Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Johanns v. United States
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85-238 «AUG 1986
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
MICHAEL A. JOHANNS,
Petitioner,
V8.
UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
MAryY LOUISE FRAMPTON*
FRAMPTON, KARSHMER & KESSELMAN
A Professional Association
925 N Street, Suite 150
Fresno, CA 93721-2256
Telephone: (209) 486-5730
MAJOR CONRAD C. BALDWIN, JR.
_ Associate Appellate Defense
Counsel
Office of the
Judge Advocate General
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters United States
Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20332-6128
Telephone: (202) 767-1562
Attorneys for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
i
— HOD, Jit.
In the Supreme C —
a 4)
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether conviction of an unmarried
military officer under Article 133 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice
for engaging in private, consensual
sexual intercourse with a married
person violates the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
SUBJECT INDEX
Page
Question Presented . ...-« -» i
Opinions Below ...s»se#+e+s#t#e#eers 8
Jurisdiction ..«++e«-e-ertee es &
Statutes and Constitutional
Provisions Involved .. . 5
Statement of Case ...e«++s+»+#*+es §
Reasons for Granting Writ .... 8
CORCIMELOR + «1 2 6 6 * 3 2 es *@ woe 20
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Brea-Garcia v. Immigration
Service, 531 F. 2d
693 (3rd Cir.1976)
Connally v. General Construc-
tion Company, 269 U.S. 385,
392, 46 S. Ct. 126, 128, 70
L.Ed., (1927)
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294,
33 L.Ed. 222 (1972)
In re Edgar, 253 F. Supp. 95l
(E.D. Mich. 1966)
Moon Ho Kim v. U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization
Service, 514 F. 2d 179 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
L.Ed. (1974)
Petition for Naturalization
of Richard Schroers, 336 F.
Supp. 1348 (S.D. N.Y. 1971)
Wadman v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 329
F. 2a 812 (1964)
Pages
16
18
18
17
17
19
17
17
iv
Statutes
Page
Uniform Code of Military Justice
Article 133, 10 U.S.c. §$ 933 $,8,18,
20
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) 15
28 u.S.c. §§ 1259(2) and (3) 4
North Dakota Century Code
Section 12.1-20-09 (1975) 5,il
Constitutional Provisicns
Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 5,18
United States Court of
Military Appea?*s Decisions
United States v. Melville,
S U.S.C.M.A. 597, 601,
25 C.M.R. 101 (1958) 9
Court of Military Review Decisions
United States v. Jefferson,
I4M.J. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982) 12
Law Review Articles
Comment, Immigration Law-
National Standard,
Incorporation of State Law
or Hybrid Test-State
Definition of Adultery
Utilized for Determining
Good Moral Chracter,
S51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1021 (1976)
Comment, Free Speech in
the Military, 53 N.Y.
UNIV. L. REV. 1102,
1109 (Nov. 1978)
Other Authorities
Manual for Courts-Martial,
969 Rev. Ed.
Paragraph 212
Paragraph 2l3c
Winthrop, Military Law and
Precedents, /11-712
(2d Ed., 1920 reprint)
Kinsey, Alfred, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE, p. 416 (Philadelphia
1953)
Kinsey Alfred, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE, p. 585 (Philadelphia
1949)
17
20
12
10
12
13
13
NO.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
MICHAEL JOHANNS,
PETITIONER,
vs.
UNITED STATES
RESPONDENT.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
MILITARY APPEALS
Petitioner MICHAEL JOHANNS
respectfully prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review a part of the
decision of the United States Court of
Military Appeals entered in the
above-entitled action on June 10, 1985.
OPINIONS BELOW
Jn July 2, 1982, petitioner was found
guilty by general court-martial of four
specifications of conduct unbeceming an
officer and gentleman in violation of
Article 133 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and one specification of
conduct prejudicial to good order and
discipline or of a nature to discredit the
armed forces in violation of Article 134
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
He was sentenced to dismissal from the
service. The findings of guilty and the
sentence were approved by the convening
authority.
On October 26, 1983, the United
States Air Force Court of Military Review
set aside three of the four findings of
guilt under Article 133 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and ordered a
rehearing on sentence on the remaining
findings. The government's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
On December 16, 1983, the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force
certified for review by the United States
Court of Military Appeals the issue of
whether the Court of Military Review was
correct in reversing the conviction of
petitioner as to the three specifications
of violation of Article 133 or Article 134
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
On July 6, 1984, the United States
Court of Military Appeals granted
petitioners' cross-petition for review on
the issue of whether Specification 1 of
Charge I (violation of Article 133). and
Charge II (violation of Article 134) were
multiplicious. It denied petitioners'
cross-petition for review on the issue of
whether the Court of Military Review was
correct in sustaining the conviction of
petitioner as to Specification 1 of Charge
I.
On June 10, 1985, the United States
Court of Military Appeals dismissed Charge
II and its specification on the grounds of
multiplicity and affirmed the remainder of
the decision of the United States Court of
Military Review.
The orders and decisions referred to
above are attached as Exhibits A, B, C &
D.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1259(2) and (3).
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article 133 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice
North Dakota Century Code Section
12.1-20-09 (1975)
Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution
STATZMENT OF CASE
Captain Michael Johanns, a single
man, was convicted of violating Articles
133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice by engaging in an act of
private consensual sexual intercourse with
Sergeant Donna Robbins, a married woman,
on October 5, 1981. The United States
Court of Military Appeals dismissed the
finding of guilty under Article 134 on the
grounds of multiplicity, leaving only the
Article 133 conviction at issue. 1/
On October 5, 1981, Captain
Johanns, a twenty-eight year old missile
combat crew commander with a superlative
performance record, went to the
Noncommissioned Officers’ Club at Minot
Air Force Base with a group of friends.
(R.T. 105) Since the Officers Club was
closed during that period, officers were
welcome to socialize at the
Noncommissioned Officers’ Club. (R.
111). During the evening Captain Johanns
1/ Specification l: In that
CAPTAIN MICHAEL A. JOHANNS, United States
Air Force, 9lst Strategic Missile Wing,
did, at Minot Air Force Base, North
Dakota, on or about 5 October 1981,
wrongfully, dishonorably, and
disgracefully have sexual intercourse with
Donna R., Sergeant, United States Air
Force, the said Sergeant Donna R. being,
at that time, the lawful wife of an active
duty enlisted member of the United States
Air Force, contrary to the customs and
traditions of the armed forces of the
United States.
was introduced to Sergeant Robbins, an
enlisted person assigned to another unit,
and invited her to his trailer. Later
that night the two of
them engaged in a private, consensual act
of sexual intercourse in Captain Johanns'
trailer. (R.T. 106) On that date
Sergeant Robbins’ husband was TDY to Guam
for two months. (R.T. 105)
Sergeant Robbins testified that her
relationship with Captain Johanns was
entirely voluntary and did not compromise
his standing in her eyes or in any manner
discredit or disgrace him. The brief
encounter was terminated before Sergeant
Robbins' husband returned home and he was
unaware of its occurrence until Sergeant
Robbins was compelled to testify at the
court-martial hearing. She told no one
that she had engaged in sexual intercourse
with Captain Johanns. (R.T. 109)
Sergeant Robbins further testified that
she was no longer married and that her
temporary relationship with Captain
Johanns was unrelated to her divorce.
(R.T. 112)
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
THE DECISION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION
OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN,
BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS
COURT,AND WHICH CONFLICTS WITH
DECISIONS OF OTHER
FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
Article 133 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §$ 933, states:
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or
midshipman who is convicted of
conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct.
There is not a single reported case
in which an unmarried military officer has
been convicted of a violation of Article
133 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice for engaging in a private
consensual act of sexual intercourse.
As the government itself explained in
United States v. Melville, 8 U.S.C.M.A.
597, 601, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958), the most
recent adultery case cited by the Court of
Military Review in this case, "the
marriage of the offending party is the
element that distinguishes the offense
from a mere disorder."
Adultery is not a crime or an offense
under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Moreover, the sole provision for
punishment of adultery in the Manual for
10
Courts-Martial, 1969 Rev. Ed., applies
exclusively when such conduct is
proscribed by state law. Paragraph 2l3c
of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969
Rev. Ed., states:
Acts in violation of local civil
law may be punished if they are of
a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces. Included within
the conduct which may be found to
be within the proscription of this
Clause are adultery, bigamy,
negligent homicide, fleeing the
scene of an accident, indecent
acts, and dishonorable failure to
pay debts.
Captain Johanns did not violate the
“local civil law", however, since the law
of North Dakota provides that only a
“married person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor if he or she engages in a
ll
sexual act with another person." North
Dakota Century Code Section 12.1-20-09
(1975). (emphasis mine)
The Court of Military Review affirmed
Captain Johanns' conviction on the ground
that adultery “although seldom prosecuted,
is a viable offense subject to trial by
court-martial and that “it is military law
which defines the parameters of the
offense of adultery, not state law."
(Slip Opinion at 4) What the Court failed
to recognize, however, was that adultery
had only been prosecuted by the military
when the accused himself was married.
The military law definitions of
Article 133 demonstrate why the finding of
guilty in petitioner's case is
unprecedented. It is well-established
that if an officer's conduct charged under
Article 133 does not constitute a crime,
it must “offend so seriously against law,
12
justice, morality or decorum as to expose
or disgrace socially or as a man, the
offender, and at the same time must be of
such a nature or committed under
circumstances as to bring dishonor or
disrepute upon the military profession
which he represents." Winthrop, Military
Law and Precedents, 711-712 (2d Ed., 1920
reprint). See also United States v.
Jefferson, 14 M.J. 806 (1982).
Winthrop further declared that the
“military community cannot expect, nor
Ought it to be expected of them, to
preserve a higher tone of moral conduct
than what is sustained by the higher
orders of society." Winthrop, Military
Law and Precedents, (2d ed. 1920 reprint),
ftn. 14, p. Jill.
The modern version of this rule is
found in Paragraph 212 of the Manual for
Courts-Martial, 1969 Rev. Ed., which
13
states explicitly that "(n)ot everyone is
or can be expected to meet ideal moral
standards."
The most authoritative studies of
sexual activity in the United States
reported that even in the early i950's
one-half of married men and one-fourth of
married women committed adultery sometime
in their married lives. Alfred Kinsey,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE
(Philadelphia 1953) p. 416, and Alfred
Kinsey, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
(Philadelphia 1949), p. 585. Undoubtedly
the statistics are considerably higher
today.
During petitioner's court-martial
trial Colonel Lipscomb confirmed the
widespread acceptance of adultery at Minot
Air Force Base:
The morals of the Air Force are no
different than the majority of
14
their counterparts in civilian
life. I believe statistics will
demonstrate that at least 50% of
the males in the Air Force have
experienced extra-marital
relationships. I can name names of
high ranking officers who are well
known to be involved in such
activity and it is simply winked
at. (Appellate Exhibit VII)
Despite the fact that such activity
was occurring with regularity, Major
William Sherman, Staff Judge Advocate at
Minot Air Force Base, testified that
previous to this case there had been no
prosecutions for adultery. (R.22)
Hence, it is questionable whether
even an act of sexual intercourse by a
married officer with a woman not his wife
would meet the definition of an Article
15
133 violation in this day and age. In the
absence of aggravating circumstances, such
a private, consensual act by a single man
cannot by any stretch of the imagination
“offend so seriously against law, justice,
morality or decorum as to expose or
disgrace socially or as a man, the
offender, and at the same time ... bring
dishonor or disrepute upon the military
profession..."
Without military law precedent for
petitioner's conviction, the only possible
basis for the finding of guilty was some
non-military federal law. The only
context in which the question of what
constitutes adultery under federal law
arises is in the naturalization area. A
person may not become a naturalized
citizen unless he or she is of “good moral
character." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) provides
that no person who has "committed
16
adultery" shall be considered to be of
such moral character.
The federal courts have wrestled with
the question of how to define "adultery"
in this national context. Some courts,
most notably the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, have determined that
adultery should be defined by
incorporating the law of the state in
which the alien resides into the federal
law. Brea-Garcia v. Immigration Service,
531 F. 2d 693 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Other courts such as the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and
the Ninth Circuit have adopted a uniform
definition of adultery. According to this
"national" standard, extra-martial
intercourse is defined as “adultery" only
if it tends to destroy an existing
marriage and threatens public morality
(for example, it is “open and notorious
17
cohabitation"). See Moon Ho Kim v. U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
514 F. 2a 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wadman v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
329 F. 2d 812 (1964); Petition for
Naturalization of Richard Schroers, 336 F.
Supp. 1348 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); In re Edgar,
253 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1966);
Comment, Immigration Law-National
Standard, Incorporation of State Law or
Hybrid Test-State Definition of Adultery
Utilized for Determining Good Moral
Character, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1021 (1976).
Under any of the above tests Captain
Johanns could not have been found guilty.
Under North Dakota law he committed no
offense. His conduct did not destroy or
even jeopardize any marriage and the
relationship was neither open nor
notorious, but entirely private.
18
Since there was no precedent for the
Article 133 conviction of a single man for
engaging in a private, consensual act of
sexual intercourse, since the military
definition of Article 133. could not
encompass petitioner's conduct, and since
petitioner did not violate North Dakota
law or commit adultery as defined by any
other federal law, he lacked the requisite
constitutional notice that his action
would be considered felonious.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that statutes be
drafted with sufficient clarity to provide
"notice" of what activity is deemed to be
prohibited. Connally v. General
Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 392,
46 S. Ct., 70 L.Ed., 126, 128
(1927);Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed. 222 (1972).
ene ai
19
Because the military is allowed
greater latitude in the drafting of its
rules than would be constitutional in the
civilian forum, "the proper standard of
review for a vagueness challenge to the
articles of the (Uniform Code of Military
Justice) is the standard which applies to
criminal statutes regulating economic
affairs." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
756-67, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed. (1974).
The Court defined that standard as
follows:
Void for vagueness simply means
that criminal responsibility should
not attach where one could not
reasonably understand that his
contemplated conduct is proscribed
- « « In determining the
sufficiency of the notice a
20
statute must of necessity be
examined in the light of the
conduct with which a defendant is
Charged. Id. at 757.
See Comment, Free Speech in the Military,
53 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 1102, 1109 (Nov.
1978).
The record clearly shows that
petitioner "could not reasonably
understand that his conduct would be
considered unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman" under Article 133 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons petitioner
respectfully prays that this petition for
:
7
21
a writ of certiorari be granted.
Dated, Fresno, California.
July 26, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
FRAMPTON, KARSHMER & KESSELMAN
Mary Louise Frampton
Major Conrad C. Baldwin, Jr.
Associate Appellate Defense
Counsel
United States Air Force
Attorneys for Petitioner,
MICHAEL A. JOHANNS
A-1
APPENDIX
EXHIBIT "A"
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW
UNITED STATES
Vv
Captain MICHAEL A. JOHANNS, 001-46-5650FR
UNITED STATES FIR FORCE
ACM 23699
26 OCT 1983
Sentence adjudged 2 July 1982 by GCM
convened at Minot Air Force Base, North
Dakota.
Military Judge: Michael C. Callinen.
Approved sentence: Dismissal.
Appellate Counsel for the Accusec :
Ms. Mary Louise Frampton, Fresno,
California, Colonel George R. Stevens and
Captain Kathleen G. O'Reilly. Appellate
Counsel for the United States: Colonel
Kenneth R. Rengert, Major Michael J.
Hoover and Captain Brenda J. Hollis.
Before
HODGSON, FORAY, HEMINGWAY, KASTL,
CANELLOS, RAICHLE, MILLER and
SNYDER
Appellate Military Judges, En Banc
A-2
DECISION
CANELLOS, Judge:
The accused was convicted, contrary
to his pleas, of adultery and of four
specifications of conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman by having sexual
relations with three female enlisted
members (one of them married), and by
sharing a bed with the married woman
while she was intoxicated. 1/ The
“conduct unbecoming” specifications are
couched in terms that the accused did
“dishonorably and disgracefully
fraternize and associate on terms of
military equality with enlisted members
of the United States Air Force."
(emphasis added).
1i/ The charges upon which the accused
was arraigned were:
Charge I: Violation of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, Article 133.
ee
A-3
The approved sentence extends to
dismissal from the service.
On appeal, the accused claims that
(1/7 cont.)
Specification l: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5
October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,
and disgracefully have sexual intercourse
with Donna R., Sergeant, United States
Air Force, the said Sergeant Donna R.
being, at that time, the lawful wife of
an active duty enlisted member of the
United States Air Force, contrary to the
customs and traditions of the armed
forces of the United States.
Specification 2: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 8
October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,
and disgracefully fraternize and
associate on terms of military equality
with enlisted members of the United
States Air Force, to wit: Sergeant Donna
R., by going into the military quarters
of the said Sergeant Donna R. at Minot
Air Force Base, North Dakota and sharing
the same bed with the said Sergeant Donna
R. while the said Sergeant Donna R. was
the lawful wife of an enlisted member of
the United States Air Force, contrary to
the customs and traditions of the armed
A-4
(1) the court lacked jurisdiction over
1/ cont.)
forces of the United States.
Specification 3: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot,
North Dakota, on three or four separate
occasions during September, 1981,
wrongfully, dishonorably, and
disgracefully fraternize and associate on
terms of military equality with Staff
Sergeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl K., a
female active duty enlisted member of the
United States Air Force, by engaging in
acts of sexual intercourse with the said
Staff Sergeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl K.,
contrary to the customs and traditions of
the armed forces of the United States.
