Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Johanns v. United States

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85-238 «AUG 1986

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

MICHAEL A. JOHANNS,

Petitioner,

V8.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

MAryY LOUISE FRAMPTON*

FRAMPTON, KARSHMER & KESSELMAN

A Professional Association

925 N Street, Suite 150

Fresno, CA 93721-2256

Telephone: (209) 486-5730

MAJOR CONRAD C. BALDWIN, JR.

_ Associate Appellate Defense

Counsel

Office of the

Judge Advocate General

Department of the Air Force

Headquarters United States

Air Force

Washington, D.C. 20332-6128

Telephone: (202) 767-1562

Attorneys for Petitioner

*Counsel of Record

i

— HOD, Jit.

In the Supreme C —

a 4)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether conviction of an unmarried

military officer under Article 133 of

the Uniform Code of Military Justice

for engaging in private, consensual

sexual intercourse with a married

person violates the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

Question Presented . ...-« -» i

Opinions Below ...s»se#+e+s#t#e#eers 8

Jurisdiction ..«++e«-e-ertee es &

Statutes and Constitutional

Provisions Involved .. . 5

Statement of Case ...e«++s+»+#*+es §

Reasons for Granting Writ .... 8

CORCIMELOR + «1 2 6 6 * 3 2 es *@ woe 20

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Brea-Garcia v. Immigration

Service, 531 F. 2d

693 (3rd Cir.1976)

Connally v. General Construc-

tion Company, 269 U.S. 385,

392, 46 S. Ct. 126, 128, 70

L.Ed., (1927)

Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S.

104, 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294,

33 L.Ed. 222 (1972)

In re Edgar, 253 F. Supp. 95l

(E.D. Mich. 1966)

Moon Ho Kim v. U.S. Immigra-

tion and Naturalization

Service, 514 F. 2d 179 (D.C.

Cir. 1975)

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,

L.Ed. (1974)

Petition for Naturalization

of Richard Schroers, 336 F.

Supp. 1348 (S.D. N.Y. 1971)

Wadman v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, 329

F. 2a 812 (1964)

Pages

16

18

18

17

17

19

17

17

iv

Statutes

Page

Uniform Code of Military Justice

Article 133, 10 U.S.c. §$ 933 $,8,18,

20

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) 15

28 u.S.c. §§ 1259(2) and (3) 4

North Dakota Century Code

Section 12.1-20-09 (1975) 5,il

Constitutional Provisicns

Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution 5,18

United States Court of

Military Appea?*s Decisions

United States v. Melville,

S U.S.C.M.A. 597, 601,

25 C.M.R. 101 (1958) 9

Court of Military Review Decisions

United States v. Jefferson,

I4M.J. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982) 12

Law Review Articles

Comment, Immigration Law-

National Standard,

Incorporation of State Law

or Hybrid Test-State

Definition of Adultery

Utilized for Determining

Good Moral Chracter,

S51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1021 (1976)

Comment, Free Speech in

the Military, 53 N.Y.

UNIV. L. REV. 1102,

1109 (Nov. 1978)

Other Authorities

Manual for Courts-Martial,

969 Rev. Ed.

Paragraph 212

Paragraph 2l3c

Winthrop, Military Law and

Precedents, /11-712

(2d Ed., 1920 reprint)

Kinsey, Alfred, SEXUAL

BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN

FEMALE, p. 416 (Philadelphia

1953)

Kinsey Alfred, SEXUAL

BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN

MALE, p. 585 (Philadelphia

1949)

17

20

12

10

12

13

13

NO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

MICHAEL JOHANNS,

PETITIONER,

vs.

UNITED STATES

RESPONDENT.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

MILITARY APPEALS

Petitioner MICHAEL JOHANNS

respectfully prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review a part of the

decision of the United States Court of

Military Appeals entered in the

above-entitled action on June 10, 1985.

OPINIONS BELOW

Jn July 2, 1982, petitioner was found

guilty by general court-martial of four

specifications of conduct unbeceming an

officer and gentleman in violation of

Article 133 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice and one specification of

conduct prejudicial to good order and

discipline or of a nature to discredit the

armed forces in violation of Article 134

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

He was sentenced to dismissal from the

service. The findings of guilty and the

sentence were approved by the convening

authority.

On October 26, 1983, the United

States Air Force Court of Military Review

set aside three of the four findings of

guilt under Article 133 of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice and ordered a

rehearing on sentence on the remaining

findings. The government's motion for

reconsideration was denied.

On December 16, 1983, the Judge

Advocate General of the Air Force

certified for review by the United States

Court of Military Appeals the issue of

whether the Court of Military Review was

correct in reversing the conviction of

petitioner as to the three specifications

of violation of Article 133 or Article 134

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

On July 6, 1984, the United States

Court of Military Appeals granted

petitioners' cross-petition for review on

the issue of whether Specification 1 of

Charge I (violation of Article 133). and

Charge II (violation of Article 134) were

multiplicious. It denied petitioners'

cross-petition for review on the issue of

whether the Court of Military Review was

correct in sustaining the conviction of

petitioner as to Specification 1 of Charge

I.

On June 10, 1985, the United States

Court of Military Appeals dismissed Charge

II and its specification on the grounds of

multiplicity and affirmed the remainder of

the decision of the United States Court of

Military Review.

The orders and decisions referred to

above are attached as Exhibits A, B, C &

D.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1259(2) and (3).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article 133 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice

North Dakota Century Code Section

12.1-20-09 (1975)

Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution

STATZMENT OF CASE

Captain Michael Johanns, a single

man, was convicted of violating Articles

133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice by engaging in an act of

private consensual sexual intercourse with

Sergeant Donna Robbins, a married woman,

on October 5, 1981. The United States

Court of Military Appeals dismissed the

finding of guilty under Article 134 on the

grounds of multiplicity, leaving only the

Article 133 conviction at issue. 1/

On October 5, 1981, Captain

Johanns, a twenty-eight year old missile

combat crew commander with a superlative

performance record, went to the

Noncommissioned Officers’ Club at Minot

Air Force Base with a group of friends.

(R.T. 105) Since the Officers Club was

closed during that period, officers were

welcome to socialize at the

Noncommissioned Officers’ Club. (R.

111). During the evening Captain Johanns

1/ Specification l: In that

CAPTAIN MICHAEL A. JOHANNS, United States

Air Force, 9lst Strategic Missile Wing,

did, at Minot Air Force Base, North

Dakota, on or about 5 October 1981,

wrongfully, dishonorably, and

disgracefully have sexual intercourse with

Donna R., Sergeant, United States Air

Force, the said Sergeant Donna R. being,

at that time, the lawful wife of an active

duty enlisted member of the United States

Air Force, contrary to the customs and

traditions of the armed forces of the

United States.

was introduced to Sergeant Robbins, an

enlisted person assigned to another unit,

and invited her to his trailer. Later

that night the two of

them engaged in a private, consensual act

of sexual intercourse in Captain Johanns'

trailer. (R.T. 106) On that date

Sergeant Robbins’ husband was TDY to Guam

for two months. (R.T. 105)

Sergeant Robbins testified that her

relationship with Captain Johanns was

entirely voluntary and did not compromise

his standing in her eyes or in any manner

discredit or disgrace him. The brief

encounter was terminated before Sergeant

Robbins' husband returned home and he was

unaware of its occurrence until Sergeant

Robbins was compelled to testify at the

court-martial hearing. She told no one

that she had engaged in sexual intercourse

with Captain Johanns. (R.T. 109)

Sergeant Robbins further testified that

she was no longer married and that her

temporary relationship with Captain

Johanns was unrelated to her divorce.

(R.T. 112)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE DECISION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION

OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN,

BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS

COURT,AND WHICH CONFLICTS WITH

DECISIONS OF OTHER

FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

Article 133 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §$ 933, states:

Any commissioned officer, cadet, or

midshipman who is convicted of

conduct unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman shall be punished as

a court-martial may direct.

There is not a single reported case

in which an unmarried military officer has

been convicted of a violation of Article

133 of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice for engaging in a private

consensual act of sexual intercourse.

As the government itself explained in

United States v. Melville, 8 U.S.C.M.A.

597, 601, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958), the most

recent adultery case cited by the Court of

Military Review in this case, "the

marriage of the offending party is the

element that distinguishes the offense

from a mere disorder."

Adultery is not a crime or an offense

under the Uniform Code of Military

Justice. Moreover, the sole provision for

punishment of adultery in the Manual for

10

Courts-Martial, 1969 Rev. Ed., applies

exclusively when such conduct is

proscribed by state law. Paragraph 2l3c

of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969

Rev. Ed., states:

Acts in violation of local civil

law may be punished if they are of

a nature to bring discredit upon

the armed forces. Included within

the conduct which may be found to

be within the proscription of this

Clause are adultery, bigamy,

negligent homicide, fleeing the

scene of an accident, indecent

acts, and dishonorable failure to

pay debts.

Captain Johanns did not violate the

“local civil law", however, since the law

of North Dakota provides that only a

“married person is guilty of a class A

misdemeanor if he or she engages in a

ll

sexual act with another person." North

Dakota Century Code Section 12.1-20-09

(1975). (emphasis mine)

The Court of Military Review affirmed

Captain Johanns' conviction on the ground

that adultery “although seldom prosecuted,

is a viable offense subject to trial by

court-martial and that “it is military law

which defines the parameters of the

offense of adultery, not state law."

(Slip Opinion at 4) What the Court failed

to recognize, however, was that adultery

had only been prosecuted by the military

when the accused himself was married.

The military law definitions of

Article 133 demonstrate why the finding of

guilty in petitioner's case is

unprecedented. It is well-established

that if an officer's conduct charged under

Article 133 does not constitute a crime,

it must “offend so seriously against law,

12

justice, morality or decorum as to expose

or disgrace socially or as a man, the

offender, and at the same time must be of

such a nature or committed under

circumstances as to bring dishonor or

disrepute upon the military profession

which he represents." Winthrop, Military

Law and Precedents, 711-712 (2d Ed., 1920

reprint). See also United States v.

Jefferson, 14 M.J. 806 (1982).

Winthrop further declared that the

“military community cannot expect, nor

Ought it to be expected of them, to

preserve a higher tone of moral conduct

than what is sustained by the higher

orders of society." Winthrop, Military

Law and Precedents, (2d ed. 1920 reprint),

ftn. 14, p. Jill.

The modern version of this rule is

found in Paragraph 212 of the Manual for

Courts-Martial, 1969 Rev. Ed., which

13

states explicitly that "(n)ot everyone is

or can be expected to meet ideal moral

standards."

The most authoritative studies of

sexual activity in the United States

reported that even in the early i950's

one-half of married men and one-fourth of

married women committed adultery sometime

in their married lives. Alfred Kinsey,

SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE

(Philadelphia 1953) p. 416, and Alfred

Kinsey, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE

(Philadelphia 1949), p. 585. Undoubtedly

the statistics are considerably higher

today.

During petitioner's court-martial

trial Colonel Lipscomb confirmed the

widespread acceptance of adultery at Minot

Air Force Base:

The morals of the Air Force are no

different than the majority of

14

their counterparts in civilian

life. I believe statistics will

demonstrate that at least 50% of

the males in the Air Force have

experienced extra-marital

relationships. I can name names of

high ranking officers who are well

known to be involved in such

activity and it is simply winked

at. (Appellate Exhibit VII)

Despite the fact that such activity

was occurring with regularity, Major

William Sherman, Staff Judge Advocate at

Minot Air Force Base, testified that

previous to this case there had been no

prosecutions for adultery. (R.22)

Hence, it is questionable whether

even an act of sexual intercourse by a

married officer with a woman not his wife

would meet the definition of an Article

15

133 violation in this day and age. In the

absence of aggravating circumstances, such

a private, consensual act by a single man

cannot by any stretch of the imagination

“offend so seriously against law, justice,

morality or decorum as to expose or

disgrace socially or as a man, the

offender, and at the same time ... bring

dishonor or disrepute upon the military

profession..."

Without military law precedent for

petitioner's conviction, the only possible

basis for the finding of guilty was some

non-military federal law. The only

context in which the question of what

constitutes adultery under federal law

arises is in the naturalization area. A

person may not become a naturalized

citizen unless he or she is of “good moral

character." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) provides

that no person who has "committed

16

adultery" shall be considered to be of

such moral character.

The federal courts have wrestled with

the question of how to define "adultery"

in this national context. Some courts,

most notably the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit, have determined that

adultery should be defined by

incorporating the law of the state in

which the alien resides into the federal

law. Brea-Garcia v. Immigration Service,

531 F. 2d 693 (3rd Cir. 1976).

Other courts such as the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia and

the Ninth Circuit have adopted a uniform

definition of adultery. According to this

"national" standard, extra-martial

intercourse is defined as “adultery" only

if it tends to destroy an existing

marriage and threatens public morality

(for example, it is “open and notorious

17

cohabitation"). See Moon Ho Kim v. U.S.

Immigration and Naturalization Service,

514 F. 2a 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wadman v.

Immigration and Naturalization Service,

329 F. 2d 812 (1964); Petition for

Naturalization of Richard Schroers, 336 F.

Supp. 1348 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); In re Edgar,

253 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1966);

Comment, Immigration Law-National

Standard, Incorporation of State Law or

Hybrid Test-State Definition of Adultery

Utilized for Determining Good Moral

Character, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1021 (1976).

Under any of the above tests Captain

Johanns could not have been found guilty.

Under North Dakota law he committed no

offense. His conduct did not destroy or

even jeopardize any marriage and the

relationship was neither open nor

notorious, but entirely private.

18

Since there was no precedent for the

Article 133 conviction of a single man for

engaging in a private, consensual act of

sexual intercourse, since the military

definition of Article 133. could not

encompass petitioner's conduct, and since

petitioner did not violate North Dakota

law or commit adultery as defined by any

other federal law, he lacked the requisite

constitutional notice that his action

would be considered felonious.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States

Constitution requires that statutes be

drafted with sufficient clarity to provide

"notice" of what activity is deemed to be

prohibited. Connally v. General

Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 392,

46 S. Ct., 70 L.Ed., 126, 128

(1927);Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,

109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed. 222 (1972).

ene ai

19

Because the military is allowed

greater latitude in the drafting of its

rules than would be constitutional in the

civilian forum, "the proper standard of

review for a vagueness challenge to the

articles of the (Uniform Code of Military

Justice) is the standard which applies to

criminal statutes regulating economic

affairs." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,

756-67, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed. (1974).

The Court defined that standard as

follows:

Void for vagueness simply means

that criminal responsibility should

not attach where one could not

reasonably understand that his

contemplated conduct is proscribed

- « « In determining the

sufficiency of the notice a

20

statute must of necessity be

examined in the light of the

conduct with which a defendant is

Charged. Id. at 757.

See Comment, Free Speech in the Military,

53 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 1102, 1109 (Nov.

1978).

The record clearly shows that

petitioner "could not reasonably

understand that his conduct would be

considered unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman" under Article 133 of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons petitioner

respectfully prays that this petition for

:

7

21

a writ of certiorari be granted.

Dated, Fresno, California.

July 26, 1985.

Respectfully submitted,

FRAMPTON, KARSHMER & KESSELMAN

Mary Louise Frampton

Major Conrad C. Baldwin, Jr.

Associate Appellate Defense

Counsel

United States Air Force

Attorneys for Petitioner,

MICHAEL A. JOHANNS

A-1

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT "A"

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW

UNITED STATES

Vv

Captain MICHAEL A. JOHANNS, 001-46-5650FR

UNITED STATES FIR FORCE

ACM 23699

26 OCT 1983

Sentence adjudged 2 July 1982 by GCM

convened at Minot Air Force Base, North

Dakota.

Military Judge: Michael C. Callinen.

Approved sentence: Dismissal.

Appellate Counsel for the Accusec :

Ms. Mary Louise Frampton, Fresno,

California, Colonel George R. Stevens and

Captain Kathleen G. O'Reilly. Appellate

Counsel for the United States: Colonel

Kenneth R. Rengert, Major Michael J.

Hoover and Captain Brenda J. Hollis.

Before

HODGSON, FORAY, HEMINGWAY, KASTL,

CANELLOS, RAICHLE, MILLER and

SNYDER

Appellate Military Judges, En Banc

A-2

DECISION

CANELLOS, Judge:

The accused was convicted, contrary

to his pleas, of adultery and of four

specifications of conduct unbecoming an

officer and a gentleman by having sexual

relations with three female enlisted

members (one of them married), and by

sharing a bed with the married woman

while she was intoxicated. 1/ The

“conduct unbecoming” specifications are

couched in terms that the accused did

“dishonorably and disgracefully

fraternize and associate on terms of

military equality with enlisted members

of the United States Air Force."

(emphasis added).

1i/ The charges upon which the accused

was arraigned were:

Charge I: Violation of the Uniform Code

of Military Justice, Article 133.

ee

A-3

The approved sentence extends to

dismissal from the service.

On appeal, the accused claims that

(1/7 cont.)

Specification l: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5

October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,

and disgracefully have sexual intercourse

with Donna R., Sergeant, United States

Air Force, the said Sergeant Donna R.

being, at that time, the lawful wife of

an active duty enlisted member of the

United States Air Force, contrary to the

customs and traditions of the armed

forces of the United States.

Specification 2: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 8

October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,

and disgracefully fraternize and

associate on terms of military equality

with enlisted members of the United

States Air Force, to wit: Sergeant Donna

R., by going into the military quarters

of the said Sergeant Donna R. at Minot

Air Force Base, North Dakota and sharing

the same bed with the said Sergeant Donna

R. while the said Sergeant Donna R. was

the lawful wife of an enlisted member of

the United States Air Force, contrary to

the customs and traditions of the armed

A-4

(1) the court lacked jurisdiction over

1/ cont.)

forces of the United States.

