Opposition Brief — Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules Inc.

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

= oct 18 1906

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

IN THE | CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 85-477

October Term, 1985

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioner

v.

HERCULES INCORPORATED,

Respondent

and

GOULD, INC.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRIEF OF HERCULES INCORPORATED

IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

John Gerald Gleeson, Esquire Joseph G. Manta, Esquire

Hercules Incorporated John C. Sullivan, Esquire

Hercules Plaza FRUMKIN & MANTA

Wilmington, DE 19899 Suite 1818

(302) 594-7004 Three Penn Center Plaza

Philadelphia, PA 19102

(215) 988-0777

Attorneys for Respondent,

Hercules Incorporated

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PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA. PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Will this Court consider on a petition for ~ rit of

certiorari an issue now claimed by petitioner to raise a

federal question where petitioner argued in the court be-

low that the identical issue was controlled by state law?

2. Will this Court grant certiorari in a diversity case

where (1) no federal question is presented, where (2) the

only issues presented arise under the common law of

Pennsylvania, and where (3) federal and state standards

are substantially identical?

3. Does this case present an issue sufficiently im-

portant to command review by this court in view of the

facts that (1) the Third Circuit refused to give its ruling

general application and expressly limited its decision to

the unique facts before it, that (2) the passage of various

environmental statutes makes this case unlikely to recur

in the federal courts, and that (3) the Third Circuit’s de-

cision is consistent with applicable precedent?

LIST OF PARTIES

Hercules Incorporated accepts as accurate petition-

er’s list of parties. In compliance with Rule 28.1,

Hercules attaches a list of Hercules’ foreign and domes-

tic subsidiaries and affiliates. See Resp. Appendix at

A-1-2.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW...... i

rr ii

pe a Sy 8) >). Ge iii

EPR Ee merere ss Gee Bee CADE, ... 1... ccc eee ]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................... 3

Se ee et ee ee 5

I.

Il.

IIT.

This Case, In Which The Sole Basis For Fed-

eral Jurisdiction Was Diversity Of Citizenship

And In Which Only Pennsylvania Nuisance

Law Issues Were Involved, Does Not Present

cca wa bb om sees

The Issues Are Not Sufficiently Important To

Warrant This Court’s Review Since The Third

Circuit’s Decision Was Narrow In Scope And

Involved Issues Unlikely To Recur In The

I Sie 8 ine Bean « ara-s Cawwes as os

PECO’s Claims Were Properly Rejected By

The Third Circuit......... hateentieneaanss

A. PECO Did Not State Or Prove A Public

Nuisance Claim Since It Did Not Allege

That It Sustained Harm While Exercising

A Right Common To The General Public.

B. PECO’s Eleventh-Hour Attempt To Assert

A Cause Of Action For Indemnification

Was Properly Rejected By The Third Cir-

cuit Because PECO Failed To Prove That

It Was Legally Liable For The Cleanup Of

Its Property And Because There Can Be

No Common Law Indemnification As Be-

tween Parties Whose Liability Is Merely

I faa arg ek ws <0 A Pe cede KOK aos

1]

12

TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued )

Page

I tte SL ee Gir d cas § a Ree 16

APPENDIX

, SBR ree eA, CP SERVICE, occas A-19

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-

tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)..... 8

Beckman Cotton Co. v. First National Bank, 666

ee Ry ot RD . 4 errr ere 7

Bem v. trom, Tai U.cm. Gem CIOS) «nw oo ec cccanc: 10

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).......... 9

Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F.Supp. 247 (D. Me.

1973), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 12, 13

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 11

City of Moore v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Rail-

way Co., 699 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983) ...... 7

Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 454

Pee ee CE can oc rc tds cee: bao )

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

ee a re ier ee Cee a ee See 6, 9,15

Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452

Ae NS ec cata ewe sees Oa ee cna wks 10

Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944)....... 5

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtis Noll Corp.,

112 Mich. App. 182, 315 N.W.2d 890 (1982). 14

McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.

SE iis kone eRe ok eae rad ee ka 10

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National

Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ...... 11

Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977)...... 6

National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh

Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498 (1950). ......... 11

O’Leary v. Moyer;s Landfill, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 642

pe Se ree ee ere ee 12

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued )

Cases: Page

Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty

to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa.

SOG, Bee AB OG CRD bcc ccececcennrasies 12

Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir.

PEEK ca nvecrndnpedskeacenees keaeerere 9

Tugboat Indian Co. v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 334 Pa.

Fa, DAs TS COE 6 heeds eebaaeelives 14

United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power

Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953) ...........005. 8

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-

ing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976)... 8

- Wamp v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 527 F.2d

595 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992

Ci PORTE e ee, ee Eevee ee 7

Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,

693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub

nom. Drury v. Westborough Mall, Inc., 461 U.S.

5? sree rrr rns Pree re 7

William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pitts-

burgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975)..... 8

Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 26

COED 6 0.0.5.4.0.3:¢064:86 005004040 CLO CE CRER tks 7

Statutes

Pe CE BROS 4.040000 8 o4dh C006 E SS eee eee 2

Other

W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed.

PPP ree eee rrr eee mee he © 13, 14, 15

Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C (1979) .. 12, 13

13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Prac-

tice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d (1984). ... 7, 8

vi

No. 85-477

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1985

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioner

v.

HERCULES INCORPORATED,

Respondent

and

GOULD, INC.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRIEF OF HERCULES INCORPORATED

IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Philadelphia Electric Company (hereinaf-

ter “PECO”) filed this lawsuit against Respondent

Hercules Incorporated (hereinafter “Hercules”) and

Gould, Inc. (hereinafter “Gould’’) for the costs of clean-

ing up certain materials leaching from industrial prop-

erty owned by PECO into the Delaware River. PECO

1

2

claimed that the materials had been placed on the prop-

erty by a former owner, Pennsylvania Industrial Chem-

ical Corporation (hereinafter “PICCO”). PICCO had sold

the property to Gould, which later sold the property to

PECO. Hercules’ liability was based on its status as an

alleged successor to PICCO. Hercules had never owned

the land in question or used the land for any purpose, but

had purchased PICCO’s remaining assets approximately

two years after PICCO had sold the property. PECO’s

claims against Hercules were grounded in private and

public nuisance and were limited to claims under the

common law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

The sole basis for federal jurisdiction was diversity of cit-

_izenship and an amount in controversy in excess of

$10,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. §1332.

The case proceeded to a trial by jury. During that

trial, PECO neither alleged nor introduced evidence that

it used the Delaware River or that it was harmed by the

alleged pollution of the River. (Pet. Appendix at A-25)

Nonetheless, at the close of the evidence, the trial judge,

over Hercules’ objections, instructed the jury on princi-

ples of public and private nuisance. The jury returned a

verdict in favor of PECO and against Hercules.

