Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.

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84-508

Office - Supreme Court. U.!

FILED

SEP 27 1924

ALEXANDER L. STEVA$

CLERK

CASE NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

October Term, 1984

BETTY ADAMS, et al.,

Plaintifrf-Petitioner,

a

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

Defendant-Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Milton Dunn, Esq.

23300 Chagrin Boulevard

Suite 106

Beachwood, Ohio 44122

(216) 464-8310

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

ISSUES PRESENTED

Pursuant to Federal R.Civ.P. 56, may

the "reasonableness" of a manufacturer's

course of conduct under Restatement (2nd)

of Torts, Sec. 388 be decided as a matter

of law?

7

PARTIES

Plaintiff-Petitioners:

Betty Adams

Joseph Adams

Defendant-Respondent

Union Carbide Corporation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities

Decisions of the Courts Below

Statement of Jurisdiction

Relevant Provisions

Statement of the Case

Argument

Service

Appendix

20

21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

page

Aetna Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co.,

234 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1956) 6

American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. London &

London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 354

F.ed 214 (4th Cir. 7

Bryant v. Technical Research Co.,

; t r. ) 12

Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434

F.od 73 (5th Cir. 1970) 8

Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp.,

STO Fa 174 (3rd Cir. 1976) 17

Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334

U.S. 249 (1948) 18

Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting

System, 366 U.S. 464 (1962) 6

Restatement (2nd) of Torts,

Section 388 13

Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119

Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (1978) 17

Baas

DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW

Memorandum and Opinion of the United

States District Court (N.D. Ohio),

May 10, 1983, Granting Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment.

Opinion and Mandate of the United States

Court of Appeals (6th Circuit), July

2, 1984, Affirming the Judgment of

the District Court.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioner seeks review of the judg-

ment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, entered

July 2, 1984. No petition for rehearing

of that decision was filed. Review is

sought in this Court pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(1).

RELEVANT PROVISIONS

The decision of the court below

involves an interpretation of Federal

R.Civ.P. 56. The pertinent text of the

Rule is set forth in the Appendix.

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of a complaint

filed by Plaintiff-Petitioner Betty Adams

(hereafter "Adams") on June 20, 1980, in

the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio. The complaint

alleged that Adams had incurred severe

respiratory problems as a result of her

exposure to toluene diisocyanate ("TDI"),

a product manufactured by Defendant-

Respondent Union Carbide Corporation

("Union Carbide"). Adams had been ex-

posed to TDI in the course of her employ-

ment with General Motors Corporation

("GM"). The complaint alleged negligence

on the part of Union Carbide in failing

to warn either Adams of the adverse ef-

fects of exposure to TDI. Jurisdiction

of the Federal Court was predicated upon

diversity of citizenship.

TDI is a liquid chemical which has

been widely used by the automobile indus-

try in the manufacture of seat cushions

and other car parts; it has been used

since 1969 by GM in the plant where Adams

worked. The TDI is pumped from delivery

trucks into storage tanks at the GM

plant; from there, it is mixed with other

chemicals to produce a polyurethane foam,

which is injected into seat cushion

molds. After the cushion is formed, the

mold is opened and the cushion is removed

by hand. Prior to removal, there is no

direct contact between employees and TDI

in its liquid form.

The chief danger of TDI, however,

lies in exposure to its fumes, which act

as a severe respiratory irritant. Per-

sons exposed to TDI vapors may develop

on

rmat is known as "TDI asthma," a con-

@ttion csaracterized by shortness of

breath, coughing, and other asthma-like

Symptoms. In certain circumstances,

inhalation of TDI fumes can lead to

death. For these reasons, the Occupa-

tional Health and Safety Administration

and its predecessor, the American Confer-

ence of Government Industrial Hygienists,

have prescribed maximum levels of ex-

posure to TDI since the mid-1960's.

Adams began her employment with GM in

1967, working in the department which

manufactured car seats, dashboards, and

arm rests. She continued working in‘that

department subsequent to the introduction

of TDI in the plant in 1969. Her medical

records clearly indicate that her prob-

lems with TDI developed almost contem-

poraneously with its introduction. As

early as 1969, her doctor advised GM that

she was experiencing difficulties because

of "fumes at work." GM's doctor removed

her from the department in 1971, but

returned her there three weeks later when

her symptoms ceased. Even after Adams'

personal physician had recommended that

she not be assigned to work in areas in

which she would be exposed to fumes, GM's

doctor encouraged her to remain in the

department on a "trial" basis. Adams was

not permanently restricted from the de-

partment until a year later, by which

time her respiratory problems had in-

creased to the extent that she was fre-

quently caused to miss work for extended

periods of times due to what was then

diagnosed as "flu" or "bronchitis."

Adams, of course, had never been

informed of the use of TDI in the plant,

let alone the dangers of that use. Not

until 1978 was it determined that her

problems resulted from exposure to TDI;

at that time, she was certified as per-

manently disabled as a result of TDI

asthma.

After the filing of the complaint,

the answer, and various discovery re-

quests, Union Carbide moved the district

court for summary judgment, claiming that

it had warned GM about the dangers of

TDI, and had thus discharged any duty it

had to warn Adams. On March 10, 1983,

the trial court granted the motion. The

case was subsequently appealed to the

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

On July 2, 1984, that Court affirmed the

lower court's ruling in a split decision.

ARGUMENT

In order to be entitled to summary

judgment, the moving party must demon-

strate the complete absence of a genuine

dispute as to any material fact.

"The function of a motion for summary

judgment is not to permit the court

to decide issues of fact, but solely

to determine whether there is an

issue of fact to be tried." Aetna

Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co., 234

F.cod 342 (oth cir. 1956).

The trial court, in making this

determination, must construe the evidence

in the record most favorably to the non-

moving party. Poller v. Columbia Broad-

casting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473

(1962). Moreover, not only the facts,

but the inferences to be drawn from those

facts, must give rise to no genuine issue

before the court may render summary

judgment.

"Not merely must the historic facts

be free of controversy but also there

must be no controversy as to the

inferences to be drawn from them. It

is often the case that although the

basic facts are not in dispute, the

parties nevertheless disagree as to

the inferences which may properly be

drawn. Under such circumstances the

case is not one to be decided on a

motion for summary judgment." Ameri-

can Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. London

& Edinburgh Ins. Co., oy F.od O14,

216 (4th Cir. 1965).

The stringency of these tests have

rendered negligence cases particularly

difficult of disposition on summary

judgment, since such cases usually in-

volve not only facts, but inferences to

be drawn from those facts. Resolution of

whether a particular course of conduct

was “reasonable” under all the circum-

stances is a determination that the

courts have been extremely reluctant to

wrest from the jury.

"Even when the facts underlying the

issue of negligence are\undisputed,

the issue must still be Subaiitted to

oo

the jury if reasonable men could

reach different conclusions and

inferences from those facts... .

