Appendix — Stearns Co. v. Hodel
Supreme Court brief1985
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APPENDIX A
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL TEXT PUBLICATION
See, Sixth Circuit Rule 24
No. 83-5299
No. 83-5305
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Ramex Mriyixc Corporation (83-5299),
GasrieL Exercy Corporation (83-5305), - Plaintiffs-
Appellants,
and
Tue Srearns Company (83-5299), - Intervening Plaintiff-
Appellant,
v.
James Watt, Secretary of Interior;
Pau. Reeves, Acting Director ;
Anpvrew Barey, Acting Director, Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforce-
ment;
Davip C. Suort, Region II, Office of Sur-
face Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, - Defendants-
Appellees.
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
Decided and Filed January 29, 1985
Before Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)*, ENGEL
and Merairt, Circuit Judges.
Merritt, Circuit Judge.
*The Honorable Potter Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)
of the United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation.
2a
In each of these two cases against the Secretary of the
Interior, a coal mining company proposes to mine coal
under the surface of land owned and maintained by the
federal government as forest land. The mining company
claims a valid royalty lease of tue mineral estate from the
successor in interest of the original owner who reserved the
mineral estate when he sold the fee interest in the land to
the government. Each case arises under the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1328 (1983). In each, the coal mining company and the
owners of the underlying royalty mineral interest seek from
this Court a declaratory judgment that they are entitled to
mine coal under the federal lands. In one case the coal
underlies part of the Daniel Boone National Forest in
Eastern Kentucky, and in the other case the land is part of
the so-called “Redbird Purchase Unit” near the Daniel
Boone National Forest. Plaintiffs do not seek injunctive
relief or damages.’
The 1977 Act applies to mining on both public and
private lands, but the questions of interpretation and appli-
cation of the Act presented by plaintiffs here relate to one
of the provisions applicable only to public lands, namely
§ 522(e)(2), codified as 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2). That sec-
tion provides, with certain exceptions which we need not
enumerate here, that “subject to valid existing rights,” no
coal mining which disturbs the surface “shall be permitted
1Plaintiffs originally sought an injunction prohibiting the
Secretary from interfering with their mining operations, but
have not pursued this remedy. Similarly, although plaintiffs
have made a Fifth Amendment takings argument, they have not
sought damages at this juncture.
3a
on any federal lands within the boundaries of any
national forest... .”?
Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment holding that
section 1272(e)(2) is not applicable to the mines they in-
tend to operate and hence that the Office of Surface Mining
which administers the Act may not apply and enforce this
section against them. They argue that section 1272(e)(2)
does not regulate their proposed mines for the following
reasons: (1) section 1272(e)(2) does not cover separate
mineral interests owned by private parties under federal
forests but covers only surface interests; (2) unless the
section is read to exclude such private mineral estates, the
section constitutes an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment; (3) the mineral estate underlying the
government-owned “Redbird Purchase Unit” is not covered
by section 1272(e)(2) because Redbird is not a national
forest.
2Section 1272(e) reads as follows:
After August 3, 1977, and subject to valid existing rights,
no surface coal mining operations except those which exist on
August 3, 1977, shall be permitted —
(1) On any lands within the boundaries of units of
the National Park System, the National Wildlife
Refuge System, the National System of Trails, the
National Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild
and Scenic Rivers System . . .;
(2) On any federal lands within the boundaries of
any national forest: provided, however, That surface
coal mining operations may be permitted on such
lands if the Secretary finds that there are no signifi-
cant recreational, timber, economic, or other values
which may be incompatible with surface mining
operations and —
(A) Surface cperations and impacts are inci-
dental to an underground coal mine;
4a
When the Office of Surface Mining learned that the two
mining companies were about to conduct underground min-
ing operations which would disturb the surface of federal
lands, the administrator gave notice that the companies are
required to seek and obtain permits under the Surface
Mining Reclamation Act and would be subject to the provi-
sions of section 1272(e)(2). When plaintiffs received these
notices, they filed this action for declaratory judgment in
District Court rather than participate in the administrative
hearing process established by the Act. The Act prohibits
the mining of coal without an administrative permit, 30
U.S.C. § 1256, and provides for administrative review and
adjudication of disputes arising from permit applications.
30 U.S.C. § 1264.
The District Court overruled in part the government’s
motion to dismiss the complaints on grounds that plaintiffs
had not exhausted their administrative remedies and that
their cases were not ripe for decision. Instead, the Court
rendered a partial declaratory judgment construing and
applying the statute. It held that the companies’ mineral
interests and mining operations would operate under and
on federal forest lands, and were therefore governed by
section 1272(e)(2) of the Act. The District Court then
agreed with the government’s position regarding ripeness,
and ruled that it would defer to the agency’s primary juris-
diction regarding plaintiffs’ further claims. However, upon
motion filed by the plaintiffs, the District Court dismissed
the cases in their entirety so that plaintiffs could appeal
from the declaratory judgment. On appeal, the govern-
ment has formally waived any exhaustion and ripeness con-
tentions to the extent that they might be interpreted to
interfere with the District Court’s limited declaration, and
asserts that the judgment is now ripe for decision by this
Court.
