Opposition Brief — Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.

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Office - Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

OCT 26 1984

Case No. 84-503

*XANDER L. STEVAS

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

BETTY ADAMS, et al,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENT

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION

Rosert C. MAYNARD

Counsel of Record

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY

1800 Huntington Building

Cleveland, Ohio 44115

(216) 687-8500

MARLENE F. GIBBONS

SQUIRL, SANDERS & DEMPSEY

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

Counsel for Respondent

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

BEST AVAILABLE COPY Siam

COUNTER-L ¢ATEMENT OF THE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Shovid this Court review a grant of summary judg-

mer. py a federal court in a diversity action dismissing a

state law claim against a chemical manufacturer for an

alleged failure to warn, when both the federal district

court and the federal circuit court of appeals, applying

the correct standard for summary judgment under Rule

56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, determined

that there was no genuine issue of material fact with

regard to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s

conduct and concluded that the manufacturer was not

negligent as a matter of law.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION Paibin 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS ... ... 54.42.55. il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................... ill

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THECASE ............. 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .............. 3

A. The Legal Standard Applicable to Union Car-

bide’s Duty To Warn A Third Party of Potential

Dangers of Its Products Is Determined By State

Law and Involves No Federal Question. ....... 3

B. The Decisions Below Are In Accordance With

the Law of This Court and Other Circuits With

Regard to the Standard For Summary Judg-

ment Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure .......15,.15.. 9 6

CONCLUSION ... 6.00 «hae . dil

lil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144(1970) ... 0 7

Aetna Insurance Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co., 234

EPG, BOND diay ek ee as ee ees 7

Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King

Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1962) ........... 7

Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337

IRE eS area a Mr at ay aay 7,8

Coleman v. Western Electric Co. Inc., 671 F.2d

a rosy gis a bya bao be 4

Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th

at Fa a ces Fe ace es 7

Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540. F.2d

I, BOWED, ons 5 wc os Seek as tke wa 8

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 4

Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 250 F.2d

i) ae Gack vk ek DR 8 6

Millhouse v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 9 Ohio

App. 3d 2038, 459 N.E.2d 623 (1983) ..........5, 11

Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Ine.

RT) 8

Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591

P.2d 478, appeal dismissed, 93 Wash.2d 5, 604

a Ie a a 6

Sams v. Englewood Ready-Mix Corp., 22 Ohio

App.2d 168, 259 N.E.2d 507 (1969)........... 4

United States v. Diebold, Inc. 369 U.S. 654 (1962)....00 7

West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

aera rarer 4

Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37 Ohio

St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974) ............ ll

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Younger v. Dow Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451

ee sg ws 6a awk ae ee ee es 6

RULES:

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 . .3, 6, 8, 10, 11

Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 ........... ll

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Restatement (Second) of Torts, $388( 1965) ...... 4,5,8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Qnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

BETTY ADAMS, et al.,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENT

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, Union Carbide Corporation (“Union

Carbide”)' is the manufacturer of a liquid chemical

known as toluene diisocyanate (“TDI”), which is used in

the manufacture of urethane foams. Union Carbide sells

TDI to the Genera! Motors Corporation (“GMC”) for use

at its Elyria, Ohio, Fisher Body Plant. GMC uses TDI in

making automobile polyurethane seat cushions. Petitioner,

Betty Adams, was employed at GMC’s Elyria plant

‘In accordance with Rule 28.1 of the Supreme Court Rules,

Respondent states that the United States subsidiaries, excluding

wholly owned subsidiaries, and affiliates of Union Carbide are:

ACM Services, Inc., Arizona Welding Equipment Co., Miami

Welding Supply, Inc., United States Welding, Inc., V. B. Ander-

son Co. and VBA Cryogenics Corp. (Foreign subsidiaries (except

wholly-owned) and affiliates ar listed at the end of this Brief.)

2

during the period 1967 through 1978, when she retired

due to disability. Petitioner claims that she was perma-

nently disabled from work due to TDI hypersensitivity

asthma caused by overexposure to TDI vapors at GMC’s

Elyria plant. TDI vapor is a respiratory irritant.

In 1980, Petitioner brought an action against Union

Carbide in the Federal District Court for the Northern

District of Ohio based upon a state law claim of negligence.”

Jurisdiction was founded on diversity of citizenship.

Petitioner alleged that Union Carbide had a duty to warn

her directly o: the potential dangers of overexposure to

TDI, even though Union Carbide had warned GMC re-

garding the potential dangers of TDI and had provided

comprehensive information to GMC regarding the safety

of GMC personnel in the storage, handling and use of TDI.

Union Carbide’s defense to Petitioner’s claim was: (1)

Union Carbide’s duty to warn of the potential hazards of

TDI under state law extended only to GMC and not to

the employees of GMC, and (2) the information provided

by Union Carbide to GMC was adequate to warn GMC

concerning the potential dangers of TDI.

