Reply Brief — Massachusetts v. American Trucking Assns.

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Nos. 99- 7,99

In The |

ey \ % Supreme Court, US

-1263,99-1265 FILED

APR 17 oy99

Supreme Court of the Un

j ed yates K

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

AND THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

-@

On Petitior. For A Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For The District of Columbia Circuit

4

REPLY BRIEF OF MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW JERSEY

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

4

JOHN J. FARMER THOMAS F. REILLY

Attorney General Attorney General

State of New Jersey Commonwealth of

Massachusetts

HOWARD L. GEDULDIG

JOHN R. RENELLA LISA HEINZERLING

Deputy Attorneys General, Counsel of Record

New Jersey Special Assistant Attorney

Richard J. Hughes Justice

Complex, 7th Floor

P.O. Box 093

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609) 633-8109, 984-5612

General, Massachusetts

Georgetown University

Law Center

600 New Jersey Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-9115

EDWARD G. BOHLEN

Assistant Attorney General,

Massachusetts

200 Portland Street

Boston, MA 02114

(617) 727-2200, Ext. 3358

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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REPLY BRIEF OF STATE PETITIONERS............. ]

TEE 5 HAN lle ees SN eed 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Lung Ass’nv. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 3

AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) ...... 6

— U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . .2, 5, 6

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 UB. FOGG) a's cdccnckabhca cadens cocoate 4

United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990)... 6

Statutory Provisions

2 USL..6 PRPC 4 455 hp eee ee ee ee 8

42 UDG, | PRP 5 464445 ReM eek eenh okie cees 8

42 UBL. § TREN kas cdceennwoes ee 7,8

Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 6103, 112 Stat. 465 (1998) ........ 8

Other Sources

H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, Pt. 1, at 229-232, reprinted in 2 1990

Legis. Giih. Sean s unnanekeuieneee shsu becuse ces 9

li

REPLY BRIEF OF STATE PETITIONERS

This case concerns two separate rules issued by EPA with

respect to two different pollutants: particulate matter and ozone.

The court below invalidated both rules on the basis of the

~ “nondelegation” doctrine. A large number of respondents

concede that this deviant but important constitutional ruling

warrants this Court’s review. (Brief in Response for

Respondents American Trucking Associations, et al., 10 (“ATA

Resp.”); Brief in Response for States of Ohio, Michigan and

West Virginia 3 (“Ohio Resp.”).) However, one group of

respondents avers that the lower court’s invalidation of EPA’s

rules on the basis of a constitutional doctrine not used by this

Court to overturn a statute in more than six decades is so

“pedestrian” that it requires “no comment, let alone Supreme

Court review.” (Brief in Response for Appalachian Power Co.,

et al., 24 (“App. Pwr. Resp.”).) As set forth below, however,

respondents premise this audacious claim on a mistaken reading

of the opinion below, and on the implicit constitutionalization

of basic principles of administrative law.

The court also held that the ozone standard could not be

enforced. As to the question whether this ruling comports with

the Clean Air Act, all respondents urge this Court to leave

matters where they stand. But the two questions that petitioners

have brought before this Court concerning the ozone standard

— constitutional and statutory — should be heard together.

Unless this Court grants review of the statutory question

whether EPA may enforce the revised ozone standard, review

of the constitutional question as it applies to the ozone rule may

amount to a pointless exercise in abstraction. To avoid this

eventuality, the Court should grant review of both questions,

constitutional and statutory, presented by petitioners.

1. The constitutionalityof the Clean Air Act as applied to

_EPA’s revised rules.

The court below held that the “statutory language” of the

Clean Air Act and the “existing agency interpretation” of that

language “involve an unconstitutional delegation of power.”

(Appendix to State Petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari 12

(“App.”).) Many respondents, including the State of Ohio,

concede that this remarkable constitutional ruling warrants this

Court’s review. (ATA Resp. 10; Ohio Resp. 3.) When the

United States Government and States that are parties to a case

collectively request this Court’s review and when, moreover, a

large contingent of industry parties acquiesces in that request,

such a case comes to this Court with a heavy presumption that

review is warranted.

Despite their sensible concession about the importance of |

this case, however, Respondents ATA, et al., attempt to recast

the decision below as a “work-a-day” remand under Chevron

- U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837 (1984). (ATA Resp. 14.) Similarly, Respondents

Appalachian Power, ef al., strain to fit the court’s problematic

constitutional decision into the familiar framework of “arbitrary

and capricious” review under the Administrative Procedure Act

and statutory interpretation under Chevron (App. Pwr. Resp.

