiday Inns., 595 F2d 890, 896 (lst

Cir. 1979) (denial of leave to § amend

shall be reversed only for abuse of

discretion).

The district court alsc properly

found that it lacked jurisdiction over

the claims, all for money damages, against

the United States. No contractual claim

can ‘be made out under the Tucker Act,

28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(2), as the United

States is not a party to the collective

bargaining agreement, the only contract

invlolved, and Serrano was paid out

of nonappropriated funds. See generally

Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S.

481, 485 (1942); H.R. Rep. No. 933,

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News 3477, 3478-79,

Nor can Serrano recover in tort under

section

Page 7

1346(b). Debarment from a military

installation falls within the discretio-

mary function exceptionto the Federal

Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a)

Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d

626, 628 (7th Cir. 1972).

It is also clear that the district

court properly dismissed Serrano's claim

under 42 U.S.C. S 1985, The complaint

9lst

does not mention a conspiracy or state

facts from which the existance of a

conspiracy might be inferred. See Griffin

v. Breckenridge, 405 U.S. 88, 102-103

(1971).

ifs

This bring us to Serrano's prin-

cipal allegations: that the debarment

involved a denial of due process and

was so arbitrary that it cannot stand.

The district court found that no liberty

Or property interest existed to trigger

due process protections, and that the

debarment was not patently arbitrary.

Because these conclutions were necessarily

based in part on submissions outside

the pleadings, we treat the decision

below as a grant of summary judgement.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c); id. 56. We

may affirm only if, looking at the record

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in the light most favorable to appellant,

there is no genuine issue of material

fact and appellee is entitled to judge-

ment as a matter of law. E.e@., ahs

v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461,464 (lst Cir.

1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 904 (1976) .

Page 8

A. Military Discretion

Our law has accorded significant

autonomy to the military with respect

to civilian and judicial interference.

The military “constitutes a specialized

community governed. by a separate discipli-

ne from ,that of the civilian," Orloff

v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 8394 (1953).

The "overriding demands of discipline

and duty" render it "a specialized society

separate from civilian society." Parker

v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974).

See also Department of the Air Force

¥.° Rene, 425 U.S. 733, 743-66 (1974).

15

Of necessity, the military constitutes

a system that stands apart from and

outside of many of the rules that govern

civilian life in our country." Greer v.

Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (Powell,

J., Concurring).

This status creates’ particular

tensions when the military and civilian

realms conjoin. Frequently, itis the

civilian that must yield to the hichee

for "the special character of the military

requires civilian authorities to accord

military commanders some flexibility

in dealing with matters that affect

internal discipline and morale." Brown v.

Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980) (up-

holding Air Force regulations requiring

commanding officer's approval before

petitions may be circulated on the base);

see _ also Secretary of the Navy v. Huff,

444 U.S. 453 (1980) (upholding equivalent

Navy regulations): Greer v. Spock,

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Page 9

424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding exclusion

of politically oriented speakers’ from

Army base). In particular, the commanding

officer of a military basg has broad

authority and discretion to exclude

civilians from the base. Cafeteria

Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893

(1961); United States v. May, 622 F.2d

1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

984 (1980); 32 C.F.R. SS 700.702(a),

700.715; H. Moyer, Justice and the milita

ry S 4-520 at 521 (1970).

In Cafeteria Workers Rachel

Brawner, a cook at the Naval Gun Factory,

was relieved of her identification badge

and denied access to the base, without

notice or hearing, because of an unspeci-

fied failure to meet security require-

ments. Noting "the historically unques-

tioned power of a commanding officer

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summarily to exclude civilians from

the area of his command, "267 U.S. at

893, and the regulatory provision, still

in existence, that civilians employees

were to be admitted only as authorized

by the commanding officer, the Court

found that the commanding officer clearly

had the authority to exclude Mrs. Brawner.

Nor was the summary procedure a denial

of due process. The Court balanced

the government's traditionally unres-

trained control of its own internal

affairs against Mrs. Brawner's pcsivate

interest in pursuing her job at that

location -- “a mere privilege subject

to the Executive's plenary power," id.

at 895 -- and concluded that no process

was due.

