Opposition Brief — Hobson v. United States

l Office - Supreme Court, U.S,

/ FILE

Nos. 84-1148, 84-1164, and 84-1493 We

Phitheetemernt= STEVAS,

In the Supreme Court of the Rni Tes

OCTOBER TERM, 4984

RUSSELL Hosson, III, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PATRICK C. WALDROP, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MANUEL ERIC VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CiRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. L&E

Solicitor General

STEPHEN S. TROTT

Assistant Attorney General

KATHRYN A. OBERLY

Assistant to the Solicitor General

SIDNEY M. GLAZER

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether marijuana offenses may serve as predicate

offenses for prosecutions under the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962.

2. Whether two or more offenses arising out of the same

criminal episode satisfy the predicate act requirement of the

RICO statute.

3. Whether the jury instructions were sufficient to ensure

that petitioner Waldrop would not be convicted on the

RICO charges in the indictment unless the jury found the

existence of an enterprise and the commission of multiple

enterprise-related offenses.

4. Whether the court of appeals correctly sustained the

validity of two amendments to a wiretap authorization

issued by a state judge.

5. Whether petitioner Hobson was deprived of due pro-

cess because the court of appeals’ review of his sufficiency

claim allegedly was based upon inaccurate factual state-

ments in the government’s brief.

6. Whether a pre-trial order disqualifying petitioner

Hobson’s original counsel because the anticipated trial tes-

timony of two government witnesses was likely to implicate

the lawyer in some of the charges in the indictment became

erroneous when the implicating evidence was not adduced

at trial.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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PEE ROGER EC EGK Ec eS eed ceceuneceWeecerdccece 9

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Alexander v. Harris, 595 F.2d 87 ............. 18

Gustafson v. United States, cert. denied,

No. 84-482 (Jan. 21, 1985) ........... eee eees 9

Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 .......... 17

Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,

ee cA eee nckensesacecios 17

Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 .......... 3

Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 ...... 17

Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 ......... 21

United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2¢ 1358,

Se I RE, ED Aca wccccccsescccse 15

United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 ...... .

United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915,

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856.0... icc ccc cecess 15

United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643 ......... 21

United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp.

DE DUAR GERACE Cin wewEs Ge ces e ca ceueces 18

IV

Page

Cases—Continued:

United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825,

A 24

United States v. Lemm, 680 F.24 1193,

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 ........... 14, 15, 16

United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 ........ 24

United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85,

ee i a eeewes 15

United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430,

— ee fo ke re 12

United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632 ........... 12

United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971,

art. Gee, Gr We BED co cccccccccccccce: 12

United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp.

Ss ee oe en i ccctuccs 12

United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852 .......... 18

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.

ridlelch 6 die ccna nein bh bbe ue del 11, 14, 15

United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d

a a 12

Statutes and rule:

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and

Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.

Se MUL. habcuuansecdasbansseccecscces 10, 11

Infant Formula Act of 1980, Pub. L.

No. 96-359, 94 Stat. 1190 et seg. ............ il

Page

Statutes and rule—Continued:

Racketeer Infiuenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. :

18 U.S.C. 1961(1M(D) .... 2... ee eee eee 9,12

BS U.S.C, ISGIGS) nc cnccccccccccccccccese 1]

18 U.S.C. 1961 note (Pub. L.

No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84

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Se lie SEED de cceccecccccccecccceses 9

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Be CUED Recccciccccccecesedoucocecseces 2

Be as EE. Ret sccccnccecenccosscoccoseconce 2

Be Win WE Se cccuscdcccewrccccsecesecesecs 2

Be Ts UE: Kcccccccccowvesesccccccessseese 2

Pe A, a BD cccccccdccdccoteuecces 18

Miscellaneous:

126 Cong. Rec. 11791 (1980) ............e0ees 1

S. Rep. 91-617, 9ist Cong., Ist Sess.

PRD 6.06 6d009600004650566n6 00 ceecnsccees 12

U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys’

Manual (Mar. 1984) .......cccceescccccces 13

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-1148

Russe_t Hopson, II], PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 84-1164

PaTRICK C. WALDROP, PETITIONER

Vv.

Uni tTep STATES OF AMERICA

No. 84-1403

MANUEL Eric VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the courts of appeals (Pet. App. 1-50)! is

reported at 742 F.2d 1335.

“Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to the petition in No. 84-1148

unless otherwise indicated.

(1)

|

>

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

October |, 1984. Petitions for rehearing filed by each peti-

tioner were denied on December 6, 1984 (84-1148 Pet. App.

51-52; 84-1164 Pet. App. Cl-C2; 84-1403 Pet. App. 51-52).

The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 84-1148 was filed

on Januar, 16, 1985, the petition in No. 84-1164 was filed

on January 17, 1985, and the petition in No. 84-1403 was

filed on March 5, 1985.* The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida, petitioners were con-

victed of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (Count |); the com-

pleted RICO substantive offense (Count 2); conspiracy to

import marijuana (Count 3); importation of marijuana

(Count 4 (Hobson and Waldrop only)); conspiracy to pos-

sess marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 5); posses-

sion of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 8 as to

Villanueva, Count 9 as to Waldrop, and Count 10 as to

Waldrop and Hobson); and engaging in a continuing crimi-

nal enterprise (Count 25 as to Villanueva), in violation of 18

U.S.C. 1962 and 21 U.S.C. 963, 952, 846, 841 and 848.

Petitioner Hobson was sentenced to consecutive terms of

imprisonment for each count on which he was convicted

totalling 35 years; he also was fined a total of $110,000 on

Counts | through 5 and Count 10. Petitioner Waldrop was

sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for each

count on which he was convicted totalling 40 years; he also

was fined various sums on each count, totalling $125,000.

