Opposition Brief — Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules Inc.
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
= oct 18 1906
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
IN THE | CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-477
October Term, 1985
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Petitioner
v.
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
Respondent
and
GOULD, INC.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
BRIEF OF HERCULES INCORPORATED
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
John Gerald Gleeson, Esquire Joseph G. Manta, Esquire
Hercules Incorporated John C. Sullivan, Esquire
Hercules Plaza FRUMKIN & MANTA
Wilmington, DE 19899 Suite 1818
(302) 594-7004 Three Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 988-0777
Attorneys for Respondent,
Hercules Incorporated
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PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA. PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Will this Court consider on a petition for ~ rit of
certiorari an issue now claimed by petitioner to raise a
federal question where petitioner argued in the court be-
low that the identical issue was controlled by state law?
2. Will this Court grant certiorari in a diversity case
where (1) no federal question is presented, where (2) the
only issues presented arise under the common law of
Pennsylvania, and where (3) federal and state standards
are substantially identical?
3. Does this case present an issue sufficiently im-
portant to command review by this court in view of the
facts that (1) the Third Circuit refused to give its ruling
general application and expressly limited its decision to
the unique facts before it, that (2) the passage of various
environmental statutes makes this case unlikely to recur
in the federal courts, and that (3) the Third Circuit’s de-
cision is consistent with applicable precedent?
LIST OF PARTIES
Hercules Incorporated accepts as accurate petition-
er’s list of parties. In compliance with Rule 28.1,
Hercules attaches a list of Hercules’ foreign and domes-
tic subsidiaries and affiliates. See Resp. Appendix at
A-1-2.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW...... i
rr ii
pe a Sy 8) >). Ge iii
EPR Ee merere ss Gee Bee CADE, ... 1... ccc eee ]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................... 3
Se ee et ee ee 5
I.
Il.
IIT.
This Case, In Which The Sole Basis For Fed-
eral Jurisdiction Was Diversity Of Citizenship
And In Which Only Pennsylvania Nuisance
Law Issues Were Involved, Does Not Present
cca wa bb om sees
The Issues Are Not Sufficiently Important To
Warrant This Court’s Review Since The Third
Circuit’s Decision Was Narrow In Scope And
Involved Issues Unlikely To Recur In The
I Sie 8 ine Bean « ara-s Cawwes as os
PECO’s Claims Were Properly Rejected By
The Third Circuit......... hateentieneaanss
A. PECO Did Not State Or Prove A Public
Nuisance Claim Since It Did Not Allege
That It Sustained Harm While Exercising
A Right Common To The General Public.
B. PECO’s Eleventh-Hour Attempt To Assert
A Cause Of Action For Indemnification
Was Properly Rejected By The Third Cir-
cuit Because PECO Failed To Prove That
It Was Legally Liable For The Cleanup Of
Its Property And Because There Can Be
No Common Law Indemnification As Be-
tween Parties Whose Liability Is Merely
I faa arg ek ws <0 A Pe cede KOK aos
1]
12
TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued )
Page
I tte SL ee Gir d cas § a Ree 16
APPENDIX
, SBR ree eA, CP SERVICE, occas A-19
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)..... 8
Beckman Cotton Co. v. First National Bank, 666
ee Ry ot RD . 4 errr ere 7
Bem v. trom, Tai U.cm. Gem CIOS) «nw oo ec cccanc: 10
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).......... 9
Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F.Supp. 247 (D. Me.
1973), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 12, 13
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 11
City of Moore v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Rail-
way Co., 699 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983) ...... 7
Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 454
Pee ee CE can oc rc tds cee: bao )
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
ee a re ier ee Cee a ee See 6, 9,15
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
Ae NS ec cata ewe sees Oa ee cna wks 10
Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944)....... 5
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtis Noll Corp.,
112 Mich. App. 182, 315 N.W.2d 890 (1982). 14
McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.
SE iis kone eRe ok eae rad ee ka 10
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ...... 11
Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977)...... 6
National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh
Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498 (1950). ......... 11
O’Leary v. Moyer;s Landfill, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 642
pe Se ree ee ere ee 12
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued )
Cases: Page
Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa.
SOG, Bee AB OG CRD bcc ccececcennrasies 12
Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir.
PEEK ca nvecrndnpedskeacenees keaeerere 9
Tugboat Indian Co. v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 334 Pa.
Fa, DAs TS COE 6 heeds eebaaeelives 14
United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power
Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953) ...........005. 8
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976)... 8
- Wamp v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 527 F.2d
595 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992
Ci PORTE e ee, ee Eevee ee 7
Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,
693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. Drury v. Westborough Mall, Inc., 461 U.S.
5? sree rrr rns Pree re 7
William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975)..... 8
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 26
COED 6 0.0.5.4.0.3:¢064:86 005004040 CLO CE CRER tks 7
Statutes
Pe CE BROS 4.040000 8 o4dh C006 E SS eee eee 2
Other
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed.
PPP ree eee rrr eee mee he © 13, 14, 15
Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C (1979) .. 12, 13
13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d (1984). ... 7, 8
vi
No. 85-477
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1985
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Petitioner
v.
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
Respondent
and
GOULD, INC.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
BRIEF OF HERCULES INCORPORATED
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Philadelphia Electric Company (hereinaf-
ter “PECO”) filed this lawsuit against Respondent
Hercules Incorporated (hereinafter “Hercules”) and
Gould, Inc. (hereinafter “Gould’’) for the costs of clean-
ing up certain materials leaching from industrial prop-
erty owned by PECO into the Delaware River. PECO
1
2
claimed that the materials had been placed on the prop-
erty by a former owner, Pennsylvania Industrial Chem-
ical Corporation (hereinafter “PICCO”). PICCO had sold
the property to Gould, which later sold the property to
PECO. Hercules’ liability was based on its status as an
alleged successor to PICCO. Hercules had never owned
the land in question or used the land for any purpose, but
had purchased PICCO’s remaining assets approximately
two years after PICCO had sold the property. PECO’s
claims against Hercules were grounded in private and
public nuisance and were limited to claims under the
common law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The sole basis for federal jurisdiction was diversity of cit-
_izenship and an amount in controversy in excess of
$10,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. §1332.
The case proceeded to a trial by jury. During that
trial, PECO neither alleged nor introduced evidence that
it used the Delaware River or that it was harmed by the
alleged pollution of the River. (Pet. Appendix at A-25)
Nonetheless, at the close of the evidence, the trial judge,
over Hercules’ objections, instructed the jury on princi-
ples of public and private nuisance. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of PECO and against Hercules.