Page 10

The only glimmer of encouragement

in Cafeteria Workers to persons situated

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18

like appellant occurs in its acknowledge-

ment that state and federal governments

"do not constitutionally have the complete

freedom of action enjyed by private

employer." Id. at 898. The Court went

on to say in this regard,

We may assume that Rachel Brawner

could not constitutionally have

been excluded from the Gun Factory

if the announced grounds’ for

the exclusion had been patently

arbitrary or discriminatory-

--that she could not have been

kept out because she was a Democrat

or .a Methodist. It does not

follow, however, that she was

entitled to notice and a hearing

when the reason advanced _ for

her exclusion was, ‘as cious

entirely rational and in accord

with the contract with M&M.

18A

id. Beside the above, the Court suggested

only one other circumstance giving rise

to a constitutional claim --"where govern-

ment action has operated to bestow a

badge of disloyalty or infamy, with

an attendant foreclosure from other

employment opportunity.” Id.

B. Due Process

Cafeteria Worker is frequently

cited for the proposition that a command-

ding officer may summarily exclude civilians

from his base. E.q., Tokar v. Hearne, 699

F.2d 753, 756 (Sth Cir. 1983)3 United

States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785, -786-

87 (10th Cir. 1973) ("well recognized

that the commander of a military installa-

tion has and must have the broad authori-

ty and discretion to summarily exclude

persons therefrom"); Government of the

Page 11

Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 F2d 346, 347

(5th Cir. 1970) (well established that

19

commanding officer "has the right to

summary exclude civilians from the insta-

llation without violating the requirements

of the due process clause"); United

States v. Jelinski, 411 F.2d 476, 477 (5th

Cir.) (mo due process violation where

subject barred without notice or hearing)

cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969); H.

Moyer, Justice and the Military S 4-

521 (1970). Despite Cafeteria Worker's

clear holding and this consistent line

of precedent, > appellant contends that

he has a fifth amendment right to notice

and a hearing before being disbarred.

It is quite clear that he received neither.

However, we agree with the district

court that he hed no right there to.

This case is squarely within the explicit

holding of Cafeteria

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20

Je The one possible exception to this

line of cases that we have found is

Kiiskila vv. United States, S32 6 -Ve«ae

745 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc). which found

a bar order invalid because it was issued

in response to Kiiskila's exercise of

her first amendment rights. The court

stated in dictum that "[a] absent explicit

authorization, a military commander

may not exclude a civilian employee

from a military installation without a

hearing." Id. at 747 n.1. (citing Cafete-

ria Workers). Even if this were true,

such explicit authorization may be assumed

to exist here as the relevant regulations

are exactly those relied on by the Court

in Cafeteria

Page 12

Workers and its progeny.

It is true that due _ process

jurisprudence has gone significant changes

sophenterarermstirysth We eeencrs'e

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21

since Cafeteria Workers, which was decide

in 1960, and that that case makes use

of the right/privilege distinction sub-

sequently abandoned by the Court. Compare

Cafeteria Workers, ar . Does at G95,

with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564,571 & n.9 (1972). Nonetheless,

the factors that persuaded the Court

that presence on the base was a mere "pri-

vilege" persuade us that Serrano did

not have a “legitimate claim of enti-

tlement" to continued admission to _ the

base. No statute, regulation, or contract

appears fo establish such an entitlement.

See generally Perkins v. Board of Direc-

Bere, G66 F.2d 49 (list Cir. 1982).

To the contrary, admission to the base

is contigent on the commanding officer's

authorization. See 32 C.F.R. SS 700.714,

700.715. The commanding officer's respon

sibility is "absolute," and his "author-

ity...is commensurate with his responsibil-

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tty.” 3a, »- S706. 02a). Nor is there

any allegation of a de facto system

of continuing admission. See Beitzel

v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870 (lst Cir. 1981).

We therefore think that the

4. Appellant argues that Cafeteria

Workers applies only when the debarment

is based on security concerns. The

distinction is hardly helpful § here--

keeping drugs off base may be as much

a "security" concern as keeping out

spies. Nothing in Cafeteria Workers

or subsequent case law suggests’ that

the commander's authority is less exten-

Sive in situations not involving classi-

fied information. See Toker v. Hearne,

699 F.2d at 757.

Page 13

district court correctly concluded that

Serrano enjoyed no property right requir-

23

ing the protections of due _ process.