5a
Plaintiffs’ first argument is that the Act, and specifically
section 1272(e), does not apply to them at all, because their
proposed mining operations will not occur “on federal
lands.” Their theory is that they still own the “lands”
beneath the surface, and although the federal government
kas been granted some rights on the surface, the lands
affected by plaintiffs’ mining, including the surface land
necessarily disturbed by their underground mines, are
wholly owned by the private plaintiffs as a matter of state
law. Proceeding from this premise, plaintiffs then claim
that they cannot be made to resort to the administrative
procedure that the Office of Surface Mining has set up for
determination of “valid existing rights,” because that pro-
cess necessarily assumes that the plaintiffs’ operations will
occur “on federal lands.”
Plaintiffs’ proposal to mine beneath federal national
forest lands, with the conceded attendant effects on the
surface of those lands, fits squarely within the common
sense meaning of the phrase “on federal lands” as used in
section 1272(e)(2). This is even more apparent when the
definition of “surface mining” contained in the Act, i.e.,
“surface impacts incident to an underground mine,” is sub-
stituted for the phrase “surface mining” in section 1272(e).
Thus, the Act and section 1272(e) apply to plaintiffs’ mines.
The District Court was correct in so holding.
The plaintiffs’ “taking” argument is governed by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation, 452 U. S. 264 (1981), a pre-
enforcement challenge to the Surface Mining Act. The
Court held that the Act is not facially invalid. Its “mere
enactment” does not constitute a taking of plaintiffs’ min-
eral estate. Thus, the Court upheld the Act against the
same type of attack under the Fifth Amendment as plain-
tiffs make in the instant case.
6a
The Supreme Court observed that “the Act does not, on
its face, prevent beneficial use of coal-bearing lands,” and
the coal companies “cannot at this juncture legitimately
vaise complaints in this Court about the manner in which
the challenged provisions of the Act have been or will be
applied in specific circumstances” because “there is no
indication in the record that appellees have availed them-
selves of the opportunities provided by the Act to obtain
administrative review,” 452 U. S. 296-97. The Court ex-
plains the hypothetical nature of the “taking” claims before
it—“if appellees were to seek administrative relief under
these procedures, a mutually acceptable solution might well
be reached”—and concludes that “the potential for such
administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that the
taking issue decided by the District Court simply is not ripe
for judicial resolution.” Jd. at 297 (footnote omitted). The
same reasoning applies in this case. The Office of Surface
Mining has not yet ruled on the questions of plaintiffs’
“valid existing right” to engage in underground coal mining
under section 1272(e)(2). Until an administrative disposi-
tion is made of this question, we will not know the nature
of the restraint imposed by the government on plaintiffs’
mining operations. Thus the District Court correctly ruled
that plaintiffs’ takings claim was not ripe for adjudication,
and deferred to the agency’s jurisdiction.
We agree with the District Court that lands within the
Redbird Purchase Unit are “national forest” lands within
the meaning of section 1272(e)(2). “National forest” land,
primarily in the west, has been set aside for many years by
the President from land in the public domain under section
24 of the Creative Act of 1891, 16 U.S.C. § 471. See United
States v. New Mezico, 438 U. S. 696, 705 (1978). “National
forest” land within the meaning of section 1272(e) has also
been acquired, primarily in the eastern section of the United
States, under section 11 of the Weeks Law of 1911, 16
Za
U.S.C. § 521, which provides that land so acquired “shall be
permanently reserved, held and administered as national
forest land” just as are the western lands set aside by the
President under the Creative Act of 1891. Land acquired
as forest land under the Weeks Act, as distinguished from
land set aside under the Creative Act of 1891, need not be
formally set aside and proclaimed as national forest by the
President. The acquisition of the land by the United States
under the authority of the Weeks Act is sufficient to desig-
nate it as “national forest.”
The “Redbird” Forest in question here is a so-called
“purchase unit” acquired, held and administered as “na-
tional forest” land under the Weeks Act. The District
Court was therefore correct in holding that section 1272(e)
regulating coal mining in national forests governs lands
within the Redbird Purchase Unit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is af-
firmed. Further relief not inconsistent with this opinion
must be sought as an initial matter from the Secretary.
8a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 83-5299/5305
Ramex Mrytnc Corporation, Et Al, - - Plaintiffs-
Appellants,
v.