[I]t would be a mistake to conclude

that summary judgment is never appro-

priate in a negligence action, but

the circumstances in which it is

proper are rare." Croley v. Matson

F.2d 73, 75 (5th

Navigation Co., 434

Cir. 1970).

The thrust of Union Carbide's claim

to entitlement to summary judgment is its

contention that it had adequately in-

formed -GM of the dangers of TDI, and

could reasonably rely upon GM to com-

municate these warnings to its employees,

including Adams. In support of its

contention, Union Carbide submitted, as

part of its motion, numerous documents

which it had provided GM regarding the

dangers of TDI. It was not disputed by

Union Carbide that this information was

not provided directly to Adams or to any

other employee of GM, nor was it disputed

that GM had not communicated these war-

nings to its employees.

The first question which must be

resolved in determining the appropriate-

ness of summary judgment in this case is

whether the material provided by Union

Carbide to GM was informationally ade-

quate; i.e., whether that material was

sufficient to adequately and fully inform

GM of the various dangers in the use of

TDI. A review of that material discloses

that, while substantial space was devoted

to procedures for unloading the chemical,

cleaning out the storage tanks, and the

like, information regarding the specific

disability suffered by Adams, development

of TDI asthma, is sketchy. The existence

of the malady is acknowledged; however,

there is a paucity of advice as to the

recognition of the disease, as well as to

SERSRSRREE

the prior detection of those individuals

who may be most susceptible to the dis-

ease. GM's mismanagement of Adams'

problems serve to underscore these inade-

quacies; despite Adams' persistent prob-

lems, GM either did not recognize the

problem because of the vague nature of

the information provided by Union Car-

bide, or callously allowed Adams to

continue working in an area which created

grave hazards to her health. While the

latter alternative may indeed be the

correct one, that conclusion is hardly an

appropriate basis for determining a

motion for summary judgment.

Adams' contention as to the informa-

tional inadequacy of Union Carbide's

warnings to GM are futher buttressed by

subsequent communications between the two

corporations. While Union Carbide de-

=10-

scribes its information program as an

"ongoing" one, one might well conclude

that the ongoing nature of the program

was compelled by the inadequacy of the

information originally provided. The

only other material submitted by Union

Carbide in support of its motion, other

than the information originally given GM

in 1969, is an exchange of letters be-

tween Union Carbide and GM in 1975.

Those letters reveal that, six years

after Union Carbide's first shipments of

TDI to GM, GM found it necessary to make

the following inquiries: "Do sensitized

individuals recover 100% pulmonary func-

tion after removal from exposure to TDI?

What medical screening should be done

prior to exposure to TDI?" If GM con-

cluded, at that late date, that the

information already supplied did not

elie

provide the answers to those questions,

it is difficult to fathom how Adams, who

received no information at all, could

have been adequately apprised of the

dangers.

Moreover, this analysis does not

fully state the issue. The question at

this juncture is not whether the infor-

mation was adequate, but rather who is

supposed to make that determination.

While, as the trial court noted, it is

possible to decide the question of ade-

quacy of warnings by summary judgment,

the better rule is that "(t]he adequacy

of a warning under products liability is

a question to be left to the jury."

Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654

F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).

Even assuming that the information

provided by Union Carbide to GM was

«12

adequate to inform GM of the full extent

of the dangers of TDI, the question

remains whether Union Carbide satisfied

its duty to warn Adams merely by warning

GM. The courts and the parties are in

agreement that this question must be

resolved according to the dictates of

Restatement (2nd) of Torts, Sec. 388,

which provides as follows:

"Ome who supplies directly or through

a third person a chattel for another

to use is subject to liability to

those whom the supplier should expect

to use the chattel with the consent

of the other or to be endangered by

its probable use, for physical harm

caused by the use of the chattel in

the manner for which and by a person

for whose use it is supplied, if the

supplier

(a) knows or has reason to know

that the chattel is or is likely to

be dangerous for the use for which it

is supplied, and

(b) has no reason to believe

that those for whose use the chattel

is supplied will realize its danger-

ous condition, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable

-13-

care to inform them of its dangerous

condition or of the facts which make

it likely to be dangerous."

The Court of Appeals found, as a

matter of law, that Union Carbide's duty

to warn was discharged by the information

Supplied to GM, based upon Comment n of

the Restatement Section. Closer reading

of the Comment, which is set forth in

full in the dissenting opinion in the

court below (See Appendix, Dissenting

Opinion at 13-16), reveals, however, that

no precise answer to the question is

given. Rather, the Comment simply sug-

gests the issue be resolved through

application of a balancing test, taking

into account numerous factors, such as

the magnitude of the danger, the likeli-

hood of the information being communi-

cated to the ultimate user, the feasi-

bility of such further communication, and

o) dea

the like.

The resolution of this balancing test

poses two problems. First, as the dis-

senting opinion makes clear, Union Car-

bide's right to rely upon GM to communi-

cate the warnings to Adams is not nearly

so clear~cut as the majority indicates.

Indeed, other than a generalized belief

that GM would advise Adams, Union Carbide

took no steps whatsoever to ensure that

Adams, or any other employee, was in fact

advised by GM of the dangers of TDI. In

essence, all that the evidence submitted

by Union Carbide demonstrates is that in

1969, Union Carbide sent a packet of

information on TDI to GM, and that, six

years later, it answered several ques-

tions that GM raised regarding the use of

TDI. To adopt, as a matter of law, the

position that, in all cases, the manufac-

-15-

BES ER EERE EER

turer can rightly rely on the sensitiv-

ities of those whose chief, if not sole,

concern is the economic profit which can

be derived from the use of the product

seems to be unduly myopic.

Apart from the question of the proper

resolution of the Comment n equation,

however, there remains the questions of

who, under our system of jurisprudence,

is supposed to provide that resolution.

As noted, Comment n sets forth a multi-

tude of factors for consideration, in

essence establishing a "reasonableness"

standard for the determination of the

required extent of communication of

warnings. That the question of "reason-

ableness," under all the circumstances,

is peculiarly within the province of the

jury has been recognized by most courts

which have considered the question. In

wy

Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540

F.2d 174 (3rd Cir. 1976), for example,

the court concluded that resolution of

the Comment n question "comes within the

function of the trier of fact," at 179,

and reversed a directed verdict for

defendant. A similar conclusion was

reached by the Supreme Court of Arizona

in Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz.

426, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (1978).

Given the recent spate of litigation

arising from the use of dangerous chemi-

cals in the workplace, it is beyond

question that the duty of a manufacturer

to warn users of those chemicals of their

hazards ts a critical issue. While the

judgments of the courts below obviously

seek to resolve that issue, the question

remains as to whether the resolution

achieved here is consistent with the

-17-

principles and purposes of summary judg-

ment. As this Court has recognized,

"But summary procedures, however

salutary where issues are clear-cut

and simple, present a treacherous

record for deciding issues of far-

flung import, on which this Court

Should draw inferences with caution

from complicated courses of legisla-

tion, contracting and practice."

a v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S.