See Bleeker v. Dukakis, 665 F2d 401

(lst Cir. 1981).

Appellant asserts, however,

that he has at least a liberty interest,

affected by his disbarment, requiring

due process protection. While a public

charge of drug selling is the sort of

serious charge that res infringe upon a

liberty interest, see Ventetuolo v.

Burke, 596 F.2d 476, 484 & n.13 (1st

Cir. 1979), this charge was never speci-

fically articulated or made public,see

id. As the district court noted, Navy

regulations protect personnel records

from public disclosure, and there is

no evidence of public stigma here,

Harrington v. United States, 673 F.2d

7, 11 (lst Cir. 1982).

We do not believe the district

court erred in finding that there was

24

no protected interest infringed by appel-

lant's summary debarment, While the

commanding officer or his’ subordinate

might have handled the incident with

greater fairness and tact, tt’. power

to exclude civilians aummarily has been

acknowledged by almost every court to

consider the matter. And for good reason,

as it "is a necessary concomitant of

thebasic function of a military installa-

tion,” Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 838,

and “of the commander's duty to.maintain

the order, security, and discipline

necessary to military operations," United

States wv. Gourley, 502 F.2d at 786-87.

Page 14

C. Arbitrariness

Although appellant had no right

to continued admission to the base,

he could not have been excluded for

reasons that were patently arbitrary

25

or discriminatory; for example, on the

grounds of race or religion. See Cafete-

ria Workers, 367 U.S. at 897-98: Weiman

Vo Bedearatt. 344 ..U.<S- 863, 292 (i9eere

The same standards would not apply if it

appeared that appellant had been excluded

for the exercise of first amendment

or other constitutional rights. See, e.q.,

Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197

(1972); Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d

745 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc). However,

the only claimed arbitrariness here

is the lack of an adequate factual basis

for the exclusion.

The language in Cafeteria Workers

indicates that the factual basis behind

the commander's allegations is not sub-

ject to judicial scrutiny. The Court

"

Was not willing to look behind the “an-

nounced grounds” for the exclusion;

it upheld the exclusion because the

reason advanced” was “entirely rational.”

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26

367 U.S. at 898 (emphasis added). Thus,

Cafeteria Workers would seem, at most, to

allow us only to “question whether the al-

legations, assumed to be true, are such

as would constitutionally permit an

exclusion order to stand; that is, whether

the assumed facts may constitutionally

be the basis for the judgement that"Serra-

no merits exclusion. Lieberman, Cafeteric

Workers Revisited; Does the Commander

Page 15

Have Plenary Power to Control Access

to his Base, 25 JAG J. 53,56 (1970).

To delve into the truth or falsity

of the facts behind the exclusion would

be to require the very hearing that

appellant has been found not entitled to.

It is true that circuit court

decisions subsequent to Cafeteria Workers

have often seemed willing to question,

within limits, not only whether the

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asserted reason for exclusion is sufficient

but also whether that reason has a basis

in fact. They phrase the issue as whether

the exclusion itself, not just the proffer

ed reason, is patently arbitrary or discri-

minatory. See, e.qg., United States v.

May, 622 F.2d at 1006; Bridges v. Davis

443 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1971) (scope

of review in challenge to debarment

"extremely limited," but commander's

wide discretion does not extend to patent

ly arbitrary or discriminatory exclu-

sions), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972);

Committee to Free the Fort Dix 38 v.

Collins 429 F.2d 807, 811 (3d Cir.