James G. Wart, Secretary of the Interior,
Et Al., - - - - - - - Defendants-
Appellees.
ORDER — Filed March 15, 1985
BeroreE: Stewart, Associate Justice (Ret.)*, Encren and
Merritt, Circuit Judges.
The Court having received a petition for rehearing en
bane, and the petition having been circulated not only to the
original panel members but also to all other active judges
of this Court, and no judge of this Court having requested
a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition
for rehearing has been referred to the original hearing
panel.
The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehear-
ing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were
fully considered upon the original submission and decision
of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE CoURT
(s) John P. Hehman, Clerk
*Hon Potter Stewart sitting by designation from the Supreme
Court of the United States.
9a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 83-5299/5305
Ramex Minrne Corporation (83-5299),
(JABRIEL Enercy CorPoRATION
(83-5305), - - - - Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Tue Stearns CoMPANy
(83-5299), - - Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
James Wart, Secretary of
Interior, et al, -~— - - Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky
JUDGMENT—Filed January 29, 1985
Before: Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)*, Encrn
and Merritt, Circuit Judges.
TxHis Cause came on to be heard on the record from the
said District Court and was argued by counsel.
On ConsmDERATION WuHeEREOF, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Dis-
trict Court in this case be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Further relief not inconsistent with this opinion must be
sought as an initial matter from the Secretary.
*The Honorable Potter Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)
of the United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation.
10a
It is further ordered that Defendants-Appellees recover
from Appellants the costs on appeal, as itemized below, and
that execution therefor issue out of said District Court, if
necessary.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE CouRT
—— (s) John Hehman
John P. Hehman, Clerk
Issued as Mandate: March 25, 1985
Costs: None
EE ME dy wind Aen ekewawcens a
PE Ackicbenenaeesas eens $
nome SES Ei NS ee $
A True Copy
Attest:
(s) Nancy Schulkens
Deputy Clerk
tia
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LONDON
Civil Action No. 81-i2
Ramex Mintnc Corporation - - - - Plaintiff,
v.
James G. Wart, Ete, Et Al. - - - Defendants.
Civil Action No, 81-18
GasrreL Enercy Corporation - »~ = Plawif,
v.
James G. Watt, Ete. Et Al. - - «+ Defendants.
MEMORANDUM — Filed November 3, 1981
These matters are before the Court on various motions
of the parties: the federal defendants’ April 27, 1981, and
May 5, 1981, motions to dismiss, their August 6, 1981, mo-
tions for summary judgment, and their August 10, 1981,
motion to dismiss the intervening complaint in London
Civil No, 81-12; Ramex Mining Corporation’s (“Raméx’s”)
May 21, 1981 (motion for summary judgment in London
Civil No. 81-12; Stearns Coal and Lamber Company’s
(“Stearns’ ”) August 14, 1981, motion for summary judg-
ment in London Civil No. 81-12; and Gabriel Energy Cor-
poration’s (“Gabriel’s”) May 26, 1981, motion for summary
judgment and its August 13, 1981, motion to amend its
complaint, both in London Civil Action No. 81-18. With the
12a
exception of Gabriel’s August 13 motion to amend its com-
plaint, all the pending motions are controverted. Fortu-
nately, in ruling on these motions, chaos may be avoided,
for the arguments are severally repeated throughout the
pleadings. The Court has extracted the principal argu-
ments from the various pleadings in this Memorandum,
and disposes of them in a slightly-different order than that
suggested to the Court by the parties. After a review of
the record and the pleadings of counsel, the Court concludes
that it has jurisdiction in these matters, that the federal
defendants are entitled to partial summary judgment, and
that the Court should retain jurisdiction pending adminis-
trative proceedings before the Office of Surface Mining Re-
clamation and Enforcement (“OSM”). Since no party has
objected, Gabriel will be permitted to file its tendered
amended complaint. Appropriate Orders will be entered
this date.
The sole issue for resolution in both matters is whether
an operator seeking to mine coal pursuant to a privately
held mineral estate underlying a federally owned surface
estate in a national forest is conducting a surface coal
mining operation on federal lands within the meaning of
Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
I. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
A. Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review.
The federal defendants contend that this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because Section 526(a)(1) of
the Surface Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1), requires
that this litigation be brought in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, within 60 days after
the alleged injuries, by plaintiffs who participated in the
administrative process. Section 526(a)(1) is plainly ap-
13a
plicable to any litigant seeking judicial review of the pro-
mulgation of national rules and regulations pertaining to
either surface mining operations or the impacts incident
to uuderground mining operations on federal lands. The
plaintiffs’ complaints and pleadings, however, evidence that
the plaintiffs are not challenging either the Secretary’s
authority to promulgate national rules and regulations per-
taining to federal lands or the validity of those regulations ;
rather, the plaintiffs contend simply that their private
mineral estates and mining operations are not subject to
the federal lands provisions of the Surface Mining Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1272, 1273. Since the plaintiffs are challenging
the applicability of the federal statute and not the validity
of the federal regulations promulgated thereunder, the
Surface Mining Act’s preclusion of judicial review, 30
U.S.C. § 1276(a) (1), is wholly inapplicable. Subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and venue are pruperly laid in the Eastern
District of Kentucky. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1391(e).