> ” (1948).

Summary judgment is, of course, the

chief method by which a court may ter-

minate litigation on the merits without

trial. The grant of certiorari by this

Court, and the reversal of the judgments

of the courts below, would serve to

reinforce the doctrine that summary

judgment is intended only to remove from

the judicial arena those cases which

present no genuine dispute as to material

issues, and not to permit the courts to

impose new standards of "reasonable"

“ite

~*~

a

conduct by judicial fiat.

Respectfully submitted,

Milton Dunn, Esq.

23300 Chagrin Boulevard

Suite 106

Beachwood, Ohio 44122

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ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that

three copies of the foregoing Petition

for Certiorari were sent by ordinary J.S.

mail, postage pre-paid, to Robert C.

Maynard, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey,

Attorneys for Defendant Union Carbide

Corporation, 1800 Union Commerce Buil-

ding, Cleveland, Ohio 44115 this

day of September, 1984.

Milton Dunn

-20-

ee

APPENDIX

Pertinent text of Federal R.Civ.P.

56:

(b) For Defending Party. A party

against whom a claim, counterclaim, or

cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory

judgment is sought may, at any time, move

with or without supporting affidavits for

a summary judgment in his favor as to all

or any part thereof.

(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.

The motion shall be served at least 10

days before the time fixed for the

hearing. The adverse party prior to the

day of hearing may serve opposing affi-

davits. The judgment sought shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the

@2)<

BEER ERB SERS ESEE

ee Sei ees eae es Dill iil bail Se Bi clea ae AT Maal alll iil Baad ra

affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. A summary

judgment, interlocutory in character, may

be rendered on the issue of liability

alone although there is a genuine issue

as to the amount of damages.

~22=

SBERBEEBSBEEERE ERB BSBEBZS

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

See, Sixth Circuit Rule 24

No. 83-3239

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Betry ADAMS; JOSEPH ADAMS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,; On Appgat from the

United States District

| Court for the North-

_ Union Carsmwe CorrPoraTION, ern District of Ohio.

Defendant-Appellee. |

Vv.

Decided and Filed July 2, 1984

Before: ENGEL and Krupansxy, Circuit Judges; and Weick,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Krupansxy, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the

court, in which Encz1, “ircuit Judge joined. Weck, Senior

Circuit Judge, (pp. 11-27) delivered a separate dissenting

opinion.

Krupansxy, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Betty Adams, a former

employee of General Motors Corporation (GMC), brought

this diversity action against Union Carbide Corporation in the

- United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

Plaintiff alleged that Union Carbide failed to adequately warn

‘GMC employees of the dangerous propensities of the chemical

toluene diisocyanate (TDI), which Union Carbide manufac-

BeeeeBEBeeeeae eS F_

2 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

tured and supplied to GMC for use in GMC’s automobile as-

sembling process. Plaintiff further contended that as a result of

defendant’s negligence, she developed a respiratory ailment

known as “TDI asthma”. Plaintiff sought $500,000 in damages.

Plaintiffs husband, Joseph Adams, also sought $50,000 in

compensation for the loss of his wife's services, companionship

and consortium.

On March 10, 1983, the district court granted defendant's

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's appeal to this court

was predicated on the theory that material issues of fact were

presented by this negligence action which should have been

submitted to a jury rather than summarily resolved by the

court below.

The record disclosed that plaintiff Adams was employed by

the Fisher Body Division of GMC at its Elyria, Ohio plant

between 1967 and 1978. TDI was first supplied to GMC for use

in making automobile seat cushions in 1969. The chemical was.

delivered in bulk liquid shipments either by tank trucks or

rail tank cars and transferred. from the common carrier into

GMC storage tanks. The TDI was then pumped, as needed,

into a closed vessel system for automatic mixing with other

chemicals. The only potential exposure GMC employees had

to TDI vapors occurred when the seat cushions were removed

from their open molds.

Union Carbide admitted that its officials were aware of

respiratory hazards associated with exposure to TDI vapors

as early as 1964. In 1960, defendant prepared a manual

specifically addressing these conditions for GMC. Attached

to this report were eight related articles on TDI's use in manu-

facturing which had been prepared by various sources. Of

special relevance to the case at bar was an article entitled

“Chemical Safety Data Sheet SD-73” prepared by the Manu-

facturing Chemists Association. The article detailed the “prop-

erties and essential information for safe handling and use of

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.. 3

TDL.” Included in this publication was a section entitled

“Employee Safety,” which read in pertinent part:

5.1.1. Employee training is probably the most important

safety measure a company can take... . An

effective employee education should include the

following items: .

(e) He should know when personal protective equip-

ment is to be used aid how to use it effectively.

5.1.2. It is the responsibility of supervision to train each

worker, and, equally as important, to instill within

him an attitude of safety. The supervisor must

procure the necessary safety equipment and be

sure that it is maintained in working order at

all times.

5.1.3. Operating procedures, including all safety rules,

should be posted in work areas where they may be

read by employees.

In 1975, officials from GMC and Union Carbide met to

discuss the handling of TDI to minimize personnel exposure.

Additional guidelines were furnished to GMC following this

conference.

Plaintiff Adams worked in various departments in the Elyria

plant during the course of her employment, including De-

partment No. 5, where automobile seat cushions were removed

from their molds and exposure to TDI was possible. Plaintiff's

medical records indicated that she had sought medical atten-

tion as early as 1969 for symptoms related to exposure to

fumes and gaseous materials. In 1974, plaintiff's doctor advised

GMC that Adams not be assigned to any area where the air

was contaminated with fumes because of her bronchopul-

monary condition. GMC’s plant physician discussed this letter

with the plaintiff and suggested she continue working in De-

4 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

‘partment No. 5 on a trial basis. One year later, in February,

1975, plaintiff's treating physicun again wrote to GMC and

recommended that plaintiff be permanently reassigned from

Department No. 5 due to her chronic bronchitis.

Plaintiff was permanently restricted from Department No. 5

thereafter. Her employment records disclosed that she was

placed on temporary disability several times by her treating

physician due to bronchitis and flu. In September, 1978 plain-

tiff came under the care of a different treating physician, who

certified that plaintiff was permanently disabled from work due

to TDI hypersensitivity from work-related exposure.

