Opposition Brief — General Motors Corp. v. Thomas
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(4) APR & 1983
No. 84-1098
ALEXANDER t STEVAS,
= acme s | 4
Iu the Supreme Court of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1984
GENERAL Motors CORPORATION, PETITIONER
Vv.
Lee M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General
MY Les E. FLInt
Acting Assistant Attorney General
RosBerT L. KLARQUIST
JOHN L. WITTENBORN
JACQUES B. GELIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
RALPH J. COLLELI, JR.
Mary SMITH
Attorneys
Environmental Protectior Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a rule issued to express the Environmental
Protection Agency’s interpretation of Section 207(c)(1) of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7541(c)(1), was an “inter-
pretative” rule and therefore properly issued without notice
and opportunity for comment.
2. Whether the court of appeals correctly sustained the
interpretative rule at issue as a reasonable interpretation of
Section 207(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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ee lt keep ee ke WA OMS bh eeee l
sates SE Sa ann 2
EE ee eee ee ree m
ae 15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,
Ee 15
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 ............. 6
Capitano v. Secretary of Health and Human
UE, Fad WE BOO ccc ersccnsevecccvens 11
Chemical Manufacturers Assn v. NRDC,
No. 83-1013 (Feb. 27, 1985) ................ 10
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, No. 82-1005
EL ccc cabecchee saves as 9,10, 11
Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA,
ee ee 6
FEC vy. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, 454 U.S. 27 ..... cece eee eee 10
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhoilin,
est ee keh ak deen os 0 et ee0 ve 10
Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792
ee ce baesberssusveentcoers 14
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n, 742 F.2d 1 ......... 11
(111)
IV
Page
Cases—Continued:
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 ........ 1]
semen ¥. SEC, S50 U.S. FF nc ccccesinccess 6
Cae ¥. Tee, SOO U.S. EF nc cece ccc c ties 10
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 ......... 10
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,
ee Eb 605 a0 05 bene ec cane Peeks 10
Statutes and regulation:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
oe ee errr ee rer rr errr 5
Clean Air Act of 1970, Tit. I,
ie Ws FO I oie aes e ev kde pee tec ens 2
Pg ss TOE Sak eh skeen ancesevus 2
$ 202(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7521(d)(1) ........... 2
Oe Oe Wis FARE. Axo bas tlvccesacesucns 2
Ome, 442 U.S. TIA nce ceess 5, 11, 13, 14, 15
@ area), 42 U.S.C. THAME) ooo eve ccecnes 2
Seer Se U.S.C. TORIB) occ cccccvcces 2
§ 207(c), 42 U.S.C.
WEE cael ek cand wa eke s 2, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15
§ 207(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.
TOE cece hes esuat cues 2, 4, 6, 7, 8,9
$ 307(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1) ........... 5
ES I so Beka leek heer nw ks 14
Page
Miscellaneous:
FIG CORR. OG. SIUM O LNT IGD cvaecccvewesncnnes 2
4S Fed. Rem, FOF CISES) osc cccvessececswnes 4,6
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Pk, rr rir ene rT errr ne ey re 6
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1984
No. 84-1098
GENERAL Motors CORPORATION, PETITIONER
V.
LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals sitting en banc (Pet.
App. Al-A48) is reported at 742 F.2d 1561. The vacated
opinion of the court of appeals panel (Pet. App. B1-B67) is
reported at 724 F.2d 979.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. D1) was
entered on September 7, i984. By order dated November
29, 1984, the Chief Justice extended the time within which
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including
January 7, 1985, and the petition was filed on that date. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. In aneffort to mitigate the harm to human health and
the environment caused by air pollution resulting from
motor vehicles, Congress enacted Title II of the Clean Air
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. 7521 et seq. Section 202 of the Act,
42 U.S.C. 7521, requires the Administrator of the Envir-
onmental Prutection Agency to prescribe emission stand-
ards that motor vehicles must meet during their useful
lives. Section 202(d)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7521(d)(1),
provides that the useful life of a passenger car is five years or
50,000 miles, whichever first occurs.
Under Section 206 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7525, the
Administrator may require new motor vehicles to be tested
prior to sale to determine whether they conform to the
emission standards prescribed by Section 202. Aware that
presale tests would not be adequate to ensure that vehicles
continue to meet the emission standards while in actual use,
Congress also enacted warranty and recall provisions appli-
cable to vehicles after their sale to consumers. See 116
Cong. Rec. 33093 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). The
warranty provisions, found in Section 207(a) and (b), 42
U.S.C. 7541(a) and (b), provide for the repair of isolated,
individuai vehicle failures. The recall provision of Section
207(c), 42 U.S.C. 7541(c), at issue in this litigation, provides
a remedy when substantial numbers of vehicles in a given
production class exceed emission standards.