The federal defendants are mistaken in their contention
that the distinction between applicability and validity of
federal statutes and regulations is wholly illusory. Under
§ 701(a)(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(1), an agency’s decisions are not reviewable when
a statute precludes judicial review. Application of Sec-
tion 701(a) (1) is contrary to the general constitutional pre-
sumption of reviewability of administrative action. See,
e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275,
289-91 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Where an agency
is alleged to be acting outside of its mandate and the
organic legislation establishing the agency also contain a
statutory preclusion or limitation of judicial review, the
aggrieved party has no remedy to challenge the applica-
bility of federal regulation, unless a federal judicial forum
construes the statute precluding judicial review as inap-
plicable. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, supra,
l4a
the Supreme Court was faced with the distinction of the
applicability and the validity of federal regulations. The
Court concluded that Section 307(b) of th Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), the federal provision precluding ju-
dicial review under the Clean Air Act, did not apply to
restrict the jurisdiction of a federal district court to de-
termine whether federal regulation applied to the defend-
ant’s conduct in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 285. The
Court explicitly cautioned federal district courts to avoid
engaging in judicial review in a manner precluded by
statutory restrictions in the organic legislation under the
-suise of making a determination of the applicability of
federal regulation. 7d. As the Supreme Court in Adamo
Wrecking indicated, the distinction between the applica-
bility and the validity of federal regulation is not illusory,
and with due regard to the Supreme Conrt’s admonition,
this Court is not precluded by Section 526(a)(1) of the
Surface Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1), from exer-
cising jurisdiction in these matters.
B. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies.
The federal defendants contend that this Court should
refrain from exercising jurisdiction in this litigation for
jurisprudential considerations. They argue that the con-
troversy is not justiciable because the plaintiffs have failed
to avail themselves of all possible administrative remedies
of an adverse administrative determination prior to seeking
judicial review. The plaintiffs concede that they have not
attempted to avail themselves of any administrative reme-
dies to resolve these matters, but argue that the juris-
prudential considerations inherent in the doctrine are
irrelevant to this litigation. The plaintiffs further argue
that they are under no duty to exhaust their administra-
tive remedies because, under their interpretation of the
Surface Mining Act, the agency proferring relief, OSM,
15a
has exceeded its authority delegated to it by Congress.
Plaintiffs contend it is futile for them to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies before OSM, for OSM has already deter-
mined that the plaintiffs are subject to their federal
regulation pertaining to national forests. OSM’s previous
determination is the ultimate issue in this litigation, and
that issue is currently before the Court.
It is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether
the plaintiffs are under a duty to exhaust administrative
remedies prior to the inception of this litigation or whether
an exhaustion requirement is futile herein, for the general
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies before
an administrative agency is subject to an exception where
the principal question is solely of statutory interpretation.
McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 197-99 (1969) ;
Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F. 2d 369, 371 (10th
Cir. 1980). None of the jurisprudential considerations urg-
ing restraint from the exercise of jurisdiction are appli-
cable. The resolution of the applicability of the Surface
Mining Act to the mineral estates of Ramex, Stearns, and
Gabriel does not require any particular expertise unique
to the OSM. McKart v. United States, supra at 198. Ju-
ducial review would not be significantly aided by any addi-
tional administrative proceedings. Id. at 199. Indeed, if
the plaintiffs were required to pursue administrative pro-
ceedings before OSM without accruing the desired results
and thereafter successfully demonstrated the inapplica-
bility of federal regulation, the plaintiffs would suffer
needless litigation expenses in the interim prior to a judg-
ment in this forum. As in McKart v. United States, supra,
there is simply no overwhelming reason for this Court to
have OSM determine in the first instance whether the plain-
tiffs’ mining operations in the Daniel Boone National Forest
are subject to the Surface Mining Act.
16a
C. Ripeness of Compensatory Claims.
The federal defendants contend that the plaintiffs’
claims for just compensation for a deprivation of property
are not ripe for adjudication. The plaintiffs concede the
defendants’ contention, but assert that their claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief are ripe. The Court con-
cludes that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
are ripe, and agrees with the parties that the claims for
compensation have not as yet matured. See Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,
U. S. ___, 49 U.S.L.W. 4654, 4661-62 (1981).
If, STATUTORY AUTHORTIY TO REGULATE PRI-
VATE MINERAL ESTATES IN THE NATIONAL
FORESTS.
