Appendix — Stearns Co. v. Hodel

Supreme Court brief1985

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

la

APPENDIX A

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL TEXT PUBLICATION

See, Sixth Circuit Rule 24

No. 83-5299

No. 83-5305

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Ramex Mriyixc Corporation (83-5299),

GasrieL Exercy Corporation (83-5305), - Plaintiffs-

Appellants,

and

Tue Srearns Company (83-5299), - Intervening Plaintiff-

Appellant,

v.

James Watt, Secretary of Interior;

Pau. Reeves, Acting Director ;

Anpvrew Barey, Acting Director, Office of

Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforce-

ment;

Davip C. Suort, Region II, Office of Sur-

face Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, - Defendants-

Appellees.

On Appeal From the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

Decided and Filed January 29, 1985

Before Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)*, ENGEL

and Merairt, Circuit Judges.

Merritt, Circuit Judge.

*The Honorable Potter Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)

of the United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation.

2a

In each of these two cases against the Secretary of the

Interior, a coal mining company proposes to mine coal

under the surface of land owned and maintained by the

federal government as forest land. The mining company

claims a valid royalty lease of tue mineral estate from the

successor in interest of the original owner who reserved the

mineral estate when he sold the fee interest in the land to

the government. Each case arises under the Surface Min-

ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-

1328 (1983). In each, the coal mining company and the

owners of the underlying royalty mineral interest seek from

this Court a declaratory judgment that they are entitled to

mine coal under the federal lands. In one case the coal

underlies part of the Daniel Boone National Forest in

Eastern Kentucky, and in the other case the land is part of

the so-called “Redbird Purchase Unit” near the Daniel

Boone National Forest. Plaintiffs do not seek injunctive

relief or damages.’

The 1977 Act applies to mining on both public and

private lands, but the questions of interpretation and appli-

cation of the Act presented by plaintiffs here relate to one

of the provisions applicable only to public lands, namely

§ 522(e)(2), codified as 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2). That sec-

tion provides, with certain exceptions which we need not

enumerate here, that “subject to valid existing rights,” no

coal mining which disturbs the surface “shall be permitted

1Plaintiffs originally sought an injunction prohibiting the

Secretary from interfering with their mining operations, but

have not pursued this remedy. Similarly, although plaintiffs

have made a Fifth Amendment takings argument, they have not

sought damages at this juncture.

3a

on any federal lands within the boundaries of any

national forest... .”?

Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment holding that

section 1272(e)(2) is not applicable to the mines they in-

tend to operate and hence that the Office of Surface Mining

which administers the Act may not apply and enforce this

section against them. They argue that section 1272(e)(2)

does not regulate their proposed mines for the following

reasons: (1) section 1272(e)(2) does not cover separate

mineral interests owned by private parties under federal

forests but covers only surface interests; (2) unless the

section is read to exclude such private mineral estates, the

section constitutes an unconstitutional taking under the

Fifth Amendment; (3) the mineral estate underlying the

government-owned “Redbird Purchase Unit” is not covered

by section 1272(e)(2) because Redbird is not a national

forest.

2Section 1272(e) reads as follows:

After August 3, 1977, and subject to valid existing rights,

no surface coal mining operations except those which exist on

August 3, 1977, shall be permitted —

(1) On any lands within the boundaries of units of

the National Park System, the National Wildlife

Refuge System, the National System of Trails, the

National Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild

and Scenic Rivers System . . .;

(2) On any federal lands within the boundaries of

any national forest: provided, however, That surface

coal mining operations may be permitted on such

lands if the Secretary finds that there are no signifi-

cant recreational, timber, economic, or other values

which may be incompatible with surface mining

operations and —

(A) Surface cperations and impacts are inci-

dental to an underground coal mine;

4a

When the Office of Surface Mining learned that the two

mining companies were about to conduct underground min-

ing operations which would disturb the surface of federal

lands, the administrator gave notice that the companies are

required to seek and obtain permits under the Surface

Mining Reclamation Act and would be subject to the provi-

sions of section 1272(e)(2). When plaintiffs received these

notices, they filed this action for declaratory judgment in

District Court rather than participate in the administrative

hearing process established by the Act. The Act prohibits

the mining of coal without an administrative permit, 30

U.S.C. § 1256, and provides for administrative review and

adjudication of disputes arising from permit applications.

30 U.S.C. § 1264.

The District Court overruled in part the government’s

motion to dismiss the complaints on grounds that plaintiffs

had not exhausted their administrative remedies and that

their cases were not ripe for decision. Instead, the Court

rendered a partial declaratory judgment construing and

applying the statute. It held that the companies’ mineral

interests and mining operations would operate under and

on federal forest lands, and were therefore governed by

section 1272(e)(2) of the Act. The District Court then

agreed with the government’s position regarding ripeness,

and ruled that it would defer to the agency’s primary juris-

diction regarding plaintiffs’ further claims. However, upon

motion filed by the plaintiffs, the District Court dismissed

the cases in their entirety so that plaintiffs could appeal

from the declaratory judgment. On appeal, the govern-

ment has formally waived any exhaustion and ripeness con-

tentions to the extent that they might be interpreted to

interfere with the District Court’s limited declaration, and

asserts that the judgment is now ripe for decision by this

Court.