Hercules filed timely motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict or for a new trial. After the district
court denied Hercules’ post-trial motions, Hercules ap-
pealed to the Third Circuit. ©
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the judgment
against Hercules. The court held that PECO had no pri-
vate nuisance cause of action against Hercuies since the
defect PECO complained about existed on PECO’s own
land. (Pet. Appendix at A-16-22) The Third Circuit held
further that PECO had not stated a cause of action for
public nusiance because it had not alleged or proved that
it sustained harm while exercising a right common to the
general public. (Pet. Appendix at A-22-25) Finally, the
Third Circuit rejected, on two grounds, the indemnity
claim which PEC( ‘:ad asserted for the first time in its
3
appellate brief. (Pet. Appendix at A-26) First, the court
found that PECO had failed to prove that it was itself
legally liable for the clean up of its property as required
to recover indemnity under Pennsylvania law. (Pet. Ap-
pendix at A-27-29) Secondly, the court ruled that indem-
nity was not available where, as here, the liability of both
parties was merely vicarious. (Pet. Appendix at A-29-30)
PECO filed a Petition for Re+ earing in Banc with the
Third Circuit. PECO claimed that the panel’s decision
was contrary to “controlling” Pennsylvania standing de-
cisions. (Resp. Appendix at A-16) In fact, the heading of
PECO’s argument was:
Under the Established Law of Public Nuisance in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, PECO Has the
Requisite Standing to Maintain this Action Against
Hercules.
(Resp. Appendix at A-6) PECO also argued that it was
entitled to indemnification under Pennsylvania law. Af-
ter its Petition for Rehearing was denied, PECO filed this
petition for writ of certiorari. In this Court, however,
PECO has changed its position on standing and now ar-
gues that the federal law of standing, rather than
Pennsylvania’s law, should control.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This diversity case does not present an issue which
warrants review by this Court on certiorari. First, this
case does not involve any federal question. Because this
is a diversity case in which the law of Pennsylvania ap-
plies, the questions of whether PECO had stated a cause
of action for public nuisance, whether it had standing to
assert such a claim, and whether it was entitled to in-
demnification from Hercules are governed by the law of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Although PECO
now attempts to characterize the question of its standing
4
to assert a public nuisance as a federal question, it ar-
gued before the Third Circuit that Pennsylvania’s law of
standing applied. Moreover, contrary to PECO’s present
position, federal courts apply the state law of standing in
diversity cases. Since the highest court of each state, and
not this Court, is the ultimate arbiter of state law, a de-
cision by this Court would have no binding effect either
on similar state court lawsuits or similar federal court
diversity lawsuits.
Secondly, this case is not of sufficient general im-
portance to warrant review by this Court. PECO’s only
argument for the importance of this case is that a deci-
sion on standing does not bar relitigation. Under PECO’s
_analysis, however, the danger of relitigation would be
present with respect to any decision on standing. It does
not make this case important. In addition, the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision is narrow in scope. The Third Circuit ex-
pressly refused to give its ruling general application and
limited its decision to the unique factual situation pre-
sented in this case. Moreover, the passage of various en-
vironmental statutes combined with the unique factual
issues presented here make this case unlikely to recur.
Finally, PECO’s claims for private nuisance! and
public nuisance, as well as its last minute indemnifica-
tion claim, were correctly rejected by the Third Circuit.
The essence of a public nuisance is injury to the public.
Because PECO failed to allege or prove that it had sus-
tained an injury while exercising a right common to the
public, the court determined that it had not stated a
cause of action for public nuisance. PECO’s indemnity
claim was not included in its complaint and was not sub-
mitted to the jury; it was asserted as an afterthought in
PECO’s brief to the Third Circuit. The claim was re-
jected because PECO had not offered any evidence to
1. Since PECO has not challenged the Third Circuit’s ruling on
private nuisance, Hercules will not discuss that aspect of the court's
decision.
5
sustain an indemnification claim. More importantly,
however, regardless of this failure of proof, indemnity
was inapplicable as a matter of law since the liability of
the parties was vicarious only. The Third Circuit’s deci-
sion is fully consistent with the facts and with applicable
precedent.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS CASE, IN WHICH THE SOLE BASIS FoR FEDERAL
JURISDICTION WAS DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP AND IN
WHICH ONLY PENNSYLVANIA NUISANCE LAW ISSUES
WERE INVOLVED, DOES NOT PRESENT A FEDERAL
QUESTION.
The ultimate issues in this case, and the focus of the
Third Circuit, was whether PECO had stated a cause of
action under Pennsylvania law for public nuisance
and/or indemnification. These issues do not involve any
constitutional or federal statutory questions, but involve
legal issues governed by the law of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. This Court does not review the consid-
ered determination of questions of state law by an inter-
mediate federal appellate court. Huddleston v. Dwyer,
322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944).
PECO argues that certiorari should be granted on
the ground that the Third Circuit’s ruling was that
PECO had no standing to sue in public nuisance and
that this ruling contravened federal law. The latter part
of this argument represents a dramatic shift in PECO’s
position. PECO itself recognized the inapplicability of
the federal law of standing in its Petition for Rehearing
In Banc to the Third Circuit. In fact, PECO argued in
that petition that “the panel decision is contrary to the
laws ox the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which
law is controlling in this action,” on the standing issue.
6
(Resp. Appendix at A-16, emphasis added). PECO now
attempts to shift positions in order to raise a federal issue
for purposes of invoking this Court’s discretionary juris-
diction. Such maneuvering does not create a basis for
review on certiorari, however. This Court will not con-
sider on a grant of certiorari bases for liability not argued
below. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 34 (1977).
In this case, PECO attempts to go further than the pe-
titioner in Miree. Here, PECO not only failed to argue
that the federal law of standing applied, but argued the
converse, that Pennsylvania law was controlling. This
Court should not consider such an argument on a writ of
certiorari.
. Moreover, the Third Circuit’s decision was actuall*’
grounded on PECO’s failure to state a cause of action.
The Third Circuit stated its holding as follows: “We hold
only that in this case the purchaser of that land, PECO
— though we recognize that it acted as a responsible
corporate citizen — had no cause of action against the
vendor’s successor, Hercules, for private nuisance, pub-
lic nuisance, or common law indemnity.” (Pet. Appendix
at A-31, emphasis added) As PECO itself acknowledges,
under the Erie doctrine, “the requirements of a claim for
public nuisance are state-law determinative.” See PECO
Petition at 8 n.3.
The Third Circuit did fully discuss the standing of
PECO to bring a public nusiance claim. As illustrated by
PECO’s petition, however, the question of whether a pri-
vate party has stated a cause of action in public nuisance
is intertwined with the question of whether that party
has standing. According, to PECO, in order to have
standing, a plaintiff must have alleged some particular-
ized injury that sets him apart from the man in the
street; in order to have stated a cause of action, plaintiff
must plead, and prove, a particular damage, different in
kind and degree from that suffered by the general public.
See PECO Petition at 18. No meaningful distinction can
be drawn between these two inquiries.