Specification 3: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot,

North Dakota, on three or four separate

occasions during September, 1981,

wrongfully, dishonorably, and

disgracefully fraternize and associate on

terms of military equality with Staff

Sergeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl K., a

female active duty enlisted member of the

United States Air Force, by engaging in

acts of sexual intercourse with the said

Staff Sergeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl K.,

contrary to the customs and traditions of

the armed forces of the United States.

Specification 4: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on two or three

occasions, during November, 1981,

wrongfully, dishonorably, and

disgracefully fraternize and associate on

terms of military equality with Senior

Airman Michelle P., then known as Senior

Airman Michelle S., a female active duty

enlisted member of the United States Air

Force, by engaging in acts of sexual .

intercourse with the said Senior Airman

Michelle P., then known as Senior Airman

Michelle S., contrary to the customs and

traditions of the armed forces of the

United States.

the adultery, charged as a violation of

Article 134, U.C.M.J.2/, since he did not

violate North Dakota law and his conduct

therefore did not discredit the armed

1/ cont.)

Charge II: Violation of the Uniform Code

of Military Justice, Article 134.

Specification: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, dic at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5

October 1981, wrongfully have sexual

intercourse with Donna R., a married

woman, not his wife.

2/ Art. 134. General article

Though not specifically mentioned in

this chapter, all disorders and neglects

to the prejudice of good order and

discipline in the armed forces, all

conduct of a nature to bring discredit

upon the armed forces, and crimes and

offenses not capital, of which persons

subject to this chapter may be guilty,

shall be taken cognizance of by a

general, special, or summary

court-martial, according to the nature

and degree of the offense, and shall be

punished at the discretion of that court.

A-6

forces, (2) Article 133,

U.C.M.J. 3/, is void for vagueness as it

applies to fraternization, (3) he was

tried on the basis of selective

prosecution, and (4) the ban on

fraternization abridges his right to

freedom of association.

The facts are not in dispute. The

accused was a single, 28 year old missile

combat crew commander who had been

stationed at Minot Air Force Base, North

Dakota, since completion of training in

1978. The Officers’ Open Mess at Minot

was being redecorated; as a result,

officers had been authorized to utilize

the facilities of the Noncommissioned

Officers' Open Mess. The accused availed

3/ Art. 133. Conduct unbecoming an

officer and a gentleman

Any commissioned officer, cadet, or

midshipman who is convicted of conduct

unbecoming an officer and a gentleman

A-7

himself of the opportunity and socialized

at the NCO Club. There he met Sgt. R.

(who was married), SrA P. and SSgt K. He

dated each and ultimately had sexual

relations with them all. On one

occasion, the accused and Sgt R. went on

a date downtown, and thereafter returned

to her house on base. Sgt. R. was

intoxicated and therefore remembers

nothing other than the next morning the

accused was asleep next to her in her

bed.

All this interaction was completely

consensual, private, nondeviate, and

sometimes instigated by the women

involved. The accused was neither the

commander nor supervisor of any of these

ee ee

3/ cont.)

shall be punished as a court-martial may

direct.

———oOoOoOoOoOwrre

A-8

enlisted members, and their respective

relationships were not publicized.4/ In

the opinion of the enlisted women, the

accused's activities were neither

dishonorable nor service discrediting.

The charges resulted from these

apparently private, voluntary liaisons.

I

We affirm the conviction of the

offense of adultery. Adultery, although

seldom prosecuted, is a viable offense

subject to trial by court-martial. See

generally United States v. Butler, 5

C.M.R. 213 (A.B.R. 1952); United States

v. Neville, 7 C.M.R. 180 (A.B.R. 1952).

The accused claims that under the

law of North Dakota he did not commit

4/ It was stipulated at trial that the

allegations were brought to the attention

of the accused's commander by a member of

his squadron on the basis of inferences

he drew from conversations with the

accused.

A-9

adultery; however, it is the military law

which defines the parameters of the

offense of adultery, not state law.

United States v. Panchisin, 30 C.M.R. 921 |

(A.F.B.R.), pet. denied, 31 C.M.R. 314

(1961). It is not required to show that

the accused was married; rather, it is

sufficient to show that either of the

participants was married to a third

party. United States v. Melville, 8

U.S.C.M.A. 597, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958);

United States v. Hedgecock, 30 C.M.R. 624

(N.B.R. 1960).

Accordingly, we are convinced that

the accused is guilty of the adultery as

charged. The evidence clearly

establishes that the accused had sexual

relations with a woman, not his wife.

The woman was an enlisted member of the

Untied States Air Force, married to a

noncommissioned officer on the same

A-10

base. An officer having sexual relations

with the wife of an enlisted

memberclearly acts in a manner

prejudicial to good order and discipline

under Article 134, U.C.M.J.5/

Having determined that the accused's

conduct amounted to actionable adultery,

we further find, on these facts, that he

was culpable c«¢ conduct unbecoming an

officer and a gentleman for such acts.

Il

We next turn our attention to the

four offenses bottomed on

“fraternization". It is propounded by

the Government that there is in the

United States Air Force a custom which

proscribes unlawful fraternization and

57 It is unnecessary to show that the

conduct of the accused was also of a

nature to bring discredit upon the armed

forces, this being an alternate method of

proving a violation of Article 134,

U.C.M.J.

3

|

?

z

j

g

5

a

.

A-11l

makes actionable the association of

officers with enlisted personnel on terms

of military equality. We find that the

time of the offenses in issue, there did

not exist a clearcut standard for gauging

so called "“fraternization" in the Air

Force; as a result, alleged violations

grounded on fraternization are not

actionable under the U.C.M.J.

We begin with an historical review

of the offense of fraternization. Prior

to its becoming a separate service, the

Air Force was, of course, a part of the

U.S. Army. There supposedly existed in

the Army a custom of the service that

officers and enlisted personnel would not

associate together in mutual social

activities. However, during World War

II, dating between officers and enlisted

personnel was commonplace, and if there

were any restrictions against such

A-12

interaction, they were not enforced. See

generally Treadwell, The Women's Army

Corps, in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (1954). This type of datingapparently

did not adversely affect morale and

discipline. J. HOLM, WOMEN IN THE

MILITARY, AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

(1982).

When it became a separate service,

the Air Force proclaimed that officers

and airmen would not generally associate

together in social activities; this more

progressive attitude was consistent with

the less formal atmosphere existing in

the Air Force, as compared with the Army.

See generally Flatten, Fraternization, 10

A.F. Reptr. 109 (1981). Since that time,

the Air Force has promulgated rules which

authorize certain activities on the part

of Air Force personnel, including those

dealing with housing and messing, which

ee re

oF ocak nen HO

ee a, ee en ee eS

A-13

contravene a strict application of what

was supposedly a customary prohibition

against fraternization.

A booklet on Air Force standards was

published in 1977. It did not discuss

fraternization, but did provide:

Since we live and work in a very

close environment and endure

common hardships, officer and

enlisted personnel frequently

develop close personal

friendships. However,

friendships must not interfere

with judgment or duty

performance. 6/

Within the last decade, the

directive governing the assignment of

on-base family quarters was changed to

authorize officers who were married to

6/ A.F.R. 30-1, Air Force Standards, 30

Sept 77, para 4b.

ila i

A-14

enlisted members to reside on base, with

an option to select whether they resided

in officer or enlisted housing. 7/ Prior

to that time, such a married couple would

not have normally been authorized to

reside on base because such was not

considered to be in the best interests of

the Air Force. 8/ The regulations

7/ A.F.R. 90-1, Assignment of Family

Housing, 19 Dec 77, Table 6-4.

8/ A.F.R. 30-6, Occupancy of Public

Quarters, 7 Feb 57, para 1l6c.

IF ONE SPOUSE IS AN OFFICER OR

WARRANT OFFICER, AND THE OTHER

IS AN ENLISTED PERSON,

assignment to family-type public

quarters is not considered to be

in the best interest of the

service, and such assignment

will not normally be made. In

this case, both members will be

permitted to reside jointly off

the base, regardless of the

availability of public quarters

for their occupancy.

eK

tatse vie Dred «Mere.

A-15

governing the operations of the Open

Messes were changed to permit officers

and enlisted personnel to patronize each

other's clubs as guests. 9/

Traditionally, such patronage was

restricted. 10/

In addition, the Air Force has

fostered management principles which

encourage close interpersonal

relationships at the expense of the

strict, customary distinction between

officers and airmen.

9/ A.F.M. 215-11, Operation of Open

Messes, 9 Oct 79, para. 1l-lla(2).

Officer and enlisted open mess

members may use one another's

open mess as guests. .. The

degree to which such privileges

are extended or encouraged is a

local decision based on

membership desires, space

limitations, social commitments,

and other morale or protocol

considerations.

10/ A.F.M. 176-3, Operations Manual

for Open Messes and Other Sundry

Nonappropriated Funds, 12 May 71.

A-16

The reported cases dealing with the

subject of fraternization have been few

and far between. They include: a U.S.

Army officer convicted of inviting an

enlisted man to his tent, offering him

liquor and then making homosexual

advances towards him; 11/ a U.S. Marine

officer convicted of inviting an enlisted

man to his room on base where he gave

himliquor and made homosexual advances;

12/

a U.S. Navy officer convicted of taking

an enlisted man to the Officers' Club,

then to his room on base and there

committing acts of sodomy. 13/ In that

case, the Court of Military Appeals

recommended that actions violative of the

ll/ United States v. Livingston, 8 C.M.R.

206 (A.B.R. 1952).

12/ United States v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466

(N.B.R. 1953).

13/ United States v. Pitasi, 20

a

~-S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31 (1971).

:

3

A-17

custom against fraternization should be

included in an appropriate regulation so

that adequate notice is given to all

ne bes ecelnneiied iat 204 Rahn Be eR 4 tous

potential violators. A U.S. Navy officer

was convicted of bringing an enlisted man

into his apartment to live, ard there

committing acts of sodomy with him. 14/

One Judge of the U.S. Court of Military

Appeals recommended that violations of

this type be handled by administrative

means. A U.S. Army warrant officer was

acquitted of rape, but convicted of

drinking with three enlisted personnel,

taking them to this house, where he

bathed one female and had sexual

relations. 15/ A U.S. Army

noncommissioned officer was convicted of

sleeping in the barracks with two

14/ United States v. Lovejoy, 20

U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970).

5/ United States v. Froelke, 390 F.

Supp. 503 (D.D.c. 1975).

i a i

A-18

enlisted members whom he supervised as

first sergeant. 16/ A U.S. Army officer

was convicted of committing adultery with

an enlisted woman in his chain of

command, during duty hours, in the

barracks. 17/ Finally, this Court, in an

unpublished decision, held that an

officer who provided drugs to her

subordinates, and then used drugs with

them, could be convicted of unlawful

fraternization; however, because of an

instructional failure, the conviction as

to that specification was disapproved.

18/

16/ United States v. Horton, 14 M.J. 96

(c.M.A. 1982) (rev'd on other grounds).

17/ United States v. Jefferson, 14 M.J.

806 (A.C.M.R. 1982).

18/ United States v. Rodriguez, ACM

23545, (A.F.C.M.R. 29 October 1982)

(Judge Miller concurring in result, and

finding that the Air Force regulations

"have not only terminated the existence

of the custom [against fraternization],

but also the offense that was once

chargeable as a violation of that

custom.")

- |

ee ee} —-

A-19

In all of these reported cases, some

aberrant conduct was in evidence;

homosexual activity, alleged rape,

supervisors seeking sexual favors from

their subordinates and performing

indecent acts before others. Notably

absent from the opinions in the cited

cases is any discussion of voluntary,

private, non-deviate sexual activity

between of-age officer and enlisted

members, who were not associated with one

another in any way on duty.

After this review of history and

case law, we address the immediate

question. To assist us, the Government,

in its able oral argument, asks this

Court to declare that mere dating between

officers and airmen violates custom; that

non-deviate, consensual and private

sexual intercourse between them violates

custom; and finally that marriage between

them violates custom, but is a "fait

A-20

accompli" against which the Government,

yielding to a higher priority, chooses to

take no action.

We expressly refuse to so declare.

If there exists a customary ban on

fraternization, and the avowed reason for

such a custom is that fraternization is

inimical to good order and discipline in

the armed forces, how then could marriage

change that effect: In our opinion, the

situation would appear exacerbated by the

closer relationship spawned by the

marriage.

Whether the present situation is

good or bad for overall readiness is not

the issue before this Court. Rather we

must measure the accused's alleged

criminal conduct against the “real world"

in which all-ranks housing and messing,

and officer-enlisted marriages are

currently authorized. Given such

practices, authorized by regulation, we

A-21

cannot say that seeing each other

socially and dating is criminal conduct.

Furthermore, once it is acceptable

to have officers married to enlisted

members, it is logical to conclude that

mere dating is also acceptable, since

that is nothing more than the socially

accepted preliminary stage to such

marriages. Also using our common sense

and knowledge of human nature and the

ways of the world, we note that it is not

an uncommon practice for men and women

who are dating, with or without marriage

in sight, to engage in sexual

relationships; in contemporary society

such a practice is not considered immoral

or unusual.

A-22

a

III

We close our discussion by examining

ee

the aspect of the crimes charged with is

premised on conduct unbecoming an officer

and a gentleman under Article 133,

U.C.M.J. Because the words thereof are

so broad, it is argued by the accused

that the standard set thereby is

ambiguous, and the Article fails for

vagueness. See generally Nelson, Conduct

Expected of an Officer and a Gentleman:

Ambiguity, 12 JAG L. REV. 124 (1970).

Despite this, the Untied States Supreme

Court has held that the Article is not

facially vague; therefore, an officer may

be punished thereunder for offenses that

he has "no reasonable doubt .. . were

both ‘unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman’ and ‘to the prejudice of good

order and discipline in the armed |

, |

A-23

forces.'" Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,

94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974).

In the evolution of the "Void for

Vagueness Doctrine," this rule has

emerged: To satisfy the requirements of

the Due Process Clause of the U.S.

Constitution, a criminal statute must

clearly spell out the activity being

proscribed so that persons of reasonable

intelligence can understand the expected

conduct and thereafter conform their

conduct to it. Any statute which fails

to accomplish this is void. United

States v. National Dairy Products, 372

U.S. 29, 83 S. Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed. 2d 561

(1963).

Customs of the service can clarify

the general article and help define the

standard expected. In order to qualify

as such, a custom must be uniform, a

known practice of long standing, certain

A-24

and reasonable, and not in conflict with

existing statutes or constitutional

provisions. See Winthrop, Military Law

and Precedents, 42 (2d e.d 1920

reprint). Likewise, non-usuage may

eliminate a previously well-established

custom. M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.), para. 213b.

As we discussed earlier, the standards

and customs of the prior day, not

memorialized by regulation, are no longer

effective as such. In the context of the

offenses charged here, rather than

solving the vagueness becomes even more

pronounced; this is so because the

customs themselves are unwritten and

vague. See generally Nelson, supra.

Looking at the issues from another

viewpoint, Congress never intended to

regulate the wholly private moral conduct

of an individual service member under the

general articles. United States v.

~~

wore

ar ee

Se

A-25

Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, C.M.R. zo

(1952). Therefore, it has been

consistently held that fornication in the

absence of aggravating factors is not an

offense under military law. United

States v. Snyder, supra; United States v.

Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 20 C.M.R. 325

(1956); United States v. Wilson, 32

C.M.R. 517 (a.b.r. 1962). Sharing a bed

with a woman without proof of sexual

intercourse, is also net an offense

absent such aggravating factors. United

States v. Prater, 5 B.R. & J.C. 228

(1950).

It is the nature of the acts

themselves, the place where they occur,

the presence of absence of other people,

the military relationship between the

officer and the enlisted member, and the

likely effects of the incident on the

attitude of the enlisted member and

A-26

others present which are all important in

determining whether sexual acts between

officers and enlisted members are

unlawful. United States v. Jefferson, 14

C.M.R. 806 (A.C.M.R. 1982); Murphy, The

Soidier's Right to a Private Life, 24

Mil. L. Rev. 97 (1964).

With this background on

fraternization and conduct unbecoming an

officer, we consider the facts of this

case on its merits. Clearly the acts of

fornication with SrA P. and SSgt. K. had

no attendant exacerbating circumstances.

They were voluntary, private and

non-deviate. If the accused had been an

enlisted man, he clearly would not have

been culpable.

Concededly, officers are held to a

higher standard of conduct than enlisted

personnel, and their conduct should be

exemplary. However, an act should not be

A-27

labelled as criminal if committed by an

officer but innocent when committed by an

enlisted person, especially when a

critical question turns on an

interpretation of the law. United States

v.- Claypool, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 302, 27 C.M.R.

376 (1959).

The only basis for finding the

accused culpable for these offenses is

that his status as an officer, coupled

with the enlisted status of the women,

made the acts wrongful. In order to

sustain that finding, we must conclude

that the acts themselv»s were criminal

because of their surrounding

circumstances. 19/ This we find not

197°". . . To constitute therefore the

conduct here denounced, [unbecoming an

officer and gentleman] the act which

forms the basis of the charge must have a

double significance and effect. Though

it need not amount to a crime, it must

offend so seriously against law, justice,

morality or decorum as to expose to

disgrace socially or as a man, the

A-28

supportable by the evidence. 20/

We specifically find that as a matter

of fact and law the custom in the Air Force

against fraternization has been so eroded

as to make criminal prosecution against an

officer for engaging in mutually voluntary,

private, non-deviate sexual intercourse

with an enlisted member, neither under his

19/ cont.)

offender, and at the same time must be of

such a nature or committed under such

circumstances as to bring dishonor or

disrepute upon the military profession

which he represents." Winthrop, Military

Law and Precedents, 711-712 (2d Ed., 1920

reprint).

