Reply Brief — Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc.

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Office - Supreme Court, U.S

a) FILED

No. 84-965 FEB 12 1985

ALEXANDER t. STEVAS.

IN THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

AIRWELD, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

AIRCO, INC.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

FERGUSON & BURDELL

C. David Sheppard

David R. Lord*

Attorneys for Petitioner

Airweld, Inc.

Office and Post Office Address:

29th Floor, One Union Square

Seattle, Washington 98101

Telephone: (206) 622-1711

*Member of the United States

Supreme Court Bar

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

In Reply to Facts as Staicd or Argued by Respondent... |

In Reply to Respondent’s Argument Re Tying Claim.... 3

In Reply to Respondent’s Argument on the Robinson-

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In Reply to Respondent’s Argument re Attempt to

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Table of Cases

Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 392 U.S.

ABS CODER 6c cisccccvccdes beapeus eer tastier 6

Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium vy. Mangurian,

SOD F.26 16RD Ch Ce. TBF kk ob es ks kee be ss 3

William Inglis & Son Baking Co. v. ITT Continental,

668 F. 2d 1014 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839

CODEED . 6 «.0ccncndsekse60840searesureteeeiin 8

Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde, Ti aithieeeniecd

508 &. Ce. BESS CHD 6k.nc sca ceoees ee eiedcseas 4,5

Kaiser Aluminum v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045

(Sth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983) . 4,5

Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d

1377, 1384-1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, __.___ U.S.

ee 8

Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685

CBG). nnccccnnbcscducatendal eheeeee caine 9

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401

UG. Rae Geese ncccectcxess cease Obeseeraenevess 4,5,6

Statutes

Clayton Act, Section 3 (15 U.S.C. G84)... .ccccccscveces 2

Sherman Act, Section 1 (15 U.S.C. §1)................ 2

Sherman Act, Section 2 (15 U.S.C. G2)... cc ccccccccne 7

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

AIRWELD, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

AIRCO, INC.,

Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

. FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN REPLY TO FACTS AS STATED

OR ARGUED BY RESPONDENT:

The facts proven at trial established that in the Portland

market in early 1973, when petitioner Airweld’s initial five year

contract with respondent Airco was about to expire, there was

only one potential supplier of atmospheric gases to petitioner

Airweld, and that was the respondent Airco. Two other

‘*suppliers,’’ Liquid Air and Linde, were present in the market.

Linde, however, had no local production facilities and had a_

nationwide policy against its distributors reselling atmospheric

gases in bulk. Because the bulk business was a very significant

component of petitioner Airweld’s operation, Linde was not a

viable supplier. Liquid Air, on the other hand, while it did not

have such a policy, did not have sufficient capacity to serve its

own needs (see Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, hereinafter

‘*Resp. Br.,’’ p. 6). Prior to entering into the “‘renewal’’ contract

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with Airco in 1973, Liquid Air informed Airweld that it would

not supply Airweld with atmospheric gases. (Cf. Resp. Br., p

17, to the Ninth Circuit Opinion, p. A-20 of the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari, hereinafter ‘‘Pet. Br.’’).

Air Products was not in the Portland market and had no

facilities nearby from which to economically service the market.

The record does not support respondent’s statement (Resp. Br.,

p. 17) that Air Products commenced efforts to become a

substantial factor in the market. As known from the record, Air

Products ‘‘efforts’’ to enter the market were confined to a 1974

discussion with Airweld concerning Air Products’ desire to acquire

Airweld and/or to supply products to it at some indefinite point

in time in the future. Other ‘‘efforts’’ by Air Products dealt with

different product markets.

The record demonstrates that Respondent Airco had the

requisite ‘‘special ability’’ and ‘‘sufficient economic power’’ to

bring it within the ambit of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of

the Clayton Act.