The task of a Court to determine whether a particular
party’s activity is subject to federal statutory regulation
is relatively narrow. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,
supra at 285. The Court must first establish that Congress
has the constitutional authority to regulate the specific
challenged conduct. Then, the only remaining question for
judicial inquiry is whether Congress has in fact chosen to
regulate the specific challenged conduct. With respect to
constitutional authorization, whatever doubts remain as to
the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Act were laid
to rest in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, supra, wherein
the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not ex-
ceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enact-
ing the Surface Mining Act. Both in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining, supra, and in Hodel v. Indiana, _— U. S.
__., 49 U.S.L.W. 4667 (1981), the Supreme Court rejected
broad constitutional challenges to the Act as violative of
the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. Those decisions estab-
lish that Congress has the authority to enact the Surface
17a
Mining Act, and, in particular, surface mining activities
within federal lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272, 1273.
It is the conclusion of this Court that Congress has
chosen to regulate the conduct at issue. Section 522(e) of
the Act prohibits new surface coal mining operations on
federal lands within the boundaries of a national forest
except where the operator can show a valid existing right
to mine as of August 3, 1977. Plaintiffs contend that the
regulations and requirements imposed upon “federal lands”
does not apply to their interests as they own private min-
eral estates. If the plaintiffs were able to remove the
minerals in question without disturbing the surface, clearly
“federal lands,” the plaintiffs’ arguments and recitation
of the law of property would become relevant. However,
common sense indicates that the plaintiffs will by necessity
disturb the surface of “federal lands” by either under-
ground or surface (especiaily) mining and this disruption
is what the Act is designed to regulate. This is reflected
in Section 101(c) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c), which
states:
Many surface mining operations result in disturbances
of surface areas that burden and adversely affect com-
merce and the public welfare by destroying or dimin-
ishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial,
residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry
purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by con-
tributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroy-
ing fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural
beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by cre-
ating hazards dangerous to life and property, by de-
grading the quality of life in local communities, and by
counteracting governmental programs and efforts to
conserve soil, water, and other natural resources.
18a
It appears that Congress recognized that in many in-
stances private proprietary interests would underlie fed-
eral lands subject to the Act in issue. The legislative
history of this Act demonstrates the intent of Congress to
address the interests of private mineral estate holders.
As stated in a Senate report concerning this Act:
Since the mining of coal became a profitable enter-
prise, there have been numerous instances in which the
mineral estate and the surface estates were separated,
both on public and private lands. State law governs
the resolution of any disputes about property rights
which might arise from such separations, and this Act
does not attempt to tamper with such state laws. The
Committee firmly believes that all valid existing prop-
erty rights must be preserved, and has no intention
whatsoever, by any provision of this bill, to change
such rights.
S. Rep. No. 95-128, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). While the
Act reflects the decide of Congress that, in most instances,
mining should not take place on federal lands, an exception
was provided to take into account those persons who had
valid existing rights in private mineral estates lying below
“federal lands.” 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). Based upon the
above discussion, it is clear that the Act in issue, as it
regulates mining activities on “federal lands,” should be
interpreted to include regulation of those private parties
who seek to mine their mineral estates underlying the
national forests.
All plaintiffs are declared to be conducting underground
coal mining operations which come within the provisions of
30 U.S.C. § 1272(e), as they involve surface operations and
impacts incident to an underground coal mine.
19a
Ill. DEFERENCE TO THE
PRIMARY JURISDICTION.
Having concluded that the plaintiffs seeking to mine
coal pursuant to a privately held mineral estate underlying
the federally owned surface estate in the Daniel Boone
National Forest are conducting a surface coal mining op-
eration on federal lands within the meaning of Section
522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e), any further inquiry into these
matters, the extent and nature of federal regulation by the
OSM, is precluded by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The doctrine applies whenever the enforcement of claims,
originally cognizable in a federal forum, requires the reso-
lution of issues which, under the regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an admin-
istrative agency. United States v. Western Pacific Rail-
road Co., 352 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1956). “[I]n such a case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its views.” Id. at 64
(citation omitted). This litigation concerns complicated
issues of fact which are not within the conventional ex-
perience of the federal judiciary. The OSM should not be
passed over, for it may provide the “[u]niformity and con-
sistency in the regulation” of surface mining activities
within the national forests. Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U. S. 570, 574 (1952). The OSM is far better
equipped than this Court to ascertain and interpret the
extent and validity of the plaintiff’s existing rights to
conduct mining operations in the Daniel Boone National
Forest. This Comt, however, will not sustain the federal
defendants’ motion in full, for if OSM’s regulation of the
plaintiffs’ mining operations is so oppressive as to amount
to a deprivation of their property interests, their Fifth
Amendment claims for just compensation may become ripe
for adjudication. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining,
supra at ...., 49 U.S.L.W. at 4661-62.