5a

Plaintiffs’ first argument is that the Act, and specifically

section 1272(e), does not apply to them at all, because their

proposed mining operations will not occur “on federal

lands.” Their theory is that they still own the “lands”

beneath the surface, and although the federal government

kas been granted some rights on the surface, the lands

affected by plaintiffs’ mining, including the surface land

necessarily disturbed by their underground mines, are

wholly owned by the private plaintiffs as a matter of state

law. Proceeding from this premise, plaintiffs then claim

that they cannot be made to resort to the administrative

procedure that the Office of Surface Mining has set up for

determination of “valid existing rights,” because that pro-

cess necessarily assumes that the plaintiffs’ operations will

occur “on federal lands.”

Plaintiffs’ proposal to mine beneath federal national

forest lands, with the conceded attendant effects on the

surface of those lands, fits squarely within the common

sense meaning of the phrase “on federal lands” as used in

section 1272(e)(2). This is even more apparent when the

definition of “surface mining” contained in the Act, i.e.,

“surface impacts incident to an underground mine,” is sub-

stituted for the phrase “surface mining” in section 1272(e).

Thus, the Act and section 1272(e) apply to plaintiffs’ mines.

The District Court was correct in so holding.

The plaintiffs’ “taking” argument is governed by the

Supreme Court’s decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface

Mining and Reclamation, 452 U. S. 264 (1981), a pre-

enforcement challenge to the Surface Mining Act. The

Court held that the Act is not facially invalid. Its “mere

enactment” does not constitute a taking of plaintiffs’ min-

eral estate. Thus, the Court upheld the Act against the

same type of attack under the Fifth Amendment as plain-

tiffs make in the instant case.

6a

The Supreme Court observed that “the Act does not, on

its face, prevent beneficial use of coal-bearing lands,” and

the coal companies “cannot at this juncture legitimately

vaise complaints in this Court about the manner in which

the challenged provisions of the Act have been or will be

applied in specific circumstances” because “there is no

indication in the record that appellees have availed them-

selves of the opportunities provided by the Act to obtain

administrative review,” 452 U. S. 296-97. The Court ex-

plains the hypothetical nature of the “taking” claims before

it—“if appellees were to seek administrative relief under

these procedures, a mutually acceptable solution might well

be reached”—and concludes that “the potential for such

administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that the

taking issue decided by the District Court simply is not ripe

for judicial resolution.” Jd. at 297 (footnote omitted). The

same reasoning applies in this case. The Office of Surface

Mining has not yet ruled on the questions of plaintiffs’

“valid existing right” to engage in underground coal mining

under section 1272(e)(2). Until an administrative disposi-

tion is made of this question, we will not know the nature

of the restraint imposed by the government on plaintiffs’

mining operations. Thus the District Court correctly ruled

that plaintiffs’ takings claim was not ripe for adjudication,

and deferred to the agency’s jurisdiction.

We agree with the District Court that lands within the

Redbird Purchase Unit are “national forest” lands within

the meaning of section 1272(e)(2). “National forest” land,

primarily in the west, has been set aside for many years by

the President from land in the public domain under section

24 of the Creative Act of 1891, 16 U.S.C. § 471. See United

States v. New Mezico, 438 U. S. 696, 705 (1978). “National

forest” land within the meaning of section 1272(e) has also

been acquired, primarily in the eastern section of the United

States, under section 11 of the Weeks Law of 1911, 16

Za

U.S.C. § 521, which provides that land so acquired “shall be

permanently reserved, held and administered as national

forest land” just as are the western lands set aside by the

President under the Creative Act of 1891. Land acquired

as forest land under the Weeks Act, as distinguished from

land set aside under the Creative Act of 1891, need not be

formally set aside and proclaimed as national forest by the

President. The acquisition of the land by the United States

under the authority of the Weeks Act is sufficient to desig-

nate it as “national forest.”

The “Redbird” Forest in question here is a so-called

“purchase unit” acquired, held and administered as “na-

tional forest” land under the Weeks Act. The District

Court was therefore correct in holding that section 1272(e)

regulating coal mining in national forests governs lands

within the Redbird Purchase Unit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is af-

firmed. Further relief not inconsistent with this opinion

must be sought as an initial matter from the Secretary.

8a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-5299/5305

Ramex Mrytnc Corporation, Et Al, - - Plaintiffs-

Appellants,

v.

James G. Wart, Secretary of the Interior,

Et Al., - - - - - - - Defendants-

Appellees.

