Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.
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84-508
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FILED
SEP 27 1924
ALEXANDER L. STEVA$
CLERK
CASE NO.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
October Term, 1984
BETTY ADAMS, et al.,
Plaintifrf-Petitioner,
a
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Milton Dunn, Esq.
23300 Chagrin Boulevard
Suite 106
Beachwood, Ohio 44122
(216) 464-8310
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
ISSUES PRESENTED
Pursuant to Federal R.Civ.P. 56, may
the "reasonableness" of a manufacturer's
course of conduct under Restatement (2nd)
of Torts, Sec. 388 be decided as a matter
of law?
7
PARTIES
Plaintiff-Petitioners:
Betty Adams
Joseph Adams
Defendant-Respondent
Union Carbide Corporation
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities
Decisions of the Courts Below
Statement of Jurisdiction
Relevant Provisions
Statement of the Case
Argument
Service
Appendix
20
21
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
page
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co.,
234 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1956) 6
American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. London &
London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 354
F.ed 214 (4th Cir. 7
Bryant v. Technical Research Co.,
; t r. ) 12
Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434
F.od 73 (5th Cir. 1970) 8
Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp.,
STO Fa 174 (3rd Cir. 1976) 17
Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334
U.S. 249 (1948) 18
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 366 U.S. 464 (1962) 6
Restatement (2nd) of Torts,
Section 388 13
Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119
Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (1978) 17
Baas
DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW
Memorandum and Opinion of the United
States District Court (N.D. Ohio),
May 10, 1983, Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Opinion and Mandate of the United States
Court of Appeals (6th Circuit), July
2, 1984, Affirming the Judgment of
the District Court.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner seeks review of the judg-
ment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, entered
July 2, 1984. No petition for rehearing
of that decision was filed. Review is
sought in this Court pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(1).
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
The decision of the court below
involves an interpretation of Federal
R.Civ.P. 56. The pertinent text of the
Rule is set forth in the Appendix.
iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a complaint
filed by Plaintiff-Petitioner Betty Adams
(hereafter "Adams") on June 20, 1980, in
the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio. The complaint
alleged that Adams had incurred severe
respiratory problems as a result of her
exposure to toluene diisocyanate ("TDI"),
a product manufactured by Defendant-
Respondent Union Carbide Corporation
("Union Carbide"). Adams had been ex-
posed to TDI in the course of her employ-
ment with General Motors Corporation
("GM"). The complaint alleged negligence
on the part of Union Carbide in failing
to warn either Adams of the adverse ef-
fects of exposure to TDI. Jurisdiction
of the Federal Court was predicated upon
diversity of citizenship.
TDI is a liquid chemical which has
been widely used by the automobile indus-
try in the manufacture of seat cushions
and other car parts; it has been used
since 1969 by GM in the plant where Adams
worked. The TDI is pumped from delivery
trucks into storage tanks at the GM
plant; from there, it is mixed with other
chemicals to produce a polyurethane foam,
which is injected into seat cushion
molds. After the cushion is formed, the
mold is opened and the cushion is removed
by hand. Prior to removal, there is no
direct contact between employees and TDI
in its liquid form.
The chief danger of TDI, however,
lies in exposure to its fumes, which act
as a severe respiratory irritant. Per-
sons exposed to TDI vapors may develop
on
rmat is known as "TDI asthma," a con-
@ttion csaracterized by shortness of
breath, coughing, and other asthma-like
Symptoms. In certain circumstances,
inhalation of TDI fumes can lead to
death. For these reasons, the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration
and its predecessor, the American Confer-
ence of Government Industrial Hygienists,
have prescribed maximum levels of ex-
posure to TDI since the mid-1960's.
Adams began her employment with GM in
1967, working in the department which
manufactured car seats, dashboards, and
arm rests. She continued working in‘that
department subsequent to the introduction
of TDI in the plant in 1969. Her medical
records clearly indicate that her prob-
lems with TDI developed almost contem-
poraneously with its introduction. As
early as 1969, her doctor advised GM that
she was experiencing difficulties because
of "fumes at work." GM's doctor removed
her from the department in 1971, but
returned her there three weeks later when
her symptoms ceased. Even after Adams'
personal physician had recommended that
she not be assigned to work in areas in
which she would be exposed to fumes, GM's
doctor encouraged her to remain in the
department on a "trial" basis. Adams was
not permanently restricted from the de-
partment until a year later, by which
time her respiratory problems had in-
creased to the extent that she was fre-
quently caused to miss work for extended
periods of times due to what was then
diagnosed as "flu" or "bronchitis."
Adams, of course, had never been
informed of the use of TDI in the plant,
let alone the dangers of that use. Not
until 1978 was it determined that her
problems resulted from exposure to TDI;
at that time, she was certified as per-
manently disabled as a result of TDI
asthma.
After the filing of the complaint,
the answer, and various discovery re-
quests, Union Carbide moved the district
court for summary judgment, claiming that
it had warned GM about the dangers of
TDI, and had thus discharged any duty it
had to warn Adams. On March 10, 1983,
the trial court granted the motion. The
case was subsequently appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
On July 2, 1984, that Court affirmed the
lower court's ruling in a split decision.
ARGUMENT
In order to be entitled to summary
judgment, the moving party must demon-
strate the complete absence of a genuine
dispute as to any material fact.
"The function of a motion for summary
judgment is not to permit the court
to decide issues of fact, but solely
to determine whether there is an
issue of fact to be tried." Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co., 234
F.cod 342 (oth cir. 1956).
The trial court, in making this
determination, must construe the evidence
in the record most favorably to the non-
moving party. Poller v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962). Moreover, not only the facts,
but the inferences to be drawn from those
facts, must give rise to no genuine issue
before the court may render summary
judgment.
"Not merely must the historic facts
be free of controversy but also there
must be no controversy as to the
inferences to be drawn from them. It
is often the case that although the
basic facts are not in dispute, the
parties nevertheless disagree as to
the inferences which may properly be
drawn. Under such circumstances the
case is not one to be decided on a
motion for summary judgment." Ameri-
can Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. London
& Edinburgh Ins. Co., oy F.od O14,
216 (4th Cir. 1965).
The stringency of these tests have
rendered negligence cases particularly
difficult of disposition on summary
judgment, since such cases usually in-
volve not only facts, but inferences to
be drawn from those facts. Resolution of
whether a particular course of conduct
was “reasonable” under all the circum-
stances is a determination that the
courts have been extremely reluctant to
wrest from the jury.
"Even when the facts underlying the
issue of negligence are\undisputed,
the issue must still be Subaiitted to
oo
the jury if reasonable men could
reach different conclusions and
inferences from those facts... .