Specification 4: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on two or three
occasions, during November, 1981,
wrongfully, dishonorably, and
disgracefully fraternize and associate on
terms of military equality with Senior
Airman Michelle P., then known as Senior
Airman Michelle S., a female active duty
enlisted member of the United States Air
Force, by engaging in acts of sexual .
intercourse with the said Senior Airman
Michelle P., then known as Senior Airman
Michelle S., contrary to the customs and
traditions of the armed forces of the
United States.
the adultery, charged as a violation of
Article 134, U.C.M.J.2/, since he did not
violate North Dakota law and his conduct
therefore did not discredit the armed
1/ cont.)
Charge II: Violation of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, Article 134.
Specification: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, dic at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5
October 1981, wrongfully have sexual
intercourse with Donna R., a married
woman, not his wife.
2/ Art. 134. General article
Though not specifically mentioned in
this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces, and crimes and
offenses not capital, of which persons
subject to this chapter may be guilty,
shall be taken cognizance of by a
general, special, or summary
court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, and shall be
punished at the discretion of that court.
A-6
forces, (2) Article 133,
U.C.M.J. 3/, is void for vagueness as it
applies to fraternization, (3) he was
tried on the basis of selective
prosecution, and (4) the ban on
fraternization abridges his right to
freedom of association.
The facts are not in dispute. The
accused was a single, 28 year old missile
combat crew commander who had been
stationed at Minot Air Force Base, North
Dakota, since completion of training in
1978. The Officers’ Open Mess at Minot
was being redecorated; as a result,
officers had been authorized to utilize
the facilities of the Noncommissioned
Officers' Open Mess. The accused availed
3/ Art. 133. Conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or
midshipman who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
A-7
himself of the opportunity and socialized
at the NCO Club. There he met Sgt. R.
(who was married), SrA P. and SSgt K. He
dated each and ultimately had sexual
relations with them all. On one
occasion, the accused and Sgt R. went on
a date downtown, and thereafter returned
to her house on base. Sgt. R. was
intoxicated and therefore remembers
nothing other than the next morning the
accused was asleep next to her in her
bed.
All this interaction was completely
consensual, private, nondeviate, and
sometimes instigated by the women
involved. The accused was neither the
commander nor supervisor of any of these
ee ee
3/ cont.)
shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.
———oOoOoOoOoOwrre
A-8
enlisted members, and their respective
relationships were not publicized.4/ In
the opinion of the enlisted women, the
accused's activities were neither
dishonorable nor service discrediting.
The charges resulted from these
apparently private, voluntary liaisons.
I
We affirm the conviction of the
offense of adultery. Adultery, although
seldom prosecuted, is a viable offense
subject to trial by court-martial. See
generally United States v. Butler, 5
C.M.R. 213 (A.B.R. 1952); United States
v. Neville, 7 C.M.R. 180 (A.B.R. 1952).
The accused claims that under the
law of North Dakota he did not commit
4/ It was stipulated at trial that the
allegations were brought to the attention
of the accused's commander by a member of
his squadron on the basis of inferences
he drew from conversations with the
accused.
A-9
adultery; however, it is the military law
which defines the parameters of the
offense of adultery, not state law.
United States v. Panchisin, 30 C.M.R. 921 |
(A.F.B.R.), pet. denied, 31 C.M.R. 314
(1961). It is not required to show that
the accused was married; rather, it is
sufficient to show that either of the
participants was married to a third
party. United States v. Melville, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 597, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958);
United States v. Hedgecock, 30 C.M.R. 624
(N.B.R. 1960).
Accordingly, we are convinced that
the accused is guilty of the adultery as
charged. The evidence clearly
establishes that the accused had sexual
relations with a woman, not his wife.
The woman was an enlisted member of the
Untied States Air Force, married to a
noncommissioned officer on the same
A-10
base. An officer having sexual relations
with the wife of an enlisted
memberclearly acts in a manner
prejudicial to good order and discipline
under Article 134, U.C.M.J.5/
Having determined that the accused's
conduct amounted to actionable adultery,
we further find, on these facts, that he
was culpable c«¢ conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman for such acts.
Il
We next turn our attention to the
four offenses bottomed on
“fraternization". It is propounded by
the Government that there is in the
United States Air Force a custom which
proscribes unlawful fraternization and
57 It is unnecessary to show that the
conduct of the accused was also of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, this being an alternate method of
proving a violation of Article 134,
U.C.M.J.
3
|
?
z
j
g
5
a
.
A-11l
makes actionable the association of
officers with enlisted personnel on terms
of military equality. We find that the
time of the offenses in issue, there did
not exist a clearcut standard for gauging
so called "“fraternization" in the Air
Force; as a result, alleged violations
grounded on fraternization are not
actionable under the U.C.M.J.
We begin with an historical review
of the offense of fraternization. Prior
to its becoming a separate service, the
Air Force was, of course, a part of the
U.S. Army. There supposedly existed in
the Army a custom of the service that
officers and enlisted personnel would not
associate together in mutual social
activities. However, during World War
II, dating between officers and enlisted
personnel was commonplace, and if there
were any restrictions against such
A-12
interaction, they were not enforced. See
generally Treadwell, The Women's Army
Corps, in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR
II (1954). This type of datingapparently
did not adversely affect morale and
discipline. J. HOLM, WOMEN IN THE
MILITARY, AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
(1982).
When it became a separate service,
the Air Force proclaimed that officers
and airmen would not generally associate
together in social activities; this more
progressive attitude was consistent with
the less formal atmosphere existing in
the Air Force, as compared with the Army.
See generally Flatten, Fraternization, 10
A.F. Reptr. 109 (1981). Since that time,
the Air Force has promulgated rules which
authorize certain activities on the part
of Air Force personnel, including those
dealing with housing and messing, which
ee re
oF ocak nen HO
ee a, ee en ee eS
A-13
contravene a strict application of what
was supposedly a customary prohibition
against fraternization.
A booklet on Air Force standards was
published in 1977. It did not discuss
fraternization, but did provide:
Since we live and work in a very
close environment and endure
common hardships, officer and
enlisted personnel frequently
develop close personal
friendships. However,
friendships must not interfere
with judgment or duty
performance. 6/
Within the last decade, the
directive governing the assignment of
on-base family quarters was changed to
authorize officers who were married to
6/ A.F.R. 30-1, Air Force Standards, 30
Sept 77, para 4b.
ila i
A-14
enlisted members to reside on base, with
an option to select whether they resided
in officer or enlisted housing. 7/ Prior
to that time, such a married couple would
not have normally been authorized to
reside on base because such was not
considered to be in the best interests of
the Air Force. 8/ The regulations
7/ A.F.R. 90-1, Assignment of Family
Housing, 19 Dec 77, Table 6-4.
8/ A.F.R. 30-6, Occupancy of Public
Quarters, 7 Feb 57, para 1l6c.
IF ONE SPOUSE IS AN OFFICER OR
WARRANT OFFICER, AND THE OTHER
IS AN ENLISTED PERSON,
assignment to family-type public
quarters is not considered to be
in the best interest of the
service, and such assignment
will not normally be made. In
this case, both members will be
permitted to reside jointly off
the base, regardless of the
availability of public quarters
for their occupancy.
eK
tatse vie Dred «Mere.
A-15
governing the operations of the Open
Messes were changed to permit officers
and enlisted personnel to patronize each
other's clubs as guests. 9/
Traditionally, such patronage was
restricted. 10/
In addition, the Air Force has
fostered management principles which
encourage close interpersonal
relationships at the expense of the
strict, customary distinction between
officers and airmen.
9/ A.F.M. 215-11, Operation of Open
Messes, 9 Oct 79, para. 1l-lla(2).
Officer and enlisted open mess
members may use one another's
open mess as guests. .. The
degree to which such privileges
are extended or encouraged is a
local decision based on
membership desires, space
limitations, social commitments,
and other morale or protocol
considerations.
10/ A.F.M. 176-3, Operations Manual
for Open Messes and Other Sundry
Nonappropriated Funds, 12 May 71.
A-16
The reported cases dealing with the
subject of fraternization have been few
and far between. They include: a U.S.
Army officer convicted of inviting an
enlisted man to his tent, offering him
liquor and then making homosexual
advances towards him; 11/ a U.S. Marine
officer convicted of inviting an enlisted
man to his room on base where he gave
himliquor and made homosexual advances;
12/
a U.S. Navy officer convicted of taking
an enlisted man to the Officers' Club,
then to his room on base and there
committing acts of sodomy. 13/ In that
case, the Court of Military Appeals
recommended that actions violative of the
ll/ United States v. Livingston, 8 C.M.R.
206 (A.B.R. 1952).
12/ United States v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466
(N.B.R. 1953).
13/ United States v. Pitasi, 20
a
~-S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31 (1971).
:
3
A-17
custom against fraternization should be
included in an appropriate regulation so
that adequate notice is given to all
ne bes ecelnneiied iat 204 Rahn Be eR 4 tous
potential violators. A U.S. Navy officer
was convicted of bringing an enlisted man
into his apartment to live, ard there
committing acts of sodomy with him. 14/
One Judge of the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals recommended that violations of
this type be handled by administrative
means. A U.S. Army warrant officer was
acquitted of rape, but convicted of
drinking with three enlisted personnel,
taking them to this house, where he
bathed one female and had sexual
relations. 15/ A U.S. Army
noncommissioned officer was convicted of
sleeping in the barracks with two
14/ United States v. Lovejoy, 20
U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970).
5/ United States v. Froelke, 390 F.
Supp. 503 (D.D.c. 1975).
i a i
A-18
enlisted members whom he supervised as
first sergeant. 16/ A U.S. Army officer
was convicted of committing adultery with
an enlisted woman in his chain of
command, during duty hours, in the
barracks. 17/ Finally, this Court, in an
unpublished decision, held that an
officer who provided drugs to her
subordinates, and then used drugs with
them, could be convicted of unlawful
fraternization; however, because of an
instructional failure, the conviction as
to that specification was disapproved.
18/
16/ United States v. Horton, 14 M.J. 96
(c.M.A. 1982) (rev'd on other grounds).
17/ United States v. Jefferson, 14 M.J.
806 (A.C.M.R. 1982).
18/ United States v. Rodriguez, ACM
23545, (A.F.C.M.R. 29 October 1982)
(Judge Miller concurring in result, and
finding that the Air Force regulations
"have not only terminated the existence
of the custom [against fraternization],
but also the offense that was once
chargeable as a violation of that
custom.")
- |
ee ee} —-
A-19
In all of these reported cases, some
aberrant conduct was in evidence;
homosexual activity, alleged rape,
supervisors seeking sexual favors from
their subordinates and performing
indecent acts before others. Notably
absent from the opinions in the cited
cases is any discussion of voluntary,
private, non-deviate sexual activity
between of-age officer and enlisted
members, who were not associated with one
another in any way on duty.
After this review of history and
case law, we address the immediate
question. To assist us, the Government,
in its able oral argument, asks this
Court to declare that mere dating between
officers and airmen violates custom; that
non-deviate, consensual and private
sexual intercourse between them violates
custom; and finally that marriage between
them violates custom, but is a "fait
A-20
accompli" against which the Government,
yielding to a higher priority, chooses to
take no action.
We expressly refuse to so declare.
If there exists a customary ban on
fraternization, and the avowed reason for
such a custom is that fraternization is
inimical to good order and discipline in
the armed forces, how then could marriage
change that effect: In our opinion, the
situation would appear exacerbated by the
closer relationship spawned by the
marriage.
Whether the present situation is
good or bad for overall readiness is not
the issue before this Court. Rather we
must measure the accused's alleged
criminal conduct against the “real world"
in which all-ranks housing and messing,
and officer-enlisted marriages are
currently authorized. Given such
practices, authorized by regulation, we
A-21
cannot say that seeing each other
socially and dating is criminal conduct.
Furthermore, once it is acceptable
to have officers married to enlisted
members, it is logical to conclude that
mere dating is also acceptable, since
that is nothing more than the socially
accepted preliminary stage to such
marriages. Also using our common sense
and knowledge of human nature and the
ways of the world, we note that it is not
an uncommon practice for men and women
who are dating, with or without marriage
in sight, to engage in sexual
relationships; in contemporary society
such a practice is not considered immoral
or unusual.
A-22
a
III
We close our discussion by examining
ee
the aspect of the crimes charged with is
premised on conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman under Article 133,
U.C.M.J. Because the words thereof are
so broad, it is argued by the accused
that the standard set thereby is
ambiguous, and the Article fails for
vagueness. See generally Nelson, Conduct
Expected of an Officer and a Gentleman:
Ambiguity, 12 JAG L. REV. 124 (1970).
Despite this, the Untied States Supreme
Court has held that the Article is not
facially vague; therefore, an officer may
be punished thereunder for offenses that
he has "no reasonable doubt .. . were
both ‘unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman’ and ‘to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed |
, |
A-23
forces.'" Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974).
In the evolution of the "Void for
Vagueness Doctrine," this rule has
emerged: To satisfy the requirements of
the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, a criminal statute must
clearly spell out the activity being
proscribed so that persons of reasonable
intelligence can understand the expected
conduct and thereafter conform their
conduct to it. Any statute which fails
to accomplish this is void. United
States v. National Dairy Products, 372
U.S. 29, 83 S. Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed. 2d 561
(1963).
Customs of the service can clarify
the general article and help define the
standard expected. In order to qualify
as such, a custom must be uniform, a
known practice of long standing, certain
A-24
and reasonable, and not in conflict with
existing statutes or constitutional
provisions. See Winthrop, Military Law
and Precedents, 42 (2d e.d 1920
reprint). Likewise, non-usuage may
eliminate a previously well-established
custom. M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.), para. 213b.
As we discussed earlier, the standards
and customs of the prior day, not
memorialized by regulation, are no longer
effective as such. In the context of the
offenses charged here, rather than
solving the vagueness becomes even more
pronounced; this is so because the
customs themselves are unwritten and
vague. See generally Nelson, supra.
Looking at the issues from another
viewpoint, Congress never intended to
regulate the wholly private moral conduct
of an individual service member under the
general articles. United States v.
~~
wore
ar ee
Se
A-25
Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, C.M.R. zo
(1952). Therefore, it has been
consistently held that fornication in the
absence of aggravating factors is not an
offense under military law. United
States v. Snyder, supra; United States v.
Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 20 C.M.R. 325
(1956); United States v. Wilson, 32
C.M.R. 517 (a.b.r. 1962). Sharing a bed
with a woman without proof of sexual
intercourse, is also net an offense
absent such aggravating factors. United
States v. Prater, 5 B.R. & J.C. 228
(1950).
It is the nature of the acts
themselves, the place where they occur,
the presence of absence of other people,
the military relationship between the
officer and the enlisted member, and the
likely effects of the incident on the
attitude of the enlisted member and
A-26
others present which are all important in
determining whether sexual acts between
officers and enlisted members are
unlawful. United States v. Jefferson, 14
C.M.R. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982); Murphy, The
Soidier's Right to a Private Life, 24
Mil. L. Rev. 97 (1964).
With this background on
fraternization and conduct unbecoming an
officer, we consider the facts of this
case on its merits. Clearly the acts of
fornication with SrA P. and SSgt. K. had
no attendant exacerbating circumstances.
They were voluntary, private and
non-deviate. If the accused had been an
enlisted man, he clearly would not have
been culpable.
Concededly, officers are held to a
higher standard of conduct than enlisted
personnel, and their conduct should be
exemplary. However, an act should not be
A-27
labelled as criminal if committed by an
officer but innocent when committed by an
enlisted person, especially when a
critical question turns on an
interpretation of the law. United States
v.- Claypool, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 302, 27 C.M.R.
376 (1959).
The only basis for finding the
accused culpable for these offenses is
that his status as an officer, coupled
with the enlisted status of the women,
made the acts wrongful. In order to
sustain that finding, we must conclude
that the acts themselv»s were criminal
because of their surrounding
circumstances. 19/ This we find not
197°". . . To constitute therefore the
conduct here denounced, [unbecoming an
officer and gentleman] the act which
forms the basis of the charge must have a
double significance and effect. Though
it need not amount to a crime, it must
offend so seriously against law, justice,
morality or decorum as to expose to
disgrace socially or as a man, the
A-28
supportable by the evidence. 20/
We specifically find that as a matter
of fact and law the custom in the Air Force
against fraternization has been so eroded
as to make criminal prosecution against an
officer for engaging in mutually voluntary,
private, non-deviate sexual intercourse
with an enlisted member, neither under his
19/ cont.)
offender, and at the same time must be of
such a nature or committed under such
circumstances as to bring dishonor or
disrepute upon the military profession
which he represents." Winthrop, Military
Law and Precedents, 711-712 (2d Ed., 1920
reprint).
20/ The accused was concerned that his
amorous involvements with enlisted women
could be wrong. As a result, he consulted
his supervisor, Col W., who told the
accused that, in his opinion, it would be
actionable fraternization if the accused
dated enlisted women. Col W. admitted that
he was not sure if this were the Air Force
policy, however it was clearly his
opinion. When pressed by the accused, Col
W. gave the accused a copy of the article
written by Colonel Flatten, referred to
herein, and told to read it since it
explained Air Force policy. Our reading of
this article reveals that the author
believes there is no longer a violation of
custom for an officer to "fraternize”" with
A-29
command nor supervision, unavailable. 21/
Accordingly, only so much of the
findings as finds the accused guilty of
207 cont.)
an enlisted member, so long as they have no
command or supervisory relationship.
