Opposition Brief — Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad

fice Supreme Court. US.)

FILED

MAY 29 1985

IN THE

SUPREME COURT CF THE UNITED fone « oreven

October Term, 1984 CLERK

No. 84-1698

RANSOM THEODORE SPURLOCK, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SANTA FE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

PHILIP E. von AMMON*

DONALD R. GILBERT

TIMOTHY BERG

FENNEMORE, CRAIG, von AMMON,

UDALL & POWERS

100 W. Washington,

Suite 1700

Phoenix, AZ 85003

(602) 257-8700

ANDREW D. HURWITZ*

ROBERT L. PALMER

RON KILGARD

MARTORI, MEYER,

HENDRICKS & VICTOR

2700 N. Third Street

Suite 4000

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 263-8700

Counsel for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

BEST AVAILABLE COPY ‘

May 28, 1985

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

No. 84-1698

RANSOM THEODORE SPURLOCK, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SANTA FE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

PHILIP E. von AMMON*

DONALD R. GILBERT

TIMOTHY BERG

FENNEMORE, CRAIG, ven AMMON,

UDALL & POWERS

100 W. Washington,

Suite 1700

Phoenix, AZ 85003

(602) 257-8700

ANDREW D. HURWITZ*

ROBERT L. PALMER

RON KILGARD

MARTORI, MEYER,

HENDRICKS & VICTOR

2700 N. Third Street

Suite 4000

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 263-8700

Counsel for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

May 28, 1985

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. .

INTRODUCTION .. .

Reasons for Denying the Petition.

1. The Spurlocks'

COMES. «© »

2. The Spurlocks' claim that

the mineral reservation

is ambiguous under the

decisions of this Court

was not raised below and

is without merit.

3. The Spurlocks'

without merit.

CONCLUSION... .

Lists of Affiliates

-i-

claim that

title to the land grant

lands was in AT&SF rather

than Santa Fe Pacific does

not warrant review by this

Claim that

their due process rights

have been violated was not

timely raised below and is

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

ican y Co. v. Baldwin,

287 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1932). .

Boise Cascade Corp. v. Union

Pacific R.R. Co., 630 F.2d 720

(10th Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981). .

Burke v. Southern Pacific R.R.

Co,, 234 U.S. 669 (1913) . ll,

Dick v. Darden, 204 Ala. 400,

Se Ges wee theeer + « 8 ee

Field v. Seabury,

60 U.S. 323 (19 How.) (1856) .

Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199,

179 S.W.2d 690 (1944) oe a e e

H.A. & L.D. Holland Co. v.

Northern Pacific Ry., 214 F.

Sao teem Gass Beeele.-s « * 4% @

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235

(1957) ° * ° ° . e e e 7 e * °

Hazelwood Brewing Co. v. Siebert,

256 Pa. 9, 100 A. 493 (1917)

Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441

(1935) e + © e e e * * . e * ©

Holmes v. Johnson, 324 Mass. 450,

S35 W.8.20 924 (1969) 2. « 0

=jje-

Pages

20

12

14

20

10

20

Illinois Commerce Comm'n v.

Cent.:al 1.

-Llinois Public

Service Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d

79, 222 N.£.2d 520 (1975)... 10

Kerfoot . Farmers §& Merchants

Bank, 218 U.S. 281 (1910). * . 10

McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462

SEE cs 6 cs tlw 7

New Mexico v. Baker, 196 U.S.

432 (1905) a = eo ” e J e e * - l@

New York ex rel. Bryant v.

Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 17

Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.

Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526

(1903) * ° . « ° . ” * & . 5 > 18

Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County,

See Usils GOO Chee bs «+ we 17

Platt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,

oo Weems Se taeres « «th oe oe + Se 24

Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d

mk Pee ee ee 7

Radio Station WOW v. Johnson,

Jae Gelbe bam CASES) s uc 0 te lt 20

Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d

S30 (ER Cite LPR?) « « « BB, Abe 16

Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co.

v. Cord, 14 Ariz. App. 254,

482 P.2d 503, cert. denied,

404 U.S. 912 (3971) . « « « « 14

“Li i=

mey_v io,

ey Ss est: ee

United States v. Northern Pacific

Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 317 (1940) .