[I]t would be a mistake to conclude
that summary judgment is never appro-
priate in a negligence action, but
the circumstances in which it is
proper are rare." Croley v. Matson
F.2d 73, 75 (5th
Navigation Co., 434
Cir. 1970).
The thrust of Union Carbide's claim
to entitlement to summary judgment is its
contention that it had adequately in-
formed -GM of the dangers of TDI, and
could reasonably rely upon GM to com-
municate these warnings to its employees,
including Adams. In support of its
contention, Union Carbide submitted, as
part of its motion, numerous documents
which it had provided GM regarding the
dangers of TDI. It was not disputed by
Union Carbide that this information was
not provided directly to Adams or to any
other employee of GM, nor was it disputed
that GM had not communicated these war-
nings to its employees.
The first question which must be
resolved in determining the appropriate-
ness of summary judgment in this case is
whether the material provided by Union
Carbide to GM was informationally ade-
quate; i.e., whether that material was
sufficient to adequately and fully inform
GM of the various dangers in the use of
TDI. A review of that material discloses
that, while substantial space was devoted
to procedures for unloading the chemical,
cleaning out the storage tanks, and the
like, information regarding the specific
disability suffered by Adams, development
of TDI asthma, is sketchy. The existence
of the malady is acknowledged; however,
there is a paucity of advice as to the
recognition of the disease, as well as to
SERSRSRREE
the prior detection of those individuals
who may be most susceptible to the dis-
ease. GM's mismanagement of Adams'
problems serve to underscore these inade-
quacies; despite Adams' persistent prob-
lems, GM either did not recognize the
problem because of the vague nature of
the information provided by Union Car-
bide, or callously allowed Adams to
continue working in an area which created
grave hazards to her health. While the
latter alternative may indeed be the
correct one, that conclusion is hardly an
appropriate basis for determining a
motion for summary judgment.
Adams' contention as to the informa-
tional inadequacy of Union Carbide's
warnings to GM are futher buttressed by
subsequent communications between the two
corporations. While Union Carbide de-
=10-
scribes its information program as an
"ongoing" one, one might well conclude
that the ongoing nature of the program
was compelled by the inadequacy of the
information originally provided. The
only other material submitted by Union
Carbide in support of its motion, other
than the information originally given GM
in 1969, is an exchange of letters be-
tween Union Carbide and GM in 1975.
Those letters reveal that, six years
after Union Carbide's first shipments of
TDI to GM, GM found it necessary to make
the following inquiries: "Do sensitized
individuals recover 100% pulmonary func-
tion after removal from exposure to TDI?
What medical screening should be done
prior to exposure to TDI?" If GM con-
cluded, at that late date, that the
information already supplied did not
elie
provide the answers to those questions,
it is difficult to fathom how Adams, who
received no information at all, could
have been adequately apprised of the
dangers.
Moreover, this analysis does not
fully state the issue. The question at
this juncture is not whether the infor-
mation was adequate, but rather who is
supposed to make that determination.
While, as the trial court noted, it is
possible to decide the question of ade-
quacy of warnings by summary judgment,
the better rule is that "(t]he adequacy
of a warning under products liability is
a question to be left to the jury."
Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654
F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
Even assuming that the information
provided by Union Carbide to GM was
«12
adequate to inform GM of the full extent
of the dangers of TDI, the question
remains whether Union Carbide satisfied
its duty to warn Adams merely by warning
GM. The courts and the parties are in
agreement that this question must be
resolved according to the dictates of
Restatement (2nd) of Torts, Sec. 388,
which provides as follows:
"Ome who supplies directly or through
a third person a chattel for another
to use is subject to liability to
those whom the supplier should expect
to use the chattel with the consent
of the other or to be endangered by
its probable use, for physical harm
caused by the use of the chattel in
the manner for which and by a person
for whose use it is supplied, if the
supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know
that the chattel is or is likely to
be dangerous for the use for which it
is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe
that those for whose use the chattel
is supplied will realize its danger-
ous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable
-13-
care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make
it likely to be dangerous."
The Court of Appeals found, as a
matter of law, that Union Carbide's duty
to warn was discharged by the information
Supplied to GM, based upon Comment n of
the Restatement Section. Closer reading
of the Comment, which is set forth in
full in the dissenting opinion in the
court below (See Appendix, Dissenting
Opinion at 13-16), reveals, however, that
no precise answer to the question is
given. Rather, the Comment simply sug-
gests the issue be resolved through
application of a balancing test, taking
into account numerous factors, such as
the magnitude of the danger, the likeli-
hood of the information being communi-
cated to the ultimate user, the feasi-
bility of such further communication, and
o) dea
the like.
The resolution of this balancing test
poses two problems. First, as the dis-
senting opinion makes clear, Union Car-
bide's right to rely upon GM to communi-
cate the warnings to Adams is not nearly
so clear~cut as the majority indicates.
Indeed, other than a generalized belief
that GM would advise Adams, Union Carbide
took no steps whatsoever to ensure that
Adams, or any other employee, was in fact
advised by GM of the dangers of TDI. In
essence, all that the evidence submitted
by Union Carbide demonstrates is that in
1969, Union Carbide sent a packet of
information on TDI to GM, and that, six
years later, it answered several ques-
tions that GM raised regarding the use of
TDI. To adopt, as a matter of law, the
position that, in all cases, the manufac-
-15-
BES ER EERE EER
turer can rightly rely on the sensitiv-
ities of those whose chief, if not sole,
concern is the economic profit which can
be derived from the use of the product
seems to be unduly myopic.
Apart from the question of the proper
resolution of the Comment n equation,
however, there remains the questions of
who, under our system of jurisprudence,
is supposed to provide that resolution.
As noted, Comment n sets forth a multi-
tude of factors for consideration, in
essence establishing a "reasonableness"
standard for the determination of the
required extent of communication of
warnings. That the question of "reason-
ableness," under all the circumstances,
is peculiarly within the province of the
jury has been recognized by most courts
which have considered the question. In
wy
Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540
F.2d 174 (3rd Cir. 1976), for example,
the court concluded that resolution of
the Comment n question "comes within the
function of the trier of fact," at 179,
and reversed a directed verdict for
defendant. A similar conclusion was
reached by the Supreme Court of Arizona
in Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz.
426, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (1978).
Given the recent spate of litigation
arising from the use of dangerous chemi-
cals in the workplace, it is beyond
question that the duty of a manufacturer
to warn users of those chemicals of their
hazards ts a critical issue. While the
judgments of the courts below obviously
seek to resolve that issue, the question
remains as to whether the resolution
achieved here is consistent with the
-17-
principles and purposes of summary judg-
ment. As this Court has recognized,
"But summary procedures, however
salutary where issues are clear-cut
and simple, present a treacherous
record for deciding issues of far-
flung import, on which this Court
Should draw inferences with caution
from complicated courses of legisla-
tion, contracting and practice."
a v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S.