Hercules filed timely motions for judgment notwith-

standing the verdict or for a new trial. After the district

court denied Hercules’ post-trial motions, Hercules ap-

pealed to the Third Circuit. ©

On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the judgment

against Hercules. The court held that PECO had no pri-

vate nuisance cause of action against Hercuies since the

defect PECO complained about existed on PECO’s own

land. (Pet. Appendix at A-16-22) The Third Circuit held

further that PECO had not stated a cause of action for

public nusiance because it had not alleged or proved that

it sustained harm while exercising a right common to the

general public. (Pet. Appendix at A-22-25) Finally, the

Third Circuit rejected, on two grounds, the indemnity

claim which PEC( ‘:ad asserted for the first time in its

3

appellate brief. (Pet. Appendix at A-26) First, the court

found that PECO had failed to prove that it was itself

legally liable for the clean up of its property as required

to recover indemnity under Pennsylvania law. (Pet. Ap-

pendix at A-27-29) Secondly, the court ruled that indem-

nity was not available where, as here, the liability of both

parties was merely vicarious. (Pet. Appendix at A-29-30)

PECO filed a Petition for Re+ earing in Banc with the

Third Circuit. PECO claimed that the panel’s decision

was contrary to “controlling” Pennsylvania standing de-

cisions. (Resp. Appendix at A-16) In fact, the heading of

PECO’s argument was:

Under the Established Law of Public Nuisance in

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, PECO Has the

Requisite Standing to Maintain this Action Against

Hercules.

(Resp. Appendix at A-6) PECO also argued that it was

entitled to indemnification under Pennsylvania law. Af-

ter its Petition for Rehearing was denied, PECO filed this

petition for writ of certiorari. In this Court, however,

PECO has changed its position on standing and now ar-

gues that the federal law of standing, rather than

Pennsylvania’s law, should control.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This diversity case does not present an issue which

warrants review by this Court on certiorari. First, this

case does not involve any federal question. Because this

is a diversity case in which the law of Pennsylvania ap-

plies, the questions of whether PECO had stated a cause

of action for public nuisance, whether it had standing to

assert such a claim, and whether it was entitled to in-

demnification from Hercules are governed by the law of

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Although PECO

now attempts to characterize the question of its standing

4

to assert a public nuisance as a federal question, it ar-

gued before the Third Circuit that Pennsylvania’s law of

standing applied. Moreover, contrary to PECO’s present

position, federal courts apply the state law of standing in

diversity cases. Since the highest court of each state, and

not this Court, is the ultimate arbiter of state law, a de-

cision by this Court would have no binding effect either

on similar state court lawsuits or similar federal court

diversity lawsuits.

Secondly, this case is not of sufficient general im-

portance to warrant review by this Court. PECO’s only

argument for the importance of this case is that a deci-

sion on standing does not bar relitigation. Under PECO’s

_analysis, however, the danger of relitigation would be

present with respect to any decision on standing. It does

not make this case important. In addition, the Third Cir-

cuit’s decision is narrow in scope. The Third Circuit ex-

pressly refused to give its ruling general application and

limited its decision to the unique factual situation pre-

sented in this case. Moreover, the passage of various en-

vironmental statutes combined with the unique factual

issues presented here make this case unlikely to recur.

Finally, PECO’s claims for private nuisance! and

public nuisance, as well as its last minute indemnifica-

tion claim, were correctly rejected by the Third Circuit.

The essence of a public nuisance is injury to the public.

Because PECO failed to allege or prove that it had sus-

tained an injury while exercising a right common to the

public, the court determined that it had not stated a

cause of action for public nuisance. PECO’s indemnity

claim was not included in its complaint and was not sub-

mitted to the jury; it was asserted as an afterthought in

PECO’s brief to the Third Circuit. The claim was re-

jected because PECO had not offered any evidence to

1. Since PECO has not challenged the Third Circuit’s ruling on

private nuisance, Hercules will not discuss that aspect of the court's

decision.

5

sustain an indemnification claim. More importantly,

however, regardless of this failure of proof, indemnity

was inapplicable as a matter of law since the liability of

the parties was vicarious only. The Third Circuit’s deci-

sion is fully consistent with the facts and with applicable

precedent.

ARGUMENT

I. THIS CASE, IN WHICH THE SOLE BASIS FoR FEDERAL

JURISDICTION WAS DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP AND IN

WHICH ONLY PENNSYLVANIA NUISANCE LAW ISSUES

WERE INVOLVED, DOES NOT PRESENT A FEDERAL

QUESTION.

The ultimate issues in this case, and the focus of the

Third Circuit, was whether PECO had stated a cause of

action under Pennsylvania law for public nuisance

and/or indemnification. These issues do not involve any

constitutional or federal statutory questions, but involve

legal issues governed by the law of the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania. This Court does not review the consid-

ered determination of questions of state law by an inter-

mediate federal appellate court. Huddleston v. Dwyer,

322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944).

PECO argues that certiorari should be granted on

the ground that the Third Circuit’s ruling was that

PECO had no standing to sue in public nuisance and

that this ruling contravened federal law. The latter part

of this argument represents a dramatic shift in PECO’s

position. PECO itself recognized the inapplicability of

the federal law of standing in its Petition for Rehearing

In Banc to the Third Circuit. In fact, PECO argued in

that petition that “the panel decision is contrary to the

laws ox the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to the

decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which

law is controlling in this action,” on the standing issue.

6

(Resp. Appendix at A-16, emphasis added). PECO now

attempts to shift positions in order to raise a federal issue

for purposes of invoking this Court’s discretionary juris-

diction. Such maneuvering does not create a basis for

review on certiorari, however. This Court will not con-

sider on a grant of certiorari bases for liability not argued

below. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 34 (1977).

In this case, PECO attempts to go further than the pe-

titioner in Miree. Here, PECO not only failed to argue

that the federal law of standing applied, but argued the

converse, that Pennsylvania law was controlling. This

Court should not consider such an argument on a writ of

certiorari.

. Moreover, the Third Circuit’s decision was actuall*’

grounded on PECO’s failure to state a cause of action.

The Third Circuit stated its holding as follows: “We hold

only that in this case the purchaser of that land, PECO

— though we recognize that it acted as a responsible

corporate citizen — had no cause of action against the

vendor’s successor, Hercules, for private nuisance, pub-

lic nuisance, or common law indemnity.” (Pet. Appendix

at A-31, emphasis added) As PECO itself acknowledges,

under the Erie doctrine, “the requirements of a claim for

public nuisance are state-law determinative.” See PECO

Petition at 8 n.3.

The Third Circuit did fully discuss the standing of

PECO to bring a public nusiance claim. As illustrated by

PECO’s petition, however, the question of whether a pri-

vate party has stated a cause of action in public nuisance

is intertwined with the question of whether that party

has standing. According, to PECO, in order to have

standing, a plaintiff must have alleged some particular-

ized injury that sets him apart from the man in the

street; in order to have stated a cause of action, plaintiff

must plead, and prove, a particular damage, different in

kind and degree from that suffered by the general public.

