Amicus Curiae Brief — General Motors Corp. v. Thomas

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Yuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

LEE M. THOMAS, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF THE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

JAN S. AMUNDSON

General Counsel

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF MANUFACTURERS

1776 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 626-3860

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

——

WILGON - Eres Printine Co.. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS ...WWW00000202000.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 1

PRI ME REIN cetsteciccicericivncnnsenoniccnntninbeowcone 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT oncaeccccccccctcncccccccconceeccssstocs 3

SIE hac cceccthicnahnacacenicpecichemimniasabinecaatiah iniipieaiadnaioie 4

Se IININIIT scccsntlnscccecuibidaainenipeneseubeddsasiaiuicosuniontbioiaseioniie 8

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Chamber of Commerce v. Occupational Safety and

Health Administration, 636 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir.

BID oinekencsensissvoseancnkasensnnendaiecatenseie ane 5, 6

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., —— U.S. , 104 S. Ct.

ie, 2). | | i nnnersena ene ETE passim

Office of Consumers’ Council v. Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, 655 F.2d 1132 (D.C.

+ A | RRR be ee) Re rhie 7

U.S. Department of Labor v. Kast Metals Corpora-

tion, [1984] 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1045... be 5

Statutes and Regulations:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551

© RO. ceiicisciemcunsiricciisipessipacieieisiniaaicmeem inane passim

Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976,

UBS. 8 Teed. 6s. eee la

Automobile Fuel Efficiency Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.

© ee Ce COD ciktsietineccine aoaaih 2a

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. Sen eee 2

Clean Air Act Aimendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.

he, cf Et | eeceenee me CRE EU. Eb Se 5a

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (b) 6a

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“Superfund’’),

SB UBL. SORE acenmictianiaa 6a

Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.

BCID | isnicnsscnnestveconeluaimdenicseadienest eee pare tetas: 4a

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of

1979, 26 U.S.C. §9011(a) & 9041(a) 2.00000... 3a

Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15

Chee Te OD cotcccieccaesiebtniciatccn cata eeaea la

Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1974, 30

ie A |, NINES EDEN ae mer ve RN 3a

Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. § 4109 (a)

GR GID seieleerkmsnvsienasaccctdepiaceelechp aiesiaeiea anne aes 2a

Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.

| | EEN Bel Der NAM SP Nd la

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITiIES—Continued

Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as amended), 26

ns liieeeennacs

International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22

i nisamintieabimbenecsn

Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1181 (b)..

Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4915(a)......

Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 42

Neen a ceensaatinindmantacines

Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program, 43

Neen a snanisehtesiainitiing

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,

A ES | ene

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-

te SE all cc

45 Fed. Reg. 36396, May 30, 1980 0.0...

Page

2a

2a

6a

4a

5a

6a

4a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-1098

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

LEE M. THOMAS, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF THE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

With consent of the parties, the National Association

of Manufacturers (NAM) files this brief in support of

the Petitioner. The NAM is a non-profit voluntary busi-

ness association incorporated under the laws of the state

of New York. The NAM represents approximately 13,500

companies, large and small, located in every state. Fur-

ther, NAM is affiliated with an additional 158,000 busi-

nesses through the Associations Council and the National

2

Industrial Council. The membership of the NAM repre-

sents an estimated 80 percent of all goods manufactured

in the United States.

The NAM and its members are affected by the federal

regulatory policy process involving virtually all govern-

ment agencies and departments. Both the NAM and its

members often file comments on proposed agency regula-

tions. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

§ 551 et seq., is the statute that governs whether a regu-

lation is legislative or interpretive and prescribes whether

public comment is required. The NAM believes that the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has

erred in the instant case in its evaluation of the nature

of the rule at issue and has misinterpreted the applica-

tion of a recent Supreme Court decision. We believe there

is great precedential risk that this decision will affect all

federal district and circuit courts and result in foreclos-

ing participation in the administrative process. Because

of the vast and diverse involvement of NAM members

nationwide with all government entities, this decision may

have an adverse impact on the NAM membership. For

this reason, the NAM submits the following arguments to

the Court in support of the Petitioner.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

In March of 1977, the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) ordered General Motors Corporation (GM) to

recall certain automobiles pursuant to its authority under

the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seg. Following

various administrative activities and negotiations, the

EPA in 1980 accepted the recall plan offered by GM in

1977. However, GM indicated that certain automobiles

would not now be recalled because they were beyond the

five year, 50,000 mile useful life limitation that was

required for repairs. On May 22, 1980 EPA adopted as

an interpretive rule a “nationally applicable” regulation

(45 Fed. Reg. 36396, May 30, 1980) stating that all recall

plans must provide:

3

... that the manufacturer will remedy, at the manu-

facturer’s expense, all properly maintained and used

vehicles which experienced nonconformity during their

useful lives regardless of their age at the time of

repairs.