12-13, 15.) Respondents National Stone Association, ef al.,

make a similar attempt. (Brief in Response for Respondents

National Stone Association and Kennecott Holdings

Corporation, et al., 7-8 (“Nat’] Stone Resp.”).) These efforts to

domesticate the D.C. Circuit’s bold ruling do not succeed.

Tellingly, none of the respondents defends the lower

court’s ruling that the “statutory language” of the Clean Air Act

violates the nondelegation doctrine. (App. 12.) Instead,

respondents seek to reassure this Court that the constitutional

status of the Clean Air Act itself— which has been on the statute

books for three decades and has been the subject of numerous

judicial challenges, including several in this Court — is secure. |

(App. Pwr. Resp. 8 (“The court did not hold the statute itself

unconstitutional”); ATA Resp. 15 (statute “undisputedly is not”

unconstitutional)). Presumably, respondents recognize that a

_ failure to concede the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act

would place their views at obvious odds with this Court’s

numerous precedents upholding far broader delegations against

constitutional attack (discussed in our petition at 18-21). Thus,

rather than acknowledging that the court below found that the

“statutory language” of the Clean Air Act violated the

nondelegation doctrine (App. 12), respondents repeatedly claim

that the court found only that EPA’s interpretation of the Act

was unconstitutional.

But how does a statute that is “undisputedly” constitutiond

somehow become unconstitutional when interpreted by an

administrative agency?

Respondents Appalachian Power, et al., offer the most

adventuresome answer to this question. Distancing themselves

from the dubious constitutional grounding of the D.C. Circuit’s

opinion, these respondents implicitly equate the arbitrary and

capricious standard of review with the constitutional doctrine

of delegation. For example, respondents cite decisions based

on the arbitrary and capricious standard as if those decisions

support the D.C. Circuit’s constitutionalruling. (See, e.g., Aipp. .

Pwr. Resp. 17 (citing American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d

388 (D.C. Cir. 1998).) Even more bewilderingly, respondents

also suggest that the D.C. Circuit’s rationale for remanding

EPA’s rules

might as well have been articulated as “arbitrary and

Capricious” agency action — that EPA failed to state a

rational basis for its decision. Whatever the rationale, the

proposition that an agency’s discretion must be guided by

an intelligible criterion is so pedestrian as to require no

comment, let alone Supreme Court review. (App. Pwr.

Resp. 12-13 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).)

See also Nat’! Stone Resp. at 7-8. Respondents’ casual

equation of the nondelegation doctrine with the arbitrary and

capricious standard should not be countenanced.’ Respondents’

'It is possible that the respondents, in the passage cited

in text, are inartfully attempting to defend the court’s judgment

on the basis of an argument not reached by the court below.

This Court should not decide the question whether EPA’s rules

are arbitrary and capricious. Addressing this question would

require systematic, in-depth scrutiny of the voluminous record

in this case. This complex and fact-bound issue should be

considered in the first instance by the appeals court. Moreover,

respondents did not present this argument in this same form

below, and therefore the question whether EPA’s rules are

arbitrary and capricious in the way respondents now allege is

not properly before this Court. With respect to particulate

matter, for example, respondents did not argue to the lower

court that EPA’s revised particulate matter rule was arbitrary

and capricious due to the agency’s failure to explain why it

targeted one pollutant level rather than another. Rather,

respondents took issue with the scientific evidence underlying

the revised standard, see Brief of Non-State Petitioners on Fine

Particulate Matter NAAQS, and with EPA’s failure to consider

the effects of the rules on small businesses, see Brief of Small

Business Petitioners and Intervenor (PM Rule). Likewise, with

respect to the ozone standard, respondents challenged the

scientific evidence underlying EPA’s finding of an

unacceptable risk to human health, but did not ask the court to

require EPA, in the name of arbitrary and capricious review, to

set “determinate, binding standards” such as those ultimately

4

theory would threaten to turn every departure from the

principles articulated in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), into a

constitutional case. Needless to say, such a result would vastly

and inappropriately enlarge courts’ authority to invalidate

agency action on constitutional grounds.

Respondents Appalachian Power, et al., also offer a second

theory as to how an “undisputedly” constitutional statute may

be transmuted into an unconstitutional one in an agency’s

hands, and in this instance they are joined in their argument by

respondents ATA, ef al. Respondents contend that the court’s

ruling invalidating EPA’s rules under the Clean Air Act on

constitutional grounds is “functionally indistinguishable” from

a “work-a-day” ruling that, according to the principles of

Chevron, the agency simply misinterpreted the Clean Air Act.