ORDER — Filed March 15, 1985

BeroreE: Stewart, Associate Justice (Ret.)*, Encren and

Merritt, Circuit Judges.

The Court having received a petition for rehearing en

bane, and the petition having been circulated not only to the

original panel members but also to all other active judges

of this Court, and no judge of this Court having requested

a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition

for rehearing has been referred to the original hearing

panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehear-

ing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were

fully considered upon the original submission and decision

of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE CoURT

(s) John P. Hehman, Clerk

*Hon Potter Stewart sitting by designation from the Supreme

Court of the United States.

9a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-5299/5305

Ramex Minrne Corporation (83-5299),

(JABRIEL Enercy CorPoRATION

(83-5305), - - - - Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Tue Stearns CoMPANy

(83-5299), - - Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

James Wart, Secretary of

Interior, et al, -~— - - Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky

JUDGMENT—Filed January 29, 1985

Before: Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)*, Encrn

and Merritt, Circuit Judges.

TxHis Cause came on to be heard on the record from the

said District Court and was argued by counsel.

On ConsmDERATION WuHeEREOF, It is now here ordered and

adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Dis-

trict Court in this case be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Further relief not inconsistent with this opinion must be

sought as an initial matter from the Secretary.

*The Honorable Potter Stewart, Associate Justice (Retired)

of the United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation.

10a

It is further ordered that Defendants-Appellees recover

from Appellants the costs on appeal, as itemized below, and

that execution therefor issue out of said District Court, if

necessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE CouRT

—— (s) John Hehman

John P. Hehman, Clerk

Issued as Mandate: March 25, 1985

Costs: None

EE ME dy wind Aen ekewawcens a

PE Ackicbenenaeesas eens $

nome SES Ei NS ee $

A True Copy

Attest:

(s) Nancy Schulkens

Deputy Clerk

tia

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

LONDON

Civil Action No. 81-i2

Ramex Mintnc Corporation - - - - Plaintiff,

v.

James G. Wart, Ete, Et Al. - - - Defendants.

Civil Action No, 81-18

GasrreL Enercy Corporation - »~ = Plawif,

v.

James G. Watt, Ete. Et Al. - - «+ Defendants.

MEMORANDUM — Filed November 3, 1981

These matters are before the Court on various motions

of the parties: the federal defendants’ April 27, 1981, and

May 5, 1981, motions to dismiss, their August 6, 1981, mo-

tions for summary judgment, and their August 10, 1981,

motion to dismiss the intervening complaint in London

Civil No, 81-12; Ramex Mining Corporation’s (“Raméx’s”)

May 21, 1981 (motion for summary judgment in London

Civil No. 81-12; Stearns Coal and Lamber Company’s

(“Stearns’ ”) August 14, 1981, motion for summary judg-

ment in London Civil No. 81-12; and Gabriel Energy Cor-

poration’s (“Gabriel’s”) May 26, 1981, motion for summary

judgment and its August 13, 1981, motion to amend its

complaint, both in London Civil Action No. 81-18. With the

12a

exception of Gabriel’s August 13 motion to amend its com-

plaint, all the pending motions are controverted. Fortu-

nately, in ruling on these motions, chaos may be avoided,

for the arguments are severally repeated throughout the

pleadings. The Court has extracted the principal argu-

ments from the various pleadings in this Memorandum,

and disposes of them in a slightly-different order than that

suggested to the Court by the parties. After a review of

the record and the pleadings of counsel, the Court concludes

that it has jurisdiction in these matters, that the federal

defendants are entitled to partial summary judgment, and

that the Court should retain jurisdiction pending adminis-

trative proceedings before the Office of Surface Mining Re-

clamation and Enforcement (“OSM”). Since no party has

objected, Gabriel will be permitted to file its tendered

amended complaint. Appropriate Orders will be entered

this date.

The sole issue for resolution in both matters is whether

an operator seeking to mine coal pursuant to a privately

held mineral estate underlying a federally owned surface

estate in a national forest is conducting a surface coal

mining operation on federal lands within the meaning of

Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-

mation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).

I. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

A. Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review.

The federal defendants contend that this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction because Section 526(a)(1) of

the Surface Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1), requires

that this litigation be brought in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, within 60 days after

the alleged injuries, by plaintiffs who participated in the

administrative process. Section 526(a)(1) is plainly ap-

13a

plicable to any litigant seeking judicial review of the pro-

mulgation of national rules and regulations pertaining to

either surface mining operations or the impacts incident

to uuderground mining operations on federal lands. The

plaintiffs’ complaints and pleadings, however, evidence that

the plaintiffs are not challenging either the Secretary’s

authority to promulgate national rules and regulations per-

taining to federal lands or the validity of those regulations ;

rather, the plaintiffs contend simply that their private

mineral estates and mining operations are not subject to

the federal lands provisions of the Surface Mining Act, 30

U.S.C. §§ 1272, 1273. Since the plaintiffs are challenging

the applicability of the federal statute and not the validity

of the federal regulations promulgated thereunder, the

Surface Mining Act’s preclusion of judicial review, 30

U.S.C. § 1276(a) (1), is wholly inapplicable. Subject mat-

ter jurisdiction and venue are pruperly laid in the Eastern

District of Kentucky. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1391(e).

