Reply Brief — Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc.
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Office - Supreme Court, U.S
a) FILED
No. 84-965 FEB 12 1985
ALEXANDER t. STEVAS.
IN THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1984
AIRWELD, INC.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
AIRCO, INC.,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
FERGUSON & BURDELL
C. David Sheppard
David R. Lord*
Attorneys for Petitioner
Airweld, Inc.
Office and Post Office Address:
29th Floor, One Union Square
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: (206) 622-1711
*Member of the United States
Supreme Court Bar
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
In Reply to Facts as Staicd or Argued by Respondent... |
In Reply to Respondent’s Argument Re Tying Claim.... 3
In Reply to Respondent’s Argument on the Robinson-
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In Reply to Respondent’s Argument re Attempt to
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Table of Cases
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 392 U.S.
ABS CODER 6c cisccccvccdes beapeus eer tastier 6
Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium vy. Mangurian,
SOD F.26 16RD Ch Ce. TBF kk ob es ks kee be ss 3
William Inglis & Son Baking Co. v. ITT Continental,
668 F. 2d 1014 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839
CODEED . 6 «.0ccncndsekse60840searesureteeeiin 8
Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde, Ti aithieeeniecd
508 &. Ce. BESS CHD 6k.nc sca ceoees ee eiedcseas 4,5
Kaiser Aluminum v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045
(Sth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983) . 4,5
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d
1377, 1384-1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, __.___ U.S.
ee 8
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
CBG). nnccccnnbcscducatendal eheeeee caine 9
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401
UG. Rae Geese ncccectcxess cease Obeseeraenevess 4,5,6
Statutes
Clayton Act, Section 3 (15 U.S.C. G84)... .ccccccscveces 2
Sherman Act, Section 1 (15 U.S.C. §1)................ 2
Sherman Act, Section 2 (15 U.S.C. G2)... cc ccccccccne 7
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1984
AIRWELD, INC.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
AIRCO, INC.,
Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
. FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IN REPLY TO FACTS AS STATED
OR ARGUED BY RESPONDENT:
The facts proven at trial established that in the Portland
market in early 1973, when petitioner Airweld’s initial five year
contract with respondent Airco was about to expire, there was
only one potential supplier of atmospheric gases to petitioner
Airweld, and that was the respondent Airco. Two other
‘*suppliers,’’ Liquid Air and Linde, were present in the market.
Linde, however, had no local production facilities and had a_
nationwide policy against its distributors reselling atmospheric
gases in bulk. Because the bulk business was a very significant
component of petitioner Airweld’s operation, Linde was not a
viable supplier. Liquid Air, on the other hand, while it did not
have such a policy, did not have sufficient capacity to serve its
own needs (see Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, hereinafter
‘*Resp. Br.,’’ p. 6). Prior to entering into the “‘renewal’’ contract
2
with Airco in 1973, Liquid Air informed Airweld that it would
not supply Airweld with atmospheric gases. (Cf. Resp. Br., p
17, to the Ninth Circuit Opinion, p. A-20 of the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, hereinafter ‘‘Pet. Br.’’).
Air Products was not in the Portland market and had no
facilities nearby from which to economically service the market.
The record does not support respondent’s statement (Resp. Br.,
p. 17) that Air Products commenced efforts to become a
substantial factor in the market. As known from the record, Air
Products ‘‘efforts’’ to enter the market were confined to a 1974
discussion with Airweld concerning Air Products’ desire to acquire
Airweld and/or to supply products to it at some indefinite point
in time in the future. Other ‘‘efforts’’ by Air Products dealt with
different product markets.
The record demonstrates that Respondent Airco had the
requisite ‘‘special ability’’ and ‘‘sufficient economic power’’ to
bring it within the ambit of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of
the Clayton Act.
