Opposition Brief — General Motors Corp. v. Thomas

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(4) APR & 1983

No. 84-1098

ALEXANDER t STEVAS,

= acme s | 4

Iu the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

GENERAL Motors CORPORATION, PETITIONER

Vv.

Lee M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

MY Les E. FLInt

Acting Assistant Attorney General

RosBerT L. KLARQUIST

JOHN L. WITTENBORN

JACQUES B. GELIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

RALPH J. COLLELI, JR.

Mary SMITH

Attorneys

Environmental Protectior Agency

Washington, D.C. 20460

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a rule issued to express the Environmental

Protection Agency’s interpretation of Section 207(c)(1) of

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7541(c)(1), was an “inter-

pretative” rule and therefore properly issued without notice

and opportunity for comment.

2. Whether the court of appeals correctly sustained the

interpretative rule at issue as a reasonable interpretation of

Section 207(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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sates SE Sa ann 2

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ae 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,

Ee 15

Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 ............. 6

Capitano v. Secretary of Health and Human

UE, Fad WE BOO ccc ersccnsevecccvens 11

Chemical Manufacturers Assn v. NRDC,

No. 83-1013 (Feb. 27, 1985) ................ 10

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, No. 82-1005

EL ccc cabecchee saves as 9,10, 11

Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA,

ee ee 6

FEC vy. Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Committee, 454 U.S. 27 ..... cece eee eee 10

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhoilin,

est ee keh ak deen os 0 et ee0 ve 10

Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792

ee ce baesberssusveentcoers 14

New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.

Public Utilities Comm'n, 742 F.2d 1 ......... 11

(111)

IV

Page

Cases—Continued:

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 ........ 1]

semen ¥. SEC, S50 U.S. FF nc ccccesinccess 6

Cae ¥. Tee, SOO U.S. EF nc cece ccc c ties 10

United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 ......... 10

Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,

ee Eb 605 a0 05 bene ec cane Peeks 10

Statutes and regulation:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

oe ee errr ee rer rr errr 5

Clean Air Act of 1970, Tit. I,

ie Ws FO I oie aes e ev kde pee tec ens 2

Pg ss TOE Sak eh skeen ancesevus 2

$ 202(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7521(d)(1) ........... 2

Oe Oe Wis FARE. Axo bas tlvccesacesucns 2

Ome, 442 U.S. TIA nce ceess 5, 11, 13, 14, 15

@ area), 42 U.S.C. THAME) ooo eve ccecnes 2

Seer Se U.S.C. TORIB) occ cccccvcces 2

§ 207(c), 42 U.S.C.

WEE cael ek cand wa eke s 2, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15

§ 207(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.

TOE cece hes esuat cues 2, 4, 6, 7, 8,9

$ 307(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1) ........... 5

ES I so Beka leek heer nw ks 14

Page

Miscellaneous:

FIG CORR. OG. SIUM O LNT IGD cvaecccvewesncnnes 2

4S Fed. Rem, FOF CISES) osc cccvessececswnes 4,6

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s

Manual on the Administrative Procedure

Pk, rr rir ene rT errr ne ey re 6

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-1098

GENERAL Motors CORPORATION, PETITIONER

V.

LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals sitting en banc (Pet.

App. Al-A48) is reported at 742 F.2d 1561. The vacated

opinion of the court of appeals panel (Pet. App. B1-B67) is

reported at 724 F.2d 979.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. D1) was

entered on September 7, i984. By order dated November

29, 1984, the Chief Justice extended the time within which

to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including

January 7, 1985, and the petition was filed on that date. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. In aneffort to mitigate the harm to human health and

the environment caused by air pollution resulting from

motor vehicles, Congress enacted Title II of the Clean Air

Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. 7521 et seq. Section 202 of the Act,

42 U.S.C. 7521, requires the Administrator of the Envir-

onmental Prutection Agency to prescribe emission stand-

ards that motor vehicles must meet during their useful

lives. Section 202(d)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7521(d)(1),

provides that the useful life of a passenger car is five years or

50,000 miles, whichever first occurs.