Specifically, Section 207(c)(1) provides that if the Admin-
istrator determines that a substantial number of a class of
vehicles, although properly maintained and used by con-
sumers, fail to conform to federal emission standards while
in actual use throughout their useful lives, he shall notify the
manufacturer of the nonconformity. Section 207(c)(1) then
requires the manufacturer to submit, for EPA’s approval, a
remedial plan to recall and repair the nonconforming vehi-
cles in the class at the manufacturer’s expense.
3
2. EPA began investigating 1975 Cadillacs (of engine
family 60V43) in May 1975 when assembly line data indi-
cated that a significant carbon monoxide (CO) problem
might exist in those vehicles. By mid-1976, EPA had
gathered and informed petitioner, General Motors Corpo-
ration, of additional evidence that the Cadillacs were emit-
ting, in actual use, CO substantially in excess of the federal
standard. These findings were confirmed between November
1976 and January 1977, when petitioner conducted retests
of some of the vehicles sampled by EPA. Pet. App. B4-BS.
On March 21, 1977, the Administrator notified peti-
tioner that he had determined that a substantial number of
1975 Cadillacs (of engine family 60V43 with carburetor part
No. 7045230), although properly maintained and used,
failed to meet the federal CO emission standard within their
useful lives. Accordingly, the Administrator required peti-
tioner to submit a remedial plan for that class of vehicles.
Pet. App. A4.
Initially, petitioner submitted a plan for a voluntary
recall of the 1975 Cadillacs; that plan “specifically provided
that ‘[a] vehicle affected will be eligible for repair under the
remedial plan, regardless of vehicle age, mileage, or
owner’ ” (Pet. App. A4-A5 & n.2). EPA did not approve
the proposed plan, however, and negotiations continued for
two years between EPA and petitioner over the effective-
ness of the proposed plan and petitioner’s obligation to
audit the performance of completed repairs (id. at A4-A5).
In December 1979, EPA withdrew its demand that peti-
tioner conduct an audit of the repairs mandated by the
recall, informed petitioner of its intent to conduct its own
audit, and approved the proposed remedial plan (id. at A5).
Shortly thereafter, however, petitioner informed EPA
for the first time that it would exclude from the plan all
nonconforming vehicles that were beyond their five-
year/ 50,000 mile useful lives at the time presented for repair
4
(Pet. App. A5 & n.4). Subsequently, EPA published, on
May 30, 1980, an interpretative rule setting forth its estab-
lished interpretation that Section 207(c)(1) requires a
manufacturer to remedy, at its expense, all vehicles in a
recalled class if those vehicles have been properly main-
tained and used and have experienced a nonconformity
during their useful lives, regardless of their age or mileage at
the time presented for repair (45 Fed. Reg. 36396; Pet.
App. E1-E9). On June 23, 1980, in keeping with this inter-
pretation, the Administrator partially disapproved a reme-
dial plan submitted by petitioner, because the plan excluded
vehicles that might have experienced a nonconformity dur-
ing their useful lives but would exceed five years/ 50,000
miles at the time presented for repair (Pet. App. A6).
2. Petitioner sought review in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of the May
1980 interpretative rule, and petitioner also sought review
of the Administrator’s partial disapproval of the Cadillac
remedial plan. The court of appeals consolidated the two
petitions for review. Pet. App. A6 & n.5.
a. On December 16, 1983, a divided panel of the court
of appeals issued an opinion vacating the agency’s inter-
pretative rule and final order of disapproval (Pet. App.
B1-B67). Senior Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority,
held that under Section 207(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act, an
automobile manufacturer is not responsible for the repair
of recalled vehicles that are beyond their useful lives at the
time presented for repair. The panel reached this conclusion
even as it admitted that its “holding may impede the
enforcement of emission standards even for cars within
their useful lives” and that the “recall system may be
rendered useless” (Pet. App. B39). Judge Wilkey filed a
concurring opinion setting out four possible constructions
of Section 207(c)(1) and identifying the construction he
believed best comported with the statute and the legislative
5
history (Pet. App. B43-B46). Judge Wald, in dissent, stated
that the panel’s decision invalidating EPA’s interpretative
rule had overstepped appropriate bounds for judicial
review of an enforcement agency’s reasonable statutory
interpretation and that the panel’s decision would permit
automobile manufacturers to circumvent, in whole or in
part, Section 207’s recall and repair obligations through a
strategy of engaging in prolonged litigation (Pet. App.