At Resp. Br., p. 5, Airco attaches some unstated significance

to the fact that the Airco-Airweld contract permitted Airweld to

solicit better prices from any available source (although there were

none), which Airco was then permitted to match. However, the

record also indicates that the industrial gas market in Portland

was characterized by industry-wide, uniform price increases which

were effective at the same time (see, e.g., Tr 540-41). So, the

**benefit’’ extended by the contract was illusory.

Also on the subject of prices, at Resp. Br., p. 18, Airco

apparently argues that it did not have the requisite market power

because Petitioner Airweld was able, on occasion, to somewhat

ameliorate the effects of price increases. The fact is that Airweld .

had significant volume, thus entitling it to better prices, vis-a-vis

other distributors with lesser volumes in other locations, but —

Airco was always able to raise its prices to Airweld.

Also at Reps. Br., p. 5, Airco states that there were “‘. . . four

independent contracts, one covering Airweld’s requirements of

acetylene and the other relating to purchases of bulk oxygen,

3

nitrogen and argon’’ and that purchases of acetylene ‘‘.. . from

another supplier would have had no effect upon Airco’s

commitment to supply other gases....’’ Respondent Airco’s

characterization of the contract, JX 126, is inaccurate. JX 126

consists of an ‘‘Authorized Distributors Agreement (Oxygen,

Acetylene And Other Industrial Gases)’’ to which are attached

three ‘‘Supplements’’ dealing with liquid nitrogen, oxygen, and

argon. Clearly, and by their terms, if the ‘‘Distributors

Agreement’’ for some reason failed, the Supplements also failed.

And this was precisely the vice of the Airco policy and threat —

that Airweld could not obtain acetylene from other than Airco

and remain as an Airco distributor — the ability to purchase

atmospheric gases disappeared with the distributorship. Other

pertinent facts regarding the contract are set out at Pet. Br., pp.

2,6, 9-10.

Airco’s statement of product independence reflects what

should have been, not what was.

IN REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT

RE TYING CLAIM

Respondent argues that the Ninth Circuit holding in the

instant case is not in conflict with the Fifth Circuit holding in

Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d

1029 (1977) because that case referred to ‘‘recent conduct’’

justifying recovery while the Ninth Circuit found no such ‘“‘recent

conduct.’’

Only on the most superficial basis does this reasoning

reconcile these cases.

The conflict is revealed by comparison of the conduct, and

timing thereof, which the Mangurian court found to be ‘‘recent

conduct,’’ and the conduct which the Ninth Circuit refused to

so find.

_. Mangurian involved a contract which tied condominum

ownership to a lease of recreational property and required the

condominium owners to pay the rent. The lease provided a

4

mechanism for escalation of the annual rents. Prior to the

limitations period, plaintiffs purchased condominium units and

became bound to the terms of the lease. The defendant lessor

continued to collect the rent and increased the rent within the

limitations period. The district court granted summary judgment

on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Following an extensive review of cases, including those of

this Court and of the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that

the defendant’s ‘‘recent acts’’ (the continued collection of rent

and the increase in rental, pursuant to the pre-limitations contract),

constituted a continuing violation of the antitrust laws for which

the plaintiffs were entitled to recover and that the cause of action

for damages suffered within the limitation period was not barred

by the statute of limitations. Damages which accrued in the period

between the pre-limitations contract and the beginning of the

period of limitations were barred.

In the instant case, the record establishes a pre-limitations

contract entered into on an unlawful condition, to-wit, that

petitioner Airweld could not purchase atmospheric gases from

Airco unless it also purchased Airco’s acetylene. The record also

establishes that the price required to be paid for the ‘‘tied’’ product

acetylene was supra-competitive. During the limitations period,

respondent Airco continued to exact supra-competitive prices and

increased those prices. The Ninth Circuit held petitioner’s entire

cause of action to be barred by the statute of limitations.

Thus, there is conflict between the Ninth and the Fifth

Circuits as to the type of conduct which gives rise to a continuing

violation of the antitrust laws.

In support of the proposition that the Ninth Circuit was

correct in its refusal to apply the continuing violation exception

to the facts of this case, Resp. Br., p. 20, cites Jefferson Parish

Hospital v. Hyde, _____._-*U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 1551

(1984); Zenith v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971);

and Kaiser Aluminum v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045 (Sth

Cir. i982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).

The Hyde case did not involve the continuing violations

exception.