Under Section 206 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7525, the

Administrator may require new motor vehicles to be tested

prior to sale to determine whether they conform to the

emission standards prescribed by Section 202. Aware that

presale tests would not be adequate to ensure that vehicles

continue to meet the emission standards while in actual use,

Congress also enacted warranty and recall provisions appli-

cable to vehicles after their sale to consumers. See 116

Cong. Rec. 33093 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). The

warranty provisions, found in Section 207(a) and (b), 42

U.S.C. 7541(a) and (b), provide for the repair of isolated,

individuai vehicle failures. The recall provision of Section

207(c), 42 U.S.C. 7541(c), at issue in this litigation, provides

a remedy when substantial numbers of vehicles in a given

production class exceed emission standards.

Specifically, Section 207(c)(1) provides that if the Admin-

istrator determines that a substantial number of a class of

vehicles, although properly maintained and used by con-

sumers, fail to conform to federal emission standards while

in actual use throughout their useful lives, he shall notify the

manufacturer of the nonconformity. Section 207(c)(1) then

requires the manufacturer to submit, for EPA’s approval, a

remedial plan to recall and repair the nonconforming vehi-

cles in the class at the manufacturer’s expense.

3

2. EPA began investigating 1975 Cadillacs (of engine

family 60V43) in May 1975 when assembly line data indi-

cated that a significant carbon monoxide (CO) problem

might exist in those vehicles. By mid-1976, EPA had

gathered and informed petitioner, General Motors Corpo-

ration, of additional evidence that the Cadillacs were emit-

ting, in actual use, CO substantially in excess of the federal

standard. These findings were confirmed between November

1976 and January 1977, when petitioner conducted retests

of some of the vehicles sampled by EPA. Pet. App. B4-BS.

On March 21, 1977, the Administrator notified peti-

tioner that he had determined that a substantial number of

1975 Cadillacs (of engine family 60V43 with carburetor part

No. 7045230), although properly maintained and used,

failed to meet the federal CO emission standard within their

useful lives. Accordingly, the Administrator required peti-

tioner to submit a remedial plan for that class of vehicles.

Pet. App. A4.

Initially, petitioner submitted a plan for a voluntary

recall of the 1975 Cadillacs; that plan “specifically provided

that ‘[a] vehicle affected will be eligible for repair under the

remedial plan, regardless of vehicle age, mileage, or

owner’ ” (Pet. App. A4-A5 & n.2). EPA did not approve

the proposed plan, however, and negotiations continued for

two years between EPA and petitioner over the effective-

ness of the proposed plan and petitioner’s obligation to

audit the performance of completed repairs (id. at A4-A5).

In December 1979, EPA withdrew its demand that peti-

tioner conduct an audit of the repairs mandated by the

recall, informed petitioner of its intent to conduct its own

audit, and approved the proposed remedial plan (id. at A5).

Shortly thereafter, however, petitioner informed EPA

for the first time that it would exclude from the plan all

nonconforming vehicles that were beyond their five-

year/ 50,000 mile useful lives at the time presented for repair

4

(Pet. App. A5 & n.4). Subsequently, EPA published, on

May 30, 1980, an interpretative rule setting forth its estab-

lished interpretation that Section 207(c)(1) requires a

manufacturer to remedy, at its expense, all vehicles in a

recalled class if those vehicles have been properly main-

tained and used and have experienced a nonconformity

during their useful lives, regardless of their age or mileage at

the time presented for repair (45 Fed. Reg. 36396; Pet.

App. E1-E9). On June 23, 1980, in keeping with this inter-

pretation, the Administrator partially disapproved a reme-

dial plan submitted by petitioner, because the plan excluded

vehicles that might have experienced a nonconformity dur-

ing their useful lives but would exceed five years/ 50,000

miles at the time presented for repair (Pet. App. A6).