2On January 19, 1985, Justice Powell extended the time for the filing

of petitioner Villanueva's petition for a writ of certiorari (No. 84-1403)

to and including March 6, 1985.

3

Petitioner Villanueva's consecutive sentences totalled 60

years’ imprisonment, and his cumulative fines amounted to

$220,000. In addition, each petitioner was given two-year

special parole term. The court of appeals affirmed the con-

victions of Hobson and Waldrop in all respects. In light of

the affirmance of his continuing criminal enterprise convic-

tion, Villanueva’s convictions for conspiracy to import

marijuana and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent

to distribute (Counts 3 and 5) were vacated on double

jeopardy grounds (see Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S.

137 (1977)). Villanueva’s convictions on all other counts

were affirmed.

The evidence showed that in late 1977 Villanueva and

co-defendants Jose Acosta and Antonio Bascaro were

operating a large marijuana importation organization in

southern Florida (38 R. 148-150). In the latter part of that

year, Clyde (“Bill”) Cobb became a member of the organi-

zation, assuming responsibility for storing the marijuana

after importation and distributing the marijuana to whole-

salers (38 R. 150). Before that year’s end, Cobb recruited his

brother-in-law, Dan Abbey, to keep track of the organiza-

tion’s accounts (40 R. 10). Abbey estimated that during the

time of his participation in the enterprise approximately

750,000 to 1.5 million pounds of marijuana had been

imported and distributed, generating proceeds in excess of

$175,000,000 (40 R. 66-67).

In December 1977, the enterprise moved its operations to

northern Florida (38 R. 150-151; 40 R. 10-11). A farm

suitable for storing marijuana was located near Cottondale,

Florida (38 R. 150). Cobb made a cash down payment of

$180,000 to buy the farm, using funds belonging to Acosta

and Bascaro and delivered to him by petitioner Villanueva

(38 R. 152-153). Shortly thereafter, more than 40,000

*“R.” refers to the 50-volume record on appeal.

\

,

4

pounds of marijuana that had been carried aboard a con-

verted shrimper, the Tanila, was transferred to the farm (40

R. 10-12). Villanueva was among those supervising the

offloading (40 R. 11). Within two or three days, several

buyers, including Waldrop and Hobson, arrived at the farm

to purchase quantities of the cargo (38 R. 154). On this

occasion, Waldrop bought 10,000 pounds (40 R. 14). After

the entire load had been distributed, Abbey collected the

moneys due from the buyers; in turn, he made periodic trips

to Acosta’s house in the Miami area, where he turned the

payments over to Villanueva (40 R. 15-i6). The total

amount delivered for the Tanila load was between $8 and $9

million (40 R. 15).

In January 1978 another vessel, the Navigator, arrived at

a clandestine offloading site near Fort Walton Beach (40 R.

18-19), and 40,000-45,000 pounds of marijuana were off-

loaded in the presence of Villanueva and other supervisors

(38 R. 150; 40 R. 19-20). The cargo was transported to the

Cottondale farm, weighed and stored there (34 R. 134-135;

40 R. 20), and subsequently distributed to customers,

including Wa:irop and Hobson (34 R. 135-136; 38 R. 157-

158). Following distribution, Abbey once again made the

rounds of the buyers to secure payment. He then proceeded

periodically to Acosta’s home to hand over the receipts to

either Acosta or Villanueva. The total amount collected was

about the same as for the Tanila load—$8 or $9 million. 40

R. 20-21.

After a third load of marijuana had been stored at the

Cottondale farm and distributed to customers from that

site, the leaders of the trafficking enterprise became-con-

cerned that the neighbors were suspicious of activities at the

farm. Accordingly, they purchased a fishing camp on the

Aucilla River in the Florida panhandle and a farm in Madi-

son County to serve as new offloading and storage sites. 38

R. 160-163. In mid-March a load of marijuana arrived at

5

the fishing camp by vessel, and the cargo was successfully

transferred to the Madison County farm, from which it was

distributed without incident (38 R. 162). As before, Abbey

collected millions of dollars from the buyers of this ship-

ment and turned the proceeds over to Villanueva (40 R. 49).

In late March or early April another vessel, the Miss Too

Nicey, reached the fishing camp (36 R. 139-140; 38 R. 163).

In the presence of Acosta, Bascaro, and Villanueva, the

vessel’s 73,000-pound cargo of marijuana was offloaded

and trucked to the Madison County farm (36 R. 140-141,

144; 38 R. 163). There, the weighing and storage was con-

ducted in the presence of Villanueva, Bascaro, and Thomas

Alexander (36 R. 141). Shortly thereafter, Hobson and an

associate came to the farm in an 18-wheel truck to take

25,000 pounds of marijuana. Hobson revealed to Alex-

ander that he and Waldrop were partners. 36 R. 141-143;

40 R. 55.

The use of the Madison County farm as a storage facility

lasted only about one month. During that period, state law

enforcement officers became suspicious of the activities

occurring at the farm and commenced surveillance (31 R.

68-70). When Alexander and others detected the surveil-

lance, the leaders of the enterprise decided to find a new

storage facility (36 R. 145).

In April 1978 the enterprise rented a warehouse in Talla-

hassee, and the 6,000 pounds of marijuana remaining at the

Madison County farm were transferred to the warehouse

(36 R. 146-147). That warehouse proved to be too small to

store an expected double load—80,000 pounds of mari-

juana. Consequently, the enterprise leased a second ware-

house in Tallahassee. GX 10; 31 R. 148-150. On two con-

secutive evenings in late April, boatloads of marijuana were

offloaded at the fishing camp and trucked to the larger

warehouse in Tallahassee (36 R. 147; 38 R. 168-169). Wal-

drop visited the warehouse and set aside 40,000 pounds for

6

pickup iater that week (40 R. 53). Before Waldrop could

make his pickup, however, state law enforcement officers

entered the warehouse, seized 70,293 pounds of marijuana,

and arrested six individuals (31 R. 74-79, 93, 151; 36 R. 148;

—— 40 R. 52-53). The officers also seized detailed records of

|

amounts received, amounts distributed, and money owed

by a number of individuals. Listed among the debtors were

“Pat” (Waldrop) and “Russ” (Hobson) (31 R. 85-89).