Further, testimony at trial from a former
wing commander at Minot AFB, indicated that
"“fraternization" was common on the base.
21/ We do not by this opinion indicate our
personal assessment of the moral
implications of the conduct described
above. We certainly do not mean to imply
that the conduct was model, nor that it
should be condoned. As reecognized earlier,
situations of this type may best be handled
by administrative means. Also, we
recognized that a stricter rule on
fraternization may be required and
desirable. This could be done by
appropriate service regulation.
We note that the dissenting judges all
assert, without citation of relevant
precedent, that the activities of the
accused were of the type to be prejudicial
to good order-and discipline. We discern no
bedrock authority for such conviction and we
conclude that it is based on their personal
perceptions of what the standards ought to
be, not on a careful analysis of what the
standard is in the United States Air Force
today.
We are a court of law and are charged
with the responsibility of determining
existing law and applying it to the facts of
a case. It is no part of our duty to
A-30
committing adultery, as alleged in Charge
II, and of conduct unbecoming an officer
for the conduct attendant thereto, as
alleged in Specification 1 of Charge I, is
affirmed. The remaining findings of guilty
are set aside and are dismissed. The
sentence is set aside. A rehearing on the
sentence is ordered. 22/
Notwithstanding a sizeable body of law
to the contrary, the majority has concluded
that the prohibition against improper
fraternization no longer exists as an
offense within the Air Force. My
colleagues accurately point out many areas
in which the Air Force has fostered the
growth of close friendships between officer
and enlisted ranks, and, through its own
regulations, created circumstances that
21/ cont.)
conceal what is so or to engage in wishful
thinking that the policy ought to be
different. In short, we are not a policy
making body-such authority reposes in those
authorized policy making powers (command).
22/ The government's Motion To File Documents
1s, DENIED.
SO a LP
A-31
could be viewed as eroding fraternization
as prohibited conduct.
Likewise Judge Snyder, I cannot
logically reconcile the Air Force's
position that fraternization that
blossoms into marriage is acceptable,
while that which continues at a less
committed level is wrong. However, I can
more readily accept this "pocket of de
facto immunity" resulting from marriage
than I can the erosion of discipline
that, in my view, will result from the
elimination of fraternization as an
offense.
The prohibition against
fraternization by officers with enlisted
members is based on preserving military
discipline, not social inequality.
United States v. Livingston, supra.
There is merit in the bromide that
“familiarity breeds contempt." In the
context of a military community, orders
A-32
are to be obeyed, not discussed in the
light of the personal relationship
between the person giving the order and
the individual expected to obey it. Thus
it is the time, the place, and the
circumstances which dictate the propriety
ef the relationship between officer and
enlisted members. United States v. Free,
supra. The prohibition against
fraternization within a military
organization serves a valid and necessary
purpose in maintaining good order and
discipline. United States v. Pitasi,
supra; United States v. Lovejoy, supra.
Accordingly, in my opinion fraternization |
remains an offense within the Air Force
and is punishable under appropriate
circumstances.
Finally, assuming, arguendo, that
fraternization no longer exists as an
offense within the Air Force, the
accused's conduct with female enlisted
A-33
subordinates clearly amounts to conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
The majority concludes that since the
alleged acts, if committed by an enlisted
member would not invoke criminal
sanctions, the accused officer therefore,
lacks culpability. I cannot accept this
premise. A higher standard of conduct is
required in law of an officer than is
required of others. United States v.
Means, 10 M.J. 162 (C.M.A. 1981); United
States v. Parini, 12 M.J. 679 (A.C.M-R-
1981). The Supreme Court of the United
States has stated on several occasions
that a military officer holds a position
of special trust and responsibility.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct.
2547, 41 L.Ed. 2d 439 (1974); Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97
L.Ed. 842 (1953). Senior Judge Hemingway
concurring in United States v. Newak, 15
M.J. 541, 545 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982), made
A-34
clear the expected standard. He wrote:
Commissioned officers have a
special responsibility to
conduct themselves in a manner
that promotes discipline,
obedience and respect. That
responsibility cannot be checked
at the gate on the way home at
the end of the duty day.
{Emphasis added]
An officer who has sexual relations with
an enlisted subordinate has acted ina
manner that is totally incompatible with
promoting discipline, obedience and
respect. See generally United States v.
King, M.J. (A.C.M.R. 1983). This
erosion of discipline is as true
regarding the officer's sexual partner as
for other military members who invariably
hear of the encounter.
For these reasons, I must with
deference dissent from Parts II and III
et wee an —
Ol
A-32
of the principal opinion.
SNYDER, Judge (concurring in part and
dissenting in part):
I fully concur with the holding that
the accused's sexual relations with the
wife of an enlisted member constitute
conduct palpably prejudicial to good
order and discipline. Such conduct does
not require sophisticated analysis in
order to reveal its adverse impact on
discipline and morale, especially in
light of the fact that military members
are frequently required to be absent from
their home base for lenghty periods. 1/
However, I dissent from the
majority's conclusion that the accused's
sexual liaisons with three enlisted women
did not constitute conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman. I will not
T7 The husband of the accused's partner
was performing temporary duty outside the
United States during the period of their
amorous liaison.
Se ee Re ee ee ee eRe eT eT
A-36
belabor the reader with a point by point
dissection of the majority opinion.
Suffice it to say that it misses the
mark.
Initially, I offer advice to those
officers who may mistakenly read the
majority opinion as carte blanche to
embark upon indiscriminate activities
with enlisted personnel of the opposite.
In my opinion, the majority result means
only that one may not be prosecuted under
the U.C.M.J. for conduct similar to the
accused's. Commanders retain the full
array of administrative sanctions,
including administrative termination of
commissioned status.
The following quote from the
majority opinion indicates the inherent
fallacy of its conclusion:
However, an act should not be
labelled as criminal if
A-37
committed by an officer but innocent
when committed by an enlisted person
- « »- +» (citations omitted)
That statement assumes that an officer is
just like any other military member,
although lip service is offered to the
contrary.
The fact of the matter is officers
are held to a higher standard of conduct;
and, demanding that the standard be met
can, will, and does result in an officer
being held criminally accountable in
situations wher# enlisted members'
derelictions may be disposed of
nonjudicially. This differential is
recognized and sanctioned by the Court of
Military Appeals. I offer the following
excerpts from the Chief Judge's opinion
in United States v. Means, 10 M.J. 162,
165 and 166 (C.M.A. 1981).
A-38
Even if appellant's officer
status had been a principal
factor-indeed, the decisive
factor-in the convening
authority's decision to refer
the case to a general
ocnteusette. appellant would
still have no valid
constitutional grievance.
=
We find nothing arbitrary
about a commander's
determination to take officer
status into account in referring
cases for trial by
court-martial. Such an exercise
of prosecutorial discretion is
quite in line with the
consistent recognition that
commissioned officers in the
Armed Services occupy a special
A-39
position of trust and duty.
ae oo
In short, the Armed Services
comprise a hierarchical society,
which is based on military rank.
Within that society commissioned
officers have for many purposes
been set apart from other
groups. Since officers have
special privileges 2/ and hold
special positions of honor, it
is not unreasonable that they be
held to a high standard of
accountability.
The essence of this principle is
that whatever the environment, an officer
always has the responsibility of
conducting one-self as an officer--be it
27 Many of the special privileges
referenced by the Chief Judge are no
longer a reality. I address this fact
later in the opinion.
A-40
in a consolidated mess, as an infrequent
guest at the noncommissioned officers’
open mess, 3/ or as a member of
anintramural athletic team. The officer
must ensure that undue familiarity does
not develop. The fact that the Air Force
encourages certain social intercourse in
the pursuit of espirit de corps does not
detract from this responsibility.
However, the official encouragement of
such limited intercourse has been
misconstrued as a subtle acceptance of
all types of relationships tween
officers and enlisted personnel. A close
reading of policy releases on the subject
will reveal that not to be the case. The
individual responsibility of officers is
3/ cont.) ©
Note 9 of the majority opinion omits the
following sentence from the referenced
regulatory provision: "However, wearing
the military uniform in such instances
and repeatedly inviting members to one
another's open mess is
discouraged.
always included.
OFFICER-ENLISTED MARRIAGES: It
would be intellectually dishonest for me
to even attempt to hypothesize a legally
acceptable position on this anomaly.
Suffice it so say that because of the
system's implicit acquiescence, those who
have joined in such marriages enjoy a
pocket of de facto immunity. 4/ However,
that is not an adequate explanation for
the failure to take action, especially
where the situation is known prior to the
parties marrying. Obviously, such
marriages have contributed to the
turbulence surrounding he issue.
It is probably safe to say that if
these marriages were not “accepted," or
4/ Although a fair number of these
marriages are the result of one of the
parties thereto obtaining a commission
after marrying, that fact does not
resolve the issue or reduce the dilemma.
A-42
tolerated, the majority opinion could
very well be the dissenting opinion.
They raise a very fair question: Given
their existence, why should one be
prosecuted for dating an enlisted person?
Perhaps the closest analogy is that
takiuxs % prosecute all offenders is no
cause to immunize all. However, it
should not escape the reader that the
desire of others to emulate the conduct
which led to those marriages is one
possible example of the pernicious impact
of officer-enlisted marriages.
The main reason for the post-World
War II uncertainty which surrounds this
topic continues to be the misconception
that the doctrine is grounded on social
or intellectual inferiority.
Inferiority, perceived or otherwise, has
absolutely no bearing on the issue. The
only driving force is DISCIPLINE. Anyone
inh
< Aas terns.
A-43
who believes that a leader can
mechanically assign a "friend" to
unpopular or hazardous duty is
unrealistic. Axiomatically, the troops
will be highly aware of the duties
assigned to an enlisted person(s) with
whom an officer habitually associates or
consorts. That is the prejudice to good
order and discipline which the line
between the ranks is meant to prevent;
and an officer and a gentleman
will endeavor to keep oneself on the
appropriate side of that line.
At any rate, making the presence or
absence of a supervisory relationship the
determining test is also erroneous. Neat
compartmentalizations and unit lines have
a way of evaporating under combat
conditions. An officer's authority and
status transcends “unit lines of
boundary." Otherwise, e. g., where is
A-44
the authority to correct a uniform or
other violation of one not a member of
the correcting officer's unit?
Because of the adverse impact on
discipline, and the compromising position
which ensues, I would hold that the
accused's actions constituted conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,
and affirm all findings of guilty.
Although not necessary for the
discussion of the issue before us, I feel
compelled to make the following
observations. The issue with which we
wrestle in this case is not truly the
problem. Captain Johanns and others like
him are merely manifestations of the
symptoms of a larg2r and pervasive
problem, as is the increasing number of
courts-martial involving the officer
accused. Young officers are assuming
their rank without an understanding of
ex
ee ee
A-45
the significance of receiving a
commission from the President, or an
appreciation of the special trust and
responsibility which accompany the
commission. To far too many, it is a pay
grade rather than a status. But they do
not bear the sole responsibility.
It is time for the Air Force's
command echelon to squarely address the
situation (and in a real sense it is a
dilemma), and accept the fact that one
reason for the dilemma's existence is the
effort to increase the prestige of an
increasingly educated enlisted corps. 5/
2/ This is where the misconception
concerning inferiority really raises its
head. Since probably close to half, if
not more, of the enlisted corps holds
college degrees, the system cannot be
viewed as failing to recognize its
talented people. Unfortunately, a
significant degree of the prestige
bestowed upon the top enlisted grades has
been at the expense of the officer
_anks--primarily the junior grades.
A-46
Allowing the gradual erosion of many, if
not all, of the trappings which once
accompanied commissioned officer status
has contributed to the problem. Why
should one act differently if the system
treats everyone identically? 6/ The
"victims" of this state of affairs are
the company grade and lower field grade
officers
As Chief Judge Everett opined in
United States v. Means, supra, the
existence of special privileges creates
special obligations. But more
importantly, they create a very real
incentive to demonstrate one's worthiness
to have and to hold special privileges.
Perhaps a reemphasis, or resurrection, of
6/ Assigning members in the top three
enlisted grades to Visiting Officers
Quarters (VOQ) and the blurring of the
distinctions between officers' and
enlisted members' uniforms are only two
examples.
A-47
some of those small intangibles will
reduce the number of offices who opt to
"be one of the guys” rather than a
leader.
MILLER, Judge (concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
In so far as the majority recognizes
that no “custom of the service" exists in
the United States Air Force which
criminalizes "fraternization" (social
intercourse) between officers and
enlisted personnel, I concur. See the
evidence I presented for this position in
United States v. Rodriguez, ACM 23545, 29
October 1982 (unpublished).
In so far, however, a the majority
concludes that the absence of such a
criminally enforceable "custom" precludes
prosecution of those associations between
officers and enlisted personnel which any
reasonably prudent officer should
A-48
immediately recognize are harmful to the
maintenance of good order and discipline
within the armed forces, I dissent. In
my opinion, it is positively ludicrous to
imply, as the majority has done in this
case, that an officers corps can maintain
the dignity and respect necessary to
command the unquestioning obedience and
trust of enlisted subordinates, if its
members are permitted to randomly compete
with one half of its insubordinate
population for the privilege of engaging
that subordinate population's other half
in the intimacies of recreational
fornication.
Accordingly, in addition to
affirming the adultery specification, I
would also affirm those specifications
that allege conduct unbecoming an officer
in that the accused's acts of fornication
with enlisted personnel were, by their
A-49
very nature, palpably and directly
prejudicial to continued good order and
discipline in the United States Air
Force.
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
| TERMS "CUSTOM OF THE SERVICE"
AND "FRATERNIZATION"
Much has been written in recent case
law and legal. literature concerning a
“long standing ‘custom of the service'"
ee aR lino ae he
that allegedly prohibits "fraternization"
between military officers and enlisted
| personnel. 1/ The general gist of these
I7 See OPJAGAF 1971/69, 30 July 1971;
| Flatten, Fraternization, 10 Air Force
; Reporter 109 (Aug 1981). See generally,
H Nelson, Conduct Expected of an Officer
and a Gentleman: Ambiguity, 12 JAG L.
Rev. 124 (1970); Murphy, The Soldier's
Right to a Private Life, 24 Mil. L. Rev.
97 (1964); J. Holm, Women in the
Military, An Unfinished Revolution
(1982); M.E. Treadwell, The Women's Army
|
. Corps (1954). See also, U.S. v-
Rodriguez, supra; United States v. _
Pitasi, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31
A-50
writings asserts that early in our
nation's military history, any social
intercourse whatever between officers and
enlisted personnel, subjected both
categories of offenders to immediate
court-martial. it then implies that as
our nation's concepts of democratic
freedom of association expanded and
permeated our military population, lines
demarcating such unacceptable social
intercourse between officers and enlisted
personnel became hopelessly blurred
(i-.e., the Line separating those
associations which constituted the per se
“custom of the service" offense of
“fraternization" from those associations
17 cont.)
(1971); United States v. Lovejoy, 41
C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M.R. 1968); United States
v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953);
United States v. Livingston, 9 C.M.R. 206
(A.B.R. 1952); United States v. Rabb, 81
B.R. 77 (1948; United States v.
aioe
‘
- ee ee ee eee
A-51
associations which were entirely
acceptable, changed so rapidly and
frequently that any semblance of the
“common consent of the governed"
necessary to successfully prosecute such
“custom of the service" offenses was
effectively obliterated).
Specifically, these writings
reasoned that because paragraph 213b, MCM
(Rev.), 1969, states that a:
[c]ustom arises out of long
established practices which by
common consent have attained the
force of law in the military or
other community affected by
them,
then, “custom of the service" offenses,
by definition, must cease their existence
once the long established and accepted
practices upon which they have
purportedly been based, change.
A-52
Applying this logic to the instant
case, the majority, first, correctly
notes that it is no longer uncommon for
Air Force officers and enlisted personnel
to engage in activities that involve
mutual social intercourse. Then, after
pointing out that such activities violate
those long established and accepted
general practices upon which the Air
Force's ban against “fraternization" is
purportedly based, it concludes that the
Air Force's "custom of the service"
offense prohibiting "fraternization" is
no longer viable. It continues that,
since fornication is but a particularized
type of "fraternization" (albeit, a
uniquely intimate one), any prohibitions
specifically precluding officers from
engaging consenting enlisted personnel in
this particular activity has also
fallen. Accordingly, the majority
A-53
concludes that, today, Air Force officers
who fornicate with consenting enlisted
personnel (or at least consenting
enlisted persons who are not directly
subordinate to them) do not commit an
offense that is prosecutable under the
U.C.M.J.
While I can well under the initial
attractiveness of this logic (I
erroneously went down the same "rose
colored path" in Rodriguez, supra), an
in-depth historical analysis of its basic
underlying assumptions shows that it is
entirely spurious.