20a
In making this ruling, the Court is making no decision
as to whether underground mining would so disturb the
surface as to be incompatible with the goals set out in 30
U.S.C. § 1272(e), as there have been numerous under-
ground mines in the national forest in this area in the past.
As the orders in these cases will not be final and thus
not appealable, if any party desires the Court to amend
its Orders to make a finding under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
such a motion will be given serious consideration.
This 3rd day of November, 1981.
(s) Eugene E. Siler, Jr.
Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Judge
2la
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LONDON
Civil Action No. 81-12
Ramex Mintno Corporation, - - - Plaintiff,
Vv.
James G. Wart, Secretary of
The Interior, et al., - - - - Defendants.
Civil Action No. 81-18
GABRIEL ENercy Corporation, - - - Plaintiff,
v.
- James G. Wart, Secretary of
The Interior, et al., - - - - Defendants.
MEMORANDUM — Filed April 1, 1983
This matter is currently before the Court for considera-
tion of the motion by the plaintiff, Gabriel Energy Corpo-
ration (hereinafter Gabriel), for reconsideration of the
Court’s Order entered Nuvember 3, 1981, whereby the de-
fendants were granted partial summary judgment. After
thorough consideration, the Court is of the opinion that its
previous Order was proper and should stand. An appro-
priate Order denying the relief requested by the plaintiff
will be entered this date. Various other motions filed on
behalf of Walter Fitzmartin, Jane Fitzmartin, Herman
Israel, and Yvonne O’Brien, executrix of the estates of
22a
John F. R. Clark and Madeline Clark, and the responses
thereto, will also be considered below.
In response to Gabriel’s request for prompt action in
this matter, this Court on November 3, 1981, addressed it-
self to the central issue raised by the parties. While the
Court was concerned with the parties’ need and desire for
a quick resolution, it was also aware of the importance and
long-ranging effect its decision would have. Unfortu-
nately, over a year later the major issue raised by this
matter has not been finally adjudicated.
The portion of the Court’s previous opinion to which
Gabriel has strenuously objected is contained within the
section entitled “Statutory AuTHority To RecunaTe Prr-
vaTE Mrnerau Estates tn THE Nationat Forests.” Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff finds exception with the Court’s follow-
ing statement:
If the plaintiff were able to remove the minerals in
question without disturbing the surface, clearly “fed-
eral lands,” the plaintiff’s argument and recitation of
the law of property would become relevant. However,
common sense indicates that the plaintiffs will by
necessity disturb the surface of “federal lands” by
either underground or surface (especially) mining and
that disruption is what the Act is designed to regulate.
This statement should in no way be construed to mean that
the government, by virtue of its ability to regulate mining
activities on federal lands, will be able to preempt totally
the plaintiff’s rights in the mineral estate once valid rights
are established through appropriate administrative pro-
cedures. However, at this juncture of this preoeeding, that
issue is not ripe for consideration.
The ability of the government to regulate mining ac-
tivities which have an impact on federal lands within the
boundaries of national forests evolves from the authority
23a
of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 (hereinafter Act) and not necessarily by virtue of the
fact that the government holds the interest of the surface
estate which it seeks to regulate. In previously addressing
this issue, Gabriel has amply set forth the law relevant to
the rights held by the owner of a mineral estate as com-
pared with the rights held by the owner of the surface
estate. The Court’s holding that this regulation is bind-
ing on the owner of private mineral estates, encompassing
both rights on the surface and the underlying strata, does
not beg the question as the plaintiff suggests. The central
question becomes not whether the interest in the private
mineral estate is dominant to that of the owner of the
surface estate but whether the government has chosen to
regulate mining upon or beneath the surface in question.
After careful consideration, the Court has determined that
the Act does indeed regulate such mining activity and that
the definition of federal lands contained within the Act is
consistent with such regulation. The legislative history of
the Act supports such a finding. While the Act should
not be construed to extinguish existing property rights, the
government’s ability to regulate as prescribed within the
Act may not be ignored.