1970); Weissman Ve United States,

387 F.2d ark: 273 (20th Cir. 1967)

("The question...is whether the order

was rational."); Lloyd, Unlawful Entry

and Re-entry into Military Reservations

in Violation of 18 U.S.C, S$ 1382, 53

28

Mil. L. Rev. 136, 142 (1971) (bar can

not be “arbitrary or capricious," citing

Digs. Ops. JAG 1912, p. 267). Indeed, in

the most recent of these cases the plain-

tiff received a full bench trial on

the merits. The district court concluded

the bar crder was reasonable, and

Page 16

the circuit cour. agreed that "there

was ample evidence to support [the comman-

der's] actions." Tokar v. Hearne, 699

9 F.2d at 757.

We need not now decide whether

this willingness to look at the under-

lying factual support for a bar order

is proper. The district court’ here

determined that the commanding officer

"had valid grounds for suspecting plain-

btiff and for deciding that it was best

for his command area that he be excluded

therefrom." Though the question is

29

fairly close, the record revealing more

than a little confusion on the part

of the Navy, we would agree with the

district court. The charge of identifica-

tion card fraud seems insubstantial,

but the concern as to appellant's invol-

vement in drug sales is adequately suppor-

ted. The circumstances were ‘plainly

suspicious; Serrano was accompanied

In his taxi not only by a passenger

who possessed marijuana bvt by a half-

brother widely identified as _ dealing

in drugs who apparently tried

to get rid of some marijuana when the

Stop occurred. While a taxi driver

might not always be expected to vouch

for every passenger, the presence of

his half-brother in the taxi put matters

in a different light. The record also

contains three sworn statements by separ-

te individuals identifying appellant

as a drug supplier. A base commander

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has wide discretion as to whom he may

exclude from the base, and there is

evidence in the form of the current

regulationsthat the

Page 17

military was deeply troubled by the

trafficking in drugs on bases. We cannot

say the exclusion of plaintiff in these

circumstances was patently arbittses

or discriminatory. See Bridges v. Davis,

433 F.2d at 974 (Koelsch, J., concurring)

("substantial proof of actual misconduct"

not required; bar orders’ should stand

"even though the result of gossip and

unconfirmed rumor").

31

Saks

The complaint named not- only

the United States and the base commander

as defendants, but also the school system

in whose cafeteria Serrano had _ been

employed. Appellant states that regard-

less of the outcome of his action against

the United States, he has an independent

and viable action against the_~ school

System for back pay and reemployment,

if only at another facility. The district

court did not address this claim in

its opinion. It did, however, dismiss

the action "as to all defendants."

It is not easy to discern the

legal theory or factual basis on which

appellant seeks to proceed against the

school system. hi .0oes allege a breach

of the collective bargaining agreement

between the school system and his union.

Yet the provision of the agreement to

~~

‘32

which he cites does not seem ‘to exist.

Moreover, in his brief he asserts that

the agreement "expired on 25 August

1977, had not been renewed or otherwise

kept in force, and was not in effect

during any of the time

Page 18

period of this case." Adding to. the

confusion is the fact that the school

system itself denies that Serrano was

even discharged.

Notwithstanding the above, and

without meaning to intimate that the

claim has any merit, we do not at this

time sustainthe dismissal as_ to. the

claim against the school system arising

out of the employment relationship.

The district court did not discuss

the matter in its opinion, and we think

Serrano should have an opportunity to

justify the claim, if he can, upon a

proper motion for summary judgement

33

focusing on that issue. Accordingly

while affirming the district court's

judgement in ail other’ respects, we

vacate and remand as to so much of it

as dismisses Serrano's claim for. back

pay from and reemployment in the school

system,

So ordered.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 82-1702

ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA

Plaintiff, Appellant,

Ve

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees,

Before

Campbell, Chief Judge

Coffin and Bowes, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Entered June 13, 1983

The petition for the rehearing

is denied. The opinion is amended as

follows:

1) The sentence beginning - on

line 13 of page 2 is changed to "His

brother, Jose Serrano Medina, was also

in the car."

2) On page 16, line 8, 9, and

10 from the bottom are changed to "passen-

ger who possessed marijuana but by his

brother, who apparently tried to get

rid of some marijuana when the stop

occurred. While a taxi...."

3) In line 6 from the bottom

on page 16, “half-brother is’ changed

to "brother."

By the Court,

Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk.

[cc: Messrs. Walser and Adkins

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the First Circuit

No. 84-1644

ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon.Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. DistrictJudge |]

Before

Coffin, Circuit Judged

Wisdom, *Senior Circuit Judge.

and Bownes, Circuit Judge.