At Resp. Br., p. 5, Airco attaches some unstated significance
to the fact that the Airco-Airweld contract permitted Airweld to
solicit better prices from any available source (although there were
none), which Airco was then permitted to match. However, the
record also indicates that the industrial gas market in Portland
was characterized by industry-wide, uniform price increases which
were effective at the same time (see, e.g., Tr 540-41). So, the
**benefit’’ extended by the contract was illusory.
Also on the subject of prices, at Resp. Br., p. 18, Airco
apparently argues that it did not have the requisite market power
because Petitioner Airweld was able, on occasion, to somewhat
ameliorate the effects of price increases. The fact is that Airweld .
had significant volume, thus entitling it to better prices, vis-a-vis
other distributors with lesser volumes in other locations, but —
Airco was always able to raise its prices to Airweld.
Also at Reps. Br., p. 5, Airco states that there were “‘. . . four
independent contracts, one covering Airweld’s requirements of
acetylene and the other relating to purchases of bulk oxygen,
3
nitrogen and argon’’ and that purchases of acetylene ‘‘.. . from
another supplier would have had no effect upon Airco’s
commitment to supply other gases....’’ Respondent Airco’s
characterization of the contract, JX 126, is inaccurate. JX 126
consists of an ‘‘Authorized Distributors Agreement (Oxygen,
Acetylene And Other Industrial Gases)’’ to which are attached
three ‘‘Supplements’’ dealing with liquid nitrogen, oxygen, and
argon. Clearly, and by their terms, if the ‘‘Distributors
Agreement’’ for some reason failed, the Supplements also failed.
And this was precisely the vice of the Airco policy and threat —
that Airweld could not obtain acetylene from other than Airco
and remain as an Airco distributor — the ability to purchase
atmospheric gases disappeared with the distributorship. Other
pertinent facts regarding the contract are set out at Pet. Br., pp.
2,6, 9-10.
Airco’s statement of product independence reflects what
should have been, not what was.
IN REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
RE TYING CLAIM
Respondent argues that the Ninth Circuit holding in the
instant case is not in conflict with the Fifth Circuit holding in
Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d
1029 (1977) because that case referred to ‘‘recent conduct’’
justifying recovery while the Ninth Circuit found no such ‘“‘recent
conduct.’’
Only on the most superficial basis does this reasoning
reconcile these cases.
The conflict is revealed by comparison of the conduct, and
timing thereof, which the Mangurian court found to be ‘‘recent
conduct,’’ and the conduct which the Ninth Circuit refused to
so find.
_. Mangurian involved a contract which tied condominum
ownership to a lease of recreational property and required the
condominium owners to pay the rent. The lease provided a
4
mechanism for escalation of the annual rents. Prior to the
limitations period, plaintiffs purchased condominium units and
became bound to the terms of the lease. The defendant lessor
continued to collect the rent and increased the rent within the
limitations period. The district court granted summary judgment
on the basis of the statute of limitations.
Following an extensive review of cases, including those of
this Court and of the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that
the defendant’s ‘‘recent acts’’ (the continued collection of rent
and the increase in rental, pursuant to the pre-limitations contract),
constituted a continuing violation of the antitrust laws for which
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover and that the cause of action
for damages suffered within the limitation period was not barred
by the statute of limitations. Damages which accrued in the period
between the pre-limitations contract and the beginning of the
period of limitations were barred.
In the instant case, the record establishes a pre-limitations
contract entered into on an unlawful condition, to-wit, that
petitioner Airweld could not purchase atmospheric gases from
Airco unless it also purchased Airco’s acetylene. The record also
establishes that the price required to be paid for the ‘‘tied’’ product
acetylene was supra-competitive. During the limitations period,
respondent Airco continued to exact supra-competitive prices and
increased those prices. The Ninth Circuit held petitioner’s entire
cause of action to be barred by the statute of limitations.
Thus, there is conflict between the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits as to the type of conduct which gives rise to a continuing
violation of the antitrust laws.
In support of the proposition that the Ninth Circuit was
correct in its refusal to apply the continuing violation exception
to the facts of this case, Resp. Br., p. 20, cites Jefferson Parish
Hospital v. Hyde, _____._-*U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 1551
(1984); Zenith v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971);
and Kaiser Aluminum v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045 (Sth
Cir. i982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
The Hyde case did not involve the continuing violations
exception.