Plaintiff filed her complaint on June 20, 1980, alleging that

Union Carbide was negligent in failing to warn GMC and its

employees of the “harmful, toxic and deleterious effects to

TDI” and that as a result of defendant's negligence, “she has

been rendered totally disabled.” On May 11, 1982 defendant

Union Carbide filed a motion for summary judgment which

it supported with two claims: (1) that the warnings given

by Union Carbide to plaintiff's employer CMC satisfied its

duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, and (2) that the

statute of limitations barred plaintiffs action. The district

court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment based

upon its finding that the case presented no unresolved material

issue of fact, and that as a matter of Ohio law, defendant did

not breach its duty to plaintiff. The lower court did not

address the statute of limitations issue.

The grant or denial of summary judgment must be made in

accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, which states in pertinent

part:

(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon. ... The judg-

ment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

ee

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.. 5

_ The standard to be applied in determining motions for sum-

mary judgment was enunciated by this Circuit over 20 years

ago and is still in accord with the overwhelming weight of

authority: :

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court

must construe the evidence in its most favorable light in

favor of the party opposing the motion and against the

movant. Further, the papers supporting the movant are

closely scrutinized, whereas the oppcnent’s are indul-

gently treated.

Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King Corp., 303 F.2d

425, 427 (6th Cir. 1962). See also United States v. Diebold,

369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962); Sankovich v. Life*In-

surance Company of North America, 638 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.

1981). :

After recognizing the above criteria for summary judgment

as controlling, the trial judge in the instant case wrote:

A thorough examination of all evidence presented here

compels the conclusion that no material issue of fact exists

in this conflict. The parties neither dispute that defen-

dant warned GM, Mrs. Adams’ employer, of the dangers

related to TDI but did not warn Mrs. Adams directly,

nor do they dispute the notations in GM’s medical records

referring to ailments suffered by Mrs. Adams during the

course of employment. There remains only the applica-

tion of these undisputed facts to the appropriate legal

The lower court then proceeded to apply the facts as estab-

lished to the “appropriate legal standard”, which under Ohio

law is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388.'

AS ig bp Ady WH, the law of the state’s

highest court. (° v. Western Electric 671 3.2d 980, 983 (6th

Cir. 1982). The district court determined that the Ohio Supreme

i

not ruled specifically on the duty of a manufacturer of

6 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

Section 388 reads:

§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use

the consent of the other or to be endangered by its prob-

able use, for physical harm caused by the use of the

ch and by a person for

supplied, if the supplier

reason to know that the chattel is or

use for which it is

the

(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use

its dangerous condi-

¢

:

:

3

j

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them

of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it

likely to be dangerous.

Comment n following the restatement advises that the

manufacturer's duty to warn may be discharged by providing

information of the dangerous propensities of the product to a

third person (GMC in the instant case) upon whom it can

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 7

Although most negligence actions are resolved by submis-

sion to a jury, “it would be a mistake to conclude summary

judgment is never appropriate in a negligence action.” Croley

v. Matson Navigation Company, 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970).

Croley and other decisions provide ample authority for the use

of summary judgment in cases where the alleged negligence

of a manufacturer is at issue. See e.g., Gracyalny v. Westing-

house Electric Corporation, 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir.

1983) (“a grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any

ground that finds support in the record)”; Bryant v. Technical

Research Company, 654 F.2d 3337 (9th Cir. 1981); Aetna

v. Loveland Gas & Electric, 369 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1966);

Millhouse v. General Tire and Rubber, “a 3rd_ 203,

459 N.E.2d 623 (1983).

The evidence which was before the court below demonstrat-

ed that TDI was delivered by Union Carbide to GMC in bulk

liquid form. After the delivery, GMC had exclusive control

over both the chemical and the GMC employees who came into

contact with it.

While § 388 defines a manufacturer's duty to warn those

who may ultimately be exposed to its product, comment n to

the restatement also explains that the duty can be discharged

by the manufacturer’s reasonable reliance on a third party —

in this case GMC — to convey the information supplied by

the manufacturer to the ultimate user — in this case employees

. such as Betty Adams. The fact that GMC repeatedly updated

its information about TDI from Union Carbide, coupled with

the fact that GMC itself had a duty to its employees to provide

them with a safe place to work, supports the inescapable

conclusion that it was reasonable for Union Carbide to rely

upon GMC to convey the information about the hazardous

propensities of TDI to its employees within the context of

comment n of the restatement.

The dissent’s rejection of the above conclusion is based upon

a bootstrap-type analysis. First the dissent concludes that GM

did not adequately warn its employees of the dangerous

8 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

propensities of TDI. (Slip op. at —). The dissent thereupon

erroneously relies upon GM's failure to adequately advise its

employees of the hazardous propensities of TDI as proof of

Union Carbide’s negligence. However, the key issue in this

case is not, as the dissent seems to hypothesize, whether the

information supplied by Union Carbide actually reached GM’s

employees. Rather, the critical question is whether Union

Carbide’s reliance upon GM to relay the information to its em-

ployees was reasonable, when viewed in light of GM's duty to

safeguard its employees’ health and in consideration of the fact

that comprehensive information concerning the use of TDI

was conveyed by Union Carbide to GM for the express purpose

of dissemination to GM’s employees.

In effect, the dissent is interpreting GM’s failure to relay

the information to its employees as negligence attributable to

Union Carbide. The negligence of GM under the circum-

stances disclosed by the record in this case cannot vicariously

be imposed upon Union Carbide.

Based upon the foregoing factual analysis of the case, there

remained no “genuine issue as to any material fact” which re-'

quired jury consideration, and therefore the grant of summary

judgment was proper. This court’s reasoning and ultimate

conclusion is reflected in Millhouse v. General Tire and Rub-

ber Co., 9 Ohio App. 3rd 203, 459 N.E.2d 623 (1983), wherein

a company called Mobile Wash had contracted to clean de-

fendant’s tank cars, certain of which had contained the chemi-

cal TDI. An employee of Mobile Wash was overcome with

fumes and died while cleaning a TDI tanker. The Administra-

trix of the decedent’s estate commenced an action against

General Tire, alleging, inter alia, that it was negligent in failing

to warn Mobile Wash Employees of the dangerous propensi-

ties of TDI. The trial court granted summary judgment for

the defendant and the state appellate court affirmed. The court

held that there were no material issues of fact in the case be-

cause uncontroverted evidence disclosed that defendant had

notified Mobile Wash that the tank cars had contained TDI,

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 3

and that Mobile Wash supervisors had been warned of the

hazards inherent to TDI. While the Milhouse decision was

predicated on the defendant’s duty to warn employees of an

independent contractor, it’s resolution is directly analogous to

a situation, like the case at bar, where a manufacturer's duty

to warn employees of a company which uses its product is at

issue.