While the officers were inspecting the warehouse, Wal-

drop arrived there in a rented car. He was stopped and

questioned by a police officer, and he consented to a search

of a briefcase in his car. Inside the briefcase the officer

found a notebook and loose sheets, all of which contained

records of marijuana transactions. 31 R. 79-81. Some of the

items (GX 7) were duplicates of records kept by Abbey for

Acosta and Villanueva (GX 145; 40 R. 44-46). Although the

records were se.zed, Waldrop was released (31 R. 89-90). He

telephoned Cobb and reported the loss of the records (38 R.

170). 7

Because of the loss of the large Tallahassee warehouse,

the need for a new storage site again arose. That need

became urgent when Cobb learned that 150,000 pounds of

marijuana already were en route to Florida (38 R. 175). A

member of the enterprise located a tobacco barn deemed

suitable for use as a storage facility near the town of Quincy

in Gadsden County, Florida (ibid.).

Three vessels were involved in the 150,000 pound deliv-

ery. The first was successfully offloaded, after which the

marijuana was transferred to the Quincy barn (38 R. 175).

The other two vessels were sent out to sea for a few more

days because the offloaders could not handle them imme-

diately (38 R. 175-176). While at sea, those vessels were

boarded by Coast Guard officers, and their cargo of mari-

juana was seized (31 R. 238-240; 34 R. 4-6; 38 R. 175-176).

On July 21, 1978, local officers, armed with a warrant,

7

searched the Quincy barn and seized numerous bales of

marijuana and drug paraphernalia (31 R. 253-255).

Thereafter, a meeting was held at Cobb’s home in south-

ern Florida to discuss moving the enterprise to Georgia (38

R. 177-178). Among the participants in the discussions were

Cobb, Acosta, Bascaro, and Villanueva (38 R. 178-179).

Arrangements were made to use Morgan’s Boat Dock in

Savannah (33 R. 22-25; 34 R. 154). On November 24, 1978,

the Sea Star arrived there with a cargo of marijuana weigh-

ing 40,224 pounds (32 R. 32-37). Federal law enforcement

officers intercepted the vessel and seized its cargo (32 R.

31-35).

Shortly thereafter, Cobb decided to engage in a new

venture (39 R. 44-47). Instead of using boats, Cobb decided

to attempt to smuggle marijuana by airplane (38 R. 186). In

mid-January 1979, pursuant to Cobb’s plan, James Mc-

Donnell flew a DC-3 airplane to Colombia, took on a cargo

of marijuana, and flew back to Fort Lauderdale. The

plane and its cargo were seized by federal and local law

enforcement agents at the Fort Lauderdale airport. 32 R.

127, 151-154.

Two weeks later, McDonnell agreed to make a second

attempt to smuggle marijuana by aircraft (32 R. 156-157).

Waldrop had made a down payment of $1,500,000 to

Abbey, and he and Hobson consequently expected to

receive a substantial part of the planeload of marijuana (38

R. 187; 40 R. 55). Waldrop and Hobson pressured Cobb to

produce the marijuana or return the $1,500,000 (38 R.

220-223). On February 13, 1979, McDonnell and two others

flew to Colombia in a Lockheed Constellation and obtained

25,795 pounds of marijuana (32 R. 140, 160-161). Trucks

furnished by Waldrop and Hobson were readied to meet the

airplane at a clandestine site to take possession of most of

the Constellation’s cargo (39 R. 10-12). On the return flight,

8

however, fog and engine problems prevented the Constella-

tion from landing at the clandestine site (32 R. 163-166).

McDonnell finally landed at an airport in Panama City in

the early morning hours of February 14 (32 R. 166). Fed-

eral agents arrested the crew members and seized the mari-

juana (32 R. 132-140, 167; 38 R. 187-188). Several hours

after the Constellation was supposed to have arrived at the

pre-arranged site, Hobson telephoned Cobb to ask what

had happened (39 R. 18).

At the same time that Cobb was planning the airplane

smuggling ventures, he met with Acosta, Bascaro, and Vil-

lanueva to discuss a second attempt to bring a boatload of

marijuana into Savannah (38 R. 186, 188). In March 1979 a

vessel with 40,000 pounds of marijuana reached Savannah,

but it was detected there by law enforcement officers (38

R. 188-191). After that loss, the principals decided once

again to use the Aucilla River fishing camp as their offload-

ing site (38 R. 191). In April 1979, two boatloads of mari-

juana were successfully offloaded there (38 R. 193). After

distribution to buyers, Abbey made his rounds and then

transferred between $15 and $18 million to Villanueva or

another individual acting in his stead (40 R. 56-57).

No further activity occurred until early 1981. Then, the

Miss Sunbury was sent from Key West to obtain a load of

marijuana (38 R. 194-195). Carrying 23,460 pounds of mari-

juana, the Miss Sunbury reached the Aucilla River fishing

camp without detection (32 R. 210-211; 38 R. 195); how-

ever, it was sent back to sea without having been emptied of

its cargo because Villanueva, after performing a quasi-

religious ritual, had determined that the time for offloading

W iS not satisfactory (38 R. 195). On February 26, 1981,

Customs officers boarded the Miss Sunbury and seized its

cargo of marijuana (32 R. 207, 211).

i aicaiiinaniaaleneeene ane

9

ARGUMENT

1. The sole argument common to all three petitions (and

the only issue raised by petitioner Villanueva) is he con-

tention that petitioners’ large scale marijuana trafficking

scheme does not constitute “racketeering activity” within

the meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(D). The court of

appeals’ conclusion to the contrary is correct and does not

conflict with any decision of this Court or of any other court

of appeals. Further review of the issue is therefore un-

warranted.