20/ The accused was concerned that his

amorous involvements with enlisted women

could be wrong. As a result, he consulted

his supervisor, Col W., who told the

accused that, in his opinion, it would be

actionable fraternization if the accused

dated enlisted women. Col W. admitted that

he was not sure if this were the Air Force

policy, however it was clearly his

opinion. When pressed by the accused, Col

W. gave the accused a copy of the article

written by Colonel Flatten, referred to

herein, and told to read it since it

explained Air Force policy. Our reading of

this article reveals that the author

believes there is no longer a violation of

custom for an officer to "fraternize”" with

A-29

command nor supervision, unavailable. 21/

Accordingly, only so much of the

findings as finds the accused guilty of

207 cont.)

an enlisted member, so long as they have no

command or supervisory relationship.

Further, testimony at trial from a former

wing commander at Minot AFB, indicated that

"“fraternization" was common on the base.

21/ We do not by this opinion indicate our

personal assessment of the moral

implications of the conduct described

above. We certainly do not mean to imply

that the conduct was model, nor that it

should be condoned. As reecognized earlier,

situations of this type may best be handled

by administrative means. Also, we

recognized that a stricter rule on

fraternization may be required and

desirable. This could be done by

appropriate service regulation.

We note that the dissenting judges all

assert, without citation of relevant

precedent, that the activities of the

accused were of the type to be prejudicial

to good order-and discipline. We discern no

bedrock authority for such conviction and we

conclude that it is based on their personal

perceptions of what the standards ought to

be, not on a careful analysis of what the

standard is in the United States Air Force

today.

We are a court of law and are charged

with the responsibility of determining

existing law and applying it to the facts of

a case. It is no part of our duty to

A-30

committing adultery, as alleged in Charge

II, and of conduct unbecoming an officer

for the conduct attendant thereto, as

alleged in Specification 1 of Charge I, is

affirmed. The remaining findings of guilty

are set aside and are dismissed. The

sentence is set aside. A rehearing on the

sentence is ordered. 22/

Notwithstanding a sizeable body of law

to the contrary, the majority has concluded

that the prohibition against improper

fraternization no longer exists as an

offense within the Air Force. My

colleagues accurately point out many areas

in which the Air Force has fostered the

growth of close friendships between officer

and enlisted ranks, and, through its own

regulations, created circumstances that

21/ cont.)

conceal what is so or to engage in wishful

thinking that the policy ought to be

different. In short, we are not a policy

making body-such authority reposes in those

authorized policy making powers (command).

22/ The government's Motion To File Documents

1s, DENIED.

SO a LP

A-31

could be viewed as eroding fraternization

as prohibited conduct.

Likewise Judge Snyder, I cannot

logically reconcile the Air Force's

position that fraternization that

blossoms into marriage is acceptable,

while that which continues at a less

committed level is wrong. However, I can

more readily accept this "pocket of de

facto immunity" resulting from marriage

than I can the erosion of discipline

that, in my view, will result from the

elimination of fraternization as an

offense.

The prohibition against

fraternization by officers with enlisted

members is based on preserving military

discipline, not social inequality.

United States v. Livingston, supra.

There is merit in the bromide that

“familiarity breeds contempt." In the

context of a military community, orders

A-32

are to be obeyed, not discussed in the

light of the personal relationship

between the person giving the order and

the individual expected to obey it. Thus

it is the time, the place, and the

circumstances which dictate the propriety

ef the relationship between officer and

enlisted members. United States v. Free,

supra. The prohibition against

fraternization within a military

organization serves a valid and necessary

purpose in maintaining good order and

discipline. United States v. Pitasi,

supra; United States v. Lovejoy, supra.

Accordingly, in my opinion fraternization |

remains an offense within the Air Force

and is punishable under appropriate

circumstances.

Finally, assuming, arguendo, that

fraternization no longer exists as an

offense within the Air Force, the

accused's conduct with female enlisted

A-33

subordinates clearly amounts to conduct

unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

The majority concludes that since the

alleged acts, if committed by an enlisted

member would not invoke criminal

sanctions, the accused officer therefore,

lacks culpability. I cannot accept this

premise. A higher standard of conduct is

required in law of an officer than is

required of others. United States v.

Means, 10 M.J. 162 (C.M.A. 1981); United

States v. Parini, 12 M.J. 679 (A.C.M-R-

1981). The Supreme Court of the United

States has stated on several occasions

that a military officer holds a position

of special trust and responsibility.

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct.

2547, 41 L.Ed. 2d 439 (1974); Orloff v.

Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97

L.Ed. 842 (1953). Senior Judge Hemingway

concurring in United States v. Newak, 15

M.J. 541, 545 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982), made

A-34

clear the expected standard. He wrote:

Commissioned officers have a

special responsibility to

conduct themselves in a manner

that promotes discipline,

obedience and respect. That

responsibility cannot be checked

at the gate on the way home at

the end of the duty day.

{Emphasis added]

An officer who has sexual relations with

an enlisted subordinate has acted ina

manner that is totally incompatible with

promoting discipline, obedience and

respect. See generally United States v.

King, M.J. (A.C.M.R. 1983). This

erosion of discipline is as true

regarding the officer's sexual partner as

for other military members who invariably

hear of the encounter.

For these reasons, I must with

deference dissent from Parts II and III

et wee an —

Ol

A-32

of the principal opinion.

SNYDER, Judge (concurring in part and

dissenting in part):

I fully concur with the holding that

the accused's sexual relations with the

wife of an enlisted member constitute

conduct palpably prejudicial to good

order and discipline. Such conduct does

not require sophisticated analysis in

order to reveal its adverse impact on

discipline and morale, especially in

light of the fact that military members

are frequently required to be absent from

their home base for lenghty periods. 1/

However, I dissent from the

majority's conclusion that the accused's

sexual liaisons with three enlisted women

did not constitute conduct unbecoming an

officer and gentleman. I will not

T7 The husband of the accused's partner

was performing temporary duty outside the

United States during the period of their

amorous liaison.

Se ee Re ee ee ee eRe eT eT

A-36

belabor the reader with a point by point

dissection of the majority opinion.

Suffice it to say that it misses the

mark.

Initially, I offer advice to those

officers who may mistakenly read the

majority opinion as carte blanche to

embark upon indiscriminate activities

with enlisted personnel of the opposite.

In my opinion, the majority result means

only that one may not be prosecuted under

the U.C.M.J. for conduct similar to the

accused's. Commanders retain the full

array of administrative sanctions,

including administrative termination of

commissioned status.

The following quote from the

majority opinion indicates the inherent

fallacy of its conclusion:

However, an act should not be

labelled as criminal if

A-37

committed by an officer but innocent

when committed by an enlisted person

- « »- +» (citations omitted)

That statement assumes that an officer is

just like any other military member,

although lip service is offered to the

contrary.

The fact of the matter is officers

are held to a higher standard of conduct;

and, demanding that the standard be met

can, will, and does result in an officer

being held criminally accountable in

situations wher# enlisted members'

derelictions may be disposed of

nonjudicially. This differential is

recognized and sanctioned by the Court of

Military Appeals. I offer the following

excerpts from the Chief Judge's opinion

in United States v. Means, 10 M.J. 162,

165 and 166 (C.M.A. 1981).

A-38

Even if appellant's officer

status had been a principal

factor-indeed, the decisive

factor-in the convening

authority's decision to refer

the case to a general

ocnteusette. appellant would

still have no valid

constitutional grievance.

=

We find nothing arbitrary

about a commander's

determination to take officer

status into account in referring

cases for trial by

court-martial. Such an exercise

of prosecutorial discretion is

quite in line with the

consistent recognition that

commissioned officers in the

Armed Services occupy a special

A-39

position of trust and duty.

ae oo

In short, the Armed Services

comprise a hierarchical society,

which is based on military rank.

Within that society commissioned

officers have for many purposes

been set apart from other

groups. Since officers have

special privileges 2/ and hold

special positions of honor, it

is not unreasonable that they be

held to a high standard of

accountability.

The essence of this principle is

that whatever the environment, an officer

always has the responsibility of

conducting one-self as an officer--be it

27 Many of the special privileges

referenced by the Chief Judge are no

longer a reality. I address this fact

later in the opinion.

A-40

in a consolidated mess, as an infrequent

guest at the noncommissioned officers’

open mess, 3/ or as a member of

anintramural athletic team. The officer

must ensure that undue familiarity does

not develop. The fact that the Air Force

encourages certain social intercourse in

the pursuit of espirit de corps does not

detract from this responsibility.

However, the official encouragement of

such limited intercourse has been

misconstrued as a subtle acceptance of

all types of relationships tween

officers and enlisted personnel. A close

reading of policy releases on the subject

will reveal that not to be the case. The

individual responsibility of officers is

3/ cont.) ©

Note 9 of the majority opinion omits the

following sentence from the referenced

regulatory provision: "However, wearing

the military uniform in such instances

and repeatedly inviting members to one

another's open mess is

discouraged.

always included.

OFFICER-ENLISTED MARRIAGES: It

would be intellectually dishonest for me

to even attempt to hypothesize a legally

acceptable position on this anomaly.

Suffice it so say that because of the

system's implicit acquiescence, those who

have joined in such marriages enjoy a

pocket of de facto immunity. 4/ However,

that is not an adequate explanation for

the failure to take action, especially

where the situation is known prior to the

parties marrying. Obviously, such

marriages have contributed to the

turbulence surrounding he issue.

It is probably safe to say that if

these marriages were not “accepted," or

4/ Although a fair number of these

marriages are the result of one of the

parties thereto obtaining a commission

after marrying, that fact does not

resolve the issue or reduce the dilemma.

A-42

tolerated, the majority opinion could

very well be the dissenting opinion.

They raise a very fair question: Given

their existence, why should one be

prosecuted for dating an enlisted person?

Perhaps the closest analogy is that

takiuxs % prosecute all offenders is no

cause to immunize all. However, it

should not escape the reader that the

desire of others to emulate the conduct

which led to those marriages is one

possible example of the pernicious impact

of officer-enlisted marriages.

The main reason for the post-World

War II uncertainty which surrounds this

topic continues to be the misconception

that the doctrine is grounded on social

or intellectual inferiority.

Inferiority, perceived or otherwise, has

absolutely no bearing on the issue. The

only driving force is DISCIPLINE. Anyone

inh

< Aas terns.

A-43

who believes that a leader can

mechanically assign a "friend" to

unpopular or hazardous duty is

unrealistic. Axiomatically, the troops

will be highly aware of the duties

assigned to an enlisted person(s) with

whom an officer habitually associates or

consorts. That is the prejudice to good

order and discipline which the line

between the ranks is meant to prevent;

and an officer and a gentleman

will endeavor to keep oneself on the

appropriate side of that line.

At any rate, making the presence or

absence of a supervisory relationship the

determining test is also erroneous. Neat

compartmentalizations and unit lines have

a way of evaporating under combat

conditions. An officer's authority and

status transcends “unit lines of

boundary." Otherwise, e. g., where is

A-44

the authority to correct a uniform or

other violation of one not a member of

the correcting officer's unit?

Because of the adverse impact on

discipline, and the compromising position

which ensues, I would hold that the

accused's actions constituted conduct

unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,

and affirm all findings of guilty.

Although not necessary for the

discussion of the issue before us, I feel

compelled to make the following

observations. The issue with which we

wrestle in this case is not truly the

problem. Captain Johanns and others like

him are merely manifestations of the

symptoms of a larg2r and pervasive

problem, as is the increasing number of

courts-martial involving the officer

accused. Young officers are assuming

their rank without an understanding of

ex

ee ee

A-45

the significance of receiving a

commission from the President, or an

appreciation of the special trust and

responsibility which accompany the

commission. To far too many, it is a pay

grade rather than a status. But they do

not bear the sole responsibility.

It is time for the Air Force's

command echelon to squarely address the

situation (and in a real sense it is a

dilemma), and accept the fact that one

reason for the dilemma's existence is the

effort to increase the prestige of an

increasingly educated enlisted corps. 5/

2/ This is where the misconception

concerning inferiority really raises its

head. Since probably close to half, if

not more, of the enlisted corps holds

college degrees, the system cannot be

viewed as failing to recognize its

talented people. Unfortunately, a

significant degree of the prestige

bestowed upon the top enlisted grades has

been at the expense of the officer

_anks--primarily the junior grades.

A-46

Allowing the gradual erosion of many, if

not all, of the trappings which once

accompanied commissioned officer status

has contributed to the problem. Why

should one act differently if the system

treats everyone identically? 6/ The

"victims" of this state of affairs are

the company grade and lower field grade

officers

As Chief Judge Everett opined in

United States v. Means, supra, the

existence of special privileges creates

special obligations. But more

importantly, they create a very real

incentive to demonstrate one's worthiness

to have and to hold special privileges.

Perhaps a reemphasis, or resurrection, of

6/ Assigning members in the top three

enlisted grades to Visiting Officers

Quarters (VOQ) and the blurring of the

distinctions between officers' and

enlisted members' uniforms are only two

examples.

A-47

some of those small intangibles will

reduce the number of offices who opt to

"be one of the guys” rather than a

leader.

MILLER, Judge (concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

In so far as the majority recognizes

that no “custom of the service" exists in

the United States Air Force which

criminalizes "fraternization" (social

intercourse) between officers and

enlisted personnel, I concur. See the

evidence I presented for this position in

United States v. Rodriguez, ACM 23545, 29

October 1982 (unpublished).

In so far, however, a the majority

concludes that the absence of such a

criminally enforceable "custom" precludes

prosecution of those associations between

officers and enlisted personnel which any

reasonably prudent officer should

A-48

immediately recognize are harmful to the

maintenance of good order and discipline

within the armed forces, I dissent. In

my opinion, it is positively ludicrous to

imply, as the majority has done in this

case, that an officers corps can maintain

the dignity and respect necessary to

command the unquestioning obedience and

trust of enlisted subordinates, if its

members are permitted to randomly compete

with one half of its insubordinate

population for the privilege of engaging

that subordinate population's other half

in the intimacies of recreational

fornication.

Accordingly, in addition to

affirming the adultery specification, I

would also affirm those specifications

that allege conduct unbecoming an officer

in that the accused's acts of fornication

with enlisted personnel were, by their

A-49

very nature, palpably and directly

prejudicial to continued good order and

discipline in the United States Air

Force.

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE

| TERMS "CUSTOM OF THE SERVICE"

AND "FRATERNIZATION"

Much has been written in recent case

law and legal. literature concerning a

“long standing ‘custom of the service'"

ee aR lino ae he

that allegedly prohibits "fraternization"

between military officers and enlisted

| personnel. 1/ The general gist of these

I7 See OPJAGAF 1971/69, 30 July 1971;

| Flatten, Fraternization, 10 Air Force

; Reporter 109 (Aug 1981). See generally,

H Nelson, Conduct Expected of an Officer

and a Gentleman: Ambiguity, 12 JAG L.

Rev. 124 (1970); Murphy, The Soldier's

Right to a Private Life, 24 Mil. L. Rev.

97 (1964); J. Holm, Women in the

Military, An Unfinished Revolution

(1982); M.E. Treadwell, The Women's Army

|

. Corps (1954). See also, U.S. v-

Rodriguez, supra; United States v. _

Pitasi, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31

A-50

writings asserts that early in our

nation's military history, any social

intercourse whatever between officers and

enlisted personnel, subjected both

categories of offenders to immediate

court-martial. it then implies that as

our nation's concepts of democratic

freedom of association expanded and

permeated our military population, lines

demarcating such unacceptable social

intercourse between officers and enlisted

personnel became hopelessly blurred

(i-.e., the Line separating those

associations which constituted the per se

“custom of the service" offense of

“fraternization" from those associations

17 cont.)

(1971); United States v. Lovejoy, 41

C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M.R. 1968); United States

v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953);

United States v. Livingston, 9 C.M.R. 206

(A.B.R. 1952); United States v. Rabb, 81

B.R. 77 (1948; United States v.

aioe

‘

- ee ee ee eee

A-51

associations which were entirely

acceptable, changed so rapidly and

frequently that any semblance of the

“common consent of the governed"

necessary to successfully prosecute such

“custom of the service" offenses was

effectively obliterated).

Specifically, these writings

reasoned that because paragraph 213b, MCM

(Rev.), 1969, states that a:

[c]ustom arises out of long

established practices which by

common consent have attained the

force of law in the military or

other community affected by

them,

then, “custom of the service" offenses,

by definition, must cease their existence

once the long established and accepted

practices upon which they have

purportedly been based, change.

A-52

Applying this logic to the instant

case, the majority, first, correctly

notes that it is no longer uncommon for

Air Force officers and enlisted personnel

to engage in activities that involve

mutual social intercourse. Then, after

pointing out that such activities violate

those long established and accepted

general practices upon which the Air

Force's ban against “fraternization" is

purportedly based, it concludes that the

Air Force's "custom of the service"

offense prohibiting "fraternization" is

no longer viable. It continues that,

since fornication is but a particularized

type of "fraternization" (albeit, a

uniquely intimate one), any prohibitions

specifically precluding officers from

engaging consenting enlisted personnel in

this particular activity has also

fallen. Accordingly, the majority

A-53

concludes that, today, Air Force officers

who fornicate with consenting enlisted

personnel (or at least consenting

enlisted persons who are not directly

subordinate to them) do not commit an

offense that is prosecutable under the

U.C.M.J.