In Kaiser, the facts were significantly different; that case
involved a single pre-limitations contract which fixed ali of the
rights and liabilities of the parties, including the obligation to make
payments over time. Any injury to competition occurred solely
at the time of the contract. In contrast, the contract in the instant
case did not fix all of the rights and liabilities of the parties, or
the amounts to be paid. Here the impact upon Petitioner Airweld
occurred with each purchase of acetylene from Airco. Competition
was not injured until others were foreclosed from the opportunity
to compete for the business of Airweld with respect to each
purchase of acetylene.
Zenith is of little help to respondent in the context of the
continuing violation exception. In that context, it supports
petitioner Airco’s position in this controversy.
Zenith is, perhaps, most cited for the proposition that the
statute of limitations does not bar from recovery such damages
as cannot be proven with the requisite certainty at the time the
cause of action would otherwise accrue. The parties here are not
in disagreement as to the rule of law, but rather as to its
application. Contrary to the rule in Zenith, the Ninth Circuit has
held, in effect, that even though damages may be speculative at
the time the cause of action would otherwise accrue, a plaintiff
may not thereafter recover those damages (when they become fixed
and certain) unless during the intervening period there have been
additional acts violative of the antitrust laws.
This holding confuses the continuing violation exception with
the speculative damage exception and emasculates the latter.
Without commenting on the patent error of the Ninth Circuit,
Respondent Airco argues that the damages sought by Petitioner
Airweld were not speculative when the contract was executed and
are, therefore, later barred.
6
That the damages were earlier speculative within the meaning
of the Zenith exception is established by the facts of the case. The
1973 contract was an ‘‘Evergreen’’ contract, i.e., it automatically
renewed from year to year unless terminated by one year’s notice
in advance. Under it the term was indefinite, the quantity of
acetylene to be purchased was unknown, and the unit price
(beyond the first year) to be paid for whatever quantity was
purchased was subject to later agreement. Quantity, perhaps,
could have been estimated on an annual basis; but, for how many
years? Future pricing was solely in the control of Airco and would
depend upon market conditions yet to occur. Further, and more
crucially, the ‘‘competitive prices’’ (what the prices would have
been, over time, absent the unlawful restraint) to which actual
prices would be compared in order to estimate damages, would.
depend upon speculation on supply and demand factors which
did not exist in the marketplace, to-wit: what price would have
prevailed in futuro had Airweld been allowed to build an
additional acetylene production plant to serve a market which
already had excess capacity. Such speculation is directly contrary
to the rationale of Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968), and, if attempted, would have been barred.
IN REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT CLAIM:
With one exception, respondent’s arguments are anticipated
in the petition and are not repeated. It should be noted, however,
that by arguing the ‘‘objective’’ of, and what was ‘‘planned”’ by,
the swap agreements (Resp. Br., pp. 6, 25), Respondent Airco
emphasizes the factual nature of the ‘‘sale’’ vel non question and
indicates the district court’s error in overturning the verdict of
the jury.
The argument which is not anticipated in the petition is
asserted at Resp. Br., pp. 26-27. Essentially, the argument is that
ne
4
| had the swap partners fixed the ‘‘settlement value’’ at the same
| higher price as that paid by Petitioner Airweld, there would be
no cause of action for discrimination and everything else would
have remained the same.
In other words, the argument is that ‘“‘if things had been
different, they would have been different.’’ But this does not
answer the problem which did exist, and which arose out of the
situation which actually existed.
Airco argues that if the price to Linde and Liquid Air had
been higher, those firms would have acted the same. Not only
is this contrary to the common experience of man, but also it
assumes too much.
The evidence shows that the settlement price was set in rough
relationship to the costs of production. From this it can be
reasoned that an imbalance in the arrangement in favor of one
party was without particular significance because the price it paid,
whether in dollars cr kind, was approximately the same. However,
if the price to the party cwing on an imbalance were greater in
dollars than in kind, there would be a disincentive to the creditor
in the arrangement to request product owed to it; in its economic
| self-interest it would prefer the greater value of the dollars owed.
Therefore, market forces would have been different if the
**settlement price’’ were different. And, those different forces
would impact competition and Airweld.