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981)

W v. W rn l ’

462 mo 36 (1983) * . we = * .

Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981)

AUTHORITIES

1 American Law of Mining

§ 3.13 (1983) e * * * e e .

Hearings Before the House Committer

on the Judiciary, 67th Cong.,

2d Sess. § 33 at 2 (1922)...

22

18

18

18

17

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petition for a Writ of Certio-

rari presents no issue warranting review

by this Court. First, the Spurlocks'

Claim that title to the land grant lands

was in an affiliate of Santa Fe Pacific,

ratuer than Santa Fe Pacific, is irrele-

vant to their claim to the reserved

minerals. Further, the Spurlocks lack

standing to make this claim, and their

claim has no-~ merit. Second, the

Spurlocks' argument that federal law, not

state law, controls the interpretation of

the mineral reservation was not presented

to the state courts and cannot be reviewed

by this Court. In any event, the issue is

one of state law which this Court need not

review. Third, the Spurlocks' claim that

their due process rights were violated was

not timely raised in the Arizona courts

and has no legal basis.

INTRODUCTION

In their effort to cast this

litigation in a form that will engage the

attention of this Court, Petitioners have

characterized a private dispute over title

to minerals as a cause of grave public

Significance. The contrary is true.

As litigated in the state courts,

this case consisted of a series of claims

and counterclaims seeking to quiet title

under Arizona law to certain minerals

located upon or under land owned by the

Spurlocks subject to a mineral reservation

in favor of Santa Fe Pacific. The

Spurlocks also asserted state law claims

seeking to recover damages for the removal

of helium-bearing gas from lands subject

to the mineral reservation. The case

involves claims based on Arizona property

and tort law.

In tke Petition, the Spurlocks

argue that Santa Fe Pacific's mineral

reservation is void under federal law.

This claim is peripheral to the real

dispute litigated below. Indeed, the

Spurlocks have characterized their claims

in the consolidated cases as follows:

Simply stated, the

Spurlock v. Santa Fe lawsuit

involves the ownership of the

helium which lies beneath the

plaintiffs' land and whether

Or not the defendants should

respond in damages to the

plaintiffs for their past and

continuing wrongs. The fact

that defendant Santa Fe

‘Pacific Railroad Company is

federally chartered and, along

with other defendants, has

violated its federal charter

in many regards, is_ only

collateral and incidental to

the main controversy.

Spurlocks' Motion f£ Reman nd Respons

in Opposition to Petition for Removal,

Appendix A at 9 (emphasis added).

The Spurlocks are dissatisfied

with the decision reached by the Arizona

Court of Appeals. However, the Supreme

Court of the United States is not merely a

haven for dissatisfied litigants. Rather,

as stated by Chief Justice Taft, "(t]he

Supreme Court's function is for. the

purpose of expounding and stabilizing

principles of law for the benefit of the

people of the country, passing upon

constitutional questions and other impor-

tant questions of law for the public

benefit." Hearings Before the House

Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d

Sess. § 33 at 2 (1922). The case below

raises no significant constitutional

issues and no federal law questions of any

public importance.

R Denyin h ition.

In the Petition, the Spurlocks

advance three reasons why this Court

should grant a writ of certiorari and

review this case. First, they argue that

at the time of the conveyances from Santa

Fe Pacific to the Spurlocks' predecessors

in interest, the title to the lands

involved in this lawsuit was in Santa Fe

Pacific's parent company, the Atchison,

Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company

("ATESE"), and not Santa Fe Pacific. They

do not suggest any reason why such a con-

clusion would entitle them to relief from

this Court. Second, they argue that the

holding of the Arizona Court of Appeals,

that under Arizona law a reservation of

“all oil, gas, coal and minerals whatso-

ever" is unambiguous and reserves the

entire mineral estate, must be overturned

as contrary to the decisions of this

Court. Third, they argue that the failure

of one Arizona Court of Appeals judge to

recuse himself violated the Spurlocks'

rights under the due process clause.

None of the arguments raised by

the Spurlocks presents any issue that

justifies review by this Court. The

arguments are without merit and, in some

instances, untimely. For these reasons,

the Petition should be denied.