The federal defendants are mistaken in their contention

that the distinction between applicability and validity of

federal statutes and regulations is wholly illusory. Under

§ 701(a)(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 701(a)(1), an agency’s decisions are not reviewable when

a statute precludes judicial review. Application of Sec-

tion 701(a) (1) is contrary to the general constitutional pre-

sumption of reviewability of administrative action. See,

e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275,

289-91 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Where an agency

is alleged to be acting outside of its mandate and the

organic legislation establishing the agency also contain a

statutory preclusion or limitation of judicial review, the

aggrieved party has no remedy to challenge the applica-

bility of federal regulation, unless a federal judicial forum

construes the statute precluding judicial review as inap-

plicable. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, supra,

l4a

the Supreme Court was faced with the distinction of the

applicability and the validity of federal regulations. The

Court concluded that Section 307(b) of th Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), the federal provision precluding ju-

dicial review under the Clean Air Act, did not apply to

restrict the jurisdiction of a federal district court to de-

termine whether federal regulation applied to the defend-

ant’s conduct in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 285. The

Court explicitly cautioned federal district courts to avoid

engaging in judicial review in a manner precluded by

statutory restrictions in the organic legislation under the

-suise of making a determination of the applicability of

federal regulation. 7d. As the Supreme Court in Adamo

Wrecking indicated, the distinction between the applica-

bility and the validity of federal regulation is not illusory,

and with due regard to the Supreme Conrt’s admonition,

this Court is not precluded by Section 526(a)(1) of the

Surface Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1), from exer-

cising jurisdiction in these matters.

B. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies.

The federal defendants contend that this Court should

refrain from exercising jurisdiction in this litigation for

jurisprudential considerations. They argue that the con-

troversy is not justiciable because the plaintiffs have failed

to avail themselves of all possible administrative remedies

of an adverse administrative determination prior to seeking

judicial review. The plaintiffs concede that they have not

attempted to avail themselves of any administrative reme-

dies to resolve these matters, but argue that the juris-

prudential considerations inherent in the doctrine are

irrelevant to this litigation. The plaintiffs further argue

that they are under no duty to exhaust their administra-

tive remedies because, under their interpretation of the

Surface Mining Act, the agency proferring relief, OSM,

15a

has exceeded its authority delegated to it by Congress.

Plaintiffs contend it is futile for them to exhaust adminis-

trative remedies before OSM, for OSM has already deter-

mined that the plaintiffs are subject to their federal

regulation pertaining to national forests. OSM’s previous

determination is the ultimate issue in this litigation, and

that issue is currently before the Court.

It is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether

the plaintiffs are under a duty to exhaust administrative

remedies prior to the inception of this litigation or whether

an exhaustion requirement is futile herein, for the general

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies before

an administrative agency is subject to an exception where

the principal question is solely of statutory interpretation.

McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 197-99 (1969) ;

Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F. 2d 369, 371 (10th

Cir. 1980). None of the jurisprudential considerations urg-

ing restraint from the exercise of jurisdiction are appli-

cable. The resolution of the applicability of the Surface

Mining Act to the mineral estates of Ramex, Stearns, and

Gabriel does not require any particular expertise unique

to the OSM. McKart v. United States, supra at 198. Ju-

ducial review would not be significantly aided by any addi-

tional administrative proceedings. Id. at 199. Indeed, if

the plaintiffs were required to pursue administrative pro-

ceedings before OSM without accruing the desired results

and thereafter successfully demonstrated the inapplica-

bility of federal regulation, the plaintiffs would suffer

needless litigation expenses in the interim prior to a judg-

ment in this forum. As in McKart v. United States, supra,

there is simply no overwhelming reason for this Court to

have OSM determine in the first instance whether the plain-

tiffs’ mining operations in the Daniel Boone National Forest

are subject to the Surface Mining Act.

16a

C. Ripeness of Compensatory Claims.

The federal defendants contend that the plaintiffs’

claims for just compensation for a deprivation of property

are not ripe for adjudication. The plaintiffs concede the

defendants’ contention, but assert that their claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief are ripe. The Court con-

cludes that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

are ripe, and agrees with the parties that the claims for

compensation have not as yet matured. See Hodel v. Vir-

ginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,

U. S. ___, 49 U.S.L.W. 4654, 4661-62 (1981).

If, STATUTORY AUTHORTIY TO REGULATE PRI-

VATE MINERAL ESTATES IN THE NATIONAL

FORESTS.

