Appendix — Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle

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Table of Contents

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Opinion below, Hope Clinic v. Ryan,

BD Te Bee PUN, SOG vsiscnsinsncnsscroscsecoscssintvores A-2

District Court opinion denying permanent

injunction, Planned Parenthood v. Doyle,

44 F. Supp 2d 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999)...........cccceeeeees A-63

Seventh Circuit opinion reversing denial of

preliminary injunction, Planned Parenthood

v. Doyle, 162 F. 3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998)..............00 A-85

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 98-1726

The Hope Clinic, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, and Richard K.

Devine, State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 C 8702--Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

Nos. 99-2528 & 99-2533

Dennis D. Christensen, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Diane

M. Nicks, District Attorney for Dane County, Wisconsin,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

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No. 98-C-0305-S--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.

Argued September 22, 1999--Decided October 26, 1999

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and COFFEY, FLAUM,

EASTERBROOK, MANION, KANNE, ROVNER, DIANE

P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges."

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. We must decide whether

state laws’ prohibiting partial-birth abortions are

unconstitutionally vague or unduly burden women’s rights.

Acting without an evidentiary hearing, a district court held

the Illinois statute unconstitutional and entered a permanent

injunction. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. -

1998). But after a trial, another district court concluded that

the Wisconsin statute is valid. Planned Parenthood of

Wisconsin v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999).

A panel of this court earlier had ordered preliminary relief

against Wisconsin’s law, see Planned Parenthood of

Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998), and

plaintiffs say that this decision, applying Planned

Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.

833 (1992), justifies permanent injunctions against both

states’ rules. To ensure consistency, we heard the appeals en

banc. We conclude that both laws can be applied in a

constitutional manner. Whether that will occur depends on

State coufig which alone can settle questions about the

construction of the statutes. To ensure that physicians are not

deterred from performing other medical procedures while

issues wend their way through state tribunals, we hold that

both sets of plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will

limit the statutes’ application to the medical procedure that

each state insists is its sole concern.

* Circuit Judge Ripple did not participate in the consideration or decision

of these cases.

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I

Induction, suction curettage, and dilation and evacuation

(D&E) are the principal methods of performing abortions in

the United States. Prohibiting any one_of these would

conflict with the right of abortion recognized by cases such

as Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion) (adopting

“undue burden” as the constitutional standard), and Planned

Parenthood of Central Missouri-v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,

75-79 (1976) (holding that a state may not forbid saline

amniocentesis, at the time the principal means of induction).

Our cases involve an uncommon procedure known to the

medical community as “intact dilation and extraction” or just

“dilation and extraction (D&X),” and to the public as

“partial-birth abortion.”

Some medical background is essential to understanding the

issues. Induction means inducing preterm labor, which

causes the expulsion of the conceptus. Methotrexate or

mifepristone (RU-486, now in clinical trials), in combination

with misoprostol, can be used for this purpose early in

pregnancy; saline amniocentesis and injected prostaglandins

serve the same function in the second trimester. Suction

curettage (vacuum aspiration), the most common surgical

method of abortion early in pregnancy, refers to evacuation

of the uterine cavity; the embryo or fetus is separated from

the placenta either by scraping or vacuum pressure, then is

removed by suction. When these methods are inappropriate,

or do not work, physicians employ the D&E procedure. To

perform a D&E, the physician dilates the cervix and

dismembers the fetus inside the uterus using forceps. Fetal

parts are removed with forceps or by suction.

A D&X is a variant of a D&E in which the fetus is

removed without dismemberment. The American College of

Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) defines D&X as

follows: “1. deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a

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sequence of days; 2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a

footling breech; 3. breech extraction of the body excepting

the head; and 4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents

of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but

otherwise intact fetus.” Martin Haskell, the physician who

developed the D&X procedure, see Dilation and Extraction

for Late Second Trimester Abortion (1992), reprinted in 139

Cong. Rec. E1092 (Apr. 29, 1993), believes that how the

head is diminished in size so that it can pass through the

cervix is not important: mechanically crushing the skull

serves the same end as evacuating its contents, which causes

its collapse. It is this combination of coming so close to

delivering a live child with the death of the fetus by reducing

the size of the skull that not only distinguishes D&X from

D&E medically but also causes the adverse public (and

legislative) reaction. Opponents deem the D&X procedure

needlessly cruel and bordering on infanticide, and all three

states in this circuit have enacted statutory restrictions.

The statute in Illinois has three sections with legal

significance: ;

720 ILCS § 513/5. Definitions

In this Act: “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion

in which the person performing the abortion partially

vaginally delivers a living human fetus or infant

before killing the fetus or infant and completing the

delivery. The terms “fetus” and “infant” are used

interchangeably to refer to the biological offspring of

human. parents.

720 ILCS § 513/10. Partial-birth abortions prohibited

Any person who knowingly performs a partial-birth

abortion and thereby kills a human fetus or infant is

guilty of a Class 4 felony. This Section does not

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apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to

save the life of a mother because her life is

endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or

physical injury, including a_ !ife-endangering

condition caused Fy or arising from the pregnancy

itself, provided that no other medical procedure

would suffice for that purpose.

720 ILCS § 513/15. Civil action

The maternal grandparents of the fetus or infant, if the

mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the time

of the abortion, may in a civil action obtain

appropriate relief unless the pregnancy resulted from

the plaintiffs criminal conduct or the plaintiff

cgnsented to the abortion. The relief shall include

money damages for all injuries, psychological and

physical, occasioned by the violation of this Act and

statutory damages equal to 3 times the cost of the

partial-birth abortion.

The Indiana statute defines “partial-birth abortion” in

identical terms. Ind. Code § 16-18-2-267.5. Like Illinois it

forbids partial-birth abortions unless that procedure is

necessary to save the mother’s life, and no other procedure

would suffice. Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1(b). The Indiana

statute has never been challenged and has been in effect since

July 1, 1997.

Wisconsin has taken a slightly different approach. Its

statutes provide:

Wis. Stat. § 895.038 Partial-birth abortions; liability.

(1) In this section:

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(a) “Child” has the meaning stn in § 940.16 (1)

(a).

(b) “Partial-birth abortion” has the meaning given

in § 940.16 (1) (b).

(2) (a) Except as provided in par. (b), any of the

following persons has a claim for appropriate relief

against a person who performs a_ partial-birth

abortion:

1. If the person on whom a partial-birth

abortion was performed was a minor, the

parent of the minor.

2. The father of the child aborted by the

partial-birth abortion.

(b) A person specified in par. (a) 1. or 2. does not

have a claim under par. (a) if any of the following

apply:

1. The person consented to performance of the

partial-birth abortion.

2. The pregnancy of the woman on whom the

partial-birth abortion was performed was the

result of a sexual assault in violation of §

940.225, 944.06, 948.02, 948.025, 948.06 or

948.09 that was committed by the person.

(3) The relief available under sub. (2) shall include all

of the following:

(a) If the abortion was performed in violation of §

940.16, damages arising out of the performance of

the partial birth abortion, including damages for

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personal injury and emotional and psychological

distress.

(b) Exemplary damages equal to 3 times the cost

of the partial-birth abortion.

(4) Subsection (2) applies even if the mother of the

child aborted by the partial-birth abortion consented

to the performance of the partial-birth abortion.

Wis. Stat. § 940.16 Partial-birth abortion.

(1) In this section:

(a) “Child” means a human being from the time of

fertilization until it is completely delivered from a

pregnant woman.

(b) “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in

which a person partially vaginally delivers a

living child, causes the death of the partially

delivered child with the intent to kill the child,

and then completes the delivery of the child.

(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever

intentionally performs a partial birth abortion is guilty

of a Class A felony.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the partial-birth

abortion is necessary to save the life of a woman

whose life is endangered by a physical disorder,

physical illness or physical injury, including a life-

endangering physical disorder, physical illness or

physical injury caused by or arising from the

pregnancy itself, and if no other medical procedure

would suffice for that purpose.

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Wisconsin’s definition of partial-birth abortion is

substantially the same as Illinois’, but the mental-state

elements differ, as do the maximum penalties: Illinois makes

unjustified partial-birth abortion a Class 4 felony, with a

maximum penalty of three years; in Wisconsin the offense is

a Class A felony, for which Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a)

provides a penalty of life imprisonment.

Because Wisconsin and Illinois use similar language to

define partial-birth abortions, we _ illustrate plaintiffs’

concerns with the latter’s statute:

“Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which

the person performing the abortion partially vaginally

delivers a living human fetus or infant before killing

the fetus or infant and completing the delivery. The

terms “fetus” and “infant” are used interchangeably to

refer to the bioiogical offspring of human parents.

This legal definition is an imperfect match for the medical

definition of D&X. It is easy to see why a legislature would

be chary of the ACOG’s specification: then any small

variation (such as a change in the method of reducing the

head size, or snipping off a toe to defeat the “otherwise

intact” specification) would take’ the abortion outside the

prohibition, even though the reasons why the technique has

been deemed objectionable would be unaffected. But, as is

common with legislation, the price of avoiding loopholes is

generality. Section 513/5 captures the idea, central to the

D&X procedure, that an intact fetus moves from uterus to

vagina before death occurs. But it also uses the words

“delivers” and “delivery,” which many physicians understand

to refer to any removal of fetal material from the uterus. The

law might be read to prohibit the extraction of dismembered

parts following a D&E, or to prohibit abortion by induction if

by chance the fetus survives until it reaches the birth canal.

Moreover, physicians performing a D&E sometimes do not

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complete the dismemberment inside the uterus, and some

fear that this could lead the procedure to be characterized as a

partial delivery under the statute.