(ATA Resp. 14; see also App. Pwr. Resp. 13 & n. 27, 15; cf

Nat’! Stone Resp. 9).?

required by the court (App. 12). See Brief of Non-State Clean

Air Act Petitioners and Intervenors 48-53 (Ozone Rule).

Although all of the respondents appear to agree that

EPA misinterpreted the Clean Air Act, they do not agree as to

how the agency should have interpreted the Act. For example,

compare Nat’! Stone Resp. 9 (arguing that EPA misinterpreted

Act in not quantifying risk before regulating) with App. Pwr.

Cross-Pet. (arguing that EPA misinterpreted Act to preclude

consideration of factors unrelated to public health effects

resulting from pollution’s presence in ambient air). As we

discuss in our opposition to respondents’ cross-petitions,

respondents offer quite a varied array of different possible

interpretationsof the Clean Air Act in the course of arguing that

the meaning of the statute is clear. See Brief in Opposition for

Petitioners Massachusetts and New Jersey.

5

Nowhere did the court below suggest, however, that EPA

had misinterpretedthe Clean Air Act. Indeed, the court upheld

EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the statute to forbid the

consideration of costs and feasibility in setting the NAAQS.

(App. 17-20.)° Rather than finding that EPA’s position was a

misinterpretationof the Clean Air Act, the court found that the

agency’s interpretation, though permissible under the statute,

was unconstitutional. This ruling is a world away from a ruling

that EPA merely misinterpreted the statute. Here, too,

therefore, respondents work hard to dismiss the constitutional

significance of the court’s ruling, and in doing so both misread

the court’s opinion and intimate that agencies that violate

Chevron, violate the Constitution. (App. Pwr. Resp. 16 & n. 35

(citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), a

garden-variety statutory interpretation case, as a

““nondelegation’” case).)

Respondents’ understandabledesire to distance themselves

from the dubious constitutional foundations of the lower court’s

decision cannot be squared with their argument that the

constitutional status of the Act as interpreted for thirty years is

so seriously in doubt that this Court should rewrite the Act in

order to avoid deciding a constitutional question. (ATA Cross-

Pet. I.) Respondents cannot have it both ways. An

“undisputedly” constitutional statute does not require or permit

invocation of the canon counseling avoidance of constitutional

decisions: “The canon about avoiding constitutional decisions

. must be used with care, for it is a closer cousin to

invalidation than to interpretation. . . . Constitutional decisions

breed penumbras, which multiply questions. Treating each as

In our Brief in Opposition, we explain why the

Conditional Cross-Petitionson this statutory question should be

denied. See Briefin Opposition for Petitioners Massachusetts

and New Jersey.

justification to construe laws out of existence too greatly

enlarges the judicial power.” United States v. Marshall, 908

F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).

2. The enforceability of the revised ozone standard.

Respondents do not seek review of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling

that the Clean Air Act authorized EPA to revise the air quality

standard for ozone. (App. 31-33.) Nor do they challenge the

court’s holding that EPA must designate areas as attainment,

nonattainment, or unclassifiable under the revised standard.

(App. 33-34.) Nevertheless, they argue that the court’s ruling

that section 181(a)(1) precludes EPA from enforcing the revised

ozone standard is unworthy of this Court’s review because the

court’s decision is correct and because the ruling is in an

interlocutory posture. Neither of thése assertions has merit.

In arguing that the language of section 181(a)(1) supports

the lower court’s ruling, respondents ignore most of the

language of this provision. As we set forth in detail in our

Petition, the language of sections 181 and 182 overwhelmingly

points to the conclusion that these provisions are exclusively

concerned with implementation of the former, one-hour ozone

standard — the standard that existed when these sections were

enacted. (Pet. 21-25.)

Respondents also never confront the absurd implications

of the lower court’s interpretation of section 181(a)(1). The

court held that EPA may revise the ozone standard and, if it

does so, it must designate areas according to their attainment

status under the revised standard. (App. 33-34.) However, if

section 181(a)(1) is interpreted as the court below interpreted it,

then the agency must disregard its designations under the

revised standard and classify areas according to the previous,

one-hour ozone standard. (Pet. 23-24.) This conclusion

follows from the plain language of section 181(a)(1): areas

designated nonattainment under this provision must be

classified “according to the interpretation methodology issued

by the Administrator most recently before the date of the

enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.” 42

U.S.C. 7511(a)(1). The interpretation methodology in effect at

that time was based on the previous, one-hour ozone standard.