While I can well under the initial

attractiveness of this logic (I

erroneously went down the same "rose

colored path" in Rodriguez, supra), an

in-depth historical analysis of its basic

underlying assumptions shows that it is

entirely spurious.

CUSTOM OF THE SERVICE OFFENSES

Violations of a “custom of the

service," per se, have never been

prosecutable in the Army or the Air Force

and they can no longer be prosecuted, as

such, in any other branch of the armed

A-54

forces of the United States. 2/

2/ The term "custom of the service,"

as descriptive of a type of per se

military offense, was used in none of

the Articles of War or Army/Air Force

Manuals for Court-Martial that

pre-dated the U.C.M.J. and its

implementing Manual for

Courts-Martial. Neither was it ever

used in such a sense by Colonel

Winthrop in any of his sundry

treatises interpreting the various

versions of this nation's Articles of

War. Nor was it ever used by any of

those editors of Army Digest of

Opinions who succeeded Winthrop.

Rather, any use of the term "custom

of the service” in all pre-U.C.M.J.

military justice law, manuals, and

treatises, was always restricted to

either matters of court-martial

procedure (including commonly held

military definitions of certain word

descriptive of the legislatively

pronounced elements of some offenses)

or determinations of allowable

punishments. See, e.g., Winthrop,

Military Laws and Precedent, second

edition (1920), at 41-42. Absent

reduction of a custom or courtesy of

the service to a law or regulation,

or the independently prosecutable

‘nature of a violator's conduct under -

the general articles of the Code, or

its predecessing Articles of War, its

violation was simply non-prosecutable

at courts-martial. See, e.g.,

Winthrop, supra, at 617. Of over 284

opinions involving allegations of

offenses involving untoward

relationships between officers and

A-55

While the term “customs and

2/ cont.)

enlisted personnel reported in the 81

volume JAGD Board of Review Opinions,

spanning 1929-1948, the 34 volume

JAJD Board of Review Opinions

(European Theater of Operations),

spanning 1943-1946, and the 12 volume

JAGD Board of Review and Judicial

Council Opinions, spanning 1949-1951,

only five of the least artful even

referenced the term “custom of the

service." In the only pre-Codal case

that actually charged an accused with

an Article of War 95/96 offense

(prejudicial to discipline, conduct

unbecoming) alleging that an

accused's conduct was not in

accordance with the “customs of the

service," the charge was disapproved.

See United States v.- Jones, supra.

In three of the others, each of which

was upheld a lesser included Article °

of War 96 (currently, U.C.M.J., Art.

134( violation of an Article of War

95 (currently, U.C.M.J., Art. 133)

conviction, the term was used only as

a shorthand reference to the fact

that the particular misconduct

alleged had always been deemed

prejudicial to good order and

discipline in past Board of Review

Opinions. See United States v.

Bunker, supra; United States v.

Patterson, supra; United States v.

Rabb, supra. In the fifth case, the

term was simply a part of the

following catch-all sencence: "The

A-56

courtesies of the service" has long

2/ cont.)

acceptance by an officer of

gratuities from enlisted personnel is

subversive of good order and

discipline, is contrary to the

customs of the service, and to the

spirit of...(a specific paragraph of

an Army regulation)." See United

States v. Price, 42 B.R. 243 (1944).

When the U.C.M.J. (which, in

1950, for the first time, brought all

members of United States military

services under a single code of

justice) was enacted, it continued

the legislative tradition of the

Articles of War by, again, refusing

to recognize mere breaches of

military custom or courtesy as a

basis for trial by courts-martial.

In an effort to placate Navy fears

that the new U.C.M.J.‘'s Article 134

might not encompass all those "custom

of the service offenses" that had

previously been punishable by the

Navy's Articles for the Government of

the Navy (see Decker, History,

Preparation and Processing, Manual

for Courts-Martial, United States,

1951, at pp. 293-294 and footnote 5,

herein, infra), the drafter of the

1951 Manual for Courts-—Martial

specifically mentioned that "a breach

of a custom of the service may result

in a violation of [the disorder and

neglects to the prejudice of good

order and discipline in the armed

forces] clause of [U.C.M.J.] Article

Natal ones

A-57

been used by all United States

2/ cont.)

134 (see M.C.M., paragraph 213b).

But, both the language and placement

of the quoted phrase, clearly belie

any intention of to create a new

category of per se offenses for

simple breaches of military custom or

courtesy; rather, the language simply

acknowledges the obvious; to wit:

that breaches of military custom and

courtesy that also amount to conduct

prejudicial to good order and

discipline in the armed forces may be

charged as a conduct prejudicial to

good order and discipline under

U.C.M.J., Article 134. Of 34

opinions involving allegations of

untoward relationships between

officers and enlisted personnel

reported in the 50 volume

Court-Martial Reports and volumes

1-15 of the Military Justice

Reporter, only four reference the

term “custom of the service." In the

first of these, the term's use is

limited to a simple statement that

long standing "customs of the

service" prohibit officers from

engaging in social intercourse with

enlisted personnel to the extent that

the familiarity induced by such

social intercourse affects or

prejudices good order of military

discipline. See United States v.

Livingston, supra. The second, after

essentially repeating the language of

the first, adds that the

A-58

military services to describe

2/ cont.)

determination of which specific

social intercourse between officers

and enlisted personnel is prejudicial

to good order or military discipline

must be based upon the circumstances

surrounding specific instances of

such social intercourse. See United

States v. Free, supra. The third,

rejects an argument that offenses

based upon alleged violations of

“customs of the service" are

inherently uncertain, indefinite, and

unclear, noting that like any other

Article 134 offense, the conduct

violative of the alleged custom must

be shown by its surrounding

circumstances to be prejudicial to

good order and discipline. See

United States v. Lovejoy, supra. And

the fourth, representing the Court of

Military Appeals' only comment

regarding the term, conforms the

progressive logic of the first three

to that Court's previous holdings

regarding the continued validity of

all Article 134 charges, extending

the progressive logic of Livingston,

Free, and Lovejoy so as to recognize

that certain acts engaged in by an

officer with an enlisted person, may

“by their very nature, [be] palpably

and directly prejudicial to the good

order and discipline of the service,"

and thus violative of Article 134.

See United States v. Pitasi, supra.

It is plainly evident,

therefore, that the additional

> anal ere nia

ana eet hay

A-59

unwritten traditions of military

service, 3/ only the now defunct

Naval Courts and Boards, 1937, ever

2/ cont.)

language of Paragraph 213b, M.C.M.

(1951) which specifically noted that

the Code's Article 134 prohibition

includes any breaches of long

standing "customs of the service"

that coincidentally meet that

Article's criteria, in no way changed

the pre-Codal «iew of “customs of the

service." Concuct breaching customs

or courtesies of the service may

still not be prosecuted in their own

right. They continue to be

prosecutable only if, coincidentally,

the conduct they proscribe, also

happens to constitute conduct which

is prejudicial to good order and

discipline in the armed forces or

conduct unbecoming an officer, and,

of course, then, they are

prosecutable only because they

independently violate either U.C.M.J.

Article 133, not because they also

happen to breach a “custom of the

service."

3/ Surveys of current "customs of

the service," contained in recent

issues of The Air Officer's Guide (an

unofficial, but continually updated

source book, that Air Force officers

are often urged to obtain and read)

identify numerous current “customs of

the service." A brief sampling,

reveals the following diversity:

A-60

endeavored to make the simple

3/ cont.)

officers will not walk under

umbrellas; an officer's word or

statement will ordinarily be accepted

without question; officers and airmen

will not generally associate together

in mutual social activities; when a

junior walks with his senior he takes

a position abreast and to the

senior's left; the word "Sir" must be

used when junior officers address

senior ones, and by all airmen who

address officers; officers should

remain at a reception or social

gathering until their commander has

departed; when a child is born to an

officer's family, the base commander

is to send a personal letter of

congratulations to the parents on

behalf of his command; officers will

support activities of their units, as

well as, activities of the entire

base; officers will periodically

attend religious services at their

base chapels; an officer's uniform

and “his official or social position

must not be defamed; an officer never

volunteers excuses; all official

communications to superiors must be

routed through command echelons;

officers do not use vulgar or profane

language; excessive indebtedness must

be avoided; and airmen and officers

stand erect unless seated, they must

not lean.

While it is true that the

origins of most of these customs are

unknown, today, the prohibition

against vulgar or profane language

A-61

violation of some of these customs,

in and of themselves, triable by

courts-martial. 4/

3/ cont.)

can be traced back as far as the

Ordinance of Richard I, dated 1190

(see Winthrop, supra, at 903) and

required attendance at religious

services, mandatory use of command

echelons in communications, and bans

against close officer/soldier

associations are traceable back

through the Code of Articles of King

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, dated

1621 (see Winthrop, supra, at

907-918. Indeed, James Thomas

Flexner, in his definitive biography

of George Washington, characterized

the Continental forces’ failure to

observe the "custom of the service"

prohibiting social familiarity

between its officers and enlisted

people as the greatest problem the

general encountered when he assumed

command of those forces.

Pn eee <

Oe

4/ Article 22, Articles for the

Government of the Navy (1934 edition)

provided:

(a) Offenses not

specified.--

All offenses committed by

persons belonging to the Navy

which are not specified in

the foregoing articles shall

be punished as a court

1 (47 contined)

martial may direct.

(b) Fraudulent enlistment.--

Fraudulent enlistment, and

the receipt of any pay or

allowance thereunder, is

hereby declared an offense

against naval discipline and

made punishable by general

court martial, under this

article.

In explaining the meaning of

Article 22(a), Article 22(a),

Articles for the Government of the

Navy (1934 edition), section 5 of

Naval Courts and Boards, 1937 (the

Navy's former court-martial manual),

stated:

The sources of unwritten

naval law are:

(a) Decisions of the courts.

* * * * +

(b) Decisions of the

President and the Secretary

of the Navy and the opinions

of the Attorney General and

the Judge Advocate General of

the Navy.

* * * * *

(c) Court-mertial orders.

* * * * *

A-63

(4/7 cont.)

(d) Customs and usages of

the service.

Circumstances from time to

time arise for the government

of which there are no written

rules to be found. In such

cases customs of the service

govern. Customs of the

service may be likened, in

their origin and development,

to the portions of the common

law of England similarly

established. But the custom

is not to be confused with

usage; the former has the

force of law, the latter is

merely a fact. There may be

usage without custom, but

there can be no custom unless

accompanied by usage. Usage

consists merely of the

repetition of acts, while

custom is created out of

their repetition.

Custom.--The following are

the principal conditions to

be fulfilled in order to

constitute a valid custom:

(1) It must be long

continued.

(2) It must be certain and

uniform.

(3) It must be compulsory.

(4) It must be consistent.

(5) It must be general.

(6) It must be known.

(4/ cont. )

(7) It must not be in

opposition to the terms

and provisions of a

statute or lawful

regulation or order.

As usage constantly observed

for a long period results,in

the establishment of a

custom, so long-continued

nonusage will operate to

destroy a particular custom,

that is, to deprive it of its

obligatory character.

The field of operation of the

unwritten naval law is

extensive. It is applied in

defining certain offenses

against naval law and in

determining whether certain

acts or omissions are

punishable as such, as in

cases coming under article 22

of the articles for the

government of the Navy. At

times, also, custom is

appealed to as a rule of

interpretation of terms

technical to the naval

service.

Usage--Mere practices or

usages of service, although

long-continued, are not

customs and have none of the

Oobligatery force which

attaches to customary law.

The fact that such usages

AOA Rl BDI

eee

A-65

(4/ cont. )

exist, therefore, can never

be pleaded in justification

of conduct otherwise criminal

or reprehensible, nor be

relied upon as a complete

defense in a trial by

court-marital. With the

permission of the court,

however, they may be

introduced in evidence, with

a view to diminishing to some

extent the degree of

criminality involved in the

offense charged.

While section 98 and 99 of Naval

Courts and Boards (1937) incorporated the

current U.C.M.J.'s general articles

pertaining to conduct prejudicial to good

order and discipline and conduct

unbecoming an officer into Article 22 of

the Articles for the Government of the

Navy, it also incorporated: (1) a number

of offenses not elsewhere prohibited by

the Articles for the Government of the

Navy which are currently prohibited by

specific Articles of the U.C.M.J. (and

which, prior to the U.C.M.J., were

prohibited in the Army and Air Force by

specific Articles of the Articles of War)

and (2) a numr>> of, apparently, per se

custom of the s rvice offenses which,

although very similar to instances of

misconduct currently proscribed by

U.C.M.J., articles 133 and 134, required

absolutely no proof that the conduct was

either prejudicial to good order and

discipline or that it constituted

behavior unbecoming an officer and a

(4/7 cont.)

gentlemen.

In the former category were: (1)

affray or disorder, riot, and unlawful

assembly, see Navy Courts and Boards,

section 92, and U.C.M.J., Article 116;

(2) blackmail and extortion, see Navy

Courts and Boards, section 93, and

U.C.M.J., Article 127,; (3) breaking

arrest, see Navy Courts and Boards,

section 94, and U.C.M.J. Article 95; (4)

burglary or housebreaking, see Navy

Courts and Boards, section 96, and

U.C.M.J. Articles 129 and 130; (5)

embezzlement of money or property not

intended for military service, see Navy

Courts and Boards, section 100, and

U.C.M.J., Article 121; (6) false

imprisonment, see Navy Courts and Boards,

section 101, and U.C.M.J., Article 97;

(7) forgery other than for the purpose of |

obtaining payment of a claim against the

United State, see Navy Courts and Boards,

section 102, and U.C.M.J., Article 123;

(8) fraudulent enlistment, see Navy

Courts and Boards, section 103, and

U.C.M.J., Article 83; (9) malingering,

see Navy Courts and Boards, section 104,

and U.C.M.J., Article 115; (10) neglect

of duty, see Navy Courts and Boards,

section 105, and U.C.M.J., Article 92(3);

(11) resisting arrest, see Navy Courts

and Boards, section 106, and U.C.M.J.,

Article 95; (12) sodomy, see Navy Courts

and Boards, section 108, and U.C.M.J.,

Article 125; (13) uttering forged or

counterfeit document other than for the |

purpose of obtaining payment of a claim

against the United States, see Naval

(47 cont.)

Courts and Boards, section 110, and

U.C.M.J., Article 123; (14) willful

destruction of non-public property, see

Naval Courts and Boards, section 111, and

U.C.M.J., Article 109; (15) conspiracy

other than to defraud the United States

by means of a false claim, see Naval

Courts and Boards, section 112, and

U.C.M.J., Article 81; (16) perjury and

subornation thereof before a judicial

proceeding or in a course of justice, see

Naval Courts and Boards, section 115, and

U.C.M.J., Article 131; 917) aiding escape

of a person under arrest, see Naval

Courts and boards, section 116, and

U.C.M.J., articles 77, 78, and 96; (18)

manslaughter, see Naval Courts and

boards, section 119, and U.C.M.J.,

Article 119; (19) assaulting or striking

a person not in the navy, see Naval

Courts and Boards, section 120, and

U.C.M.J., Article 128; 920) rape and

carnal knowledge, see Naval Courts and

Boards, section 121, and JU.C.M.J.,

Article 120; (21) maiming, see Naval

Courts and Boards, section 122, and

U.C.M.J., Article 124; (22) robbery, see

Naval Courts and Boards, section 123, and

U.C.M.J., Article 122; and, (23) arson,

see Naval Courts and Boards, section 124,

and U.C.M.J., Article 126.

In the latter category were the

Navy's per se custom of the service

offenses of: (1) scandalous conduct, se

Naval Courts and Boards, section 59

(although no specific model specification

in the M.C.M. covers such a misconduct,

see generally the elements of U.C.M.J.,

\

(4/ cont.)

Article 133 and the discrediting

provision of U.C.M.J., Article 134); 92)

breaking quarantine, see Naval Courts and

Boards, section 95, and see M.C.M.,

specification form 173, at A6-25; (3)

carelessly or negligently endangering

lives of others, see Naval Courts and

Boards, section 97 (although no model

specification in the M.C.M. specifically

covers such misconduct, see generally,

M.C.M., specification forms 150 and I51,

at A6-22); (4) seduction, see Naval

Courts and Boards, section 107 (although

no model specification in the M.C.M.

specifically covers such misconduct, see

generally, the elements of U.C.M.J.,

Article 133 and the discrediting

provision of U.C.M.J., Article 134); (5)

unauthorized use of vehicles, see Naval

Courts and Boards, section 109 (although

no model specification in the M.C.M.

specifically covers such nisconduct, see

generally, U.C.M.J., Article 121(a)(2),

M.C.M., specification form 148, at A6-22,

and the prejudice to good order and

discipline provision of U.C.M.J., Article

134); (6) forging military or naval

certificate of discharge or pass, see

Naval Courts and Boards, section 113, and

see M.C.M., specification form 147, at

A6-22; (7) bribery, see Naval Courts and

Boards, section 114, and see M.C.M.,

specification forms 131 and 132, at A6-20

and A6-21; (8) perjury and subornation

thereof other than before a judicial

proceeding or in a course of justice, see

Naval Courts and Boards, section 115, and

see M.C.M., specification forms 169 and

170, at A6-25; (9) offenses against the

LAE I C bit. t tak Ser erie Mn ENT ENN Bilin

BP LEA tia ah nic hard

nek

iti:

A-69

It is particularly ironic,

therefore, that the three appellate cases

most often quoted by writers, today, who

argue that prosecutions for

"fraternization" are based upon its

(4/ cont.)

postal service, see Naval Courts and

Boards, section 117, and see M.C.M.,

specification forms 160, 161, and 162, at

A6-23 and A6-24; (10) offenses against

foreign and interstate commerce, see

Naval Courts and Boards, section 118, and

see M.C.M., specification form 179, at

A6-26; (11) receiving stolen goods, see

naval Courts and Boards, section 125, and

see M.C.M., specification form 179, at

A6-26; (12) circulating obscene

literature, see Naval Courts and Boards,

section 126 (no similar provision is

mentioned in either the U.C.M.J. or

M.C.M.); (13) polygamy, unlawful

cohabitation, adultery and fornication,

see Naval Courts and Boards, section i27,

and see M.C.M., specification forms 130,

188, 127, and 159, at A6-20, A6-23, and

A6-26; (14) narcotics offenses, see Naval

Courts and Boards, section 128, and see

M.C.M., specification forms 144, 145, and

146, at A6-22; and, (15) wrongful

movement of liquor, see Naval Courts and

Boards, sec 129 (not specifically

addressed by an M.C.M. specification

form).