The possibility that § 513/10 might discourage risk-averse

physicians from performing the D&E procedure led the

district court in Illinois to declare that it is too vague to be

enforced, and a similar concern animated our panel’s

decision to require preliminary relief against Wisconsin’s

law. Moreover, if these lawsneedlessly raise the effective -

costs of induction, suction curettage, or D&E, then they

would unduly burden the right of abortion, another concern

expressed not only by the district court in the Illinois case but

also by the panel in the Wisconsin case. But after a trial on

remand, the district court in Wisconsin concluded that

physicians who perform abortions recognize that the

statutory formula, however vague or broad these words

appear to lay eyes, refers to the D&X procedure alone. The

court held ‘that, as so limited, the statute does not

substantially burden any woman’s right to an abortion,

because D&X is never the only safe procedure.

Litigation elsewhere has produced results mirroring the

divergence between the outcomes in Jllinois and Wisconsin.

The sixth circuit held that Ohio’s ban on partial-birth

abortions is unconstitutional, Women’s Medical Professional

Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), but the

fourth circuit issued a stay preventing interference with

Virginia’s statute. Richmond Medical Center for Women v.

Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), motion to vacate stay

denied, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18547. Both of those

decisions were rendered over dissents. A single panel of the

eighth circuit recently held three states’ partial-birth-abortion

laws unconstitutional, but only after first concluding that all

three statutes forbid the D&E procedure. Carhart v.

Stenberg, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23162 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,

1999) (Nebraska); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A.

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v. Jegley, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23165 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,

1999) (Arkansas); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc.

v. Miller, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23166 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,

1999) (Iowa).

Il

Plaintiffs would like us to employ the approach of our

panel’s opinion in the Wisconsin case and declare both

States’ laws unconstitutional without ado. But different

statutes have different language, which may be important.

Litigants also have made distinctive arguments--for example,

Illinois relies on United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739

(1987), for the proposition that, except in first amendment

cases, a law may be held unconstitutional only when “no set

of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”

Moreover, two events since the panel wrote call for fresh

analysis. First, that opinion dealt with preliminary relief and

observed that “the full trial may cast the facts in a different

light”. 162 F.3d at 466. That trial has been held in

Wisconsin, and its results must be considered. Second, both

the panel’s decision in the Wisconsin case and the district

court’s opinion in the Illinois case conclude that the statute as

written is vagué. A more recent decision of the Supreme

Court, Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), stresses

that state courts are entitled to construe state laws to reduce

their ambiguity, and that federal courts should evaluate state

laws as they have been construed, not just as they appear in

the statute books. See also, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.

733 (1974); Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413

U.S. 548 (1973). This implies that Illinois and Wisconsin are

entitled to interpret their own laws--that federal courts should

not enjoin all application before enforcement and thus

prevent the state courts from having a chance to save their

Statutes.

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Salerno offers a potential ground for giving the states that

chance. It would be hard to say that every possible instance

of the D&X procedure is protected by the Constitution.

Along similar lines are the many cases saying that outside the

domain of the first amendment, vagueness challenges must

be assessed “as applied.” See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright,

486 U.S. 356 1853 (1988); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,

Hofjiman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982). But we

are reluctant to rely too heavily on this approach, because

Morales shows that three Justices believe that this language

is too sweeping, see 119 S. Ct. at 1858-59 & n.22 (Stevens,

J., joined by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.), and the Supreme Court

has on occasion resolved constitutional challenges to statutes

that do not involve speech without asking whether every

conceivable application would be unconstitutional. E.g.,

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Kolender v. Lawson,

461 U.S. 352, 358-59 n.8 (1983); Nash v. United States, 229

U.S. 373 (1913). Only one Justice offered any support for

Salerno’s approach in Morales, and he did so in a dissenting

opinion. 119 S. Ct. at 1867-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Justice Scalia identified many cases that articulate Salerno’s

requirement, and many others that bypass the inquiry. Courts

of appeals are divided on the question whether Salerno

applies to abortion legislation. Compare Jane L. v.

Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996), with

Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (Sth Cir. 1992). The

safest course for a court of appeals, when confronted with

inconsistent lines of precedent, is to decide on other grounds

if at all possible. Here it is possible, for we think that the

Supreme Courts of Illinois and Wisconsin could read their

laws in ways that comport with the Constitution.

1. One means of doing this would be to assimilate the

statutory definitions to the medical definition of D&X, with

allowance for different ways of reducing the head size and

other immaterial variations. Both states are concerned about

the D&X procedure and did not set out to forbid any other.

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The Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin, the

principal defendants, tell us that their statutes are concerned

only with the D&X procedure and will be enforced only

against its use. That assurance might be enough by itself, in

the absence of any contrary indication from the state

judiciary, to resolve immediate vagueness concerns. See

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988); cf. Arizonans

for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-80 (1997).

Although local prosecutors (States’ Attorneys in Illinois,

District Attorneys in Wisconsin) initiate criminal

prosecutions, representatives of these prosecutors have been

named as parties in each case, and they agree with the

Attorneys General. Plaintiffs object that this approach would

rewrite rather than interpret the law, but we doubt this. Both

medical and popular literature equate “partial-birth abortion”

(the statutory term) with the D&X procedure. See Janet E.

Gans Epner, Harry S. Jonas & Daniel L. Seckinger, Late-

term Abortion, 280 J. Am. Medical Ass’n 724 (Aug. 26,

1998); M. LeRoy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhof, Rationale for

Banning Abortions Late in Pregnancy, 280 J. Am. Medical

Ass’n 744 (Aug. 26, 1998). The district court in Wisconsin

found that this is the statute’s aim. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 984

(relying on the Attorney General’s concession). Using a

medical definition to supplement a vague lay definition does

not strike us as revisionism or an exercise in deconstruction.

But if this approach would nonetheless be an example of

brute force used to save a statute-- well, courts do it all the

time. Florida had a law forbidding “the abominable and

detestable crime against nature”. Placement in the code

showed that this crime had something to do with sex, but

what? Did it forbid incest? Necrophilia? Bestiality? A

legal historian might give an answer, but to lay readers of the

Statute, and even to most lawyers, the words are Delphic.

The state’s highest court filled in the blank by saying that the

object was sodomy--and the Supreme Court of the United

States rebuffed a charge of unconstitutional vagueness, given

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the state court’s prestidigitation. Wainwright v. Stone, 414

U.S. 21 (1973). Only if vagueness remains after judicial

interpretation is there a constitutional problem, the Court

held. See also, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259

(1997); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Lanzetta v. New

Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455-57 (1939); Kolender, 461 U.S. at

355-57. Federal courts have performed equally dramatic

feats. As written, the Federal Election Campaign Act is

hopelessly vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

1 (1976), saved the bulk of the statute by adding details. In

two recent cases we predicted that state courts would follow

suit with comparable state laws. See Wisconsin Right to Life,

Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1998); Brownsburg

Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503

(7th Cir. 1998). In the latter case, because we were not

completely confident that the state judiciary would follow

Buckley’s path of freewheeling interpretation, we certified

the issue to the Supreme Court of Indiana--which responded

that it indeed possesses, and is inclined to use, that power.

Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714

N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 1999).

Relying on Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), the

sixth circuit concluded in Women’s Medical Professional

Corp. v. Voinovich that any statute concerning abortion is

unconstitutionally vague, no matter how precise an

interpretation state courts eventually develop, unless it

requires proof that the physician knows that a given act has

been forbidden. If this were so, then the approach to

avoiding vagueness that we have just sketched would be

untenable. But it is not so; never has the Supreme Court held

that all criminal laws (or even just all criminal laws affecting

abortion) depend on scienter. Cases we have mentioned

already (and more that we cite later) hold that a statute may

be sustained against a charge of vagueness if, as construed, it

gives reasonable notice of the forbidden conduct. That the

notice does not sink in--that some people close their eyes (or

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minds) and thus do not learn of the law’s contents or

appreciate its application to their conduct--does not prevent a

state from enforcing its rules. See United States v: Wilson,

159 F.3d 280, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1998). This subject received

sustained attention in Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 460-64

(7th Cir. 1999). For the reasons laid out in Karlin we

respectfully disagree with the sixth circuit’s understanding of

this question. See also Note, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 731 (1999)

(criticizing Women’s Medical Professional Corp.).

2. Although the Constitution does not compel states to

ameliorate vagueness problems by using a mental-state

requirement to limit prosecutions to situations in which the

defendant knows that his acts are forbidden, they are free to

do so. This is the path the Supreme Court took in Screws v.

United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), and United States v.

Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), to save 18 U.S.C. §§ 241

and 242. These companion statutes, the poster children for a

vagueness campaign, make it a crime to deprive anyone of

any constitutional right (or conspire to do so). These statutes

are written entirely in terms that have been difficult to pin

down, such as “under color of any law” and “rights,

privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the

Constitution . . . of the United States”. Section 242 contains

the word “willfully”, and in Screws the Court read this to

mean that a person commits the offense only if he knows that

his acts deprive someone of a constitutional right. A person

who actually recognizes his legal obligation can’t complain

that he lacked notice. Many cases since Screws use a

knowledge requirement to prevent unfair surprise when the

statute is vague or complex. E.g., Cheek v. United States,

498 U.S. 192 (1991) (tax laws); Staples v. United States, 511

U.S. 600 (1994) (gun-control laws).

Both Illinois and Wisconsin put mental-state elements in

their statutes. Attorneys General of both states contend that

under their laws a procedure may be deemed a “partial-birth

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abortion” only if at the outset of the procedure the physician

intends to perform all of the steps that mark the D&X. We

think that the Supreme Courts of both states could go even

farther and read the statutes to require knowledge of the legal

rules, and thus to follow the trail blazed in Screws.