See PECO Petition at 18. No meaningful distinction can

be drawn between these two inquiries.

7

Contrary to PECO’s contention before this Court.

the question of standing in diversity cases is a matter of

state law, not federal law.? Federal concepts of standing

developed to regulate enforcement of federal rights do

not represent any independent interest of the federal

courts that justifies disregarding state law in the diver-

sity context. 13A C. Wright, A Miller & E. Cooper, Fed-

eral Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d §3531.14,

at 84 (1984). This rule has long been recognized by this

Court and other federal courts. For example, in Williams

v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 48 (1933), this Court

ruled that state law determines who has standing to chal-

lenge the constitutionality of a state statute on the

ground that it violates a state constitution.

This principle has been reaffirmed in recent deci-

sions of the intermediate federal appellate courts. For ex-

ample, in Beckman Cotton Co. v. First National Bank,

666 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1982), the court applied

Georgia law to determine plaintiff’s standing to sue in a

diversity case. See also City of Moore v. Atchison, To-

peka, & Santa Fe Railway Co., 699 F.2d 507, 511 (10th

Cir. 1983) (in a diversity suit, state law determines

standing of city to challenge state statute exempting rail-

roads from city zoning power); Westborough Mall, Inc. v.

City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 747-48 & n.8 (8th

Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Drury v. Westborough

Mall, Inc., 461 U.S. 945 (1983) (state law of standing

applied to claims that city’s zoning actions violated state

law); Wamp v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 527

F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992

(1976) (since plaintiff did not have standing to maintain

action in state court, federal court had no remova! juris-

diction).

2. PECO does not even attempt to characterize the issue cf

whether it was entitled to indemnification as a federal question. The

indemnification issue is unquestionably a matter of state law.

8

In fact, the very commentator cited by PECO on the

question of the applicable law for standing determina-

tions rejects petitioner’s argument. In discussing the ef-

fect of state law on standing in federal diversity cases,

Wright says: “[A]s to litigation involving state rights but

commenced in federal courts or removed to them, state

law [of standing] ordinarily should apply.” 13A C.

Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-

cedure: Jurisdiction 2d §3531.14, at 84 (1984). The

cases cited by PECO stand for the proposition that the

federal law of standing applies only when a plaintiff is

asserting federal rights. See, e.g., Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 262 n.8 (1976) (state law of standing does

not govern where plaintiff is seeking relief in federal

courts for an asserted injury to its federal rights). Since

PECO asserted no federal rights, the federal law of

standing has no applicability.

Whether the federal or Pennsylvania law of standing

is applied, the test is substantially the same: (1) whether

plaintiff alleges that the challenged activity has caused

him injury in fact and (2) whether the interest sought to

be protected by the complainant is arguably within the

zone of interests sought to be protected. Association of

Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,

397 U.S. 150, 152, 153 (1970); William Penn Parking

Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d

269, 283-84 (1975). Standing rulings are not made in a

vacuum, but require consideration of the “specific cir-

cumstances of the individual circumstances.” See

United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power

Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). The Third Circuit

found that PECO had never alleged or proved that it had

sustained a “particular injury” while exercising a right

common to the general public as required under appli-

cable public nusiance principles. (Pet. Appendix at A-25)

Therefore, PECO could not meet either federal or Penn-

sylvania standing requirements.

9

In a diversity case, the lower federal courts and this

Court are bound to follow applicable state law. Erie Rail-

road Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). “Federal

court decisions in diversity cases have no precedential

value as state iaw and only determine the issues between

the parties.” Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174,

1177 (8th Cir. 1969). As a result, this Court’s interpre-

tation or application of state law will not prevent a dif-

ferent resolution of this issue by the state courts. See,

e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963); Com-

monwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 128, 454 A.2d

991, 995 (1982). Only issues of state law were presented

in this diversity suit. Therefore, the petition for writ of

cert.crari should be denied.

II. THE ISSUES ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO

WARRANT THIS COURT’S REVIEW SINCE THE THIRD

CIRCUIT’S DECISION WAS NARROW IN SCOPE AND IN-

VOLVED ISSUES UNLIKELY TO RECUR IN THE FEDERAL

COURTS.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States provides that this Court will grant review

on a writ of certiorari “only when there are special and

important reasons therefore.” PECO has not made any

showing that this case is of sufficient general importance

to warrant review by this Court.

The only argument made by PECO to show thi al-

leged importance of this case is its claim that a decision

on standing does not preclude further litigation of the

dispute by the parties. See PECO Petition at 14 17. As

stated above, the holding of the Third Circuit was that

PECO had not stated a cause of action for public nui-

sance. Therefore, this argument is immaterial.

Furthermore, even if the Third Circuit’s decision is

viewed as a standing decision, the argument that

relitigation may result does not demonstrate the impor-

tance of this case. According to PECO, a ruling that any

10

plaintiff lacked standing would not bar a later suit based

upon the same factual allegations.* Therefore, under

PECO’s analysis, the danger of relitigation argument

could be made with respect to virtually any standing de-

termination. PECO’s argument proves too much. Surely

it was not intended that this court would grant review on

certiorari in any case which was dismissed for lack of

standing.

In addition, it must again be noted that petitioner did

not raise the danger of relitigation issue in its Petition for

Rehearing In Banc to the Third Circuit. (Resp. Appendix

at A-6-10) Petitioner should have raised this issue below

when it had the opportunity.

That this case is lacking in the importance required

for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction is

further demonstrated by the limited nature of the Third

Circuit’s ruling. The decision, contrary to PECO’s exag-

gerated view of its impact, See PECO Petition at 6, says

nothing about the rights of purchasers and sellers of real

estate generally. To the contrary, the Third Circuit was

careful to expressly limit its decision to a determination

that, based on the evidence presented in this case, PECO

had no cause of action under Pennsylvania law against

Hercules for private nuisance, public nuisance or com-

mon law indemnity. (Pe*. Appendix at A-31)

Finally, the issue in this case is unlikely to recur in

the federal courts. The fec eral common law of nuisance

3. Contrary to PECO’s claim, PECO would be barred from fur-

ther litigation in this case. First, the Third Circuit’s actual holding

was that PECO had not stated a cause of action. Dismissal for failure

to state a proper cause of action is a judgment on the merits. Fed-

erated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3

(1981); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Moreover, Mc-

Carney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230, 231 (8th Cir. 1981), which

PECO cites as support, is inapplicable. In McCarney, the court ad-

dressed only the “narrow issue of whether a dismissal for lack of

standing to invoke a particular statute can act as a bar to a later suit

based upon the same factual allegations.” (Emphasis added) It has

no applicability to a case based on various common law theories.

11

has been preempted by the various federal environmen-

tal statutes. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

National Sea Clammers Ass’n., 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981);

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).