Summary judgment was granted to Union Carbide on

the basis of its defenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment. Both courts

below held that as a matter of Ohio law, Union Carbide

had satisfied its duty to warn of the potential dangers

of TDI by informing GMC of the potential dangers of

TDI and the methods tor its safe handling and use.

GMC had exclusive control over both TDI and the GMC

2 The action was brought by Betty Adams and her spouse,

Joseph Adams. The claim by Joseph Adams was based on a loss

of consortium caused by the alleged negligence of Union Carbide.

employees who came into contact with TDI. The courts

below further held that the information supplied to

GMC by Union Carbide about TDI was sufficient as a

matter of law to warn GMC of the potential dangers of

TDI.

We submit that this is not a case for this Court to

grant certiorari. The only issue raised by the Petitioner

is the appropriateness of summary judgment under the

circumstances of this case based upon the negligence law

of the State of Ohio. The applicable law relating to the

duty of Union Carbide to warn of the potential dangers

of TDI is entirely a matter of state law. Although the

legal standard for summary judgment under Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involves federal law

the appropriate legal standard for summary judgment is

not at issue. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit

recognized and applied the legal standard for summary

judgment as enunciated by this Court. Accordingly,

there is no conflict between the decisions of the courts

delow and this Court. Petitioner claims only that sum-

mary judgment was not appropriate under the facts of

this case. Two federal courts already have held that

summary judgment was appropriate after a thorough

review of the record.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

A. The Legal Standard Applicable To Union Carbide’s

Duty To Warn A Third Party of Potential Dan-

gers of Its Product Is Determined By State Law

and Involves No Federal Question.

The jurisdiction of the federal courts below was

founded solely on diversity of citizenship. (Petition at

1-2) In a diversity action, it has long been established by

this Court that a federal court is to apply state law to a

negligence claim such as here, involving the duty of a

manufacturer to warn third parties of the potential

dangers of its product.’

Although the highest court in Ohio has not addressed

the specific issue involved in this case, a decision by a

state intermediate appellate court, which the district

court relied on, indicates that Ohio courts would have

applied the standard set forth in Section 388 of che

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) to determine Un-

ion Carbide’s liability.1 See Sams v. Engiewood Ready-

Mix Corp., 22 Ohio App.2d 168, 259 N.E.2d 507 (1969).

Petitioner does not dispute that § 388 of the Restatement

is applicable.’ Under that standard, specifically comment

‘See Eric Railroad Co. vv. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);

see also Coleman vo Western Eleetrie Co. Ine.. 671 F.2d 980

(6th Cir. 1982)

‘If the highest court in the State has not ruled on the issue,

the federal court is bound to apply the law announced by a state

intermediate appellate court unless it is convinced that the

highest state court would decide differently. See West v. Amer?-

can Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S, 223 (1940).

> The text of § 388 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, states:

§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use

One who —— directly or through a third person a

chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those

whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the

consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use,

for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the

manner for which and by a person for whose use it is

supplied, if the supplier

a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is

id to be dangerous for the use fer which it is supplied,

an

(Footnote Continued on next page)

n to §388, a manufacturer is not required to warn

directly an ultimate end user of the dangers of its

product when the manufacturer has provided its vendee

all the information necessary to the safe use of its

product, provided that this method of disclosure gives a

reasonable assurance that the information will reach

those whose safety depends upon their having it.

The district court held that when Union Carbide

warned GMC, an industrial user, of the potential dangers

of TDI it was reasonable for Union Carbide under § 388

to rely on GMC to inform GMC’s employees of the poten-

tial dangers and to implement the appropriate safety

measures. An Ohio appellate case decided subsequent to

the district court’s opinion, which the Sixth Circuit duly

noted in its opinion, reaffirms the correctness of the

district court’s holding. The Ohio case, Millhouse v.

General Tire and Rubber Co., 9 Ohio App.3d 203, 459 N.E

2d 623 (1983), involved the same product, TDI, which is

involved here. The defendants in Millhouse were General

Tire and Rubber Co. and an independent contractor,

Mobile Wash, whom General Tire had hired to clean a

tank car which had contained TDI. The plaintiff was the

administratrix of the estate of a former employee of

Mobile Wash who had died from overexposure to TDI

while he was cleaning the tank car. The Chio trial court

granted summary judgment to General Tire, which was

affirmed on appeal, because General Tire had satisfied

(Footnote 5 Continued)

b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the

chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and

c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its

dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be

dangerous.

its duty to warn of the potential danger of TDI when

it warned Mobile Wash.*

Even if the propriety of the negligence law of Ohio as

it relates to the du.y of a manufacturer to warn third

parties regarding the potential danger of its product was

at issue, it is not an appropriate subject for this Court’s

review on certiorari. It involves no issue of federal law.