> ” (1948).
Summary judgment is, of course, the
chief method by which a court may ter-
minate litigation on the merits without
trial. The grant of certiorari by this
Court, and the reversal of the judgments
of the courts below, would serve to
reinforce the doctrine that summary
judgment is intended only to remove from
the judicial arena those cases which
present no genuine dispute as to material
issues, and not to permit the courts to
impose new standards of "reasonable"
“ite
~*~
a
conduct by judicial fiat.
Respectfully submitted,
Milton Dunn, Esq.
23300 Chagrin Boulevard
Suite 106
Beachwood, Ohio 44122
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ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that
three copies of the foregoing Petition
for Certiorari were sent by ordinary J.S.
mail, postage pre-paid, to Robert C.
Maynard, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey,
Attorneys for Defendant Union Carbide
Corporation, 1800 Union Commerce Buil-
ding, Cleveland, Ohio 44115 this
day of September, 1984.
Milton Dunn
-20-
ee
APPENDIX
Pertinent text of Federal R.Civ.P.
56:
(b) For Defending Party. A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for
a summary judgment in his favor as to all
or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion shall be served at least 10
days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affi-
davits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the
@2)<
BEER ERB SERS ESEE
ee Sei ees eae es Dill iil bail Se Bi clea ae AT Maal alll iil Baad ra
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue
as to the amount of damages.
~22=
SBERBEEBSBEEERE ERB BSBEBZS
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
See, Sixth Circuit Rule 24
No. 83-3239
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Betry ADAMS; JOSEPH ADAMS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,; On Appgat from the
United States District
| Court for the North-
_ Union Carsmwe CorrPoraTION, ern District of Ohio.
Defendant-Appellee. |
Vv.
Decided and Filed July 2, 1984
Before: ENGEL and Krupansxy, Circuit Judges; and Weick,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Krupansxy, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the
court, in which Encz1, “ircuit Judge joined. Weck, Senior
Circuit Judge, (pp. 11-27) delivered a separate dissenting
opinion.
Krupansxy, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Betty Adams, a former
employee of General Motors Corporation (GMC), brought
this diversity action against Union Carbide Corporation in the
- United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
Plaintiff alleged that Union Carbide failed to adequately warn
‘GMC employees of the dangerous propensities of the chemical
toluene diisocyanate (TDI), which Union Carbide manufac-
BeeeeBEBeeeeae eS F_
2 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
tured and supplied to GMC for use in GMC’s automobile as-
sembling process. Plaintiff further contended that as a result of
defendant’s negligence, she developed a respiratory ailment
known as “TDI asthma”. Plaintiff sought $500,000 in damages.
Plaintiffs husband, Joseph Adams, also sought $50,000 in
compensation for the loss of his wife's services, companionship
and consortium.
On March 10, 1983, the district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's appeal to this court
was predicated on the theory that material issues of fact were
presented by this negligence action which should have been
submitted to a jury rather than summarily resolved by the
court below.
The record disclosed that plaintiff Adams was employed by
the Fisher Body Division of GMC at its Elyria, Ohio plant
between 1967 and 1978. TDI was first supplied to GMC for use
in making automobile seat cushions in 1969. The chemical was.
delivered in bulk liquid shipments either by tank trucks or
rail tank cars and transferred. from the common carrier into
GMC storage tanks. The TDI was then pumped, as needed,
into a closed vessel system for automatic mixing with other
chemicals. The only potential exposure GMC employees had
to TDI vapors occurred when the seat cushions were removed
from their open molds.
Union Carbide admitted that its officials were aware of
respiratory hazards associated with exposure to TDI vapors
as early as 1964. In 1960, defendant prepared a manual
specifically addressing these conditions for GMC. Attached
to this report were eight related articles on TDI's use in manu-
facturing which had been prepared by various sources. Of
special relevance to the case at bar was an article entitled
“Chemical Safety Data Sheet SD-73” prepared by the Manu-
facturing Chemists Association. The article detailed the “prop-
erties and essential information for safe handling and use of
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.. 3
TDL.” Included in this publication was a section entitled
“Employee Safety,” which read in pertinent part:
5.1.1. Employee training is probably the most important
safety measure a company can take... . An
effective employee education should include the
following items: .
(e) He should know when personal protective equip-
ment is to be used aid how to use it effectively.
5.1.2. It is the responsibility of supervision to train each
worker, and, equally as important, to instill within
him an attitude of safety. The supervisor must
procure the necessary safety equipment and be
sure that it is maintained in working order at
all times.
5.1.3. Operating procedures, including all safety rules,
should be posted in work areas where they may be
read by employees.
In 1975, officials from GMC and Union Carbide met to
discuss the handling of TDI to minimize personnel exposure.
Additional guidelines were furnished to GMC following this
conference.
Plaintiff Adams worked in various departments in the Elyria
plant during the course of her employment, including De-
partment No. 5, where automobile seat cushions were removed
from their molds and exposure to TDI was possible. Plaintiff's
medical records indicated that she had sought medical atten-
tion as early as 1969 for symptoms related to exposure to
fumes and gaseous materials. In 1974, plaintiff's doctor advised
GMC that Adams not be assigned to any area where the air
was contaminated with fumes because of her bronchopul-
monary condition. GMC’s plant physician discussed this letter
with the plaintiff and suggested she continue working in De-
4 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
‘partment No. 5 on a trial basis. One year later, in February,
1975, plaintiff's treating physicun again wrote to GMC and
recommended that plaintiff be permanently reassigned from
Department No. 5 due to her chronic bronchitis.
Plaintiff was permanently restricted from Department No. 5
thereafter. Her employment records disclosed that she was
placed on temporary disability several times by her treating
physician due to bronchitis and flu. In September, 1978 plain-
tiff came under the care of a different treating physician, who
certified that plaintiff was permanently disabled from work due
to TDI hypersensitivity from work-related exposure.
Plaintiff filed her complaint on June 20, 1980, alleging that
Union Carbide was negligent in failing to warn GMC and its
employees of the “harmful, toxic and deleterious effects to
TDI” and that as a result of defendant's negligence, “she has
been rendered totally disabled.” On May 11, 1982 defendant
Union Carbide filed a motion for summary judgment which
it supported with two claims: (1) that the warnings given
by Union Carbide to plaintiff's employer CMC satisfied its
duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, and (2) that the
statute of limitations barred plaintiffs action. The district
court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment based
upon its finding that the case presented no unresolved material
issue of fact, and that as a matter of Ohio law, defendant did
not breach its duty to plaintiff. The lower court did not
address the statute of limitations issue.