Based upon a tortuous analysis of

1866, 1871, 1897 ana 1902 Acts of Con-

gress, the Spurlocks argue that after 1903

the land grant lands, including the lands

involved in this lawsuit, were owned by

ATSSF rather than Santa Fe Pacific. The

point of the argument is unclear. Even if

ATSSF rather than Santa Fe Pacific owned

the land grant lands in 1903, the

Spurlocks would not own the minerals in

dispute. Rather, either AT&SF would own

the land and underlying minerals, having

conveyed to no one, or the conveyances by

Santa Fe Pacific to the Spurlocks'

predecessors subject to a mineral reserva-

tion would be in effect conveyances by

ATsSF.+ In either case, the judgment

1 If AT&SF rather’ than Santa Fe Pacific

was the owner of the lands after 1903, the

Spurlocks are not entitled to judgment

because they have not joined AT&SF as a

party to this litigation. See McShan v.

Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462, 463-64 (9th Cir.

1960).

Further, the Spurlocks cannot claim

full fee title against AT&SF by adverse

possession because their predecessors

entered into possession of the lawsuit

lands pursuant to the deeds containing

mineral reservations. The Spurlocks

entered the lands under the same chain of

title. An occupant cannot acquire title

by adverse possession greater than that

which he intended to claim when entering

the property. Holmes _v. Johnson, 324

Mass. 450, 86 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1949).

Thus, when a party enters property under a

deed, the deed limits the scope of his

possession and he cannot acquire any

greater title than the deed purports to

convey. See Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199,

179 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1944); Porter v.

Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650, 657-58 (Tex.

1965). This is true even when the occu-

pant enters under a void or invalid deed.

See v , 204 Ala. 400, 85 So.

369' (1920). Therefore, because the

Spurlocks and their predecessors entered

under a deed that contained a mineral

reservation, the title they could acquire

(footnote continued)

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entered by the Arizona Court of Appeals

would be correct.

Recognizing the necessity of pre-

senting an issue of public importance,

Petitioners argue that the decision of the

Arizona Court of Appeals will affect title

to some 4,000,000 acres of land in Arizona

and New Mexico, a part of which is within

the boundaries of Grand Canyon National

Park and Lake Mead National Recreation

Area. Petition at 10 n.14. The argument

does not withstand the most superficial

scrutiny.

If, as Petitioners insist, title

to these lands passed to AT&SF in 1903,

the occupants, both public and private,

may be mere squatters whose rights can

only be confirmed by a multitude of

(footnote continued from previous page)

by adverse possession would be subject to

that mineral reservation.

oe ocnss Peat,

3 Wien aay

individual quiet-title actions. No over-

riding national purpose could be served by

such a result. It is less than clear how

the Interior Department's effort to

eliminate pockets of private ownership in

the national parks will be facilitated by

an adjudication that AT&SF, rather than

Santa Fe Pacific, is the owner.

The Spurlocks are, in effect,

seeking an advisory opinion from this

Court as to whether title to the land

grant lands from 1903 onward rested in

Santa Fe Pacific or AT&SF. Since the

answer to that question is irrelevant to

any dispute between the Spurlocks and

Santa Fe Pacific or Kerr-McGee, there is

no basis for this Court to decide the

issue.

Further, the Spurlocks lack stand-

ing to argue that AT&SF rather than Santa

Fe Pacific owns the land grant lands or

\

PAIS ET REA RR Meh Eo ole

PEDERSON ES A

that the Santa Fe Pacific mineral reserva-

tion is void. Only the United States or

the parties to the 1902 and 1903 transac-

tions would have standing to enforce an

obligation of Santa Fe Pacific to convey

to AT&SF or to challenge the retention of

the land grant lands by Santa Fe Pacific.