In a case strikingly similar to the case at bar, Younger v. Dow

Chemical Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451 P.2d 177 (1969), the

Kansas Supreme Court upheld the grant of summary judgment

in favor of the defendant manyfacturer on the basis that

adequate warnings had been given to the immediate vendee,

thereby satisfying the manufacturer's duty to warn the vendee's

employees of dangers related to exposure to TDI. As in the

case at bar, the defendant had sold TDI to the plaintiff's em-

ployer and had warned the employer of the chemical’s dan-

gerous propensities.

Similarly, in Reed v. Penwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591

P.2d 478, appeal dismissed 604 P.2d 614 (Wash. 1979), a jury

verdict for defendant was upheld on appeal.? There the de-

fendant supplied a food processing plant with caustic soda.

This chemical was shipped in tank cars and unloaded into

holding tanks owned by the food processor. It was later diluted

according to a formula controlled by the processor. There was

no evidence that the defendant had any control over the use of

- the chemical in the plant. The Washington Court of Appeals

determined that the supplier’s duty to warn had been ful-

filed by providing adequate warning to the immediate vendee.

As in the case at bar, the Reed court also noted that since the

product was used in a different form than its original state,

it was reasonable to expect that the vendee had a safety pro-

10 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

gram designed to communicate adequate information about

the substance to its employees.

And again, in Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627,

549 P.2d 1393 (1976), the Kansas Supreme Court upheld

summary judgment in favor of defendant, a manufacturer of

propane gas, based upon the lower court's finding that the

manufacturer fulfilled its duty to the ultimate consumers when

it verified that the distributor to whom it sold the product in

bulk was adequately trained and informed of the hazardous

characteristics of the gas, and would convey that knowledge

to consumers. See also Marker v. Universal Oil Products, 350

F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957) (developer of a petroleum refining

process had right to rely upon duty of employer who used

the process to protect its own employees).

In sum, the lower court's findings of fact and application of

the law is well reasoned and in line with respected precedent.

The decision of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

S&@G&GBEBERBSBEERB EEE

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. ll

a 'Weicx, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully

dissent. The district court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of defendant-appellee Union Carbide Corporation

a and dismissing the complaint of plaintiff-appellant Betty

Adams, thereby depriving her of her right to trial by jury to

which she was justly entitled.

e In her complaint, Mrs. Adams had alleged that defendant

Union Carbide Corporation was negligent in failing and ne-

glecting to warn her of the harmful, toxic and deleterious ef-

J fects of her exposure to the poisonous fumes of toluene

| diisocyanate (TDI) which it manufactured and supplied to her

employer, General Motors Corperation (GMC), and which

4 had permeated the entire area of the plant where she was

employed and working. As a direct and proximate result

thereof, she contracted TDI hypersensitivity asthma and

E became totally and permanently disabled.

In my opinion, construing the evidence in its most favorable

light in favor of Mrs. Adams, to which she was justly entitled

. under the law, there were genuine issues of material fact not

properly disposed of by summary judgment. The judgment of

the district court should therefore be reversed.

I

The Facts

The uncontroverted facts underlying this dispute bear re-

_peating and clarification. Although Mrs. Adams was not certi-

fied as permanently disabled due to “TDI hypersensitivity

asthma from exposure at work” until October 1, 1978, GMC

was first advised as early as May, 1969, by her private doctor

that she was experiencing significant eye and throat irritation

and a cough because of “vapors at her work.”* On November

1An affidavit submitted by Union Carbide indicates that before

Union Carbide delivered any TDI to GMC’s Fisher Body-Elyria

plant, it fully informed plaintif? of all potentially harm-

effects of TDI at « meeting on ot about

ful, toxic and deleterious

‘

,

i

{

12 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

10, 1971, Mrs. Adams complained to GMC’s plant physician

“that fumes from a tank near where she was working were

causing a ‘burning throat,’” and she was temporarily relieved

from working in Department No. 5. Twenty days later, how-

ever, after noting that her symptoms had cleared, GMC’'s

physician requested her to return to Department No. 5. In

February, 1974, Mrs. Adams’ physician treated her for broncho-

pulmonary problems, and advised GMC that she should not be

assigned to work where the air was contaminated with these

irritating fumes. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the

GMC physician encouraged Mrs. Adams to remain in Depart-

ment No. 5 on a “trial” basis. One year later, in February,

1975, her personal physician recommended that she be re-

moved permanently from Department No. 5 because of chronic

bronchitis, and the GMC plant physician concurred. Fol-

lowing, Mrs. Adams’ permanent restriction from Department

No. 5, she was placed on temporary disability by her personal

physician for bronchitis and flu several times in 1978, prior

to being certified by a different physician as permanently dis-

abled due to “TDI hypersensitivity asthma.”

The extent of plaintiff's exposure to TDI vapors is disputed.

Although the majority indicates “[t]he only potential exposure

GMC employees had to TDI vapors occurred when the seat

cushions were removed from their open molds,” Mrs. Adams

stated in her deposition that due to inadequate ventilation, she

was exposed to the fumes from Department No. 5 even when

she was working in another department. Additionally, she

stated that on at least one occasion, she was directly exposed

to TDI during a chemical spill, although she did not learn of

the chemical’s identity until her union told her it was TDI.

Pebtwoey 4, 1969. Mrs. Adams began her employment in Department

No. 5 i og BR RR yoy RB.

“fumes” and ‘toe Februssy 4 meeting. The relatively short period

after the Fi 4 meeting. The relatively short period

of time, elapeing before te . AS 2 ee Tee Se

nion Carbide’s product.

‘

]

'

j

* §

}

‘

;

,

‘

i

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 13

Furthermore, Mrs. Adams testified that GMC never told her

that she was working with TDI, never provided her with

written safety procedures applicable in the event of chemical

spills, and never screened her health background prior to

sending her into Department No. 5. Defendant Union Car-

bide presented no contrary evidence.

a »

General Principles of Negligence Law

Since none of the parties contest the applicability of Ke-

statement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) as the legal standard

defining defendant's duty to plaintiff, I turn to those principles

of negligence law which are embodied in § 388 to determine

whether, as a matter of law, Union Carbide, the manufacturer

of TDI, exercised reasonable care to inform the employees of

GMC, including Mrs. Adams, of TDI’s dangerous condition or

of the facts which make TDI likely to be dangerous. Stated

otherwise, in the context of this case, we must determine

whether reasonable men could differ as to whether it was rea-

sonable for defendant Union Carbide to totally rely on GMC

to communicate the information about TDI to the ultimate

users of the product, including plaintiff, who would be ex-

posed to the product’s hazardous effects.

Comment n to § 388 is concerned with warnings given to

third persons, such as GMC. It states in pertinent part:

Giving to the third person through whom the chattel

is supplied all the information necessary to its safe use is

not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from

liability. It is merely a means by which this information

is to be conveyed to those who are to use the chattel.