As this was considered an interpretive rule, it was not

published for notice or comment. GM filed for review of

the order in the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit. Initially GM prevailed and the order

was vacated. EPA petitioned for a rehearing en banc.

In the rehearing EPA prevailed and this petition for

certiorari is from the decision on rehearing.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit has erroneously misapplied the decision of this Court

in the case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., US. , 104 8S. Ct. 2778

(1984). The deference given to the decision of agencies

in the Chevron case did not contemplate the interpretive

rule which is not required to be open for public notice

and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Interpretive rules do not create new liabilities or re-

sponsibilities. They are merely interpretations of the stat-

utory mission delegated to an agency by Congress. As

such, they should not enjoy the judicial deference given

to legislative rules.

Finally, if this decision is allowed to stand, there is

great precedential potential for other circuit and district

courts. The D.C. Circuit has original jurisdiction in

many statutes and will apply this decision to future

appeals. Also the court may be viewed as the leading

circuit in other potential litigation.

4

ARGUMENT

THIS DECISION MISINTERPRETS THE HOLDING

IN CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC. v. NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit has relied heavily on the ruling in Chevron, U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., US.

, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984), in giving exceptional defer-

ence to the interpretive rule published by the EPA in

May of 1980. We believe that this is a misapplication

of the holding by the Supreme Court. In the Chevron

opinion this Court states that Congress may explicitly

direct the administrative agency to pursue a particular

action or may implicitly leave the determination to the

agency. However, with respect to an implicit delegation,

this Court contemplated a regulation with substantive

and legislative impact. As such, any regulation would

require notice and comment according to the requisites of

the APA. This Court held in the Chevron case that a

court is prohibited from issuing its own construction of a

statute when an administrative agency’s legislative rule

reflects a reasonable interpretation.

In such a case, a court may not substitute its own

construction of statutory provision for a reasonable

interpretation made by the administrator of an

agency.

— US. at ——, 104 S. Ct. at 2782. It is inconceivable

that this decision should be extended to interpretive rules

that have not had the benefit of public participation. To

allow the extension of judicial deference to such an in-

terpretive rule thwarts the very essence of the APA. It

potentially could negate any reasonable challenge of any

agency’s interpretive ruling with courts applying such an

interpretation of Chevron to future rules.

The NAM believes that the correct application of the

Chevron decision would require deference only to sub-

5

stantive legislative rules that have been published for

notice and comment, and would not extend to the interpre-

tive rules of an agency the higher degree of respect that

is extended to the legislative rule. To give interpretive

rules this deference undermines the very essence of the

Administrative Procedure Act that was crafted by Con-

gress in 1946. Rules with substantive impact deserve

the participation of affected parties. When an agency

endeavors to go beyond the interpretation of statutory

mandate via an interpretive rule, the interests of the

public are threatened. Judge Bazelon, in a concurring

opinion in Chamber of Commerce v. Occupational Safety

and Health Administration, 636 F.2d 464, 471-72 (D.C.

Cir. 1980), who also wrote the reasoned dissent in the

instant case, made the following statement regarding the

impact of an OSHA effort to achieve legislative regulatory

results using an interpretive regulation:

If left undisturbed by this court, this agency action

would wield a significant change in the practices

which private employers must follow and in the

enforcement steps the agency must take. Under

these circumstances, I believe that advance notice

and opportunity for public participation are vital

if a semblance of democracy is to survive in this

regulatory era.

Thus NAM believes that the misinterpretation and ap-

plication of the Chevron decision begs for clarification by

this Court.