See Kerfoot v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,

218 U.S. 281 (1910); Illinois Commerce

Comm'n _v. Central Illinois Public Service

Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 79, 322 N.E.2d 520

(1975); Hazelwood Brewing Co. v. Siebert,

256 Pa. 9, 100 A. 493 (1917). Similarly,

the Spurlocks are not entitled to attack

the Santa Fe Pacific mineral reservation

as contrary to the 1866, 1871, 1897 or

1902 Acts of Congress. The United States

Court of Appeals rejected aie similar

argument in Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d

636 (9th Cir. 1957), observing:

Even assuming arguendo that

appellant's theory is’ sound

-10-

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ih I ket

and that Congress did in 1870

impose a mandatory duty on the

Northern Pacific to convey a

full fee title to the land

here involved, with no reser-

vations, appellant has

indicated no authority by

which he is enabled to enforce

that mandate. Nor has he

attempted, if indeed it were

possible, to classify himself

as a third party beneficiary

Or a cestui que trust with

respect to this land. To

overlook such a distinction is

to vault the appellant into a

status which he has~ not

acquired. In such legal gym-

nastics we will not indulge.

238 F.2d at 640.

The Spurlocks' claim that title to

the lands involved in this lawsuit was in

AT&SF is also a collateral attack on the

patents issued by the United States to

Santa Fe Pacific. A determination of the

Secretary of the Interior that a patent

should be granted to an applicant cannot

be attacked by a third party in a collat-

eral proceeding. Burke _v. Southern

Pacific R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669 (1913); see

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also Field v. Seabury, 60 U.S. 323 (19

How.) (1856); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Union

Pacific R.R. Co., 630 F.2d 720 (10th Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981).

The Spurlocks' reading of the

1866, 1871, 1897 and 1902 Acts of Congress

is also erroneous. Santa Fe Pacific was

chartered as the successor to the Atlantic

and Pacific Railroad Company ("A&P"). It

succeeded to a railroad and right of way

belonging to that company and certain land

grant lands, already patented and not yet

patented, granted by Congress. It con-

veyed the railroad and right of way to

AT&SF and retained the land grant lands.2

: Contrary to the Spurlocks' assertions

that this transaction was a secret, fraud-

ulent scheme, the transaction was well

known at the time. In New Mexico v.

Baker, 196 U.S. 432 (1905), the United

States Supreme Court recognized that Santa

Fe Pacific had conveyed away the railroad

pursuant to the 1902 Act of Congress and

retained the land grant lands.

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Santa Fe Pacific ultimately sold those

land grant lands, retaining a severed

mineral estate in some of the lands sold.

None of this was inconsistent with the

four Acts of Congress or with the general

intent of Congress in chartering land

grant railroads.

Between 1861 and 1871, Congress

enacted a series of statutes chartering

companies to build railroads to the

Pacific coast. The overriding purpose

behind those Acts (including the Act of

July 26, 1866 chartering A&P) was to esta-

blish railroad links with the West. See

Platt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 99 U.S.

48, 59-60 (1878); Burke v. Southern

Pacific R.R. Co., supra. Land grant lands

were conveyed to the railroads by the

government pursuant to these Acts, not as

a gift or bounty, but as compensation and

consideration for the railroads'

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undertaking to build through the barren

and unsettled West. Burke, supra.

The federally chartered railroads

received the land grant lands from the

federal government and held title to them

as any private landowner. Santa Fe

Pacific R.R. Co. v. Cord, 14 Ariz. App.

254, 261, 482 P.2d 503, 510, cert. denied,

404 U.S. 912 (1971). As part of their

full fee ownership of the lanc grant

lands, the federally chartered railroads

had an unrestricted right to dispose of

the land grant lands. Platt v. Union

Pacific K.R. Co., supra; H.A. & LL.D.

Holland Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry., 214

F. 920, 923 (9th Cir. 1914). This right

of disposition included the right to sell

the lands and reserve a severed mineral

estate. 1 American Law of Mining § 3.13

at 496 (1983).

Under the terms of the 1897 Act,

\

-14-

PER ce

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Santa Fe Pacific succeeded to the A&P's

title to the land grant lands and its

power to convey those lands. The purpose

of the 1902 Act was not to authorize Santa

Fe Pacific to transfer the land grant

lands to AT&SF (since Santa Fe Pacific

already had the power to transfer those

lands to AT&SF or anyone else), but to

authorize a transfer of the railroad and

operating properties to AT&SF. Contrary

to the Spurlocks' lengthy analysis,

nothing in the 1902 Act (or any other Act

of Generous) seuvkead Santa Fe Pacific to

convey the land grant lands to AT&SF.