The grant or denial of summary judgment must be made in
accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, which states in pertinent
part:
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon. ... The judg-
ment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
ee
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.. 5
_ The standard to be applied in determining motions for sum-
mary judgment was enunciated by this Circuit over 20 years
ago and is still in accord with the overwhelming weight of
authority: :
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must construe the evidence in its most favorable light in
favor of the party opposing the motion and against the
movant. Further, the papers supporting the movant are
closely scrutinized, whereas the oppcnent’s are indul-
gently treated.
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King Corp., 303 F.2d
425, 427 (6th Cir. 1962). See also United States v. Diebold,
369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962); Sankovich v. Life*In-
surance Company of North America, 638 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.
1981). :
After recognizing the above criteria for summary judgment
as controlling, the trial judge in the instant case wrote:
A thorough examination of all evidence presented here
compels the conclusion that no material issue of fact exists
in this conflict. The parties neither dispute that defen-
dant warned GM, Mrs. Adams’ employer, of the dangers
related to TDI but did not warn Mrs. Adams directly,
nor do they dispute the notations in GM’s medical records
referring to ailments suffered by Mrs. Adams during the
course of employment. There remains only the applica-
tion of these undisputed facts to the appropriate legal
The lower court then proceeded to apply the facts as estab-
lished to the “appropriate legal standard”, which under Ohio
law is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388.'
AS ig bp Ady WH, the law of the state’s
highest court. (° v. Western Electric 671 3.2d 980, 983 (6th
Cir. 1982). The district court determined that the Ohio Supreme
i
not ruled specifically on the duty of a manufacturer of
6 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
Section 388 reads:
§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
the consent of the other or to be endangered by its prob-
able use, for physical harm caused by the use of the
ch and by a person for
supplied, if the supplier
reason to know that the chattel is or
use for which it is
the
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use
its dangerous condi-
¢
:
:
3
j
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them
of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it
likely to be dangerous.
Comment n following the restatement advises that the
manufacturer's duty to warn may be discharged by providing
information of the dangerous propensities of the product to a
third person (GMC in the instant case) upon whom it can
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 7
Although most negligence actions are resolved by submis-
sion to a jury, “it would be a mistake to conclude summary
judgment is never appropriate in a negligence action.” Croley
v. Matson Navigation Company, 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970).
Croley and other decisions provide ample authority for the use
of summary judgment in cases where the alleged negligence
of a manufacturer is at issue. See e.g., Gracyalny v. Westing-
house Electric Corporation, 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir.
1983) (“a grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any
ground that finds support in the record)”; Bryant v. Technical
Research Company, 654 F.2d 3337 (9th Cir. 1981); Aetna
v. Loveland Gas & Electric, 369 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1966);
Millhouse v. General Tire and Rubber, “a 3rd_ 203,
459 N.E.2d 623 (1983).
The evidence which was before the court below demonstrat-
ed that TDI was delivered by Union Carbide to GMC in bulk
liquid form. After the delivery, GMC had exclusive control
over both the chemical and the GMC employees who came into
contact with it.
While § 388 defines a manufacturer's duty to warn those
who may ultimately be exposed to its product, comment n to
the restatement also explains that the duty can be discharged
by the manufacturer’s reasonable reliance on a third party —
in this case GMC — to convey the information supplied by
the manufacturer to the ultimate user — in this case employees
. such as Betty Adams. The fact that GMC repeatedly updated
its information about TDI from Union Carbide, coupled with
the fact that GMC itself had a duty to its employees to provide
them with a safe place to work, supports the inescapable
conclusion that it was reasonable for Union Carbide to rely
upon GMC to convey the information about the hazardous
propensities of TDI to its employees within the context of
comment n of the restatement.
The dissent’s rejection of the above conclusion is based upon
a bootstrap-type analysis. First the dissent concludes that GM
did not adequately warn its employees of the dangerous
8 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
propensities of TDI. (Slip op. at —). The dissent thereupon
erroneously relies upon GM's failure to adequately advise its
employees of the hazardous propensities of TDI as proof of
Union Carbide’s negligence. However, the key issue in this
case is not, as the dissent seems to hypothesize, whether the
information supplied by Union Carbide actually reached GM’s
employees. Rather, the critical question is whether Union
Carbide’s reliance upon GM to relay the information to its em-
ployees was reasonable, when viewed in light of GM's duty to
safeguard its employees’ health and in consideration of the fact
that comprehensive information concerning the use of TDI
was conveyed by Union Carbide to GM for the express purpose
of dissemination to GM’s employees.
In effect, the dissent is interpreting GM’s failure to relay
the information to its employees as negligence attributable to
Union Carbide. The negligence of GM under the circum-
stances disclosed by the record in this case cannot vicariously
be imposed upon Union Carbide.
Based upon the foregoing factual analysis of the case, there
remained no “genuine issue as to any material fact” which re-'
quired jury consideration, and therefore the grant of summary
judgment was proper. This court’s reasoning and ultimate
conclusion is reflected in Millhouse v. General Tire and Rub-
ber Co., 9 Ohio App. 3rd 203, 459 N.E.2d 623 (1983), wherein
a company called Mobile Wash had contracted to clean de-
fendant’s tank cars, certain of which had contained the chemi-
cal TDI. An employee of Mobile Wash was overcome with
fumes and died while cleaning a TDI tanker. The Administra-
trix of the decedent’s estate commenced an action against
General Tire, alleging, inter alia, that it was negligent in failing
to warn Mobile Wash Employees of the dangerous propensi-
ties of TDI. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the defendant and the state appellate court affirmed. The court
held that there were no material issues of fact in the case be-
cause uncontroverted evidence disclosed that defendant had
notified Mobile Wash that the tank cars had contained TDI,
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 3
and that Mobile Wash supervisors had been warned of the
hazards inherent to TDI. While the Milhouse decision was
predicated on the defendant’s duty to warn employees of an
independent contractor, it’s resolution is directly analogous to
a situation, like the case at bar, where a manufacturer's duty
to warn employees of a company which uses its product is at
issue.
In a case strikingly similar to the case at bar, Younger v. Dow
Chemical Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451 P.2d 177 (1969), the
Kansas Supreme Court upheld the grant of summary judgment
in favor of the defendant manyfacturer on the basis that
adequate warnings had been given to the immediate vendee,
thereby satisfying the manufacturer's duty to warn the vendee's
employees of dangers related to exposure to TDI. As in the
case at bar, the defendant had sold TDI to the plaintiff's em-
ployer and had warned the employer of the chemical’s dan-
gerous propensities.