The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), makes it unlawful

for any person associated with an enterprise engaged in

interstate commerce to participate in the conduct of the

affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering

activity. “Racketeering activity” is defined under 18 U.S.C.

1961(1)(D) to include certain state felonies and enumerated

violations of federal criminal laws, including “the felonious

manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,

selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotics or other dangerous

drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.”

Petitioners contend that the absence of any explicit mention

of marijuana in this definition signifies an intent on the part

of Congress to exclude marijuana violations from the class

of offenses that may form the basis for a conviction under

RICO. Petitioners therefore claim that their RICO convic-

tions, which were premised solely upon involvement in

marijuana trafficking, must be reversed.

As petitioner Waldrop notes (84-1164 Pet. 28), the same

issue was raised in Gustafson v. United States, cert. denied,

No. 84-482 (Jan. 21, 1985). We are furnishing petitioners’

counsel with copies of our brief in opposition in Gustafson;

that brief fully responds to most of petitioners’ contentions.

As we noted in that brief (at 5), it appears that Congress

deliberately deleted a specific reference to “marijuana” that

had appeared in early drafts of the RICO legislation

10

because marijuana was encompassed within the phrase

“other dangerous drugs” that was added to the bill that

Congress enacted into law. Consequently, the earlier refer-

ences to marijuana became surplusage. Moreover, the

express legislative mandate that the RICO statute “shall be

liberaliy construed to effectuate its remedial purposes” con-

tradicts the narrow interpretation advanced by petitioners.

Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, 18 U.S.C. 1961

note; see 84-482 Br. in Opp. at 6-7. Certainly, the purposes

of the RICO statute are furthered by applying it to offenses

relating to the sort of massive marijuana trafficking enter-

prise involved in this case.

Petitioner Hobson makes one additional argument on

the marijuana issue. He contends (84-1148 Pet. 11) that the

enactment in 1980 of an amendment to 21 U.S.C. 841

increasing the penalties for large-scale marijuana traffick-

ing was deemed necessary by Congress because at that time

—ten years after the passage of RICO—Congress was con-

cerned that the penalties for trafficking in marijuana were

inadequate. Hobson argues that if Congress had believed

that dealing in marijuana was encompassed within the

RICO statute, which carries a maximum prison term of 20

years and a fine of up to $25,000 upon conviction (18 U.S.C.

1963(a)), it would not have been concerned about the fact

that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-

trol Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., limited the prison

term for a convicted marijuana violator to five years, no

matter how much marijuana was involved in the case. In

Hobson’s view, therefore, the 1980 amendment to 21 U.S.C.

841 was the result of Congress’s belief that the 20-year

RICO penalty did not apply to marijuana cases.

However, as Hobson readily admits (84-1148 Pet. 11),

Congress made no mention of RICO coverage when it

increased the penalties for trafficking in marijuana. The

legislative history shows that the increased penalties were

ll

passed as an amendment to the Infant Formula Act of 1980,

Pub. L. No. 96-359, 94 Stat. 1190 et seg., and that the sole

purpose of the amendment was to correct what Congress

believed to have been an oversight in the enactment of the

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of

) 1970, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seg. As Representative Carter stated,

“Mr. Speaker, in 1970, I was a member of the Commerce

, Committee when it passed the Controlled Substances Act.

Unfortunately, we did not make the penalties for mari-

huana as strict as they should have been.” 126 Cong. Rec.

11791 (1980).

Moreover, when the amendment was enacted in 1980, the

courts of appeals were in conflict as to whether RICO

applied to purely illegal enterprises such as the one in which

petitioners were involved. Until this Court resolved the

question in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981),

the practical use of the RICO statute to prosecute mari-

juana traffickers was uncertain for reasons quite apart from

the issue presented here. Finally, the 1980 amendment to

Section 841 substantially increased the fine for large-scale

marijuana offenses (from $15,000 to $125,000) to a level far

in excess of the fine that could be imposed under RICO, and

also provided for the cumulation of prison sentences in

excess of RICO’s maximum in the case of a series of mari-

juana violations. In these circumstances, Congress’s deci-

sic-n in 1980 to increase the penalties for trafficking in more

tun 1,000 pounds of marijuana cannot be taken as any

reflection upon the legislative intent ten years prior thereto

regarding the propriety of including marijuana as a “dan-

gerous drug” encompassed by RICO.

2. The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961(5), requires the

government to prove that the defendant committed at least

two “predicate acts” of racketeering activity. Petitioner

Hobson alleges (84-1148 Pet. 12-15) that because both of

the predicate offenses of which he was convicted arose out

ial

12

of the same criminal transaction, i.e., the Constellation

episode, he did not engage in a “pattern” of racketeering

activity as required by RICO. Hobson’s attempt to limit

RICO coverage to separate transactions finds no judicial

support; indeed, every court that has considered Hobson’s

argument has rejected it. E.g., United States v. Pepe, 747

F.2d 632, 661-663 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Phil-

lips, 664 F.2d 971, 1039 (Sth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457

U.S. 1136(1982); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d

595, 601-602 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Parness, 503

F.2d 430, 441-442 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105

(1975); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 199-200

(E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978) (Table).

These decisions are supported by the plain language of

the statute. RICO defines racketeering activity in terms of

felonious offenses, not transactions. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(D).