7
Contrary to PECO’s contention before this Court.
the question of standing in diversity cases is a matter of
state law, not federal law.? Federal concepts of standing
developed to regulate enforcement of federal rights do
not represent any independent interest of the federal
courts that justifies disregarding state law in the diver-
sity context. 13A C. Wright, A Miller & E. Cooper, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d §3531.14,
at 84 (1984). This rule has long been recognized by this
Court and other federal courts. For example, in Williams
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 48 (1933), this Court
ruled that state law determines who has standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a state statute on the
ground that it violates a state constitution.
This principle has been reaffirmed in recent deci-
sions of the intermediate federal appellate courts. For ex-
ample, in Beckman Cotton Co. v. First National Bank,
666 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1982), the court applied
Georgia law to determine plaintiff’s standing to sue in a
diversity case. See also City of Moore v. Atchison, To-
peka, & Santa Fe Railway Co., 699 F.2d 507, 511 (10th
Cir. 1983) (in a diversity suit, state law determines
standing of city to challenge state statute exempting rail-
roads from city zoning power); Westborough Mall, Inc. v.
City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 747-48 & n.8 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Drury v. Westborough
Mall, Inc., 461 U.S. 945 (1983) (state law of standing
applied to claims that city’s zoning actions violated state
law); Wamp v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 527
F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992
(1976) (since plaintiff did not have standing to maintain
action in state court, federal court had no remova! juris-
diction).
2. PECO does not even attempt to characterize the issue cf
whether it was entitled to indemnification as a federal question. The
indemnification issue is unquestionably a matter of state law.
8
In fact, the very commentator cited by PECO on the
question of the applicable law for standing determina-
tions rejects petitioner’s argument. In discussing the ef-
fect of state law on standing in federal diversity cases,
Wright says: “[A]s to litigation involving state rights but
commenced in federal courts or removed to them, state
law [of standing] ordinarily should apply.” 13A C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure: Jurisdiction 2d §3531.14, at 84 (1984). The
cases cited by PECO stand for the proposition that the
federal law of standing applies only when a plaintiff is
asserting federal rights. See, e.g., Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 262 n.8 (1976) (state law of standing does
not govern where plaintiff is seeking relief in federal
courts for an asserted injury to its federal rights). Since
PECO asserted no federal rights, the federal law of
standing has no applicability.
Whether the federal or Pennsylvania law of standing
is applied, the test is substantially the same: (1) whether
plaintiff alleges that the challenged activity has caused
him injury in fact and (2) whether the interest sought to
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests sought to be protected. Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152, 153 (1970); William Penn Parking
Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d
269, 283-84 (1975). Standing rulings are not made in a
vacuum, but require consideration of the “specific cir-
cumstances of the individual circumstances.” See
United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power
Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). The Third Circuit
found that PECO had never alleged or proved that it had
sustained a “particular injury” while exercising a right
common to the general public as required under appli-
cable public nusiance principles. (Pet. Appendix at A-25)
Therefore, PECO could not meet either federal or Penn-
sylvania standing requirements.
9
In a diversity case, the lower federal courts and this
Court are bound to follow applicable state law. Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). “Federal
court decisions in diversity cases have no precedential
value as state iaw and only determine the issues between
the parties.” Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174,
1177 (8th Cir. 1969). As a result, this Court’s interpre-
tation or application of state law will not prevent a dif-
ferent resolution of this issue by the state courts. See,
e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 128, 454 A.2d
991, 995 (1982). Only issues of state law were presented
in this diversity suit. Therefore, the petition for writ of
cert.crari should be denied.
II. THE ISSUES ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO
WARRANT THIS COURT’S REVIEW SINCE THE THIRD
CIRCUIT’S DECISION WAS NARROW IN SCOPE AND IN-
VOLVED ISSUES UNLIKELY TO RECUR IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS.
Rule 17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States provides that this Court will grant review
on a writ of certiorari “only when there are special and
important reasons therefore.” PECO has not made any
showing that this case is of sufficient general importance
to warrant review by this Court.
The only argument made by PECO to show thi al-
leged importance of this case is its claim that a decision
on standing does not preclude further litigation of the
dispute by the parties. See PECO Petition at 14 17. As
stated above, the holding of the Third Circuit was that
PECO had not stated a cause of action for public nui-
sance. Therefore, this argument is immaterial.
Furthermore, even if the Third Circuit’s decision is
viewed as a standing decision, the argument that
relitigation may result does not demonstrate the impor-
tance of this case. According to PECO, a ruling that any
10
plaintiff lacked standing would not bar a later suit based
upon the same factual allegations.* Therefore, under
PECO’s analysis, the danger of relitigation argument
could be made with respect to virtually any standing de-
termination. PECO’s argument proves too much. Surely
it was not intended that this court would grant review on
certiorari in any case which was dismissed for lack of
standing.
In addition, it must again be noted that petitioner did
not raise the danger of relitigation issue in its Petition for
Rehearing In Banc to the Third Circuit. (Resp. Appendix
at A-6-10) Petitioner should have raised this issue below
when it had the opportunity.
That this case is lacking in the importance required
for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction is
further demonstrated by the limited nature of the Third
Circuit’s ruling. The decision, contrary to PECO’s exag-
gerated view of its impact, See PECO Petition at 6, says
nothing about the rights of purchasers and sellers of real
estate generally. To the contrary, the Third Circuit was
careful to expressly limit its decision to a determination
that, based on the evidence presented in this case, PECO
had no cause of action under Pennsylvania law against
Hercules for private nuisance, public nuisance or com-
mon law indemnity. (Pe*. Appendix at A-31)
Finally, the issue in this case is unlikely to recur in
the federal courts. The fec eral common law of nuisance
3. Contrary to PECO’s claim, PECO would be barred from fur-
ther litigation in this case. First, the Third Circuit’s actual holding
was that PECO had not stated a cause of action. Dismissal for failure
to state a proper cause of action is a judgment on the merits. Fed-
erated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3
(1981); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Moreover, Mc-
Carney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230, 231 (8th Cir. 1981), which
PECO cites as support, is inapplicable. In McCarney, the court ad-
dressed only the “narrow issue of whether a dismissal for lack of
standing to invoke a particular statute can act as a bar to a later suit
based upon the same factual allegations.” (Emphasis added) It has
no applicability to a case based on various common law theories.
11
has been preempted by the various federal environmen-
tal statutes. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Ass’n., 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981);
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
The Third Circuit recognized that an extension of com-
mon law nuisance would be inadvisable since “Congress
and the state legislatures are actively seeking to achieve.
a socially acceptable definition of rights and liabilities.”
See Pet. Appendix at A-22. Therefore, the issues pre-
sented here would arise only in those diversity cases
where a purchaser of land sought recovery in nuisance
from the seller of that land for an alleged defect existing
in the property. Such claims will be limited in number.