The question remains whether this method gives a rea-

sonable assurance that the information will reach those

whose safety depends upon their having it. All sorts of

chattels may be supplied for the use of others, through

all sorts of third persons and under an infinite variety of

=@2a @eo SBS SBS BEE HeEHEeEse s&s

14

Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

circumstances. This being true, it is obviously impossible

to state in advance any set of rules which will automa-

tically determine in all cases whether one supplying a

chattel for the use of others through a third person has

satisfied his duty to those who are to use the chattel by

informing the third person of the dangerous character of

the chattel, or of the precautions which must be exercised

in using it in order to make its use safe. There are, how-

ever, certain factors which are important in determining

this question. There is necessarily some chance that in-

ird person will not be communi-

are to use the chattel. This

chance varies with the circumstances existing at the time

the chatiel is turned over to the third person, or permis-

others to use it. These cir-

|

Z

ef

i!

ag

1H

af

of may also include the purpose

for which the chattel is given. Modern life would be in-

tolerable unless one were permitted to rely to a certain

extent on others’ doing what they normally do, particu-

larly if it is their duty to do so. If the chattel is one which |

if ignorantly used contains no great chance of causing :

anything more than some comparatively trivial harm, it

is reasonable to permit the one who supplies the chattel

through a third person to rely upon the fact that the

third person is an ordinary normal man to whose discredit

the supplier knows nothing, as a sufficient assurance

that information given to him will be passed on to those

who are to use the chattel.

If, however, the third person is known to be careless or

inconsiderate or if the purpose for which the chattel is to

be used is to his advantage and knowledge of the true

character of the chattel is likely to prevent its being

used and so to deprive him of this advantage—as when

goods so defective as to be unsalable are sold by a whole-

saler to a retailer—the supplier of the chattel has reason

to expect, or at least suspect, that the information will!

fail to reach those who are to use the chattel and whose

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 15

safety depends upon their knowledge of its true character.

In such a case, the supplier may well be required to go

further than to tell such a third person of the dangerous

character of the article, or, if he fails to do so, to take the

risk of being subjected to liability if the information is not

brought home to those whom the supplier should expect

to use the chattel. In many cases the burden of doing so

is slight, as when the chattel is to be used in the presence

or vicinity of the person supplying it, so that he could

easily give a personal warning to those who are to use the

chattel Even though the supplier has no practicable

opportunity to give this information directly and in

person to those who are to use the chattel or share in

its use, it is not unreasonable to require him to make

good any harm which is caused by his using so unreliable

a method of giving the information which is obviously

necessary to make the chattel safe for those who use it

and those in the vicinity of its use.

Here, as in every case which involves the determination

of the precautions which must be taken to satisfy the

requirements of reasonable care, the magnitude of the

risk involued must be compared with the burden which

would be imposed by requiring them (see § 291), and

the magnitude of the risk is determined not only by the

chance that some harm may result but also the serious or

trivial character of the harm which is likely to result

(see § 293). Since the care which must be taken always

increases with the danger involved, it may be reasonable

to require those who supply through others chattels which

if ignorantly used involve grave risk of serious harm to

those who use them and those in the vicinity of their use,

to take precautions to bring the information home to the

users of such chattels which it would be unreasonable to

demand were the chattels of a less dangerous character.

Thus, while it may be proper to permit a supplier to

assume that one through whom he supplies a chattel

which is only slightly dangerous will communicate the

information given him to those who are to use it unless

Adams vy. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

he knows that the other is careless, it may be improper

to permit him to trust the conveyance of the necessary

information of the actual character of a highly dangerous

article to a third person of whose character he knows

nothing. It may well be that he szouid take the risk that

this information may not be communicated, unless he

exercises reasonable care to ascertain the character of

the third person, or unless from previous experience with

him or from the excellence of his reputation the supplier

has positive reason to believe that he is careful. In addi-

tion to this, if the danger involved in the ignorant use

of @ particular chattel is very great, it may be that the

supplier does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting

the communication of the necessary information even

to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be

careful. Many such articles can be made to carry their

own message to the understanding of those who are

likely to use them by the form in which they are put out,

by the container in which they are supplied, oz by a label

or other device, indicating with a substantial sufficiency

their dangerous character. Where the danger involved

in the ignorant use of their true quality is great and

such means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly

burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should be

required to adopt them. (Emphasis added).

The majority’s quote from Comment n that “[mJodern life

would be intolerable unless one were permitted to rely to a

certain extent on others’ doing what they normally do, particu-

larly if it is their duty to do so,” supra at 6, barely scratches

the surface of considerations which must be weighed and

balanced in determining whether Union Carbide discharged

its duty to exercise reasonable care to inform Mrs. Adams .

of the dangerous nature of TDI. Whether it is reasonable

to rely on the third party to inform the ultimate user about the

product’s hazardous properties requires a balancing of such

factors as the dangerous nature of the product, the burdens

imposed by requiring warnings to the ultimate users, the like-

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 17

lihood that the particular warning will be adequately com-

municated to those who will foreseeably use the product, the

intensity and form of the warnings given, and the form in

which the product is used. See Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical

Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1978).

The majority opinion holds:

The fact that GMC repeatedly updated its information

about TDI from Union Carbide, coupled with the fact

that GMC had a duty to its employees to provide them

with a safe place to work, supports the inescapable con-

clusion that it was reasonable for Union Carbide to rely

on GMC to convey the information about the hazardous

propensities of TDI to its employees within the context

of comment n of the restatement.

Supra at 7. Not only do I disagree both with the inescapa-

bility of such conclusion and with its underlying premises,

but I conclude, to the contrary, that there is no evidence to

support the reasonableness of Union Carbide’s actions, and

therefore, that there are genuine issues of material fact not ap-

propriate for resolution by summary judgment.

There is no evidence that “GMC repeatedly updated its in-

formation about TDI from Union Carbide.” Based on an ex-

tensive review of the entire record before the District Court,

it is clear that GMC, at best, discussed the dangers of TDI

with defendant only twice — once in 1969 prior to delivery

of TDI by defendant, and again in 1975, some six and one-half

years after GMC first began TDI use. What the majority has

characterized as “repeatedly” really constitutes only isolated

communications between GMC and Union Carbide. In plain-

tiffs case, the communications were infrequent enough for her

to become substantially disabled through repeated exposure to

a poisonous product as extremely dangerous as TDI.

