Appendix — DeSeyn v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District

Supreme Court brief1985

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

84-1468 WAR 1 1985

KLE ANDER SEV AR,

CERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

No.

ROBERT L. DESEYN,

Petitioner,

vs.

MUSKINGUM WATERSHED CONSERVANCY

DISTRICT,

Respondent.

SUBSTITUTE APPENDIX FOR

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals

Por the Sixth Circuit

MACK D. COOK, II

900 First National Tower

Akron, Ohio 44308

(216) 376-1005

Attorney for Petitioner

SA-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT L. DESEYN ) JUDGE

( ALVIN I. KRENZLER

Plaintiff )

~ve- ) CASE NO. C82-3018A

MUSKINGUM WATERSHED )

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ) MEMORANDUM OF

) OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant )

Plaintiff filed this action on November 3, 1983

[Sic]. In his complaint, plaintiff is asserting causes of

action alleged to arise under 42 U.S.C $1983, the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion, and the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C $407, in addi-

tion to various pendent state claims.

The defendant in this action, the Muskingum

Watershed Conservancy District, was organized as a

conservancy district under the authority of Capter /Sic/

61 of the Ohio Revised Code. Pursuant to O.R.C

§6101.03, the defendant is a political subdivision and a

public corporation of the state of Ohio.

Generally, the plaintiff alleges in his complaint

that he owns a residential dwelling located on land leas-

ed from the defendant in an area referred to as the

‘North Shore area adjacent to Atwood Lake’ (North

Shore area). Plaintiff alleges that the defendant is

about to commence oil and gas drilling in the North

Shore area, and plaintiff is seeking to enjoin that activi-

ty.

On November 23, 1983 /Sic],the defendant filed

a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which is

SA-2

presently pending before the Court. In its motion, the

defendant asserts that any oil and gas drilling in the

North Shore area will not be conducted by the defen-

dant but will be conducted by a third party under an oil

and gas lease entered into prior to when plaintiff ob-

tained his lease from the defendant. Further, plaintiff's

lease expressly states that it is subject to any existing

oil and gas leases. Defendant also asserts in its motion

to dismiss that it is not a person within the meaning of

42 U.S.C.§1983, and that plaintiff does not have stan-

ding to sue under 33 U.S.C. §407.

The defendant has attached exhibits and af-

fidavits to its motion to dismiss. Therefore, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), the defendant’s motion will be

treated as a motion for summary judgement under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56.

Fed R. Civ. P. 56 provides in pertinent

part:

The judgement sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and ad-

missions on file, together with the af-

fidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a

judgement as a matter of law.

The undisputed facts in this case, established by

the pleadings, exhibits and affidavits of the parties are

as follows. The defendant owns the real estate in the

North Shore area at issue in this case. On June 1, 1967,

defendant entered into a oil and gas lease with the Ox-

ford Oil Company, granting the company the right to

drill for oil and gas on lands which encompass that

presenti» occupied by the plaintiff.

SA-3

On August 1, 1969, a Dr. Frank Schirack entered

into a cottage site lease with the defendant with respect

to the lot presently occupied by the plaintiff. The lease

was for a term of one year with the right to renew it each

year, subject to certain conditions, for a total period of

fourteen years. The lease expressly provided that it was

* gubject to ‘[a]ll existing oil and gas leases.’ On March 1,

1970, Dr. Schirack assigned the lease to the plaintiff,

Robert L. Deseyn. Plaintiff, at the same time, purchas-

ed the cottage Dr. Schirack had constructed on the site.

The plaintiff continues to occupy the site at the present

time. Plaintiff brought this action in November, 1982

when he personally observed three gas drilling sites on

real estate owned by the defendant in the North Shore

area.

Plaintiff's first claim is alleged to arise under 42

U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff alleges, in this claim, that the

defendant’s actions regarding oil and gas drilling ac-

tivities in the North Shore area have been arbitrary,

capricious and unreasonable and thus a violation of due

process of law.

In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564

(1972), the Supreme Court held that the requirements

of due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protec-

tion of liberty and property. The Court went on to hold:

Property interests, of course, are not

created by the Constitution. Rather, they

are created and their dimensions are

defined by existing rules or understan-

dings that stem from an independent

source such as state law--rules or un-

derstandings that secure certain benefits

anc that support claims of entitlement to

those benefits.

SA-4

In the present case, the plaintiff's property rights

are defined by the lease agreement covering the proper-

ty at issue here. The plaintiff has a property interest in

the land only to the extent such an interest is granted

by the lease. The lease agreement specifically provides

that plaintiff's interest in the property is subject to any

prior oil and gas leases. The oil and gas lease at issue

here was entered into on June 1, 1967. The lease plain-

tiff took by assignment was entered into on August 1,

1969. Accordingly, the plaintiff did not have a property

interest in this land which would give rise to a right to

due process concerning oil and gas drilling activities in

the North Shore area, and, therefore, the plaintiff could

not violate such a right. Thus, plaintiff's claim under 42

U.S.C. §1983, alleging a violation of due process is

hereby dismissed.