2. Petitioner sought review in the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of the May

1980 interpretative rule, and petitioner also sought review

of the Administrator’s partial disapproval of the Cadillac

remedial plan. The court of appeals consolidated the two

petitions for review. Pet. App. A6 & n.5.

a. On December 16, 1983, a divided panel of the court

of appeals issued an opinion vacating the agency’s inter-

pretative rule and final order of disapproval (Pet. App.

B1-B67). Senior Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority,

held that under Section 207(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act, an

automobile manufacturer is not responsible for the repair

of recalled vehicles that are beyond their useful lives at the

time presented for repair. The panel reached this conclusion

even as it admitted that its “holding may impede the

enforcement of emission standards even for cars within

their useful lives” and that the “recall system may be

rendered useless” (Pet. App. B39). Judge Wilkey filed a

concurring opinion setting out four possible constructions

of Section 207(c)(1) and identifying the construction he

believed best comported with the statute and the legislative

5

history (Pet. App. B43-B46). Judge Wald, in dissent, stated

that the panel’s decision invalidating EPA’s interpretative

rule had overstepped appropriate bounds for judicial

review of an enforcement agency’s reasonable statutory

interpretation and that the panel’s decision would permit

automobile manufacturers to circumvent, in whole or in

part, Section 207’s recall and repair obligations through a

strategy of engaging in prolonged litigation (Pet. App.

B47-B67).

b. The court of appeals granted the government’s sug-

gestion for rehearing en banc. Judge Wald, this time writing

for an eight-judge majority, sustained the agency’s inter-

pretative rule and final order (Pet. App. Al-A23). The en

banc court held that EPA’s actions were consistent with the

language, legislative history, and purposes of the Clean Air

Act (ibid.). Senior Judge Bazelon, joined by Judges Tamm

and Wilkey, dissented (id. at A24-A48).

ARGUMENT

The decision of the en banc court of appeals, character-

ized by petitioner as raising an issue of “first impression”

(Pet. 3), iscorrect anddoes not conflict with any decision

of this Court. Moreover, petitioner has failed to demon-

strate that acceptance of its arguments by this Court would

alter the result reached by the court of appeals. Accord-

ingly, further review is not warranted.

1. The court of appeals correctly ruled — and on this

issue the en banc court was unanimous — that EPA’s May

30 rule was an interpretative rule (Pet. App. A7-A10, A24

n.3). Hence, the rule is not void for failure to follow the

notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).!

'The APA exempts from its notice and comment procedures “inter-

pretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organi-

zation, procedure, or practice” (5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A)). The rulemaking

provisions of the Clean Air Act incorporate this provision of the APA

(42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1)).

6

Although petitioner contends that considerable confu-

sion exists regarding the distinction between interpretative

and legislative rulemaking, EPA’s May 30 rule is a classic

example of an interpretative rule. An interpretative rule

simply states what the administrative agency thinks the

Statute means; it only “ ‘reminds’ affected parties of exist-

ing duties.” Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600

F.2d 844, 876 & n.153 (D.C. Cir. !979). See generally Bar-

terton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); U.S. Dep’t

of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947).?

The May 30 rule fits the accepted definition of an inter-

pretative rule perfectly. All that it does and all that it

purports to do is set forth EPA’s interpretation regarding a

manufacturer’s recall liability under Section 207(c)(1). See

45 Fed. Reg. 36396 (1980); Pet. App. El. Indeed, peti-

tioner’s principal challenge to the May 30 rule — that EPA

has misinterpreted the scope of a manufacturer’s liability

under Section 207(c)( 1) — in effect characterizes the rule as

interpretative. The only “requirement” of the May 30 rule is

to remind manufacturers of their statutory obligation to

submit pians, when ordered to do so, that conform to EPA’s

interpretation of Section 207(c)(1). It is a manufacturer’s

refusal to comply with a recall order issued under the sta-

tute, and not its refusal to comply with the interpretative

rule, that is punishable by the statute.