(Pet. 23 & n. 9). Thus, if EPA must, as the court below held

and as respondents claim, classify areas under the revised

standard under section 181(a)(1) of the Act, and not under

Subpart 1, then EPA will be forced to classify areas according

to the ozone standard that it has abandoned. There is no

warrant in the language, structure, or purpose of the Clean Air

Act for sanctioning such an odd result.‘

Nor does the legislative history support respondents’

awkward reading of section 181(a)(1). Respondents ATA, ef

al., claim that “Congress specifically considered and rejected

bills that would have expressly limited Subpart 2's reach in just

the manner EPA claims that enacted statute does.” (ATA Resp.

23 (emphasis added and in original).) While it is true that the

version of Subpart 2 contained in the original House and Senate

bills referred specifically to the bills’ equivalent of section

107(d)(4) rather than to 107(d) as a whole, there is nothing in

‘Subsequent legislation confirms our reading of the

statute. In the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century,

Congress reaffirmed the States’ and EPA’s obligations to

designate areas under the revised ozone standard. Congress

extended the States’ statutory deadline for submitting

designations, and shortened EPA’s deadline for promulgating

them. Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 6103, 112 Stat. 465 (1998).

Under respondents’ interpretation of the Clean Air Act,

Congress, in taking this action in 1998, simply — pointlessly —

reaffirmed the States’ and EPA’s obligations to promulgate

designations that would then be completely ignored.

8

the legislative history to suggest that this change was meant to

transform a revised ozone standard from an enforceable

standard into an unenforceable one. Indeed, the failure to

include the single number “(4)” in the final law — which, on

respondents’ reading, dramatically reworked the regulatory

_ scheme — went unremarked in the legislative history.°

Respondents also argue that the question whether the

revised ozone standard may be énforced is in an “interlocutory

posture” because EPA must now, in light of a part of the D.C.

Circuit’s decision not challenged here, consider and evaluate

the claim that smog is good for people. (E.g., App. Pwr. Resp.

29-30.) Respondents claim that EPA must now redo the entire

process of setting air quality standards, including issuing a new

Criteria Document — a process that Respondents ATA, et al.,

assert will take from “three to five years.” (ATA Resp. 17.)

Even assuming that respondents are correct in claiming

that EPA must now entirely redo its work on the ozone

standard, and even assuming they are correct that this process

will take from three to five years, this gives this Court all the

more reason to grant review of the question whether the ozone

standard may be enforced. For if respondents are correct, EPA

must now engage in a lengthy and complex process, likely

involving scores of agency personnel, in order to revise a

standard that the court below has ruled cannot be enforced.

This would be a colossal waste of precious resources.®

*See H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, Pt. 1, at 229-232, reprinted

in 2 1990 Legis. Hist. 3253-3256.

*Respondents also oppose review on the Subpart 2 issue

on the ground that the lower court has “left open the door” to

further proceedings with respect to Subpart 2. (ATA Resp. 20,

citing the United States’ appendix to its petition, at 8la.) The

9

Many of the parties in this case agree that the question

whether EPA’s revised ozone standard violates the

nondelegation doctrine is worthy of this Court’s review. Yet

unless this Court also agrees to review the question whether this

standard may be enforced, review of the constitutional question

pertaining to the ozone standard may turn out to be a pointless

exercise, as it may succeed only in either ratifying or undoing

an agency standard that in any event may not be enforced. In

this way, the constitutional and statutory questions petitioners

have raised are closely connected, and this Court should review

them together.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS F. REILLY

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

JOHN J. FARMER

Attorney General

State of New Jersey

HOWARD L. GEDULDIG

JOHN R. RENELLA

Deputy Attys. General, N.J.

Richard J. Hughes Justice

Complex 7th Floor

P.O. Box 093

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609) 633-8109, 984-5612

LISA HEINZERLING

Counsel of Record

Special Assistant Atty. General,

Massachusetts

Georgetown Univ. Law Center

600 New Jersey Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-9115

EDWARD G. BOHLEN

Assistant Atty. General, Mass.

200 Portland Street

Boston, MA 02114

(617) 727-2200, ext. 3358

only proceedings for which the court left open the door,

however, are proceedings to reconsider the court’s decision not

to vacate the ozone standard. (U.S. App. 81a.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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