B47-B67).
b. The court of appeals granted the government’s sug-
gestion for rehearing en banc. Judge Wald, this time writing
for an eight-judge majority, sustained the agency’s inter-
pretative rule and final order (Pet. App. Al-A23). The en
banc court held that EPA’s actions were consistent with the
language, legislative history, and purposes of the Clean Air
Act (ibid.). Senior Judge Bazelon, joined by Judges Tamm
and Wilkey, dissented (id. at A24-A48).
ARGUMENT
The decision of the en banc court of appeals, character-
ized by petitioner as raising an issue of “first impression”
(Pet. 3), iscorrect anddoes not conflict with any decision
of this Court. Moreover, petitioner has failed to demon-
strate that acceptance of its arguments by this Court would
alter the result reached by the court of appeals. Accord-
ingly, further review is not warranted.
1. The court of appeals correctly ruled — and on this
issue the en banc court was unanimous — that EPA’s May
30 rule was an interpretative rule (Pet. App. A7-A10, A24
n.3). Hence, the rule is not void for failure to follow the
notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).!
'The APA exempts from its notice and comment procedures “inter-
pretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organi-
zation, procedure, or practice” (5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A)). The rulemaking
provisions of the Clean Air Act incorporate this provision of the APA
(42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1)).
6
Although petitioner contends that considerable confu-
sion exists regarding the distinction between interpretative
and legislative rulemaking, EPA’s May 30 rule is a classic
example of an interpretative rule. An interpretative rule
simply states what the administrative agency thinks the
Statute means; it only “ ‘reminds’ affected parties of exist-
ing duties.” Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600
F.2d 844, 876 & n.153 (D.C. Cir. !979). See generally Bar-
terton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947).?
The May 30 rule fits the accepted definition of an inter-
pretative rule perfectly. All that it does and all that it
purports to do is set forth EPA’s interpretation regarding a
manufacturer’s recall liability under Section 207(c)(1). See
45 Fed. Reg. 36396 (1980); Pet. App. El. Indeed, peti-
tioner’s principal challenge to the May 30 rule — that EPA
has misinterpreted the scope of a manufacturer’s liability
under Section 207(c)( 1) — in effect characterizes the rule as
interpretative. The only “requirement” of the May 30 rule is
to remind manufacturers of their statutory obligation to
submit pians, when ordered to do so, that conform to EPA’s
interpretation of Section 207(c)(1). It is a manufacturer’s
refusal to comply with a recall order issued under the sta-
tute, and not its refusal to comply with the interpretative
rule, that is punishable by the statute.
?In Steadman vy. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103 n.22 (1981), the Court
observed:
We have previously noted that the Attorney Generai’s Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) has been “given some
deference by this Court because of the role played by the Depart-
ment of Justice in drafting the legislation,” Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. at 546, and Justice Clark was Attorney General
both when the APA was passed and when the Manual was
published.
7
Thus, the May 30 rule did not create any new rights or
duties; itsimply restated the consistent agency practice in
conducting recalls pursuant to Section 207(c)(1). As the rule
itself explains, “[iJn the past, manufacturers have not
conditioned a vehicle’s eligibility for recall repair * * * on
the basis of the vehicle’s age or mileage” (Pet. App. E2). Not
until petitioner announced in February 1980 that it would
exclude older cars from the remedial plan that it had pre-
viously proposed did EPA find it necessary to publish its
interpretation of Section 207(c). See Pet. App. A8-A10 n.7.
Although petitioner contends (Pet. 13) that review should
be granted because the various circuits sometimes employ
different formulations to distinguish legislative rules from
interpretative rules, those differences, even assuming they
exist, are not material here, because EPA’s May 30 rule
would be considered interpretative under any estabiished
test. Moreover, petitioner has failed utterly to demonstrate
how its own proposed test (id. at 13-15) would produce a
different result in this case. Petitioner apparently would
employ a three-factor analysis. First, it would look to con-
gressional intent; under this factor, “rules that essentially
restate or explain Congress’ intent may fairly be considered
interpretative” (id. at 13 (footnote omitted)). As we explain
later in this brief (see pages 12-15, infra), EPA’s May 30 rule
did exactly that.