The critical language in Illinois reads: “Any person who

knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills

a human fetus or infant is guilty of a Class 4 felony.” 720

ILCS § 513/10 (emphasis added). If the Supreme Court of

Illinois reads “knowingly” in § 513/10 the same way the

Supreme Court of the United States read “willfully” in § 242,

then there is no vagueness problem with § 513/10. And we

can’t see any impediment to giving “knowingly” such a

reading. In context, the word sounds distinctly like a

requirement that the physician know that the medical

procedure being performed is a “partial-birth abortion” and

not simply that the physician know that he is performing

particular physical acts. The most natural reading is one that

requires knowledge of the law’s application to the medical

procedure being performed. Federal courts have been

creative with knowledge requirements as a means of saving

Statutes against constitutional infirmity. E.g., United States

v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). Section

513/10 readily supports a construction that eliminates all

concern about vagueness, which makes it inappropriate for a

federal court to enjoin its application. (In Morales, the

Supreme Court’s most recent vagueness opinion, the lead

opinion stressed that the statute lacked any mental-state

requirement.)

Wisconsin uses the word “intentionally” rather than the

word “knowingly.” Its statute has two intent elements: a -

partial-birth abortion is defined as one in which the physician

acts with “the intent to kill the child”, Wis. Stat. §

940.16(1)(b), and the section defining the offense reads:

“Whoever intentionally performs a partial-birth abortion is

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guilty of a Class A felony.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(2). The

reference to “intent” in § 940.16(1)(b) must mean “that the

actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result

specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically

certain to cause that result.” Wis. Stat. § 939.23(4) (defining

“with intent to”). The reference to “intentionally” in §

940.16(2) has at least potentially a broader scope. Although

§ 939.23(3) defines “intentionally” as “a purpose to do the

thing or cause the result specified”, a “partial-birth abortion”

is neither a thing nor a result; it is a defined legal term. It is

therefore a distinct possibility that the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin will read this reference as equivalent to “wilfully”

or “knowingly” notwithstanding the caution in § 939.23(5)

that criminal intent “does not require proof of knowledge of

the . . . scope or meaning of the terms used in” a statute. The

question here is not whether a physician understands the

terms of § 940.16(1)(b) in the abstract, but whether the

physician intends that the plan of action add up to a “partial-

birth abortion.” In cases such as X-Citement Video, Cheek,

and Staples, the Supreme Court of the United States was

exceptionally creative with statutory allusions to mental

states; plaintiffs have not established that the Supreme Court

of Wisconsin would be unwilling to save its statutes the way

the Supreme Court of the United States saved 18 U.S.C. §

242.

3. Still a third interpretive approach is open to the state

courts. They may elect to apply the statute to its central core

of meaning, the D&X, while working out in common law

fashion its outer boundaries. See United States v. Pitt-Des

Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 986-90 (7th Cir. 1999). This is

how the Supreme Court has chosen to proceed with respect to

the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, a statute much

less: precise than the partial-birth-abortion laws. Long before

the development of a body of antitrust rules, or even of a

clear distinction between the domains of the per se rule and

the rule of reason, the Court rebuffed a vagueness challenge,

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remarking that “law is full of instances where a man’s fate

depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury

subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.” Nash, 229

U.S. at 377 (Holmes, J.). The Court took the same approach

in Parker v. Levy for Article 133 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, which makes it a crime for a commissioned

officer to engage in “conduct unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman.” That statute, compared to which § 513/5 and §

940.16(1)(b) are paragons of specificity, was sustained

against a vagueness challenge because the military courts had

added details over many years, and the Supreme Court

anticipated that they would continue to do so as new

situations arose. Letter Carriers applies the same approach

to vague provisions of the Hatch Act. Parker cannot be

passed off as a sport of military law; it is just’one illustration

of the proposition that vagueness may be overcome

incrementally, as well as by an all-at-once construction.

Consider United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975), a

civilian case dealing with 18 U.S.C. § 1715, which makes it a

crime to mail a firearm capable of being concealed on the

person. A Derringer unquestionably qualifies, and although

larger guns pose tough questions, the combination of a core

meaning plus size as a metric for adjudication enabled the

Court to hold that borderline cases could be decided later, as

they arose.

Notice the difference between this approach and Salerno.

In cases such as Nash, Parker, and Powell, the Court did not

ask simply whether there was one constitutional application.

It asked whether there was a core of meaning that people

could grasp. In Nash the common law of restraint of trade

supplied that core; in Parker the accumulated body of

military precedents did so; in Powell the core comprised

handguns. Occasionally the Court fortifies this approach by

combining it with a scienter requirement, as United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), did for the

Sherman Act. Illinois and Wisconsin can follow the same

A-19

path. For their statutes, the medical definition of the D&X

procedure supplies the core of understandable application.

Indeed, the district court in Wisconsin found as a matter of

fact that physicians who are likely to perform an abortion

already understand that this is the point of partial-birth-

abortion statutes. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 978. That finding cannot

be set aside as clearly erroneous.

Plaintiffs respond to this core-plus-common-law approach

by contending that a statute is unconstitutionally vague until

the interstices have been filled in. But then all of the cases

we have cited were wrongly decided, for the interstices of

antitrust law were not filled in by 1913, nor were all of the

gun-mailing issues worked out before 1975: Powell involved

a sawed-off shotgun, not a pistol. To say that the law cannot

be applied to anyone, even a person who commits a violation

within the core of the statute, until all issues about its reach

have been resolved would prevent those issi es from coming

before the court to be resolved. How, precisely, are the

interpretive wrinkles to be smoothed if the law can’t be

invoked? By advisory opinions? Anyway, there is always a

periphery, no matter how many situations judges have

evaluated. Resolving each new question moves the area of

uncertainty but can’t abolish it. “Whenever the law draws a

line there will be cases very near each other on opposite

sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no

one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he

thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to

make him take the risk.” United States v. Wurzbach, 280

U.S. 396, 399 (1930) (Holmes, J.).

Protection for events outside the core is provided by the

principle that surprising and unanticipated applications of a

criminal statute violate the due process clause. See, e.g.,

Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964); Marks v.

United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977); Lanier, 520 U.S. at

266. Given the assurances made in this litigation by the

A-20

Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin, application of

these states’ partial-birth-abortion statutes to a normal D&E

or induction (including one that began as a D&E but turned

out to have elements of a D&X because of inadvertence or

developments during- surgery) would be surprising and

constitutionally impermissible. Plaintiffs therefore can

practice medicine without undue concern on the legal front.

The Constitution provides the assurance they crave--but

without the need to prevent application of the state law to the

D&X procedure itself. States have a powerful interest in

working out the details of their criminal laws in their own

courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.-37 (1971); Nelson v.

Murphy, 44 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1995). On remand the district

judges should enter precautionary injunctions, limited to

implementing the conclusion of this paragraph that the state

laws may not be applied to a normal D&E or induction until

after the state has provided additional specificity, by statutory

amendment, regulations, or judicial interpretation (which

could arise either from civil litigation, see Part IV below, or

from criminal prosecutions in which the parties disagree

about whether the medical procedure properly may be

labeled a D&X). With that assurance in hand, plaintiffs

would not face any substantial threat of prosecution.

A skeptic might respond: what’s the basis for an injunction

without a finding of actual constitutional violation? The

basis is the risk that plaintiffs face. See Ex parte Young, 209

U.S. 123 (1908). Whenever suit is brought against a statute

that has yet to be enforced, there is a chance that what the

federal court does will be unnecessary or even advisory--for

in the absence of relief the statute might never be enforced in

a way that plaintiffs fear, or that would violate their rights.

Everything depends on probabilities. Plaintiffs believe that

the probability of improper prosecution is so high that the

statutes must be enjoined root and branch. We think that the

probability of improper prosecution is low, but non-zero; and

a prosecution for performing a D&E not only raises

—

A-21

vagueness concerns but also could unduly burden women’s

rights (see Part III below). That risk can be reduced to a

constitutionally acceptable level with a simple injunction

based on Bouie.

Persons who believe that the risk of improper prosecution

is so high that all prosecution under the statute should be

enjoined are poorly situated to contend that the risk also is so

low that the plaintiffs lack standing under Los Angeles v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660

(1983). When this case began the plaintiffs faced a real risk

and therefore had standing; and no one thinks that

defendants’ representations about their projected course of

enforcement have made the controversy moot. If as plaintiffs

believe the Constitution requires an injunction against

everything Illinois and Wisconsin have enacted, despite these

assurances, then the Constitution can’t simultaneously forbid

an injunction against potential misuses of state power in the

enforcement of these laws. Article III does not limit a federal

court’s choice to enjoining nothing, or enjoining everything.

The path we choose allows the states to interpret their laws

and supply more concrete rules, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428

U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976); the path the plaintiffs (and our

dissenting colleagues) prefer would foreclose now and

forever all interpretation by the state judiciary. By filing suit

against a novel and ambiguous law in federal court, litigants

can’t preclude interpretation by the state judiciary. Our

precautionary approach preserves the state judiciary’s role

while protecting plaintiffs’ (and their patients’) legitimate

interests in the interim.

4. In the Wisconsin case our panel expressed concern that

even if the probability of unanticipated application is low, the

penalty is so high (life imprisonment) that physicians would

avoid performing the D&E procedure. 162 F.3d at 469. This

cannot be said of Illinois, where the maximum penalty is

three years’ imprisonment. Although the threat of life in

A-22

prison has a greater potential to induce caution than does the

threat of three years in prison, the precautionary injunction

discussed above should reduce the risk of improper or

unanticipated application to a trivial level. The right

constitutional objection to a Draconian penalty is not

vagueness (a statute’s scope is equally clear or uncertain

whether the penalty is a $10 fine or 20 years in prison) but a

contention that severe criminal punishment for a medical

misunderstanding would inflict cruel and _ unusual

punishment. Plaintiffs themselves do not make such an

argument, however; they object to the substance of the state

laws, not to the punishment available on conviction. The

penalty is an afterthought, scarcely mentioned in their briefs.

If Wisconsin should some day impose a lengthy prison term

for a violation of § 940.16(2), then it will be time to consider

arguments based on the eighth amendment.