This Court grants review on certiorari only to resolve
issues of general importance as distinguished from cases
only of importance to the parties. National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498,
502 (1950). The only real questions PECO raises in its
Petition turn on the particular facts of this case alone and
are of interest only to the parties to it. Given the limited
scope of the Third Circuit’s decision and the improba-
bility of recurring litigation of this nature, this case does
not merit review by this Court on certiorari.
III. PECO’Ss CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY REJECTED BY THE
‘ ‘THIRD CIRCUIT.
A final reason for denying the PECO petition is that
each claim for which it seeks review was correctly re-
jected by the Third Circuit.
12
A. PECO Did Not State Or Prove A Public Nuisance
Claim Since It Did Not Allege That It Sustained
Harm While Exercising A Right Common To The
General Public.
The essence of PECO’s public nuisance claim was
that its land was damaged by the presence of contami-
nants which were leaching from its land into the Dela-
ware River. By way of contrast, the essence of a public
nuisance is injury te the public. Pennsylvania Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo En-
terprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350, 237 A.2d 342, 348 (1968). As
a result, in order for a private plaintiff to recover damages
for a public nuisance, it must have “suffered harm of a
- kind different from that suffered by other members of
the public exercising the right common to the general
public that was the subject of interference.” Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §821C (1979) (emphasis added).
PECO never alleged or attempted to show that it was
making any use of the Delaware River or that it was
harmed in any way by the alleged contamination of those
waters. Instead PECO focused on the condition of its
own property.
The Third Circuit, consistent with applicable prece-
dent, found that PECO had not made out a claim for pub-
lic nuisance because it found that PECO had made no
allegation nor offered any evidence that it had sustained
any harm while exercising a right common to the gen-
eral public. (Pet. Appendix at A-24-25) This limit on pri-
vate actions for public nuisance has been recognized by
the courts, the Restatement and the leading commenta-
tor on tort law. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc.,
523 F. Supp. 642, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (public nuisance
claim brought by private individuals dismissed where
plaintiffs proved only that contaminants were entering a
creek, but failed to show harm to users of the creek
caused by the leachate discharges); Burgess v. M/V
Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), aff’d, 559
13
F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977) (public nuisance claims
brought by businessmen who alleged economic harm
from poilution of a lake dismissed where plaintiffs did not
assert any interference with their exercise of 1 public
right); Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C (1979) (in
order to recover damages in an individual action for pub-
lic nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind dif-
ferent from that suffered by other members of the public
exercising the right common to the general public that
was the subject of interference); W. Prosser, The Law of
Torts, §88, at 586 (4th ed. 1971) (private individual has
no action for invasion of public right unless he is injured
by public nuisance over and above the injury suffered by
public generally).
Furthermore, the Third Circuit properly distin-
guished the facts of this case from public nuisance
claims by riparian landowners whose property was dam-
aged by pollution. (Pet. Appendix at A-25) In each of
those cases, the damage to the property was caused by
the pollution of the river; here it is alleged that PECO’s
property was the source of the pollution of the Delaware
River. This case presents the inverse of a public
nuisance.
B. PECO’s Eleventh-Hour Attempt To Assert A Cause
Of Action For Indemnification Was Properly Re-
jected By The Third Circuit Because PECO Failed
To Prove That It Was Legally Liable For The
Cleanup Of The Site And Because There Can Be No
Common Law Indemnification As Between Parties
Whose Liability Is Merely Vicarious.
In its Brief to the Third Circuit, PECO argued for the
first time that it was entitled to recovery on common law
principles of indemnification. The Third Circuit properly
rejected this claim finding: (1) that the record did not
support affirmance on the basis of a cause of action never
pleaded, proved, nor submitted to the jury and (2) that
14
there could be no common law indemnification between
two parties whose liability is merely vicarious. (Pet. Ap-
pendix at A-25-31) The Third Circuit’s decision is con-
sistent with applicable Pennsylvania law.
The initial problem with PECO’s indemnification
claim was that the evidence submitted by PECO did not
support it. This is not surprising since PECO had never
pleaded, proved nor submitted the indemnification issue
to the jury. (Pet. Appendix at A-26) In fact, the issue was
first raised by PECO in its appellate brief. Under Penn-
sylvania law, PECO was required, inter alia, to prove
that it was legally liable for the cleanup of the PECO site
in order to recover indemnity. Tugboat Indian Co. v. A/S
_Ivarans Rederi, 334 Pa. 15, 21, 5 A.2d 153, 156 (1939).
Finding no such evidence, the Third Circuit properly re-
jected PECO’s claim. PECO ignores this fundamental
failure of proof in its petition to this Court.
The Third Circuit also found that as a matter of law
there could be no indemnity between two parties whose
liability is vicarious. In this case, PECO’s liability was
based on its status as successor to PICCO in title to the
land; Hercules’ alleged liability was based on its status as
successor to PICCO’s other assets. The Third Circuit’s
decision was based on the general rule that indemnity
turns upon whether the difference in the gravity of the
faults of the participants is so great as to throw the whole
loss upon one. (Pet. Appendix at A-30) Once again this
ruling is fully consistent with applicable precedent
which holds that there can be no indemnification be-
tween two parties whose liability is vicarious. See Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtis Noll Corp., 112 Mich.
App. 182, 315 N.W.2d 890 (1982).
The Third Circuit gave full consideration to the is-
sues and decided them correctly and fairly. The Third
Circuit’s reasoning and conclusions showed a scholarly
attempt to ascertain what the Pennsylvania courts would
have done in an area described by Prosser as an “impen-
etrable jungle.” W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of
15
Torts §86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971). The case was fully con-
sistent with relevant Pennsylvania precedent. As a re-
sult, the decision was entirely in accordance with the
principles of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). Therefore, the petition for writ of certiorari
should be denied.
16
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, Respondent
Hercules incorporated respectfully requests that the Pe-
tition for a Writ of Certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
John Gerald Gleeson
Hercules Incorporated
Hercules Plaza
Wilmington, DE 19894
(302) 594-7004
FRUMKIN & MANTA
By
Joseph G. Manta
John C. Sullivan
Suite 1818
Three Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 988-0777
Attorneys for Respondent
Hercules Incorporated
APPENDIX TO
HERCULES INCORPORATED’S BRIEF
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
HERCULES’ SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED
I re ee ee eee A-1
APPELLEE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COM-
PANY’S PETITION FOR REHEARING IN
BANC PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE NO. 40......... A-3
HERCULES’ SUBSIDIARIES
AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES
Consolidated, Wholly Owned
Subsidiaries
(Directly or Indirectly)
AUSTRIA
Patex Chemie GmbH, Traun
THE BAHAMAS
Hercules International Trade
Corporation Limited
(HINTCO), Nassau
BELGIUM
Hercules Chemicals N.V.,
Beringen
BRAZIL
Hercules do Brasil Produtos
Quimicos Ltda., Sao Paulo
CANADA
Hercules Canada Inc., Missis-
sauga, Ontario
DENMARK
A/S Kobenhavns Pektinfabrik,
Lille Skensved
ENGLAND
Hercules Limited, London
The Holden Vale Manufactur-
ing Company, Limited,
Haslingden
PFW Ltd., Perivale
FINLAND
Oy Hercofinn Ab, Helsinki
FRANCE
Hercules France S.A., Paris
GERMANY
Hercules GmbH, Hamburg
Pomosin AG, Grossenbrode
HONG KONG
Hercochem (H.K.) Ltd.