The Third Circuit recognized that an extension of com-

mon law nuisance would be inadvisable since “Congress

and the state legislatures are actively seeking to achieve.

a socially acceptable definition of rights and liabilities.”

See Pet. Appendix at A-22. Therefore, the issues pre-

sented here would arise only in those diversity cases

where a purchaser of land sought recovery in nuisance

from the seller of that land for an alleged defect existing

in the property. Such claims will be limited in number.

This Court grants review on certiorari only to resolve

issues of general importance as distinguished from cases

only of importance to the parties. National Labor Rela-

tions Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498,

502 (1950). The only real questions PECO raises in its

Petition turn on the particular facts of this case alone and

are of interest only to the parties to it. Given the limited

scope of the Third Circuit’s decision and the improba-

bility of recurring litigation of this nature, this case does

not merit review by this Court on certiorari.

III. PECO’Ss CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY REJECTED BY THE

‘ ‘THIRD CIRCUIT.

A final reason for denying the PECO petition is that

each claim for which it seeks review was correctly re-

jected by the Third Circuit.

12

A. PECO Did Not State Or Prove A Public Nuisance

Claim Since It Did Not Allege That It Sustained

Harm While Exercising A Right Common To The

General Public.

The essence of PECO’s public nuisance claim was

that its land was damaged by the presence of contami-

nants which were leaching from its land into the Dela-

ware River. By way of contrast, the essence of a public

nuisance is injury te the public. Pennsylvania Society

for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo En-

terprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350, 237 A.2d 342, 348 (1968). As

a result, in order for a private plaintiff to recover damages

for a public nuisance, it must have “suffered harm of a

- kind different from that suffered by other members of

the public exercising the right common to the general

public that was the subject of interference.” Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts §821C (1979) (emphasis added).

PECO never alleged or attempted to show that it was

making any use of the Delaware River or that it was

harmed in any way by the alleged contamination of those

waters. Instead PECO focused on the condition of its

own property.

The Third Circuit, consistent with applicable prece-

dent, found that PECO had not made out a claim for pub-

lic nuisance because it found that PECO had made no

allegation nor offered any evidence that it had sustained

any harm while exercising a right common to the gen-

eral public. (Pet. Appendix at A-24-25) This limit on pri-

vate actions for public nuisance has been recognized by

the courts, the Restatement and the leading commenta-

tor on tort law. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc.,

523 F. Supp. 642, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (public nuisance

claim brought by private individuals dismissed where

plaintiffs proved only that contaminants were entering a

creek, but failed to show harm to users of the creek

caused by the leachate discharges); Burgess v. M/V

Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), aff’d, 559

13

F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977) (public nuisance claims

brought by businessmen who alleged economic harm

from poilution of a lake dismissed where plaintiffs did not

assert any interference with their exercise of 1 public

right); Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C (1979) (in

order to recover damages in an individual action for pub-

lic nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind dif-

ferent from that suffered by other members of the public

exercising the right common to the general public that

was the subject of interference); W. Prosser, The Law of

Torts, §88, at 586 (4th ed. 1971) (private individual has

no action for invasion of public right unless he is injured

by public nuisance over and above the injury suffered by

public generally).

Furthermore, the Third Circuit properly distin-

guished the facts of this case from public nuisance

claims by riparian landowners whose property was dam-

aged by pollution. (Pet. Appendix at A-25) In each of

those cases, the damage to the property was caused by

the pollution of the river; here it is alleged that PECO’s

property was the source of the pollution of the Delaware

River. This case presents the inverse of a public

nuisance.

B. PECO’s Eleventh-Hour Attempt To Assert A Cause

Of Action For Indemnification Was Properly Re-

jected By The Third Circuit Because PECO Failed

To Prove That It Was Legally Liable For The

Cleanup Of The Site And Because There Can Be No

Common Law Indemnification As Between Parties

Whose Liability Is Merely Vicarious.

In its Brief to the Third Circuit, PECO argued for the

first time that it was entitled to recovery on common law

principles of indemnification. The Third Circuit properly

rejected this claim finding: (1) that the record did not

support affirmance on the basis of a cause of action never

pleaded, proved, nor submitted to the jury and (2) that

14

there could be no common law indemnification between

two parties whose liability is merely vicarious. (Pet. Ap-

pendix at A-25-31) The Third Circuit’s decision is con-

sistent with applicable Pennsylvania law.

The initial problem with PECO’s indemnification

claim was that the evidence submitted by PECO did not

support it. This is not surprising since PECO had never

pleaded, proved nor submitted the indemnification issue

to the jury. (Pet. Appendix at A-26) In fact, the issue was

first raised by PECO in its appellate brief. Under Penn-

sylvania law, PECO was required, inter alia, to prove

that it was legally liable for the cleanup of the PECO site

in order to recover indemnity. Tugboat Indian Co. v. A/S

_Ivarans Rederi, 334 Pa. 15, 21, 5 A.2d 153, 156 (1939).

Finding no such evidence, the Third Circuit properly re-

jected PECO’s claim. PECO ignores this fundamental

failure of proof in its petition to this Court.

The Third Circuit also found that as a matter of law

there could be no indemnity between two parties whose

liability is vicarious. In this case, PECO’s liability was

based on its status as successor to PICCO in title to the

land; Hercules’ alleged liability was based on its status as

successor to PICCO’s other assets. The Third Circuit’s

decision was based on the general rule that indemnity

turns upon whether the difference in the gravity of the

faults of the participants is so great as to throw the whole

loss upon one. (Pet. Appendix at A-30) Once again this

ruling is fully consistent with applicable precedent

which holds that there can be no indemnification be-

tween two parties whose liability is vicarious. See Liberty

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtis Noll Corp., 112 Mich.

App. 182, 315 N.W.2d 890 (1982).

The Third Circuit gave full consideration to the is-

sues and decided them correctly and fairly. The Third

Circuit’s reasoning and conclusions showed a scholarly

attempt to ascertain what the Pennsylvania courts would

have done in an area described by Prosser as an “impen-

etrable jungle.” W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of

15

Torts §86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971). The case was fully con-

sistent with relevant Pennsylvania precedent. As a re-

sult, the decision was entirely in accordance with the

principles of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

(1938). Therefore, the petition for writ of certiorari

should be denied.