5. For the last two years, a natural experiment has been

conducted in the United States. Thirty states enacted laws

forbidding most partial-birth abortions. Judges prohibited

the application of these laws in two-thirds of these states; in

the other third the statutes have been in force. One way to

perform a reality check on the district court’s conclusion in

the Wisconsin case that physicians know that these statutes

cover only the D&X is to see what has happened in the states

where the laws have been permitted to take effect.

Vagueness could affect physicians in either or both of two

ways. First, they might send women seeking second-

trimester abortions to other states that do not regulate partial-

birth abortions. The result would be a decrease in second-

trimester abortions as a percentage of all abortions in the

state. Second, physicians might select a different procedure--

principally substituting induction for a D&E--even though

the replacement was medically infevior. This would produce

a change in the ratio of inductions to D&E procedures in the

affected state.

A-23

Indiana supplies a nice test, because its law took effect on

July 1, 1997, so it is easy to compare the first six months of

1997 to the second six. Moreover, Indiana is surrounded by

states that lack an effective prohibition on partial-birth

abortions (because of the Illinois injunction and the sixth

circuit’s ruling in Women’s Medical Professional Corp.), so

it was relatively easy for physicians to send their patients

elsewhere. Although the maximum penalty in Indiana is not

steep (an unjustified partial-birth abortion there is a Class C

felony, Ind. Code § 16-34-2-7(a), for which the punishment

is four years’ imprisonment, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a)), no

state or federal court has construed the statutory term, so

whatever uncertainty the raw text of the statute engenders is

unabated.

During 1997 a total of 13,208 abortions were performed in

Indiana. (These data come from tables prepared by Indiana’s

State Epidemiologist.) During the first six months, 74 late-

second-trimester abortions were performed: 72 by D&E and

2 by intra-uterine prostaglandin injection. During the second

six months (that is, after the partial-birth-abortion law took

effect), 87 late-second-trimester abortions were performed,

all by D&E. Thus physicians did not substitute induction for

D&E in order to reduce risk to themselves. Nor did they

avoid the D&E procedure by sending women to other states.

Abortion by D&E during the first six months represented

1.03% of all abortions performed in Indiana (72 of 6,950).

Abortion by D&E during the second six months represented

1.39% of all abortions in the state (87 of 6,258). These data

are incompatible with plaintiffs’ a priori belief that the

partial-birth-abortion statutes will discourage the

performance of the D&E procedure or cause the physician to

substitute an inferior procedure. Perhaps things have turned

out differently in other states, or perhaps physicians behaved

differently in 1998 or 1999. We do not mean to preclude

plaintiffs from submitting the data in Indiana and other states

to rigorous analysis. A few procedures were classified in the

A-24

tables as “unknown,” which may mask some effects--though

the number of “unknown” procedures did not change much

from the first to the second half of 1997. Our point is only

that a simple inquiry reinforces the findings of fact made in

the Wisconsin case and implies that partial-birth-abortion

statutes need not have the baleful effects that plaintiffs

foresee.

Plaintiffs in both cases contend that, even if the statutes are

precise enough to be enforced, they create an undue (and

therefore unconstitutional) burden on abortion. The eighth

circuit reached this conclusion in Carhart and its two

companion cases, but only after first holding that the state

laws effectively prohibit the D&E procedure. If we thought

that the Illinois or Wisconsin laws forbade D&E, then

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth would

require us to agree with the eighth circuit. For reasons we

have already given, however, we believe that state courts are

entitled to accept the view of both states’ Attorneys General

that their laws do not forbid, or even affect, the D&E

procedure. The question we must address, then, is whether a

statute limited to D&X unduly burdens abortion.

One reason why this might be so is that neither state’s law

contains an exception for situations in which the D&X

procedure is necessary to protect the woman’s health. A

second argument is that any prohibition of any medical

procedure unduly burdens a woman’s right to abortion. The

first line of argument finds some support in Casey, which

held that any regulation of abortion must make an exception

for procedures that protect “the woman’s life or health”, 505

U.S. at 846 (emphasis added), as well as our panel’s decision

_ in the Wisconsin case, 162 F.3d at 467-68, 470-71. But we

do not think that the plurality in Casey meant this as a

universal rule, one applicable even when the procedure in

A-25

question lacks demonstrable health benefits. The point that

the plurality made was that a statute that lacks a “health

exception” may unduly burden the woman’s right to obtain

an abortion before the fetus has reached viability; when state

law offers many safe options to that end, the regulation of an

additional option does not produce an undue burden.

Section 513/10 of the Illinois statute contains an exception

for “‘a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life

of a mother because her life is endangered by a physical

disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-

endangering condition caused by or arising from fhe -

pregnancy itself, provided that no other medical procedure

would suffice for that purpose.” It does not contain a

comparable exception for a partial-birth abortion that

promotes the woman’s health. Wisconsin’s law has a similar

structure. Both sets of plaintiffs contend that the lack of an

exception for a woman’s health dooms the statute. Coming

from the Illinois plaintiffs, this is a weak argument indeed,

for none of the plaintiff physicians or clinics in Illinois uses

the D&X, and none asserts any desire to start. Whether the

D&X procedure sometimes would protect a woman’s health

is therefore immaterial to these physicians and the women in

their care. But several of the plaintiff physicians in the

Wisconsin case do employ the D&X procedure on occasion,

sO we must consider the merits of the argument.

After a trial, the district court in the Wisconsin case

concluded that the D&X procedure is never necessary from

the perspective of the patient’s health. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 979-

82. This conclusion cannot be called clearly erroneous; as

things transpired, it was not a seriously contested issue.

None of the plaintiff physicians in that case testified to the

contrary. The district court summed up:

None of the physicians would state unequivocally that

the D&X procedure is safer than the D&E procedure.

A-26

Broekhuizen conceded that further study of the

procedures is required. Smith admitted that he had

never encountered a situation where D&X would

have been the best procedure to use. Haskell, who

invented the procedure, admitted that the D&X

procedure is never medically necessary to save the

life or preserve the health of a woman. Giles agreed.

Id. at 980. The judge added that, although the D&X

procedure has been used for more than a decade, no

published study compares the risks of D&X to those of D&E.

Id. at 979. Some authors believe that the D&X procedure is

more hazardous. See Sprang & Neerhof, supra, 280 J. Am.

Medical Ass’n at 746 (“Intact D&X (partial-birth abortion)

should not be performed because it is needlessly risky,

inhumane, and ethically unacceptable.”); Nancy G. Romer,

The Medical Facts of Partial-Birth Abortions, 3 Nexus 57

(1998).

_ Plaintiffs have not identified any data that undercut the

district court’s finding of fact. Their principal medical

reference is the ACOG’s 1997 statement and technical

bulletin on the D&X procedure, which concluded that,

although D&X is never the only medically appropriate

option, choice still should be reserved to the physician.

Although the statement asserts that D&X sometimes may be

the best option, the ACOG did not identify any concrete

circumstance under which this would be so or provide

support for the assertion. Several of the plaintiff physicians

testified to like effect, again without specifics or data. No

published medical study fills the gap. Cf. Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1177-79 (1999). Unelaborated

avowals do not demonstrate that a finding of fact reached

after a trial is clearly erroneous. When there is a conflict in

the testimony--and that is the description most favorable to

the plaintiffs--the finder of fact is entitled to choose. See

A-27

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). We

proceed on the assumption, which appears to be shared by

the American Medical Association, that the D&X is not the

best or safest option in any articulable category of situations.

The AMA’s Policy H-5.982 concludes, among other things,

that “there does not appear to be any identified situation in

which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to

induce abortion.” The district court in Illinois did not make

contrary findings, or indeed any finding; acting without a

trial or even an evidentiary hearing, it could not properly

have rendered “findings” about disputed issues. District

courts in other circuits have disagreed with the conclusions

the district judge reached in the Wisconsin case, but this does

more to show that the issue is debatable among reasonable

persons than to show that a particular view is in error.

The question in the end is not what one or another judge

found on a given record; it is whether the state legislatures

exceeded their constitutional powers. Factual premises

underlying legislation normally are not subject to review by

trial courts. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.

307, 315 (1993); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,

449 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,

111 (1979); National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. Chicago, 45

F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court’s

findings, the statements of medical groups, and the inferences

to be drawn from what has happened in states that have

implemented partial-birth-abortion statutes, are informative

rather than conclusive on the question whether the

underpinnings of the legislation are tenable. See Henry P.

Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev.

229 (1985). Although “undue burden” analysis does not map

neatly to the standard classifications (“rational basis,” “strict

scrutiny,” and the like), making it hard to know the extent to

which courts must respect legislative decisions about

contestable factual matters, it is significant that none of the

Supreme Court’s decisions in abortion cases suggests that the

A-28

same law would be constitutional in one state, and

unconstitutional in another, depending on a district judge’s

resolution of factual disputes. Thus we treat the findings in

the Wisconsin case, like the view of the AMA, not as

replacements for legislative conclusions, but as establishing

that there is real, and not just hypothetical, support for a

belief that the partial-birth-abortion laws do not pose hazards

to maternal health. (This is the approach to evaluation of

facts when the constitutional standard prescribes an

intermediate level of analysis. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.

190, 199-204 (1976).)

Only if every regulation related to abortions must contain a

case-by-case “health exception” is there a problem with these

laws. Yet Casey did not say that health effects must be

evaluated case by case, rather than procedure by procedure.

Abortions are not havens for-junk science--so that, for

example, the state must let any chiropractor perform an

abortion, if the chiropractor believes that manipulation of the

spine is safest for the woman. Cases such as Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), which held that states may

limit performance of abortions to physicians, permit laws that

regulate by class of procedures (or of medical providers). Cf.

United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (FDA may

ban a generally ineffective drug, even though for a few

people it may be the only cure). Doubtless some nurses are

better than some physicians at performing abortions, so

patients’ health would be improved by allowing these nurses

to perform abortions; yet the Court held that states may

provide otherwise. Similarly, Illinois and Wisconsin

concluded that the D&X procedure is not essential to protect

the health of any woman, given the availability of other

procedures. Compilation of additional information by the

medical profession could call this conclusion into question.