Second, petitioner would consider (Pet. 14) whether an
agency’s regulation involves significant policy determina-
tions; if it does, petitioner would characterize the rule as
legislative. Here, EPA’s May 30 rule did not, and did not
purport to involve any significant policy determination not
already made by Congress. To be sure, petitioner argues
that the rule “expands” the liability of manufacturers under
Section 207(c)(1) (Pet. 20-21, 27). But the recall plan
requirement described in the May 30 rule is mandated by
Section 207(c)(1) itself, and merely clarifies and restates
8
EPA’s long-standing interpretation of the statutory obliga-
tion for aclass-based recall and repair without regard to the
age or mileage of each vehicle when presented for repair.
Thus, petitioner’s dispute with the agency is merely about
the meaning of the statutory provision itself. Since the rule
does not purport to “expand” the liability of manufacturers
beyond that provided in the statute itself, it would not be
legislative even under petitioner’s own analysis.
Finally, petitioner would consider whether an agency’s
regulation has a “ ‘substantial impact’” on individual
rights and liabilities (Pet. 14-15). Again, EPA’s May 30 rule
does not constitute a legislative rule under petitioner’s own
“substantial impact” analysis. It was the statutory require-
ments of Section 207(c) itself, of which petitioner merely
was “reminded” by the May 30 rule, that had a “substantial
impact” on automobile manufacturers.’ In sum, petitioner’s
Petitioner claims (Pet. 27-29) that if the court of appeals’ decision
upholding the interpretative rule is allowed to stand, manufacturers’
liability for recalls will increase dramatically. Petitioner also suggests
(id. at 27) that recalls have escalated greatly since the interpretative rule
was published in 1980 and, therefore, that the number of older vehicles
eligible for repair under the rule also is growing. These claims are both
inaccurate and irrelevant.
Petitioner’s argument, once again, is premised on the erroneous
assumption that the interpretative rule exceeded the intended scope of
Section 207(c)(1) of the Act by making manufacturers liable for recall
and repair of nonconforming vehicles that are past their statutory useful
lives. However, as the court of appeals correctly concluded, the inter-
pretative rule “did not create any new rights or duties,” but merely
res.ated “the consistent practice of the agency in conducting recalls
pursuant to section 207(c)” (Pet. App. A8). Moreover, the court con-
cluded that EPA’s interpretation was amply supported by the language,
legislative history, and purposes of Section 207(c)(1), as well as by
relevant case law (Pet. App. Al3, Al6, Al7 & n.12, A20-A22). There-
fore, whatever number of vehicles may be recalled in the future, that
number will be due to the implementation of purely statutory require-
ments and not to the interpretative rule.
In addition, petitioner is simply wrong in suggesting that the number
of vehicles recalled has risen drastically since 1980. Contrary to
9
own approach to the legislative/ interpretative rulemaking
dichotomy shows that there is no need for further review of
the unanimous judgment of the en banc court of appeals
that the May 30 rule was an interpretative rule.
2. Petitioner next contends (Pet. 21-26) that the court of
appeals compounded its alleged error when, after determin-
ing that the May 30 rule was interpretative rather than
legislative, the court applied the “highly deferential” (id. at
21) standard of review articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NRDC, No. 82-1005 (June 25, 1984), to its review of the
May 30 rule. Petitioner’s argument is erroneous.
\
petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 27), the total number of vehicles recalled in
1979 (before the interpretative rule was issued) was not 837,000, but
approximately 2.5 million. Petitioner’s calculations of vehicles recalled
in 1979 and 1983 purportedly were derived from Attachment 7 to an
EPA Staff Memorandum of May 9, 1980. Pet. 27 n.31. That memoran-
dum is included in the appendix to the petition (Pet. App. H1-H8),
although Attachment 7 is not. In any event, Attachment 7 (which is part
of the record below) clearly indicates that the total number of vehicles
recalled in 1979 was about 2.5 million. This figure includes voluntary as
well as mandatory recalls, as does the 1983 total of 3 million that
petitioner uses for comparison purposes. (Interestingly, petitioner has
not mentioned that Attachment 7 also shows that the total number of
vehicles recalled in 1978 likewise was abuut 2.6 million.) These figures
are not dramatically different from the 1983 total of 3 million vehicles
(correctly cited by petitioner) and demonstrate that the total number of
vehicles recalled and, therefore, the impact of the interpretative rule on
the total number of vehicles eligible for repair, is not rising substantially.