?In Steadman vy. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103 n.22 (1981), the Court

observed:

We have previously noted that the Attorney Generai’s Manual on

the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) has been “given some

deference by this Court because of the role played by the Depart-

ment of Justice in drafting the legislation,” Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 435 U.S. at 546, and Justice Clark was Attorney General

both when the APA was passed and when the Manual was

published.

7

Thus, the May 30 rule did not create any new rights or

duties; itsimply restated the consistent agency practice in

conducting recalls pursuant to Section 207(c)(1). As the rule

itself explains, “[iJn the past, manufacturers have not

conditioned a vehicle’s eligibility for recall repair * * * on

the basis of the vehicle’s age or mileage” (Pet. App. E2). Not

until petitioner announced in February 1980 that it would

exclude older cars from the remedial plan that it had pre-

viously proposed did EPA find it necessary to publish its

interpretation of Section 207(c). See Pet. App. A8-A10 n.7.

Although petitioner contends (Pet. 13) that review should

be granted because the various circuits sometimes employ

different formulations to distinguish legislative rules from

interpretative rules, those differences, even assuming they

exist, are not material here, because EPA’s May 30 rule

would be considered interpretative under any estabiished

test. Moreover, petitioner has failed utterly to demonstrate

how its own proposed test (id. at 13-15) would produce a

different result in this case. Petitioner apparently would

employ a three-factor analysis. First, it would look to con-

gressional intent; under this factor, “rules that essentially

restate or explain Congress’ intent may fairly be considered

interpretative” (id. at 13 (footnote omitted)). As we explain

later in this brief (see pages 12-15, infra), EPA’s May 30 rule

did exactly that.

Second, petitioner would consider (Pet. 14) whether an

agency’s regulation involves significant policy determina-

tions; if it does, petitioner would characterize the rule as

legislative. Here, EPA’s May 30 rule did not, and did not

purport to involve any significant policy determination not

already made by Congress. To be sure, petitioner argues

that the rule “expands” the liability of manufacturers under

Section 207(c)(1) (Pet. 20-21, 27). But the recall plan

requirement described in the May 30 rule is mandated by

Section 207(c)(1) itself, and merely clarifies and restates

8

EPA’s long-standing interpretation of the statutory obliga-

tion for aclass-based recall and repair without regard to the

age or mileage of each vehicle when presented for repair.

Thus, petitioner’s dispute with the agency is merely about

the meaning of the statutory provision itself. Since the rule

does not purport to “expand” the liability of manufacturers

beyond that provided in the statute itself, it would not be

legislative even under petitioner’s own analysis.

Finally, petitioner would consider whether an agency’s

regulation has a “ ‘substantial impact’” on individual

rights and liabilities (Pet. 14-15). Again, EPA’s May 30 rule

does not constitute a legislative rule under petitioner’s own

“substantial impact” analysis. It was the statutory require-

ments of Section 207(c) itself, of which petitioner merely

was “reminded” by the May 30 rule, that had a “substantial

impact” on automobile manufacturers.’ In sum, petitioner’s

Petitioner claims (Pet. 27-29) that if the court of appeals’ decision

upholding the interpretative rule is allowed to stand, manufacturers’

liability for recalls will increase dramatically. Petitioner also suggests

(id. at 27) that recalls have escalated greatly since the interpretative rule

was published in 1980 and, therefore, that the number of older vehicles

eligible for repair under the rule also is growing. These claims are both

inaccurate and irrelevant.