As things stand, however, interference with the operation of

the siate laws cannot be justified on the ground that the D&X

procedure is necessary to protect women’s health.

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A requirement of a case-by-case “health exception” to

every statute concerning abortion would amount to a rule that

no state may regulate any abortion procedure. For a

physician will use a particular procedure only if in the

physician’s judgment the procedure is superior in some way--

faster, safer, more likely to work (and thus indirectly safer

because an abortion can be achieved with one procedure

rather than two, with cumulative risks), or perhaps less

expensive (and thus again indirectly safer, because the lower

cost brings it within the reach of- additional patients). Can

plaintiffs, who object to the vagueness of the states’ laws,

really welcome a ruling under which every abortion creates

the possibility of a prosecution in which the state invites a

jury to disagree with the physician’s assessment of the

procedure’s safety? A health exception, where jurors rather

than physicians assessed health, would be an order of

magnitude worse than the ambiguity plaintiffs perceive in the

partial-birth-abortion laws. Perhaps plaintiffs believe that a

“health exception” should make the physician’s assessment

of health consequences incontestable. That would avoid

vagueness at the price of vitiating the laws. Some physicians

are bound to think that a given procedure is safer or

otherwise superior, even if the medical profession as a whole

disagrees. A constitutionally based health exception for

every procedure, coupled with a prohibition against review of

physicians’ beliefs about which procedures are safest, would

amount to a rule that arvyything goes. And plaintiffs make this

argument explicitly: they contend that any regulation of any

medical procedure that pertains to abortion is an “undue

burden” on women’s rights.

To the observation that D&X is not an important

procedure--indeed, that it is such a marginal procedure that

few physicians anywhere in the nation (and none in Illinois)

express any interest in performing it--plaintiffs rejoin that the

question is not whether a law creates an undue burden for

A-30

women as a group, but only whether it does so for those

women it affects. The affected set here is women for whom

a physician will think that D&X is the procedure most likely

to succeed, or to entail the least cost. For these women,

plaintiffs contend, the burden is substantial and therefore

“undue.” Moreover, the argument continues, if the states are

right--if D&X really is a procedure that the medical

profession abjures--then the law must be political

grandstanding. A restriction imposed for no better reason

than to make a point has no benefits and therefore must be

“undue,” the argument concludes. On plaintiffs’ approach, if

the statutes actually accomplish something, then the burden

is “undue” because the laws have effects; and if the laws

accomplish nothing, then the burden is “undue” because any

cost is excessive when the benefit is zero. Plaintiffs have the

states both coming and going.

But this cannot be a sound understanding of Casey, or

Mazurek would have come out the other way. By plaintiffs’

lights, Montana’s statute restricting the performance of

abortions to licensed physicians would have had an “undue

burden” on those women it affected--that is, the set of

women for whom the extra cost of a physician’s fees made

obtaining an abortion impractical or burdensome. Yet the

Court held that a physician-only rule is not an “undue

burden,” as the plurality in Casey used that phrase. What

plaintiffs in our case really argue is not that limiting the

D&X procedure to situations (if there are any) in which it is

necessary to save the woman’s life is an undue burden, when

compared with other burdens (such as waiting periods,

information requirements, parental approval or consultation

requirements, and physician-only rules) that the Court has

sustained; it is, rather, that a// “burdens” are “undue” because

women should have unfettered choice among medical

procedures. But then the phrase “undue burden” is simply

redundant; the word “undue” does no work.

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It is always difficult for a court of appeals to predict how

Justices of the Supreme Court will apply a phrase with as

much plasticity as “undue burden.” But our best estimate is

that “undue” rather than “burden” is the key word, and that

“undue” means not only “substantial” (a small cost or

inconvenience is not “undue”’) but also that the burden must

be undue in relation to the woman’s interests, rather than

undue in relation to the court’s assessment of society’s

interests. Plaintiffs’ (implicit) argument that every regulation

of a medical procedure is “undue” fails because many

regulations create small burdens. The physician-only rule

was one; a prohibition of D&X is another. Even for the class

of wemen who seek late-second-trimester abortions, there is

always one or more other safe methods of abortion in

addition to D&X. Let us return to the natural experiment

now under way. Plaintiffs do not contend that in any of the

states where a partial-birth-abortion law is in effect, even one

woman has been injured or denied an abortion because of the

law.

As for the second branch of plaintiffs’ argument--that

because the partial-birth-abortion laws do not diminish the

number of abortions, they must be condemned as moralizing

rather than utilitarian laws--this calls on judges to

recapitulate Lochner’s methodology. This line of argument

amounts to the contention that Casey so restricts the states’

power that states are limited to symbolic gestures; and then

the states’ very attempt to comply with Casey by refraining

from substantially impeding women’s access to abortion

dooms their laws. We do not read Casey as condemning

states to this self-defeating legislative menu. So long as the

law does not harm women’s legitimate interests, the fact that

the law’s effects are small and justified by moral rather than

utilitarian considerations does not spell unconstitutionality.

A-32

IV

One final issue requires attention. The district court in

Illinois read 720 ILCS § 513/15 to establish a parental-

consent requirement, which the court enjoined because it

lacks a judicial bypass procedure. 995 F. Supp. at 861,

relying on a portion of Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900, that

reaffirmed Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). But

what § 513/15 actually provides is different. It reads:

The maternal grandparents of the fetus or infant, if the

mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the time

of the abortion, may in a civil action obtain

appropriate relief unless the pregnancy resulted from

the plaintiff's criminal conduct or the plaintiff

consented to the abortion. The relief shall include

money damages for all injuries, psychological and

physical, occasioned by the violation of this Act and

statutory damages equal to 3 times the cost of the

partial-birth abortion.

Nothing here requires parental consent to a partial-birth

abortion. Section 513/10 forbids most partial-birth abortions;

no one can authorize that procedure in Illinois unless it is

necessary to protect the woman’s life, and then no parent’s

consent is necessary.

Section 513/15 provides civil damages for conduct that

violates § 513/10, and it assigns the right to pursue these

damages to parents if the person who undergoes the

procedure is a minor. A parent who gave consent to the

procedure naturally can’t recover damages, even though a

criminal prosecution remains possible under § 513/10 if the

mother’s life was not in jeopardy. The possibility that a

parent may consent to an unlawful procedure (and thus

insulate the physician from civil damages), or consent to a

life-saving procedure for which no consent was necessary in

A-33

the first place, hardly implies that a judge also must be

empowered to authorize a violation of § 513/10.

Wisconsin’s civil-liability provision, Wis. Stat. § 895.038

(2), is entirely derivative from its criminal-liability provision,

and the district court held it valid because the criminal

provision is valid. Plaintiffs in the Wisconsin case do not

take issue with this approach: they argue only that §

895.038(2) is unconstitutional because -§ 940.16 is

unconstitutional. We therefore do not discuss § 895.038(2)

further.

Actually, we have said too much already about the civil-

liability provisions. They are enforced in private litigation;

the states’ Attorneys General and local prosecutors have

nothing to do with civil suits. Relief against the public

officials therefore would be pointless even if the civil-

liability provisions were problematic. See Summit Medical

Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).

There is no controversy between the parties to this case that

can be resolved by a declaration concerning the civil-liability

rules. But see Okpalobi v. Foster, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS

22785 (Sth Cir. Sept. 17, 1999) (purporting to enjoin a

private-civil-damages provision in a suit to which only state

officers were defendants, without mentioning the eleventh

circuit’s conclusion in Summit Medical).

The judgments in both cases are vacated. The cases are

remanded with instructions to enter the precautionary

injunctions discussed in Part II.3 of this opinion, to dismiss

the challenges to the civil-liability provisions for want of a

case or controversy, and otherwise to enter judgment for the

defendants.

VACATED AND REMANDED

A-34

POSNER, Chief Judge, with whom ROVNER, DIANE P.

WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.

Compromise holds seductive allure for a court faced with a

hot issue, and there is none hotter than the issue of abortion

rights. The Illinois and Wisconsin statutes criminalizing

“partial birth” abortion are challenged here both as being

unconstitutionally vague and as unconstitutionally burdening

the right of abortion. (These are independent grounds; if

either is valid, the statutes are invalid.) The court rejects

both challenges yet orders the district courts to enjoin

enforcement of the statutes against any method of abortion

other than the one the medical community refers to as “intact

D & E” (that is, intact dilation and evacuation) or, more

commonly, “D & X” (dilation and extraction). This is the

form of “partial birth” abortion that gave rise to these

statutes, although they are not limited to it.

The court’s decision is not a real compromise. It leaves

intact the core of the statutory prohibitions, which unlawfully

burden the right of abortion by outlawing the D & X™

procedure. The court does toss a bone to the plaintiffs, but at

the cost of expanding federal judicial power over the states

by a method that the Supreme Court has never countenanced

and that violates Article III of the Constitution. It is a bone,

incidentally, that the plaintiffs didn’t ask for; neither side, in

either case, requested this novel form of relief or commented

on it in their briefs. We are taking a leap into the unknown

without any inpw* from the parties.

The “precautionary” injunctions that the court is directing

the district courts to enter will forbid the enforcement of the

statutes outside their core prohibition, thus placing the

federal contempt power behind this court’s interpretation of

state statutes. The court does this while accepting the

enforcers’ assurances that they will not enforce the statutes

outside the core, and concludes, therefore, “that the

probability of improper prosecution is low.” The states are

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nevertheless to be enjoined because the probability, though

low, is greater than zero. The probability of improper

prosecution under every criminal statute ever written is

greater than zero; and so the court’s decision, should it be

followed outside the abortion context--and nothing in the

decision suggests a principled limitation to that context--

implies a radical expansion of the power of the federal courts

to superintend the enforcement of state statutes. State

Officials will be subject to federal contempt sanctions for

failing to abide by a federal court’s interpretation of the

statutes that these officials, not federal judges, are charged

with administering.