Plaintiff's second claim, that oil and gas drilling

in the North Shore area will diminish the value of plain-

tiffs property and will, thus, constitute an uncompen-

sated taking of plaintiffs property in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment, is similarly defeated by the

lease at issue here. The source of any property interest

the plaintiff might have in the land at issue here is the

lease. The lease, by providing that plaintiff's property

interest is subject to any preexisting oil and gas leases,

never gave the plaintiff the property interest he now

claims will be taken by the drilling activity. Board of

Regents v. Roth, supra.

Accordingly, because the property interest plain-

tiff claims will be taken was never given to him in the

first place, the plaintiff's claim which is based on an un- -

compensated taking in violation of the Fourteenth

anil

ole

Amendment is hereby dismissed. This is not to say,

however, that the plaintiff will not have a state tort ac-

tion against the driller if the drilling should damage

those property interests that plaintiff does have in the

land.

Plaintiffs third claim is brought under the

Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §407. Plaintiff alleges

that the drilling activity will produce refuse matter

which will flow in to the water reservoir of Atwood Lake.

The Refuse Act provides in pertinent part:

It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge,

or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to

be thrown, discharged, or deposited either

from or out of any ship, barge, or other

floating craft of any kind, or from the

shore, wharf, manufacturing establish-

ment, or mill of any kind, any refuse

matter of any kind or description

whatever other than that flowing from

streets and sewers and passing therefrom

in a liquid state, into any navigable water

of the United States, or into any tributary

of any navigable water from which the

same shall float or be washed into such

navigable water; and it shall not be lawful

to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to

be deposited material of any kind in any

place on the bank of navigable water, or

on the bank of any tributary of any

navigable water, where the same shall be

liable to be washed into such navigable

water, either by ordinary or high tides, or

by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby

navigation shall or may be impeded or

obstructed.

OO

SA-6

In his complaint, the plaintiff does not specify

what types of refuse matter the drilling will produce

which might impede or obstruct navigation. However,

even assuming that such matter may be produced, 33

U.S.C. §407 does not create a private right of action to

enforce the statute. City of Evansville, Ind. v Ken-

tucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F. 2nd 1008 (7th Cir.

1979). Accordingly, the plaintiff does not have a stan-

ding to assert a cause of action under 33 U.S.C. §407

and this claim must, therefore, be dismissed.

The remainder of plaintiff's claims arise under

state law and are only before the Court under the doc-

trine of pendent jurisdiction. The Court having dismiss-

ed the plaintiff’s federal claims prior to trial, plaintiff's

pendent state claims are better resolved in a state court

and are therefore dismissed. United Mine Workers v.

Gibb, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

_ Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss

is hereby granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

(s)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT L. DESEYN ) JUDGE

ALVIN I. KRENZLER

Plaintiff )

-vs- ) CASE NO. C82-3018A

MUSKINGUM WATERSHED )

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ;

) JUDGEMENT ENTRY

Defendant )

On May 18, 1983 this Court entered its Memoran-

dum of Opinion and Order granting the defendant’s

motion to dismiss this action. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that this action is hereby dis-

missed. Plaintiff is to pay all costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

(s)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NO. 83-3400

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBL

ROBERT L. DESEYN ) Sixth Circuit Rule 24 limits citation to specific situation:

Rule 24 bolore citing in a proceeding in a court in the Su

cilcd, @ copy must be served on other periies and the Cour

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) This notice is to be prominenitiy Cispiuyed it this decision is

-vs- ) APPEAL FROM

) THE UNITED STATES

) DISTRICT COURT

) FORTHE

MUSKINGUM WATERSHED ) NORTHERN DISTRICT

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ) OFOHIO

)

Defendant-Appellee. )

BEFORE: EDWARDS and WELLFORD, Circuit

Judges, and CHURCHILL, District Judge.*

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Deseyn owls a house

and water well located in a Conservancy District in

Tuscarawas County, Ohio. The property upon which

his house and water well are located is leased from |

defendant Conservancy District. Plaintiff acquired the

lease by assignment from a Dr. Frank Schirack and

subsequently purchased the residence from him and

continued to lease the real estate from the Conservancy

District.

Defendant is an Ohio Conservancy District

authorized under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 6101 to

operate and maintain the lake and surrounding proper-

ty on which many cottages have been built. Defendant

Conservancy District is a political subdivision of the

State of Ohio.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

aaa

SA-9

Sometime in 1982 plaintiff Deseyn noticed three oil

and gas well drilling sites in an area around his home

(none closer than 600 feet to his property). Deseyn then

filed this action for an injunction, declaratory judg -

ment, damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, alleging

irreparable damage and injury to himself and to the

market value and peaceable enjoyment of his home and

water well. Among other things, he alleges violation of

42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) for arbitrary, capricious, and

unreasonable actions taken without due process of law,

and under the Fourteenth Amendment for a“taking”of

his home and water well without compensation and due ©

process.