Petitioner’s argument, once again, is premised on the erroneous

assumption that the interpretative rule exceeded the intended scope of

Section 207(c)(1) of the Act by making manufacturers liable for recall

and repair of nonconforming vehicles that are past their statutory useful

lives. However, as the court of appeals correctly concluded, the inter-

pretative rule “did not create any new rights or duties,” but merely

res.ated “the consistent practice of the agency in conducting recalls

pursuant to section 207(c)” (Pet. App. A8). Moreover, the court con-

cluded that EPA’s interpretation was amply supported by the language,

legislative history, and purposes of Section 207(c)(1), as well as by

relevant case law (Pet. App. Al3, Al6, Al7 & n.12, A20-A22). There-

fore, whatever number of vehicles may be recalled in the future, that

number will be due to the implementation of purely statutory require-

ments and not to the interpretative rule.

In addition, petitioner is simply wrong in suggesting that the number

of vehicles recalled has risen drastically since 1980. Contrary to

9

own approach to the legislative/ interpretative rulemaking

dichotomy shows that there is no need for further review of

the unanimous judgment of the en banc court of appeals

that the May 30 rule was an interpretative rule.

2. Petitioner next contends (Pet. 21-26) that the court of

appeals compounded its alleged error when, after determin-

ing that the May 30 rule was interpretative rather than

legislative, the court applied the “highly deferential” (id. at

21) standard of review articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

v. NRDC, No. 82-1005 (June 25, 1984), to its review of the

May 30 rule. Petitioner’s argument is erroneous.

\

petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 27), the total number of vehicles recalled in

1979 (before the interpretative rule was issued) was not 837,000, but

approximately 2.5 million. Petitioner’s calculations of vehicles recalled

in 1979 and 1983 purportedly were derived from Attachment 7 to an

EPA Staff Memorandum of May 9, 1980. Pet. 27 n.31. That memoran-

dum is included in the appendix to the petition (Pet. App. H1-H8),

although Attachment 7 is not. In any event, Attachment 7 (which is part

of the record below) clearly indicates that the total number of vehicles

recalled in 1979 was about 2.5 million. This figure includes voluntary as

well as mandatory recalls, as does the 1983 total of 3 million that

petitioner uses for comparison purposes. (Interestingly, petitioner has

not mentioned that Attachment 7 also shows that the total number of

vehicles recalled in 1978 likewise was abuut 2.6 million.) These figures

are not dramatically different from the 1983 total of 3 million vehicles

(correctly cited by petitioner) and demonstrate that the total number of

vehicles recalled and, therefore, the impact of the interpretative rule on

the total number of vehicles eligible for repair, is not rising substantially.

In any event, petitioner has failed to show how the number of vehicles

recalled in any given year is even relevant to the questions whether EPA

has correctly interpreted the statute and whether the court of appeals

properly upheld that interpretation. Since the interpretative rule merely

restated EPA’s long-standing and consistent application of Section

207(c)(1) (see Pet. App. A3, A8 & n.7), the rule itself (whether or not

the underlying interpretation is correct) could not be the cause, per se,

of any increase in recalls. For the same reason, the number of vehicles

recalled before and after the interpretative rule was issued has no

bearing on whether EPA properly interpreted the statute in the first

place.

10

First, petitioner seems to proceed on the assumption that

the principle of deference to administrative expertise

applied in Chevron established new law. As the Court

explicitly recognized, however, the principle is of long-

Standing vintage. Chevron, slip op. 6-7 & n.14.4 Thus, the

court of appeals cited Chevron only for the well-established

proposition that a reviewing court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the agency if the agency’s interpreta-

tion is “sufficiently reasonable” (Pet. App. All (citation

omitted)). See also FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Cam-

paign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981); Udall v. Tallman,

380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S.

374, 381-382 (1961). Although it is true that Chevron

involved judicial review of legislative rulemaking, nothing

in the opinion purports to limit the traditional deference

principle to such cases, nor to alter the well-established

proposition that “the interpretation given [a] statute by the

officers or agency charged with its administration” is

entitled to substantial deference. Ford Motor Credit Co. v.

Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (quoting Zenith Radio

Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)).