The assertion that Union Carbide could rely on GMC be-

cause “GMC itself had a duty to its employees to provide them

with a safe place to work” is questionable. Accepting the fact

:

aii aii

18 Adams vy. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

that such duty exists, I find not an iota of evidence in the

record before the district court or this Court that Union

Carbide relied on GMC’s discharge of this duty as the reason

for failing to notify Mrs. Adams and the other ultimate users

about the dangers of TDI. Furthermore, even if defendant did

so rely, there is no evidence of any actions taken by Union

Carbide either before or after the February 4, 1969 meeting

to determine how successfully GMC was discharging its duty

to provide a safe work place, such that Union Carbide’s re-

liance on GMC to disseminate warnings about TDI could

be termed “reasonable.” What the record does support are

findings that GMC never communicated the dangers of TDI

to Mrs. Adams, never informed her of emergency procedures

in the event of a TDI spill, and never screened her for TDI

sensitivity while she was employed in Department No. 5,

even after her illnesses due to exposure to poisonous “fumes” in

that department. In light of these facts, a conclusion that

defendant’s reliance on GMC was reasonable as a matter of law

is insupportable.?

2 Similarly, the district court’s opinion stated:

No inference can be drawn that defendant breached its duty by

relying on GM to inform its own employees of these warnings

under its safety programs. In fact, there is evidence that GM

sought and was given continuing information in regard to

employee safety which would foster reasonable reliance by

defendant. (Emphasis added).

E

There is no evidence suggesting that GM did not have a

safety program to inform employees of its warnings upon

which defendant could reasonably rely. To the contrary, the

affidavits submitted by defendant substantiate the occurrence

of between its experts and GM medical staff and

{[sic]. (Emphasis added).

For purposes of summary GMC’s failure to warn should

be construed against 2a ae Ban, Sees Se Be

extent guch negative inference speaks t the unreasonableness of de-

fendant’s total reliance on GMC. Furthermore, the district court’s .

conclusions the quality « of GMC’s efforts to seek “contin

information” and to t a “safety program” are directly refu

by the record, and should be found by this Court to be clearly

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 19

Comment n addresses the majority's implicit assumption that

GMC will behave as “an ordinary normal man” in the discharge

of its duty to its employees to provide a safe place to work as

follows:

If the chattel is one which if ignorantly used contains no

great chance of causing anything more than some com-

paratively trivial harm, it is reasonable to permit the one

who supplies the chattel through a third person to rely

upon the fact that the third person is an ordinary normal

man to whose discredit the supplier knows nothing, as a

sufficient assurance that information given to him will be

passed on to those who are to use the chattel. (Empha-

sis added).

There is no dispute that TDI is an extremely dangerous, .

poisonous product. Defendant Union Carbide admitted that

its officials were aware of respiratory hazards associated with

exposure to TDI vapors as early as 1964. The magnitude of

substantial harm resulting from improper use of the product

is further evidenced by Mrs. Adams’ statement in her deposi-

tion that “38 employees [at the Elyria plant] have been dam-

aged by TDI.” (Appendix 138). Perhaps this widespread in-

jury was the reason GMC saw fit in 1975 to recontact Union

Carbide with the express purpose of discussing safeguards

for its employees working with TDI.

The risk to Mrs. Adams and other users of TDI could never

be considered “some comparatively trivial harm.” Thus, it is

error for this Court to conclude under Comment n that de-

fendant could rely, as a mater of law, on GMC’s duty to its

employees to provide them with a safe place to work, par-

ticularly since defendant could easily have ascertained that

GMC gave no warnings of any kind to its employees, including

Mrs. Adams, and did not provide them with a safe place to

work, and additionally that poisonous fuines were permeating

through the entire work area and a number of its employees

including Mrs. Adams were being affected.

20 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

i

The Controlling Case Law

The district court noted:

When the highest court has not ruled on an area of law,

the federal court must ascertain the state law ‘rom ali

available sources. When a state appellate court an-

nounces and relies on a principle, a federal court should

recognize that reliance as indicative of state law unless

it is convinced that the highest court would decide dif-

ferently. West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

311 U.S. 223, 61 St. [sic] Ct. 179, 85 L. Ed. 139 (1940);

Ruth v. Bitumerous [sic] Casualty Corp., 427 F.2d 290

(8th Cir. 1970).

I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that Ohio

‘would hold, as a matter of law, that defendant Union Carbide

exercised reasonable care and was discharged from liability

thereby, because it provided warnings to GMC, particularly

when the warnings were not adequately communicated to the _

ultimate users.

In my opinion, the clearest statement of Ohio law applicable

to this case is found in Hargis v. Doe, 3 Ohio App. 3d 36 (1981).

In Hargis, the plaintiff was injured when bis clothing caught

fire after becoming dampened with a degreasing solvent sup-

plied by the defendant. At the time of the accident, Hargis

was not using the solvent for its intended cleaning purpose, but

instead to detect faulty welds in automatic torque converters

by immersion in a vat of the solvent.

In Hargis, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that a supplier is

subject to liability for damages proximately caused by any

reasonable use of the product for any purpose, “if he fails to

exercise reasonable care to give the user information which

[the supplier} has and which [the supplier] should realize

would be necessary to make use of the product safe. See Re-

statemei, ~ lorts 2d, Section 388.” 3 Ohio App. 3d at 37. In

‘

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 21

"fact, the court in Hargis specifically held that the supplier

did have a duty to warn the user, Hargis, of the flammable

nature of the product and to proscribe its use around fire. Id.

Because Ohio recognizes the existence of this duty to warn,

the failure of the supplier to warn the user is sufficient to over-

come a verdict for defendant supplier as a matter of law on

the specific issue of negligence. Id. This Court is incorrect

in holding otherwise on the issue of negligence.

According to Hargis, however, a finding of negligence is not

dispositive of plaintiff's right to recover damages. The appro-

priate standard of law defined by the Uhio Court of Appeals

is set out in Headnote 2:

Where a particular product is not_inherently dangerous,

and where the supplier has no access to an employee,

some causal relationship between the failure to warn and

the injuries must be shown in order to overcome a

motion for directed verdict. (Emphasis added).

Id. at 36. In so holding, the Ohio Court of Appeals has also

spoken to plaintiff Adams’ action by stating that

[a]lthough the inherent dangers of certain types of prod-

ucts, such as poisor., explosives, drugs, and the like, may

require personal notice to the user without reference to

any intervening source, in other situations [involving

products not unreasonably dangerous in their foreseeable

uses], the requirement of an adequate warning extends

only to those to whom the distributor has reasonable

access. {Emphasis added).

Id. at 38. Thus, under Hargis, defendant Union Carbide, the

producer and supplier of a concededly extremely dangerous

and poisonous product, owed plaintiff a duty to warn of TDI’s

dangers, regardless of any warnings supplied to GMC, and

plaintiff may even be entitled to judgment, as 2 matter of Ohio.

law, for her damages suffered as a result of defendant’s failure

“SSS SSS SRR EE ES

22 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

to notify her personally of the dangerous properties of its

product.