In any event, petitioner has failed to show how the number of vehicles
recalled in any given year is even relevant to the questions whether EPA
has correctly interpreted the statute and whether the court of appeals
properly upheld that interpretation. Since the interpretative rule merely
restated EPA’s long-standing and consistent application of Section
207(c)(1) (see Pet. App. A3, A8 & n.7), the rule itself (whether or not
the underlying interpretation is correct) could not be the cause, per se,
of any increase in recalls. For the same reason, the number of vehicles
recalled before and after the interpretative rule was issued has no
bearing on whether EPA properly interpreted the statute in the first
place.
10
First, petitioner seems to proceed on the assumption that
the principle of deference to administrative expertise
applied in Chevron established new law. As the Court
explicitly recognized, however, the principle is of long-
Standing vintage. Chevron, slip op. 6-7 & n.14.4 Thus, the
court of appeals cited Chevron only for the well-established
proposition that a reviewing court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency if the agency’s interpreta-
tion is “sufficiently reasonable” (Pet. App. All (citation
omitted)). See also FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Cam-
paign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S.
374, 381-382 (1961). Although it is true that Chevron
involved judicial review of legislative rulemaking, nothing
in the opinion purports to limit the traditional deference
principle to such cases, nor to alter the well-established
proposition that “the interpretation given [a] statute by the
officers or agency charged with its administration” is
entitled to substantial deference. Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (quoting Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)).
Second, the court of appeals did not in any event substi-
tute blind “deference” to EPA for its own review of the
Statute and its legislative history. Instead, the court
reviewed the contentions of the parties at length (Pet. App.
A12-A22) and concluded that EPA’s position found “sub-
stantial support, and no contradiction, in the language and
legislative history of section 207 of the Clean Air Act” (id. at
All (emphasis added)). In these circumstances, even the
‘Although the principle is by no means new, it undoubtedly has taken
on increasing importance — indeed, necessity — with the advent of
extraordinarily technical and complex statutes such as the Clean Air
Act. Cf. Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC, No. 83-1013 (Feb.
27, 1985), slip op. 8-9. Petitioner has not identified any compelling
reason for ignoring this reality in the instant case.
1]
most minimal degree of deference to administrative exper-
tise would require upholding the agency’s interpretation.
Finally, petitioner again has failed to explain how the
outcome of this case would have been any different if,
instead of citing Chevron, the court of appeals had applied
the standard enunciated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944). On the contrary, the court of appeals
explained at length (see, e.g., Pet. App. A8-Al1 n.7) the
basis for its conclusion that EPA’s interpretation of Section
207 was longstanding, consistent, and the product of the
agency’s specialized expertise. Thus, the court’s validation
of the agency’s interpretation rested on “the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade * * *.” Skid-
more, 323 U.S. at 140.°
3. Although petitioner lists the court of appeals’ ultimate
determination to sustain the agency’s May 30 rule as a
question presented by the petition (Pet. i), petitioner has not
discussed that issue in the petition itself. Accordingly, we set
forth here only a brief description of the merits of the
5Petitioner contends (Pet. 26) that the courts of appeals are in con-
flict over the applicability of Chevron’s principle of deference to inter-
pretative rules. The conflict, if any, is quite illusory. For example. New
England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 742
F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1984), did not even involve an interpretative rule;
instead, the court refused to defer to the interpretations of the agency’s
General Counsel, “contained only in his brief.” And in Capitano
v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 732 F.2d 1066, 1076 (2d
Cir. 1984), the court refused to defer to the agency upon concluding that
the agency’s interpretation was inconsistent with the spirit of the sta-
tute. In the instant case, by contrast, the court of appeals expressly
concluded (Pet. App. A20-A22) that the May 30 rule furthers the
purposes of Congress in enacting the Clean Air Act. There is nothing in
the opinion to suggest that the court would have accorded undue
deference to the agency’s interpretation had it concluded otherwise.
12
controversy, sufficient to demonstrate that the court of
appeais was correct in upholding the agency’s May 30 rule.
a. EPA’s interpretative rule simply follows the statutory
directive enacted by Congress in Section 207(c), which
mandates a class-based approach to recalls. Section 207(c)
reads, in pertinent part:
(1) If the Administrator determines that a substan-
tial number of any class or category of vehicles or
engines, although properly maintained and used, do
not conform to the regulations prescribed under sec-
tion 7521 of this title, when in actual use throughout
their useful life (as determined under section 7521(d) of
this title) he shall immediately notify the manufacturer
thereof of such nonconformity, and he shall require the
manufacturer to submit a plan for remedying the non-
conformity of the vehicles or engines with respect to
which such notification is given. The plan shall provide
that the nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines
which are properly used and maintained will be reme-
died at the expense of the manufacturer. * * *
(2) Any notification required by paragraph (1) with
respect to any class or category of vehicles or engines
shall be given to dealers, ultimate purchasers, and sub-
sequent purchasers (if known) in such manner and
containing such information as the Administrator may
by regulations require.