A-70 i

status as a per se “custom of the '

service" offense (to wit: United States

v. Free, 14, C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953),

United States v. Lovejoy, 41 C.M.R. 777

(N.B.R. 1953), and United States v.

Pitasi, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31

(1971), are, in fact, the very ones which

sounded the judicial death knell for the

Only per se "custom of the service"

offense practice ever recognized in the

armed forces, that of the Navy prior to

the U.C.M.J.'s enactment. 5/

5/ In 1944, the Judge Advocate General

of the Navy, interpreting the limitations

imposed upon Articles for the government

of the Navy, Article 22, by Naval Courts

and Boards (1937), section 5, set aside

an Article 22 charge and specification

that alleged a naval officer had

fraternized with an enlisted man by

taking him to dinner, to the theater, and /

to his hotel room, where he had spent the ;

night with the enlisted man while

occupying the same bed. This action was

taken because none of the specific facts |

pleaded in the charge and its )

specification were sufficient, in and cf

themselves, to allege any violation of\

A-71

(5/7 cont. )

either written law, as identified by

Naval Courts and Boards (1937), section

3, or those unwritten naval laws that

could properly be identified by reference

to Naval Courts and Boards (1937),

Section 5. See United States v. Yocum,

CMO 3, 1944, at 412. Since he had

earlier recognized that the navy's long

recognized “custom of the service"

banning fraternization (any social

intercourse between its officers and

enlisted personnel) was far too general

to be enforceable as an Article 22

violation, see CMO as 134k, 2 27), and

because no more specific prohibitions

against certain types of fraternization

had either been authorized by Navy

decisions and opinions or were readily

discernible as independent "customs of

the service," the Navy Judge Advocate

General could, in 1944, have rendered no

other decision consistent with his then

existing legislative and administrative

mandates.

Following enactment of the Code,

however, a specification alleging similar

conduct by another naval officer arrived

in the Navy Judge Advocate General's

office. Unlike the former specification,

however, this one, having been charged

under U.C.M.J., Article 134, carried with

it the additional factual allegation that

the other facts stated therein were “all

to the prejudice of good order and

discipline in the armed forces of the

United States." Since, U.C.M.J., Article

134, itself, purported to subject to

court-martial "all disorders and neglects

A-72

(3/ cont.)

to “he prejudice of good order and

discipline in the armed forces" committed

by person subject to the Code, the Judge

Advocate General decided to refer it to

his newly formed Navy Board of Review for

resolution.

The Navy Board, considering the

matter in United States v. Free, supra,

identified the problem before them as

being one of drawing "a line as to vhere

acts of fraternization or association

with enlisted men by officers cease to be

innocent acts of comradeship and normal

social intercourse between members of a

democratic military force and become a

violation of Article 134 of the Code,

prejudicial to good order and discipline

in the armed forces of the United

State." After noting that efforts "to

lay down a measuring rod of

particularities to determine in advance

what acts are prejudicial to good order

and discipline and what are not," it

concluded:

that each case must be

determined on its own

merits. Where it is shown

that the acts and

circumstances are such as to

lead a reasonably prudent

person, experienced in the

problems of military

leadership, to conclude that

the good order and discipline

of the armed forces has been

prejudiced by the

compromising of an enlisted

ee ee ee

alli ate ONE pS

A-73

(5/ cont. )

person's respect for the

integrity and gentlemanly

obligations of an officer,

there has been an offense

under Article 134.

United States v. Free, supra, at 470.

Of additional interest, is the fact

that the specification in Free included a

"throwback" factual allegation conforming

the specification to the outmoded

requirements of Naval Courts and Boards

(1937), section 5, standards for

unwritten naval law (to wit: that the

accused's conduct was "in violation of

the custom of the Naval service of the

United States that officers shall not

fraternize or associate with enlisted men

on terms of military equality"). After

noting that its Judge Advocate General

had earlier determined no “custom of the

service" exists in the Navy that, per se,

precludes the specific types of conduct —

alleged by the specification, the Navy

Court merely noted that "[tJhe rule under

the U.C.M.J. governing the adequacy of

the pleading is that a pleading is

sufficient if it informs the accused of

what he must be prepared to meet and it,

as supplemented by the evidence, is

sufficiently definite to eliminate the

danger of again being placed in jeopardy

for the same offense." Its superfluous

inclusion in the specification obviously

had no bearing upon the decision rendered

in the case.

Seventeen years later, in the first

(5/7 cont.)

of two specification that included the

term "fraternize" which the United States

Court of Military Appeals has considered

in its 33 year history, (the navy

specification alleging only that the

accused naval officer "Willfully and

knowingly fraterniz[ed] with one of the

Seaman [N] on terms of military equality

to the prejudice of good order and

discipline") the Court in United States

v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R.

210 ec) avoided addressing a

"vagueness" challenge by finding that the

accused's Article 134 "fraternization"

conviction had merged with a simultaneous

sodomy conviction.

Then, in 1971, the Court of Military

Appeals, in United States v. Pitasi, 20

U.S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 33 (1971),

squarely addressed the sufficiency of a

navy specification alleging that a naval

officer had "fraternized" and

"associated" with an enlisted person:

+ « »« in violation of the

custom of the Naval Service

of the United States that

officers shall not fraternize

and associate with enlisted

men on terms of military

equality.

Confronted by a defense contention that

“fraternization: is not a cognizable

court-martial offense, the Navy rebutted

by arguing that "'fraternization' by an

officer with an enlisted man has, ‘by 7

custom, always been held to be |

iadaail

A-75

(57 cont. )

prejudicial to good order and discipline

in the armed forces." (In view of the

Navy's earlier decision in United States

v. Yocum, supra, that acts of

fraternization or association by Naval

officers with enlisted personnel, in and

of themselves, do not violate Naval

custom, and its later holding in United

States v. Free, supra, that when such

acts of fraternization or association

prejudice good order or discipline they

are cognizable by court-martial as a

violation of U.C.M.J., Article 134, this

rebuttal argument was presumably meant to

emphasize the phrase “prejudicial to good

order and discipline," and to imply that

had the fraternization in Yocum, been

alleged as “prejudicial to good order and

discipline," as it was in Free, a similar

decision would have been reached. )

After briefly consulting Winthrop,

supra, and referencing paragraph 213b of

the M.C.M., the Court of Military Appeals

approvingly quoted those portions of

United States v. Free in which the Navy

court had discussed the prejudicial

effect of intimate types of personal

relationships between officers and

enlisted personnel on military

discipline. Included in these quotes was

the standard suggested by the Navy court

for determining what acts of

fraternization are, and what acts of

fraternization are not, prejudicial to

good order and military discipline within

the meaning of U.C.M.J., Article 134.

(For the text of this quotation, see my

discussion of Free within this footnote,

(57 cort.)

supra. )

Having completed its cursory review

of the law in the area, the Court of

Military Appeals, first, cautioned

services against attempting to prosecute

any custom, not palpably and directly

prejudicial to good order and military

discipline, under U.C.M.J., Article 134,

by stating:

These factors, however, do

not, in our opinion, relieve

military authorities from the

obligation of providing some

guidelines by which an

officer, or those who are

called upon to sit in

judgment as members of a

court-marital, may test what

conduct is or is not

violative of the "custom," in

light of the fact that our

armed forces are currently

constituted of a large number

of citizen soldiers.

And, second, it recommended that, since

regulatory proscription of conduct

prohibited by a “custom of the service"

(even though it be prejudicial to good

order and military discipline, and

accordingly, otherwise prosecutable under

U.C.M.J., Article 134), has the advantage

over Article 134, of precise definition,

publication, and definite punishment

parameters, responsible military

authorities should consider reducing all

of their existing “custom of the service"

as Wl awd

A-77

Regardless, then, of how often, and

(5/ cont.)

prohibitions into regulatory form.

Having stated these two ancillary

propositions, however, the Court's

response to the defense's contention that

allegations of fraternization are so

vague as not to be cognizable by

court-martial, was exceptionally acerbic:

We in no way intend to depart

from our holding in United

States v. Sadinsky, wherein

we reiterated our prior

decision that Article 134 is

not void for vagueness, that

some acts are by their very

nature palpably and directly

prejudicial to the good order

and discipline of the

service. [Citations

omitted. ]

Unless it is specifically proscribed by

another article of the Code, conduct

alleged in an Article 134 specification

which, by its very nature directly is

palpably and directly prejudicial to the

good order and discipline of the service,

constitutes a violation of Article 134,

which is cognizable by court-martial.

Whether or not this same conduct, also,

happens to violate a “custom of the

service," be it prohibition against

“fraternization" or any other activity,

is completely irrelevant.

A-78

by whom, ‘it has been implied that

prosecutions for "fraternization"

offenses are dependent upon the continued

existence of “long standing customs of

the service” (or, more specifically, the

common recognition of the current

vitality of such customs by a vast

majority of service personnel), this

simply is not the case. Today, unless

specific conduct (or a specific type of

conduct) (1) violates one of the

U.C.M.J.'s specific Articles or (2) it

either is palpably and directly

“prejudicial to good order and

discipline," “service discrediting," or a

“crime or offense not capital" under

Article 135 or amounts to “conduct

unbecoming an officer" under Article 133,

it may not be prosecuted at

courts-martial.

When determining whether a custom of

A-79

the service breach may be prosecuted

under the U.C.M.J., the only relevant

question to be asked is the one which is

entirely dispositive; to wit: Whether

the specific or general type of conduct

alleged violates any punitive article of

the U.C.M.J., including either of its two

general articles. Whether the custom of

the service allegedly breached is, or

remains, viable, is totally irrelevant.

While cynics may argue that the

question of exactly what conduct

constitutes an offense under either of

these two general articles is based to

some extent on "customs of the service,"

I would counter that a critical

examination of post-Codal case law

reveals, instead, that this precise

question has always been uniformly

decided either by a disciplined analysis

of whether, in fact, one of the specific

A-80

“general elements"6/ of the particular

general article is or is not satisfied,

or by citations to past cases7/ in which

a particular offense's existence has

already established by such an analysis.

FRATERNIZATION

Before discussing whether the

conduct alleged in this case meets one or

more of the "general elements" of either

of the U.C.M.J.'s general articles,

however, it is necessary, first, to

6/ For an excellent example of such a

disciplined analysis, establishing that a

specific example of "fraternization" type

conduct, in fact, satisfies the

“prejudicial to good order and

discipline" general element of Article of

War 96 (now, U.C.M.J, Article 134), see

United States v. Lillis, 39 B. R. 395

(1944).

7/ For excellent examples of such a

confirmation of the existence of a

general article's offense, despite

passing references to "customs of the

service," see United States v. Bunker and

United States v. Livingston, both supra.

A-81

comment upon the very generalized

approach that all of my fellow judges

have used in their discussions of the

specific conduct alleged by the instant

specifications. Rather than addressing

the specific conduct which the

specifications alleged (an officers’

indiscriminate "recreational" fornication

with enlisted personnel in violation of

Article 133 of the U.C.M.J.), they have,

instead, chosen to address the question

of whether or not a c:arge of

"“fraternization" can properly be affirmed

as a violation of this Article. In my

opinion, it is this patently incorrect

statement of the question before the,

more than any other single factor, that

resulted in their fuzzy and occasionally

incorrect handling of those principles

necessary to a clear and proper

resolution of this case.

A-82

An in-depth historical analysis of

the most recent 238 military appellate

case decisions dealing with allegations

generically capable of categorization as

"fraternization type offenses" (or

untoward officer/enlisted conduct)

irrefutably demonstrates my point.

The first recorded use of the term

“fraternization" occurred in United

States v. Bunxer, 27 B.R. 385 (1943).

There, an Army Board of Review,

apparently confronting contentions that

an allegation of conduct which violated

the, then recognized, Army “custom of the

service" that prohibited any

"“fraternization" between officers and

enlisted personnel could be prosecuted

solely on the basis that the alleged

conduct violated a “custom of the

service," cleverly modified the

traditional statement of that customary

A-83

ban against fraternization by stating:

[I]t has long been recognized

as a custom of the service

that an officer should not

fraternize with enlisted men

to the extent that it will

affect or prejudice good

order and discipline."

[Emphasis on modifying

language provided. ]

United States v. Bunker, supra, at

389.

This modifying language was, of

course, exceptionally significant. It

limited prosecutions for breaches of this

particular custom of the service to those

few breaches in which the breaching

conduct, itself, independently, satisfied

the separate criteria for prosecution

required by U.C.M.J., Article 134.

(Compare the effect of the mollifying

A-84

language of M.C.M., paragraph 213b , some

eight years later. See note 2, herein,

supra. )

Other usage of the term "fraternize"

or "“fraternization" has occurred in only

ten of the remaining 237 case decisions

that have dealt with "fraternization type

offenses."8/ In five of these, the term

8 / I do not here consider eight cases

that used these terms only in reference

to references to regulatory prohibitions

against social intercourse between

soldiers and foreign nationals in the

European Theater, rather than in

reference to any proscription against

similar relationships between officers

and enlisted persons serving together in

our Armed Forces. See United States v.

Mistretta, 16 B.R. (ETO) 191 (1945);

United States v. Van Houten, 18 B.R.

(ETO) 65 (1945); United States v.

Blankenship, 22 B.R.(ETO) 279 (1945);

United States v. Wofford, 24 B.R. (ETO)

346 (1945); United States v. Malott, 27

B-R.(sTO) 259 (1945); United States v.

Wilson, 30 B.R.(ETO) 75 (1945); United

States v. Newman, 32 B.R.(ETO) 57 (1945);

and United States v. Wallace, 34

B.R.(ETO) 131 (1946).

i hilt ih hh et

A-85

was used to describe several instances of

varied officer/enlisted misconduct

alleged separately or in combination with

One another in one or more

specifications.9/ In two of them, it was

used solely to describe allegations that

an officer had made male/female sexual

overtures to an enlisted person.10/ And,

in the final there, it was used, once

each, in reference to an officer/enlisted

homosexual liaison,11/ an officer's

behavior in the presence of enlisted men

amounting to drunk and disorderly

9/ See United States v. Patterson, 41

B.R. 365 (1944); United States v. Leonard

16 B.R.(ETO) 272 (1945); United States v.

Penick, 19 B.R.(ETO) 257 (1945); United

States v. Livingston, 8 C.M.R. 206.

(A.B.R. 1952); and United States v. Free,

14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.M.R. 1953).

10/ See United States v. Morgan, 41 B.R.

73 (1944) and United States v. Brauchler,

15 M.J. 755 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).

1l/ See, United States v. Lovejoy, 41

C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M.R. 1968).

A-86

conduct;12/ and, a bar, unsupported,

allegation that an officer "wrongfully

fraternize[d] with enlisted men (the

board dismissed this allegation based

upon lack of evidence) .13/

Of the entire 238 recorded cases,

only five referenced any specifications

that included the term "fraternization, "

and only two of these (one of which,

also, included factual allegations as to

the manner in which the alleged

"fraternization: had occurred) were

ultimately affirmed.14/

12/ See United States v. Fiedler, 33

B.R. 189 (1944)

13/ See United States v. Jones, 40 B.R.

149 (1944).

14/ In the sole pre-Codal citation of a

specification incorporating a usage of

the term “fraternization, an Army board

of review in United States v. Jones,

supra, dismissed an Articles of War,

Article 96, specification alleging simply

(14/7 cont. )

that the accused “did... wrongfully

fraternize with enlisted men, thereby

seriously compromising his position as an

officer" because "no substantial evidence

whatsoever of [the accused officer's]

wrongful fraternization with enlisted

men" was presented at trial.

In United States v. Free, 14

C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953), a Navy board of

review, affirmed a conviction pursuant to

a U.C.M.J., Article 135, specification,

which alleged that the accused

"did . . . willfully and

knowingly, in the room

assigned to [him],. . .

fraternize and associate with

[a private first class]...

on terms of military equality

by having said [private first

class] in said room as his...

guest and offering said

[private first class]...

alcoholic beverages to drink

while his guest in said room

and by inviting said [private

first class] ... to sleep

in said room as his guest,...

all to the prejudice of good

order and discipline in the

armed forces of the United

States."

In doing so, the board specifically

found, both, that the accused officer had

been “fairly apprised" of the offenses to

which the specification pertained and

that the officer's behavior had in fact,

A-88

What is most significant about

these 238 cases is the fact that, in 227

of them, neither the generic term

(14/ cont.)

prejudiced good order and military

discipline in the naval service.