Similarly, in Reed v. Penwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591
P.2d 478, appeal dismissed 604 P.2d 614 (Wash. 1979), a jury
verdict for defendant was upheld on appeal.? There the de-
fendant supplied a food processing plant with caustic soda.
This chemical was shipped in tank cars and unloaded into
holding tanks owned by the food processor. It was later diluted
according to a formula controlled by the processor. There was
no evidence that the defendant had any control over the use of
- the chemical in the plant. The Washington Court of Appeals
determined that the supplier’s duty to warn had been ful-
filed by providing adequate warning to the immediate vendee.
As in the case at bar, the Reed court also noted that since the
product was used in a different form than its original state,
it was reasonable to expect that the vendee had a safety pro-
10 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
gram designed to communicate adequate information about
the substance to its employees.
And again, in Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627,
549 P.2d 1393 (1976), the Kansas Supreme Court upheld
summary judgment in favor of defendant, a manufacturer of
propane gas, based upon the lower court's finding that the
manufacturer fulfilled its duty to the ultimate consumers when
it verified that the distributor to whom it sold the product in
bulk was adequately trained and informed of the hazardous
characteristics of the gas, and would convey that knowledge
to consumers. See also Marker v. Universal Oil Products, 350
F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957) (developer of a petroleum refining
process had right to rely upon duty of employer who used
the process to protect its own employees).
In sum, the lower court's findings of fact and application of
the law is well reasoned and in line with respected precedent.
The decision of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
S&@G&GBEBERBSBEERB EEE
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. ll
a 'Weicx, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully
dissent. The district court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of defendant-appellee Union Carbide Corporation
a and dismissing the complaint of plaintiff-appellant Betty
Adams, thereby depriving her of her right to trial by jury to
which she was justly entitled.
e In her complaint, Mrs. Adams had alleged that defendant
Union Carbide Corporation was negligent in failing and ne-
glecting to warn her of the harmful, toxic and deleterious ef-
J fects of her exposure to the poisonous fumes of toluene
| diisocyanate (TDI) which it manufactured and supplied to her
employer, General Motors Corperation (GMC), and which
4 had permeated the entire area of the plant where she was
employed and working. As a direct and proximate result
thereof, she contracted TDI hypersensitivity asthma and
E became totally and permanently disabled.
In my opinion, construing the evidence in its most favorable
light in favor of Mrs. Adams, to which she was justly entitled
. under the law, there were genuine issues of material fact not
properly disposed of by summary judgment. The judgment of
the district court should therefore be reversed.
I
The Facts
The uncontroverted facts underlying this dispute bear re-
_peating and clarification. Although Mrs. Adams was not certi-
fied as permanently disabled due to “TDI hypersensitivity
asthma from exposure at work” until October 1, 1978, GMC
was first advised as early as May, 1969, by her private doctor
that she was experiencing significant eye and throat irritation
and a cough because of “vapors at her work.”* On November
1An affidavit submitted by Union Carbide indicates that before
Union Carbide delivered any TDI to GMC’s Fisher Body-Elyria
plant, it fully informed plaintif? of all potentially harm-
effects of TDI at « meeting on ot about
ful, toxic and deleterious
‘
,
i
{
12 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
10, 1971, Mrs. Adams complained to GMC’s plant physician
“that fumes from a tank near where she was working were
causing a ‘burning throat,’” and she was temporarily relieved
from working in Department No. 5. Twenty days later, how-
ever, after noting that her symptoms had cleared, GMC’'s
physician requested her to return to Department No. 5. In
February, 1974, Mrs. Adams’ physician treated her for broncho-
pulmonary problems, and advised GMC that she should not be
assigned to work where the air was contaminated with these
irritating fumes. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the
GMC physician encouraged Mrs. Adams to remain in Depart-
ment No. 5 on a “trial” basis. One year later, in February,
1975, her personal physician recommended that she be re-
moved permanently from Department No. 5 because of chronic
bronchitis, and the GMC plant physician concurred. Fol-
lowing, Mrs. Adams’ permanent restriction from Department
No. 5, she was placed on temporary disability by her personal
physician for bronchitis and flu several times in 1978, prior
to being certified by a different physician as permanently dis-
abled due to “TDI hypersensitivity asthma.”
The extent of plaintiff's exposure to TDI vapors is disputed.
Although the majority indicates “[t]he only potential exposure
GMC employees had to TDI vapors occurred when the seat
cushions were removed from their open molds,” Mrs. Adams
stated in her deposition that due to inadequate ventilation, she
was exposed to the fumes from Department No. 5 even when
she was working in another department. Additionally, she
stated that on at least one occasion, she was directly exposed
to TDI during a chemical spill, although she did not learn of
the chemical’s identity until her union told her it was TDI.
Pebtwoey 4, 1969. Mrs. Adams began her employment in Department
No. 5 i og BR RR yoy RB.
“fumes” and ‘toe Februssy 4 meeting. The relatively short period
after the Fi 4 meeting. The relatively short period
of time, elapeing before te . AS 2 ee Tee Se
nion Carbide’s product.
‘
]
'
j
* §
}
‘
;
,
‘
i
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 13
Furthermore, Mrs. Adams testified that GMC never told her
that she was working with TDI, never provided her with
written safety procedures applicable in the event of chemical
spills, and never screened her health background prior to
sending her into Department No. 5. Defendant Union Car-
bide presented no contrary evidence.
a »
General Principles of Negligence Law
Since none of the parties contest the applicability of Ke-
statement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) as the legal standard
defining defendant's duty to plaintiff, I turn to those principles
of negligence law which are embodied in § 388 to determine
whether, as a matter of law, Union Carbide, the manufacturer
of TDI, exercised reasonable care to inform the employees of
GMC, including Mrs. Adams, of TDI’s dangerous condition or
of the facts which make TDI likely to be dangerous. Stated
otherwise, in the context of this case, we must determine
whether reasonable men could differ as to whether it was rea-
sonable for defendant Union Carbide to totally rely on GMC
to communicate the information about TDI to the ultimate
users of the product, including plaintiff, who would be ex-
posed to the product’s hazardous effects.
Comment n to § 388 is concerned with warnings given to
third persons, such as GMC. It states in pertinent part:
Giving to the third person through whom the chattel
is supplied all the information necessary to its safe use is
not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from
liability. It is merely a means by which this information
is to be conveyed to those who are to use the chattel.