Thus, the statute requires that notification of a recall go
to owners of all vehicles within an entire class, without
distinction among individual vehicles. The statute further
requires a manufacturer to remedy the nonconformity “of
the vehicles with respect to which * * * notification is
given,” i.e., every nonconforming vehicle within the entire
class of vehicles, with but one exception for vehicles that
have not been “properly used and maintained.” Otherwise,
13
the statutory language on its face allows no exception to a
manufacturer’s obligation to repair all vehicles within a
particular recalled class that exceeded the standards during
their useful lives.
The interpretative rule tracks the statute, by focusing ona
class of vehicles. The rule clarifies that the manufacturer’s
remedial obligation includes all the vehicles within the class
that exceed standards during their useful lives, even if they
are beyond their useful lives at the time presented for repair,
since it is clear that even such older vehicles are within the
class for which notification was given.®
In short, if a class of vehicles fails to conform to the
standards during the useful life of those vehicles, the obliga-
tion to recall and repair the class does not end as individual
vehicles cross the five-year /50,000 mile threshold. The fact
remains that vehicles in the class failed to meet the stand-
ards during their useful lives. The nonconformity of the
class can be corrected only by repairing each nonconform-
ing vehicle in the class, as the statute and the interpretative
rule require.
Petitioner’s interpretation of Section 207 would effec-
tively rewrite the statute. Under petitioner’s reading, manu-
facturers would be required “to submit a plan for remedying
the nonconformity of the vehicles or engines with respect to
which such notification is given[,]” except for those vehicles
that will have passed beyond their useful lives at the time
presented for repair. The remedial plan would “provide that
the nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines which are
properly used and maintained will be remedied at the
expense of the manufacturer[,]” except for those vehicles
*A manufacturer is not liable for repairs to the extent it can affirma-
tively demonstrate that a particular vehicle within the recalled class did
not exceed the standards during its useful life.
14 |
that have passed beyond their useful lives at the time pres-
ented for repair. If Congress had intended this scheme, it
easily could have drafted the statute in this fashion. Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals properly declined petitioner’s
invitation to interpret the statute as if Congress had enacted
such a limitation. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell,
No. 82-792 (Feb. 28, 1984), slip op. 8.’
b. EPA’s interpretative rule also is fully consistent with
the purposes of the Clean Air Act in generai and Section
207(c) in particular. One of the principal purposes of the
Clean Air Act is “to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population”
(42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1)). EPA’s interpretation of Section 207
advances that purpose by ensuring that manufacturers
retain the incentive to design pollution control equipment
that will last the full useful life of five years or 50,000 miles.
Petitioner’s interpretation, on the other hand, would allow
manufacturers to breach that requirement and escape the
consequences. For example, a manufacturer could employ
an emission control system that would function only for
40,000 miles, knowing that by the time EPA sampled a
“substantial number” of high-mileage cars to discover the
defect and institute recall proceedings, most (if not all) of
the vehicles in the class would have passed the 50,000-mile
mark. In addition, manufacturers could limit their liability
substantially by delaying administrative recall proceedings
and engaging in protracted litigation after a nonconformity
was discovered, so that most (if not all) of the vehicles in the
class would have exceeded their useful lives before being
presented for repair. Thus, the public would be forced to
’The court of appeals discussed the legislative history of Section 207
at length and demonstrated that it fully supports EPA’s interpretation
of the statute. See Pet. App. A16-A20. Accordingly, we will not repeat
that discussion here.
a
15
bear the burden of this additional increment of air pollution
without effective recourse through the mechanism of Sec-
tion 207(c). The courts will not “impute to Congress a
purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to pro-
mote with the other.” American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, EPA’s interpretation of Section 207 fully
comports with, and does not exceed, the expressed intent of
Congress.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Rex E. LEE
Solicitor General
MYLEs E. FLINT
Acting Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
JOHN L. WITTENBORN
JACQUES B. GELIN
Attorneys
RALPH J. COLLELI, JR.
MARY SMITH
Attorneys
Environmental Protection Agency
APRIL 1985
DOJ-1985-04
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.