B. The Decisions Below are In Accordance With

The Law of This Court and Other Circuits With

Regard to the Standard For Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

There is no inconsistency in the standard for summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

which was applied by the district court and the Sixth

Circuit and the standard enunciated by this Court. The

Sixth Circuit stated in its opinion:

The standard to be applied in determining motions

for summary judgment was enunciated by this

Circuit over 20 years ago and is still in accord with

the overwhelming weight of authority:

“In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the

court must construe the evidence in its most favora-

ble light in favor of the party opposing the motion ana

against the movant. Further, the papers supporting

the movant are closely scrutinized whereas the

opponent’s are indulgently treated.”

‘ Other jurisdictions have held to the same effect. See, e.g.,

Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478, appeal

dismissed, 93 Wash.2d 5, 604 P.2d 164 (1979); Younger v. Dow

Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451 P.2d 177 (1969); see also,

Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.

1957) (applying the law of Oklahoma).

The Sixth Circuit adopted the holdings of its earlier

decision in Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King

Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1962) and this Court’s

decision in United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654

(1962). The district court recognized that Union Carbide

had the burden of showing the absence of any genuine

issue of fact and that all reasonable inferences which

might be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the

manner most favorable to the non-moving party, in

accord with this Court’s decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).

As in any negligence case, the reasonableness of

defendant Union Carbide’s conduct was an issue. Under

Ohio state law Union Carbide had no duty to warn Peti-

tioner directly of the potential dangers of TDI if (1) the

information provided to GMC by Union Carbide was suf-

ficient to warn GMC of the potential dangers of TDI and

(2) Union Carbide was reasonable in relying on GMC to

warn GMC employees regarding the potential dangers of

TDI. The district court recognized that generally a de-

termination whether a warning was adequate under the

particular facts of a case is a jury question. The district

court, however, also correctly recognized that when the

legal standard for summary judgment is met, summary

judgment must be granted even in a negligence case.

This view is consistent with the decisions of this Court

and the law of the other Circuits.’ Petitioner has cited

7 Contrary to Fetitioner’s suggestion, the Sixth Circuit’s deci-

sion in this case is consistent with its earlier decision in Aetna

Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co., 234 F.24 342 (6th Cir. 1956) and

the view of the other Circuits in Bryant v. Technical Research

Co., 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) and Croley v. Matson Naviga-

tion Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970). In fact, the Sixth Circuit in

(Footnote Continued on next page)

no case where summary judgment was prohibited per se,

regardless of the circumstances of the case, solely be-

cause the claim was predicated on a certain legal theory,

which is the position Petitioner is advocating before this

Court. Summary judgment under Rule 56 is a procedural

mechanism applicable to any and all actions, provided

the requisites of the rule have been met."

(Footnote 7 Continued)

this case cited as support for its decision, Aetna, Bryant and

Croley. These cases stand only for the proposition that summary

judgment is appropriate less frequently in negligence cases than

with regard to other types of claims. For example, in Bryant, the

Ninth Circuit determined that under the facts of that case

summary judgment was not appropriate because the non-moving

party had introduced sworn statements which created a dispute

whether the manufacturer had provided an adequate warning to

its vendee regarding the dangerous propensities of its product.

The Ninth Circuit expressly stated, however, that “we do not

foreclose the possibility that under some circumstances the

adequacy of warnings may be decided by summary judgment.

... Id. at 1346. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit

recognized that principle as a correct statement of the law.

*The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules state in

reference to Rule 56: “This rule is applicable to all actions, ....”

Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (8rd Cir.

1976), cited by Petitioner, does not stand for a contrary proposi-

tion in the context of determinations under § 388 of the

Restatement. The Third Circuit in Dougherty held only that a

directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer was not proper in

that case because it was apparent from review of all the evidence

that a jury cou'd reasonably find that the manufacturer’s warn-

ing to its vendee was not adequate.

Moreover, while this Court in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting

Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) held “that summary

procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litiga-

(Footnote Continued on next page)

After an exhaustive review of the record, both the

district court and the Sixth Circuit concluded that

Petitioner had introduced no evidence to support her

assertion under Ohio law of negligent breach of duty to

warn on the part of Union Carbide.

The undisputed facts show that GMC had exclusive

control over both the TDI chemical and the GMC employ-

ees who came into contact with it. GMC employees did

not manipulate open containers of TDI or transfer TDI

from one container to another. Union Carbide delivered

TDI to GMC in bulk shipments by tank trucks or rail

ear lots. Upon delivery, the TDI was pumped from the

common carrier into a GMC storage tank. From the

storage tank TDI was pumped by GMC into a closed

vessel system to mixers where TDI was automatically

combined by GMC with other chemicals to cause a chemi-

cal reaction known as “polymerization.” This process

completely altered the chemical properties of TDI by

reacting TD] with several other chemicals to form poly-

urethane foam. The chemical mixture was then injected

into molds the shape of cushions. The record below shows

that petitioner’s only alleged exposure to TDI vapors

was when the cushions were removed from the molds.