OTHER PENDING MOTIONS
On July 30, 1982, a hearing was held in this matter to
allow all parties the opportunity to summarize their argu-
ments regarding the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
After hearing all parties, the Court granted counsel for
Amici Curiae an additional period of five days to supple-
ment their argument. The federal defendants were given
ten days thereafter in which to advise the Court of their
position as to the suggestion by Gabriel that the complaint
be dismissed so that it may appeal the dispositive issue to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
24a
Following the hearing, the Amici Curiae were joined as
parties-plaintiff in this action (hereinafter plaintiff min-
eral owners). Thereafter, the following motions and re-
sponses were filed by the respective parties:
Motion for Extension of Time in which to File Supple-
ment to the Record and Response to Federal Defend-
ants’ Motion to Join Parties Plaintiff (filed by the
plaintiff mineral owners on August 13, 1982) ;
Motion to Join Parties Defendant (filed by the plain-
tiff mineral owners on August 13, 1982) ;
Request for Ruling and Judgment on Dispositive
Issues in Consolidated Case (filed by the plaintitf
mineral owners on August 13, 1982) ;
Objection to Plaintiff Mineral Owners’ Motions and
Request (filed by Gabriel on August 17, 1982) ;
Motion to Reset Time for Extension of Time for Sub-
mission of Motion for Reconsideration of Order (filed
by plaintiff mineral owners on August 19, 1982) ;
Objection to Plaintiff Mineral Owners’ Motions and
Requests or Alternatively Motion for Time to Respond
(filed by federal defendants on August 19, 1982) ;
Objection to Motion to Reset Time, etc., and Motion to
Close the Record to Deny Further Filings (filed by
Gabriel on August 29, 1982);
Motion to Amend Motion for Extension of Time in
which to File Supplement to Record and Response to
Federal Defendants’ Motion to Join Parties Plaintiff
(filed by plaintiff mineral owners on October 29,
1982); and
Motion for Extension of Time in which to File Re-
sponse to Objection of Federal Defendants to Plaintiff
Mineral Owners’ Motion and Requests and Response
25a
to Objections of Gabriel te Motion and Request and
Motion to Reset Time, ete., and Motion (filed by plain-
tiff mineral owners on October 29, 1982).
Initially, the Court must note that it does not look with
favor upon the delays which have resulted from the various
late filings by the plaintiff mineral owners. However,
after reviewing these materials, the Court concludes that
none of the parties herein will be prejudiced by allowing
the materials submitted by the plaintiff mineral owners to
be considered. For the sake of clarity and brevity, all
materials heretofore tendered by the plaintiff mineral
owners will be allowed to be filed. Objection to these
materials by the remaining parties will be overruled.
Further, the Court does not deem it necessary to require
the remaining parties to address any new matter which
may have been raised by these materials. Therefore, the
Court will proceed to address the issues raised by the
plaintiff mineral owners.
Before considering the gravamen of the plaintiff min-
eral owners’ supporting authority, the Court will address
the motion to add additional defendants. After reviewing
the materials submitted by the parties in regard to this
issue, the Court finds the plaintiff mineral owners’ motion
to add additional defendants to be improper. The movant
has not shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the
failure to add the Secretary of the Department of Agri-
culture and the Chief of the Forest Service will impair or
impede the parties’ ability to protect their respective in-
terests or subject any party to a substantial risk of an in-
consistent obligation. Rule 19(a), Fed. R. Civ P. Thus,
the motion to add additional defendants to this action will
be denied.
As set forth in the affidavit of counsel for the plaintiff
mineral owners, their interest in this litigation arises by
26a
virtue of the fact that they own in fee simple the mineral
estate in approximately 9,000 acres of land wherein the
surface estate is owned by the United States. These 9,000
acres are located within the Redbird Purchase Unit, al-
though not specifically designated as a part of the Daniel
Boone National Forest. The crux of their argument cen-
ters on the issue of whether purchase units should be
considered as being included within the definition of na-
tional forests as set forth in section 522(e) of the Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1272(e). The Court has reviewed the materials
submitted by the plaintiff mineral owners and finds much
of it to be inconclusive as to the issue herein being con-
sidered. A review of the legislative history and the various
enactments creating and affecting the national forest lands
convinces the Court that the position set forth and argued
by the plaintiff mineral owners is erroneous.
The Court is also unpersuaded by the plaintiff mineral
owners’ argument that, inasmuch as the various agencies
of the defendants have made a distinction, via their regu-
lations, between national forests and purchase units, they
are now bound by their regulations, citing inter alia, United
States v. Nixon, 418 U. 8. 683 (1974). The Court has re-
viewed this issue and finds that the differences which exist
are merely for administrative convenience and do not alter
the intent of Congress.
In pertinent part, section 522(e) of the Act provides:
After August 3, 1977, and subject to valid existing
rights no surface coal mining operations except those
which exist on August 3, 1977, shall be permitted—
(2) on any Federal lands within the boun-
daries of any national forest: Provided, however, that
surface coal mining operations may be permitted on
such lands if the Secretary finds that there are no sig-
nificant recreational, timber, economic, or other values
27a
which may be incompatible with surface mining opera-
tions.