In the third of these five cases, an

Article 134 specification alleging that

an accused “did . . . willfully and

knowingly fraternize and associate with

[a seaman] . . . on terms of military

equality" by having the seaman as his

"guest" in his apartment and sharing with

him the cost of food "to the prejudice of

good order and discipline" was considered

first by the navy court of military

review in United States v. Lovejoy, 41

C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M.R. 1969), and then by

the Court of Military Appeals in United

States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42

C.M.R. 210 (1970). The Navy Court,

below, affirmed the specification,

dismissing a constitutional "vagueness

and indefinite" argument as to the

specification's sufficiency, by simply

stating, without citations, that "After a

careful analysis and review of all the

circumstances of this case, we arrive at

Can] opposite conclusion." The Court of

Military Appeals, when faced with an

identical argument, above, refused to

address the question it presented,

opting, instead, to dismiss the

specification on other grounds.

A-89

“fraternization" nor any of its

derivatives was even mentioned! Rather,

in these cases, the courts and boards

recognized that questions pertaining to

whether alleged officer/enlisted

misconduct does, or does not, breach a

"custom of the service" prohibiting

“fraternization" are irrelevant to the

legal sufficiency of Article 133 or 134

specifications that allege such

misconduct. Accordingly, the limited

their consideration of that issue to

those few questions that are relevant to

wit: whether the misconduct alleged

within the particular Article 133 or 134

specification confronting them, was, or

was not, of a nature to "prejudice good

order and military discipline, "

“discredit the military service," or

amount to “conduct unbecoming an officer

and a gentleman."

A-90

And, turning from court, to code or

manual usage of the term, we find that,

unlike the phrase “custom of the

service," the term "fraternize" or

"“fraternization" has never been used in :

any United States military law or manual

for courts-martial. |

My fellow judges, the, erred when |

they chose to define the issue before

this Court in terms of a generalized

generic notion of fraternization rather

than in terms of that factually detailed

misconduct which is alleged within the

instant U.C.M.J, Article 133

specifications. While those portions of

their opinions that relate to the demise

of the Air Force's now defunct "custom of

the service" banning "fraternization" and

the question of whether violations of

such a defunct custom may nevertheless

still be prosecuted as Article 133

A-91

"customs of the service" violations are

interesting, they are totally irrelevant

to the issue presented by this case. The

sole question before us for decision is

whether the factually detailed misconduct

alleged within the instant Article 133

specifications, under the circimstances

of this case, is immediately recognizable

by a reasonably prudent officer as an

example of conduct that would subject him

to potential prosecution for conduct

unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

Unfortunately, by limiting their

discussions of the history of

"fraternization type cases" to those few

cases which actualiy contained the term

“fratnerize" or "fraternizatin," my

fellow judges also overlooked some

exceptionally useful and exceptionally

relevant generalizations pertinent to the

resolution of this quintessential

A-92

question. Had they expanded their

research so as to encompass those cases

which, although not mentioning the term

“fraternization," nevertheless, dealt

with specific allegations of

officer/enlisted misconduct alleged to

have violated one of the general

articles, they would have been able to

glean four distinct categories of

ofticer/enlisted behavior recognized time

and again by our appellate courts as

violating the proper criteria of Article

133 and 134 offenses.15/ Even more

15/ My personal review of 237 military

appellate decisions that have dealt with

Article 133 and 134 allegations of

officer misconduct in relation to

enlisted personnel reveals, without

exception, that all such allegations fit

neatly into conduct described by one of

four sub-headings.

The first of these may be

categorized as alcohol related offenses.

They include those allegations of conduct

in which the courts, under the particular

Se ein arse 8 lars elie

“ PY st Dab

iP AMIE tye

a ae .

(15/ cont. )

circumstances of the case, have concluded

that, whether by virtue of simple or

excessive persona: use, or simple

provision of the substance to enlisted

persons, an officer has demeaned the

position of "a commissioned officer"

within the eyes of enlisted ranks. See

United States v. Hammond, 1 B.R. 83

(1929); United States v. MacIver, 2 B.R.

321 (1931); United States v. Fleming, 2

B.R. 359 (1931); United States v. Lowry,

6 B.R. 67 (1934); United States v.

Shirley, 6 B.R. 337 (1935); United States

v. Gould, 7 B.R. 49 (1935); United States

v. Lowry, 8 B.R. 377 (1937); United

States v. Raymond, 10 B.R. 169 (1939);

United States v. Hester, 11 B.R. 145

(1941); United States v. Harris, 11 B.R.

171 (1941); United States v. Callan, 12

B.R. 49 (1941); United States v. Bethard,

12 B.R. 67 (1941); United States v.

Knight, 13 B.R. 27 (1942); United States

v. Brown, 13 B.R. 183 (1942); United

States v. Jones 13 B.R. 231 (1942);

United States v. Smith, 14 B.R. 371

(T1942); United States v. Saul, 15 B.R.

197 (1942); United States v. Taliaferro,

16 B.R. 187 (1942); United States v.

Hess, 49 B.R. 231 (1942); United States

v. Wall 16 B.R. 233 (1943); United States

v. O’Maley, 16 B.R. 285 (1943); United

States v. Griffin, 17 B.R. 85 (1943);

United States v. Granosk, 17 B.R. 193

(1943); Urited States v. Daly 17 B.R. 333

(1943); United States v. Minnis, 18 B.R.

101 (1943); United States v. Parks, 19

B.R. 23 (1943); United States v.

Paradise, 19 B.R. 43 (1943) United States _

v. Brennan, 19 B.R. 139 (1943); United

A-94

(15/7 cont.)

States v. Slaughter, 20 B.R. 9 (1943);

United States v. Lyday, 20 B.R. 37

(1943); United States v. Murphy, 21 B.R.

13 (1943); United States v. Westcott, 21

B.R. 41 (1943); United States v. Nelson,

21 B.R. 55 (1943); United States v.

Singletary, 21 B.R. 399 (1943); United

States v. Baker, 22 B.R. 131 (1943);

United States v. Cannon, 22 B.R. 237

(1943); United States v. Johnston, 23

B.R. 57 (1943); United States v. Hyre, 23

B.R. 115 (1943); United States v. Minton,

23 B.R. 159 (1943); United States v.

Biggs, 25 B.R. 385 (1943); United States

v. Ferguson, 26 B.R. 43 (1943); United

States v. Shapiro, 26 B.R. 43 (1943);

United States v. Bunker, supra; United

States v. Thorn, 29 B-R. 1943);

United States v. Gage, 1 B.R.(ETO) 299

{1943); United States v. Nicholson, 1

B.R.(ETO) 397 (1943); United States v.

Booker, 2 B.R.(ETO) 325 (1943); United

States v. Bradford, 30 B.R. 279 (1944);

United States v. Green, 31 B.R. 5l

(1944); United States v. Norren, 32 B.R.

95 (1944); United States v. Fiedler,

supra; United States v. Watts, 33 B.R.

19 1944); United States v. Blanton, 33

B.R. 22] (1944); United States v.

McPheron, 33 B.R. 325 (1944); United

States v. Bates, 34 B.R. 147 (1944);

United States v. Martin, 34 B.R. 223

(1944); United States v. Goggin, 34 B.R.

399 (1944); United States v. Roundtree,

36 B.R. 283 (1944); United States v.

MacFarlane, 38 B.R. 338 (1944); United

States v. Lillis, 39 B.R. 395 (1944);

United States v. Jones, supra; United

Statess v. Nettles, 40 B.R. 385 (1944);

A-95

(157 cont.)

United States v. Myers, 41 B.R. 83

(1944); United States v. Patterson,

supra; United States v. Rooney, 42 B.R.

119 (1944); United States v. Evans, 42

B.R. 187 (1944); United States v. Price,

supra; United States v. Carey, 43 B.R.

261 (1944); United States v. McCoy, 44

B.R. 81 (1944); United States v. Madden,

4 B.R.(ETO) 253 (1944); United States v.

Moffit, 7 B.R.(ETO) 113 (1944); United

States v. Whalen, 10 B.R.(ETO) 201

(1944); United States v. Buck, ll

B.R.(ETO) 187 (1944); United States v.

Gardner, 13 B.R.(ETO) 127 (1944); United

States v. Long, 13 B.R.(ETO) 291 (1944);

United States v. Glover, 14 B.R.(ETO) 67

(1944); United States v. Newcombe, 14

B.R.(ETO) 93 (1944); United States v.

Campbell, 14 B.R.(ETO) 127 (1944); United

States v. Wright, 44 B.R. 183 (1945);

United States v. Kelley, 46 B.R. 89

(1945); United States v. Foster, 46 B.R.

295 (1945); United States v. Futrell, 47

B.R. 339 (1945); United States v.

Ponsler, 51 B.R. 47 (1945); United States

v. Packard, 52 B.R. 125 (1945); United

States v. Buckner, 53 B.R. 197 (1945);

United States v. Mann, 55 B.R. 381

(1945); United States v. Skinner, 17

B.R.(ETO) 317 (1945); United States v.

Watker, 18 B.R.(ETO) 33 (1945); United

States v. Manning, 18 B.R.(ETO) 201

(1945); United States v. Taylor, 18 B.R.

(ETO) 319 (1945); United States v.

McBride, 15 B.R. (ETO) 91 (1954); United

States v. Leonard, supra; United States

vy. Thorpe, 19 B.R.(ETO) 245 (1945);

United States v. Penick, supra; United

States v. Sirois, 20 B.R.(ETO) 21 (1945);

A-96

(15/ cont. )

United States v. Suitt, 20 B.R.(ETO) 265

(1945); United Statess v. Dawson, 21

B.R.(ETO) 95 (1945); United Statess v.

Wetherford, 22 B.R.(ETO) 147 (1945);

United States v. Hindmarch, 22 B.R.(ETO)

223 (1945); United States v. Shipley, 22

B.R.(ETO) 257 (1945); United States v.

Patton, 23 B.R.(ETO) 75 (1945); United

States v. Petroski, 23 B.R.(ETO) 8l

(1945); United States v. Roberson, 23

B.R.(ETO) 149 (1945); United States v.

Tucker, 23 B.R.(ETO) 319 (1945); United

States v. O'Hara, 24 B.R.(ETO) 93 (1945);

United States v. Vollmer 24 B.R.(ETO) 281

(1945); United States v. Stark, 24

B.R.(ETO) 332 (1945); United States v.

Buck, 25 B.R.(ETO) 213 (1945); United

States v. St. George, 25 B.R.(ETO) 367

(1945); United States v. Traynor, 25

B.R.(ETO) 377 (1945); United States v.

Bradford, 28 B.R.(ETO) 91 (1945); United

States v. Ingham, 30 B.R..(ETO), 83

(1945); United States v. Bryant, 30

B.R. (ETO) 25. (1945) United States v.

Snyder, 31 B.R..(ETO) 181 (1945); United

States v. Marrs, 31 B.R. (ETO) 243 (1945)

United States v. Gunning, 32 BR.E. (ETO)

85 (1945); United Statess v. Powell, 33

B.R.(ETO) 221 (1945); United States v.

Griffith, 33 B.R.(ETO) 239 (1945); United

Statess v. Parkinson, 34 B.R.(ETO) ll

(1945); United States v. Epperson, 58

B.R. 323 (1946); Unite es V.

Pasquariello, 60 B.R. 179 (1946); United

States v. Glass, 60 B.R. 185 (1946);

United States v. Hart, 60 B.R. 247

(1946); United States v. Clovatre, 60

B.R. 381 (1946); United States v.

Shirley, 63 B.R. 65 (1946); United States

A-97

(15/ cont. )

v. Heaton, 64 B.R. 3 (1946); United

States v. McMaster, 64 B.R. 171 (1946);

United States v. Creighton, 70 B.R. 355

(1947); United States v. Ward, 72 B.R.

301 (1947); United States v. Dows, 73

B.R. 275 (1947); United States v. Becker,

78 B.R. 329 (1948); United States v.

Kearbey, 2 B.R.J.C. 281 (1949); United

States v. Boraczek, 4 B.R.J.C. 283

(1949); United States v. Powers, 8

~B.R.J.C. 111 (1950); United States v.

Hansen, 10 B.R.J.C. 165 (1951); United

States v. Clarke, 3 C.M.R. 227 (A.B.R.

1951); United States v. Akins, 4 C.M.R.

364 (A.B.R. 1951); United States v.

Powers, 5 C.M.R. 206 (A.B.R. 1951);

United States v. Livingston, supra;

United States v. Jackson, 8 C.M.R. 215

(A.B.R. 1952); United State v. Loney, 8

C.M.R. 533 (A.B.R 1952); United States

v. Johnson, 10 C.M.R. 513 (A.B.R. 1953);

United States v. Sloan, 14 C.M.R. 375

(A.°T.R. 1953); United States v. Free,

supra; United States v. Long, /

U.S.C.M.A. 205, 22 C.M.R. (1956);

United States v. McCardle, 27 C.M.R. 1006

(A.B.R. 1958); United States v. Lovejoy,

supra; and United States v. Pitasi,

supra. For cases prior to 1920, see

Winthrop, supra, at 716-717, notes 44 and

Tana 72 , note 26.

The second such subheading includes

those charges which allege that, under

the circumstances alluded to in the

cases, an officer somehow either demanded

the respect due to commissioned officers

and/or subjected his personal

impartiality to criticizm by "gambling"

(15/7 cont.)

for money with enlisted personnel.

Included among these cases, see United

States v. Van Hess, 14 B.R. 271 (1942);

United States v. Thompson, 14 B.R. 133

(1942); United States v. Cromer, 15 B.R.

17 (1942); United States v. Marinelli, 18

B.R. 377 (1943); United States v. Black,

20 B.R. 345 (1943); United States v.

Johnston, supra; United States v.

Campbell, 24 B.R. 215 (1943); United

States v. Petty, 26 B.R. 213 (1943);

United States v. Phillips, 26 B.R. 299

(1943); United States v. Murray, 31 B.R.

389 (1944); United States v. Bates,

Supra; United States v. Martin, supra;

United States v. Lillis, supra; United

States v. Futrell, supra; United States

v. Garris, 48 B.R. 39 (1945); United

States v. Ponsler, supra; United States

v. Welch, 56 B.R. 223 (1945); United

States v. Stanley, 20 B.R.(ETO) 319

(1945); United States v. Porter, 24

B.R.(ETO) 286 (1945); United States v.

Mayfield, 60 B.R. 179 (1946); United

States v. Hoover, 3 B.R.J.C. 39 (1949);

United States v. Bazanos, 8 B.R.J.C. 33

(1950); United States v. Weller, 10

B.R.J.C. 381 (1951); United States v.

Pryor, 2 C.M.R. 365 (A.B.R. 1951); United

States v. Reed, 9 C.M.R. 269 (A.B.R.

1952); United States v. Atkinson, 10

C.M.R. 443 A.B.R. (1953); United States

v. Villiados, 32 C.M.R. 561 (A.B.R.

1962); United States v. Britton, 13

U.S.C.M.A. 499, 33 C.M.R. 31 (1963); and

United States v. Light, 36 C.M.R. 579

(A.B.R. 1965). For cases prior to 1920,

see Winthrop, supra, at 716, note 44, and

at 727, note ll.

a seiaeaiiaainaiamaaliiiiiaaiaie

oe See re ee

8 AED LI ROR cares, ine De enh. vie

BU Reo

Se ee ee ek en de

(15/ cont. )

In the third identifiable

subheading of these cases, dealing with

allegations that an officer “borrowed"

money from enlisted persons, the courts

again lookes to the same types of

surrounding conditions as they had looked

into in the "gambling" type allegations.

See United States v. Strickland, 1 B.R.

329 (1930); United States v. Johnston, 4

B.R. 211 (1933); United States v.

Sullivan, 5 B.R. 83 (1934); United States

v. Gould, supra; United States v. Crist,

12 B.R. 49 1); United States v.

Curran, 15 B.R. 129 (1942); United States

v. Folk, 15 B.R. 307 (1942); United

States v. Delbrook 18 B.R. 29 (1943);

United States v. Addison, 18 B.R. 171

(1943); United States v. Brunkella, 19

B.R. 289 (1943); United States v.

Tillotson, 20 B.R. 149 (1943); United

States v. Black, supra; United States v.

Westcott, supra; United States v. Nelson,

Supra; United States v. Hart, 23 B.*:. 295

(1943); United States v. Skeen, 24 B.R.

373 (1943); United States v. Peck, 25

B.R. 205 (1943); United States v.

Churchich, 26 B.R. 199 (1943); Un_ted

States v. Hedgess, 27 B.R. 223 (1943);

U.S. v. Bedwell, 28 B.R. 229 (1943);

United States v. Morrison, 28 B.R. 355

(1943); United States v. Benfield, 29

B.R. 365 (1944); United States v. Maeef,

30 B.R. 53 (1944); United States v.

Bohlin, 30 B.R. 209 (1944); United States

v. Bradford, supra; United States v.-_

Steele, 30 B.R. 331 (1944); United States

v. Van Epps, 31 B.R. 193 (1944); United

States v. Young, 31 B.R. 249 (1944);

United States v. Murray, supra; United

A-100

(15/ cont.)

States v. Norren, supra; United States v.

Clift, 33 B.R. 263 (1944); United States

v. Elliott, 34 B.R. 293 (1944); United

States v. Robertson, 34 B.R. 321 (1944);

United States v. Edwards, 35 B.R. 143

(1944); United States v. Sears, 37 B.R.

39 (1944); United States v. Lowden, 39

B.R. 109 (1944) United States v. Gross,

39 B.R. 133 (1944); United States v.

Corcoran, 40 B.R. 235 (1944); United >

States v. Allgood, 40 B.R. 353 (1944);

United States v. Price, supra; United

States v. Gilson, 43 B.R. 235 (1944);

United States v. Hambright, 5 B.R. (ETO)

287 (1944); United States v. Collins, 8

B.R. (ETO) 219 (1944); United States v.