THE ACTION OF THE EPA iS LEGISLATIVE

RATHER THAN INTERPRETIVE

Divining agency intent is rarely a simple matter, for

bureaucratic boilerplate often obscures the true pur-

pose. The administrative agency’s own label is in-

dicative but not dispositive; we do not classify a rule

as interpretive just because the agency says it is.’

1636 F.2d at 468. See U.S. Department of Labor v. Kast Metals

Corporation [1984] 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1045.

6

Much of the concern in this case revolves around

whether the action by the EPA in May of 1980 was an

interpretive rule which does not require notice and com-

ment or whether it constitutes a legislative rule that does

require public participation. Many circuits have had to

consider this issue, particularly the D.C. Circuit. Again

in Chamber of Commerce the D.C. Circuit stated:

A rule is interpretive, rather than legislative, if it

is not “issued pursuant to legislatively-delegated

power to make rules having the force of law” or if

the agency intends the rule to be no more than an

expression of its construction of a statute or a rule.

636 F.2d at 468. In this instance, EPA contends that it is

merely reciting its interpretation of the pertinent section

of the Clean Air Act and has admitted that it is not a

rule that relies heavily upon the agency’s expertise. In

the Chamber decision the Court of Appeals for the D.C.

Circuit in discussing the intent of interpretive rules, stated

that “[s]uch rules only provide a ‘clarification of statu-

tory language’” and “the interpreting agency only ‘re-

minds’ affected parties of existing duties . . .” 636 F.2d

at 469. The EPA interpretive rule is not a mere clarifica-

tion but in fact imposes new duties. This nationally ap-

plicable rule changed a key definition, namely that auto-

mobiles must be repaired regardless of their useful life.

The majority of the lower court agreed, however, to the

EPA’s typification of this as interpretive.

The nationally applicable policy that was issued by the

EPA in May 1980 does create new responsibilities and is

not in keeping with the statutory definition of useful life

and the intent of Congress as set forth in the legislative

history of the act and the published regulations. This

interpretive rule was published six years after regulations

promulgated under the Clean Air Act were implemented.

It is imperative to consider the circumstances surround-

ing an interpretive rule to determine how much credence

or deference should be accorded the agency.

7

However, the degree of respect to be accorded to an

agency’s statutory interpretation of the limit of its

authority varies, depending upon such factors as the

interpretation’s inherent reasonableness, its consist-

ency with prior precedent, its basis in statutory text

and legislative history, and whether it is based on

— or expertise peculiarily within the agency’s

n.

Office of Consumers’ Council v. Federal Energy Regula-

tory Commission, 655 F.2d 1182, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

NAM contends that this EPA policy extends beyond the

purview of an interpretive rule and has the attributes of

a legislative rule which should have required the agency to

provide an opportunity for notice and comment by affected

parties.

THIS CASE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR CONSID-

ERABLE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT

Enclosed in this brief is Appendix A which is a com-

pilation of all the statutes over which the U.S. Circuit

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia exercises

exclusive jurisdiction. There are 19 statutes that are

reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit. This decision does

have the potential for great impact on all future decisions

involving these specific statutes. Additionally, other cir-

cuits, in the wake of this opinion, may well view the

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as the definitive

circuit for resolution of issues involving legislative and

interpretive rules and follow this Circuit’s application of

the decision in the Chevron case.

Another concern is that this opinion in the D.C. Cir-

cuit will encourage other agencies that are reviewable by

the D.C. Cireuit to cireumvent the lengthier legislative

rule process and achieve like results by the issuance of an

interpretive rule that supposedly only clarifies the agency’s

statutory interpretation. Additionally, many of the stat-

8

utes, mandated exclusive jurisdiction in the District of

Columbia Circuit, are administered by the respondent,

the Environmental Protection Agency. This offers greater

impetus to the EPA to continue the use of nationally ap-

plicable interpretive rules in areas that have a substan-

tial impact that should merit the scrutiny attendant to

the legislative regulation process. The NAM believes

that the far reaching effects of this decision in the

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as well as the

other federal district and circuit courts demands consid-

eration of this issue by this Court.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the significant issues raised by the D.C.