CUSTOM OF THE SERVICE OFFENSES
Violations of a “custom of the
service," per se, have never been
prosecutable in the Army or the Air Force
and they can no longer be prosecuted, as
such, in any other branch of the armed
A-54
forces of the United States. 2/
2/ The term "custom of the service,"
as descriptive of a type of per se
military offense, was used in none of
the Articles of War or Army/Air Force
Manuals for Court-Martial that
pre-dated the U.C.M.J. and its
implementing Manual for
Courts-Martial. Neither was it ever
used in such a sense by Colonel
Winthrop in any of his sundry
treatises interpreting the various
versions of this nation's Articles of
War. Nor was it ever used by any of
those editors of Army Digest of
Opinions who succeeded Winthrop.
Rather, any use of the term "custom
of the service” in all pre-U.C.M.J.
military justice law, manuals, and
treatises, was always restricted to
either matters of court-martial
procedure (including commonly held
military definitions of certain word
descriptive of the legislatively
pronounced elements of some offenses)
or determinations of allowable
punishments. See, e.g., Winthrop,
Military Laws and Precedent, second
edition (1920), at 41-42. Absent
reduction of a custom or courtesy of
the service to a law or regulation,
or the independently prosecutable
‘nature of a violator's conduct under -
the general articles of the Code, or
its predecessing Articles of War, its
violation was simply non-prosecutable
at courts-martial. See, e.g.,
Winthrop, supra, at 617. Of over 284
opinions involving allegations of
offenses involving untoward
relationships between officers and
A-55
While the term “customs and
2/ cont.)
enlisted personnel reported in the 81
volume JAGD Board of Review Opinions,
spanning 1929-1948, the 34 volume
JAJD Board of Review Opinions
(European Theater of Operations),
spanning 1943-1946, and the 12 volume
JAGD Board of Review and Judicial
Council Opinions, spanning 1949-1951,
only five of the least artful even
referenced the term “custom of the
service." In the only pre-Codal case
that actually charged an accused with
an Article of War 95/96 offense
(prejudicial to discipline, conduct
unbecoming) alleging that an
accused's conduct was not in
accordance with the “customs of the
service," the charge was disapproved.
See United States v.- Jones, supra.
In three of the others, each of which
was upheld a lesser included Article °
of War 96 (currently, U.C.M.J., Art.
134( violation of an Article of War
95 (currently, U.C.M.J., Art. 133)
conviction, the term was used only as
a shorthand reference to the fact
that the particular misconduct
alleged had always been deemed
prejudicial to good order and
discipline in past Board of Review
Opinions. See United States v.
Bunker, supra; United States v.
Patterson, supra; United States v.
Rabb, supra. In the fifth case, the
term was simply a part of the
following catch-all sencence: "The
A-56
courtesies of the service" has long
2/ cont.)
acceptance by an officer of
gratuities from enlisted personnel is
subversive of good order and
discipline, is contrary to the
customs of the service, and to the
spirit of...(a specific paragraph of
an Army regulation)." See United
States v. Price, 42 B.R. 243 (1944).
When the U.C.M.J. (which, in
1950, for the first time, brought all
members of United States military
services under a single code of
justice) was enacted, it continued
the legislative tradition of the
Articles of War by, again, refusing
to recognize mere breaches of
military custom or courtesy as a
basis for trial by courts-martial.
In an effort to placate Navy fears
that the new U.C.M.J.‘'s Article 134
might not encompass all those "custom
of the service offenses" that had
previously been punishable by the
Navy's Articles for the Government of
the Navy (see Decker, History,
Preparation and Processing, Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951, at pp. 293-294 and footnote 5,
herein, infra), the drafter of the
1951 Manual for Courts-—Martial
specifically mentioned that "a breach
of a custom of the service may result
in a violation of [the disorder and
neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed
forces] clause of [U.C.M.J.] Article
Natal ones
A-57
been used by all United States
2/ cont.)
134 (see M.C.M., paragraph 213b).
But, both the language and placement
of the quoted phrase, clearly belie
any intention of to create a new
category of per se offenses for
simple breaches of military custom or
courtesy; rather, the language simply
acknowledges the obvious; to wit:
that breaches of military custom and
courtesy that also amount to conduct
prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces may be
charged as a conduct prejudicial to
good order and discipline under
U.C.M.J., Article 134. Of 34
opinions involving allegations of
untoward relationships between
officers and enlisted personnel
reported in the 50 volume
Court-Martial Reports and volumes
1-15 of the Military Justice
Reporter, only four reference the
term “custom of the service." In the
first of these, the term's use is
limited to a simple statement that
long standing "customs of the
service" prohibit officers from
engaging in social intercourse with
enlisted personnel to the extent that
the familiarity induced by such
social intercourse affects or
prejudices good order of military
discipline. See United States v.
Livingston, supra. The second, after
essentially repeating the language of
the first, adds that the
A-58
military services to describe
2/ cont.)
determination of which specific
social intercourse between officers
and enlisted personnel is prejudicial
to good order or military discipline
must be based upon the circumstances
surrounding specific instances of
such social intercourse. See United
States v. Free, supra. The third,
rejects an argument that offenses
based upon alleged violations of
“customs of the service" are
inherently uncertain, indefinite, and
unclear, noting that like any other
Article 134 offense, the conduct
violative of the alleged custom must
be shown by its surrounding
circumstances to be prejudicial to
good order and discipline. See
United States v. Lovejoy, supra. And
the fourth, representing the Court of
Military Appeals' only comment
regarding the term, conforms the
progressive logic of the first three
to that Court's previous holdings
regarding the continued validity of
all Article 134 charges, extending
the progressive logic of Livingston,
Free, and Lovejoy so as to recognize
that certain acts engaged in by an
officer with an enlisted person, may
“by their very nature, [be] palpably
and directly prejudicial to the good
order and discipline of the service,"
and thus violative of Article 134.
See United States v. Pitasi, supra.
It is plainly evident,
therefore, that the additional
> anal ere nia
ana eet hay
A-59
unwritten traditions of military
service, 3/ only the now defunct
Naval Courts and Boards, 1937, ever
2/ cont.)
language of Paragraph 213b, M.C.M.
(1951) which specifically noted that
the Code's Article 134 prohibition
includes any breaches of long
standing "customs of the service"
that coincidentally meet that
Article's criteria, in no way changed
the pre-Codal «iew of “customs of the
service." Concuct breaching customs
or courtesies of the service may
still not be prosecuted in their own
right. They continue to be
prosecutable only if, coincidentally,
the conduct they proscribe, also
happens to constitute conduct which
is prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces or
conduct unbecoming an officer, and,
of course, then, they are
prosecutable only because they
independently violate either U.C.M.J.
Article 133, not because they also
happen to breach a “custom of the
service."
3/ Surveys of current "customs of
the service," contained in recent
issues of The Air Officer's Guide (an
unofficial, but continually updated
source book, that Air Force officers
are often urged to obtain and read)
identify numerous current “customs of
the service." A brief sampling,
reveals the following diversity:
A-60
endeavored to make the simple
3/ cont.)
officers will not walk under
umbrellas; an officer's word or
statement will ordinarily be accepted
without question; officers and airmen
will not generally associate together
in mutual social activities; when a
junior walks with his senior he takes
a position abreast and to the
senior's left; the word "Sir" must be
used when junior officers address
senior ones, and by all airmen who
address officers; officers should
remain at a reception or social
gathering until their commander has
departed; when a child is born to an
officer's family, the base commander
is to send a personal letter of
congratulations to the parents on
behalf of his command; officers will
support activities of their units, as
well as, activities of the entire
base; officers will periodically
attend religious services at their
base chapels; an officer's uniform
and “his official or social position
must not be defamed; an officer never
volunteers excuses; all official
communications to superiors must be
routed through command echelons;
officers do not use vulgar or profane
language; excessive indebtedness must
be avoided; and airmen and officers
stand erect unless seated, they must
not lean.
While it is true that the
origins of most of these customs are
unknown, today, the prohibition
against vulgar or profane language
A-61
violation of some of these customs,
in and of themselves, triable by
courts-martial. 4/
3/ cont.)
can be traced back as far as the
Ordinance of Richard I, dated 1190
(see Winthrop, supra, at 903) and
required attendance at religious
services, mandatory use of command
echelons in communications, and bans
against close officer/soldier
associations are traceable back
through the Code of Articles of King
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, dated
1621 (see Winthrop, supra, at
907-918. Indeed, James Thomas
Flexner, in his definitive biography
of George Washington, characterized
the Continental forces’ failure to
observe the "custom of the service"
prohibiting social familiarity
between its officers and enlisted
people as the greatest problem the
general encountered when he assumed
command of those forces.
Pn eee <
Oe
4/ Article 22, Articles for the
Government of the Navy (1934 edition)
provided:
(a) Offenses not
specified.--
All offenses committed by
persons belonging to the Navy
which are not specified in
the foregoing articles shall
be punished as a court
1 (47 contined)
martial may direct.
(b) Fraudulent enlistment.--
Fraudulent enlistment, and
the receipt of any pay or
allowance thereunder, is
hereby declared an offense
against naval discipline and
made punishable by general
court martial, under this
article.
In explaining the meaning of
Article 22(a), Article 22(a),
Articles for the Government of the
Navy (1934 edition), section 5 of
Naval Courts and Boards, 1937 (the
Navy's former court-martial manual),
stated:
The sources of unwritten
naval law are:
(a) Decisions of the courts.
* * * * +
(b) Decisions of the
President and the Secretary
of the Navy and the opinions
of the Attorney General and
the Judge Advocate General of
the Navy.
* * * * *
(c) Court-mertial orders.
* * * * *
A-63
(4/7 cont.)
(d) Customs and usages of
the service.
Circumstances from time to
time arise for the government
of which there are no written
rules to be found. In such
cases customs of the service
govern. Customs of the
service may be likened, in
their origin and development,
to the portions of the common
law of England similarly
established. But the custom
is not to be confused with
usage; the former has the
force of law, the latter is
merely a fact. There may be
usage without custom, but
there can be no custom unless
accompanied by usage. Usage
consists merely of the
repetition of acts, while
custom is created out of
their repetition.
Custom.--The following are
the principal conditions to
be fulfilled in order to
constitute a valid custom:
(1) It must be long
continued.
(2) It must be certain and
uniform.
(3) It must be compulsory.
(4) It must be consistent.
(5) It must be general.
(6) It must be known.
(4/ cont. )
(7) It must not be in
opposition to the terms
and provisions of a
statute or lawful
regulation or order.
As usage constantly observed
for a long period results,in
the establishment of a
custom, so long-continued
nonusage will operate to
destroy a particular custom,
that is, to deprive it of its
obligatory character.
The field of operation of the
unwritten naval law is
extensive. It is applied in
defining certain offenses
against naval law and in
determining whether certain
acts or omissions are
punishable as such, as in
cases coming under article 22
of the articles for the
government of the Navy. At
times, also, custom is
appealed to as a rule of
interpretation of terms
technical to the naval
service.
Usage--Mere practices or
usages of service, although
long-continued, are not
customs and have none of the
Oobligatery force which
attaches to customary law.
The fact that such usages
AOA Rl BDI
eee
A-65
(4/ cont. )
exist, therefore, can never
be pleaded in justification
of conduct otherwise criminal
or reprehensible, nor be
relied upon as a complete
defense in a trial by
court-marital. With the
permission of the court,
however, they may be
introduced in evidence, with
a view to diminishing to some
extent the degree of
criminality involved in the
offense charged.
While section 98 and 99 of Naval
Courts and Boards (1937) incorporated the
current U.C.M.J.'s general articles
pertaining to conduct prejudicial to good
order and discipline and conduct
unbecoming an officer into Article 22 of
the Articles for the Government of the
Navy, it also incorporated: (1) a number
of offenses not elsewhere prohibited by
the Articles for the Government of the
Navy which are currently prohibited by
specific Articles of the U.C.M.J. (and
which, prior to the U.C.M.J., were
prohibited in the Army and Air Force by
specific Articles of the Articles of War)
and (2) a numr>> of, apparently, per se
custom of the s rvice offenses which,
although very similar to instances of
misconduct currently proscribed by
U.C.M.J., articles 133 and 134, required
absolutely no proof that the conduct was
either prejudicial to good order and
discipline or that it constituted
behavior unbecoming an officer and a
(4/7 cont.)
gentlemen.
In the former category were: (1)
affray or disorder, riot, and unlawful
assembly, see Navy Courts and Boards,
section 92, and U.C.M.J., Article 116;
(2) blackmail and extortion, see Navy
Courts and Boards, section 93, and
U.C.M.J., Article 127,; (3) breaking
arrest, see Navy Courts and Boards,
section 94, and U.C.M.J. Article 95; (4)
burglary or housebreaking, see Navy
Courts and Boards, section 96, and
U.C.M.J. Articles 129 and 130; (5)
embezzlement of money or property not
intended for military service, see Navy
Courts and Boards, section 100, and
U.C.M.J., Article 121; (6) false
imprisonment, see Navy Courts and Boards,
section 101, and U.C.M.J., Article 97;
(7) forgery other than for the purpose of |
obtaining payment of a claim against the
United State, see Navy Courts and Boards,
section 102, and U.C.M.J., Article 123;
(8) fraudulent enlistment, see Navy
Courts and Boards, section 103, and
U.C.M.J., Article 83; (9) malingering,
see Navy Courts and Boards, section 104,
and U.C.M.J., Article 115; (10) neglect
of duty, see Navy Courts and Boards,
section 105, and U.C.M.J., Article 92(3);
(11) resisting arrest, see Navy Courts
and Boards, section 106, and U.C.M.J.,
Article 95; (12) sodomy, see Navy Courts
and Boards, section 108, and U.C.M.J.,
Article 125; (13) uttering forged or
counterfeit document other than for the |
purpose of obtaining payment of a claim
against the United States, see Naval
(47 cont.)
Courts and Boards, section 110, and
U.C.M.J., Article 123; (14) willful
destruction of non-public property, see
Naval Courts and Boards, section 111, and
U.C.M.J., Article 109; (15) conspiracy
other than to defraud the United States
by means of a false claim, see Naval
Courts and Boards, section 112, and
U.C.M.J., Article 81; (16) perjury and
subornation thereof before a judicial
proceeding or in a course of justice, see
Naval Courts and Boards, section 115, and
U.C.M.J., Article 131; 917) aiding escape
of a person under arrest, see Naval
Courts and boards, section 116, and
U.C.M.J., articles 77, 78, and 96; (18)
manslaughter, see Naval Courts and
boards, section 119, and U.C.M.J.,
Article 119; (19) assaulting or striking
a person not in the navy, see Naval
Courts and Boards, section 120, and
U.C.M.J., Article 128; 920) rape and
carnal knowledge, see Naval Courts and
Boards, section 121, and JU.C.M.J.,
Article 120; (21) maiming, see Naval
Courts and Boards, section 122, and
U.C.M.J., Article 124; (22) robbery, see
Naval Courts and Boards, section 123, and
U.C.M.J., Article 122; and, (23) arson,
see Naval Courts and Boards, section 124,
and U.C.M.J., Article 126.
In the latter category were the
Navy's per se custom of the service
offenses of: (1) scandalous conduct, se
Naval Courts and Boards, section 59
(although no specific model specification
in the M.C.M. covers such a misconduct,
see generally the elements of U.C.M.J.,
\
(4/ cont.)
Article 133 and the discrediting
provision of U.C.M.J., Article 134); 92)
breaking quarantine, see Naval Courts and
Boards, section 95, and see M.C.M.,
specification form 173, at A6-25; (3)
carelessly or negligently endangering
lives of others, see Naval Courts and
Boards, section 97 (although no model
specification in the M.C.M. specifically
covers such misconduct, see generally,
M.C.M., specification forms 150 and I51,
at A6-22); (4) seduction, see Naval
Courts and Boards, section 107 (although
no model specification in the M.C.M.
specifically covers such misconduct, see
generally, the elements of U.C.M.J.,
Article 133 and the discrediting
provision of U.C.M.J., Article 134); (5)
unauthorized use of vehicles, see Naval
Courts and Boards, section 109 (although
no model specification in the M.C.M.
specifically covers such nisconduct, see
generally, U.C.M.J., Article 121(a)(2),
M.C.M., specification form 148, at A6-22,
and the prejudice to good order and
discipline provision of U.C.M.J., Article
134); (6) forging military or naval
certificate of discharge or pass, see
Naval Courts and Boards, section 113, and
see M.C.M., specification form 147, at
A6-22; (7) bribery, see Naval Courts and
Boards, section 114, and see M.C.M.,
specification forms 131 and 132, at A6-20
and A6-21; (8) perjury and subornation
thereof other than before a judicial
proceeding or in a course of justice, see
Naval Courts and Boards, section 115, and
see M.C.M., specification forms 169 and
170, at A6-25; (9) offenses against the
LAE I C bit. t tak Ser erie Mn ENT ENN Bilin
BP LEA tia ah nic hard
nek
iti:
A-69
It is particularly ironic,
therefore, that the three appellate cases
most often quoted by writers, today, who
argue that prosecutions for
"fraternization" are based upon its
(4/ cont.)
postal service, see Naval Courts and
Boards, section 117, and see M.C.M.,
specification forms 160, 161, and 162, at
A6-23 and A6-24; (10) offenses against
foreign and interstate commerce, see
Naval Courts and Boards, section 118, and
see M.C.M., specification form 179, at
A6-26; (11) receiving stolen goods, see
naval Courts and Boards, section 125, and
see M.C.M., specification form 179, at
A6-26; (12) circulating obscene
literature, see Naval Courts and Boards,
section 126 (no similar provision is
mentioned in either the U.C.M.J. or
M.C.M.); (13) polygamy, unlawful
cohabitation, adultery and fornication,
see Naval Courts and Boards, section i27,
and see M.C.M., specification forms 130,
188, 127, and 159, at A6-20, A6-23, and
A6-26; (14) narcotics offenses, see Naval
Courts and Boards, section 128, and see
M.C.M., specification forms 144, 145, and
146, at A6-22; and, (15) wrongful
movement of liquor, see Naval Courts and
Boards, sec 129 (not specifically
addressed by an M.C.M. specification
form).