IN REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
RE ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE:
In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Airweld argued that
the Ninth Circuit has departed from clear guidelines imposed by
the United States Supreme Court in determining anticompetitive
conduct in attempted monopolization claims under the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §2. The thrust of Airweld’s argument was that
the Ninth Circuit had employed a mechanistic and artificial cost
test, which alters plaintiff’s the burden of proof. Specifically,
the Ninth Circuit’s utilization of the ‘‘Areeda-Turner test,’’ as
modified in Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d
1377, 1384-1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ____—sCvULS..
, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983), was a departure from the
standard promulgated by this Court in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., (‘‘Anheuser-Busch’’) 363 U.S. 536, 80 S. Ct. 1257, 4 L. Ed.
2d 1385 (1960).
In Anheuser-Busch, this Court determined that: ‘‘A price
reduction below cost tends to establish such an (predatory) intent.”’
363 U.S. at 552. If the Ninth Circuit had applied this standard
of proof, that Court would have had no choice but to -einstate
the jury verdict for Airweld.
In its responsive brief Airco ignores the Ninth Circuit’s clear
departure from accepted case law, and instead argues in much
the same fashion as it did in the Court of Appeals and in the district
court, ignoring most of its conduct and compartmentalizing the
balance for separate examination of each fraction. This approach
was necessarily rejected by the jury in finding for Airweld.
Even should this Court adopt for the first time the evidentiary
standard utilized by the Ninth Circuit, still Airweld should prevail
because it has presented substantial evidence as to each of the
elements of attempted monopolization. See William Inglis & Son
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental, 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982).
In proving that Airco had the specific intent to injure or
destroy competition, Airweld presented probative evidence of
Airco’s ‘‘targeting’’ of Airweld’s customers. Additionally, a third
party testifed that Airco representatives told him that Airco was
going to get their share of the market back ‘‘any way they could’’
and had the subsidy with which to do it. Further, Airco engaged
in severe price cutting to customers of this third party in an attempt
by Airco to “‘encourage’’ him to sell his business to it.
Airweld established the requisite anticompetitive conduct of
Airco by proof of below cost pricing, approaches by Airco to a
9
majority of Airweld’s customers, and the so-called ‘‘argon
squeeze’ (Tr 763-780).
Airweld carried its burden with respect to presenting
substantial probative evidence of the dangerous probability of
success of Airco monopolizing the Portland cylinder gas market.
Airco is a billion-dollar corporation which possessed
approximately 30% of the relevant market; Airweld suffered losses
resulting from Airco’s conduct that amounted to 25% of its pre-tax
profit.
Airco continues to claim (Resp. Br., pp. 30-34) that Airweld’s
**proof’’ of predatory conduct consisted solely of evidence of
approaches by Airco Welding Supply to only 17 of Airweld’s
customers. However, these seventeen customers were only used
for damage computations; there was specific evidence in the record
concerning Airco Welding Supply’s predatory solicitation of a
majority of Airweld’s customers.
At Resp. Br., p. 33, Airco argues that other elements of an
economic nature were not supplied by expert testimony. These
elements were either supplied by testimony of employees of
Respondent Airco or were unnecessary.
If this Court adheres to the clear precedent of Anheuser-Busch
and Utah Pie v. Continental Baking, 386 U.S. 685 (1967), then
Airweld did present substantial evidence of anticompetitive
conduct, and the jury verdict must be reinstated. Even if this court
applies the ‘‘Areeda-Turner test’’ in analyzing Airco’s
anticompetitive conduct, Airweld met its burden of proof with
respect to the elements of attempted monopolization of the
relevant market.
CONCLUSION
_ _The Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be granted in order to
eliminate conflict between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits concerning
10
the type of conduct which constitutes a continuing violation of
the antitrust laws; in order to resolve a question of first impression
concerning the so-called ‘‘swap agreements’’; and to eliminate
confusion among the circuit courts of the United States and the
district courts of the United States concerning the so-called Areeda-
Turner test concerning the importance of various economic factors
to proof of predatory conduct.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February,
1985.
FERGUSON & BURDELL
By: C. David Sheppard
David R. Lord
Attorneys for Petitioner
Airweld, Inc.
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