The majority's reliance on Millhouse, supra at 8, is mis-

placed. First of all, the decision in Millhouse was based on

the law of agency, and not products liability. The deceased

was not a user of the product, ut instead the employee of an

independent contractor hired by defendant General Tire to

clean one of defendant's tank cars containing TDI. In Ohio,

there is a rule of general acceptance that where an inde-

pendent contractor undertakes potentially dangerous work

for another and one of the independent contractor’s employees

is injured, no liability ordinarily attaches to the party who

engaged the independent contractor. Millhouse, 9 Ohio App.

3d at 204. By contrast, Hargis, supra, makes it clear that there

is no analogous rule for products liability cases involving § 388.

Millhouse is also distinguishable on its facts: it was uncon-

tested in the case that the employer had established safety

procedures for working around TDI, and that the deceased

plaintiff in fact had been warned of the properties of TDI. Id.

Furthermore, the tank car which the deceased was cleaning.

had the letters “TDI” stenciled on, and had a poison placard on

each side and end. Id. at 203. None of these or similar facts

have been established in Mrs. Adams’ case.*

The decisions of the courts of Kansas and Washington are

also distinguishable. In Younger, the Kansas Supreme Court

ee ee me

BEREBEREREEREEREERESESBSBSESE

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 23

gerous explosive or poisonous product. 451 P.2d at 184. In

Jones, the ultimate users were unknown, there was no ade-

quate means to express any warnings to the users, and the sup-

plier had verified that the third party was capable of convey-

ing the necessary information to the consumers. 549 P.2d at

1384, 1394. The decision in Reed was based on the doctrine of

intervening negligence of the third party employer as the

superceding cause of the damage, 591 P.2d at 481-82; this

doctrine was limited in the case of extremely dangerous prod-

ucts by Hargis, supra, and furthermore requires a finding

of duty to notify the ultimate user, which this Court incorrectly

has found not to exist in this case, contrary to Hargis.*

Additionally, the majority has disregarded respected prece-

dent of the highest courts of North Dakota and Arizona, both

of which have adopted a much more expansive view of Com-

ment n than the courts of Kansas and Washington. See Seibel

v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50, 57 (N.D. 1974); Shell Oil

Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271, 278-79 (1978).

The decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Hargis is con-

sistent with these cases, and we have no reason to believe the

Ohio Supreme Court would hold otherwise. See also Hasten,

Comparative Liability Principles: Should They Now Apply to

Strict Products Liability Actions in Ohio, 14 U. Tol. L. Rev.

1151, 1181 n.88 (1983). Thus, we are bound to apply that law

to the present suit founded upon diversity. Erie R.R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

24 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

IV

The District Court Improperly

Granted Summary Judgment

Determining whether the supplier's duty has been reason-

ably discharged under Section 388 comes within the function

of the trier of fact. See Dougherty, supra, 540 F.2d at 179.

Thus, the issue in this case was not proper for resolution by

summary judgment. Accord Bryant v. Technical Research

Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1981); Hopkins v. Chip-

In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 620 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980); Weekes

v. Michigan Chrome & Chemical Co., 352 F.2d 603, 607 (6th

Cir. 1965) (supplier must reasonably assure itself that third

party likely to transmit information to ultimate users); Hargis,

supra, (existence of duty sufficient to prevent directed verdict

on issue of negligence alone); Sams v. Englewood Ready-Mix

Corp., 22 Ohio App. 2d 168 (1969) (liability under Section

388 should be submitted to the trier of fact). See also Gordon

v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th

Cir. 1978) (supplier must have reasonable basis for believing

third party could be expected to communicate warnings to

users ) (subsequent information gained by third party not rele-

vant to negligence of supplier at time of original sale).

In its motion for summary judgment, defendant Union Car-

bide submitted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law based upon -the following relevant, undisputed facts

established by the record:

(1) Carbide fully warned GM on or about February 4,

1969 concerning the harmful, toxic and deleterious effects

of TDI, including the risk of TDI asthma;

(2) Carbide provided the above warnings to GM be-

fore it supplied Fisher Body-Elyria with production quan-

tities of TDI; .

(3) Betty Adams was exposed to TDI vapor in De-

partment 5 at Fisher Body-Elyria;

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 25

(4) As a result of said exposure, Betty Adams devel-

oped a hypersensitivity reaction to TDI and a disease

known as TDI asthma.

Although Union Carbide argues that it exercised reasonable

care in this case, it is apparent, based on my review of the

record, a jury could reasonably find that:

(1) no warnings were communicated by Union Car-

bide or by GMC to GMC’s employees, including plain-

tiff:

(2) because of the extremely dangerous propensities

of TDI, Union Carbide was obliged to take reasonable

steps beyond what appears in the record to warn GMC’s

employees (see § 388, Comment n, supra), including:

(a) following up on its initial discussions with GMC

in February, 1969,

(b) verifying that GMC was implementing a safety

program for TDI use by its employees,

(c) inspecting the conditions in GMC’s plant,

(d) overseeing the actual implementation of the

safety program by GMC, or

(e) actually undertaking to warn GMC’s employees

directly; and

(3) there was no reasonable basis for Union Carbide

to rely on GMC to communicate necessary information

to employees including plaintiff.

See Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1321-22; Dougherty, 540 F.2d at

181-825

5 None of the opinions ond Se Se melee ponte steguiee

authority for the of t this case. In

Coca Deamie, Gal Crmceten meant. te Timah Coats cnhuen

the grant of summary t for reasons very similar to those I

@SBSBBRBEEBEEREERE RRR E EBB EE

26 Adams vy. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239

The majority has cited evidence that TDI was delivered by

Union Carbide to GMC in bulk form, and that after delivery,

GMC had exclusive control over both the chemical and the

GMC employees who came into contact with it, supra at 7.

Comment n notes that the form in which the product is used is

only one factor considered in determining whether defendant

dence in the record regarding the actual magnitude of that

burden. On appeal, Union Carbide argues that the bulk form

in which TDI is supplied to GMC virtually precludes a warn-

ing by Union Carbide to employees who subsequently may

come in contact with TDI, and that the record demonstrates

defendant had no effective means of communicating a warn-

ing except through GMC. Plaintiff argues that the burden of

notification is not onerous, and could even have been accom-

BEREEREEREEREEBEE RE REBEE

No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 27

of that burden on Union Carbide’s right to reasonably rely

on GMC. |

Finally, Mrs. Adams argues that the warnings given by

defendant to GMC were informationally inadequate to suf-

ficiently apprise GMC of the dangers of TDI, and that this

allegation is supported by GMC’s subsequent communication

with Union Carbide in 1975 for further discussions on the

safeguards required with TDI usage.~I reiterate that form

and intensity of the warnings given is another factor which

must be argued and balanced in determining whether de-

fendant exercised reasonable care under the circumstances in

this case. Dougherty, supra. -

This is an important case involving interstate commerce, and

a conflict among the circuits is occasioned by this Court's

decision. I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary

judgment and remand the case for further proceedings, in-

cluding the submission of questions of fact to the jury.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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