ITALY
Hercules Bewoid Italia S_p.A.,
Milan
Cesalpinia S.p.A., Milan
JAPAN
Hercules Far East K.K., Tokyo
MEXICO
Quimica Hercules, S.A. de
C.V., Mexico, D.F.
THE NETHERLANDS
Hercules B.V., Rijswijk
PFW (Nederland) B.V.,
Amersfoort
SINGAPORE
Hersean Pte Ltd., Singapore
SPAIN
Ceratonia, Sociedad Anonima,
Tarragona
Rohe, S.A., Tarragona
SWEDEN
Hercules Kemiska Aktiebolag,
Goteborg
UNITED STATES
Caribbean Lumber Company,
Inc., Savannah, Georgia
Champlain Cable Corporation,
Wilmington, Delaware
Esgraph Incorporated, Cerritos,
California
Hercules Chemical Corpora-
tion, Wilmington, Delaware
Hercules Overseas Corporation,
Wilmington, Delaware
Hercules Trading Corporation,
Wilmington, Delaware
Simmonds Precision Products,
Inc., Tarrytown, New York
Consolidated, Joint-Venture
Companies
(Percent Directly Owned)
UNITED STATES
Hercofina, Wilmington, North
Carolina (74%)
Hercofina (Delaware),
Wilmington, Delaware (74%)
Lextar, Wilmington, Delaware
(100% )
A-2
Affiliated Companies
(Percent Directly or Indirectly
Owned by Hercules)
AUSTRALIA
Australian Chemical Holdings
Limited, Botany, New South
Wales (60% );
Hercules Chemicals Australia
Pty. Ltd., Melbourne (60%);
Spurway Cooke Holdings Lim-
ited, Sidney (36%)
BELGIUM
HIMONT Belgium N.V.,
Beringen (50% )
BERMUDA
Curtis Bay Insurance Co. Ltd.,
Hamilton (100% )
. BRAZIL
Companhia Brasileira de
Produtos Quimicos Bononia,
Sao Paule (46%);
Polo Filme Industria e
Comercio, Ltda., Sao Paulo
(49%);
PPH — Companhia Industrial
de Polipropileno, Porto Alegre
(38% )
CANADA
HIMONT Canada Inc., Missis-
sauga, Ontario (50% )
ENGLAND
Nelsons Acetate Limited,
Lancaster (50% )
GERMANY
Abieta Chemie GmbH,
Augsburg (50% )
INDIA
Herdillia Chemicals Limited,
Bombay (22%);
Indian Gum Industries Lim-
ited, Bombay (49%)
ITALY
HIMONT Italia S.p.A., Milan
(50% );
Neofil S.p.A., Milan (50% )
JAPAN
DIC-Hercules Chemicals Incor-
porated, Tokyo (50%);
Japan Magnetics, Ltd., Tokyo
(50% );
Rika-Hercules Incorporated,
Osaka (50%);
Sumika-Hercules (° npany,
Ltd., Osaka (50%);
Teijin Hercules Chemical
Company Limited, Tokyo
(49% )
MEXICO
Petrocel, S.A., Tampico (30%);
Taloquimia, S.A., Chihuahua
(49%)
THE NETHERLANDS
ANTILLES
Erbamont, N.V. (13%);
Finance Company of Hercules,
Inc. N.V. (100%)
NEW ZEALAND
A. C. Hatrick (N.Z.) Ltd.,
Auckland (60% )
PAKISTAN
Dawood Hercules Chemicals
Limited, Lahore (40%);
Pakistan Gum Industries Lim-
ited, Karachi (49%)
TAIWAN
Taiwan Hercules Chemicals
Inc., Taipei (67%);
Taiwan Polypropylene Com-
pany Limited, Taipei (40% )
UNITED STATES
Hercules Credit, Inc.,
Wilmington, Delaware
(100% );
HIMONT Incorporated,
Wilmington, Delaware
(50% );
HIMONT U.S.A., Inc.,
Wilmington, Delaware
(50% );
Texas Alkyls, Inc., Deer Park,
Texas (50% )
VIRGIN ISLANDS
St. Croix Petrochemical Corp.,
St. Croix (37%)
A-3
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Appellee
v. Appeal No. 84-1159
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
and
GOULD, INC.,
Hercules, Inc., Appellant
APPELLEE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY’S
PETITION FOR REHEARING IN BANC PURSUANT
TO FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
NO. 40
JOSEPH M. DONLEY, ESQ.
Kittredge, Kaufman & Donley
121 South Broad Street, 8th Flr.
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 732-2700
A-4
PETITION OF PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
FOR REHEARING BEFORE THE COURT IN BANC
Petitioner-Appellee, Philadelphia Electric Company
(“PECO”), pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, respectfully requests this Honor-
able Court to grant it a rehearing in banc of the appeal in
the above-captioned action, in which a panel of this
Court (“the Panel”) vacated the injunction and reversed
the judgment entered by the district court, which was
based upon a jury verdict in favor of PECO and against
Defendant Appellant Hercules, Inc. (“Hercules”).
The Panel by its judgment and opinion of May 28,
1985, has upset a jury verdict, which found that
‘Hercules through its predecessor in interest (“PICCO”)
had created a public nuisance on land now owned by
PECO, and was responsible to PECO for the cost of the
clean-up and to further abate the nuisance. The nui-
sance consisted of deposits of resinous materials and
other contaminants, some of which are known or sus-
pected carcinogens, which have polluted and continue to
pollute and damage PECO’s property, the groundwater
on and under PECO’s property and the Delaware River.
The evidence produced at trial virtually fingerprinted the
contaminants as being products produced by Hercules’
predecessor, PICCO. Both the trial court and the Panel
agreed that Hercules had expressly assumed PICCO’s
liability for the nuisance PICCO created at the Chester
site.! The jury specifically found in answer to special in-
terrogatories that a nuisance was created and that
Hercules had created it, that it continues to pollute
1. Since both the trial court and the Panel found that a de facto
merger had occurred between PICCO and Hercules and that
Hercules had expressly assumed PICCO’s liability for the pollution
of the Chester site, PECO will simply refer to PICCO as Hercules.