A-70 i
status as a per se “custom of the '
service" offense (to wit: United States
v. Free, 14, C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953),
United States v. Lovejoy, 41 C.M.R. 777
(N.B.R. 1953), and United States v.
Pitasi, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31
(1971), are, in fact, the very ones which
sounded the judicial death knell for the
Only per se "custom of the service"
offense practice ever recognized in the
armed forces, that of the Navy prior to
the U.C.M.J.'s enactment. 5/
5/ In 1944, the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy, interpreting the limitations
imposed upon Articles for the government
of the Navy, Article 22, by Naval Courts
and Boards (1937), section 5, set aside
an Article 22 charge and specification
that alleged a naval officer had
fraternized with an enlisted man by
taking him to dinner, to the theater, and /
to his hotel room, where he had spent the ;
night with the enlisted man while
occupying the same bed. This action was
taken because none of the specific facts |
pleaded in the charge and its )
specification were sufficient, in and cf
themselves, to allege any violation of\
A-71
(5/7 cont. )
either written law, as identified by
Naval Courts and Boards (1937), section
3, or those unwritten naval laws that
could properly be identified by reference
to Naval Courts and Boards (1937),
Section 5. See United States v. Yocum,
CMO 3, 1944, at 412. Since he had
earlier recognized that the navy's long
recognized “custom of the service"
banning fraternization (any social
intercourse between its officers and
enlisted personnel) was far too general
to be enforceable as an Article 22
violation, see CMO as 134k, 2 27), and
because no more specific prohibitions
against certain types of fraternization
had either been authorized by Navy
decisions and opinions or were readily
discernible as independent "customs of
the service," the Navy Judge Advocate
General could, in 1944, have rendered no
other decision consistent with his then
existing legislative and administrative
mandates.
Following enactment of the Code,
however, a specification alleging similar
conduct by another naval officer arrived
in the Navy Judge Advocate General's
office. Unlike the former specification,
however, this one, having been charged
under U.C.M.J., Article 134, carried with
it the additional factual allegation that
the other facts stated therein were “all
to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces of the
United States." Since, U.C.M.J., Article
134, itself, purported to subject to
court-martial "all disorders and neglects
A-72
(3/ cont.)
to “he prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces" committed
by person subject to the Code, the Judge
Advocate General decided to refer it to
his newly formed Navy Board of Review for
resolution.
The Navy Board, considering the
matter in United States v. Free, supra,
identified the problem before them as
being one of drawing "a line as to vhere
acts of fraternization or association
with enlisted men by officers cease to be
innocent acts of comradeship and normal
social intercourse between members of a
democratic military force and become a
violation of Article 134 of the Code,
prejudicial to good order and discipline
in the armed forces of the United
State." After noting that efforts "to
lay down a measuring rod of
particularities to determine in advance
what acts are prejudicial to good order
and discipline and what are not," it
concluded:
that each case must be
determined on its own
merits. Where it is shown
that the acts and
circumstances are such as to
lead a reasonably prudent
person, experienced in the
problems of military
leadership, to conclude that
the good order and discipline
of the armed forces has been
prejudiced by the
compromising of an enlisted
ee ee ee
alli ate ONE pS
A-73
(5/ cont. )
person's respect for the
integrity and gentlemanly
obligations of an officer,
there has been an offense
under Article 134.
United States v. Free, supra, at 470.
Of additional interest, is the fact
that the specification in Free included a
"throwback" factual allegation conforming
the specification to the outmoded
requirements of Naval Courts and Boards
(1937), section 5, standards for
unwritten naval law (to wit: that the
accused's conduct was "in violation of
the custom of the Naval service of the
United States that officers shall not
fraternize or associate with enlisted men
on terms of military equality"). After
noting that its Judge Advocate General
had earlier determined no “custom of the
service" exists in the Navy that, per se,
precludes the specific types of conduct —
alleged by the specification, the Navy
Court merely noted that "[tJhe rule under
the U.C.M.J. governing the adequacy of
the pleading is that a pleading is
sufficient if it informs the accused of
what he must be prepared to meet and it,
as supplemented by the evidence, is
sufficiently definite to eliminate the
danger of again being placed in jeopardy
for the same offense." Its superfluous
inclusion in the specification obviously
had no bearing upon the decision rendered
in the case.
Seventeen years later, in the first
(5/7 cont.)
of two specification that included the
term "fraternize" which the United States
Court of Military Appeals has considered
in its 33 year history, (the navy
specification alleging only that the
accused naval officer "Willfully and
knowingly fraterniz[ed] with one of the
Seaman [N] on terms of military equality
to the prejudice of good order and
discipline") the Court in United States
v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R.
210 ec) avoided addressing a
"vagueness" challenge by finding that the
accused's Article 134 "fraternization"
conviction had merged with a simultaneous
sodomy conviction.
Then, in 1971, the Court of Military
Appeals, in United States v. Pitasi, 20
U.S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 33 (1971),
squarely addressed the sufficiency of a
navy specification alleging that a naval
officer had "fraternized" and
"associated" with an enlisted person:
+ « »« in violation of the
custom of the Naval Service
of the United States that
officers shall not fraternize
and associate with enlisted
men on terms of military
equality.
Confronted by a defense contention that
“fraternization: is not a cognizable
court-martial offense, the Navy rebutted
by arguing that "'fraternization' by an
officer with an enlisted man has, ‘by 7
custom, always been held to be |
iadaail
A-75
(57 cont. )
prejudicial to good order and discipline
in the armed forces." (In view of the
Navy's earlier decision in United States
v. Yocum, supra, that acts of
fraternization or association by Naval
officers with enlisted personnel, in and
of themselves, do not violate Naval
custom, and its later holding in United
States v. Free, supra, that when such
acts of fraternization or association
prejudice good order or discipline they
are cognizable by court-martial as a
violation of U.C.M.J., Article 134, this
rebuttal argument was presumably meant to
emphasize the phrase “prejudicial to good
order and discipline," and to imply that
had the fraternization in Yocum, been
alleged as “prejudicial to good order and
discipline," as it was in Free, a similar
decision would have been reached. )
After briefly consulting Winthrop,
supra, and referencing paragraph 213b of
the M.C.M., the Court of Military Appeals
approvingly quoted those portions of
United States v. Free in which the Navy
court had discussed the prejudicial
effect of intimate types of personal
relationships between officers and
enlisted personnel on military
discipline. Included in these quotes was
the standard suggested by the Navy court
for determining what acts of
fraternization are, and what acts of
fraternization are not, prejudicial to
good order and military discipline within
the meaning of U.C.M.J., Article 134.
(For the text of this quotation, see my
discussion of Free within this footnote,
(57 cort.)
supra. )
Having completed its cursory review
of the law in the area, the Court of
Military Appeals, first, cautioned
services against attempting to prosecute
any custom, not palpably and directly
prejudicial to good order and military
discipline, under U.C.M.J., Article 134,
by stating:
These factors, however, do
not, in our opinion, relieve
military authorities from the
obligation of providing some
guidelines by which an
officer, or those who are
called upon to sit in
judgment as members of a
court-marital, may test what
conduct is or is not
violative of the "custom," in
light of the fact that our
armed forces are currently
constituted of a large number
of citizen soldiers.
And, second, it recommended that, since
regulatory proscription of conduct
prohibited by a “custom of the service"
(even though it be prejudicial to good
order and military discipline, and
accordingly, otherwise prosecutable under
U.C.M.J., Article 134), has the advantage
over Article 134, of precise definition,
publication, and definite punishment
parameters, responsible military
authorities should consider reducing all
of their existing “custom of the service"
as Wl awd
A-77
Regardless, then, of how often, and
(5/ cont.)
prohibitions into regulatory form.
Having stated these two ancillary
propositions, however, the Court's
response to the defense's contention that
allegations of fraternization are so
vague as not to be cognizable by
court-martial, was exceptionally acerbic:
We in no way intend to depart
from our holding in United
States v. Sadinsky, wherein
we reiterated our prior
decision that Article 134 is
not void for vagueness, that
some acts are by their very
nature palpably and directly
prejudicial to the good order
and discipline of the
service. [Citations
omitted. ]
Unless it is specifically proscribed by
another article of the Code, conduct
alleged in an Article 134 specification
which, by its very nature directly is
palpably and directly prejudicial to the
good order and discipline of the service,
constitutes a violation of Article 134,
which is cognizable by court-martial.
Whether or not this same conduct, also,
happens to violate a “custom of the
service," be it prohibition against
“fraternization" or any other activity,
is completely irrelevant.
A-78
by whom, ‘it has been implied that
prosecutions for "fraternization"
offenses are dependent upon the continued
existence of “long standing customs of
the service” (or, more specifically, the
common recognition of the current
vitality of such customs by a vast
majority of service personnel), this
simply is not the case. Today, unless
specific conduct (or a specific type of
conduct) (1) violates one of the
U.C.M.J.'s specific Articles or (2) it
either is palpably and directly
“prejudicial to good order and
discipline," “service discrediting," or a
“crime or offense not capital" under
Article 135 or amounts to “conduct
unbecoming an officer" under Article 133,
it may not be prosecuted at
courts-martial.
When determining whether a custom of
A-79
the service breach may be prosecuted
under the U.C.M.J., the only relevant
question to be asked is the one which is
entirely dispositive; to wit: Whether
the specific or general type of conduct
alleged violates any punitive article of
the U.C.M.J., including either of its two
general articles. Whether the custom of
the service allegedly breached is, or
remains, viable, is totally irrelevant.
While cynics may argue that the
question of exactly what conduct
constitutes an offense under either of
these two general articles is based to
some extent on "customs of the service,"
I would counter that a critical
examination of post-Codal case law
reveals, instead, that this precise
question has always been uniformly
decided either by a disciplined analysis
of whether, in fact, one of the specific
A-80
“general elements"6/ of the particular
general article is or is not satisfied,
or by citations to past cases7/ in which
a particular offense's existence has
already established by such an analysis.
FRATERNIZATION
Before discussing whether the
conduct alleged in this case meets one or
more of the "general elements" of either
of the U.C.M.J.'s general articles,
however, it is necessary, first, to
6/ For an excellent example of such a
disciplined analysis, establishing that a
specific example of "fraternization" type
conduct, in fact, satisfies the
“prejudicial to good order and
discipline" general element of Article of
War 96 (now, U.C.M.J, Article 134), see
United States v. Lillis, 39 B. R. 395
(1944).
7/ For excellent examples of such a
confirmation of the existence of a
general article's offense, despite
passing references to "customs of the
service," see United States v. Bunker and
United States v. Livingston, both supra.
A-81
comment upon the very generalized
approach that all of my fellow judges
have used in their discussions of the
specific conduct alleged by the instant
specifications. Rather than addressing
the specific conduct which the
specifications alleged (an officers’
indiscriminate "recreational" fornication
with enlisted personnel in violation of
Article 133 of the U.C.M.J.), they have,
instead, chosen to address the question
of whether or not a c:arge of
"“fraternization" can properly be affirmed
as a violation of this Article. In my
opinion, it is this patently incorrect
statement of the question before the,
more than any other single factor, that
resulted in their fuzzy and occasionally
incorrect handling of those principles
necessary to a clear and proper
resolution of this case.
A-82
An in-depth historical analysis of
the most recent 238 military appellate
case decisions dealing with allegations
generically capable of categorization as
"fraternization type offenses" (or
untoward officer/enlisted conduct)
irrefutably demonstrates my point.
The first recorded use of the term
“fraternization" occurred in United
States v. Bunxer, 27 B.R. 385 (1943).
There, an Army Board of Review,
apparently confronting contentions that
an allegation of conduct which violated
the, then recognized, Army “custom of the
service" that prohibited any
"“fraternization" between officers and
enlisted personnel could be prosecuted
solely on the basis that the alleged
conduct violated a “custom of the
service," cleverly modified the
traditional statement of that customary
A-83
ban against fraternization by stating:
[I]t has long been recognized
as a custom of the service
that an officer should not
fraternize with enlisted men
to the extent that it will
affect or prejudice good
order and discipline."
[Emphasis on modifying
language provided. ]
United States v. Bunker, supra, at
389.
This modifying language was, of
course, exceptionally significant. It
limited prosecutions for breaches of this
particular custom of the service to those
few breaches in which the breaching
conduct, itself, independently, satisfied
the separate criteria for prosecution
required by U.C.M.J., Article 134.
(Compare the effect of the mollifying
A-84
language of M.C.M., paragraph 213b , some
eight years later. See note 2, herein,
supra. )
Other usage of the term "fraternize"
or "“fraternization" has occurred in only
ten of the remaining 237 case decisions
that have dealt with "fraternization type
offenses."8/ In five of these, the term
8 / I do not here consider eight cases
that used these terms only in reference
to references to regulatory prohibitions
against social intercourse between
soldiers and foreign nationals in the
European Theater, rather than in
reference to any proscription against
similar relationships between officers
and enlisted persons serving together in
our Armed Forces. See United States v.
Mistretta, 16 B.R. (ETO) 191 (1945);
United States v. Van Houten, 18 B.R.
(ETO) 65 (1945); United States v.
Blankenship, 22 B.R.(ETO) 279 (1945);
United States v. Wofford, 24 B.R. (ETO)
346 (1945); United States v. Malott, 27
B-R.(sTO) 259 (1945); United States v.
Wilson, 30 B.R.(ETO) 75 (1945); United
States v. Newman, 32 B.R.(ETO) 57 (1945);
and United States v. Wallace, 34
B.R.(ETO) 131 (1946).
i hilt ih hh et
A-85
was used to describe several instances of
varied officer/enlisted misconduct
alleged separately or in combination with
One another in one or more
specifications.9/ In two of them, it was
used solely to describe allegations that
an officer had made male/female sexual
overtures to an enlisted person.10/ And,
in the final there, it was used, once
each, in reference to an officer/enlisted
homosexual liaison,11/ an officer's
behavior in the presence of enlisted men
amounting to drunk and disorderly
9/ See United States v. Patterson, 41
B.R. 365 (1944); United States v. Leonard
16 B.R.(ETO) 272 (1945); United States v.
Penick, 19 B.R.(ETO) 257 (1945); United
States v. Livingston, 8 C.M.R. 206.
(A.B.R. 1952); and United States v. Free,
14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.M.R. 1953).
10/ See United States v. Morgan, 41 B.R.
73 (1944) and United States v. Brauchler,
15 M.J. 755 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).
1l/ See, United States v. Lovejoy, 41
C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M.R. 1968).
A-86
conduct;12/ and, a bar, unsupported,
allegation that an officer "wrongfully
fraternize[d] with enlisted men (the
board dismissed this allegation based
upon lack of evidence) .13/
Of the entire 238 recorded cases,
only five referenced any specifications
that included the term "fraternization, "
and only two of these (one of which,
also, included factual allegations as to
the manner in which the alleged
"fraternization: had occurred) were
ultimately affirmed.14/
12/ See United States v. Fiedler, 33
B.R. 189 (1944)
13/ See United States v. Jones, 40 B.R.
149 (1944).
14/ In the sole pre-Codal citation of a
specification incorporating a usage of
the term “fraternization, an Army board
of review in United States v. Jones,
supra, dismissed an Articles of War,
Article 96, specification alleging simply
(14/7 cont. )
that the accused “did... wrongfully
fraternize with enlisted men, thereby
seriously compromising his position as an
officer" because "no substantial evidence
whatsoever of [the accused officer's]
wrongful fraternization with enlisted
men" was presented at trial.
In United States v. Free, 14
C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953), a Navy board of
review, affirmed a conviction pursuant to
a U.C.M.J., Article 135, specification,
which alleged that the accused
"did . . . willfully and
knowingly, in the room
assigned to [him],. . .
fraternize and associate with
[a private first class]...
on terms of military equality
by having said [private first
class] in said room as his...
guest and offering said
[private first class]...
alcoholic beverages to drink
while his guest in said room
and by inviting said [private
first class] ... to sleep
in said room as his guest,...
all to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the
armed forces of the United
States."
In doing so, the board specifically
found, both, that the accused officer had
been “fairly apprised" of the offenses to
which the specification pertained and
that the officer's behavior had in fact,
A-88
What is most significant about
these 238 cases is the fact that, in 227
of them, neither the generic term
(14/ cont.)
prejudiced good order and military
discipline in the naval service.
In the third of these five cases, an
Article 134 specification alleging that
an accused “did . . . willfully and
knowingly fraternize and associate with
[a seaman] . . . on terms of military
equality" by having the seaman as his
"guest" in his apartment and sharing with
him the cost of food "to the prejudice of
good order and discipline" was considered
first by the navy court of military
review in United States v. Lovejoy, 41
C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M.R. 1969), and then by
the Court of Military Appeals in United
States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42
C.M.R. 210 (1970). The Navy Court,
below, affirmed the specification,
dismissing a constitutional "vagueness
and indefinite" argument as to the
specification's sufficiency, by simply
stating, without citations, that "After a
careful analysis and review of all the
circumstances of this case, we arrive at
Can] opposite conclusion." The Court of
Military Appeals, when faced with an
identical argument, above, refused to
address the question it presented,
opting, instead, to dismiss the
specification on other grounds.