The task of a Court to determine whether a particular

party’s activity is subject to federal statutory regulation

is relatively narrow. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,

supra at 285. The Court must first establish that Congress

has the constitutional authority to regulate the specific

challenged conduct. Then, the only remaining question for

judicial inquiry is whether Congress has in fact chosen to

regulate the specific challenged conduct. With respect to

constitutional authorization, whatever doubts remain as to

the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Act were laid

to rest in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, supra, wherein

the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not ex-

ceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enact-

ing the Surface Mining Act. Both in Hodel v. Virginia

Surface Mining, supra, and in Hodel v. Indiana, _— U. S.

__., 49 U.S.L.W. 4667 (1981), the Supreme Court rejected

broad constitutional challenges to the Act as violative of

the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. Those decisions estab-

lish that Congress has the authority to enact the Surface

17a

Mining Act, and, in particular, surface mining activities

within federal lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272, 1273.

It is the conclusion of this Court that Congress has

chosen to regulate the conduct at issue. Section 522(e) of

the Act prohibits new surface coal mining operations on

federal lands within the boundaries of a national forest

except where the operator can show a valid existing right

to mine as of August 3, 1977. Plaintiffs contend that the

regulations and requirements imposed upon “federal lands”

does not apply to their interests as they own private min-

eral estates. If the plaintiffs were able to remove the

minerals in question without disturbing the surface, clearly

“federal lands,” the plaintiffs’ arguments and recitation

of the law of property would become relevant. However,

common sense indicates that the plaintiffs will by necessity

disturb the surface of “federal lands” by either under-

ground or surface (especiaily) mining and this disruption

is what the Act is designed to regulate. This is reflected

in Section 101(c) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c), which

states:

Many surface mining operations result in disturbances

of surface areas that burden and adversely affect com-

merce and the public welfare by destroying or dimin-

ishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial,

residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry

purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by con-

tributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroy-

ing fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural

beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by cre-

ating hazards dangerous to life and property, by de-

grading the quality of life in local communities, and by

counteracting governmental programs and efforts to

conserve soil, water, and other natural resources.

18a

It appears that Congress recognized that in many in-

stances private proprietary interests would underlie fed-

eral lands subject to the Act in issue. The legislative

history of this Act demonstrates the intent of Congress to

address the interests of private mineral estate holders.

As stated in a Senate report concerning this Act:

Since the mining of coal became a profitable enter-

prise, there have been numerous instances in which the

mineral estate and the surface estates were separated,

both on public and private lands. State law governs

the resolution of any disputes about property rights

which might arise from such separations, and this Act

does not attempt to tamper with such state laws. The

Committee firmly believes that all valid existing prop-

erty rights must be preserved, and has no intention

whatsoever, by any provision of this bill, to change

such rights.

S. Rep. No. 95-128, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). While the

Act reflects the decide of Congress that, in most instances,

mining should not take place on federal lands, an exception

was provided to take into account those persons who had

valid existing rights in private mineral estates lying below

“federal lands.” 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). Based upon the

above discussion, it is clear that the Act in issue, as it

regulates mining activities on “federal lands,” should be

interpreted to include regulation of those private parties

who seek to mine their mineral estates underlying the

national forests.

All plaintiffs are declared to be conducting underground

coal mining operations which come within the provisions of

30 U.S.C. § 1272(e), as they involve surface operations and

impacts incident to an underground coal mine.

19a

Ill. DEFERENCE TO THE

PRIMARY JURISDICTION.

Having concluded that the plaintiffs seeking to mine

coal pursuant to a privately held mineral estate underlying

the federally owned surface estate in the Daniel Boone

National Forest are conducting a surface coal mining op-

eration on federal lands within the meaning of Section

522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e), any further inquiry into these

matters, the extent and nature of federal regulation by the

OSM, is precluded by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

The doctrine applies whenever the enforcement of claims,

originally cognizable in a federal forum, requires the reso-

lution of issues which, under the regulatory scheme, have

been placed within the special competence of an admin-

istrative agency. United States v. Western Pacific Rail-

road Co., 352 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1956). “[I]n such a case, the

judicial process is suspended pending referral of such

issues to the administrative body for its views.” Id. at 64

(citation omitted). This litigation concerns complicated

issues of fact which are not within the conventional ex-

perience of the federal judiciary. The OSM should not be

passed over, for it may provide the “[u]niformity and con-

sistency in the regulation” of surface mining activities

within the national forests. Far East Conference v. United

States, 342 U. S. 570, 574 (1952). The OSM is far better

equipped than this Court to ascertain and interpret the

extent and validity of the plaintiff’s existing rights to

conduct mining operations in the Daniel Boone National

Forest. This Comt, however, will not sustain the federal

defendants’ motion in full, for if OSM’s regulation of the

plaintiffs’ mining operations is so oppressive as to amount

to a deprivation of their property interests, their Fifth

Amendment claims for just compensation may become ripe

for adjudication. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining,

supra at ...., 49 U.S.L.W. at 4661-62.