TDI vapor was known to be a respiratory irritant.”

(Footnote 8 Continued)

tion where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is

largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile

witnesses thicken the plot” it did not state that summary

judgment is never appropriate in antitrust cases.

“Standards for the maximum level of exposure to TDI vapor

(.02 parts per million (ppm) of ambient air) were established by

the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

These standards were applicable to GMC’s Fisher Body Division

throughout the entire period of Petitioner’s employment there.

10

Before shipping production quantities of TDI to GMC in

1969, Union Carbide supplied GMC comprehensive infor-

mation regarding the potential dangers of TDI and the

methods for its safe handling and use. The documentary

information was thorough, explicit and based upon the

information Union Carbide had at the time. Representa-

tives of Union Carbide, including the Associate Corporate

Medical Director, met with certain GMC personnel,

including the Medical Director and Industrial Hygenist

from GMC’s Fisher Body Division, to discuss how GMC

employees could be protected by GMC from the potential

dangers ot TDI. Union Carbide recommended in its

literature preplacement physician examinations for those

persons who could be exposed to TDI vapors at GMC and

periodic health examinations thereafter. The document-

ary information supplied to GMC identified the specific

respiratory problems allegedly suffered by Petitioner as

one of the potential dangers of repeated exposure to TDI

vapors by some individuals.

Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit concluded

that there was no evidence before the trial court to even

suggest that the warnings to GMC were not adequate or

that Union Carbide would have a reason not to rely on

GMC to inform GMC employees of the potential dangers

of overexposure to TDI. The Sixth Circuit correctly re-

jected the bootstrap-type analysis which Petitioner is

advancing before this Court that the alleged negligence

of GMC in failing to adequately warn Petitioner, GMC’s

employee, of the potential danger of TDI constituted

factual evidence of negligence by Union Carbide. As

stated by the Sixth Court, the alleged negligence of GMC

“cannot vicariously be imposed upon Union Carbide.”

The proper legal standard tor summary judgment

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 was applied by the district court

11

and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. There is no conflict

between the decisions of the courts below and those of

this Court or any other Circuit. The appropriateness of

summary judgment under the facts of this case is

underscored by the Ohio court decision in Millhouse v.

General Tire and Rubber Co., supra.”

CONCLUSION

The only question Petitioner raises in her Petition

turns on the particular facts of this case and, accordingly,

is of interest only to the parties to it. Petitioner asks this

Court to make a third review of the undisputed facts

of the rather lengthy record in this case to determine

whether there are any material facts in genuine dispute.

This task is without any legal significance outside the

limits of this case. Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. MAYNARD

Counsel of Record

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY

1800 Huntington Building

Cleveland, Ohio 44115

(216) 687-8500

MARLENE F. GIBBONS

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Was. ington, D.C. 20004

Counsel for Respondent

” Rule 56 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure for summary

judgment is based upon Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37

Ohio St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924, 925 (1974).

(Continuation of footnote 1)

The following are Union Carbide's

foreign subsidiaries (except wholly-

owned subsidiaries) and affiliates: Union

Carbide Egypt S.A.E.; Union Carbide Ghana

Limited; Union Carbide Kenya Limited;

Union Carbide Nigeria Limited; Union

Carbide Sudan Limited; Union Carbide

Canada Limited; Chemos Industries Pty.

Limited (Australia); Union Carbide

Australia Limited; Union Carbide India

Limited; P.T. Agrocarb Indonesia; Nippon

Unicar Company Limited (Japan); Union

Showa K.K. (Japan); Sony Eveready, Inc.

(Japan); Union Gas Company Limited (Korea) ;

Union Carbide Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.; Union

Polymers Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia); Union

Carbide New Zealand Limited; Union Carbide

Ceylon Limited (Republic of Sri Lanka) ;

Indugas N.V. (Belgium); Calida Gas N.V.

(Belgium); La Littorale S.A. (France);

Argon, S.A. (Spain); Unifas Kemi A.B.

(Sweden); Electro Manganes Ltda (Brazil);

S.A. White Martins (Brazil); S.A. White

Martins Nordeste (Brazil); Union Carbide

Mexicana, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico) ;

Electrode Maatskappy Van Suid Afrika

(Eiendoms) Beperk (Republic of South

Africa); Tubatse Ferrochrome (Proprietary)

Limited (Republic of South Africa).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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