16

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, Respondent

Hercules incorporated respectfully requests that the Pe-

tition for a Writ of Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

John Gerald Gleeson

Hercules Incorporated

Hercules Plaza

Wilmington, DE 19894

(302) 594-7004

FRUMKIN & MANTA

By

Joseph G. Manta

John C. Sullivan

Suite 1818

Three Penn Center Plaza

Philadelphia, PA 19102

(215) 988-0777

Attorneys for Respondent

Hercules Incorporated

APPENDIX TO

HERCULES INCORPORATED’S BRIEF

IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

HERCULES’ SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED

I re ee ee eee A-1

APPELLEE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COM-

PANY’S PETITION FOR REHEARING IN

BANC PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE NO. 40......... A-3

HERCULES’ SUBSIDIARIES

AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

Consolidated, Wholly Owned

Subsidiaries

(Directly or Indirectly)

AUSTRIA

Patex Chemie GmbH, Traun

THE BAHAMAS

Hercules International Trade

Corporation Limited

(HINTCO), Nassau

BELGIUM

Hercules Chemicals N.V.,

Beringen

BRAZIL

Hercules do Brasil Produtos

Quimicos Ltda., Sao Paulo

CANADA

Hercules Canada Inc., Missis-

sauga, Ontario

DENMARK

A/S Kobenhavns Pektinfabrik,

Lille Skensved

ENGLAND

Hercules Limited, London

The Holden Vale Manufactur-

ing Company, Limited,

Haslingden

PFW Ltd., Perivale

FINLAND

Oy Hercofinn Ab, Helsinki

FRANCE

Hercules France S.A., Paris

GERMANY

Hercules GmbH, Hamburg

Pomosin AG, Grossenbrode

HONG KONG

Hercochem (H.K.) Ltd.

ITALY

Hercules Bewoid Italia S_p.A.,

Milan

Cesalpinia S.p.A., Milan

JAPAN

Hercules Far East K.K., Tokyo

MEXICO

Quimica Hercules, S.A. de

C.V., Mexico, D.F.

THE NETHERLANDS

Hercules B.V., Rijswijk

PFW (Nederland) B.V.,

Amersfoort

SINGAPORE

Hersean Pte Ltd., Singapore

SPAIN

Ceratonia, Sociedad Anonima,

Tarragona

Rohe, S.A., Tarragona

SWEDEN

Hercules Kemiska Aktiebolag,

Goteborg

UNITED STATES

Caribbean Lumber Company,

Inc., Savannah, Georgia

Champlain Cable Corporation,

Wilmington, Delaware

Esgraph Incorporated, Cerritos,

California

Hercules Chemical Corpora-

tion, Wilmington, Delaware

Hercules Overseas Corporation,

Wilmington, Delaware

Hercules Trading Corporation,

Wilmington, Delaware

Simmonds Precision Products,

Inc., Tarrytown, New York

Consolidated, Joint-Venture

Companies

(Percent Directly Owned)

UNITED STATES

Hercofina, Wilmington, North

Carolina (74%)

Hercofina (Delaware),

Wilmington, Delaware (74%)

Lextar, Wilmington, Delaware

(100% )

A-2

Affiliated Companies

(Percent Directly or Indirectly

Owned by Hercules)

AUSTRALIA

Australian Chemical Holdings

Limited, Botany, New South

Wales (60% );

Hercules Chemicals Australia

Pty. Ltd., Melbourne (60%);

Spurway Cooke Holdings Lim-

ited, Sidney (36%)

BELGIUM

HIMONT Belgium N.V.,

Beringen (50% )

BERMUDA

Curtis Bay Insurance Co. Ltd.,

Hamilton (100% )

. BRAZIL

Companhia Brasileira de

Produtos Quimicos Bononia,

Sao Paule (46%);

Polo Filme Industria e

Comercio, Ltda., Sao Paulo

(49%);

PPH — Companhia Industrial

de Polipropileno, Porto Alegre

(38% )

CANADA

HIMONT Canada Inc., Missis-

sauga, Ontario (50% )

ENGLAND

Nelsons Acetate Limited,

Lancaster (50% )

GERMANY

Abieta Chemie GmbH,

Augsburg (50% )

INDIA

Herdillia Chemicals Limited,

Bombay (22%);

Indian Gum Industries Lim-

ited, Bombay (49%)

ITALY

HIMONT Italia S.p.A., Milan

(50% );

Neofil S.p.A., Milan (50% )

JAPAN

DIC-Hercules Chemicals Incor-

porated, Tokyo (50%);

Japan Magnetics, Ltd., Tokyo

(50% );

Rika-Hercules Incorporated,

Osaka (50%);

Sumika-Hercules (° npany,

Ltd., Osaka (50%);

Teijin Hercules Chemical

Company Limited, Tokyo

(49% )

MEXICO

Petrocel, S.A., Tampico (30%);

Taloquimia, S.A., Chihuahua

(49%)

THE NETHERLANDS

ANTILLES

Erbamont, N.V. (13%);

Finance Company of Hercules,

Inc. N.V. (100%)

NEW ZEALAND

A. C. Hatrick (N.Z.) Ltd.,

Auckland (60% )

PAKISTAN

Dawood Hercules Chemicals

Limited, Lahore (40%);

Pakistan Gum Industries Lim-

ited, Karachi (49%)

TAIWAN

Taiwan Hercules Chemicals

Inc., Taipei (67%);

Taiwan Polypropylene Com-

pany Limited, Taipei (40% )

UNITED STATES

Hercules Credit, Inc.,

Wilmington, Delaware

(100% );

HIMONT Incorporated,

Wilmington, Delaware

(50% );

HIMONT U.S.A., Inc.,

Wilmington, Delaware

(50% );

Texas Alkyls, Inc., Deer Park,

Texas (50% )

VIRGIN ISLANDS

St. Croix Petrochemical Corp.,

St. Croix (37%)

A-3

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

Appellee

v. Appeal No. 84-1159

HERCULES INCORPORATED,

and

GOULD, INC.,

Hercules, Inc., Appellant

APPELLEE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY’S

PETITION FOR REHEARING IN BANC PURSUANT

TO FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

NO. 40

JOSEPH M. DONLEY, ESQ.

Kittredge, Kaufman & Donley

121 South Broad Street, 8th Flr.

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(215) 732-2700

A-4

PETITION OF PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

FOR REHEARING BEFORE THE COURT IN BANC

Petitioner-Appellee, Philadelphia Electric Company

(“PECO”), pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, respectfully requests this Honor-

able Court to grant it a rehearing in banc of the appeal in

the above-captioned action, in which a panel of this

Court (“the Panel”) vacated the injunction and reversed

the judgment entered by the district court, which was

based upon a jury verdict in favor of PECO and against

Defendant Appellant Hercules, Inc. (“Hercules”).

The Panel by its judgment and opinion of May 28,

1985, has upset a jury verdict, which found that

‘Hercules through its predecessor in interest (“PICCO”)

had created a public nuisance on land now owned by

PECO, and was responsible to PECO for the cost of the

clean-up and to further abate the nuisance. The nui-

sance consisted of deposits of resinous materials and

other contaminants, some of which are known or sus-

pected carcinogens, which have polluted and continue to

pollute and damage PECO’s property, the groundwater

on and under PECO’s property and the Delaware River.