Hobson does not contend that he did not commit two

separate felonies, and nothing in the statutory language

requires that the two offenses constituting the RICO predi-

cates be premised upon two separate and distinct criminal

transactions. Moreover, nothing contained in Hobson's

excerpt (84-1148 Pet. 13) of S. Rep. 91-617, 91st Cong., Ist

Sess. 158 (1969), discussing the meaning of “pattern of

racketeering activity,” conflicts with the unanimous view of

the courts that two criminal offenses may comprise the

requisite pattern even though they are part of the same

ongoing criminal episode. Accordingly, further review of

this issue is not warranted.‘

‘Hobson also argues (84-1148 Pet. 14) that the Department of Justice

guidelines in effect at the time he was indicted proscribed the bringing of

a RICO indictment based upon a pattern of racketcering activity grow-

ing out of a single criminal episode or transaction. As Hobson acknowil-

edges, however, the guidelines do not confer any rights upon defend-

ants. The preface to the Department's RICO guidelines always has

provided that they are for internal guidance only and that they “are not

intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,

13

3. a. Petitioner Waldrop contends that his RICO con-

victions were improperly premised on a single predicate act.

In fact, three predicate acts supported Waldrop’s convic-

tion on the RICO counts—two offenses related to the Con-

stellation episode and one related to the Tallahassee ware-

house. Nevertheless, Waldrop argues (84-1164 Pet. 11-17)

that his RICO convictions cannot stand because the Con-

stellation episode was a separate endeavor of Cobb’s that

was wholly unrelated to the activities of the RICO enter-

prise. Waldrop contends that the district court failed to give

the jury proper instructions on the concept of a RICO

enterprise, thereby erroneously allowing the jury to con-

sider the Constellation episode as enterprise-related.

The court of appeals correctly rejected Waldrop’s attack

on the jury instructions (Pet. App. 43-44). Contrary to

Waldrop’s contention (84-1164 Pet. 16 (emphasis added)),

the instructions given by the district court did not permit the

jury to conclude that “amy criminal activity related to the

importation of marijuana by any of the persons charged in

the indictment” was sufficient “to link that defendant ines-

capably to a racketeering enterprise.” On the contrary, the

district court instructed the jury that the government had to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the [predicate]

offenses were connected with each other by some common

scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern, and not

merely a series of disconnected acts.” Pet. App. 43 (empha-

sis in Original).

In addition, as the court of appeals determined (Pet. App.

45), there was ample evidence to connect the Constellation

episode with the marijuana trafficking RICO enterprise

substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter

civil or ciminal.” U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys’

Manual § 9-110.200 (Mar. 1984). Furthermore, the guidelines do not

place any limitations on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the

Department of Justice. /bid.

Ee

14

even though some key members of the enterprise did not

actively participate in that venture. Among those enterprise

participants who did were Cobb, Hobson, Waldrop, co-

defendants Manuel James, Clifford Wentworth, and John

M. Araneo, and unindicted co-conspirators (and govern-

ment witnesses) Carlton Reeves and James Sellers. Indeed,

the only differences between the Constellation scheme and

the other ventures of the enterprise were the use of an

airplane instead of a vessel and the exclusion of Acosta,

Bascaro, Villanueva, and another co-defendant, Gustavo °

Fernandez, from the initial planning and proposed sharing

of profits. These distinctions did not make the Constella-

tion episode a wholly distinct activity. The time frame coin-

cided with the life of the enterprise, the goal was the same as

that of the enterprise, the statute violated was the same as

the one customarily violated by the enterprise, there was a

continuity in the pattern of roles, and the geographical area

was identical to that in which the enterprise otherwise oper-

ated. See United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th

Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983). The fact that

Cobb, rather than Acosta, Bascaro, or Villanueva, orches-

trated the venture and considered it separate from the

enterprise's affairs did not necessarily make it so (see 84-

1164 Pet. 14).

b. Waldrop also urges this Court to use his case as a

vehicle to resolve an alleged conflict between the Eighth

Circuit and other courts of appeals involving the manner in

which the “enterprise” element in a RICO prosecution need

be proved (84-1164 Pet. 18-26). The issue arose after United

States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), where this Court,

in holding that RICO applies to wholly illegitimate as well

as legitimate enterprises, stated (id. at 583) that the enter-

prise “is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of

activity in which it engages.” Relying on this language, the

Eighth Circuit has held that a RICO enterprise must possess

an ascertainable structure “distinct from that inherent in the

15

conduct of a pattern of racketeering.” United States v. |

Lemm, 680 F.2d at 1198. See also United States v. Bledsoe,

674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ander-

son, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450

U.S. 912 (1981).

Other courts of appeals have rejected the Eighth Circuit's

analysis of Turkette. E.g., United States v. Mazzei, 700

F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983);

United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 921 (11th Cir.),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983). While these decisions

recognize (as did the court below (Pet. App. 43)) that

Turkette requires the government to prove both the exist-

ence of an “enterprise” and a “pattern of racketeering activ-

ity,” they also recognize that Turkette does not require

separate and independent proof of the two elements. E.g.,

Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 89. Indeed, the Court expressly stated

in Turkette that the proof used to establish the enterprise

element “may in particular cases coalesce” with the proof

offered to establish the pattern of racketeering activity. 452

U.S. at 583. Were this not the case, Turkette’s holding that

an enterprise may include a group of individuals associated

for wholly illegitimate purposes would be effectively

negated. Thus, the enterprise element in a RICO prosecu-

tion may be proved, as it was in this case, by showing that an

ongoing associatior of individuals who shared a common

purpose acted together to commit a series of racketeering

acts.