Second, the court of appeals did not in any event substi-

tute blind “deference” to EPA for its own review of the

Statute and its legislative history. Instead, the court

reviewed the contentions of the parties at length (Pet. App.

A12-A22) and concluded that EPA’s position found “sub-

stantial support, and no contradiction, in the language and

legislative history of section 207 of the Clean Air Act” (id. at

All (emphasis added)). In these circumstances, even the

‘Although the principle is by no means new, it undoubtedly has taken

on increasing importance — indeed, necessity — with the advent of

extraordinarily technical and complex statutes such as the Clean Air

Act. Cf. Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC, No. 83-1013 (Feb.

27, 1985), slip op. 8-9. Petitioner has not identified any compelling

reason for ignoring this reality in the instant case.

1]

most minimal degree of deference to administrative exper-

tise would require upholding the agency’s interpretation.

Finally, petitioner again has failed to explain how the

outcome of this case would have been any different if,

instead of citing Chevron, the court of appeals had applied

the standard enunciated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

U.S. 134 (1944). On the contrary, the court of appeals

explained at length (see, e.g., Pet. App. A8-Al1 n.7) the

basis for its conclusion that EPA’s interpretation of Section

207 was longstanding, consistent, and the product of the

agency’s specialized expertise. Thus, the court’s validation

of the agency’s interpretation rested on “the thoroughness

evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its

consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all

those factors which give it power to persuade * * *.” Skid-

more, 323 U.S. at 140.°

3. Although petitioner lists the court of appeals’ ultimate

determination to sustain the agency’s May 30 rule as a

question presented by the petition (Pet. i), petitioner has not

discussed that issue in the petition itself. Accordingly, we set

forth here only a brief description of the merits of the

5Petitioner contends (Pet. 26) that the courts of appeals are in con-

flict over the applicability of Chevron’s principle of deference to inter-

pretative rules. The conflict, if any, is quite illusory. For example. New

England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 742

F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1984), did not even involve an interpretative rule;

instead, the court refused to defer to the interpretations of the agency’s

General Counsel, “contained only in his brief.” And in Capitano

v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 732 F.2d 1066, 1076 (2d

Cir. 1984), the court refused to defer to the agency upon concluding that

the agency’s interpretation was inconsistent with the spirit of the sta-

tute. In the instant case, by contrast, the court of appeals expressly

concluded (Pet. App. A20-A22) that the May 30 rule furthers the

purposes of Congress in enacting the Clean Air Act. There is nothing in

the opinion to suggest that the court would have accorded undue

deference to the agency’s interpretation had it concluded otherwise.

12

controversy, sufficient to demonstrate that the court of

appeais was correct in upholding the agency’s May 30 rule.

a. EPA’s interpretative rule simply follows the statutory

directive enacted by Congress in Section 207(c), which

mandates a class-based approach to recalls. Section 207(c)

reads, in pertinent part:

(1) If the Administrator determines that a substan-

tial number of any class or category of vehicles or

engines, although properly maintained and used, do

not conform to the regulations prescribed under sec-

tion 7521 of this title, when in actual use throughout

their useful life (as determined under section 7521(d) of

this title) he shall immediately notify the manufacturer

thereof of such nonconformity, and he shall require the

manufacturer to submit a plan for remedying the non-

conformity of the vehicles or engines with respect to

which such notification is given. The plan shall provide

that the nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines

which are properly used and maintained will be reme-

died at the expense of the manufacturer. * * *

(2) Any notification required by paragraph (1) with

respect to any class or category of vehicles or engines

shall be given to dealers, ultimate purchasers, and sub-

sequent purchasers (if known) in such manner and

containing such information as the Administrator may

by regulations require.

Thus, the statute requires that notification of a recall go

to owners of all vehicles within an entire class, without

distinction among individual vehicles. The statute further

requires a manufacturer to remedy the nonconformity “of

the vehicles with respect to which * * * notification is

given,” i.e., every nonconforming vehicle within the entire

class of vehicles, with but one exception for vehicles that

have not been “properly used and maintained.” Otherwise,

13

the statutory language on its face allows no exception to a

manufacturer’s obligation to repair all vehicles within a

particular recalled class that exceeded the standards during

their useful lives.