The evidence produced at trial virtually fingerprinted the

contaminants as being products produced by Hercules’

predecessor, PICCO. Both the trial court and the Panel

agreed that Hercules had expressly assumed PICCO’s

liability for the nuisance PICCO created at the Chester

site.! The jury specifically found in answer to special in-

terrogatories that a nuisance was created and that

Hercules had created it, that it continues to pollute

1. Since both the trial court and the Panel found that a de facto

merger had occurred between PICCO and Hercules and that

Hercules had expressly assumed PICCO’s liability for the pollution

of the Chester site, PECO will simply refer to PICCO as Hercules.

(Slip Opinion pp. 8-16) Philadelphia Electric Company v. Hercules,

Inc. and Gould, Inc., No. 84-1159, slip. op. at 8-16 (3d Cir. May 28,

1985) (hereinafter cited to as “Slip Op. at”).

A-5

PECO’s property, PECO’s groundwater and the Dela-

ware River. There is no question that PECO had nothing

to do with the creation of the nuisance and that PECO

expended $345,906.69 in a reasonable attempt to curtail

the pollution of the groundwater and the Delaware. Yet,

the Panel in overturning the jury’s verdict found in es-

sence that PECO had no “standing” to assert any claims

against Hercules.

PECO requests this rehearing on the grounds that

this matter: (1) involves questions of exceptional impor-

tance; (2) concerns a matter of first impression both in

this Circuit, and, to the knowledge of PECO, one which

has never been specifically addressed by any other court

in the United States; (3) concerns critical issues of eco-

nomic, environmental and social circumstances; and be-

cause the Panel’s opinion: (4) creates a dangerous

precedent which unduly restricts and emasculates the

doctrines of private and public nuisance and indemnifi-

cation, which are recognized as necessary to remedy se-

rious environmental hazards, contrary to existing

principles of Pennsylvania law?; (5) is self-contradictory

in its finding that Hercules expressly assumed the lia-

bility of PICCO for the pollution of the site and the nui-

sance created thereby, but that Hercules is not

» ~donsible to PECO for indemnification or nuisance

waich PICCO would have been; and (6) frustrates and

undermines the constitutional rights guaranteed by the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to ensure every person

the right to clean air, pure water and the preservation of

2. Nor did the Panel eve. address the series of cases which

recognize the “environmental to:t” as the nuisance par excellance of

the modern world. See, e.g., Neu Jersey Department of Transpor-

tation v. PSC Resources, Inc. 175 N.J. Super 447, 419 A.2d 1151

(1980); New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v.

Ventron Corporation, 94 N}J} 254, 463 A.2d 893 (1983); New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corporation,

151 N.J. Super 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1997); New York v. Ole Olsen,

Ltd., 76 Misc. 2d 796, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 97 (1973) aff'd 357 N.Y.S. 2d

1016 (1974).

A-6

the natural environment. As set forth herein, the rehear-

ing of this matter by the Court in banc is most important

to correct an ~roneous application of Pennsyylvania law

to the circumstances of this case, which although is one

of first impression, will become a vital area of the law in

addressing problems of hazardous waste disposal, pro-

tection of the natural environment and placing the re-

sponsibility upon those who cause environmental and

health threats by their operating and disposal practices.

A. Under the Established Law of Public Nuisance in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, PE'CO Has the Req-

uisite Standing to Maintain this Action Against

Hercules?

The Panel of this Court by its decision of May 28,

1985, has shifted the responsibility of the public nui-

sance from the party who created it to the one most dam-

aged by it. As the Panel and the trial court aptly

recognized, Hercules stands in the shoes of PICCO un-

der concepts of de facto merger and as a result of its ex-

press assumption of PICCO’s liabilities. (Slip Op. at

9-16) Accordingly, the Panel’s attempt to paint Hercules

as being innocent and without knowledge as to the cre-

ation of the nuisance is both irrelevant and inaccurate;

PICCO is now Hercules; Hercules is now PICCO. The

legal fiction of the “corporate entity” requires acceptance

of this principal without qualification as to Hercules per-

sonal “fault”. As the Panel stated: “We conclude that

Hercules has assumed any liability PICCO may have had

due to pollution of the Chester site.” (Slip Op. at 11)

3. While PECO also disagrees with the Panel’s unduly conser-

vative analysis of PECO’s private nuisance claim and believes the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reach a contrary result, PECO

believes that it is unnecessary to reach that more difficult decision

in order to prevail on its claims against Hercules, and therefore, will

not address them herein.

A-7

But regardless of whether this Court characterizes

Hercules as being blameless, Hercules is legally liable

for abating the nuisance created by PICCO and it should

not be permitted to side-step this responsibility by a find-

ing, (on an issue raised for the first time before this

Court) which requires a tortiously restrictive analysis of

the “standing” requirement.4

The general rule, of course, has been that a private

individual has no standing to sue for the abatement of a

public nuisance if his injury is only that which is shared

by the public generally. See, Holloway v. Bristol-Myers

Corporation, 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.C.C. 1971), aff’d, 485

F.2d 986 (1973); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 188, at 583

(4th ed. 1971). This rule developed in the early common

law because harm to the public order, decency or morals

was considered a crime against the king. See Prosser,

Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997

(1966). Only the king, therefore, could bring an action

against the perpetrator of the nuisance. The sole excep-

tion to this rule was that a member of the public had

standing to sue if he suffered a special injury, which was

different in kind from the general public. See, e.g., Hardy

Salt Company v. Southern Pacific Transportation Com-

pany, 501 F.2d 1156 (19th Cir. 1974), cert denied 419

U.S. 1033 (1974). The purpose of the rule was to prevent

a multiplicity of actions and frivolous suits. Neither of

these concerns could even arguably be considered to be

a factor in denying PECO standing in the case.

As for whether PECO satisfies the requirements of

tne Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C (1977), which

the Panel found applicable, the pleadings, PECO’s pre-

trial memorandum, the evidence presented at trial and

the specific finuings of the jury all belie the Panel’s con-

clusion that PECO did not allege or suffer any injury in

4. PECO submits that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would

adopt the more liberal standing requirement expressed by the Ha-

waii Supreme Court in Akau v. Olomana Corp., 65 Hawaii 383

(1982), than that applied by the Panel in this case.

A-8

the exercise of a right common to the general public that

was the subject of the interference. (Slip Op. at 24-25.

The Panel states that: “If PECO — as a riparian land-

owner — had suffered damage to its land or its operations

as a result of the pollution of the Delaware, it would pos-

sibly have a claim for public nuisance. But the condition

of the Chester site was not the result of the pollution, it

was the cause of it.” (Slip Op. at 25) (emphasis in orig-

inal). It is obvious from this statement that the Panel

failed to focus upon a very key element of the case and

the evidence presented at trial: It was the pollutants

(i.e., PICCO resinous materials) which were the cause of

the contaminated condition of the Chester site, includ-

ing PECO’s soil and groundwater, and the contamina-

tion of the Delware River. Thus, the public water both in

the Delaware and the groundwater flowing on PECO’s

land was and continues to be contaminated by the nui-

sance Hercules created.