Circuit’s interpretation of the decision in the Chevron

case and the distinctions to be drawn between legislative

and interpretive rules, this case warrants review by this

Court. As stated above, the NAM believes that the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has erroneously ap-

plied this Court’s decision in the Chevron case. Further,

we believe that the EPA’s nationally applicable regula-

tion is tantamount to a legislative rule that should re-

quire notice and comment pursuant to the APA. Finally,

because there are numerous statutes over which this Cir-

cuit has exclusive jurisdiction, all aspects of this case re-

quire careful consideration due to the potential prece-

dential effect it will have in future appeals. The ma-

jority opinion in the lower court argues that the public is

benefited by the resolution of this case in the EPA’s favor

and is in keeping with the public policy goals expressed

in the Clean Air Act. It is equally as important to the

public interest that the requisites of the Administrative

Procedure Act be assiduously followed as this affects not

only an entity such as the Petitioner but any party that

is affected by a Congressionally mandated statute and

the regulations issued thereunder. It is only when the

agency is truly engaging in interpreting the statute and

9

is not creating new responsibilities or liabilities that the

rule should not require public participation.

A linchpin of our democratic process is that any af-

fected party be allowed to have its voice heard when an

agency action has the effect of statutory law and creates

new liabilities and responsibilities. Thus, it is essential

that the requisites of the Administrative Procedure Act

be accorded the respect that Congress intended when the

statute was enacted and as it has been interpreted in the

ensuing decades.

We respectfully request this Court to grant the peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari to review the decision below

of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit.

Respectfully submitted,

JAN S. AMUNDSON

General Counsel

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF MANUFACTURERS

1776 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 626-3860

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

STATUTORY PROVISIONS UNDER WHICH THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT EXERCISES

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit possesses exclusive jurisdiction to re-

view agency action taken under the following major leg-

islation, pursuant to the specified statutory provisions:

1. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552b(g).

Review of agency regulations issued pursuant to

this subsection for compliance with the open-

meeting requirements of § 552b(b)-(f) and pro-

ceedings to require the promulgation of conform-

ing regulations. \

2. Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976,

15 U.S.C. § 719h(c).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit, acting as a Special

Court, has exclusive jurisdiction over claims al-

leging that this chapter is invalid or that an action

will deny rights under the Constitution or that an

action is in excess of statutory jurisdiction, au-

thority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.

3. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15

U.S.C. § 766(c).

Challenges to administrative rulemaking of gen-

eral and national applicability done pursuant to

this chapter, unless done pursuant to the Emer-

gency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.

2a

4. Automobile Fuel Efficiency Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2003 (b) (3) (E).

Review of any action by the Secretary of Trans-

portation denying or granting an exemption from

the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 2003(b) (1), which

requires separate calculation of fuel economy for

automobiles domestically manufactured and auto-

mobiles not domestically manufactured.

5. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22

U.S.C. § 1631f(b).

Claims for the return of Bulgarian, Hungarian,

or Rumanian property or proceeds vested in the

President’s designee that have been denied in whole

or in part by that designee.

6. Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. § 4109(a).

Action for judicial review of final orders of the

Foreign Service Labor Relations Board, except as

provided in 22 U.S.C. § 4114(d) (resolution of

implementation disputes) .

22 U.S.C. § 4109(b).

Petitions of the Foreign Service Labor Rela-

tions Board for enforcement of orders.

7. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as amended), 26

U.S.C. § 7482 (b) (1).

Decisions of the Tax Court not covered by 26

U.S.C. § 7482(b) (1) (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)

describing venue in the courts of appeals may be

reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit.

26 U.S.C. § 7482(b) (3).

Decisions of the Tax Court under 26 U.S.C.

§ 7478 (declaratory judgments relating to status

10.

3a

of certain governmental obligations) may be re-

viewed only in the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of

1979, 26 U.S.C. § 9011(a).

Review of any certification, determination, or

other action of the Federal Election Commission

pursuant to the chapter governing the Presiden-

tial Election Campaign Fund.

26 U.S.C. § 9041 (a).

Review of any action by the Federal Election

Commission under the chapter governing the Presi-

dential Primary Matching Payment Account.

Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1974, 30

U.S.C. § 953(d).

Any state aggrieved by a decision of the Secre-

tary regarding federal assistance to the states,

may file in the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit to modify or set

aside that decision.

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-

7(a) (1).