Witmer, 9 B.R.(ETO) 237 (1944); United

States v. Moore, 45 B.R. 141 (1945);

United States v. MacDonald, 46 B.R. 1

(1945); United States v. McGovern, 46

B.R. 305 (1945); United States v.

Jamieson, 47 B.R-. 369 (1945); United

States v. Wilson, 48 B.R. 71 (1945);

United States v. Morris, 51 B.R. 29

(1945); United States v. Giardina, 5l

B.R. 291 (1945); United States v. Murray,

53 B.R. 93 (1945); United States v.

Phillips, B.R. 31 (1945); United States

v. Burbank, 57 B.R. 41 (1945); United

States v. Coates, 57 B.R. 157 (1945);

United States v. Kuse, 15 B.R.(ETO) 73

(1945); United States v. Stanley, 20 B.R.

319 (1945); United States v. Vollmer,

supra,; United States v. Porter, supra;

United States v. Wickerson, 25 B.R. (ETO)

295 (1945); United States v. Powell,

supra; United States v. Hicks, 58 B.R.

139 (1946); United States v. Zaleski, 58

B.R. 349 (1946) United States v. Heaton,

A-101

(15/7 cont.)

supra; United States v. Bryant, 65 B.R.

119 (1946); United States v. Sandsness,

65 B.R. 337 (1946); United States v.

Thomas, 65 B.R. 57 (1947); United States

: v. Dye, 70 B.R. 385 (1947); United States

2 v. Fears, 71 B.R. 37 (1947); United

States v. Lach, 71 B.R. 303 (1947);

United States v. Vanover, 79 B.R. 189

; (1948); United States v. Johnson, 1

| B.R.J.C. 343 (1949); United States v.

i Wilkins, 2 B.R.J.C. 153 (1949); United

States v. Cole, 3 B.R.J.C. 159 (1949);

United States v. Storm, 11 B.R.J.C. 127

(1951); United States v. St. Ours, 6

C.M.R. (A.B.R. 1952); United States v.

Rehmann, 7 C.M.R. 172 (A.B.R. 1952);

United States v. Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323

(A.B.R. 1952); United States v. Wetzell,

i 12 C.M.R. 269 (A.B.R. 1953); United

States v. Scioli, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 502, 22

C.M.R. 292 (1957); United States v._

Calderon, 24 C.M.R. 338, (A.B.R. 1957);

United States v. Burgin, 30 C.M.R. 525

(A.B.R. 1960); United States v.

Villiados, supra; and United States v.

Light, 32 C.M.R. 561 (A.B.R. 1965). For

cases occurring prior to 1920, see

Winthrop, supra, at 714, note 40, at 715,

: note 42, and at 716, notes 45 and 46.

And finally, the fourth subheading

| deals with those specifications that have

: alleged an officer has demaned the

respect due him by virtue of his

commission, by sexual behavior which a

substantial portion of the service's

enlisted population required to render

this respect deems as scurrilous. See

United States v. Kelly, 11 B.R. 257

A-102

(157 cont.)

(1941); United Statses v. Hightower, 14

B.R. 97 (1942); United States v. Smith,

supra, United Stases v. Leavit, 15 B.R.

51 (1942); United States v. Saul, supra;

United Statess v. Peterson, 16 B.R. 59

(1942); United States v. Hathaway, 14

B.R. 349 (1943); United States v. Law, 16

B.R. 117 (1943); United States v.

Samuels, 22 B.R. 229 (1943); United

States v. Hyre, supra; United States; v.

Fahey, 26 B.R. 305 (1943); United States

v. Hooey, 27 B.R. 5 (1943); United States

v. Fowler, 27 B.R. 21 (1943); United

States v. Kappes, 27 B.R. 87 (1943);

United States v. McFarlane, 28 B.R. 217

(1943); United States v. Sebastian, 28

B.R. 267 (1943); United States v.

Breymann, 50 B.R. 1 (1944); United States

v. Gage, supra; United States v. Suckow,

2 B.R. (ETO) 199 (1943); United States v.

Cookerly, 29 B.R. 99 (1944); United

States v. Stone, 32 B.R. 55 (1944);

United States v. Arnold, 33 B.R. 69

(1944); United Statess v. McCaffree, 33

B.R. 95 (1944); United States v. Blanton,

supra; United States v. Goggin, supra;

United States v. Willetts, 35 B.R. 231

(1944); United States v. Gray, 38 B.R.

109 (1944); United States v. Kelly, 39

B.R. 1 (1944); United States v. Porter,

39 B.-R. 49 (1944); United States v.

Nettles, supra; United States v. Morgan,

supra; United States v. Knickerbocker, 42

B.R. 1 (1944); United States v. Shipman,

4 B.R.(ETO) 161 (1944); United States v.

Jared, 8 B.R.(ETO) 1 (1944); United

States v. Whalen, supra; United States v.

Buck, supra; United States v. Long,

supra; United States v. Wright, supra;

a

A-103

(15/ cont. )

United States v. Futrell, supra; United

States v. Wagner, 48 B.R. 45 (1945);

United States v. Stallworth, 55 B.R. 97

(1945); United States v. MacIntyre, 55

B.R. 151 (1945); United States v. Ritner,

18 B.R.(ETO) 189 (1945); United States v.

Traux, 27 B.R.(ETO) 25 (1945); United

States v. Pfefferkuch, 27 B.R. (ETO) 265

(1945); United States v. Thompson, 31

B.R.(ETO) 235 (1945); United States v.

Gunning, supra; United States v. Kooch,

32 B.R.(ETO) 169 (1945); United States v.-

Petrie, 33 B.R.(ETO) 133 (1945); United

States v. Powell, supra; United States v-

Peterson, 59 B-.R- 95 (1946); United

States v. Bonet, 60 B.R. 191 (1946);

United States v. Hart, supra; United

States v. Shelton, 62 B-.R. 29 41946);

United States v. Martin, 66 B.R. 259

(1947); United States v. McMillen, 69

B.R. 113 (1947); United States v. Slater,

74 B.R. 371 (1947); United States v.

Rabb, supra; United States v. Crank, 81l

B.R. 289 (1948); United States v. Prater,

5 B.R.J.C. 228 (1950); United States v-

Kempe, B.R.J.C. 101 (1950); United States

v. Clark, 9 B.R.J.C. 119 (1950); United

States v. Dunlop, 10 B.R.J.C. 187 (1951);

United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185

(A-B-R. 1951); United States v. Jewson, 7

C.M.R. 213 (A.B.R. 1951); United States

v. Livingston, supra; United States v.-

Cowan, 12 C.M.R. 374 (A.B.R. 1953);

United States v. Rice, 14 C.M.R. 316

(A.B.R. 1953); United States v. Free,

supra; United States v. Yeast, 36 C.M.R.

A.F.B.R. 1965); United States v.

Lovejoy, supra; United States v. Pitasi,

Supra; United States v. Horton, 14 M.J.

A-104

importantly, they might have recognized

that the behavior alleged, here, falls

distinctly within the fourth of these

actionable categories, demeaning sexual

behavior.

THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Having conclusively established that

concepts embodied by the terms “custom of

the service" and "fraternization" are

irrelevant to the question of whether

factually detailed Article 133 or 134

allegations of untoward officer/enlisted

behavior are legally sufficient to

Support such specifications, I strip the

specifications, before me, of this

(15/ cont.)

96 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Newak,

15 M.J. 541 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); United

States v. Brauchler, 15 M.J. 755

(A.F.C.M.R. 1983); and United States v.

King, M.J. (A.C.M.R. 1983). For

cases prior to 1920, see Winthrop, supra,

at 716, note 44, and at 718, notes 52 and

54.

_— - = —

agt eaten, es

A-105

surplusage.

Accordingly, the instant

specifications become Article 133

allegations that the accused, an

unmarried Air Force Captain assigned to

Minot Air Force Base, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, engage in several acts of

sexual intercourse each, with a certain

female Air Force Sergeant and with a

certain female Air Force Senior Airman.

Accordingly, only two questions are

germane to my decision. The first is

whether or not existing stare decisis

identifies multiple acts of fornication

by an officer with enlisted personnel as

misconduct that is "conduct unbecoming an

officer and a gentleman" under Article

133, or, in the alternative, as

misconduct that either "prejudices good

order and military discipline" or is

“service discrediting" under a lesser

A-106

included Article 134 specification. The

second, which must be addressed only if

the answer to the first is negative, is

whether in the absence of such stare

decisis, a disciplined analysis of the

likely effect of such blatant and casual

acts of fornication upon the respect

required of enlisted personnel for the

commissioned status of all officers,

might independently establish that the

criteria of all officers, might

independently establish that the criteria

of an Article 133 offense has been met

or, in the alternative, whether a

similarly disciplined analysis of the

likely effect of such acts upon either

the continued maintenance of “good order

and discipline" within the Air Force or

the continued good will of our nation's

civilian population toward the Air Force

and its leaders, might indepe:.dently

A-107

establish that the criteria of a lesser

included Article 134 offense has been

met.

CONCLUSION

It is impossible to review the cases

I have cited in the fourth sub-heading of

note 15, herein, supra, without

concluding that the conduct of the

accused in this case violated both the

Article 133 specification, as alleged,

and the lesser included "prejudice to

good order and discipline" Article 134

ffense, contained within that Article

133 specification. Accordingly, I demur

from a more detailed discussion of these

cases.

I also recognize that the need for a

disciplined analysis of the likely effect

of the blatant and casual acts of

fornication perpetrated by the accused

upon his military inferiors upon the

A-108

respect required of enlisted personnel

for the commissioned status of all

officers is mooted by the above

conclusion. I, nevertheless, remain so

completely appalled by the cavalier

attitude of the accused toward the

quintessential responsibilities of any

commissioned officer and the majority's

discipline shattering acquiescence to it,

that I am compelled to briefly comment

upon those circumstances of this

particular case which causes me concerns.

First, I would point out that there

is no other conduct in this nation, which

in recent years has generated a more

widely divergent and individually

self-righteous group of moral attitudes

than that related to individual sexual

behavior. Indeed, the so-called "Sexual

Revolution," has in many instances even

pitted individual family member against

A-109

individual family member in morally

devastating conflicts such as have

probably been unequalled in this country

since the civil war.

Unquestionably, the tide through

this revolution has been toward a greater

and greater tolerance of individual

sexual proclivity, and as the majority

pointed out, even the former military

justice prohibitions against military

members fornicating with one another,

have been decriminalized. But, to this

day, few law abiding activities have been

so widely viewed or referred to by

various segments of our society as

illicit, as are those instances of sexual

conduct between consenting adults that

have generally been decriminalized within

the last two decades. Indeed, despite

the "decriminalization of such sexual

conduct, when it has occurred between

eT

A-110

people with certain fiduciary type

relationships to one another (e.q.,

professor-student, executive-junioc

executive, congressman-page) it has

resulted more often, than not, in

unquestioned dismissals, scholarly

advocation of such dismissals, 16/ or

unprecedented outrage quelling

Congressional reprimands.

It is within this emotionally

charged arena, that the accused, a

commissioned officer in the United States

Air Force, first decided for some unknown

reason to consciously push against what

he believed to be a questionable Air

Force taboo, by engaging a variety of

young enlisted women in multiple acts of

what one of the young women described at

16/ See Collins, Managers and Lovers,

Harvard Business Review, Sep-Oct, at 142.

A-1ll

trial as "recreational fornication.

Every military officer should

immediately recognize that an effective

fighting force, which it is their mission

to achieve, is absolutely dependent upon

the unquestioning obedience of

subordinates to command. Further, all

military officers should recognize that

in order to fulfill their mission of

achieving this obedience they must never,

knowingly, conduct themselves in a manner

that would likely cause even a small

portion of their subordinate population

to question their moral fiber.

Clearly, it is impossible for an

individual officer to obtain the

unquestioning obedience of his

subordinates if they regard him with

moral suspicion or contempt.

Accordingly, every military officer is

obliged to insure at all times that his

A-112

or her moral conduct does not f2rll to a

level that might justify such suspicions,

even among a small proportion of his

subordinate population. The moment such

a commissioned officer's observable moral

conduct falls to such a level, is the

moment he has become a totally

ineffective officer.

The moral conduct required of a

military officer cannot, therefore, ever

be a mere reflection of his own moral

values. In point of fact, it cannot even

be a reflection of the moral values of a

majority of his subordinates. A military

leader can simply not be effective when

he can only rely on the unquestioning

obedience of 60, 70, or even 90 percent

of his subordinates. Particularly, in

combat situations, where a single

disobeyed order can sometimes result in

untold horror for obedient individuals,

A-113

he must command the moral respect of

virtually everyone that may be subject to

his orders.

Had the accused in the instant case

any regard whatsoever for his status as a

commissioned officer, he would have

| immediately recognized that his moral

behavior, while perhaps not particularly

offensive to him would, nevertheless,

have been blatantly offensive to that

large group of basically fundamentalist

church-goers that populated his, and

practically every other base in the Air

Force (and, some of which undoubtedly

were directly subordinate to him).

Lacking this regard for his commission,

he instead, consciously destroyed not

only his own effectuality, but risked the

possibility that the emotion charged

moral indignation he had aroused might be

transferred by these people to other

A-114

military officers.

Similarly, by violating his

fiduciary-like duty to the moral

well-being of his enlisted

subordinatesl7/ he risked subjecting the

service to public moral condemnation

similar to that which would recently have

beset our Congress, had the House of

Representatives chosen not to reprimand

its members who offended public mores in

a similar manner.

Contrary to the overriding concern

of the majority, I see no similarity,

whatsoever, between the accused's conduct

in this case and the conduct of a married

officer who engages in sexual relations

with his or her enlisted spouse. Here

17/ See Executive Order 10013, 27

October 1948, as amended by Executive

Order 10043, 10 March 1949. See also AFR

50-31, Moral Leadership, 24 October 1969,

and its predecesors.

A-115

the accused's conduct was actionable

because he should have recognized that

recreational fornication with a variety

of enlisted personnel is still viewed as

immeral and promiscuous by a substantial

minority of the Air Force enlisted

personnel, and that he could not

effectively function as an Air Force

officer, once such a substantial minority

of his subordinates had developed a

contemptuous suspicion concerning his

moral uprightness. Such conduct on the

accused's part clearly amounted to

conduct unbecoming an officer and conduct

prejudicial to good order and discipline.

I cannot think of a single Air Force

group or person that would be offendea by

an Air Force officer having sex with his

or her spouse, nor can I think of a

Single instance in which such conduct

could be said to amount to conduct

A-116

unbecc .ing an officer or conduct

prejudicial to good order and discipline.

I would affirm the findings and the

sentence as adjudged.

OFFICIAL

LEO B. WEGEMER

Captain, USAF

Chief Commissioner

B-1

EXHIBIT "B"

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Headquarters United States Air Force

REPLY TO

ATTN OF:

SUBJECT:

TO:

Washington, D.C.

20324

JAJM ACM 23699 (recon)

Captain Michael A. Johanns

001-46-5650FR 16 DEC 1983

8 AF/JA

1. The United States Air Force

Court of Military Review has

issued the attached Order

denying Motion for

Reconsideration of the decision

of the Court rendered on 26

October 1983 and has set aside

the sentence in the attached

decision. A rehearing on

sentence may be ordered.

However, The Judge Advocate

B-2

General is certifying the case

to the United States Court of

Military Appeals in accordance

with Article 67(b)(2), Uniform

Code of Military Justice (Atch

3). Therefore, do not take

action based upon the decision

of the Court of Military Review

until you receive further

instructions.

2. Please arrange to have the

accused's copy of the decision

and of the certificate of The

Judge Advocate General served

upon him (Atch 4) and return

his signed receipts (Atch 5) to

us. If these attachments are

to be served by mail, you

should include a self-addresed,

franked envelope for the

accused's convenience in

- —— ae

returning the receipts to your

office. If the accused refuses

to sign them, forward instead a

certificate of service. If

service of the decision upon

the accused will be delayed,

advise us of the reason and

approximately when we may

expect the receipts.

3. Advise the accused that,

pursuant to paragraph 102b,

Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969

(Rev), appellate counsel in the

Office of the Judge Advocate

General has been designated to

represent him before the Court

of Military Appeals. Also

advise him that he has the

right additionally to be

represented before the Court of

B-4

Military Appeals by civilian

counsel if provided by him. He

should also be advised that the

certification of his case by

The Judge Advocate General will

not in any manner affect his

right to petition the United

States Court of Miitary

Appeals, within the statutory

period, with respect to any

matter of law in the case.

FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Signed

KEITHE E. NELSON, Colonel, USAF

Director, USAF Judiciary

Office of The Judge Advocate General

5 Atch

1. Decn of COMR

2. Order of COMR

3. Certificate of TJAG

4. Accused's Copy

5. Receipts (2)

C=-1

EXHIBIT "“C"

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

UNITED STATES, USCMA Dkt.

Appellant anda No. 48445/AF

Cross-Appellee CMR Dkt.

No. 23699

Vv.

Michael A. CROSS-PETITION

JOHANNS (001-46-5650),

Appellee and

)

)

)

)

)

) ORDER GRANTING

)

)

)

Cross-Appellant )

On consideration of the

cross-petition for grant of review of the

decision of the United States Air Force

Court of Military Review, it is, by the

Court, this 6th day of July 1984,

ORDERED:

That said cross-petition be, and

the same is, hereby granted on Issue III

rasied by appellate defense counsel.

C=-2

Briefs required under Rule 25 will

not be filed.