A-89
“fraternization" nor any of its
derivatives was even mentioned! Rather,
in these cases, the courts and boards
recognized that questions pertaining to
whether alleged officer/enlisted
misconduct does, or does not, breach a
"custom of the service" prohibiting
“fraternization" are irrelevant to the
legal sufficiency of Article 133 or 134
specifications that allege such
misconduct. Accordingly, the limited
their consideration of that issue to
those few questions that are relevant to
wit: whether the misconduct alleged
within the particular Article 133 or 134
specification confronting them, was, or
was not, of a nature to "prejudice good
order and military discipline, "
“discredit the military service," or
amount to “conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman."
A-90
And, turning from court, to code or
manual usage of the term, we find that,
unlike the phrase “custom of the
service," the term "fraternize" or
"“fraternization" has never been used in :
any United States military law or manual
for courts-martial. |
My fellow judges, the, erred when |
they chose to define the issue before
this Court in terms of a generalized
generic notion of fraternization rather
than in terms of that factually detailed
misconduct which is alleged within the
instant U.C.M.J, Article 133
specifications. While those portions of
their opinions that relate to the demise
of the Air Force's now defunct "custom of
the service" banning "fraternization" and
the question of whether violations of
such a defunct custom may nevertheless
still be prosecuted as Article 133
A-91
"customs of the service" violations are
interesting, they are totally irrelevant
to the issue presented by this case. The
sole question before us for decision is
whether the factually detailed misconduct
alleged within the instant Article 133
specifications, under the circimstances
of this case, is immediately recognizable
by a reasonably prudent officer as an
example of conduct that would subject him
to potential prosecution for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
Unfortunately, by limiting their
discussions of the history of
"fraternization type cases" to those few
cases which actualiy contained the term
“fratnerize" or "fraternizatin," my
fellow judges also overlooked some
exceptionally useful and exceptionally
relevant generalizations pertinent to the
resolution of this quintessential
A-92
question. Had they expanded their
research so as to encompass those cases
which, although not mentioning the term
“fraternization," nevertheless, dealt
with specific allegations of
officer/enlisted misconduct alleged to
have violated one of the general
articles, they would have been able to
glean four distinct categories of
ofticer/enlisted behavior recognized time
and again by our appellate courts as
violating the proper criteria of Article
133 and 134 offenses.15/ Even more
15/ My personal review of 237 military
appellate decisions that have dealt with
Article 133 and 134 allegations of
officer misconduct in relation to
enlisted personnel reveals, without
exception, that all such allegations fit
neatly into conduct described by one of
four sub-headings.
The first of these may be
categorized as alcohol related offenses.
They include those allegations of conduct
in which the courts, under the particular
Se ein arse 8 lars elie
“ PY st Dab
iP AMIE tye
a ae .
(15/ cont. )
circumstances of the case, have concluded
that, whether by virtue of simple or
excessive persona: use, or simple
provision of the substance to enlisted
persons, an officer has demeaned the
position of "a commissioned officer"
within the eyes of enlisted ranks. See
United States v. Hammond, 1 B.R. 83
(1929); United States v. MacIver, 2 B.R.
321 (1931); United States v. Fleming, 2
B.R. 359 (1931); United States v. Lowry,
6 B.R. 67 (1934); United States v.
Shirley, 6 B.R. 337 (1935); United States
v. Gould, 7 B.R. 49 (1935); United States
v. Lowry, 8 B.R. 377 (1937); United
States v. Raymond, 10 B.R. 169 (1939);
United States v. Hester, 11 B.R. 145
(1941); United States v. Harris, 11 B.R.
171 (1941); United States v. Callan, 12
B.R. 49 (1941); United States v. Bethard,
12 B.R. 67 (1941); United States v.
Knight, 13 B.R. 27 (1942); United States
v. Brown, 13 B.R. 183 (1942); United
States v. Jones 13 B.R. 231 (1942);
United States v. Smith, 14 B.R. 371
(T1942); United States v. Saul, 15 B.R.
197 (1942); United States v. Taliaferro,
16 B.R. 187 (1942); United States v.
Hess, 49 B.R. 231 (1942); United States
v. Wall 16 B.R. 233 (1943); United States
v. O’Maley, 16 B.R. 285 (1943); United
States v. Griffin, 17 B.R. 85 (1943);
United States v. Granosk, 17 B.R. 193
(1943); Urited States v. Daly 17 B.R. 333
(1943); United States v. Minnis, 18 B.R.
101 (1943); United States v. Parks, 19
B.R. 23 (1943); United States v.
Paradise, 19 B.R. 43 (1943) United States _
v. Brennan, 19 B.R. 139 (1943); United
A-94
(15/7 cont.)
States v. Slaughter, 20 B.R. 9 (1943);
United States v. Lyday, 20 B.R. 37
(1943); United States v. Murphy, 21 B.R.
13 (1943); United States v. Westcott, 21
B.R. 41 (1943); United States v. Nelson,
21 B.R. 55 (1943); United States v.
Singletary, 21 B.R. 399 (1943); United
States v. Baker, 22 B.R. 131 (1943);
United States v. Cannon, 22 B.R. 237
(1943); United States v. Johnston, 23
B.R. 57 (1943); United States v. Hyre, 23
B.R. 115 (1943); United States v. Minton,
23 B.R. 159 (1943); United States v.
Biggs, 25 B.R. 385 (1943); United States
v. Ferguson, 26 B.R. 43 (1943); United
States v. Shapiro, 26 B.R. 43 (1943);
United States v. Bunker, supra; United
States v. Thorn, 29 B-R. 1943);
United States v. Gage, 1 B.R.(ETO) 299
{1943); United States v. Nicholson, 1
B.R.(ETO) 397 (1943); United States v.
Booker, 2 B.R.(ETO) 325 (1943); United
States v. Bradford, 30 B.R. 279 (1944);
United States v. Green, 31 B.R. 5l
(1944); United States v. Norren, 32 B.R.
95 (1944); United States v. Fiedler,
supra; United States v. Watts, 33 B.R.
19 1944); United States v. Blanton, 33
B.R. 22] (1944); United States v.
McPheron, 33 B.R. 325 (1944); United
States v. Bates, 34 B.R. 147 (1944);
United States v. Martin, 34 B.R. 223
(1944); United States v. Goggin, 34 B.R.
399 (1944); United States v. Roundtree,
36 B.R. 283 (1944); United States v.
MacFarlane, 38 B.R. 338 (1944); United
States v. Lillis, 39 B.R. 395 (1944);
United States v. Jones, supra; United
Statess v. Nettles, 40 B.R. 385 (1944);
A-95
(157 cont.)
United States v. Myers, 41 B.R. 83
(1944); United States v. Patterson,
supra; United States v. Rooney, 42 B.R.
119 (1944); United States v. Evans, 42
B.R. 187 (1944); United States v. Price,
supra; United States v. Carey, 43 B.R.
261 (1944); United States v. McCoy, 44
B.R. 81 (1944); United States v. Madden,
4 B.R.(ETO) 253 (1944); United States v.
Moffit, 7 B.R.(ETO) 113 (1944); United
States v. Whalen, 10 B.R.(ETO) 201
(1944); United States v. Buck, ll
B.R.(ETO) 187 (1944); United States v.
Gardner, 13 B.R.(ETO) 127 (1944); United
States v. Long, 13 B.R.(ETO) 291 (1944);
United States v. Glover, 14 B.R.(ETO) 67
(1944); United States v. Newcombe, 14
B.R.(ETO) 93 (1944); United States v.
Campbell, 14 B.R.(ETO) 127 (1944); United
States v. Wright, 44 B.R. 183 (1945);
United States v. Kelley, 46 B.R. 89
(1945); United States v. Foster, 46 B.R.
295 (1945); United States v. Futrell, 47
B.R. 339 (1945); United States v.
Ponsler, 51 B.R. 47 (1945); United States
v. Packard, 52 B.R. 125 (1945); United
States v. Buckner, 53 B.R. 197 (1945);
United States v. Mann, 55 B.R. 381
(1945); United States v. Skinner, 17
B.R.(ETO) 317 (1945); United States v.
Watker, 18 B.R.(ETO) 33 (1945); United
States v. Manning, 18 B.R.(ETO) 201
(1945); United States v. Taylor, 18 B.R.
(ETO) 319 (1945); United States v.
McBride, 15 B.R. (ETO) 91 (1954); United
States v. Leonard, supra; United States
vy. Thorpe, 19 B.R.(ETO) 245 (1945);
United States v. Penick, supra; United
States v. Sirois, 20 B.R.(ETO) 21 (1945);
A-96
(15/ cont. )
United States v. Suitt, 20 B.R.(ETO) 265
(1945); United Statess v. Dawson, 21
B.R.(ETO) 95 (1945); United Statess v.
Wetherford, 22 B.R.(ETO) 147 (1945);
United States v. Hindmarch, 22 B.R.(ETO)
223 (1945); United States v. Shipley, 22
B.R.(ETO) 257 (1945); United States v.
Patton, 23 B.R.(ETO) 75 (1945); United
States v. Petroski, 23 B.R.(ETO) 8l
(1945); United States v. Roberson, 23
B.R.(ETO) 149 (1945); United States v.
Tucker, 23 B.R.(ETO) 319 (1945); United
States v. O'Hara, 24 B.R.(ETO) 93 (1945);
United States v. Vollmer 24 B.R.(ETO) 281
(1945); United States v. Stark, 24
B.R.(ETO) 332 (1945); United States v.
Buck, 25 B.R.(ETO) 213 (1945); United
States v. St. George, 25 B.R.(ETO) 367
(1945); United States v. Traynor, 25
B.R.(ETO) 377 (1945); United States v.
Bradford, 28 B.R.(ETO) 91 (1945); United
States v. Ingham, 30 B.R..(ETO), 83
(1945); United States v. Bryant, 30
B.R. (ETO) 25. (1945) United States v.
Snyder, 31 B.R..(ETO) 181 (1945); United
States v. Marrs, 31 B.R. (ETO) 243 (1945)
United States v. Gunning, 32 BR.E. (ETO)
85 (1945); United Statess v. Powell, 33
B.R.(ETO) 221 (1945); United States v.
Griffith, 33 B.R.(ETO) 239 (1945); United
Statess v. Parkinson, 34 B.R.(ETO) ll
(1945); United States v. Epperson, 58
B.R. 323 (1946); Unite es V.
Pasquariello, 60 B.R. 179 (1946); United
States v. Glass, 60 B.R. 185 (1946);
United States v. Hart, 60 B.R. 247
(1946); United States v. Clovatre, 60
B.R. 381 (1946); United States v.
Shirley, 63 B.R. 65 (1946); United States
A-97
(15/ cont. )
v. Heaton, 64 B.R. 3 (1946); United
States v. McMaster, 64 B.R. 171 (1946);
United States v. Creighton, 70 B.R. 355
(1947); United States v. Ward, 72 B.R.
301 (1947); United States v. Dows, 73
B.R. 275 (1947); United States v. Becker,
78 B.R. 329 (1948); United States v.
Kearbey, 2 B.R.J.C. 281 (1949); United
States v. Boraczek, 4 B.R.J.C. 283
(1949); United States v. Powers, 8
~B.R.J.C. 111 (1950); United States v.
Hansen, 10 B.R.J.C. 165 (1951); United
States v. Clarke, 3 C.M.R. 227 (A.B.R.
1951); United States v. Akins, 4 C.M.R.
364 (A.B.R. 1951); United States v.
Powers, 5 C.M.R. 206 (A.B.R. 1951);
United States v. Livingston, supra;
United States v. Jackson, 8 C.M.R. 215
(A.B.R. 1952); United State v. Loney, 8
C.M.R. 533 (A.B.R 1952); United States
v. Johnson, 10 C.M.R. 513 (A.B.R. 1953);
United States v. Sloan, 14 C.M.R. 375
(A.°T.R. 1953); United States v. Free,
supra; United States v. Long, /
U.S.C.M.A. 205, 22 C.M.R. (1956);
United States v. McCardle, 27 C.M.R. 1006
(A.B.R. 1958); United States v. Lovejoy,
supra; and United States v. Pitasi,
supra. For cases prior to 1920, see
Winthrop, supra, at 716-717, notes 44 and
Tana 72 , note 26.
The second such subheading includes
those charges which allege that, under
the circumstances alluded to in the
cases, an officer somehow either demanded
the respect due to commissioned officers
and/or subjected his personal
impartiality to criticizm by "gambling"
(15/7 cont.)
for money with enlisted personnel.
Included among these cases, see United
States v. Van Hess, 14 B.R. 271 (1942);
United States v. Thompson, 14 B.R. 133
(1942); United States v. Cromer, 15 B.R.
17 (1942); United States v. Marinelli, 18
B.R. 377 (1943); United States v. Black,
20 B.R. 345 (1943); United States v.
Johnston, supra; United States v.
Campbell, 24 B.R. 215 (1943); United
States v. Petty, 26 B.R. 213 (1943);
United States v. Phillips, 26 B.R. 299
(1943); United States v. Murray, 31 B.R.
389 (1944); United States v. Bates,
Supra; United States v. Martin, supra;
United States v. Lillis, supra; United
States v. Futrell, supra; United States
v. Garris, 48 B.R. 39 (1945); United
States v. Ponsler, supra; United States
v. Welch, 56 B.R. 223 (1945); United
States v. Stanley, 20 B.R.(ETO) 319
(1945); United States v. Porter, 24
B.R.(ETO) 286 (1945); United States v.
Mayfield, 60 B.R. 179 (1946); United
States v. Hoover, 3 B.R.J.C. 39 (1949);
United States v. Bazanos, 8 B.R.J.C. 33
(1950); United States v. Weller, 10
B.R.J.C. 381 (1951); United States v.
Pryor, 2 C.M.R. 365 (A.B.R. 1951); United
States v. Reed, 9 C.M.R. 269 (A.B.R.
1952); United States v. Atkinson, 10
C.M.R. 443 A.B.R. (1953); United States
v. Villiados, 32 C.M.R. 561 (A.B.R.
1962); United States v. Britton, 13
U.S.C.M.A. 499, 33 C.M.R. 31 (1963); and
United States v. Light, 36 C.M.R. 579
(A.B.R. 1965). For cases prior to 1920,
see Winthrop, supra, at 716, note 44, and
at 727, note ll.
a seiaeaiiaainaiamaaliiiiiaaiaie
oe See re ee
8 AED LI ROR cares, ine De enh. vie
BU Reo
Se ee ee ek en de
(15/ cont. )
In the third identifiable
subheading of these cases, dealing with
allegations that an officer “borrowed"
money from enlisted persons, the courts
again lookes to the same types of
surrounding conditions as they had looked
into in the "gambling" type allegations.
See United States v. Strickland, 1 B.R.
329 (1930); United States v. Johnston, 4
B.R. 211 (1933); United States v.
Sullivan, 5 B.R. 83 (1934); United States
v. Gould, supra; United States v. Crist,
12 B.R. 49 1); United States v.
Curran, 15 B.R. 129 (1942); United States
v. Folk, 15 B.R. 307 (1942); United
States v. Delbrook 18 B.R. 29 (1943);
United States v. Addison, 18 B.R. 171
(1943); United States v. Brunkella, 19
B.R. 289 (1943); United States v.
Tillotson, 20 B.R. 149 (1943); United
States v. Black, supra; United States v.
Westcott, supra; United States v. Nelson,
Supra; United States v. Hart, 23 B.*:. 295
(1943); United States v. Skeen, 24 B.R.
373 (1943); United States v. Peck, 25
B.R. 205 (1943); United States v.
Churchich, 26 B.R. 199 (1943); Un_ted
States v. Hedgess, 27 B.R. 223 (1943);
U.S. v. Bedwell, 28 B.R. 229 (1943);
United States v. Morrison, 28 B.R. 355
(1943); United States v. Benfield, 29
B.R. 365 (1944); United States v. Maeef,
30 B.R. 53 (1944); United States v.
Bohlin, 30 B.R. 209 (1944); United States
v. Bradford, supra; United States v.-_
Steele, 30 B.R. 331 (1944); United States
v. Van Epps, 31 B.R. 193 (1944); United
States v. Young, 31 B.R. 249 (1944);
United States v. Murray, supra; United
A-100
(15/ cont.)
States v. Norren, supra; United States v.
Clift, 33 B.R. 263 (1944); United States
v. Elliott, 34 B.R. 293 (1944); United
States v. Robertson, 34 B.R. 321 (1944);
United States v. Edwards, 35 B.R. 143
(1944); United States v. Sears, 37 B.R.
39 (1944); United States v. Lowden, 39
B.R. 109 (1944) United States v. Gross,
39 B.R. 133 (1944); United States v.
Corcoran, 40 B.R. 235 (1944); United >
States v. Allgood, 40 B.R. 353 (1944);
United States v. Price, supra; United
States v. Gilson, 43 B.R. 235 (1944);
United States v. Hambright, 5 B.R. (ETO)
287 (1944); United States v. Collins, 8
B.R. (ETO) 219 (1944); United States v.