The court adds that while the probability of improper

enforcement now is low, given the assurances that the state

law enforcement authorities have male in their briefs in this

court and at oral argument, the probability was high enough

when these cases were brought to confront the plaintiffs with

“a real risk” of being prosecuted for performing

constitutionally privileged abortions. But if that is so, it

means the statutes are unconstitutionally vague. If the law

enforcers’ present assurances are not enough to moot the

case, how can they be enough to moot the central issue to

which those assurances are addressed, the issue the court

ducks of whether the statutes are in fact unconstitutionally

vague? And if the present probability of improper

enforcement is slight, as the court believes, what equity do

the plaintiffs have to obtain an injunction?

The court is directing that state statutes be enjoined that it

has not found either violate federal law or create a significant

danger of such violation. This is unprecedented, and (on the

court’s view of the facts) violates Article III. If the court is

right--I do not think it is, but it is the premise of the decision-

-that there is only a “non-zero” probability that either state

statute will be enforced against any abortion procedure other

than the D & X, the threatened injury is too slight to activate

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the curative powers of federal courts. A nonzero probability

could be a probability of one in a thousand, or one in a

million. A probabilistic injury can support standing, e.g.,

Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2100-01

(1998); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998);

North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir.

1991), but the probability must be nontrivial, not merely

nonzero. E.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1982)

(per curiam); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-

07 and n. 8 (1983); Walters v. Edgar, supra, 163 F.3d at 434-

35. Otherwise the federal courts will be flooded with cases,

since few statutes are altogether free of vagueness; statutes

that are too precise allow loopholes.

Lyons, the choke-hold case, makes the basic point. The

probability that the plaintiff would again be arrested and

subjected to a choke hold was held to be too slight to support

standing-—But it was no less than the implicit probability that

this court today assigns to the threat of prosecution for

performing abortions that the state law enforcement

authorities concede are constitutionally privileged.

Although the injunctions that the court is ordering

ostensibly are temporary, to remain in force only until the

state courts have a chance to clarify the statutes, those courts

are unlikely ever to get that chance, since the enforcement of

the statutes beyond their core prohibition, which in the

court’s view needs no clarification, will be enjoined. Private

civil suits are unaffected, but the provisions for civil

enforcement of these statutes are limited and cases are

unlikely. The Illinois statute authorizes civil suits only by

the parents of a minor who has a “partial birth” abortion, and

the Wisconsin statute by either the minor’s parent or the

fetus’s father. Should a prosecutor indict a physician for

performing a D & X, and the physician contend that it was

really a D & E, the dispute will be-resolved by the district

court’s interpreting its injunction in contempt proceedings.

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As a practical matter, the courts of Illinois and Wisconsin

will never have an opportunity to explore the outer bounds of

these statutes.

The court cites no case that authorizes such injunctions. It

relies on cases such as City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct.

1849, 1861 (1999), and Village of Hoffman Estates v. The

Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n. 5

(1982), which hold that if a state statute has been interpreted

by the state’s highest court, the interpretation binds any

federal court asked to decide the meaning of the statute. No

case holds, however, that until the statute is construed by the

state courts, a claim that it is unconstitutionally vague is

premature. No case denies the authority of the federal courts

to interpret state statutes, which is something we do all the

time. No case holds that until a state statute is construed by

the state courts its operation may be enjoined without a

determination that the statute is unconstitutional. All the

cases on which the majority relies involve federal courts

either narrowing federal statutes that are fairly susceptible of

being narrowed or accepting as authoritative a narrowing

interpretation of a state statute by a state court. In no case

cited by the majority did a federal court impose its own

narrowing interpretation on a state statute by injunction, let

alone a state statute the language of which defies a saving

interpretation.

Although grounded in a concern with preserving the

prerogative of state courts to interpret state statutes, today’s

decision curtails that prerogative by forbidding the states to

enforce state statutes that the court has not found to be

invalid. The decision is thus internally inconsistent (the

court both rejects the charge that the statutes are

unconstitutionally vague and, by enjoining their application

outside their small clear core until they are clarified by the

state courts, holds that they are too vague to provide fair

warning--which means they are unconstitutionally vague,

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e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964)),

as well as being an evasion of judicial duty, a violation of

Article III, and an affront to federalism. The content of the

injunctions that the court orders entered, moreover, is not

specified; disputes over it will undoubtedly give rise to

further litigation. And there will be a nice question of

whether the plaintiffs can obtain attorneys’ fees on the

ground that they have won something, with the defendants

arguing that it is they who have won the case because the

court has both held the challenged statutes to be valid and

accepted the defendants’ assurances that the statutes will not

be enforced beyond their valid scope.

On the merits, the most important issue raised by the

appeals is that of undue burden. (I'll come back later to the

substantive issue of vagueness, as distinct from the problems

raised by the court’s effort to evade the issue by means of the

“precautionary” injunctions.) To understand this issue

requires understanding the peculiar and questionable

character of these statutes. They do not protect the lives of

fetuses either directly or by seeking to persuade a woman to

reconsider her decision to seek an abortion. For the statutes

do not forbid the destruction of any class of fetuses, but

merely criminalize a method of abortion--they thus have Jess

to recommend them than the antiabortion statutes invalidated

in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). If any fetal lives are

saved by these statutes, it will only be by scaring physicians

away from performing any late-term abortions, an effect

particularly likely in Wisconsin, whose statute imposes a

punishment of life imprisonment for its violation. In tacit

acknowledgment of that statute’s especially questionable

character, the majority opinion invites an Eighth Amendment

challenge should a lengthy prison sentence ever be imposed

on a violator of the statute.

The statutes do not seek to protect the lives or health of

pregnant women, or of anybody else, as by confining the

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performance of abortions to licensed physicians, as in

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam), or

to facilities equipped to deal with emergencies that may arise

in the course of an abortion, particularly a late-term one. A

legislature can ban quacks from practicing medicine without

making an exception for those quacks (and no doubt there are

some) who are abler than the worst physicians. Any general

health regulation is likely to hurt a few people. But as

banning “partial birth” abortions is not intended to improve

the health of women (or anyone, for that matter), it cannot be

defended as a health regulation.

The statutes make no exception for cases in which

pregnancy results from rape or incest, or in which the fetus is

profoundly deformed, nonviable, or unlikely to live more

than a few hours after birth, or indeed, as I shall show, in

which the woman’s life would be endangered if she carried

the fetus to term. The absence of any such exceptions is

particularly surprising because late-term abortions are much

less likely than the much more common first-trimester

abortions to be motivated by considerations merely of

convenience rather than of urgency. A woman who finds

herself five months pregnant is unlikely to decide to have an

abortion unless advised by her physician either that the fetus

is profoundly deformed or that her own health requires that

the pregnancy be terminated. Indeed, if the fetus has become

viable, she cannot lawfully obtain an abortion unless her life

or health is in danger. Wis. Stat. § 940.15(3); 720 ILCS

510/5(1). These are constitutionally permissible protections

of fetal life. | Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). It is

incomprehensible to me why these states, if acting in good

faith, were unwilling to write the same health exception into

statutes that criminalize the abortion of nonviable as well as

viable fetuses. The “partial birth” statutes do not distinguish

between fetuses that are viable, in the sense of being

sufficiently developed to be able to survive outside the

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mother’s body, and those that are not. Some fetuses don’t

become viable until 27 weeks or even later, but the “partial

birth” abortion, even defined so narrowly as to cover only the

D & X procedure, is performed from 20 weeks on. A

physician might be convicted of a felony violation of these

statutes even though the Supreme Court has held that a state

may not prevent the abortion of a nonviable fetus. /d. at 846,

877. -

The statutes do not outlaw a particularly cruel or painful or

horrifying mode of abortion. This can be shown with the aid

of a simple example. Suppose that the fetus is hydrocephalic,

so that its head is too large to pass through the cervix. If the

physician performing the abortion crushes the fetus’s skull in

the uterus, killing the fetus while the fetus is still entirely

within the uterus, he is not guilty of violating either of the

statutes before us. But if before crushing the fetus’s skull the

physician turns the fetus around so that its feet are protruding

into the vagina, he has committed a felony. In both cases, the

fetus is killed by the crushing of its head in the uterus. (The

crushing is necessary to enable the fetus to be removed

through the birth canal without making the woman go into

labor.) From the standpoint of the fetus, and, | should think,

of any rational person, it makes no difference whether, when

the skull is crushed, the fetus is entirely within the uterus or

its feet are outside the uterus. Yet the position of the feet is

the only difference between committing a -felony and

performing an act that the states concede is constitutionally

privileged.

The tortured efforts of the states’ lawyers to provide

guidance to physicians engaged in performing abortions--

physicians who already are frequent subjects of picketing and

other harassment and occasionally of physical assaults, see,

e.g., United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996),

and who are now to be threatened with criminal prosecution

and professional defrocking-- make one thing clear: it is

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extremely difficult, indeed probably impossible, to

distinguish a “partial birth” abortion from the methods of

abortion that are conceded to be privileged. (This is the key

to the statutes’ vagueness, and so a point to which I’11 return.)

The principal reason for the difficulty is that, as my example

of the hydrocephalic fetus suggests, there is no meaningful

difference between the forbidden and the privileged practice.

No reason of policy or morality that would allow the one

would forbid the other. We should consider therefore why

any state would pass such a law. An important part of the

answer is found in Judge Manion’s opinion in Planned

Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir.

1998). The states want to dramatize the ugliness of abortion.

“All methods [of abortion] are gruesome. But this is the one

method that has been at least partially exposed to the light of

day. . . . The exposure of this procedure has cast a bright light

on the alternative procedures that are equally gruesome. .. .