In Kaiser, the facts were significantly different; that case

involved a single pre-limitations contract which fixed ali of the

rights and liabilities of the parties, including the obligation to make

payments over time. Any injury to competition occurred solely

at the time of the contract. In contrast, the contract in the instant

case did not fix all of the rights and liabilities of the parties, or

the amounts to be paid. Here the impact upon Petitioner Airweld

occurred with each purchase of acetylene from Airco. Competition

was not injured until others were foreclosed from the opportunity

to compete for the business of Airweld with respect to each

purchase of acetylene.

Zenith is of little help to respondent in the context of the

continuing violation exception. In that context, it supports

petitioner Airco’s position in this controversy.

Zenith is, perhaps, most cited for the proposition that the

statute of limitations does not bar from recovery such damages

as cannot be proven with the requisite certainty at the time the

cause of action would otherwise accrue. The parties here are not

in disagreement as to the rule of law, but rather as to its

application. Contrary to the rule in Zenith, the Ninth Circuit has

held, in effect, that even though damages may be speculative at

the time the cause of action would otherwise accrue, a plaintiff

may not thereafter recover those damages (when they become fixed

and certain) unless during the intervening period there have been

additional acts violative of the antitrust laws.

This holding confuses the continuing violation exception with

the speculative damage exception and emasculates the latter.

Without commenting on the patent error of the Ninth Circuit,

Respondent Airco argues that the damages sought by Petitioner

Airweld were not speculative when the contract was executed and

are, therefore, later barred.

6

That the damages were earlier speculative within the meaning

of the Zenith exception is established by the facts of the case. The

1973 contract was an ‘‘Evergreen’’ contract, i.e., it automatically

renewed from year to year unless terminated by one year’s notice

in advance. Under it the term was indefinite, the quantity of

acetylene to be purchased was unknown, and the unit price

(beyond the first year) to be paid for whatever quantity was

purchased was subject to later agreement. Quantity, perhaps,

could have been estimated on an annual basis; but, for how many

years? Future pricing was solely in the control of Airco and would

depend upon market conditions yet to occur. Further, and more

crucially, the ‘‘competitive prices’’ (what the prices would have

been, over time, absent the unlawful restraint) to which actual

prices would be compared in order to estimate damages, would.

depend upon speculation on supply and demand factors which

did not exist in the marketplace, to-wit: what price would have

prevailed in futuro had Airweld been allowed to build an

additional acetylene production plant to serve a market which

already had excess capacity. Such speculation is directly contrary

to the rationale of Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,

392 U.S. 481 (1968), and, if attempted, would have been barred.

IN REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT

ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT CLAIM:

With one exception, respondent’s arguments are anticipated

in the petition and are not repeated. It should be noted, however,

that by arguing the ‘‘objective’’ of, and what was ‘‘planned”’ by,

the swap agreements (Resp. Br., pp. 6, 25), Respondent Airco

emphasizes the factual nature of the ‘‘sale’’ vel non question and

indicates the district court’s error in overturning the verdict of

the jury.

The argument which is not anticipated in the petition is

asserted at Resp. Br., pp. 26-27. Essentially, the argument is that

ne

4

| had the swap partners fixed the ‘‘settlement value’’ at the same

| higher price as that paid by Petitioner Airweld, there would be

no cause of action for discrimination and everything else would

have remained the same.

In other words, the argument is that ‘“‘if things had been

different, they would have been different.’’ But this does not

answer the problem which did exist, and which arose out of the

situation which actually existed.

Airco argues that if the price to Linde and Liquid Air had

been higher, those firms would have acted the same. Not only

is this contrary to the common experience of man, but also it

assumes too much.

The evidence shows that the settlement price was set in rough

relationship to the costs of production. From this it can be

reasoned that an imbalance in the arrangement in favor of one

party was without particular significance because the price it paid,

whether in dollars cr kind, was approximately the same. However,

if the price to the party cwing on an imbalance were greater in

dollars than in kind, there would be a disincentive to the creditor

in the arrangement to request product owed to it; in its economic

| self-interest it would prefer the greater value of the dollars owed.

Therefore, market forces would have been different if the

**settlement price’’ were different. And, those different forces

would impact competition and Airweld.