Witmer, 9 B.R.(ETO) 237 (1944); United
States v. Moore, 45 B.R. 141 (1945);
United States v. MacDonald, 46 B.R. 1
(1945); United States v. McGovern, 46
B.R. 305 (1945); United States v.
Jamieson, 47 B.R-. 369 (1945); United
States v. Wilson, 48 B.R. 71 (1945);
United States v. Morris, 51 B.R. 29
(1945); United States v. Giardina, 5l
B.R. 291 (1945); United States v. Murray,
53 B.R. 93 (1945); United States v.
Phillips, B.R. 31 (1945); United States
v. Burbank, 57 B.R. 41 (1945); United
States v. Coates, 57 B.R. 157 (1945);
United States v. Kuse, 15 B.R.(ETO) 73
(1945); United States v. Stanley, 20 B.R.
319 (1945); United States v. Vollmer,
supra,; United States v. Porter, supra;
United States v. Wickerson, 25 B.R. (ETO)
295 (1945); United States v. Powell,
supra; United States v. Hicks, 58 B.R.
139 (1946); United States v. Zaleski, 58
B.R. 349 (1946) United States v. Heaton,
A-101
(15/7 cont.)
supra; United States v. Bryant, 65 B.R.
119 (1946); United States v. Sandsness,
65 B.R. 337 (1946); United States v.
Thomas, 65 B.R. 57 (1947); United States
: v. Dye, 70 B.R. 385 (1947); United States
2 v. Fears, 71 B.R. 37 (1947); United
States v. Lach, 71 B.R. 303 (1947);
United States v. Vanover, 79 B.R. 189
; (1948); United States v. Johnson, 1
| B.R.J.C. 343 (1949); United States v.
i Wilkins, 2 B.R.J.C. 153 (1949); United
States v. Cole, 3 B.R.J.C. 159 (1949);
United States v. Storm, 11 B.R.J.C. 127
(1951); United States v. St. Ours, 6
C.M.R. (A.B.R. 1952); United States v.
Rehmann, 7 C.M.R. 172 (A.B.R. 1952);
United States v. Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323
(A.B.R. 1952); United States v. Wetzell,
i 12 C.M.R. 269 (A.B.R. 1953); United
States v. Scioli, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 502, 22
C.M.R. 292 (1957); United States v._
Calderon, 24 C.M.R. 338, (A.B.R. 1957);
United States v. Burgin, 30 C.M.R. 525
(A.B.R. 1960); United States v.
Villiados, supra; and United States v.
Light, 32 C.M.R. 561 (A.B.R. 1965). For
cases occurring prior to 1920, see
Winthrop, supra, at 714, note 40, at 715,
: note 42, and at 716, notes 45 and 46.
And finally, the fourth subheading
| deals with those specifications that have
: alleged an officer has demaned the
respect due him by virtue of his
commission, by sexual behavior which a
substantial portion of the service's
enlisted population required to render
this respect deems as scurrilous. See
United States v. Kelly, 11 B.R. 257
A-102
(157 cont.)
(1941); United Statses v. Hightower, 14
B.R. 97 (1942); United States v. Smith,
supra, United Stases v. Leavit, 15 B.R.
51 (1942); United States v. Saul, supra;
United Statess v. Peterson, 16 B.R. 59
(1942); United States v. Hathaway, 14
B.R. 349 (1943); United States v. Law, 16
B.R. 117 (1943); United States v.
Samuels, 22 B.R. 229 (1943); United
States v. Hyre, supra; United States; v.
Fahey, 26 B.R. 305 (1943); United States
v. Hooey, 27 B.R. 5 (1943); United States
v. Fowler, 27 B.R. 21 (1943); United
States v. Kappes, 27 B.R. 87 (1943);
United States v. McFarlane, 28 B.R. 217
(1943); United States v. Sebastian, 28
B.R. 267 (1943); United States v.
Breymann, 50 B.R. 1 (1944); United States
v. Gage, supra; United States v. Suckow,
2 B.R. (ETO) 199 (1943); United States v.
Cookerly, 29 B.R. 99 (1944); United
States v. Stone, 32 B.R. 55 (1944);
United States v. Arnold, 33 B.R. 69
(1944); United Statess v. McCaffree, 33
B.R. 95 (1944); United States v. Blanton,
supra; United States v. Goggin, supra;
United States v. Willetts, 35 B.R. 231
(1944); United States v. Gray, 38 B.R.
109 (1944); United States v. Kelly, 39
B.R. 1 (1944); United States v. Porter,
39 B.-R. 49 (1944); United States v.
Nettles, supra; United States v. Morgan,
supra; United States v. Knickerbocker, 42
B.R. 1 (1944); United States v. Shipman,
4 B.R.(ETO) 161 (1944); United States v.
Jared, 8 B.R.(ETO) 1 (1944); United
States v. Whalen, supra; United States v.
Buck, supra; United States v. Long,
supra; United States v. Wright, supra;
a
A-103
(15/ cont. )
United States v. Futrell, supra; United
States v. Wagner, 48 B.R. 45 (1945);
United States v. Stallworth, 55 B.R. 97
(1945); United States v. MacIntyre, 55
B.R. 151 (1945); United States v. Ritner,
18 B.R.(ETO) 189 (1945); United States v.
Traux, 27 B.R.(ETO) 25 (1945); United
States v. Pfefferkuch, 27 B.R. (ETO) 265
(1945); United States v. Thompson, 31
B.R.(ETO) 235 (1945); United States v.
Gunning, supra; United States v. Kooch,
32 B.R.(ETO) 169 (1945); United States v.-
Petrie, 33 B.R.(ETO) 133 (1945); United
States v. Powell, supra; United States v-
Peterson, 59 B-.R- 95 (1946); United
States v. Bonet, 60 B.R. 191 (1946);
United States v. Hart, supra; United
States v. Shelton, 62 B-.R. 29 41946);
United States v. Martin, 66 B.R. 259
(1947); United States v. McMillen, 69
B.R. 113 (1947); United States v. Slater,
74 B.R. 371 (1947); United States v.
Rabb, supra; United States v. Crank, 81l
B.R. 289 (1948); United States v. Prater,
5 B.R.J.C. 228 (1950); United States v-
Kempe, B.R.J.C. 101 (1950); United States
v. Clark, 9 B.R.J.C. 119 (1950); United
States v. Dunlop, 10 B.R.J.C. 187 (1951);
United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185
(A-B-R. 1951); United States v. Jewson, 7
C.M.R. 213 (A.B.R. 1951); United States
v. Livingston, supra; United States v.-
Cowan, 12 C.M.R. 374 (A.B.R. 1953);
United States v. Rice, 14 C.M.R. 316
(A.B.R. 1953); United States v. Free,
supra; United States v. Yeast, 36 C.M.R.
A.F.B.R. 1965); United States v.
Lovejoy, supra; United States v. Pitasi,
Supra; United States v. Horton, 14 M.J.
A-104
importantly, they might have recognized
that the behavior alleged, here, falls
distinctly within the fourth of these
actionable categories, demeaning sexual
behavior.
THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Having conclusively established that
concepts embodied by the terms “custom of
the service" and "fraternization" are
irrelevant to the question of whether
factually detailed Article 133 or 134
allegations of untoward officer/enlisted
behavior are legally sufficient to
Support such specifications, I strip the
specifications, before me, of this
(15/ cont.)
96 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Newak,
15 M.J. 541 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); United
States v. Brauchler, 15 M.J. 755
(A.F.C.M.R. 1983); and United States v.
King, M.J. (A.C.M.R. 1983). For
cases prior to 1920, see Winthrop, supra,
at 716, note 44, and at 718, notes 52 and
54.
_— - = —
agt eaten, es
A-105
surplusage.
Accordingly, the instant
specifications become Article 133
allegations that the accused, an
unmarried Air Force Captain assigned to
Minot Air Force Base, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, engage in several acts of
sexual intercourse each, with a certain
female Air Force Sergeant and with a
certain female Air Force Senior Airman.
Accordingly, only two questions are
germane to my decision. The first is
whether or not existing stare decisis
identifies multiple acts of fornication
by an officer with enlisted personnel as
misconduct that is "conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman" under Article
133, or, in the alternative, as
misconduct that either "prejudices good
order and military discipline" or is
“service discrediting" under a lesser
A-106
included Article 134 specification. The
second, which must be addressed only if
the answer to the first is negative, is
whether in the absence of such stare
decisis, a disciplined analysis of the
likely effect of such blatant and casual
acts of fornication upon the respect
required of enlisted personnel for the
commissioned status of all officers,
might independently establish that the
criteria of all officers, might
independently establish that the criteria
of an Article 133 offense has been met
or, in the alternative, whether a
similarly disciplined analysis of the
likely effect of such acts upon either
the continued maintenance of “good order
and discipline" within the Air Force or
the continued good will of our nation's
civilian population toward the Air Force
and its leaders, might indepe:.dently
A-107
establish that the criteria of a lesser
included Article 134 offense has been
met.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to review the cases
I have cited in the fourth sub-heading of
note 15, herein, supra, without
concluding that the conduct of the
accused in this case violated both the
Article 133 specification, as alleged,
and the lesser included "prejudice to
good order and discipline" Article 134
ffense, contained within that Article
133 specification. Accordingly, I demur
from a more detailed discussion of these
cases.
I also recognize that the need for a
disciplined analysis of the likely effect
of the blatant and casual acts of
fornication perpetrated by the accused
upon his military inferiors upon the
A-108
respect required of enlisted personnel
for the commissioned status of all
officers is mooted by the above
conclusion. I, nevertheless, remain so
completely appalled by the cavalier
attitude of the accused toward the
quintessential responsibilities of any
commissioned officer and the majority's
discipline shattering acquiescence to it,
that I am compelled to briefly comment
upon those circumstances of this
particular case which causes me concerns.
First, I would point out that there
is no other conduct in this nation, which
in recent years has generated a more
widely divergent and individually
self-righteous group of moral attitudes
than that related to individual sexual
behavior. Indeed, the so-called "Sexual
Revolution," has in many instances even
pitted individual family member against
A-109
individual family member in morally
devastating conflicts such as have
probably been unequalled in this country
since the civil war.
Unquestionably, the tide through
this revolution has been toward a greater
and greater tolerance of individual
sexual proclivity, and as the majority
pointed out, even the former military
justice prohibitions against military
members fornicating with one another,
have been decriminalized. But, to this
day, few law abiding activities have been
so widely viewed or referred to by
various segments of our society as
illicit, as are those instances of sexual
conduct between consenting adults that
have generally been decriminalized within
the last two decades. Indeed, despite
the "decriminalization of such sexual
conduct, when it has occurred between
eT
A-110
people with certain fiduciary type
relationships to one another (e.q.,
professor-student, executive-junioc
executive, congressman-page) it has
resulted more often, than not, in
unquestioned dismissals, scholarly
advocation of such dismissals, 16/ or
unprecedented outrage quelling
Congressional reprimands.
It is within this emotionally
charged arena, that the accused, a
commissioned officer in the United States
Air Force, first decided for some unknown
reason to consciously push against what
he believed to be a questionable Air
Force taboo, by engaging a variety of
young enlisted women in multiple acts of
what one of the young women described at
16/ See Collins, Managers and Lovers,
Harvard Business Review, Sep-Oct, at 142.
A-1ll
trial as "recreational fornication.
Every military officer should
immediately recognize that an effective
fighting force, which it is their mission
to achieve, is absolutely dependent upon
the unquestioning obedience of
subordinates to command. Further, all
military officers should recognize that
in order to fulfill their mission of
achieving this obedience they must never,
knowingly, conduct themselves in a manner
that would likely cause even a small
portion of their subordinate population
to question their moral fiber.
Clearly, it is impossible for an
individual officer to obtain the
unquestioning obedience of his
subordinates if they regard him with
moral suspicion or contempt.
Accordingly, every military officer is
obliged to insure at all times that his
A-112
or her moral conduct does not f2rll to a
level that might justify such suspicions,
even among a small proportion of his
subordinate population. The moment such
a commissioned officer's observable moral
conduct falls to such a level, is the
moment he has become a totally
ineffective officer.
The moral conduct required of a
military officer cannot, therefore, ever
be a mere reflection of his own moral
values. In point of fact, it cannot even
be a reflection of the moral values of a
majority of his subordinates. A military
leader can simply not be effective when
he can only rely on the unquestioning
obedience of 60, 70, or even 90 percent
of his subordinates. Particularly, in
combat situations, where a single
disobeyed order can sometimes result in
untold horror for obedient individuals,
A-113
he must command the moral respect of
virtually everyone that may be subject to
his orders.
Had the accused in the instant case
any regard whatsoever for his status as a
commissioned officer, he would have
| immediately recognized that his moral
behavior, while perhaps not particularly
offensive to him would, nevertheless,
have been blatantly offensive to that
large group of basically fundamentalist
church-goers that populated his, and
practically every other base in the Air
Force (and, some of which undoubtedly
were directly subordinate to him).
Lacking this regard for his commission,
he instead, consciously destroyed not
only his own effectuality, but risked the
possibility that the emotion charged
moral indignation he had aroused might be
transferred by these people to other
A-114
military officers.
Similarly, by violating his
fiduciary-like duty to the moral
well-being of his enlisted
subordinatesl7/ he risked subjecting the
service to public moral condemnation
similar to that which would recently have
beset our Congress, had the House of
Representatives chosen not to reprimand
its members who offended public mores in
a similar manner.
Contrary to the overriding concern
of the majority, I see no similarity,
whatsoever, between the accused's conduct
in this case and the conduct of a married
officer who engages in sexual relations
with his or her enlisted spouse. Here
17/ See Executive Order 10013, 27
October 1948, as amended by Executive
Order 10043, 10 March 1949. See also AFR
50-31, Moral Leadership, 24 October 1969,
and its predecesors.
A-115
the accused's conduct was actionable
because he should have recognized that
recreational fornication with a variety
of enlisted personnel is still viewed as
immeral and promiscuous by a substantial
minority of the Air Force enlisted
personnel, and that he could not
effectively function as an Air Force
officer, once such a substantial minority
of his subordinates had developed a
contemptuous suspicion concerning his
moral uprightness. Such conduct on the
accused's part clearly amounted to
conduct unbecoming an officer and conduct
prejudicial to good order and discipline.
I cannot think of a single Air Force
group or person that would be offendea by
an Air Force officer having sex with his
or her spouse, nor can I think of a
Single instance in which such conduct
could be said to amount to conduct
A-116
unbecc .ing an officer or conduct
prejudicial to good order and discipline.
I would affirm the findings and the
sentence as adjudged.
OFFICIAL
LEO B. WEGEMER
Captain, USAF
Chief Commissioner
B-1
EXHIBIT "B"
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters United States Air Force
REPLY TO
ATTN OF:
SUBJECT:
TO:
Washington, D.C.
20324
JAJM ACM 23699 (recon)
Captain Michael A. Johanns
001-46-5650FR 16 DEC 1983
8 AF/JA
1. The United States Air Force
Court of Military Review has
issued the attached Order
denying Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision
of the Court rendered on 26
October 1983 and has set aside
the sentence in the attached
decision. A rehearing on
sentence may be ordered.
However, The Judge Advocate
B-2
General is certifying the case
to the United States Court of
Military Appeals in accordance
with Article 67(b)(2), Uniform
Code of Military Justice (Atch
3). Therefore, do not take
action based upon the decision
of the Court of Military Review
until you receive further
instructions.
2. Please arrange to have the
accused's copy of the decision
and of the certificate of The
Judge Advocate General served
upon him (Atch 4) and return
his signed receipts (Atch 5) to
us. If these attachments are
to be served by mail, you
should include a self-addresed,
franked envelope for the
accused's convenience in
- —— ae
returning the receipts to your
office. If the accused refuses
to sign them, forward instead a
certificate of service. If
service of the decision upon
the accused will be delayed,
advise us of the reason and
approximately when we may
expect the receipts.
3. Advise the accused that,
pursuant to paragraph 102b,
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969
(Rev), appellate counsel in the
Office of the Judge Advocate
General has been designated to
represent him before the Court
of Military Appeals. Also
advise him that he has the
right additionally to be
represented before the Court of
B-4
Military Appeals by civilian
counsel if provided by him. He
should also be advised that the
certification of his case by
The Judge Advocate General will
not in any manner affect his
right to petition the United
States Court of Miitary
Appeals, within the statutory
period, with respect to any
matter of law in the case.
FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Signed
KEITHE E. NELSON, Colonel, USAF
Director, USAF Judiciary
Office of The Judge Advocate General
5 Atch
1. Decn of COMR
2. Order of COMR
3. Certificate of TJAG
4. Accused's Copy
5. Receipts (2)
C=-1
EXHIBIT "“C"
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
UNITED STATES, USCMA Dkt.
Appellant anda No. 48445/AF
Cross-Appellee CMR Dkt.
No. 23699
Vv.
Michael A. CROSS-PETITION
JOHANNS (001-46-5650),
Appellee and
)
)
)
)
)
) ORDER GRANTING
)
)
)
Cross-Appellant )
On consideration of the
cross-petition for grant of review of the
decision of the United States Air Force
Court of Military Review, it is, by the
Court, this 6th day of July 1984,
ORDERED:
That said cross-petition be, and
the same is, hereby granted on Issue III
rasied by appellate defense counsel.