20a

In making this ruling, the Court is making no decision

as to whether underground mining would so disturb the

surface as to be incompatible with the goals set out in 30

U.S.C. § 1272(e), as there have been numerous under-

ground mines in the national forest in this area in the past.

As the orders in these cases will not be final and thus

not appealable, if any party desires the Court to amend

its Orders to make a finding under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),

such a motion will be given serious consideration.

This 3rd day of November, 1981.

(s) Eugene E. Siler, Jr.

Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Judge

2la

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

LONDON

Civil Action No. 81-12

Ramex Mintno Corporation, - - - Plaintiff,

Vv.

James G. Wart, Secretary of

The Interior, et al., - - - - Defendants.

Civil Action No. 81-18

GABRIEL ENercy Corporation, - - - Plaintiff,

v.

- James G. Wart, Secretary of

The Interior, et al., - - - - Defendants.

MEMORANDUM — Filed April 1, 1983

This matter is currently before the Court for considera-

tion of the motion by the plaintiff, Gabriel Energy Corpo-

ration (hereinafter Gabriel), for reconsideration of the

Court’s Order entered Nuvember 3, 1981, whereby the de-

fendants were granted partial summary judgment. After

thorough consideration, the Court is of the opinion that its

previous Order was proper and should stand. An appro-

priate Order denying the relief requested by the plaintiff

will be entered this date. Various other motions filed on

behalf of Walter Fitzmartin, Jane Fitzmartin, Herman

Israel, and Yvonne O’Brien, executrix of the estates of

22a

John F. R. Clark and Madeline Clark, and the responses

thereto, will also be considered below.

In response to Gabriel’s request for prompt action in

this matter, this Court on November 3, 1981, addressed it-

self to the central issue raised by the parties. While the

Court was concerned with the parties’ need and desire for

a quick resolution, it was also aware of the importance and

long-ranging effect its decision would have. Unfortu-

nately, over a year later the major issue raised by this

matter has not been finally adjudicated.

The portion of the Court’s previous opinion to which

Gabriel has strenuously objected is contained within the

section entitled “Statutory AuTHority To RecunaTe Prr-

vaTE Mrnerau Estates tn THE Nationat Forests.” Specifi-

cally, the plaintiff finds exception with the Court’s follow-

ing statement:

If the plaintiff were able to remove the minerals in

question without disturbing the surface, clearly “fed-

eral lands,” the plaintiff’s argument and recitation of

the law of property would become relevant. However,

common sense indicates that the plaintiffs will by

necessity disturb the surface of “federal lands” by

either underground or surface (especially) mining and

that disruption is what the Act is designed to regulate.

This statement should in no way be construed to mean that

the government, by virtue of its ability to regulate mining

activities on federal lands, will be able to preempt totally

the plaintiff’s rights in the mineral estate once valid rights

are established through appropriate administrative pro-

cedures. However, at this juncture of this preoeeding, that

issue is not ripe for consideration.

The ability of the government to regulate mining ac-

tivities which have an impact on federal lands within the

boundaries of national forests evolves from the authority

23a

of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977 (hereinafter Act) and not necessarily by virtue of the

fact that the government holds the interest of the surface

estate which it seeks to regulate. In previously addressing

this issue, Gabriel has amply set forth the law relevant to

the rights held by the owner of a mineral estate as com-

pared with the rights held by the owner of the surface

estate. The Court’s holding that this regulation is bind-

ing on the owner of private mineral estates, encompassing

both rights on the surface and the underlying strata, does

not beg the question as the plaintiff suggests. The central

question becomes not whether the interest in the private

mineral estate is dominant to that of the owner of the

surface estate but whether the government has chosen to

regulate mining upon or beneath the surface in question.

After careful consideration, the Court has determined that

the Act does indeed regulate such mining activity and that

the definition of federal lands contained within the Act is

consistent with such regulation. The legislative history of

the Act supports such a finding. While the Act should

not be construed to extinguish existing property rights, the

government’s ability to regulate as prescribed within the

Act may not be ignored.