It was fully within the legal

rights and corporate powers of Santa Fe

Pacific to do what it did: convey the

railroad to AT&SSF and retain the land

grant lands. It was equally proper for

Santa Fe Pacific, more than forty years

later, to convey some of the land grant

-15-

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lands to the Spurlocks' predecessors

subject to a reservation of "all oil, gas,

coal and minerals whatsoever." See

Russell _v. Texas Co., supra at 641. The

Spurlocks have no claim under federal law

to the minerals in dispute in this litiga-

tion based on an assertion that title to

the land grant lands was in ATESF.

The Spurlocks have never before

argued that the term "minerals" must be

found to be ambiguous under the decisions

of this Court. The interpretation of the

reservation clause was treated by the

parties, and decided by the Arizona

courts, as a question of state law.

Having failed to argue the

existence of a federal question before the

Arizona courts, the Spurlocks may not

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assert i: as a basis for certiorari. "It

is a long-settled rule that the jurisdic-

tion of this Court to re-examine the final

judgment “ state court can arise only

if the record as a whole shows either

expressly or by clear implication that the

federal claim was adequately presented in

the state system." Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S.

493, 496-97 (1981) (emphasis added). See

also New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,

278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928); Oxley Stave Co. v.

Butler County, 166 U.S. 648, 655 (1897).

Whether timely raised or not,

there is, in reality, no federal question

inherent in this case. The question of

whether the language in a private deed is

ambiguous is a question of state law. It

is not the burden of this Court to rectify

perceived inequities in the application of

state law by state courts.

The Spurlocks cite four cases in

-17-

which, it is claimed, this Court found the

term “minerals” to be per se ambiguous.

In each case this Court performed its

familiar role of interpreting an act of

Congress which unquestionably governed the

conveyance in issue, a different role

altogether from serving as a final arbiter

of state law issues.3

There is no case in which this

Court has undertaken to establish a

"federal rule” of construction of private

3 Thus, in Watt v. Western Nuclear,

Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983), this Court con-

strued the federal government's mineral

reservation expressly mandated by the

Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916. In

Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188

U.S. 526 (1903), this Court construed an

1864 act of Congress chartering the

Northern Pacific Railroad Company. In

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981), this

Court construed the language of the

Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act of

1935 and the hie gata Leasing Act of 1920.

In United States v. Northern Pacific Ry.

Co., 311 U.S. 317 (1940), this Court con-

Strued language from the same _ act

construed in Soderberg.

-18-

conveyances not governed by an act of

Congress.

3. ane Spurlocks— claim that

hei h been vi -

ted was =e ven raised or and _is

without merit.

The Spurlocks argue that one of

the members of the Arizona Court of

Appeals was required to recuse himself and

that his failure to do so violated their

right to due process of law.

The Spurlocks did not raise that

issue in the court of appeals or in their

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme

Court.4 Only in their motions filed after

their petition for review was denied and

mandate issued did the Spurlocks attempt

to raise any issue that their right to due

4 It is undisputed that the Spurlocks

were aware of the asserted grounds for

recusal prior to the consideration of this

case by the court of appeals. Petition at

28.

-19-

process of law was abridged by Judge

Haire's decision not to recuse himself.

The Spurlocks did not raise their

due process claim in a timely fashion. In

H nv ia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935),

the petitioners asked this Court to decide

a federal question that was first raised

in a motion for rehearing to the state

Supreme court. This Court stated that

"(t]he long-established general rule is

that the attempt to raise a federal ques-

tion after judgment, upon a petition for

rehearing, comes too late, unless the

court actually entertains the question and

decides it." Id. at 443. See also Hanson

v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 243-44 (1957);

Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S.

120, 128 (1945); American Surety Co. v.

Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1932).

In the instant case, the Arizona

Supreme Court denied the Spurlocks leave

-20-

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to file motions for reconsideration. In

no way can the Arizona Supreme Court be

said to have considered and decided the

Spurlocks' claim of due process viola-

tions.