The interpretative rule tracks the statute, by focusing ona

class of vehicles. The rule clarifies that the manufacturer’s

remedial obligation includes all the vehicles within the class

that exceed standards during their useful lives, even if they

are beyond their useful lives at the time presented for repair,

since it is clear that even such older vehicles are within the

class for which notification was given.®

In short, if a class of vehicles fails to conform to the

standards during the useful life of those vehicles, the obliga-

tion to recall and repair the class does not end as individual

vehicles cross the five-year /50,000 mile threshold. The fact

remains that vehicles in the class failed to meet the stand-

ards during their useful lives. The nonconformity of the

class can be corrected only by repairing each nonconform-

ing vehicle in the class, as the statute and the interpretative

rule require.

Petitioner’s interpretation of Section 207 would effec-

tively rewrite the statute. Under petitioner’s reading, manu-

facturers would be required “to submit a plan for remedying

the nonconformity of the vehicles or engines with respect to

which such notification is given[,]” except for those vehicles

that will have passed beyond their useful lives at the time

presented for repair. The remedial plan would “provide that

the nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines which are

properly used and maintained will be remedied at the

expense of the manufacturer[,]” except for those vehicles

*A manufacturer is not liable for repairs to the extent it can affirma-

tively demonstrate that a particular vehicle within the recalled class did

not exceed the standards during its useful life.

14 |

that have passed beyond their useful lives at the time pres-

ented for repair. If Congress had intended this scheme, it

easily could have drafted the statute in this fashion. Accord-

ingly, the court of appeals properly declined petitioner’s

invitation to interpret the statute as if Congress had enacted

such a limitation. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell,

No. 82-792 (Feb. 28, 1984), slip op. 8.’

b. EPA’s interpretative rule also is fully consistent with

the purposes of the Clean Air Act in generai and Section

207(c) in particular. One of the principal purposes of the

Clean Air Act is “to protect and enhance the quality of the

Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health

and welfare and the productive capacity of its population”

(42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1)). EPA’s interpretation of Section 207

advances that purpose by ensuring that manufacturers

retain the incentive to design pollution control equipment

that will last the full useful life of five years or 50,000 miles.

Petitioner’s interpretation, on the other hand, would allow

manufacturers to breach that requirement and escape the

consequences. For example, a manufacturer could employ

an emission control system that would function only for

40,000 miles, knowing that by the time EPA sampled a

“substantial number” of high-mileage cars to discover the

defect and institute recall proceedings, most (if not all) of

the vehicles in the class would have passed the 50,000-mile

mark. In addition, manufacturers could limit their liability

substantially by delaying administrative recall proceedings

and engaging in protracted litigation after a nonconformity

was discovered, so that most (if not all) of the vehicles in the

class would have exceeded their useful lives before being

presented for repair. Thus, the public would be forced to

’The court of appeals discussed the legislative history of Section 207

at length and demonstrated that it fully supports EPA’s interpretation

of the statute. See Pet. App. A16-A20. Accordingly, we will not repeat

that discussion here.

a

15

bear the burden of this additional increment of air pollution

without effective recourse through the mechanism of Sec-

tion 207(c). The courts will not “impute to Congress a

purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to pro-

mote with the other.” American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v.

Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, EPA’s interpretation of Section 207 fully

comports with, and does not exceed, the expressed intent of

Congress.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. LEE

Solicitor General

MYLEs E. FLINT

Acting Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT L. KLARQUIST

JOHN L. WITTENBORN

JACQUES B. GELIN

Attorneys

RALPH J. COLLELI, JR.

MARY SMITH

Attorneys

Environmental Protection Agency

APRIL 1985

DOJ-1985-04

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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