Plaintiff also asserted a cause of action under 33

U.S.C. § 407.! Dismissal by the district court of this

asserted private cause of action was proper. See City of

Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F. 2nd

1008 (7th Cir. 1978). As stated by another court:

The rivers and Harbors Act is limited by

its terms to enforcement by the United

States Attorneys. The majority of courts,

and the courts of this circuit that have ad-

dressed this issue, have held that the Act

precludes private suits and have thus

refused to find an implied private cause of

action. Red Star Towing and Transp.

Co. v. Department of Transportation,

423 F.2nd 104, 105 (3rd Cir. 1970);

Township of Long Beach v. City of New

York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1211-12 (D.N.J.

1978); see Connecticut Action Now, Inc.

v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2nd 81,85-

87 (2nd Cir. 1972); Parcell v. Shell Oil

Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1279-80 (D.Conn.

1976). affirmed, 573 F.2nd 1289 (2nd Cir.

1977).

National Sea Clammers Ass’n. v. City of New York,

616 F.2nd 1222, 1232 (2nd Cir. /Sic] 1980).

1. This Act is known as the Rivers and Harbors Act

(Refuse Act).

SA-10 :

It appears that the ‘cottage site lease’ (attached

to the complaint) which was assigned to Deseyn was

entered into by his predecessor on August 1, 1969, and

contains a clause which expressly provides that the

lease is subject to ‘all existing oil and gas leases and

utility rights-of-way thereunto pertaining.’ The district

court, on review of defendant’s motion for summary

judgement, found that the oil and gas drilling lease un-

der attack by Deseyn was entered into June 1, 1967,

over two years prior to Deseyn’s predecessor’s acquisi-

tion of his property rights in the lease and cottage.

We AFFIRM the district court’s decision for

defendants since it sets vut, as a matter of law, the

rights of the parties based on the uncontested facts that

were before it, recognizing, at the same time, that

plaintiff may at some later time have a cause of action if

future drilling demonstrably damages his property in-

terests.

SA-11

NO. 83-3400

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT L. DESEYN ) F l L E cD

DEC 7 1984

Plaintiff-Appellant, JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk

-ve- )

)

) ORDER

)

MUSKINGUM WATERSHED )

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT )

)

)

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: EDWARDS and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges;

and CHURCHILL, District Judge.*

The district court, on review of defendant’s mo-

tion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judge-

ment, found that the oil and gas drilling lease under at-

tack by Deseyn was entered into June 1, 1967, over two

years prior to Deseyn’s predecessor’s acquisition of his

property rights in the lease and cottage. Even if con-

sidered as a sua sponte summary judgement action

without the requisite notice, plaintiff has not

demonstrated prejudice in this procedure. Plaintiff has

never demonstrated any basis to challenge the validity

of the 1967 lease. See Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler

Board of Education, 649 F.2nd 434, 436.

Upon consideration of plaintiff's petition for

rehearing, we again affirm the district court's decision

* The Honorable James P. Churchill, U.S. District

Court for the Fastern District of Michigan, sitting by

designation.

SA-12

for the reasons heretofore stated in the court’s per

curiam opinion.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

(s)

Clerk

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES

AND PROCEDURAL RULES INVOLVED

The Due process Clawse of the Four-

teenth Amendment provides:

- « « nor shall any State deprive any

person of .. . property, without due

process of law; nor Geny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the law.

The Bill of Rights, Article V, pro-

vides:

» + « nor shall private property be

taken for public use, without just

compensation.

28 U.S.C. §1254(1) provides:

Cases in the courts of appeals may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by the

following methods: (1) By writ of

certiorari granted upon the petition

of any party to any civil... case.

28 U.S.C. §1331 provides:

The district courts shall have ori-

ginal jurisdiction of all civil ac-

tions arising under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. §1343 provides:

The district courts shall have ori-

ginal jurisdiction of any civil action

authorized by law to be commenced by

any person: .. . (3) To redress the

deprivation, under color of any State

law, statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom or usage, of any right, privi-

lege or immunity secured by the Con-

stitution of the United States or by

any Act of Congress providing for

equal rights of citizens or of all

persons within the jurisdiction of the

United States; (4) To recover damages

Or to secure equitable or other relief

SA-15

under any Act of Congress providing

for the protection of civil rights,

28 U.S.C. §2201 provides:

In a case of actual controversy

within its jurisdiction, . . . any

court of the United States, upon the

filing of an appropriate pleading, may

declare the rights and other legal

relations of any interested party

seeking such declaration, whether or

not further relief is or could be

sought. Any such declaration shall

have the force and effect of a final

judgment or decree and shall be re-

viewable as such.