Review of actions of the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency in promulgating any national primary

drinking water regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 300g-

1 (national drinking water regulations), any reg-

ulation under 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(b) (1) (state pri-

mary enforcement responsibility; regulations; no-

tice and hearing; publication in Federal Register;

applications), any regulation under 42 U.S.C.

§ 300g-3(c) (notice of owner or operator of public

water system to persons served), any regulation

for state underground injection control programs

11.

12.

13.

4a

under 42 U.S.C. § 300h, or any general regulation

for the administration of this subchapter.

Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4915(a).

Any petition for review of an action of the En-

viromental Protection Agency in promulgating any

standard or regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 4905

(noise emission standards for products distributed

in commerce), or 42 U.S.C. § 4916 (railroad noise

emission standards), or 42 U.S.C. § 4917 (motor

carrier noise emission standards) or any labeling

regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 4907 and any peti-

tion for review of an auction the Federal Aviation

Administration in promulgating any standard or

regulation under 49 U.S.C. App. § 1431 (control

and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom).

Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6384 (b).

Actions to enjoin or set aside an order issued

under 42 U.S.C. § 6382(a) (1) (B), which author-

izes the Comptroller General, by general or special

orders, to require any person to submit written

answers to interrogatories, or to submit informa-

tion (books, records or any other information) for

the purpose of verifying records of any vertically

integrated petroleum company’s financial informa-

tion related to certain activities under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1381(a) (3) or of any person required to submit

energy information to federal agencies under 42

U.S.C. § 6381(a) (1) (B).

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,

42 U.S.C. § 6976 (a) (1).

Review of actions of the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency in promulgating any regulation or re-

quirement under this Act, which includes principal

provisions for the regulation of hazardous wastes.

14,

15.

5a

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607 (b) (1).

Review of actions by the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency in promulgating any national primary

or secondary ambient air quality standard, any

emission standard or requirement under 42 U.S.C.

§ 7412 (hazardous air pollutants), any standard

of performance or requirement under 42 U.S.C.

§ 7411 (new stationary sources), any standard un-

der 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (motor vehicle emission and

fuel standards) (other than other promulgated un-

der 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)), any determination

under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (5) (waiver for 1981

and 1982 model years of carbon monoxide emis-

sion standard for light-duty motor vehicles and

engines), any control or prohibition under 42

U.S.C. § 7545 (regulation of fuels), any standard

under 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (aircraft emission stand-

ards), any rule issued under 42 U.S.C. § 7413

(federal enforcement proc~ ‘1res), 42 U.S.C. § 7419

(primary nonferrous smel.. orders), or 42 U.S.C.

§ 7420 (noncompliance penalty), or any other na-

tionally applicable regulation promulgated, or final

action taken, by EPA under this Act.

Additionally, review of actions by EPA under

other specifically listed sections, if the Administra-

tor finds and publishes notice that those actions

are of nationwide scope or effect.

Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980,

42 U.S.C. § 9125.

Review of decisions by the National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration ty issue, trans-

fer, modify, renew, suspend, or terminate a license

for an ocean thermal energy conversion facility.

16.

17.

18.

19.

6a

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“Superfund”),

42 U.S.C. § 9613(a).

Review of any regulation promulgated by the

Environmental Protection Agency under this Act,

which contains principal regulatory provisions for

the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.

Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program, 43

U.S.C. § 1349(¢) (1).

Review of any action of the Secretary of the

Interior to approve a leasing program pursuant

to 43 U.S.C. § 1344.

Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1181 (b).

Denials by the Secretary of Transportation of

contractor’s applications to transfer vessels which

are subject to operating-differential subsidy con-

tracts to foreign registry upon default or cancel-

lation by the United States.

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).

Appeals of decisions and orders of the FCC in

eight categories, including: by any applicant for

a construction permit or station license, or for the

renewal of modification of any such license, whose

application is denied by the Commission; by any

party to an application for authority to transfer,

assign, or dispose of any such instrument of au-

thorization, or any rights thereunder, whose ap-

plication is denied by the Commission; by the

holder of any construction permit or station li-

cense which has been modified or revoked by the

Commission; by any person upon whom an order

to cease and desist has been served under section

312 of this title; by any other person who is ag-

grieved or whose interests are adversely affected

by any order of the Commission granting or deny-

ing any application described in paragraphs (1)-

(4) of this subsection.