(Slip Opinion pp. 8-16) Philadelphia Electric Company v. Hercules,
Inc. and Gould, Inc., No. 84-1159, slip. op. at 8-16 (3d Cir. May 28,
1985) (hereinafter cited to as “Slip Op. at”).
A-5
PECO’s property, PECO’s groundwater and the Dela-
ware River. There is no question that PECO had nothing
to do with the creation of the nuisance and that PECO
expended $345,906.69 in a reasonable attempt to curtail
the pollution of the groundwater and the Delaware. Yet,
the Panel in overturning the jury’s verdict found in es-
sence that PECO had no “standing” to assert any claims
against Hercules.
PECO requests this rehearing on the grounds that
this matter: (1) involves questions of exceptional impor-
tance; (2) concerns a matter of first impression both in
this Circuit, and, to the knowledge of PECO, one which
has never been specifically addressed by any other court
in the United States; (3) concerns critical issues of eco-
nomic, environmental and social circumstances; and be-
cause the Panel’s opinion: (4) creates a dangerous
precedent which unduly restricts and emasculates the
doctrines of private and public nuisance and indemnifi-
cation, which are recognized as necessary to remedy se-
rious environmental hazards, contrary to existing
principles of Pennsylvania law?; (5) is self-contradictory
in its finding that Hercules expressly assumed the lia-
bility of PICCO for the pollution of the site and the nui-
sance created thereby, but that Hercules is not
» ~donsible to PECO for indemnification or nuisance
waich PICCO would have been; and (6) frustrates and
undermines the constitutional rights guaranteed by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to ensure every person
the right to clean air, pure water and the preservation of
2. Nor did the Panel eve. address the series of cases which
recognize the “environmental to:t” as the nuisance par excellance of
the modern world. See, e.g., Neu Jersey Department of Transpor-
tation v. PSC Resources, Inc. 175 N.J. Super 447, 419 A.2d 1151
(1980); New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v.
Ventron Corporation, 94 N}J} 254, 463 A.2d 893 (1983); New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corporation,
151 N.J. Super 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1997); New York v. Ole Olsen,
Ltd., 76 Misc. 2d 796, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 97 (1973) aff'd 357 N.Y.S. 2d
1016 (1974).
A-6
the natural environment. As set forth herein, the rehear-
ing of this matter by the Court in banc is most important
to correct an ~roneous application of Pennsyylvania law
to the circumstances of this case, which although is one
of first impression, will become a vital area of the law in
addressing problems of hazardous waste disposal, pro-
tection of the natural environment and placing the re-
sponsibility upon those who cause environmental and
health threats by their operating and disposal practices.
A. Under the Established Law of Public Nuisance in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, PE'CO Has the Req-
uisite Standing to Maintain this Action Against
Hercules?
The Panel of this Court by its decision of May 28,
1985, has shifted the responsibility of the public nui-
sance from the party who created it to the one most dam-
aged by it. As the Panel and the trial court aptly
recognized, Hercules stands in the shoes of PICCO un-
der concepts of de facto merger and as a result of its ex-
press assumption of PICCO’s liabilities. (Slip Op. at
9-16) Accordingly, the Panel’s attempt to paint Hercules
as being innocent and without knowledge as to the cre-
ation of the nuisance is both irrelevant and inaccurate;
PICCO is now Hercules; Hercules is now PICCO. The
legal fiction of the “corporate entity” requires acceptance
of this principal without qualification as to Hercules per-
sonal “fault”. As the Panel stated: “We conclude that
Hercules has assumed any liability PICCO may have had
due to pollution of the Chester site.” (Slip Op. at 11)
3. While PECO also disagrees with the Panel’s unduly conser-
vative analysis of PECO’s private nuisance claim and believes the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reach a contrary result, PECO
believes that it is unnecessary to reach that more difficult decision
in order to prevail on its claims against Hercules, and therefore, will
not address them herein.
A-7
But regardless of whether this Court characterizes
Hercules as being blameless, Hercules is legally liable
for abating the nuisance created by PICCO and it should
not be permitted to side-step this responsibility by a find-
ing, (on an issue raised for the first time before this
Court) which requires a tortiously restrictive analysis of
the “standing” requirement.4
The general rule, of course, has been that a private
individual has no standing to sue for the abatement of a
public nuisance if his injury is only that which is shared
by the public generally. See, Holloway v. Bristol-Myers
Corporation, 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.C.C. 1971), aff’d, 485
F.2d 986 (1973); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 188, at 583
(4th ed. 1971). This rule developed in the early common
law because harm to the public order, decency or morals
was considered a crime against the king. See Prosser,
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997
(1966). Only the king, therefore, could bring an action
against the perpetrator of the nuisance. The sole excep-
tion to this rule was that a member of the public had
standing to sue if he suffered a special injury, which was
different in kind from the general public. See, e.g., Hardy
Salt Company v. Southern Pacific Transportation Com-
pany, 501 F.2d 1156 (19th Cir. 1974), cert denied 419
U.S. 1033 (1974). The purpose of the rule was to prevent
a multiplicity of actions and frivolous suits. Neither of
these concerns could even arguably be considered to be
a factor in denying PECO standing in the case.
As for whether PECO satisfies the requirements of
tne Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C (1977), which
the Panel found applicable, the pleadings, PECO’s pre-
trial memorandum, the evidence presented at trial and
the specific finuings of the jury all belie the Panel’s con-
clusion that PECO did not allege or suffer any injury in
4. PECO submits that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
adopt the more liberal standing requirement expressed by the Ha-
waii Supreme Court in Akau v. Olomana Corp., 65 Hawaii 383
(1982), than that applied by the Panel in this case.
A-8
the exercise of a right common to the general public that
was the subject of the interference. (Slip Op. at 24-25.
The Panel states that: “If PECO — as a riparian land-
owner — had suffered damage to its land or its operations
as a result of the pollution of the Delaware, it would pos-
sibly have a claim for public nuisance. But the condition
of the Chester site was not the result of the pollution, it
was the cause of it.” (Slip Op. at 25) (emphasis in orig-
inal). It is obvious from this statement that the Panel
failed to focus upon a very key element of the case and
the evidence presented at trial: It was the pollutants
(i.e., PICCO resinous materials) which were the cause of
the contaminated condition of the Chester site, includ-
ing PECO’s soil and groundwater, and the contamina-
tion of the Delware River. Thus, the public water both in
the Delaware and the groundwater flowing on PECO’s
land was and continues to be contaminated by the nui-
sance Hercules created.