The groundwater and the Delaware River are natu-

ral resources belonging to the citizens of Pennsylvania

and entrusted to DER. As the result of the contamination

of these resources by Hercules, the public at large was

and continues to be harmed. As owner of the property

temporarily responsible for these natural resources,

PECO was specifically harmed by both the damages to

its property and the contamination of its groundwater

and by DER'’s request to abate the polluting condition.

See, National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth

Department of Environmental Resources, 489 Pa. 221,

414 A.2d 37 (1980). That abatement, as of the time of

trial, cost PECO $345,906.690. That expense is, indeed,

harm of a kind different from and greater in degree than

that suffered by other members of the public, in the ex-

ercise of a right common to the general public.

PECO pleaded and proved that as a result of the of-

fensive nuisance created by Hercules, not only was the

Delaware River being polluted but so was PECO’s soil

and groundwater. (J.A. 319-20; 341; 351-60; 430-31;

A-9

437-38; 469-84; 603-15; 644-48). Not only did PECO

demonstrate that the soil and groundwater were being

contaminated by the nuisance, but also that it was in-

jured in the use and enjoyment of its property by the loss

of rentals from its tenant as a result of the same pollutant

which were contaminating the Delaware River. (J.A.

267-272)

The right to reasonable groundwater use and enjoy-

ment is a right which all landowners possess and is also

considered a public right. Restatement (Second) of Torts

§821C comment (h) (1977); Pennsylvania Clean Stream

Law, 35 P.S. §§691.1, 691.4. The case law is supportive

of PECO’s position that it has suffered special damages

qualifying it as having the requisite standing. See, e.g.,

Akau v. Olomana Corproation, 65 Hawaii 383 (1921);

Heinl v. Pecher, 330 Pa. 232, 198 A. 797 (1938); Frady

v. Portland General Electric Co., 637 P.2d 1345 (Or. App.

1981).

In Heinl v. Pecher, 330 Pa. 232, 198 A. 797 (1938),

defendant erected an incinerator plant intended for the

burning and disposal of garbage. The residents living ad-

jacent to the plant brought an action for public nuisance

to restrain defendants from operating the plant on the

grounds that the defendants had not obtained a building

permit and non-compliance with the applicabie zoning

statute was declared to be a nuisance. The Court af-

firmed the lower court’s holding, “|s]ince plaintiffs al-

leged that the building was erected as an incinerator

plant in violation of the ordinances of the township and

since the building ordinance provides that a building

erected in violation of its provisions shall be ‘declared a

nuisance’ and ‘may be abated’ .. .” and the allegations

were sustained by the evidence. Id. at 236, 918 A. at 799.

In Heinl, Defendants argued that plaintiffs had no

right to bring the action for public wrongs. In response,

the Court pointed out that since the violation of the or-

dinance was declared to be a nuisance, the private indi-

vidual does have a right to bring the action as long as the

A-10

plaintiff’s injury complained of is “only greater in de-

gree” than that of the public. Jd. at 238, 198 A. at 799.

Also, defendants argued, on appeal, that plaintiffs

showed only that the neighborhood would be depreci-

ated and that was not sufficient damage to support a

claim for public nuisance. The Supreme Court dismissed

this argument on the ground that:

‘Equitable relief must be predicated on an injurious

invasion of a fixed and determined property right. By

injury is meant something affecting the capacity of

the property for ordinary use or causing a discomfort

in the enjoyment of it that threatens the health or

welfare of the occupant, with resultant injury to the

property...’

Id. at 239, 198 A. at 800 (quoting Pennsylvania Co.

v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404, 138 A. 909)

As several of the plaintiffs lived adjacent to the inciner-

ator plant, the Court held that, by operation of the plant,

they would suffer “discomfort in the enjoyment” of their

property.> Id. at 239, 198 A. at 800 (citation omitted).

It is difficult to fathom how, if this Court is applying

Pennsylvania law, it can conclude that PECO did not

suffer the requisite injury io give it standing in light of

the Supereme Court's opinion in Heinl. For as recog-

nized by Dean Prossser: “When a public nusiance sub-

stantially interferes with the use or enjoyment of the

plaintiff's rights in land, it never has been disputed that

there is a particular kind of damage, for which the private

action will lie.” Prosser, Private Action for Public Nui-

sance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997, 1018 (1966) (footnote omit-

ted) (emphasis added).

5. Although as of the time of the action, the incineration had

never been in operation.

A-11]

B. As a Matter of the Law of the Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania, PECO is Entitlea to Indemnification From

Hercules

Contrary to the Panel’s determination, the record

clearly supports the conclusion that PECO “could have

been compelled” through legal action taken by DER pur-

suant to the Clean Streams Law to incur the abatement

expenses for the nuisance created by Hercules. Section

691.316 of the Clean Streams Law specifically provides

in pertinent part:

Whenever the department finds that pollution or a

danger of pollution is resulting from a condition

which exists on land in the Commonwealth the de-

partment may order the landowner or occupier to

correct the condition in a manner satisfactory to the

department or it may order such owner or occupier

to allow a mine operator or other person or agency of

the Commonwealth access to the land to take such

action. For the purpose of this section, “landowner”

includes any person holding title to or having a pro-

prietary interest in either surface or subsurface

rights.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld this pro-

vision as constitutional in National Wood Preserves, Inc.

v. Commonwealth Department of Environmental Re-

sources, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980).

Under the Pennsylvania Clean Stream Law, “pollu-

tion” is defined as “contamination of any waters of the

Commonwealth such as will create or is likely to create

a nuisance .. .” §691.1. The jury specifically found that

Hercules had created a nuisance which was polluting or

contaminating the Delaware River and PECO’s ground-

water.® (J.A. 796-801) There was nothing further to sub-

6. Section 691.1 also defines “Waters of the Commonwealth”

as: “.. . any and all rivers, streams, creeks, rivulets, impoundments,

ditches, water courses, storm sewers. lakes, dammed water, ponds,

A-12

mit to the jury on the issue of indemnification. It is

simply a matter of applying Pennsylvania law to the find-

ings of the jury; the reasonableness and amount of the

clean-up costs were conceded by Hercules’ counsel. (J.A.

206).

Under federal practice it is not necessary to plead

“causes of action”, but merely to state a claim for relief.

That PECO clearly did throughout and there cannt be

any claim of “surprise” by Hercules’ as to the fact that

PECO was secking recovery of its clean-up costs.

The Panel then tries to justify not shifting the re-

sponsibility to Hercules where it properly lies on the ba-

sis that Hercules was not the culprit , rather it was

-PICCO. (Slip Op. at 30) But such an “equitable” analysis

contradicts the Panel’s holding that Hercules is PICCO

by virtue of the de facto merger doctrine and the Panel’s

holding that: “. . . Hercules has [expressly] assumed any

liability PICCO may have had due to the pollution of the

Chester site.” (Slip Op. at 11) Surely PICCO (ergo

Hercules) “was best suited to prevent the poilution”.