OTHER PENDING MOTIONS

On July 30, 1982, a hearing was held in this matter to

allow all parties the opportunity to summarize their argu-

ments regarding the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

After hearing all parties, the Court granted counsel for

Amici Curiae an additional period of five days to supple-

ment their argument. The federal defendants were given

ten days thereafter in which to advise the Court of their

position as to the suggestion by Gabriel that the complaint

be dismissed so that it may appeal the dispositive issue to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

24a

Following the hearing, the Amici Curiae were joined as

parties-plaintiff in this action (hereinafter plaintiff min-

eral owners). Thereafter, the following motions and re-

sponses were filed by the respective parties:

Motion for Extension of Time in which to File Supple-

ment to the Record and Response to Federal Defend-

ants’ Motion to Join Parties Plaintiff (filed by the

plaintiff mineral owners on August 13, 1982) ;

Motion to Join Parties Defendant (filed by the plain-

tiff mineral owners on August 13, 1982) ;

Request for Ruling and Judgment on Dispositive

Issues in Consolidated Case (filed by the plaintitf

mineral owners on August 13, 1982) ;

Objection to Plaintiff Mineral Owners’ Motions and

Request (filed by Gabriel on August 17, 1982) ;

Motion to Reset Time for Extension of Time for Sub-

mission of Motion for Reconsideration of Order (filed

by plaintiff mineral owners on August 19, 1982) ;

Objection to Plaintiff Mineral Owners’ Motions and

Requests or Alternatively Motion for Time to Respond

(filed by federal defendants on August 19, 1982) ;

Objection to Motion to Reset Time, etc., and Motion to

Close the Record to Deny Further Filings (filed by

Gabriel on August 29, 1982);

Motion to Amend Motion for Extension of Time in

which to File Supplement to Record and Response to

Federal Defendants’ Motion to Join Parties Plaintiff

(filed by plaintiff mineral owners on October 29,

1982); and

Motion for Extension of Time in which to File Re-

sponse to Objection of Federal Defendants to Plaintiff

Mineral Owners’ Motion and Requests and Response

25a

to Objections of Gabriel te Motion and Request and

Motion to Reset Time, ete., and Motion (filed by plain-

tiff mineral owners on October 29, 1982).

Initially, the Court must note that it does not look with

favor upon the delays which have resulted from the various

late filings by the plaintiff mineral owners. However,

after reviewing these materials, the Court concludes that

none of the parties herein will be prejudiced by allowing

the materials submitted by the plaintiff mineral owners to

be considered. For the sake of clarity and brevity, all

materials heretofore tendered by the plaintiff mineral

owners will be allowed to be filed. Objection to these

materials by the remaining parties will be overruled.

Further, the Court does not deem it necessary to require

the remaining parties to address any new matter which

may have been raised by these materials. Therefore, the

Court will proceed to address the issues raised by the

plaintiff mineral owners.

Before considering the gravamen of the plaintiff min-

eral owners’ supporting authority, the Court will address

the motion to add additional defendants. After reviewing

the materials submitted by the parties in regard to this

issue, the Court finds the plaintiff mineral owners’ motion

to add additional defendants to be improper. The movant

has not shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the

failure to add the Secretary of the Department of Agri-

culture and the Chief of the Forest Service will impair or

impede the parties’ ability to protect their respective in-

terests or subject any party to a substantial risk of an in-

consistent obligation. Rule 19(a), Fed. R. Civ P. Thus,

the motion to add additional defendants to this action will

be denied.

As set forth in the affidavit of counsel for the plaintiff

mineral owners, their interest in this litigation arises by

26a

virtue of the fact that they own in fee simple the mineral

estate in approximately 9,000 acres of land wherein the

surface estate is owned by the United States. These 9,000

acres are located within the Redbird Purchase Unit, al-

though not specifically designated as a part of the Daniel

Boone National Forest. The crux of their argument cen-

ters on the issue of whether purchase units should be

considered as being included within the definition of na-

tional forests as set forth in section 522(e) of the Act, 30

U.S.C. § 1272(e). The Court has reviewed the materials

submitted by the plaintiff mineral owners and finds much

of it to be inconclusive as to the issue herein being con-

sidered. A review of the legislative history and the various

enactments creating and affecting the national forest lands

convinces the Court that the position set forth and argued

by the plaintiff mineral owners is erroneous.

The Court is also unpersuaded by the plaintiff mineral

owners’ argument that, inasmuch as the various agencies

of the defendants have made a distinction, via their regu-

lations, between national forests and purchase units, they

are now bound by their regulations, citing inter alia, United

States v. Nixon, 418 U. 8. 683 (1974). The Court has re-

viewed this issue and finds that the differences which exist

are merely for administrative convenience and do not alter

the intent of Congress.

In pertinent part, section 522(e) of the Act provides:

After August 3, 1977, and subject to valid existing

rights no surface coal mining operations except those

which exist on August 3, 1977, shall be permitted—

(2) on any Federal lands within the boun-

daries of any national forest: Provided, however, that

surface coal mining operations may be permitted on

such lands if the Secretary finds that there are no sig-

nificant recreational, timber, economic, or other values

27a

which may be incompatible with surface mining opera-

tions.