In any event, Waldrop has not demonstrated that the

Eighth Circuit would have reversed his RICO convictions

in this case. In Lemm, that court affirmed the RICO convic-

tions of three defendants who participated in an insurance

fraud scheme involving 17 arson fires. The court found (680

F.2d at 1201) that the government had established the exist-

ence of a RICO enterprise with a distinct, ascertainable

structure because the proof showed not only that the

16

defendants had committed the predicate acts of mail fraud

but also that they had engaged in “legitimate purchases and

repairs of property.” Likewise here, the Eighth Circuit's

requirement was satisfied because, in addition to the predi-

cate acts of marijuana trafficking, the enterprise made legit-

imate purchases of farms and a fishing camp. Although the

properties were used only to store marijuana for very brief

periods, the enterprise did not immediately dispose of them

after their usefulness as storage facilities had ended. Like

Lemm, therefore, this case involved the use of the RICO

statute as a weapon against “organized criminal activity”

and not against a “sporadic and temporary criminal alliance

to commit one of the enumerated RICO crimes” (680 F.2d

at 1201). Because it is thus unlikely that the outcome of this

prosecution turned on the jurisdictio.. in which it was

brought, the case does not provide a proper vehicle for

resolving a conflict among the circuits.

4. Petitioners Hobson and Waldrop claim (84-1148 Pet.

15-20; 84-1164 Pet. 26-28) that the court of appeals erred in

upholding the validity of two amendments to a state wiretap

authorization. The amendments were necessitated by the

fact that Cobb, the target of the electronic surveillance,

changed his telephone numbers after the issuing court had

approved the initial wiretap application (Pet. App. 5, 11). In

each of the two applications for authorization to amend the

wiretap order to allow surveillance of the new telephone

numbers, the affiant attached a copy of the original order,

incorporated it by specific reference, and explained why it

needed to be amended (id. at 11).

‘The defendants in Lemrm purchased property to be burned. One of

the defendants also “act{ed] as a private contractor and repair{ed] the

fire damage in order to obtain a larger portion of the insurance pro-

ceeds.” 680 F.2d at 1197.

17

Hobson and Waldrop argue that the Florida courts

would not have approved the amendments because prior

state court decisions have held that, when amendments are

necessitated by a change of address during the authorized

period of wiretapping, .. application to amend must con-

tain a full explanation as to why normal investigative tech-

niques would be unworkable and may not simply incorpo-

rate a previous application by reference (84-1148 Pet. 18-20;

84-1164 Pet. 27). This claim was addressed in full by the

court of appeals (Pet. App. 13-14). The court agreed that

Florida law was controlling, but it rejected Hobson's and

Waldrop’s contention that the state courts would have dis-

approved the applications for amendments involved in this

case. The court of appeals explained that the distinction

between this case and the state intermediate appellate court

decisions cited by Hobson and Waldrop lay in the fact that

here only the telephone number, and not the residence, was

changed and that such a change “could not conceivably

have affected the efficacy of alternative investigative tech-

niques.” /d. at 14.

Petitioners’ argument that the court of appeals misinter-

preted Florida law by drawing a distinction between this

case and the Florida decisions upon which they rely pres-

ents no substantial federal question.’ In any event, it is

*Hobson and Waldrop allege that the court of appeals should have

certified the question to the Florida courts rather than answer it.

Although certification was a possible course, it was not mandatory.

Where, as here, the request to certify was not made until petitions for

rehearing were filed, no issue of constitutional dimension was involved,

the lawsuit already had been protracted, and the court of appeals

obviously believed that it could resolve the issue with available research

materials already at hand, its determination should not be disturbed

simply because the certification procedure existed but was not used.

Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 392-395 (1974) (Rehnquist,

J., concurring); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-536 (1965),

Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 328-329

(1964). If the rule were otherwise, federal courts could never resolve

questions of state law without resort to available certification

procedures.

ieee

18

adequately answered in the opinion of the court of appeals.’

Moreover, nothing in the opinion below conflicts with

United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1984) (en

banc). Initially, we note that the court in Smith never dis-

cussed technical amendments such as those involved in this

case; rather, the opinion dealt with the state law procedures

for obtaining initial wiretap authorizations, renewals of

those authorizations, and substantive amendments permit-

ting the interception of calls involving persons other than

those named in the initial authorizations. In any event, the

legal analysis employed by the court below is fully consist-

ent with Smith. As here, the First Circuit in Smith looked to

state law in upholding the validity of state wiretaps. The

court concluded that the procedures employed by Massa-

chusetts for authorizing applications and amendments vio-

lated neither federal law aor the state wiretap statute as

7In a variation on the argument that the applications for the amend-

ments did not comply with Florida law, Hobson also alleges (84-1148

Pet. 15-16) that the affiant, a state law enforcement officer, was not

authorized to seek the amendments because the Florida wiretap statute

allows only the Governor, the Attorney General, or a State Atiorney to

apply for a wiretap order. Hobson does not cite any authority for the

proposition that simple amendments such as the ones involved here are

encompassed within this statutory authorization requirement. More-

over, neither the federal nor the Florida statute contemplates that the

high officials authorized to make applications for wiretaps must pre-

pare each one personally and present it to the issuing judge. Alexander

v. Harris, 595 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1979); United State: v. Harvey, 560

F. Supp. 1040, 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Because none o/ the defendants

raised this issue at trial, thereby in any event forfeiting their right to

have it considered now (Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)), the record does not

indicate whether the affiant had the permission of the State Attorney to

seek the amendments.

*In an appendix to its opinion, the court in Smith listed all the

applications, renewais, and amendments involved in the case (726 F.2d

at 868). The appendix shows five initial applications, five renewals, and

14 sanendments. Nearly all of the amendments were for the purpose of

naming additional conversants. Only one amendment related to a

change in telephone number, and the court’s opinion nowhere discusses

what procedures, if any, were required to obtain that amendment.