For the Court, *

/s/ John A. Cutts, III

Deputy Clerk of the Court

*Senior Judge Cook did not

participate.

cc: The Judge Advocate General of the

Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel

(FRAMPTON, Esq. )

Appellate Government Counsel

(HOLLIS)

EXHIBIT "D"

UNITED STATES, Appellant and

Cross-Appellee,

Vv.

Captain Michael A. JOHANNS, U.S. Air

Force, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

NO. 48,455

ACM 23699.

U.S. Court of Military Appeals.

June 10, 1985.

Accused, a captain, U.S. Air Force,

was convicted by general court-martial of

four specifications of conduct unbecoming

an officer and no specification of

conduct prejudicial to good order and

discipline or of a nature to discredit

armed forces, and he appealed. The

United States Air Force Court of Military

Review, 17 M.J. 862, affirmed in part and

set aside in part. Questions were

certified for review and accused's cross

D-2

petition for review was granted. The

United States Court of Military Appeals,

Everett, C.J., held that: (1) officers

engaging in mutually voluntary, private,

nondeviate sexual intercourse with

enlisted member, neither under his

command nor supervision, was not

violation of article prohibiting conduct

unbecoming an officer or article

prohibiting conduct prejudicial to good

order and discipline or of nature to

discredit armed forces, and (2)

specification that accused wrongfully had

sexual intercourse with enlisted woman, a

married woman, not his wife, was

multiplicious for findings purposes with

specification that accused wrongfully,

dishoncrably and disgracefully had sexual

intercourse with same woman who was, at

that time, the lawful wife of active duty

enlisted member of United States Air

D-3

Force, contrary to customs and traditions

of armed forces of the United States.

Affirmed in part and reversed in

part.

Cox, J., filed opinion concuring in

part and concurring in the result in

part.

1. Military Justice 760, 778

Officer's engaging in mutually

voluntary, private, nondeviate sexual

intercourse with enlisted member, neither

under his command nor supervision, was

not violation of article prohibiting

conduct unbecoming an officer or article

prohibiting conduct prejudicial to good

order and discipline or of nature to

discredit armed forces. UCMJ, Art. 133,

134, 10 U.S.C.A $§933, 934.

D-4

2. Military Justice 533

Officers can not be prohibited from

attending bona fide religious services

with enlisted persons. U.S.C.A. Const.

Amend. l.

3. Military Justice 533

Restrictions on contacts between

officers and enlisted persons,

male/female or otherwise, can be imposed

where there is direct supervisory

relationship.

4. Military Justice 959

Specification that accused

wrongfully had sexual intercourse with

enlisted woman, a married woman, not his

wife, was multiplicious for findings

purposes with specification that accused

wrongfully, dishonorably and |

disgracefully had sexual, intercourse

D-5

with same woman who was, at that time,

the lawful wife of active duty enlisted

member of United States Air Force,

contrary to customs and traditions of

armed forces of the United States. UCMJ,

Arts. 134, 10 U.S.C.A. §§933, 934.

For Appellant and Cross-Appellee:

Major Robert E. Ferencik, Jr. (argued);

Colonel Kenneth R. Rengert, Captain

Brenda J. Hollis (on brief).

For Appellee and Cross-Appellant:

Mary Louise Frampton, Esquire (argued);

Colonel Leo L. Sergi, Captain Kathleen G.

O'Reilly (on brief).

Amicus Curiae: Eugene R. Fidell,

Esquire (argued); Charles S. Sims,

Esquire, and Arthur B. Spitzer, Esquire,

of counsel--For American Civil Liberties

Union Foundation.

Opinion

EVERETT, Chief Judge:

I

Contrary to his pleas, Captain

Michael A. Johanns was found guilty by

D-6

general court-martial of four

specifications of conduct unbecoming an

officer, in violation of Article 133 of

the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10

U.S.C. §933, and one specification of

conduct prejudicial to good order and

discipline or of a nature to discredit

the armed forces, in violation of Article

134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. $934. The court

members sentenced him to dismissal from

the armed forces on July 2, 1982. The

convening authority approved these

findings of guilty and the sentence. The

United States Air Force Court of Military

Review on October 26, 1983, set aside

three of the above findings of guilty

under Article 133, 10 U.S.C. §933, and

ordered a rehearing on sentence on the

remaining findings of guilty. A

subsequent government motion for

reconsideration of this decision was

D-7

denied by the Court of Military Review.

On December 16, 1983, the Judge

Advocate General of the Air Force,

pursuant to Article 67(b)(2), UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. §867, certified the following

questions for review by this Court.

I

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS

CASE, WAS THE COURT OF REVIEW

CORRECT IN NOT SUSTAINING CONVICTION

OF CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER IN

VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 133 AS TO

SPECIFICATIONS 2, 3 AND 4 OF

CHARGE I?

as

IF THE FOREGOING IS ANSWERED IN THE

AFFIRMATIVE, WAS THE COURT OF

MILITARY REVIEW CORRECT IN’ NOT

SUSTAINING A CONVICTION OF CONDUCT

TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER IN

D-8

VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 134 AS TO

SPECIFICATIONS 2, 3 AND 4 OF

CHARGE I?

Thereafter, on July 6, 194, this

Court granted the accused's

cross-petition for review on the

following question raised by appellate

defense counsel:

III

THE SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II AND

CHARGE II SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS

THAT SPECIFICATION WAS MULTIPLICIOUS

FOR FINDINGS PURPOSES WITH

SPECIFICATION 1 OF CHARGE I.

The above questions were raised with

respect to the findings of guilty entered

at the accused's trial on the following

charges and spnattigekions:

CHARGE I: Violation of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice, Article 133.

Specification 1: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

D-9

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5

October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,

and disgracefully have sexual intercourse

with Donna R., Sergeant, United States

Air Force, the said Sergeant Donna R.

being, at that time, the lawful wife of

an active duty enlisted member of the

United States Air Force, contrary to the

customs and traditions of the armed

forces of the United States.

Specification 2: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst '

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 8

October 1981, wrongfully, dishonorably,

and disgracefully fraternize and

associate on terms of military equality

with enlisted members of the United

States Air Force, to wit: Sergeant

D-10

Donna R., by going into the military

quarters of the said Sergeant Donna R. at

Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota and

sharing the same bed with the said

Sergeant Donna R. while the said Sergeant

Donna R. was intoxicated and at a time

when the said Sergeant Donna R. was the

lawful wife of an enlisted member of the

United States Air Force, contrary to the

customs and traditions of the armed

forces of the United States.

Specification 3: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot,

North Dakota, on three or four separate

occasions during September, 1981,

wrongfully, dishonorably, and

disgracefully fraternize and associate on

terms of military equality with Staff

Sergeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl K., a

female active duty enlisted member of the

—s.

D-11

United States Air Force, wy engaging in

acts of sexual intercourse with the said

Staff Seargeant, then Sergeant, Sheryl

K., contrary to the customs and

traditions of the armed forces of the

United States.

Specification 4: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on two or three

occasions, during November, 1981,

wrongfully, dishonorably, and

disgracefully fraternize and associate on

terms of military equality with Senior

Airman Michelle P., then known as Senior

Airman Michelle S., a female active duty

enlisted member of the United States Air

Force, by engaging in acts of sexual

intercourse with the said Senior Airman

Michelle P., then known as Senior Airman

Michelle P., then known as Senior Airman

D-12

Michelle S., contrary to the customs and

traditions of the armed forces of the

United States.

CHARGE II: Violation of the Uniform Code

of Military Justice, Article 134.

Specification: In that CAPTAIN MICHAEL

A. JOHANNS, United States Air Force, 9lst

Strategic Missile Wing, did, at Minot Air

Force Base, North Dakota, on or about 5

October 1881, wrongfully have sexual

intercourse with Donna R., a married

woman, not his wife.

The Court of Military review in its

decision below delineated the facts

surrounding these offenses as follows:

The accused was a single, 28 year

Old missile combat crew commander who had

been stationed at Minot Air Force Base,

North Dakota, since completion of

training in 1978. The Officers’ Open

Mess at Minot was being redecorated; as a

:

:

'

.

|

D-13

result, officers had been authorized to

utilize the facilities of the

Noncommissioned Officers' Open Mess. The

accused availed himself of the

opportunity and socialized at the NCO

Club. There he met Sgt. R. (who was

married), SrA P. and SSqt K. He dated

each and ultimately had sexual relations

with them all. On one occasin, the

accused and Sgt R. went on a date

downtown, and thereafter returned to her

house on base. Sgt. R. was intoxicated

and therefore remembers nothing other

than the next morning the accused was

asleep next to her :n bed.

All this interaction was completely

consensual, private, nondeviate, and

sometimes instigated by the women

involved. The accused was neither the

commander nor supervisor of any of these

enlisted members, and their respective

D-14

relationships were not publicized.4/ In

the opinion of the enlisted women, the

accused's activities were neither

dishonorable nor service discrediting.

The charges resulted from the apparently

private, voluntary liaisons.

United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J. 862,

964 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).

The Government had contended before

the United States Air Force Court of

Military Review that there was a custom

in the United States Air Force which

prohibited fraternizations with and made

criminal the associate of officers with

enlisted personnel on terms of military

equality. However, the court below found

that at the time of the offenses in

4/ It was stipulated at trial that the

allegations were brought to the attention

of the accused’s commander by a member of

his squadron on the basis of inferences

he drew from conversations with the

accused.

sy ia allt ine te Whe

Ce ae ee

D-15

issue, “there did not exist a clearcut

standard for qauging as called

'fraternization' in the Air Force".

Furthermore, the court

specifically [found] that as a

matter of fact and law the custom in

the Air Force against fraternization

has been so eroded as to make

criminal prosecution against an

officer for engaging in mutually

voluntary, private, non-deviate

sexual intercourse with an enlisted

member, neither under his command

nor supervision, unavailable.

United State v. Johanns, supra at 869.

II

In Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94

S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), the

Supreme Court emphasized that "the

military is, by necessity, a specialized

society separate from civilian society."

D-16

Id. at 743, 94 S.Ct. at 2555. Moreover,

"to maintain the discipline essential to

perform its mission effectively, the

military has developed what ‘may not

unfitly be called the customary military

law' or ‘general usage of the military

service.'" Id. at 744, 94 S.Ct. at

2556. The Supreme Court pointed out that

Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code

have a lineage extending back more than

three centuries, it. at 745-46, 94 S.Ct.

at 2556-57; and that "[dJecisions of this

Court during the last century have

recognized that the longstanding customs

and usages of the services i. part

accepted meaning to the seemingly

imprecise standards of Arts. 133 and

134." Id. at 746-47, 94 S.Ct. at 2557.

Thus, in 1857, the Court had "upheld the

Navy's general article, which provided

that “LaJll crimes committed by persons

iittala

sie

belonging to the navy, which are not

specified in the foregoing articles,

shall be punished according to the laws

and customs in such cases at sea.'" Id.

at 747, 94 S.Ct. at 2557, citing Dynes v.

Hoover, 20 How. 65, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1857).

The rationale for this result had been

that,

fnjotwithstanding the apparent

indeterminateness of such a

provision, it is not liable to

abuse; for what those crimes are,

and how they are to be punished, is

well known by practical men in the

navy and army, and by those who have

studied the law of courts martial,

and the offenses of which the

different courts martial have

cognizance. Ibid.1/

1/ The court also pointec to Smith v.

Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 6 S.Ct. 5/70, 29

D-18

In considering Captain Levy's

contention that Articles 133 and 134 were

“void for vagueness" under the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,

the Supreme Court concluded that, "[flJor

the reasons that differentiate military

society from civilian society, we think

Congress is permitted to legislate both

with greater breadth and with greater

flexibility when prescribing the rules by

which the former shall be governed than

it is when prescribing rules for the

latter." 417 U.S. at 756, 94 S.Ct. at

2561. "Because of the factors

(1/7 cont. )

L.Ed. 601 (1886); United States v.

Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 13 S.Ct. 552, 37

L.Ed 378 (1893); and Swaim v. United

States, 165 U.S. 553, 17 S.Ct. 448, 41

L.Ed. 823 (1897), in support of its

thesis that "the usages and customs of

war" and "training and experience in the

service" give precision to tne general

prohibitions contained in Articles 133

and 134.

D-19

differentiating military society from

civilian society," the Court held

that the proper standard of review

for a vagueness challenge to the

articles of the Code is the standara

which applies to criminal statues

regulating economic affairs.

Id. at 756, 94 S.Ct. at 2562.

Consequently, Levy's attack on Articles

133 and 134 for vagueness was rejected

because he "could have had no reasonable

doubt that his public statements urging

Negro enlisted men not to go to Vietnam

if ordered to do so were both ‘unbecoming

an officer and a gentlemen', and ‘to the

prejudice of good order and discipline in

the armed forces.'" Id. at 757, 94 S.Ct.

at 2562.

[1] Obviously, the premise for this

result in Parker v. Levy was that, in

view of the military customs, usage, and

D-20

training, the accused could not

successfully claim that he lacked

constitutionally required notice under

the more relaxed standard of measuring

void-for-vagueness. However, because

that premise is inapplicable to Captain

Johanns, the result here must be that

reached by the Court of Military Review.

Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,

78 &.Ct. 240, 2L.BE4.2d 228 (1957); United

States v. Tolkach, 14 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.

1982).

In discussing Article 133, the

Manual for Courts-Martial in effect when

Johanns was tried explained:

Conduct violative of this article is

action or behavior in an official

capacity which, in dishonoring or

disgracing the individual as an

officer, seriously compromises his

character as a gentleman, or action

D-21

or behavior in an unofficial or

private capacity which, in

dishonoring or disgracing the

individual personally, seriously

compromises his standing as an

officer.

Para. 212, Manual for Court-Martial,

United States, 1969 (Revised edition).

(Emphasis added). With respect to

ii il nadie er ee ‘

nv = Scapa

disorders and neglects to the prejudice

of good order and discipline in the armed

forces, the Manual remarked: |

Almost any irregular or improper

act on the part of a member of the

military service could be regarded

j as prejudicial in some indirect or

: remote sense; however, the article

does not contemplate these distant

effects. It is confined to cases in

which the prejudice is reasonably

direct and palpable.

* * * * * *

D-22

A breach of a custom of the service

may result in a violation of this clause

of Article 134. In its legal sense the

work "custom" imports something more than

a method of procedure or a mode of

conduct or behavior which is merely of

frequent or usual occurrence. Custom

arises out of long established practices

which by common consent have attained the

force of law in the military or other

community affected by them. There can be

no such thing as a custom that is

contrary to existing law or regulation.

A custom which has not been adopted by

existing statue or regulation ceases to

exist when its observance has been long

abandoned. Many customs of the service

are now set forth in regulations of the

various armed forces. Violations of

those customs should be charged under

Article 92 as violations of the

ne aia

D-23

regulations in which they appear. Para.

213b, Manual, supra. [Emphasis added).

The language of the 1951 Manual for

Courts-Martial is almost identical. See

paras. 213, 213b, Manual for

Courts-Martial, United States, 1951; see

also paras. 182, 183, Manual for

Courts-Martial, United States Army, 1949

(discussing Articles of War 95 and 96).

Interestingly, none of these three

Manuals contains a form specification for

“fraternization". See App. 6 c, 1951

Manual; App. 4, 1949 Manual.

Consistent with these Manual

provisions, this Court has indicated that

Article 134, 10 U.S.C. §934, is not

intended "to regulate the wholly private

moral conduct of an individual." See

United States v. Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609,

614, 20 C.M.R. 325, 330 (9156); United

States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 427,

D-24

4 C.M.R. 15, 19 (1952). These

pronouncements have been interpreted to

mean that, "[fJornication in the absence

of aggravating circumstances is

recognized as not an offense under

military law." See United States v.

Wilson, 32 C.M.R. 517, 518 (C.M.R.

1962). Certainly officers hold a special

status whereunder a higher standard of

conduct is required of them by law and

custom. United States v. Means, 10 M.J.

162 (C.M.A. 1981). Nonetheless, even for

an officer, private fornication in the

absence of some other aggravating

circumstance would not seem subject to

prosecution under Articles 133 and

134--regardless of the moral censure to

which this activity might be subject.

If the officer's sexual partner is

an enlisted person, does this constitute

sufficient aggravation to make private

binK be Re | Netw

men al

D-25

fornication subject to prosecution? For

two reasons, the answer to this question

depends on whether there was a custom

proscribing this type of relationship.

In the first place, if such a custom

existed, the violation of that custom

would tend to have a much more direct and

palpable effect on good order and

discipline and would more seriously

compromise the officer's standing. he

would be perceived as flouting military

authority--which, of course, no officer

may do.

Secondly--and constitutionally more

important--the existence of such a custom

would provide notice to officers, so that

they would have no reasonable doubt as to

the legal requirements to which they are

subject. Obviously, "not every social

contact between an officer and enlisted

man is or even can reasonably be

D-26

prohibited. To do so would be

inconsistent with our democratic concept

of social relations and, probably,

unavailing." See United States v.

Pitasi, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 608, 44 C.M.R.

31, 38 (1971). Custom can help define

which relationships between officers and

enlisted persons are improper.

Customs differ among the armed

services. Coast Guard customs and

regulations still allow the wearing of a

beard, as did the Navy until recently;

but the other services require their

members to be cleaiu-shaven. In the Army,

an officer still may not protect himself

from rain with an umbrella; but in the

Air Force this custom has been

abandoned. Indeed, the Air Force--the

most recently created of the armed

services--has never honored some of the

customs recognized in the senior

D-27

services; and perhaps because both

officers and airmen at one time served

together in small flight crews, the

barriers placed by custom between

; officers and enlisted persons have

| probably always been lower in that

) Service than in others.

) Und

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Johanns v. United States · 474 U.S. 850 | Frix