IN REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT

RE ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE:

In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Airweld argued that

the Ninth Circuit has departed from clear guidelines imposed by

the United States Supreme Court in determining anticompetitive

conduct in attempted monopolization claims under the Sherman

Act, 15 U.S.C. §2. The thrust of Airweld’s argument was that

the Ninth Circuit had employed a mechanistic and artificial cost

test, which alters plaintiff’s the burden of proof. Specifically,

the Ninth Circuit’s utilization of the ‘‘Areeda-Turner test,’’ as

modified in Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d

1377, 1384-1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ____—sCvULS..

, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983), was a departure from the

standard promulgated by this Court in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch,

Inc., (‘‘Anheuser-Busch’’) 363 U.S. 536, 80 S. Ct. 1257, 4 L. Ed.

2d 1385 (1960).

In Anheuser-Busch, this Court determined that: ‘‘A price

reduction below cost tends to establish such an (predatory) intent.”’

363 U.S. at 552. If the Ninth Circuit had applied this standard

of proof, that Court would have had no choice but to -einstate

the jury verdict for Airweld.

In its responsive brief Airco ignores the Ninth Circuit’s clear

departure from accepted case law, and instead argues in much

the same fashion as it did in the Court of Appeals and in the district

court, ignoring most of its conduct and compartmentalizing the

balance for separate examination of each fraction. This approach

was necessarily rejected by the jury in finding for Airweld.

Even should this Court adopt for the first time the evidentiary

standard utilized by the Ninth Circuit, still Airweld should prevail

because it has presented substantial evidence as to each of the

elements of attempted monopolization. See William Inglis & Son

Baking Co. v. ITT Continental, 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982).

In proving that Airco had the specific intent to injure or

destroy competition, Airweld presented probative evidence of

Airco’s ‘‘targeting’’ of Airweld’s customers. Additionally, a third

party testifed that Airco representatives told him that Airco was

going to get their share of the market back ‘‘any way they could’’

and had the subsidy with which to do it. Further, Airco engaged

in severe price cutting to customers of this third party in an attempt

by Airco to “‘encourage’’ him to sell his business to it.

Airweld established the requisite anticompetitive conduct of

Airco by proof of below cost pricing, approaches by Airco to a

9

majority of Airweld’s customers, and the so-called ‘‘argon

squeeze’ (Tr 763-780).

Airweld carried its burden with respect to presenting

substantial probative evidence of the dangerous probability of

success of Airco monopolizing the Portland cylinder gas market.

Airco is a billion-dollar corporation which possessed

approximately 30% of the relevant market; Airweld suffered losses

resulting from Airco’s conduct that amounted to 25% of its pre-tax

profit.

Airco continues to claim (Resp. Br., pp. 30-34) that Airweld’s

**proof’’ of predatory conduct consisted solely of evidence of

approaches by Airco Welding Supply to only 17 of Airweld’s

customers. However, these seventeen customers were only used

for damage computations; there was specific evidence in the record

concerning Airco Welding Supply’s predatory solicitation of a

majority of Airweld’s customers.

At Resp. Br., p. 33, Airco argues that other elements of an

economic nature were not supplied by expert testimony. These

elements were either supplied by testimony of employees of

Respondent Airco or were unnecessary.

If this Court adheres to the clear precedent of Anheuser-Busch

and Utah Pie v. Continental Baking, 386 U.S. 685 (1967), then

Airweld did present substantial evidence of anticompetitive

conduct, and the jury verdict must be reinstated. Even if this court

applies the ‘‘Areeda-Turner test’’ in analyzing Airco’s

anticompetitive conduct, Airweld met its burden of proof with

respect to the elements of attempted monopolization of the

relevant market.

CONCLUSION

_ _The Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be granted in order to

eliminate conflict between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits concerning

10

the type of conduct which constitutes a continuing violation of

the antitrust laws; in order to resolve a question of first impression

concerning the so-called ‘‘swap agreements’’; and to eliminate

confusion among the circuit courts of the United States and the

district courts of the United States concerning the so-called Areeda-

Turner test concerning the importance of various economic factors

to proof of predatory conduct.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February,

1985.

FERGUSON & BURDELL

By: C. David Sheppard

David R. Lord

Attorneys for Petitioner

Airweld, Inc.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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