C=-2
Briefs required under Rule 25 will
not be filed.
For the Court, *
/s/ John A. Cutts, III
Deputy Clerk of the Court
*Senior Judge Cook did not
participate.
cc: The Judge Advocate General of the
Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel
(FRAMPTON, Esq. )
Appellate Government Counsel
(HOLLIS)
EXHIBIT "D"
UNITED STATES, Appellant and
Cross-Appellee,
Vv.
Captain Michael A. JOHANNS, U.S. Air
Force, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
NO. 48,455
ACM 23699.
U.S. Court of Military Appeals.
June 10, 1985.
Accused, a captain, U.S. Air Force,
was convicted by general court-martial of
four specifications of conduct unbecoming
an officer and no specification of
conduct prejudicial to good order and
discipline or of a nature to discredit
armed forces, and he appealed. The
United States Air Force Court of Military
Review, 17 M.J. 862, affirmed in part and
set aside in part. Questions were
certified for review and accused's cross
D-2
petition for review was granted. The
United States Court of Military Appeals,
Everett, C.J., held that: (1) officers
engaging in mutually voluntary, private,
nondeviate sexual intercourse with
enlisted member, neither under his
command nor supervision, was not
violation of article prohibiting conduct
unbecoming an officer or article
prohibiting conduct prejudicial to good
order and discipline or of nature to
discredit armed forces, and (2)
specification that accused wrongfully had
sexual intercourse with enlisted woman, a
married woman, not his wife, was
multiplicious for findings purposes with
specification that accused wrongfully,
dishoncrably and disgracefully had sexual
intercourse with same woman who was, at
that time, the lawful wife of active duty
enlisted member of United States Air
D-3
Force, contrary to customs and traditions
of armed forces of the United States.
Affirmed in part and reversed in
part.
Cox, J., filed opinion concuring in
part and concurring in the result in
part.
1. Military Justice 760, 778
Officer's engaging in mutually
voluntary, private, nondeviate sexual
intercourse with enlisted member, neither
under his command nor supervision, was
not violation of article prohibiting
conduct unbecoming an officer or article
prohibiting conduct prejudicial to good
order and discipline or of nature to
discredit armed forces. UCMJ, Art. 133,
134, 10 U.S.C.A $§933, 934.
D-4
2. Military Justice 533
Officers can not be prohibited from
attending bona fide religious services
with enlisted persons. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. l.
3. Military Justice 533
Restrictions on contacts between
officers and enlisted persons,
male/female or otherwise, can be imposed
where there is direct supervisory
relationship.
4. Military Justice 959
Specification that accused
wrongfully had sexual intercourse with
enlisted woman, a married woman, not his
wife, was multiplicious for findings
purposes with specification that accused
wrongfully, dishonorably and |
disgracefully had sexual, intercourse
D-5
with same woman who was, at that time,
the lawful wife of active duty enlisted
member of United States Air Force,
contrary to customs and traditions of
armed forces of the United States. UCMJ,
Arts. 134, 10 U.S.C.A. §§933, 934.
For Appellant and Cross-Appellee:
Major Robert E. Ferencik, Jr. (argued);
Colonel Kenneth R. Rengert, Captain
Brenda J. Hollis (on brief).
For Appellee and Cross-Appellant:
Mary Louise Frampton, Esquire (argued);
Colonel Leo L. Sergi, Captain Kathleen G.
O'Reilly (on brief).
Amicus Curiae: Eugene R. Fidell,
Esquire (argued); Charles S. Sims,
Esquire, and Arthur B. Spitzer, Esquire,
of counsel--For American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation.
Opinion
EVERETT, Chief Judge:
I
Contrary to his pleas, Captain
Michael A. Johanns was found guilty by
D-6
general court-martial of four
specifications of conduct unbecoming an
officer, in violation of Article 133 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. §933, and one specification of
conduct prejudicial to good order and
discipline or of a nature to discredit
the armed forces, in violation of Article
134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. $934. The court
members sentenced him to dismissal from
the armed forces on July 2, 1982. The
convening authority approved these
findings of guilty and the sentence. The
United States Air Force Court of Military
Review on October 26, 1983, set aside
three of the above findings of guilty
under Article 133, 10 U.S.C. §933, and
ordered a rehearing on sentence on the
remaining findings of guilty. A
subsequent government motion for
reconsideration of this decision was
D-7
denied by the Court of Military Review.
On December 16, 1983, the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force,
pursuant to Article 67(b)(2), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. §867, certified the following
questions for review by this Court.
I
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, WAS THE COURT OF REVIEW
CORRECT IN NOT SUSTAINING CONVICTION
OF CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 133 AS TO
SPECIFICATIONS 2, 3 AND 4 OF
CHARGE I?
as
IF THE FOREGOING IS ANSWERED IN THE
AFFIRMATIVE, WAS THE COURT OF
MILITARY REVIEW CORRECT IN’ NOT
SUSTAINING A CONVICTION OF CONDUCT
TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER IN
D-8
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 134 AS TO
SPECIFICATIONS 2, 3 AND 4 OF
CHARGE I?
Thereafter, on July 6, 194, this
Court granted the accused's
cross-petition for review on the
following question raised by appellate
defense counsel:
III
THE SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II AND
CHARGE II SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS
THAT SPECIFICATION WAS MULTIPLICIOUS
FOR FINDINGS PURPOSES WITH
SPECIFICATION 1 OF CHARGE I.
The above questions were raised with
respect to the findings of guilty entered
at the accused's trial on the following
charges and spnattigekions:
CHARGE I: Violation of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, Article 133.
Specification 1: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
D-9
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5
October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,
and disgracefully have sexual intercourse
with Donna R., Sergeant, United States
Air Force, the said Sergeant Donna R.
being, at that time, the lawful wife of
an active duty enlisted member of the
United States Air Force, contrary to the
customs and traditions of the armed
forces of the United States.
Specification 2: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst '
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 8
October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,
and disgracefully fraternize and
associate on terms of military equality
with enlisted members of the United
States Air Force, to wit: Sergeant
D-10
Donna R., by going into the military
quarters of the said Sergeant Donna R. at
Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota and
sharing the same bed with the said
Sergeant Donna R. while the said Sergeant
Donna R. was intoxicated and at a time
when the said Sergeant Donna R. was the
lawful wife of an enlisted member of the
United States Air Force, contrary to the
customs and traditions of the armed
forces of the United States.
Specification 3: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot,
North Dakota, on three or four separate
occasions during September, 1981,
wrongfully, dishonorably, and
disgracefully fraternize and associate on
terms of military equality with Staff
Sergeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl K., a
female active duty enlisted member of the
—s.
D-11
United States Air Force, wy engaging in
acts of sexual intercourse with the said
Staff Seargeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl
K., contrary to the customs and
traditions of the armed forces of the
United States.
Specification 4: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on two or three
occasions, during November, 1981,
wrongfully, dishonorably, and
disgracefully fraternize and associate on
terms of military equality with Senior
Airman Michelle P., then known as Senior
Airman Michelle S., a female active duty
enlisted member of the United States Air
Force, by engaging in acts of sexual
intercourse with the said Senior Airman
Michelle P., then known as Senior Airman
Michelle P., then known as Senior Airman
D-12
Michelle S., contrary to the customs and
traditions of the armed forces of the
United States.
CHARGE II: Violation of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, Article 134.
Specification: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL
A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst
Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air
Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5
October 1881, wrongfully have sexual
intercourse with Donna R., a married
woman, not his wife.
The Court of Military review in its
decision below delineated the facts
surrounding these offenses as follows:
The accused was a single, 28 year
Old missile combat crew commander who had
been stationed at Minot Air Force Base,
North Dakota, since completion of
training in 1978. The Officers’ Open
Mess at Minot was being redecorated; as a
:
:
'
.
|
D-13
result, officers had been authorized to
utilize the facilities of the
Noncommissioned Officers' Open Mess. The
accused availed himself of the
opportunity and socialized at the NCO
Club. There he met Sgt. R. (who was
married), SrA P. and SSqt K. He dated
each and ultimately had sexual relations
with them all. On one occasin, the
accused and Sgt R. went on a date
downtown, and thereafter returned to her
house on base. Sgt. R. was intoxicated
and therefore remembers nothing other
than the next morning the accused was
asleep next to her :n bed.
All this interaction was completely
consensual, private, nondeviate, and
sometimes instigated by the women
involved. The accused was neither the
commander nor supervisor of any of these
enlisted members, and their respective
D-14
relationships were not publicized.4/ In
the opinion of the enlisted women, the
accused's activities were neither
dishonorable nor service discrediting.
The charges resulted from the apparently
private, voluntary liaisons.
United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J. 862,
964 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).
The Government had contended before
the United States Air Force Court of
Military Review that there was a custom
in the United States Air Force which
prohibited fraternizations with and made
criminal the associate of officers with
enlisted personnel on terms of military
equality. However, the court below found
that at the time of the offenses in
4/ It was stipulated at trial that the
allegations were brought to the attention
of the accused’s commander by a member of
his squadron on the basis of inferences
he drew from conversations with the
accused.
sy ia allt ine te Whe
Ce ae ee
D-15
issue, “there did not exist a clearcut
standard for qauging as called
'fraternization' in the Air Force".
Furthermore, the court
specifically [found] that as a
matter of fact and law the custom in
the Air Force against fraternization
has been so eroded as to make
criminal prosecution against an
officer for engaging in mutually
voluntary, private, non-deviate
sexual intercourse with an enlisted
member, neither under his command
nor supervision, unavailable.
United State v. Johanns, supra at 869.
II
In Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94
S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), the
Supreme Court emphasized that "the
military is, by necessity, a specialized
society separate from civilian society."
D-16
Id. at 743, 94 S.Ct. at 2555. Moreover,
"to maintain the discipline essential to
perform its mission effectively, the
military has developed what ‘may not
unfitly be called the customary military
law' or ‘general usage of the military
service.'" Id. at 744, 94 S.Ct. at
2556. The Supreme Court pointed out that
Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code
have a lineage extending back more than
three centuries, it. at 745-46, 94 S.Ct.
at 2556-57; and that "[dJecisions of this
Court during the last century have
recognized that the longstanding customs
and usages of the services i. part
accepted meaning to the seemingly
imprecise standards of Arts. 133 and
134." Id. at 746-47, 94 S.Ct. at 2557.
Thus, in 1857, the Court had "upheld the
Navy's general article, which provided
that “LaJll crimes committed by persons
iittala
sie
belonging to the navy, which are not
specified in the foregoing articles,
shall be punished according to the laws
and customs in such cases at sea.'" Id.
at 747, 94 S.Ct. at 2557, citing Dynes v.
Hoover, 20 How. 65, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1857).
The rationale for this result had been
that,
fnjotwithstanding the apparent
indeterminateness of such a
provision, it is not liable to
abuse; for what those crimes are,
and how they are to be punished, is
well known by practical men in the
navy and army, and by those who have
studied the law of courts martial,
and the offenses of which the
different courts martial have
cognizance. Ibid.1/
1/ The court also pointec to Smith v.
Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 6 S.Ct. 5/70, 29
D-18
In considering Captain Levy's
contention that Articles 133 and 134 were
“void for vagueness" under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the Supreme Court concluded that, "[flJor
the reasons that differentiate military
society from civilian society, we think
Congress is permitted to legislate both
with greater breadth and with greater
flexibility when prescribing the rules by
which the former shall be governed than
it is when prescribing rules for the
latter." 417 U.S. at 756, 94 S.Ct. at
2561. "Because of the factors
(1/7 cont. )
L.Ed. 601 (1886); United States v.
Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 13 S.Ct. 552, 37
L.Ed 378 (1893); and Swaim v. United
States, 165 U.S. 553, 17 S.Ct. 448, 41
L.Ed. 823 (1897), in support of its
thesis that "the usages and customs of
war" and "training and experience in the
service" give precision to tne general
prohibitions contained in Articles 133
and 134.
D-19
differentiating military society from
civilian society," the Court held
that the proper standard of review
for a vagueness challenge to the
articles of the Code is the standara
which applies to criminal statues
regulating economic affairs.
Id. at 756, 94 S.Ct. at 2562.
Consequently, Levy's attack on Articles
133 and 134 for vagueness was rejected
because he "could have had no reasonable
doubt that his public statements urging
Negro enlisted men not to go to Vietnam
if ordered to do so were both ‘unbecoming
an officer and a gentlemen', and ‘to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces.'" Id. at 757, 94 S.Ct.
at 2562.
[1] Obviously, the premise for this
result in Parker v. Levy was that, in
view of the military customs, usage, and
D-20
training, the accused could not
successfully claim that he lacked
constitutionally required notice under
the more relaxed standard of measuring
void-for-vagueness. However, because
that premise is inapplicable to Captain
Johanns, the result here must be that
reached by the Court of Military Review.
Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
78 &.Ct. 240, 2L.BE4.2d 228 (1957); United
States v. Tolkach, 14 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.
1982).
In discussing Article 133, the
Manual for Courts-Martial in effect when
Johanns was tried explained:
Conduct violative of this article is
action or behavior in an official
capacity which, in dishonoring or
disgracing the individual as an
officer, seriously compromises his
character as a gentleman, or action
D-21
or behavior in an unofficial or
private capacity which, in
dishonoring or disgracing the
individual personally, seriously
compromises his standing as an
officer.
Para. 212, Manual for Court-Martial,
United States, 1969 (Revised edition).
(Emphasis added). With respect to
ii il nadie er ee ‘
nv = Scapa
disorders and neglects to the prejudice
of good order and discipline in the armed
forces, the Manual remarked: |
Almost any irregular or improper
act on the part of a member of the
military service could be regarded
j as prejudicial in some indirect or
: remote sense; however, the article
does not contemplate these distant
effects. It is confined to cases in
which the prejudice is reasonably
direct and palpable.
* * * * * *
D-22
A breach of a custom of the service
may result in a violation of this clause
of Article 134. In its legal sense the
work "custom" imports something more than
a method of procedure or a mode of
conduct or behavior which is merely of
frequent or usual occurrence. Custom
arises out of long established practices
which by common consent have attained the
force of law in the military or other
community affected by them. There can be
no such thing as a custom that is
contrary to existing law or regulation.
A custom which has not been adopted by
existing statue or regulation ceases to
exist when its observance has been long
abandoned. Many customs of the service
are now set forth in regulations of the
various armed forces. Violations of
those customs should be charged under
Article 92 as violations of the
ne aia
D-23
regulations in which they appear. Para.
213b, Manual, supra. [Emphasis added).
The language of the 1951 Manual for
Courts-Martial is almost identical. See
paras. 213, 213b, Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States, 1951; see
also paras. 182, 183, Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States Army, 1949
(discussing Articles of War 95 and 96).
Interestingly, none of these three
Manuals contains a form specification for
“fraternization". See App. 6 c, 1951
Manual; App. 4, 1949 Manual.
Consistent with these Manual
provisions, this Court has indicated that
Article 134, 10 U.S.C. §934, is not
intended "to regulate the wholly private
moral conduct of an individual." See
United States v. Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609,
614, 20 C.M.R. 325, 330 (9156); United
States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 427,
D-24
4 C.M.R. 15, 19 (1952). These
pronouncements have been interpreted to
mean that, "[fJornication in the absence
of aggravating circumstances is
recognized as not an offense under
military law." See United States v.
Wilson, 32 C.M.R. 517, 518 (C.M.R.
1962). Certainly officers hold a special
status whereunder a higher standard of
conduct is required of them by law and
custom. United States v. Means, 10 M.J.
162 (C.M.A. 1981). Nonetheless, even for
an officer, private fornication in the
absence of some other aggravating
circumstance would not seem subject to
prosecution under Articles 133 and
134--regardless of the moral censure to
which this activity might be subject.
If the officer's sexual partner is
an enlisted person, does this constitute
sufficient aggravation to make private
binK be Re | Netw
men al
D-25
fornication subject to prosecution? For
two reasons, the answer to this question
depends on whether there was a custom
proscribing this type of relationship.
In the first place, if such a custom
existed, the violation of that custom
would tend to have a much more direct and
palpable effect on good order and
discipline and would more seriously
compromise the officer's standing. he
would be perceived as flouting military
authority--which, of course, no officer
may do.
Secondly--and constitutionally more
important--the existence of such a custom
would provide notice to officers, so that
they would have no reasonable doubt as to
the legal requirements to which they are
subject. Obviously, "not every social
contact between an officer and enlisted
man is or even can reasonably be
D-26
prohibited. To do so would be
inconsistent with our democratic concept
of social relations and, probably,
unavailing." See United States v.
Pitasi, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 608, 44 C.M.R.
31, 38 (1971). Custom can help define
which relationships between officers and
enlisted persons are improper.
Customs differ among the armed
services. Coast Guard customs and
regulations still allow the wearing of a
beard, as did the Navy until recently;
but the other services require their
members to be cleaiu-shaven. In the Army,
an officer still may not protect himself
from rain with an umbrella; but in the
Air Force this custom has been
abandoned. Indeed, the Air Force--the
most recently created of the armed
services--has never honored some of the
customs recognized in the senior
D-27
services; and perhaps because both
officers and airmen at one time served
together in small flight crews, the
barriers placed by custom between
; officers and enlisted persons have
| probably always been lower in that
) Service than in others.
) Und
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