(Slip Op. at 30) Is there any question but that PICCO, if

it had not been merged into Hercules, would have had to

NOTES (Continued )

springs and all other bodies or channels of conveyance of surface

and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or artifi-

cial, within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth.”

7. Indeed Hercules’ entire defense of this case until the time of

appeal was that it was not liable to PECO because it was not

PICCO’s successor in interest and had not assumed this obligation.

Hercules took virtually no discovery, it filed no interrogatories or

requests for production of documents. It did not view the site al-

though PECO offered it the opportunity. Hercules’ counsel stated in

his opening; “. . . so that if you find the condition [PECO] alleges is

the fault of PICCO, then your verdict will be against Hercules.” (J.A.

205) During the course of the trial PECO submitted expert evidence

which virtually “fingerprinted” the pollutants as PICCO products

which were contaminating PECO’s groundwater and the Delaware

River. (J.A. 473-84; 645-48) Hercules offered no contrary expert

opinion evidence.

A-13

answer to PECO in both public nuisance and indemni-

fication? The Panel seemed to be swayed by the “fair-

ness” of making PECO bear the responsibility because

‘“... PECO had an opportunity to protect itself through

inspection and negotiation. . .” (Slip Op. at 30) But even

if that consideration had any bearing on the issues be-

fore this Court, it ignores the reality of the case and the

evidence. PECO asserted, and evidence so established,

that the buried contaminants were a latent condition un-

discovered until years later. (J.A. 10, 257) Indeed,

Hercules’ defense proffered through former PICCO em-

ployees was that PICCO had not deposited the pollutants

of which PECO and DER complained. (J.A. 520-22;

528-539) It is difficult to understand why the Panel be-

lieves it is fairer to shift the burden for this nuisance to

PECO, who certainly had nothing to do with its creation,

rather than to the party who created it yet to this day

denies it. How was PECO to negotiate a “fair price” for

land saddled with a latent condition which is a public

nuisance, when the perpetrator of the nuisance to this

day denies it and that party was not even PECO’s seller.®

Even if this Court somehow concludes that PECO and

Hercules are on ‘equal footing’ with regard to the

Chester site, shouldn’t the principles of contribution ap-

ply? See, e.g., State v. City of San Francisco, 94 Cal. App.

3d 522, 156 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1979).

But once the court determined that Hercules as-

sumed the liability for the Chester site, it acknowledged

that Hercules is primarily liable and it, not PECO, should

bear the burden of abatement. Despite disclaimers to the

contrary, the Panel’s self-contradictory opinion dos

stand for the proposition that “... a party that contam-

inates land, .. . can escape liability by the expedient of

selling the land”. (Slip Op. at 31)

8. Nor was there any evidence that Gould knew of the existence

of the pollutants which caused the public nuisance. The only evi-

dence was that the condition which was caused by the resinous pol-

lutants was a latent condition.

A-14

SUMMARY

The decision of the Panel in this case is contrary to

the law of public nuisance as established in Pennsylva-

nia, since PECO obviously has standing in that the pol-

lutants which cause the nuisance have damaged

PECO’s property, interfered with PECO’s use and en-

joyment of its property, and polluted the groundwater on

its property which then flows into the Delaware. PECO

was, and continues to be, specially harmed in the exer-

cise of its right to pure groundwater and uncontaminated

soil, a right common to the general public, but which the

Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law imposes an added ob-

ligation on a landowner to protect under Section

-691.316. The monies PECO expended in abating the

nuisance were in furtherance of these common rights

and that attendant obligation. Moreover, PECO submits

that the Supreme Court of Pennsyvlania would not apply

such a restrictive standard for standing given its decision

‘in Heinl v. Pecher, supra.

PECO further admits that the Panel’s decision is

self-contradictory in its analysis of PECO’s right to in-

demnification in light of its holding that Hercules has

expressly assumed the liability PICCO had for the pol-

lution of the Chester site. Thus, the Panel’s considera-

tion of when Hercules acquired PICCO was

inappropriate. PECO proved each and every element

necessary to entitle it to indemnification from Hercules.

A-15

If the Panel's decision is permitted to stand, it will

establish a precedent contrary to the law and public pol-

icy of Pennsylvania in requiring the one who caused the

nuisance to correct it, and will haunt for years to conie

the development of the law of public and private nui-

sance in the area of environmental protection and haz-

ardous waste disposal. Accordingly, PECO respectfully

requests that its Petition for Reargument be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN

& DONLEY

Joseph M. Donley

Robert Emmet Hernan

121 South Broad Street

8thFlocr

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 732-2700

Attorneys for Petitioner

Philadelphia Electric Company

A-16

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

Appellee

v. Appeal No. 84: 1159

HERCULES INCORPORATED,

Appellant

and

GOULD, INC.,

Appellee

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL PURSUANT

TO RULE 22 OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied

professional judgment that the panel decision is contrary

to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and tc

the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

which law is controlling in this action, to wit, the panel’s

decision is contrary to the decision of Heinl v. Pecher,

330 Pa. 232, 198A. 797 (1938) and Article I, §27 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, and 35 Pa. C.S.A. §691.1 et

seq. And, that this appeal involves a question of excep-

tional importance, to wit, whether the panel decision es-

tablishes a precedent which encourages a party who

contaminates land to escape liability by divesting itself of

that land, while shifting the sole responsibility for abat-

ing the public nuisance to an innocent property owner

who’s land and groundwater is contaminated by the

nuiusance, which is a case of first impression that

A-17

presents critical issues of economic, environmental and

social circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN

& DONLEY

Joseph M. Donley

121 South Broad Street

8th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 732-2700

Attorneys for Petitioner

Philadelphia Electric Company

A-18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| hereby certify that I have caused to be served on

this 11th day of June, 1985, by hand, two copies of the

Petition of Appellee Philadelphia Electric Company for

Rehearing Before the Court In Banc on the below-listed

counsel:

John C. Sullivan, Esq.

FRUMKIN & MANTA

1818 Three Penn Center Plaza

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorney for Appellant

Hercules Incorporated

Kean K. McDonald, Esq.

LABRUM AND DOAK

700 IVB Building

1700 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorney for Appellee

Gould, Inc.

A copy of same was mailed, first class, this 11th day

of June, 1985, to:

John G. Gleeson, Esq.

HERCULES INCORPORATED

Hercules Plaza

Wilmington, DE 19899

JOSEPH M. DONELY

A-19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that three copies of this Brief of Hercules

Incorporated in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certio-

rari were mailed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.3

by United States mail, first class postage, prepaid this

18th day of October, 1985, to:

Joseph M. Donley, Esquire

KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN

& DONLEY

800 North American Building

121 South Broad Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Kean K. McDonald, Esquire

700 I.V.B. Building

1700 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

JOHN C. SULLIVAN

Attorney for Respondent

Hercules Incorporated

——s

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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