No doubt when this statute is properly construed--[so] that it

bans only the rarely-used D & X procedure--it does not

appear to accomplish much in the way of saving babies. But

these laws have certainly elevated the public’s concern over

the fate of the ‘potential human lives’ that are exposed to

abortion.” Jd. at 477, 479 (dissenting opinion). From this

standpoint, the more a “partial birth” abortion is like an

abortion that is conceded to be constitutionally _——-

the better.

The wave of “partial birth” abortion statutes that broke over

the nation after a description of the D & X procedure was

publicized--see Martin Haskell, “Dilation and Extraction for

Late Second Trimester Abortion” (1992), reprinted in 139

Cong. Rec. E1092, 1993 WL 135664 (Apr. 28, 1993), and in

The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, Hearing before

the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 5

(Nov. 17, 1995)--does not exhibit the legislative process at its

best, whatever one thinks of abortion rights. Whipped up by

activists who wanted to dramatize the ugliness of abortions

a ee eee ee ee ee ee ee

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and deter physicians from performing them, the public

support for the laws was also based--as is implicit in Judge

Manion’s defense of the laws--on sheer ignorance of the

medical realities of late-term abortion. The uninformed

thought the D & X procedure gratuitously cruel, akin to

infanticide; they didn’t realize that the only difference

between it and the methods of late-term abortion that are

conceded all round to be constitutionally privileged is which

way the fetus’s feet are pointing. Opposition to the bills that

became these laws was at first muted not only by ignorance

of the character of a late-term abortion but also by the fact

that few women are likely to be affected by the laws.

Circumstances conspired, as it were, to produce a set of laws

that can fairly be described as irrational.

This is a harsh verdict, but doubt about its soundness is laid

to rest by the absence of any exception for situations in

which a “partial birth” abortion is necessary to protect the

pregnant woman’s health. The right of abortion is unduly

burdened by any law that endangers the woman’s health.

Even a law that limits only the right to abort viable fetuses--a

limitation not found in the statutes challenged in this case--

must, to pass co..stitutional muster, make an exception “for

pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health.”

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,

supra, 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added). Immediately the

question arises why the Wisconsin and Illinois legislatures

didn’t try to come within reach of the cases that permit states

to limit the right of abortion by making an exception for

pregnancies that endanger the woman’s health, the same

exception they have written into their other abortion statutes.

When pressed at argument, the lawyers for the two states

could answer only that the exception is unnecessary. The

lawyers were confident that such an abortion is never

required to preserve a woman’s health. They may be right,

though I think not (more on this below). But if so, they are

right only for today. Tomorrow, studies may show that, yes,

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there indeed are cases where a “partial birth” abortion is

necessary to protect the mother’s health, as many physicians

believe. Tomorrow, then, these two statutes may be

unconstitutional even by the lights of the majority opinion.

Why would a state risk the early obsolescence of its statute

by making it wholly dependent on ever-changing medical

opinion, when to avoid this risk it need only have excepted

those “partial birth” abortions, if any, that are necessary to

protect the woman’s health? If there are few such cases, the

exception will rarely be invoked; if none, never.

The answer is that opponents of abortion do not think there

should be an exception for abortions that endanger a

woman’s health. Life, yes, but not health. These statutes,

remember, are not concerned with saving fetuses, with

protecting fetuses from a particularly cruel death, with

protecting the health of women, with protecting viable

fetuses, or with increasing the Wisconsin population (as

intimated, surely not seriously, by Wisconsin’s counsel).

They are concerned with making a statement in an ongoing

war for public opinion, though an incidental effect may be to

discourage some late-term abortions. The statement is that

fetal life is more valuable than women’s health.

I do not deny the right of legislatures to enact statutes that

are mainly or for that matter entirely designed as a statement

of the legislators’ values. Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 814

(7th Cir. 1998). Nothing in the Constitution forbids

legislation so designed. Many statutes are passed or, more

commonly, retained merely for their symbolic or aspirational

effect. But if_a statute burdens constitutional rights and all

that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that

legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those

rights, the burden is undue. The statutes before us endanger

pregnant women--and not only pregnant women who want to

have an abortion. There is no exception for women whose

physicians tell them you must have an abortion or die. It is

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true that if a “partial birth” abortion is necessary to save the -

woman’s life, the statutes permit this. But if her life could be

saved by another type of abortion, even one that threatened |

her health--that threatened to sterilize her or to paralyze her--

then the physician would be committing a felony if he

performed a “partial birth” abortion. I cannot believe that my

colleagues would think the physician could be punished in

such a case, and I wonder therefore why the “precautionary”

injunctions do not extend to it. The statutes allow a “partial

birth” abortion to be performed if “no other medical

procedure would suffice for that purpose” (that is, saving the

mother’s life). Wis. Stat. § 940.16(3); 720 ILCS 513/10.

Could not “would suffice” be interpreted to mean “would be

as good as from the standpoint of the woman’s health’?

Such an interpretation, no more audacious than the

interpretive leaps that underlie the order to enter

“precautionary” injunctions, would seem compelled by the

court’s own reasoning, but goes unremarked. If the

interpretation is rejected, it would imply that a D & X would

be forbidden even if the only alternative were a

hysterectomy. That can’t be right.

The court points out that it is unclear how many women are

endangered by these statutes. The forbidden procedure is

performed only (or almost only) in late-term abortions, which

fortunately are rare; and only in some unknown fraction of

them is a “partial birth” abortion the medically preferable

procedure. But government cannot without a reason forbid a

person to obtain medical treatment and if challenged defend

by pointing out that most people don’t need that treatment.

In the context of abortion this principle is implicit in the

statement in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

Pennsylvania v. Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 878, that “purpose

or effect” (emphasis added)--and thus purpose alone--“‘to

place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking

an abortion before the fetus attains viability” condemns an

antiabortion statute. E.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, No. 98-30228,

A-45

1999 WL 728396, at *16-20 (Sth Cir. Sept. 17, 1999); Jane

L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116-18 (10th Cir. 1996).

That is no constitutional novelty; statutes that burden other

constitutional rights besides the right of abortion have been

invalidated on the basis of improper purpose. E.g., Edwards

v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The Casey opinion speaks

of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of “ta woman,”

not “many women.” Imagine a married woman, pregnant,

told by her physician that her life depends on her obtaining

an abortion. He tells her it would be better from the

standpoint of minimizing the risk to her of medical

complications from the abortion for her to have a D & X.

But, he adds, unfortunately the law prohibits the procedure.

It does so not because the procedure kills the fetus, not

because it risks worse complications for the woman than

alternative procedures would do, not because it is a crueler or

more painful or more disgusting method of terminating a

pregnancy, but because the state wishes to make a statement

of opposition to constitutional doctrine. A legislature may be

taken to intend any consequences of its handiwork that are at

once natural, highly probable, and wholly foreseeable (and

foreseen). Here the intent is to block a woman from seeking

an abortion when her doctor advises her that the best

procedure for her is criminal.

The statutes’ improper purpose is further shown by the

terminology they employ. The Wisconsin statute defines a

fetus from the moment of conception to the moment of birth

as a “child” (thus absurdly implying that when we are born

we are no longer children). The Illinois statute defines the

fetus, also from the moment of conception, as an “infant.” If

these definitions are sound, a// abortion is infanticide, which

is not the Supreme Court’s view. A state cannot be permitted

to abrogate federal constitutional rights by definition. Line

drawing is inescapable but the line between feticide and

infanticide is birth, Once the baby emerges from the

mother’s body, no possible concern for the mother’s life or

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health justifies killing the baby. But as long as the baby

remains within the mother’s body, it poses a potential threat

to her life or health and this threat presents a compelling case

(or so at least the Supreme Court believes) for a right of

abortion. The Wisconsin statute, whose provision for life

imprisonment already marks it as the crazier one, also allows

either of the fetus’s grandparents to sue in respect of a

“partial birth” abortion. One can imagine a father who cares

more for having a grandchild than he cares for the health of

his daughter threatening to sue in order to block a “partial

birth” abortion, while the mother (who may be divorced from

the father), valuing the situation differently, sits on the

sideline, helpless to protect her daughter.

In concluding that the challenged statutes do not pose any

threat. to women’s health, the court relies heavily on

tendentious factfindings by the district judge in the

Wisconsin case. He fastened on the fact that a Dr. Harlan

Giles believes that the D & X procedure is rarely, maybe

never, necessary for the protection of the pregnant woman’s

health. The judge brushed aside the contrary testimony of

reputable physicians--more reputable, perhaps, as we’re

about to see, than Dr. Giles. Giles’s testimony is essentially

the only basis of the judge’s finding, and the judge’s finding

is the principal basis on which this court, disregarding the

contrary findings in the Illinois case, dismisses concerns

about the absence of a health exception. Yet apart from

everything else, Judge Shabaz’s opinion is_ internally

contradictory. He acknowledged that the D & X procedure,

being quicker and easier to perform on fetuses that are more

than 18 weeks old, has advantages for the woman’s health in

reducing the amount of bleeding, the risk of uterine

perforations, and the amount of time that she has to be under

anesthesia. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d

975, 979 (W.D. Wis. 1999). Yet without retracting these

findings, he concluded that the procedure is never necessary

to protect the woman’s health.

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I daresay reputable physicians can be found who believe

that surgery is never necessary in a case of prostate cancer, or

that all vitamins are worthless, or that no efforts should be

made to resuscitate a person over 80 years old who

experiences cardiac arrest, since he is quite likely to be -

“revived” to a vegetative state. Dr. Giles may not even be

wholly reputable. Another district judge rejected his

testimony in opposition to the D & X procedure because,

among other reasons, Giles was “more focused on the

political aspects of the abortion debate than on the medical

questions essential to resolution of the issues presented in

this action. And, Dr. Giles was evasive when responding to

questions directed at crucial issues in the case. Hence the

testimony of Dr. Giles was neither credible, reliable nor

helpful.” Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore,

55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 1999 WL 507453, at *7 (E.D. Va. 1999)

(footnote omitted). Another district judge criticized Giles--

who appears to be a member of that much-criticized

fraternity, the professional expert witness--for pronouncing

on an abortion statute with which he was unfamiliar. Evans

v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1309-10 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

Another rejected his testimony that the D & X is “a

resurrection of an obstetric method discarded in the 1960s,

which was used to deliver dead fetuses, and known as

craniotomy,” and concluded that Giles’s criticisms of the D

& X procedure were “not persuasive.” Women's Medical

Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070

(S.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).