Even if the Spurlocks had timely

raised their due process claim, granting

certiorari would be inappropriate. Their

argument is utterly devoid of merit.

The question posed by the Petition

is whether the due process clause is vio-

lated when one member of a three-judge

state appellate panel participates in a

decision twenty-five years after he served

as counsel for the receiver of a company

that had done business with one of the

parties to the litigation.> The answer is

5 Judge Haire concluded that he had no

knowledge of significant evidentiary

facts. Before making his decision not to

recuse himself, he consulted with other

court of appeals judges, including the

chief judge. Appendix B at 35.

(footnote continued)

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Clearly no. As this Court has observed:

All questions of judicial

qualification may not involve

constitutional validity. Thus

matters of kinship, personal

bias, state policy, remoteness

of interest would generally be

matters merely of legislative

discretion.

Tumey_v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523

(1927).

Not one of the cases cited by the

Spurlocks suggests that due process is

violated when a judge who arguably knows

facts that may be of minimal evidentiary

value sits as one of three judges on an

(footnote continued from previous page)

Indeed, the Spurlocks in their

letters to Judge Haire disavowed any

concern that Judge Haire would be biased

and expressly stated that the Spurlocks

were not requesting recusal. "By writing

this letter and calling certain matters to

your attention, I am not suggesting that

you would be biased for or against either

party. « « s" Appendix C at 36. "The

purpose of discussing the foregoing is not

to encourage you to recuse yourself."

Appendix D at 45.

-22-

ape Ta:

ae:

i

appellate panel in a civil case. Recusal

was fully considered by Judge Haire prior

to oral argument in the court of appeals.

He concluded correctly that there was no

basis for recusal.

-23-

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the

Court should deny the Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

easy, Erm Komnen

- von Ammon*

Donald R. Gilbert

Timothy Berg

FENNEMORE, CRAIG, von AMMON,

UDALL & POWERS

A Professional Corporation

100 W. Washington, Suite 1700

Phoenix, Arizona 85003-1888

Attorneys for Santa Fe

Pacific Railroad Company

bch, H—

Andrew D. Hurwitz*

Robert L. Palmer

Ron Kilgard

MARTORI, MEYER, HENDRICKS

& VICTOR

2700 N. 3rd Street,

Suite 4000

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Attorneys for Kerr-McGee

Corporation

*Counsel of Record

-24-

SANTA FE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Parent

Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation

Affiliate

Santa Fe Industries, Inc.

Advertising Direction, Inc.

Alameda Belt Line

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway

Company

Central California Traction Company

The Clinton and Oklahoma Western Railroad

Company

The Dodge City and Cimarron Valley Railway

Company

Fresno Interurban Railway Company

The Garden City, Gulf and Northern

Railroad Company

The Gulf and Inter-State Railway Company

of Texas

Haystack Mountain Development Company

The Kansas Southwestern Railway Company

Los Angeles Junction Railway Company

The Oakland Terminal Railway

Oklahoma City Junction Railway Company

Rio Grande, El Paso and Santa Fe Railway

Company

St. Joseph Terminal Railroad Company

Santa Fe Forwarding Company

Santa Fe Industrial Realty Company

Santa Fe Rail Equipment Company

Sante Fe Terminal Services, Inc.

Santa Fe Transportation Company

Star Lake Railroad Company

Sunset Railway Company

Transit Ice Company

Kirby Forest Industries, Inc.

Walker-Kurth Lumber Company

Limited Partnership Management, Inc.

-i-

iets. ‘bi

Sa eae as a

a aan) | oe =

Robert E. McKee, Inc.

B & C General Agency, Inc.

McKee Building Services, Inc.

McKee Products, Inc.

Sun Country Construction Company

SF Minerals Corporation

Cerrillos Land Company

SF Coal Corporation

Santa Fe Mining, Inc.

Gallo Wash Coal Company

Hospah Coal Company

Pintada Coal Company

Santa Fe Capital, Inc.

Santa Fe Land Improvement Company

Chula Vista Bayfront Investment Company

Santa Fe Towers Land Company

Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc.