33 U.S.C. §407 provides:

It shall not be lawful to throw,

discharge, or deposit, or cause, suf-

fer, Or procure to be thrown, dis-

charged, or deposited either from or

SA-16

out of any ship, barge, or other

floating craft of any kind, or from

the shore, wharf, manufacturing es-

tablishment, or mill of any kind, any

refuse matter of any kind or descrip-

tion whatever other than that flowing

from streets and sewers and passing

therefrom in a liquid state, into any

navigable water of the United States,

Or into any tributary of any navigable

water from which the same shall float

or be washed into such navigable wa-

ter; and it shall not be lawful to

deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure

to be deposited material of any kind

in’ any place on the bank of any navi-

gable water, or on the bank of any

tributary of any navigable water,

where the same shall be liable to be

washed into such navigable water,

either by ordinary or high tides, or

by storms or floods, or otherwise,

whereby navigation shall or may be

impeded or obstructed:

33 U.S.C. §413 provides:

The Department of Justice shall

conduct the legal proceedings neces-

sary to enforce the provisions of sec-

tions 401, 403, 404, 406, 407, 408,

409, 411, 549, 686, and 687 of this

title; and it shall be the duty of

Unite. States attorneys to vigorously

prosecute all offenders against the

same whenever requested to do so by

the Secretary of the Army or by any of

the officials hereinafter designated,

and it shall furthermore be the duty

of said United States attorneys to

report to the Attorney General of the

United States the action taken by him

against offenders so reported, and a

transcript of such reports shal’ be

transmitted to the Secretary of the

Army by the Attorney General; and for

the better enforcement of the said

provisions and to facilitate the de-

tection and bringing to punishment of

such offenders, the officers and

agents of the United States in charge

of river and harbor improvements, and

the assistant engineers and inspec-

tors employed under them by authority

of the Secretary of the Army, and the

United States collectors of customs

and other revenue officers shall have

power and authority to swear out pro-

cess, and to arrest and take into

custody, with or without process, and

person or persons who may commit any

of the acts or offenses prohibited by

the said sections, or who may violate

any of the provisions of the same.

SA-19

42 U.S.C. §1983, enacted as §1 of the

Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,

provides:

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-

tom, or usage, of any State or Terri-

tory, subjects, or causes to be sub-

jected, any citizen ‘of the United

States or other person within the jur-

isdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immuni-

ties secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.

Rule 12(b), FRCP, provides:

Every defense, in law or fact, toa

claim for relief in any pleading,

whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-

Claim, or third-party claim, shall be

asserted in the responsive pleading

SA~20

thereto if one is required, except

that the following defenses may at the

option of the pleader be made by mo-

tion: (1) lack of ‘jurisdiction over

the subject matter, (2) lack of juris-

diction over the person, (3) improper

venue, (4) insufficiency of process,

(5) insufficiency of service of pro-

cess, (6) failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, (7)

failure to join a party under Rule 19.

A motion making any of these dGefenses

shall be made before pleading if a

further pleading is permitted. No

defense or objection is waived by be-

ing joined with one or more other

defenses or objections in a responsive

pleading or motion. If a pleading

sets forth a claim for relief to which

the adverse party is not required to

serve a responsive pleading, he may

SA-21

assert at the trial any defense in law

or fact to that claim for relief. If,

on a motion asserting the defense num-

bered (6) to dismiss for failure of

the pleading to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, matters

outside the pleading are presented to

and not excluded by the court, the

motion shall be treated as one for

summary judgment and disposed of as

provided in Rule 56, and all parties

shall be given reasonable opportunity

to present all material made pertinent

to such a motion by Rule 56.

Rule 15(a), FRCP, provides:

A party may amend his pleading once

as a matter of course at any time

before a responsive pleading is served

Rule 20(a), FRCP, provides:

Permissive Joinder. All persons

SA-22

Ru le

may join in one action as plaintiffs

if they assert any right to relief

jointly, severally, or in the alter-

native in respect of or arising out of |

the same transaction, occurrence, or

series cf transactions or occurrences

and if any question of law or fact

common to all these persons will arise

in the action.

23, FRCP, provides:

(b) An action may be maintained as a

class action if the prerequisites of

subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in

addition: ...

(2) the party opposing the class

has acted or refused to act on

grounds generally applicable to the

class, thereby making appropriate

final injunctive relief or corres-

ponding declaratory relief with re-

spect to the class as a whole;....

SA-23

Rule 56(c), FRCP, provides:

The motion shall be served at least

10 days before the time fixed for the

hearing. The adverse party prior to

the day of hearing may serve opposing

affidavits. The judgment sought shall

be rendered forthwith if the plead-

ings, depositions, answers to inter-

rogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.