The question remains whether this method gives a rea-
sonable assurance that the information will reach those
whose safety depends upon their having it. All sorts of
chattels may be supplied for the use of others, through
all sorts of third persons and under an infinite variety of
=@2a @eo SBS SBS BEE HeEHEeEse s&s
14
Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
circumstances. This being true, it is obviously impossible
to state in advance any set of rules which will automa-
tically determine in all cases whether one supplying a
chattel for the use of others through a third person has
satisfied his duty to those who are to use the chattel by
informing the third person of the dangerous character of
the chattel, or of the precautions which must be exercised
in using it in order to make its use safe. There are, how-
ever, certain factors which are important in determining
this question. There is necessarily some chance that in-
ird person will not be communi-
are to use the chattel. This
chance varies with the circumstances existing at the time
the chatiel is turned over to the third person, or permis-
others to use it. These cir-
|
Z
ef
i!
ag
1H
af
of may also include the purpose
for which the chattel is given. Modern life would be in-
tolerable unless one were permitted to rely to a certain
extent on others’ doing what they normally do, particu-
larly if it is their duty to do so. If the chattel is one which |
if ignorantly used contains no great chance of causing :
anything more than some comparatively trivial harm, it
is reasonable to permit the one who supplies the chattel
through a third person to rely upon the fact that the
third person is an ordinary normal man to whose discredit
the supplier knows nothing, as a sufficient assurance
that information given to him will be passed on to those
who are to use the chattel.
If, however, the third person is known to be careless or
inconsiderate or if the purpose for which the chattel is to
be used is to his advantage and knowledge of the true
character of the chattel is likely to prevent its being
used and so to deprive him of this advantage—as when
goods so defective as to be unsalable are sold by a whole-
saler to a retailer—the supplier of the chattel has reason
to expect, or at least suspect, that the information will!
fail to reach those who are to use the chattel and whose
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 15
safety depends upon their knowledge of its true character.
In such a case, the supplier may well be required to go
further than to tell such a third person of the dangerous
character of the article, or, if he fails to do so, to take the
risk of being subjected to liability if the information is not
brought home to those whom the supplier should expect
to use the chattel. In many cases the burden of doing so
is slight, as when the chattel is to be used in the presence
or vicinity of the person supplying it, so that he could
easily give a personal warning to those who are to use the
chattel Even though the supplier has no practicable
opportunity to give this information directly and in
person to those who are to use the chattel or share in
its use, it is not unreasonable to require him to make
good any harm which is caused by his using so unreliable
a method of giving the information which is obviously
necessary to make the chattel safe for those who use it
and those in the vicinity of its use.
Here, as in every case which involves the determination
of the precautions which must be taken to satisfy the
requirements of reasonable care, the magnitude of the
risk involued must be compared with the burden which
would be imposed by requiring them (see § 291), and
the magnitude of the risk is determined not only by the
chance that some harm may result but also the serious or
trivial character of the harm which is likely to result
(see § 293). Since the care which must be taken always
increases with the danger involved, it may be reasonable
to require those who supply through others chattels which
if ignorantly used involve grave risk of serious harm to
those who use them and those in the vicinity of their use,
to take precautions to bring the information home to the
users of such chattels which it would be unreasonable to
demand were the chattels of a less dangerous character.
Thus, while it may be proper to permit a supplier to
assume that one through whom he supplies a chattel
which is only slightly dangerous will communicate the
information given him to those who are to use it unless
Adams vy. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
he knows that the other is careless, it may be improper
to permit him to trust the conveyance of the necessary
information of the actual character of a highly dangerous
article to a third person of whose character he knows
nothing. It may well be that he szouid take the risk that
this information may not be communicated, unless he
exercises reasonable care to ascertain the character of
the third person, or unless from previous experience with
him or from the excellence of his reputation the supplier
has positive reason to believe that he is careful. In addi-
tion to this, if the danger involved in the ignorant use
of @ particular chattel is very great, it may be that the
supplier does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting
the communication of the necessary information even
to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be
careful. Many such articles can be made to carry their
own message to the understanding of those who are
likely to use them by the form in which they are put out,
by the container in which they are supplied, oz by a label
or other device, indicating with a substantial sufficiency
their dangerous character. Where the danger involved
in the ignorant use of their true quality is great and
such means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly
burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should be
required to adopt them. (Emphasis added).
The majority’s quote from Comment n that “[mJodern life
would be intolerable unless one were permitted to rely to a
certain extent on others’ doing what they normally do, particu-
larly if it is their duty to do so,” supra at 6, barely scratches
the surface of considerations which must be weighed and
balanced in determining whether Union Carbide discharged
its duty to exercise reasonable care to inform Mrs. Adams .
of the dangerous nature of TDI. Whether it is reasonable
to rely on the third party to inform the ultimate user about the
product’s hazardous properties requires a balancing of such
factors as the dangerous nature of the product, the burdens
imposed by requiring warnings to the ultimate users, the like-
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 17
lihood that the particular warning will be adequately com-
municated to those who will foreseeably use the product, the
intensity and form of the warnings given, and the form in
which the product is used. See Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical
Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1978).
The majority opinion holds:
The fact that GMC repeatedly updated its information
about TDI from Union Carbide, coupled with the fact
that GMC had a duty to its employees to provide them
with a safe place to work, supports the inescapable con-
clusion that it was reasonable for Union Carbide to rely
on GMC to convey the information about the hazardous
propensities of TDI to its employees within the context
of comment n of the restatement.
Supra at 7. Not only do I disagree both with the inescapa-
bility of such conclusion and with its underlying premises,
but I conclude, to the contrary, that there is no evidence to
support the reasonableness of Union Carbide’s actions, and
therefore, that there are genuine issues of material fact not ap-
propriate for resolution by summary judgment.
There is no evidence that “GMC repeatedly updated its in-
formation about TDI from Union Carbide.” Based on an ex-
tensive review of the entire record before the District Court,
it is clear that GMC, at best, discussed the dangers of TDI
with defendant only twice — once in 1969 prior to delivery
of TDI by defendant, and again in 1975, some six and one-half
years after GMC first began TDI use. What the majority has
characterized as “repeatedly” really constitutes only isolated
communications between GMC and Union Carbide. In plain-
tiffs case, the communications were infrequent enough for her
to become substantially disabled through repeated exposure to
a poisonous product as extremely dangerous as TDI.
The assertion that Union Carbide could rely on GMC be-
cause “GMC itself had a duty to its employees to provide them
with a safe place to work” is questionable. Accepting the fact
:
aii aii
18 Adams vy. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
that such duty exists, I find not an iota of evidence in the
record before the district court or this Court that Union
Carbide relied on GMC’s discharge of this duty as the reason
for failing to notify Mrs. Adams and the other ultimate users
about the dangers of TDI. Furthermore, even if defendant did
so rely, there is no evidence of any actions taken by Union
Carbide either before or after the February 4, 1969 meeting
to determine how successfully GMC was discharging its duty
to provide a safe work place, such that Union Carbide’s re-
liance on GMC to disseminate warnings about TDI could
be termed “reasonable.” What the record does support are
findings that GMC never communicated the dangers of TDI
to Mrs. Adams, never informed her of emergency procedures
in the event of a TDI spill, and never screened her for TDI
sensitivity while she was employed in Department No. 5,
even after her illnesses due to exposure to poisonous “fumes” in
that department. In light of these facts, a conclusion that
defendant’s reliance on GMC was reasonable as a matter of law
is insupportable.?