Santa Fe Energy Company

SF Energy Company of Colombia

SF Energy Company of Indonesia

SF Energy Company of Indonesia

(Banyu Block)

SF Energy Company of Indonesia

(Java Basin A)

Santa Fe Energy Company of Indonesia

(Java Basin B)

Santa Fe Energy Company of Tunisia

Santa Fe Energy Products Company

Santa Fe Oil Company

Santa Fe Pacific Fuels Company

Santa Fe Pipelines, Inc.

Gulf Central Pipeline Company

Gulf Central Storage and Terminal Company

Gulf Central Storage and Terminal Company

of Nebraska

San Diego Pipeline Company

Santa Fe Marketing Company

Santa Fe Pipeline Company

Southwest Pipe Line Company

Standard Office Building Corporation

The Zia Company

Los Alamos Constructors, Inc.

atte

pegtctbtiy Women

S haciaks Mactoaed

SGSI Corporation

Southern Pacific Company

Bankers Leasing and Financial Corporation

Bankers Leasing Corporation

Asociados Internacionales del Pacifico

BLC Corporation

Commetro Leasing, Inc.

Commonwealth Control, Inc.

The Commonwealth Plan, Inc.

The Commonwealth Plan of Puerto Rico, Inc.

The Commonwealth System, Inc.

Financial Leasing Corporation

Lease Capital, Inc.

The Midwest Commonwealth Plan, Inc.

The Pacific Plan, Inc.

The Worcester Plan, Inc.

BLFC Securities Corporation

ComPian, Inc.

Bravo Oil Company

Constellation 130, Inc.

Constellation Reinsurance Company

Constellation Reinsco, Inc.

CRM Associates, Inc.

Galaxy Reinsurance Company

One Market Street Properties, Inc.

Pacific Petroleum Pipe Lines, Inc.

San Diego Pipeline Company

Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation

Santa Fe Pacific Timber Company

So Pac Finance N.V.

Southern Pacific Development Company

Canton Street Properties, Inc.

Golden Empire Investment Corporation

Southern Pacific Industrial Development

Company

Southern Pacific Land Company

Geoproducts Corporation

Southern Pacific Pipe Lines, Inc.

Black Mesa Pipeline, Inc.

Mescalero Pipeline, Inc.

SPPLITT, Ltd.

Southern Pacific Transportation Company

-iii-

Central California Traction Company

Evergreen Leasing Corporation

Holton Inter-Urban Railway Company

Los Angeles Union Terminal, Inc.

Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company

Petaluma and Santa Rosa Railroad Company

The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company

Pacific Fruit Express Company

Pacific Motor Transport Company

Pacific Motor Trucking Company

Louis Heller, Incorporated

Portland Terminal Railroad Company

Portland Traction Company

Southern Pacific Air Freight, Inc.

Southern Pacific Equipment Company

Southern Pacific International, Inc.

Southern Pacific Marine Transport, Inc.

Southern Pacific Warehouse Company

St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company

The Alton & Southern Railway Company

Arkansas & Memphis Railway Bridge

and Terminal Company

Dallas Terminal Railway and Union Depot

Company

Glascar, Inc. .

Kansas City Terminal Railway Company

Southern Illinois and Missouri Bridge

Company

The Southwestern Town Lot Corporation

Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis

Sunset Railway Company

Visalia Electric Railroad Company

Sunset Communications Company

Sunset Insurance Company

TOPS On-Line Services, Inc.

KERR MCGEE CORPORATION

Subsidiaries

Basic Management, Inc.

Bikita Minerals Private Limited

Crescent Petroleum Company

Downtown Airpark, Inc.

Kerr-McGee Oil (U.K.) Limited

Little Medicine Development Company

San-Ann Service, Inc.

Sunningdale Oil (Ireland) Limited

Texoma Pipe Line Company

Transocean Drilling Company Limited

Transocean Drilling Company (U.K.) Limited

Transocean Drilling (Curacao) N.V.

Transshore Drilling (Curacao) N.V.

Transshore Drilling Company Limited

Transworld Drilling Company (Nigiria)

Limited

White Shoal Pipeline Corporation

Partnership

Brewster Phosphates

@-Yy=