30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). Examination of the legislative history

of this section is relevant in resolving the issue herein being

raised by the plaintiff mineral owners. The Conferees’

Report states at Cong. Rec. 38281 (Dee. 5, 1974) :

7. Designation of Areas Unsuitable for Surface

Coal Mining —Both the Senate bill and House amend-

ment provide for the establishment of a process by

which regulatory authority could designate land areas

as unsuitable for the surface mining of coal. In addi-

tion to the prohibition of surface mining which may

result from the operation of the designation process,

certain outright prohibitions were included in the

Senate bill and House amendment. Thus both the

Senate bill and House amendment would prohibit new

surface coal mining operations on lands within the

National Park System, the National Wilderness Pres-

ervation System and the House amendment contained

additional bans applicable to the National Forest Sys-

tem (including national grasslands) and alluvial valley

floors.

The conferees adopted certain of the statutory pro-

hibitions (e.g., lands within the National Park System,

National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wilderness

System), and modified others (rejected the prohibition

applicable to national grasslands but retained a ban on

National Forests). . .

Although this proposed Act eventually received a presiden-

tial veto, the prohibitions contained in the 1977 Act are the

same. The intention of Congress clearly appears to be the

protection of all areas of the National Forest System with

the exclusion of the national grasslands. This intent would

28a

be frustrated were the Court to adopt the meaning urged

by the plaintiff mineral owners. The term National Forest

System has been defined by the plaintiff mineral owners as

follows:

All National Forest lands reserved or withdrawn from

the public domain of the United States, all National

Forest Jands acquired through purchase, exchange, do-

nation, or other means, the National Grasslands and

Land Utilization Projects administered under Title III

of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act (citations

omitted) and other lands, waters, or interests therein

which are administered by the Forest Services or are

designated for administration through the Forest

Service as a part of the system.

This definition, taken from Forest Service Manual 5405.4

is also included within the definition cited by the defendants

taken from the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources

Planning Act of 1974, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a).

Hither definition is broad enough to include purchase units

which were acquired pursuant to the Weeks Act of 1911.

Therefore, even if national grasslands are excluded from

coverage as reflected by congressional intent, purchase

units remain and are protected by section 522(e).

Additionally, unlike purchase units which may, in time,

be designated as a specific national forest, national grass-

lands do not have national forest status. While they are

administered by the Forest Service and are a part of the

National Forest System, their acquisition arose from the

Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1010. Con-

trary to the Weeks Act which has as a primary purpose

proper timber management and protection of waterways

and watersheds, the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act was

designed primarily to restore soil management and prevent

soil erosion in areas of the Midwest and Great Plains which

—N ee a ee

29a

had resulted from improper land use. While exclusion of

national grasslands from section 522(e)(2) of the Act does

not frustrate the intent of the Act, exclusion of purchase

units from this same section would frustrate the intention

of the Weeks Act as well as the Surface Mining Control and

Reclamation Act of 1977.

Based upon a plain reading of the statutory section as

well as its underlying legislative history, the Court finds

that areas designated as purchase units come within the

meaning of national forests as set forth in section 522(e) (2)

of the Act. Further, after considering all parties’ respec-

tive position regarding dismissal of this action so that an

appeal may be taken and finding the issues considered

herein to be dispositive, this matter will be dismissed this

date by separate Order, as the Court finds that the plain-

tiffs are conducting underground coal mining operations

which come within the provisions of 30 U.S.C. ¢ 1272(e), as

they involve surface operations and impacts incident to an

underground coal mine. Moreover, in accordance with the

oral motion by the plaintiff, judgment will be entered deny-

ing the plaintiffs’ claims of a taking, as they are not ripe

for adjudication. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452

U.S. 264 (1981).

This 1st day of April, 1983.

(s) Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Judge

30a

APPENDIX F

[LETTERHEAD OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR]

January 23, 1981

Mr. Douglas Arnett

Gabriel Energy Corporation

Route 1, Box 476

Oneida, Kentucky 40972

Dear Mr. Arnett:

Thank you for meetiag with us on the 20th regarding

Permit No. 0955003. I am especially grateful for your

notifying me of the commencement of the referenced opera-

tion.

As I indicated at that time, because this operation is

being conducted on Federal (surface) land in the Daniel

Boone National Forest, either a determination of valid

existing rights or a compatibility finding is required be-

fore it may be performed lawfully. These requirements

are found in Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining Control

and Reclamation Act of 1977.

Your discontinuing the operation and stabilizing the

mine site pending the determination of the issues involved

and your all-around candor and good faith are both com-

mendable and very much appreciated. You may rest as-

sured that I and my staff look forward to providing you

with whatever assistance you require as you work toward

resolving these matters.

Sincerely yours,

(s) David C. Short

David C. Short

Regional Director

3la

ce:

William H. Gorin, Esquire

Stites, McElwain & Fowler

500 McClure Building

Frankfort, KY. 40601

Dr. Douglas Arnett

344 Greenbrier Road

Lexington, KY. 40503

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.