19

interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-

setts.? Waldrop’s allegation of aconflict between Smith and

this case rests upon the erroneous premise that the court

below confined its analysis to a “cursory treatment of Flor-

ida law” and “disregard[ed]” the fact that Florida law gov-

erned the validity of the applications (84-1164 Pet. 28). The

opinion below demonstrates that the court did no such

thing.

5. Petitioner Hobson argued in the court below (Pet.

App. 35-39) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction on any of the six counts on which he was con-

victed. In this Court, he contends (84-1148 Pet. 21-27) that

factual misrepresentations in the government’s brief de-

prived him of due process of law because the court of

appeals, in rejecting his sufficiency argument, “apparently

chose to rely on the government’s assertions” in its brief

(id. at 24-25). This claim lacks merit.

At the outset, we acknowledge that the government's

154-page brief in the court of appeals contained one clear

factual error. See page 22, infra. Moreover, we agree with

Hobson that, upon discovery of this inadvertent mistake,

the better course would have been for the government to

advise the court of appeals of the error by letter or other

supplemental pleading.'® As for the other “misrepresenta-

tions” that Hobson attributes to the government (see pages

The fact that the First Circuit in Smith looked to an opinion of the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for guidance in interpreting

the state wiretap statute does not demonstrate the existence of a con-

flict. The Massachusetts state court opinion was directly on point,

whereas there are no controlling decisions of the Florida Supreme

Court. As we have already shown, however, the absence of dei-itive

state court precedent in Florida did not preclude the court of appeals

from resolving the state law issue itself (see note 6, supra).

While we agree with Hobson that the government should have

corrected the error in its brief, we take issue with his assertion (84-1148

Pet. 25) that the error was other than inadvertent. The record in this

20

22-23, infra), our review of the record convinces us that the

most that can be said is that the government’s brief may

have summarized the evidence against Hobson with less

than complete precision. In fact, however, it appears to us

that the “errors” alleged by Hobson—with the one excep-

tion noted—actually amount to nothing more than aggres-

sive advocacy that Hobson has chosen, with equal or

greater aggressiveness, to characterize as “horrendous mis-

statement[s]” (84-1148 Pet. 22). In any event, it is clear, as

we demonstrate below, that Hobson could not have suf-

fered any prejudice regardless of how one characterizes the

government’s brief and that the record evidence amply sup-

ports his convictions.

Contrary to the entire premise of Hobson’s argument, the

court of appeals’ opinion shows that it did not simply adopt

the factual assertions in the government’s brief. In uncom-

mon fashion, the opinion below contains its own record

citations for the facts relied upon by the court in rejecting

Hobson’s sufficiency claim (Pet. App. 35-36). The inclusion

of these references demonstrates that the court did not

ignore the contentions made in Hobson’s reply brief and at

oral argument that there were misstatements in the govern-

ment’s brief. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding

that the court below abdicated its duty to make an inde-

pendent examination of the record in light of the conten-

tions advanced by the parties.

More importantly, the facts recited by the court of

appeals (Pet. App. 35-36) are supported by the record. The

record shows that petitioners Hobson and Waldrop were

partners (36 R. 141-143; 40 R. 55); that Waldrop was one of

multi-defendant case is massive, and the facts pertaining to each indi-

vidual defendant are scattered throughout that record. In these circum-

stances, inadvertent errors, while regrettable, are certainly under-

standable.

21

the “best buyers” that the marijuana enterprise had (40 R.

55); and that Hobson and Waldrop dealt with the enter-

prise’s accountant in connection with marijuana transac-

tions on 25 or 30 occasions (40 R. 61-62). The record also

shows that Waldrop, acting with Hobson and another indi-

vidual, made a $1,500,000 advance payment for a shipment

of marijuana by airplane; that Hobson subsequently told

co-conspirator Bill Cobb that Cobb should either return the

money or deliver the marijuana (38 R. 186-187, 220-223; 40

R. 54-55; GX 126); and that trucks furnished by Waldrop

and Hobson came to the clandestine landing site in Florida

where the Constellation was scheduled to arrive (39 R.

10-12). The record also shows the presence of both Hobson

and Waldrop at various of the organization’s stash houses.

Specifically, both acquired marijuana at the Cottondale

farm (38 R. 154); Waldrop stacked some of the marijuana at

the Tallahassee warehouse (40 R. 53); and Hobson came to

the farm in Madison County in an 18-wheel truck in order

to acquire 25,000 pounds of marijuana (36 R. 142; 40 R. 55).

These facts from tue record fully support the court of

appeals’ conclusion that, “[{iJn light of the massive quanti-

ties of marijuana involved, the frequency with which Wal-

drop and Hobson had occasion to deal with the other

members of the enterprise, the fact that Hobson, Waldrop

and Cobb were described as the principal organizers of the

Constellation episode * * *, and the presence of both Hob-

son and Waldrop at various of the organization’s stash

houses on numerous occasions” (Pet. App. 39), the jury was

warranted in finding that Hobson knew the marijuana was

imported. See United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 652-

653 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Turner v. United States, 396

U.S. 398, 416 n.29 (1970). These facts also support the court

of appeals’ conclusion that Hobson and Waldrop were

more than “mere purchasers” and that the evidence was

more than sufficient to show that they joined a conspiracy

with the other co-defendants (Pet. App. 38).

22

Nor is it plausible to contend that the court of appeals’

rejection of Hobson’s sufficiency claim could have been

premised upon government-induced inaccuracies. The state-

ment of facts in the government’s brief consisted of 31 pages

with appropriate record references, and Hobson does not

claim that there were any errors in that lengthy statement.

Rather, his claim is directed to statements on pages 137 and

139 of the government’s brief, made in response to Hob-

son’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his convictions on Counts 3 and 4.