30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). Examination of the legislative history
of this section is relevant in resolving the issue herein being
raised by the plaintiff mineral owners. The Conferees’
Report states at Cong. Rec. 38281 (Dee. 5, 1974) :
7. Designation of Areas Unsuitable for Surface
Coal Mining —Both the Senate bill and House amend-
ment provide for the establishment of a process by
which regulatory authority could designate land areas
as unsuitable for the surface mining of coal. In addi-
tion to the prohibition of surface mining which may
result from the operation of the designation process,
certain outright prohibitions were included in the
Senate bill and House amendment. Thus both the
Senate bill and House amendment would prohibit new
surface coal mining operations on lands within the
National Park System, the National Wilderness Pres-
ervation System and the House amendment contained
additional bans applicable to the National Forest Sys-
tem (including national grasslands) and alluvial valley
floors.
The conferees adopted certain of the statutory pro-
hibitions (e.g., lands within the National Park System,
National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wilderness
System), and modified others (rejected the prohibition
applicable to national grasslands but retained a ban on
National Forests). . .
Although this proposed Act eventually received a presiden-
tial veto, the prohibitions contained in the 1977 Act are the
same. The intention of Congress clearly appears to be the
protection of all areas of the National Forest System with
the exclusion of the national grasslands. This intent would
28a
be frustrated were the Court to adopt the meaning urged
by the plaintiff mineral owners. The term National Forest
System has been defined by the plaintiff mineral owners as
follows:
All National Forest lands reserved or withdrawn from
the public domain of the United States, all National
Forest Jands acquired through purchase, exchange, do-
nation, or other means, the National Grasslands and
Land Utilization Projects administered under Title III
of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act (citations
omitted) and other lands, waters, or interests therein
which are administered by the Forest Services or are
designated for administration through the Forest
Service as a part of the system.
This definition, taken from Forest Service Manual 5405.4
is also included within the definition cited by the defendants
taken from the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a).
Hither definition is broad enough to include purchase units
which were acquired pursuant to the Weeks Act of 1911.
Therefore, even if national grasslands are excluded from
coverage as reflected by congressional intent, purchase
units remain and are protected by section 522(e).
Additionally, unlike purchase units which may, in time,
be designated as a specific national forest, national grass-
lands do not have national forest status. While they are
administered by the Forest Service and are a part of the
National Forest System, their acquisition arose from the
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1010. Con-
trary to the Weeks Act which has as a primary purpose
proper timber management and protection of waterways
and watersheds, the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act was
designed primarily to restore soil management and prevent
soil erosion in areas of the Midwest and Great Plains which
—N ee a ee
29a
had resulted from improper land use. While exclusion of
national grasslands from section 522(e)(2) of the Act does
not frustrate the intent of the Act, exclusion of purchase
units from this same section would frustrate the intention
of the Weeks Act as well as the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977.
Based upon a plain reading of the statutory section as
well as its underlying legislative history, the Court finds
that areas designated as purchase units come within the
meaning of national forests as set forth in section 522(e) (2)
of the Act. Further, after considering all parties’ respec-
tive position regarding dismissal of this action so that an
appeal may be taken and finding the issues considered
herein to be dispositive, this matter will be dismissed this
date by separate Order, as the Court finds that the plain-
tiffs are conducting underground coal mining operations
which come within the provisions of 30 U.S.C. ¢ 1272(e), as
they involve surface operations and impacts incident to an
underground coal mine. Moreover, in accordance with the
oral motion by the plaintiff, judgment will be entered deny-
ing the plaintiffs’ claims of a taking, as they are not ripe
for adjudication. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452
U.S. 264 (1981).
This 1st day of April, 1983.
(s) Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Judge
30a
APPENDIX F
[LETTERHEAD OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR]
January 23, 1981
Mr. Douglas Arnett
Gabriel Energy Corporation
Route 1, Box 476
Oneida, Kentucky 40972
Dear Mr. Arnett:
Thank you for meetiag with us on the 20th regarding
Permit No. 0955003. I am especially grateful for your
notifying me of the commencement of the referenced opera-
tion.
As I indicated at that time, because this operation is
being conducted on Federal (surface) land in the Daniel
Boone National Forest, either a determination of valid
existing rights or a compatibility finding is required be-
fore it may be performed lawfully. These requirements
are found in Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977.
Your discontinuing the operation and stabilizing the
mine site pending the determination of the issues involved
and your all-around candor and good faith are both com-
mendable and very much appreciated. You may rest as-
sured that I and my staff look forward to providing you
with whatever assistance you require as you work toward
resolving these matters.
Sincerely yours,
(s) David C. Short
David C. Short
Regional Director
3la
ce:
William H. Gorin, Esquire
Stites, McElwain & Fowler
500 McClure Building
Frankfort, KY. 40601
Dr. Douglas Arnett
344 Greenbrier Road
Lexington, KY. 40503
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.