2 Similarly, the district court’s opinion stated:
No inference can be drawn that defendant breached its duty by
relying on GM to inform its own employees of these warnings
under its safety programs. In fact, there is evidence that GM
sought and was given continuing information in regard to
employee safety which would foster reasonable reliance by
defendant. (Emphasis added).
E
There is no evidence suggesting that GM did not have a
safety program to inform employees of its warnings upon
which defendant could reasonably rely. To the contrary, the
affidavits submitted by defendant substantiate the occurrence
of between its experts and GM medical staff and
{[sic]. (Emphasis added).
For purposes of summary GMC’s failure to warn should
be construed against 2a ae Ban, Sees Se Be
extent guch negative inference speaks t the unreasonableness of de-
fendant’s total reliance on GMC. Furthermore, the district court’s .
conclusions the quality « of GMC’s efforts to seek “contin
information” and to t a “safety program” are directly refu
by the record, and should be found by this Court to be clearly
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 19
Comment n addresses the majority's implicit assumption that
GMC will behave as “an ordinary normal man” in the discharge
of its duty to its employees to provide a safe place to work as
follows:
If the chattel is one which if ignorantly used contains no
great chance of causing anything more than some com-
paratively trivial harm, it is reasonable to permit the one
who supplies the chattel through a third person to rely
upon the fact that the third person is an ordinary normal
man to whose discredit the supplier knows nothing, as a
sufficient assurance that information given to him will be
passed on to those who are to use the chattel. (Empha-
sis added).
There is no dispute that TDI is an extremely dangerous, .
poisonous product. Defendant Union Carbide admitted that
its officials were aware of respiratory hazards associated with
exposure to TDI vapors as early as 1964. The magnitude of
substantial harm resulting from improper use of the product
is further evidenced by Mrs. Adams’ statement in her deposi-
tion that “38 employees [at the Elyria plant] have been dam-
aged by TDI.” (Appendix 138). Perhaps this widespread in-
jury was the reason GMC saw fit in 1975 to recontact Union
Carbide with the express purpose of discussing safeguards
for its employees working with TDI.
The risk to Mrs. Adams and other users of TDI could never
be considered “some comparatively trivial harm.” Thus, it is
error for this Court to conclude under Comment n that de-
fendant could rely, as a mater of law, on GMC’s duty to its
employees to provide them with a safe place to work, par-
ticularly since defendant could easily have ascertained that
GMC gave no warnings of any kind to its employees, including
Mrs. Adams, and did not provide them with a safe place to
work, and additionally that poisonous fuines were permeating
through the entire work area and a number of its employees
including Mrs. Adams were being affected.
20 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
i
The Controlling Case Law
The district court noted:
When the highest court has not ruled on an area of law,
the federal court must ascertain the state law ‘rom ali
available sources. When a state appellate court an-
nounces and relies on a principle, a federal court should
recognize that reliance as indicative of state law unless
it is convinced that the highest court would decide dif-
ferently. West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
311 U.S. 223, 61 St. [sic] Ct. 179, 85 L. Ed. 139 (1940);
Ruth v. Bitumerous [sic] Casualty Corp., 427 F.2d 290
(8th Cir. 1970).
I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that Ohio
‘would hold, as a matter of law, that defendant Union Carbide
exercised reasonable care and was discharged from liability
thereby, because it provided warnings to GMC, particularly
when the warnings were not adequately communicated to the _
ultimate users.
In my opinion, the clearest statement of Ohio law applicable
to this case is found in Hargis v. Doe, 3 Ohio App. 3d 36 (1981).
In Hargis, the plaintiff was injured when bis clothing caught
fire after becoming dampened with a degreasing solvent sup-
plied by the defendant. At the time of the accident, Hargis
was not using the solvent for its intended cleaning purpose, but
instead to detect faulty welds in automatic torque converters
by immersion in a vat of the solvent.
In Hargis, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that a supplier is
subject to liability for damages proximately caused by any
reasonable use of the product for any purpose, “if he fails to
exercise reasonable care to give the user information which
[the supplier} has and which [the supplier] should realize
would be necessary to make use of the product safe. See Re-
statemei, ~ lorts 2d, Section 388.” 3 Ohio App. 3d at 37. In
‘
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 21
"fact, the court in Hargis specifically held that the supplier
did have a duty to warn the user, Hargis, of the flammable
nature of the product and to proscribe its use around fire. Id.
Because Ohio recognizes the existence of this duty to warn,
the failure of the supplier to warn the user is sufficient to over-
come a verdict for defendant supplier as a matter of law on
the specific issue of negligence. Id. This Court is incorrect
in holding otherwise on the issue of negligence.
According to Hargis, however, a finding of negligence is not
dispositive of plaintiff's right to recover damages. The appro-
priate standard of law defined by the Uhio Court of Appeals
is set out in Headnote 2:
Where a particular product is not_inherently dangerous,
and where the supplier has no access to an employee,
some causal relationship between the failure to warn and
the injuries must be shown in order to overcome a
motion for directed verdict. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 36. In so holding, the Ohio Court of Appeals has also
spoken to plaintiff Adams’ action by stating that
[a]lthough the inherent dangers of certain types of prod-
ucts, such as poisor., explosives, drugs, and the like, may
require personal notice to the user without reference to
any intervening source, in other situations [involving
products not unreasonably dangerous in their foreseeable
uses], the requirement of an adequate warning extends
only to those to whom the distributor has reasonable
access. {Emphasis added).
Id. at 38. Thus, under Hargis, defendant Union Carbide, the
producer and supplier of a concededly extremely dangerous
and poisonous product, owed plaintiff a duty to warn of TDI’s
dangers, regardless of any warnings supplied to GMC, and
plaintiff may even be entitled to judgment, as 2 matter of Ohio.
law, for her damages suffered as a result of defendant’s failure
“SSS SSS SRR EE ES
22 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
to notify her personally of the dangerous properties of its
product.
The majority's reliance on Millhouse, supra at 8, is mis-
placed. First of all, the decision in Millhouse was based on
the law of agency, and not products liability. The deceased
was not a user of the product, ut instead the employee of an
independent contractor hired by defendant General Tire to
clean one of defendant's tank cars containing TDI. In Ohio,
there is a rule of general acceptance that where an inde-
pendent contractor undertakes potentially dangerous work
for another and one of the independent contractor’s employees
is injured, no liability ordinarily attaches to the party who
engaged the independent contractor. Millhouse, 9 Ohio App.