The groundwater and the Delaware River are natu-
ral resources belonging to the citizens of Pennsylvania
and entrusted to DER. As the result of the contamination
of these resources by Hercules, the public at large was
and continues to be harmed. As owner of the property
temporarily responsible for these natural resources,
PECO was specifically harmed by both the damages to
its property and the contamination of its groundwater
and by DER'’s request to abate the polluting condition.
See, National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Department of Environmental Resources, 489 Pa. 221,
414 A.2d 37 (1980). That abatement, as of the time of
trial, cost PECO $345,906.690. That expense is, indeed,
harm of a kind different from and greater in degree than
that suffered by other members of the public, in the ex-
ercise of a right common to the general public.
PECO pleaded and proved that as a result of the of-
fensive nuisance created by Hercules, not only was the
Delaware River being polluted but so was PECO’s soil
and groundwater. (J.A. 319-20; 341; 351-60; 430-31;
A-9
437-38; 469-84; 603-15; 644-48). Not only did PECO
demonstrate that the soil and groundwater were being
contaminated by the nuisance, but also that it was in-
jured in the use and enjoyment of its property by the loss
of rentals from its tenant as a result of the same pollutant
which were contaminating the Delaware River. (J.A.
267-272)
The right to reasonable groundwater use and enjoy-
ment is a right which all landowners possess and is also
considered a public right. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§821C comment (h) (1977); Pennsylvania Clean Stream
Law, 35 P.S. §§691.1, 691.4. The case law is supportive
of PECO’s position that it has suffered special damages
qualifying it as having the requisite standing. See, e.g.,
Akau v. Olomana Corproation, 65 Hawaii 383 (1921);
Heinl v. Pecher, 330 Pa. 232, 198 A. 797 (1938); Frady
v. Portland General Electric Co., 637 P.2d 1345 (Or. App.
1981).
In Heinl v. Pecher, 330 Pa. 232, 198 A. 797 (1938),
defendant erected an incinerator plant intended for the
burning and disposal of garbage. The residents living ad-
jacent to the plant brought an action for public nuisance
to restrain defendants from operating the plant on the
grounds that the defendants had not obtained a building
permit and non-compliance with the applicabie zoning
statute was declared to be a nuisance. The Court af-
firmed the lower court’s holding, “|s]ince plaintiffs al-
leged that the building was erected as an incinerator
plant in violation of the ordinances of the township and
since the building ordinance provides that a building
erected in violation of its provisions shall be ‘declared a
nuisance’ and ‘may be abated’ .. .” and the allegations
were sustained by the evidence. Id. at 236, 918 A. at 799.
In Heinl, Defendants argued that plaintiffs had no
right to bring the action for public wrongs. In response,
the Court pointed out that since the violation of the or-
dinance was declared to be a nuisance, the private indi-
vidual does have a right to bring the action as long as the
A-10
plaintiff’s injury complained of is “only greater in de-
gree” than that of the public. Jd. at 238, 198 A. at 799.
Also, defendants argued, on appeal, that plaintiffs
showed only that the neighborhood would be depreci-
ated and that was not sufficient damage to support a
claim for public nuisance. The Supreme Court dismissed
this argument on the ground that:
‘Equitable relief must be predicated on an injurious
invasion of a fixed and determined property right. By
injury is meant something affecting the capacity of
the property for ordinary use or causing a discomfort
in the enjoyment of it that threatens the health or
welfare of the occupant, with resultant injury to the
property...’
Id. at 239, 198 A. at 800 (quoting Pennsylvania Co.
v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404, 138 A. 909)
As several of the plaintiffs lived adjacent to the inciner-
ator plant, the Court held that, by operation of the plant,
they would suffer “discomfort in the enjoyment” of their
property.> Id. at 239, 198 A. at 800 (citation omitted).
It is difficult to fathom how, if this Court is applying
Pennsylvania law, it can conclude that PECO did not
suffer the requisite injury io give it standing in light of
the Supereme Court's opinion in Heinl. For as recog-
nized by Dean Prossser: “When a public nusiance sub-
stantially interferes with the use or enjoyment of the
plaintiff's rights in land, it never has been disputed that
there is a particular kind of damage, for which the private
action will lie.” Prosser, Private Action for Public Nui-
sance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997, 1018 (1966) (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
5. Although as of the time of the action, the incineration had
never been in operation.
A-11]
B. As a Matter of the Law of the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, PECO is Entitlea to Indemnification From
Hercules
Contrary to the Panel’s determination, the record
clearly supports the conclusion that PECO “could have
been compelled” through legal action taken by DER pur-
suant to the Clean Streams Law to incur the abatement
expenses for the nuisance created by Hercules. Section
691.316 of the Clean Streams Law specifically provides
in pertinent part:
Whenever the department finds that pollution or a
danger of pollution is resulting from a condition
which exists on land in the Commonwealth the de-
partment may order the landowner or occupier to
correct the condition in a manner satisfactory to the
department or it may order such owner or occupier
to allow a mine operator or other person or agency of
the Commonwealth access to the land to take such
action. For the purpose of this section, “landowner”
includes any person holding title to or having a pro-
prietary interest in either surface or subsurface
rights.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld this pro-
vision as constitutional in National Wood Preserves, Inc.
v. Commonwealth Department of Environmental Re-
sources, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980).
Under the Pennsylvania Clean Stream Law, “pollu-
tion” is defined as “contamination of any waters of the
Commonwealth such as will create or is likely to create
a nuisance .. .” §691.1. The jury specifically found that
Hercules had created a nuisance which was polluting or
contaminating the Delaware River and PECO’s ground-
water.® (J.A. 796-801) There was nothing further to sub-
6. Section 691.1 also defines “Waters of the Commonwealth”
as: “.. . any and all rivers, streams, creeks, rivulets, impoundments,
ditches, water courses, storm sewers. lakes, dammed water, ponds,
A-12
mit to the jury on the issue of indemnification. It is
simply a matter of applying Pennsylvania law to the find-
ings of the jury; the reasonableness and amount of the
clean-up costs were conceded by Hercules’ counsel. (J.A.
206).
Under federal practice it is not necessary to plead
“causes of action”, but merely to state a claim for relief.
That PECO clearly did throughout and there cannt be
any claim of “surprise” by Hercules’ as to the fact that
PECO was secking recovery of its clean-up costs.
The Panel then tries to justify not shifting the re-
sponsibility to Hercules where it properly lies on the ba-
sis that Hercules was not the culprit , rather it was
-PICCO. (Slip Op. at 30) But such an “equitable” analysis
contradicts the Panel’s holding that Hercules is PICCO
by virtue of the de facto merger doctrine and the Panel’s
holding that: “. . . Hercules has [expressly] assumed any
liability PICCO may have had due to the pollution of the
Chester site.” (Slip Op. at 11) Surely PICCO (ergo
Hercules) “was best suited to prevent the poilution”.