Robert J. Walser for appellant.

Osvaldo Carlo Linares, assistant United

36

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37

States Attorney, with whom Daniel F. Lo-

pez Romo, United States Attorny, was no

brief for appellees.

March 27, 1985

38

Per curiam, Appellant, Andres Serrano

Medina, challenges a grant of summary

judgement, dismissing his claim that

appelee, the Antilles Consolidated School

System, had terminated his employment

as a cook without cause and thereby

violated his due process rights. For

the reasons outlined below, we affirm

district court's decision,

The district court entertained

cross-motions for summary judgement

in response to our earlier decision

in this case, Serrano Medina v. United

States, 709 F.2d 104 (ist Cir. 1983).

There we upheld the district court's

dismissal of appellant's primary claim,

which was that the commanding officer

of the United States Naval Station at

Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, had violated

appellant's due process and equal protec-

tionrights by permanently barring him

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from the naval station. Id. at 108-

110, For a number of years’ preceding

the issuance of the bar order, appellant

had worked at the naval station in two

Capacities, as an independent taxi driver

and as a cook for the school system,

Although not unsympathetic to appellant's

plight, we held that the commanding

officer's exclusion of appellant from

the naval station had neither violated

his constitutional rights nor been "arbi -

trary or discriminatory."! Id.

At the same time, we remanded

for further consideration what

I. Having rejected the claim against

the commanding officer in our earlier

decision, we find that part of appellant's

brief which concerns the facts under

lying the bar order largely, if not

entirely, irrelevant at this juncture.

So Ronee gee: PERNA aae here NR RL

For a complete summary of these facts,

40

see Serrano Medina »s. United States,

709 F.2d 104, 105-106 (lst Cir.

Page 3

appeared to be a- possible’ secondary

; ; 2

claim against the school system, which

operates as a somewhat autonomous entity

at this and two other military bases.

"

While we noted that it was not easy

to discern the legal theory or factual

basis on which appellant seeks to proceed

against the school system" for _ back

pay and re-employment, we thought it

best that the district court give appel-

lant an opportunity to justify what

ever claim he might have. Id. at 110.

After considering the cross-

motions for summary judgement that were

subsequently filed, the district court

dismissed appellant's claim against

the school system for a number of reasons,

'

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41

including: (1) the fact that appellant

was unable to point to any collective

bargaining agreement, contract, or statute

that required the school to prove that

it had cause to terminate someone in

appellant's position; (2) the fact

that the school system had ample cause

to terminate him in that it was impossible

for him to report to work as a result

of the bar order; and (3) the fact that

there was no evidence that the school

System had injured his’ reputation by

publishing any defamatory statements

about him.

In reviewing the district court's

decision, we focus solely upon the second

and third grounds, which, by tnemselves,

are sufficient to dispose of this appeal.

The evidence unmistakably shows” that

appellant was dismissed in large part

because he was unable to report to work.

Appellant concedes both in his amended

2. As the district court has subsequent-

ly noted, none of the specific charges

set forth in the amended complaint spe-

cifically identifies tthe school system

as the wrongdoer.

Page 4

complaint and in the "Stipulated Statement

of Facts" signed by counsel for both

parties that his "employment as_ cook

in the school cafeteria [was] terminated

' Moreover,

because of the debarment order.'

the termination letter itself states

in pertinent part:' "Due to the barment

from entering Roosevelt Roads Naval

Station, you became ineligible to perform

the duties of your position. This may

not be controverted since employees

must be ready, willing and able to work."

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These facts fully support the district

court's conclusion that even if appellant

was correct in his contention that he

could only be terminated ‘for cause,

the school system had more than sufficent

cause to terminate him.

Similarly, the evidence on record

fully supports the district court's deter-

mination that any damage to appellant's

reputation was caused not by the school

system but by the commanding officer.

Appellant makes no allegation, and points

to no evidence which would support an

allegation, that the schol system disclosa

to the public any defamatory comment, eva-

luation, or letter.

Accordingly, the decision of

the district court is affirmed.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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