3d at 204. By contrast, Hargis, supra, makes it clear that there
is no analogous rule for products liability cases involving § 388.
Millhouse is also distinguishable on its facts: it was uncon-
tested in the case that the employer had established safety
procedures for working around TDI, and that the deceased
plaintiff in fact had been warned of the properties of TDI. Id.
Furthermore, the tank car which the deceased was cleaning.
had the letters “TDI” stenciled on, and had a poison placard on
each side and end. Id. at 203. None of these or similar facts
have been established in Mrs. Adams’ case.*
The decisions of the courts of Kansas and Washington are
also distinguishable. In Younger, the Kansas Supreme Court
ee ee me
BEREBEREREEREEREERESESBSBSESE
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 23
gerous explosive or poisonous product. 451 P.2d at 184. In
Jones, the ultimate users were unknown, there was no ade-
quate means to express any warnings to the users, and the sup-
plier had verified that the third party was capable of convey-
ing the necessary information to the consumers. 549 P.2d at
1384, 1394. The decision in Reed was based on the doctrine of
intervening negligence of the third party employer as the
superceding cause of the damage, 591 P.2d at 481-82; this
doctrine was limited in the case of extremely dangerous prod-
ucts by Hargis, supra, and furthermore requires a finding
of duty to notify the ultimate user, which this Court incorrectly
has found not to exist in this case, contrary to Hargis.*
Additionally, the majority has disregarded respected prece-
dent of the highest courts of North Dakota and Arizona, both
of which have adopted a much more expansive view of Com-
ment n than the courts of Kansas and Washington. See Seibel
v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50, 57 (N.D. 1974); Shell Oil
Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271, 278-79 (1978).
The decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Hargis is con-
sistent with these cases, and we have no reason to believe the
Ohio Supreme Court would hold otherwise. See also Hasten,
Comparative Liability Principles: Should They Now Apply to
Strict Products Liability Actions in Ohio, 14 U. Tol. L. Rev.
1151, 1181 n.88 (1983). Thus, we are bound to apply that law
to the present suit founded upon diversity. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
IV
The District Court Improperly
Granted Summary Judgment
Determining whether the supplier's duty has been reason-
ably discharged under Section 388 comes within the function
of the trier of fact. See Dougherty, supra, 540 F.2d at 179.
Thus, the issue in this case was not proper for resolution by
summary judgment. Accord Bryant v. Technical Research
Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1981); Hopkins v. Chip-
In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 620 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980); Weekes
v. Michigan Chrome & Chemical Co., 352 F.2d 603, 607 (6th
Cir. 1965) (supplier must reasonably assure itself that third
party likely to transmit information to ultimate users); Hargis,
supra, (existence of duty sufficient to prevent directed verdict
on issue of negligence alone); Sams v. Englewood Ready-Mix
Corp., 22 Ohio App. 2d 168 (1969) (liability under Section
388 should be submitted to the trier of fact). See also Gordon
v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th
Cir. 1978) (supplier must have reasonable basis for believing
third party could be expected to communicate warnings to
users ) (subsequent information gained by third party not rele-
vant to negligence of supplier at time of original sale).
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant Union Car-
bide submitted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law based upon -the following relevant, undisputed facts
established by the record:
(1) Carbide fully warned GM on or about February 4,
1969 concerning the harmful, toxic and deleterious effects
of TDI, including the risk of TDI asthma;
(2) Carbide provided the above warnings to GM be-
fore it supplied Fisher Body-Elyria with production quan-
tities of TDI; .
(3) Betty Adams was exposed to TDI vapor in De-
partment 5 at Fisher Body-Elyria;
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 25
(4) As a result of said exposure, Betty Adams devel-
oped a hypersensitivity reaction to TDI and a disease
known as TDI asthma.
Although Union Carbide argues that it exercised reasonable
care in this case, it is apparent, based on my review of the
record, a jury could reasonably find that:
(1) no warnings were communicated by Union Car-
bide or by GMC to GMC’s employees, including plain-
tiff:
(2) because of the extremely dangerous propensities
of TDI, Union Carbide was obliged to take reasonable
steps beyond what appears in the record to warn GMC’s
employees (see § 388, Comment n, supra), including:
(a) following up on its initial discussions with GMC
in February, 1969,
(b) verifying that GMC was implementing a safety
program for TDI use by its employees,
(c) inspecting the conditions in GMC’s plant,
(d) overseeing the actual implementation of the
safety program by GMC, or
(e) actually undertaking to warn GMC’s employees
directly; and
(3) there was no reasonable basis for Union Carbide
to rely on GMC to communicate necessary information
to employees including plaintiff.
See Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1321-22; Dougherty, 540 F.2d at
181-825
5 None of the opinions ond Se Se melee ponte steguiee
authority for the of t this case. In
Coca Deamie, Gal Crmceten meant. te Timah Coats cnhuen
the grant of summary t for reasons very similar to those I
@SBSBBRBEEBEEREERE RRR E EBB EE
26 Adams vy. Union Carbide Corp. No. 83-3239
The majority has cited evidence that TDI was delivered by
Union Carbide to GMC in bulk form, and that after delivery,
GMC had exclusive control over both the chemical and the
GMC employees who came into contact with it, supra at 7.
Comment n notes that the form in which the product is used is
only one factor considered in determining whether defendant
dence in the record regarding the actual magnitude of that
burden. On appeal, Union Carbide argues that the bulk form
in which TDI is supplied to GMC virtually precludes a warn-
ing by Union Carbide to employees who subsequently may
come in contact with TDI, and that the record demonstrates
defendant had no effective means of communicating a warn-
ing except through GMC. Plaintiff argues that the burden of
notification is not onerous, and could even have been accom-
BEREEREEREEREEBEE RE REBEE
No. 83-3239 Adams v. Union Carbide Corp. 27
of that burden on Union Carbide’s right to reasonably rely
on GMC. |
Finally, Mrs. Adams argues that the warnings given by
defendant to GMC were informationally inadequate to suf-
ficiently apprise GMC of the dangers of TDI, and that this
allegation is supported by GMC’s subsequent communication
with Union Carbide in 1975 for further discussions on the
safeguards required with TDI usage.~I reiterate that form
and intensity of the warnings given is another factor which
must be argued and balanced in determining whether de-
fendant exercised reasonable care under the circumstances in
this case. Dougherty, supra. -
This is an important case involving interstate commerce, and
a conflict among the circuits is occasioned by this Court's
decision. I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings, in-
cluding the submission of questions of fact to the jury.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.