(Slip Op. at 30) Is there any question but that PICCO, if
it had not been merged into Hercules, would have had to
NOTES (Continued )
springs and all other bodies or channels of conveyance of surface
and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or artifi-
cial, within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth.”
7. Indeed Hercules’ entire defense of this case until the time of
appeal was that it was not liable to PECO because it was not
PICCO’s successor in interest and had not assumed this obligation.
Hercules took virtually no discovery, it filed no interrogatories or
requests for production of documents. It did not view the site al-
though PECO offered it the opportunity. Hercules’ counsel stated in
his opening; “. . . so that if you find the condition [PECO] alleges is
the fault of PICCO, then your verdict will be against Hercules.” (J.A.
205) During the course of the trial PECO submitted expert evidence
which virtually “fingerprinted” the pollutants as PICCO products
which were contaminating PECO’s groundwater and the Delaware
River. (J.A. 473-84; 645-48) Hercules offered no contrary expert
opinion evidence.
A-13
answer to PECO in both public nuisance and indemni-
fication? The Panel seemed to be swayed by the “fair-
ness” of making PECO bear the responsibility because
‘“... PECO had an opportunity to protect itself through
inspection and negotiation. . .” (Slip Op. at 30) But even
if that consideration had any bearing on the issues be-
fore this Court, it ignores the reality of the case and the
evidence. PECO asserted, and evidence so established,
that the buried contaminants were a latent condition un-
discovered until years later. (J.A. 10, 257) Indeed,
Hercules’ defense proffered through former PICCO em-
ployees was that PICCO had not deposited the pollutants
of which PECO and DER complained. (J.A. 520-22;
528-539) It is difficult to understand why the Panel be-
lieves it is fairer to shift the burden for this nuisance to
PECO, who certainly had nothing to do with its creation,
rather than to the party who created it yet to this day
denies it. How was PECO to negotiate a “fair price” for
land saddled with a latent condition which is a public
nuisance, when the perpetrator of the nuisance to this
day denies it and that party was not even PECO’s seller.®
Even if this Court somehow concludes that PECO and
Hercules are on ‘equal footing’ with regard to the
Chester site, shouldn’t the principles of contribution ap-
ply? See, e.g., State v. City of San Francisco, 94 Cal. App.
3d 522, 156 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1979).
But once the court determined that Hercules as-
sumed the liability for the Chester site, it acknowledged
that Hercules is primarily liable and it, not PECO, should
bear the burden of abatement. Despite disclaimers to the
contrary, the Panel’s self-contradictory opinion dos
stand for the proposition that “... a party that contam-
inates land, .. . can escape liability by the expedient of
selling the land”. (Slip Op. at 31)
8. Nor was there any evidence that Gould knew of the existence
of the pollutants which caused the public nuisance. The only evi-
dence was that the condition which was caused by the resinous pol-
lutants was a latent condition.
A-14
SUMMARY
The decision of the Panel in this case is contrary to
the law of public nuisance as established in Pennsylva-
nia, since PECO obviously has standing in that the pol-
lutants which cause the nuisance have damaged
PECO’s property, interfered with PECO’s use and en-
joyment of its property, and polluted the groundwater on
its property which then flows into the Delaware. PECO
was, and continues to be, specially harmed in the exer-
cise of its right to pure groundwater and uncontaminated
soil, a right common to the general public, but which the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law imposes an added ob-
ligation on a landowner to protect under Section
-691.316. The monies PECO expended in abating the
nuisance were in furtherance of these common rights
and that attendant obligation. Moreover, PECO submits
that the Supreme Court of Pennsyvlania would not apply
such a restrictive standard for standing given its decision
‘in Heinl v. Pecher, supra.
PECO further admits that the Panel’s decision is
self-contradictory in its analysis of PECO’s right to in-
demnification in light of its holding that Hercules has
expressly assumed the liability PICCO had for the pol-
lution of the Chester site. Thus, the Panel’s considera-
tion of when Hercules acquired PICCO was
inappropriate. PECO proved each and every element
necessary to entitle it to indemnification from Hercules.
A-15
If the Panel's decision is permitted to stand, it will
establish a precedent contrary to the law and public pol-
icy of Pennsylvania in requiring the one who caused the
nuisance to correct it, and will haunt for years to conie
the development of the law of public and private nui-
sance in the area of environmental protection and haz-
ardous waste disposal. Accordingly, PECO respectfully
requests that its Petition for Reargument be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN
& DONLEY
Joseph M. Donley
Robert Emmet Hernan
121 South Broad Street
8thFlocr
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 732-2700
Attorneys for Petitioner
Philadelphia Electric Company
A-16
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Appellee
v. Appeal No. 84: 1159
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
Appellant
and
GOULD, INC.,
Appellee
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL PURSUANT
TO RULE 22 OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied
professional judgment that the panel decision is contrary
to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and tc
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which law is controlling in this action, to wit, the panel’s
decision is contrary to the decision of Heinl v. Pecher,
330 Pa. 232, 198A. 797 (1938) and Article I, §27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and 35 Pa. C.S.A. §691.1 et
seq. And, that this appeal involves a question of excep-
tional importance, to wit, whether the panel decision es-
tablishes a precedent which encourages a party who
contaminates land to escape liability by divesting itself of
that land, while shifting the sole responsibility for abat-
ing the public nuisance to an innocent property owner
who’s land and groundwater is contaminated by the
nuiusance, which is a case of first impression that
A-17
presents critical issues of economic, environmental and
social circumstances.
Respectfully submitted,
KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN
& DONLEY
Joseph M. Donley
121 South Broad Street
8th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 732-2700
Attorneys for Petitioner
Philadelphia Electric Company
A-18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
| hereby certify that I have caused to be served on
this 11th day of June, 1985, by hand, two copies of the
Petition of Appellee Philadelphia Electric Company for
Rehearing Before the Court In Banc on the below-listed
counsel:
John C. Sullivan, Esq.
FRUMKIN & MANTA
1818 Three Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorney for Appellant
Hercules Incorporated
Kean K. McDonald, Esq.
LABRUM AND DOAK
700 IVB Building
1700 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorney for Appellee
Gould, Inc.
A copy of same was mailed, first class, this 11th day
of June, 1985, to:
John G. Gleeson, Esq.
HERCULES INCORPORATED
Hercules Plaza
Wilmington, DE 19899
JOSEPH M. DONELY
A-19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that three copies of this Brief of Hercules
Incorporated in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari were mailed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.3
by United States mail, first class postage, prepaid this
18th day of October, 1985, to:
Joseph M. Donley, Esquire
KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN
& DONLEY
800 North American Building
121 South Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Kean K. McDonald, Esquire
700 I.V.B. Building
1700 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
JOHN C. SULLIVAN
Attorney for Respondent
Hercules Incorporated
——s
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