On page 139 of the government’s brief, the government

erroneously stated that Count 4 related to the Tanila boat-

load. We acknowledge that Count 4 charged Hobson with

importing marijuana aboard the Constellation aircraft

rather than the 7anila. But the court of appeals recognized

this obvious mistake and placed no reliance on it; the court’s

opinion correctly states that “Hobson and Waldrop’s con-

victions arose out of their involvement in two smuggling

ventures: the “Tallahassee warehouse’ and ‘Constellation’

episodes” (Pet. App. 35). What Hobson characterizes as a

“false statement, pure and simple” (84-1148 Pet. 24) thus

played no role whatsoever in the affirmance of his convic-

tion on Count 4.

Hobson also challenges (84-1148 Pet. 22) the govern-

ment’s characterization of the evidence to support his con-

_viction on Count 3 (conspiracy to import marijuana) by

attacking certain statements made on page 137 of the

government’s brief. There, referring to the various mari-

juana storage sites used by the enterprise, the government

stated that “middlemen such as Hobson and Waldrop stood

by awaiting the completion of the counting and weighing,

after which they immediately removed sizable portions of

the massive loads” (ibid.). The brief continued by stating,

with reference to Hobson and Waldrop, that “[t]hey were

not mere customers. Their constant readiness to take charge

of large quantities of marijuana at whichever storage site

23

they had been directed to demonstrates that they played a

substantial role in the importation activities” (id. at 137-138

(footnote omitted)).!!

Hobson apparently objects to the representations that he

and Waldrop were “standing by” and that they were “con-

stantly ready” to purchase large quantities of marijuana

(84-1148 Pet. 22). Hobson’s objections on this score amount

to little more than semantic quibbles. A more precise argu-

ment demonstrating that Hobson and Waldrop were not

just mere customers and that they were ready to buy large

quantities of marijuana would have noted that both of them

visited the organization’s stash houses, that Waldrop had

stacked marijuana at the Tallahassee warehouse where

''The full paragraphs from which petitioner quotes read as follows

(Appellee Br. 137-138 (citations and footnote omitted)):

In this case the government proved that conspirators other than

Waldrop and Hobson brought marijuana from outside the United

States to various locations in Florida and Georgia. The importa-

tion venture did not end at the shore, since the marijuana was

immediately destined for an internal location. The internal desti-

nation points were storage sites such as different farms or a

warehouse in Tallahassee. Theze, middlemen such as Hobson and

Waldrop stood by awaiting the completion of the counting and

weighing, after which they immediately removed sizable portions

of the massive loads.

From the evidence of presence at the storage sites at a delivery

time the jury could fairly conclude that Waldrop and Hobson

were trusted members of the enterprise and the’ they knew of the

delivery plans in advance. From the frequency of their involve-

ment the jury also could infer that Waldrop and Hobson knew of

the scope of the delivery activity. They were not mere customers.

Their constant readiness to take charge of large quantities of

marijuana at whichever storage site they had been directed to

demonstrates that they played a substantial role in the importa-

tion activities by providing assurances that the importation would

be successful and by minimizing the risk of loss to the importers, a

risk that increased with each moment that the marijuana

remained in storage. In fact, on one occasion they paid $1,500,000

in advance for a part of the Constellation load.

24

40,000 pounds had been set aside for him, and that Hobson

had picked up 25,000 pounds in a huge truck. See pages 4-6,

supra. That they were not mere customers is further demon-

strated by their advance payment of $1,500,000 for mari-

juana, an action that clearly facilitated the importation of

marijuana in the Constellation aircraft.'

In short, there is no reason to remand the sufficiency

question “for reconsideration in light of an accurate state-

ment of facts” (84-1148 Pet. 27).

6. Petitioner Hobson claims (84-1148 Pet. 27-29) that

government misrepresentations caused the district court to

disqualify his original counsel, thereby depriving him of

representation by counsel of his choice. Because Hobson

failed to raise this issue in the court of appeals, it should not

be considered by this Court. See, e.g., United States v.

Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977). In any event, nothing

in the record supports a claim of prosecutorial misrepresen-

tation that caused the trial judge to be “misled” (84-1148

Pet. 28) when he issued a pretrial order disqualifying Hob-

son’s first counsel based on the fact that the testimony of

two governme.t witnesses might have implicated that law-

yer in the mar‘juana trafficking scheme. The decision to

disqualify the lawyer was premised upon sworn affidavits of

the two witnesses. Hobson unsuccessfully challenged the

disqualification order prior to trial. United States v. Hob-

son, 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906

(1982). The court of appeals’ opinion in that case sets forth

the facts contained in the witnesses’ affidavits (672 F.2d at

826); those facts leave no room to doubt the correctness of

the district court’s ruling. The lawyer’s alleged involvement

in the drug trafficking scheme was substantial, and his

'2Hobson’s claim (84-1148 Pet. 23) that he had no knowledge of

“specific delivery plans” is refuted by the trucks he and Waldrop

brought to the planned landing site of the Constellation (39 R. 10-12).

25

representation of Hobson was frought with the potential for

a serious conflict of interest. The fact that the witnesses

ultimately presented their testimony without referring to

the misconduct of the disqualified lawyer did not belie the

allegations contained in their affidavits. Moreover, filing

the motion to disqualify Hobson’s original counsel was the

only prudent action available to the government prior to

trial since it could not know for certain whether the testi-

mony would prove necessary or, even if not necessary,

might come out at trial inadvertently. The fact that neither

event occurred has no bearing on the propriety of the

government's motion when filed or the district court’s rul-

ing when made.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respecfully submitted.

Rex E. L&E

Solicitor General

STEPHEN S. TROTT

Assistant Attorney General

KATHRYN A. OBERLY

Assistant to the Solicitor General

SIDNEY M. GLAZER

Attorney

May 1985

DOJ-i9as-05