Judge Shabaz, his only support the dubious Dr. Giles,

stands alone among district judges who have made

factfindings concerning the potential benefits of the D & X

procedure for women’s health. See Rhode Island Medical

Society v. Whitehouse, No. C.A. 97-416 L, 1999 WL 683846,

at *22 (D.R.I. Aug. 30, 1999) (contrary testimony is

“unbelievable”); Richmond Medical Center for Women v.

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Gilmore, supra, at *44-45; Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp.

2d 1099, 1124-26 (D. Neb. 1998), aff'd, 1999 WL 753919

(8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999); A Choice For Women vy.

Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153, 1156-57 (S.D. Fla.

1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 852 (N.D. Ill.

1998) (the decision reversed today without regard for the

district judge’s findings); Evans v. Kelley, supra, 977 F.

Supp. at 1296; Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v.

Voinovich, supra, 911 F. Supp. at 1070; see also Causeway

Medical Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 608, 613-14

(E.D. La. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey

v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484-85 (D.N.J. 1998). If

this court is to give weight to district judges’ assessment of

the credibility of the physicians who have testified pro or con

the D & X procedure, it ought at least to acknowledge that

Judge Shabaz is in a minority of one.

In refusing to give any weight to the findings of fact made

by Judge Kocoras in the Hope case, the court seems to have

forgotten that we are reviewing his judgment too. It is not

some unrelated case that we are free to ignore on the ground

that it is based on a different record from any before us. His

findings, made in a proceeding that resulted in the issuance

of a permanent injunction against the Illinois statute, are

entitled to as much weight as Judge Shabaz’s, Knapp v.

Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996);

Durasys, Inc. v. Leyba, 992 F.2d 1465, 1471 (7th Cir. 1993)--

more, really, because they are not infected by the internal

contradiction that weakens Judge Shabaz’s findings. If those

findings justify our upholding the Wisconsin statute, Judge

Kocoras’s should lead us to invalidate the Illinois statute.

The court denies that Judge Kocoras made findings. I don’t

understand this. It is true that he based his findings on

affidavits rather than on live testimony, but the state did not

challenge the facts contained in the affidavits, including the

facts about the medical advantages of the D & X procedure.

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Findings do not lose weight by being based on uncontested

facts; admissions are not weaker evidence than facts found

after vigorous contest. And if it were true that there were no

findings in the Illinois case, this would call for a remand; it

would not entitle us to plug Judge Shabaz’s findings into a

separate litigation with no common parties. (What kind of

transplant is that?)

Consistent deference to district court factfindings in this

pair of cases would lead to an inconsistent result--the

upholding of one statute and the condemnation of its sister.

This demonstrates that the constitutional right of abortion

cannot be made to depend on whether a particular district

judge finds a particular physician who disagrees with the

consensus of medical opinion to be more credible than the

spokesmen for the consensus. The consensus here is found

in the statement by the American College of Obstetricians

and Gynecologists (ACOG) that the D & X procedure “may ~

be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular

circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a

woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with the patient,

based upon the woman’s particular circumstances can make

this decision.” As Judge Shabaz himself acknowledged, the

procedure reduces the risk of lacerating the uterus and the

cervix with the sharp instruments used in the standard D & E.

Such lacerations cause trauma and loss of blood. The D & X

also reduces the risk that fetal tissue will remain in the

woman’s body, where it can cause infection. It reduces the

length of time that the woman is under anesthesia. And it

facilitates testing for genetic abnormalities, which is

particularly important to the woman’s decision whether to

become pregnant again. (So much for the suggestion of

Wisconsin’s lawyer that banning the D & X will lead to more

births.) Not all physicians agree with these points; and

ACOG hedged its opinion by noting that a select panel of

physicians had been unable to identify specific circumstances

in which there is no satisfactory alternative to aD & X. But

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the team of Dr. Giles and Judge Shabaz are, with all due

respect, not competent to resolve this medical controversy.

How often the circumstances sketched in the previous

paragraph that led ACOG to recommend retention of the D &

X as a treatment option in late-term abortions will be present

is not critical. It is slight consolation to be told that while the

state has forbidden the optimal treatment of your medical

problem, that problem happily is rare. Although we haven’t

been told of cases in states that have enacted laws forbidding

“partial birth” abortion that were not promptly enjoined in

which the consequence has been to endanger women, for all

we know women in those states go out of state if they are

candidates fora D & X. Cf. Jane L. v. Bangerter, supra, 102

F.3d at 1117. That would be the prudent course. My

colleagues in the majority perform their own statistical

analysis, outside the record, in an effort to refute this

possibility. I have no objection to a court’s relying on extra-

record evidence to determine the health effects of “partial

birth” abortion. Those effects should indeed be treated as a

legislative fact rather than an adjudicative fact, in order to

avoid inconsistent results arising from the reactions of

different district judges, sheltered by -the deferential “clear

error” standard of appellate review of factfindings, to

different records--the inconsistency illustrated by the

different findings of Judges Shabaz and Kocoras in the two

cases before us. Even so, we should hesitate to play

statistician. It is incongruous for this court to brush aside the

findings of district judges in other cases- while bolstering

Judge Shabaz’s inadequate findings with extra-record

evidence of its own.

The court tries to shore up Judge Shabaz’s findings with

two medical papers. One of these, however, Nancy G.

Romer, “The Medical Facts of Partial-Birth Abortion,” 3

Nexus: A Journal of Opinion 57 (1998), is not a medical

paper at all. Although the author is an M.D., she is also a

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pro-life activist, and the burden of her paper is that viable

fetuses should be saved rather than aborted. This is a

respectable ethical stance but it has nothing to do with the

medical pros and cons of a D & X. The other paper, M.

LeRoy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhoff, “Rationale fur Banning

Abortions Late in Pregnancy,” 280 JAMA (Journal of the

American Medical Association) 744 (1998), appears in a

section of JAMA captioned “controversies,” and though it

does point out possible dangers to the woman from the

procedure, the authors are heavy on the ethical issues

involved in abortion. Like Dr. Romer, they come out in

opposition to late-term abortion by any method, and opine

very unscientifically that “partial birth” abortion is “closer to

infanticide than it is to abortion.” /d. at 746. Another

medical article in the same issue of JAMA concludes that the

D & X procedure should, as ACOG concluded, be an option

for the physician. See David A. Grimes, “The Continuing

Need for Late Abortions,” 280 JAMA (Journal of the

American Medical Association) 747 (1998). The court does

not cite that article.

No hypothesis has been proposed by either of the states, or

by the amici curiae who have submitted briefs in support of

the Wisconsin statute, as to why physicians would perform,

or the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

support, a method of abortion that benefits no patient. There

has been no suggestion of any pecuniary incentive that might

cause them to engage in a controversial procedure of this

kind.

Apart from performing its own statistical analysis and

bringing to bear so-called medical papers, the court evinces

its queasiness about resting entirely on Judge Shabaz’s

findings by saying that “the question in the end is not what

one or another judge found on a given record” (the question

the court had spent so much time discussing). “It is enough

that there is real, and not just hypothetical, support for a

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belief that the partial-birth-abortion laws do not pose hazards

for maternal health.” This sounds suspiciously like the test

for whether a statute has a rational basis, see, e.g., FCC v.

Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993), and

so may explain the court’s one-sided treatment of the facts

(the failure to cite Dr. Grimes’s paper, for example).

Rational basis is not the issue here. The issue is whether the

Wisconsin and Illinois “partial birth” statutes impose an

undue burden, and specifically whether they are a threat to

maternal health. That is rightly an issue of legislative fact,

meaning that its resolution is not to be cabined by facts

determined in an adjudicative hearing; still it must be

resolved in accordance with the weight of the evidence,

including such extra-record evidence as the consensus of the

relevant expert community, in this case the medical

community. It is not enough to note that there is some

evidence in support of one side of the issue, when there is

more evidence on the other side. In the case the court cites as

illustrating the appropriate scope of review, Craig v. Boren,

429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976), the Supreme Court critically

reviewed statistical evidence underlying the claimed

constitutionality of the challenged statute--and found it

wanting. When one critically reviews the testimony of Dr.

Giles, and the court’s own statistical analysis, and the so-

called medical papers, and weighs them against the evidence

that establishes the medical consensus, it becomes apparent

that the court does not take the standard of Craig seriously.

Let me suggest an analogy. Suppose that a legislature in

the South in the 1950s had listened to several “reputable”

cognitive psychologists testify that blacks as a group are slow

learners, and hence that they should be educated in separate

schools. No one would argue that this legislative finding,

because supported by some evidence from the relevant expert

community, would have to be accepted in deciding the

constitutionality of segregated education. The court, if it

thought the issue relevant, would have to decide whether the

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finding was correct before relying on it. Similarly, the

Wisconsin and Illinois legislatures are not entitled to ban an

abortion procedure that the medical community believes may

be preferable from a medical standpoint for some women,

simply because a marginally reputable expert (Dr. Giles)

thinks that the set of women for whom the procedure is

preferable is actually zero. That might bear on the

legislatures’ good faith (though there is contrary evidence on

that too, as I have pointed out), but it would not decide the

issue of the statutes’ effects on the right of abortion.

Enough said: banning the D & X, the core prohibition in

these statutes, imposes an undue burden on women who seek

to have an abortion, and is therefore unconstitutional. Let me

turn now to the alternative ground of vagueness. Both

statutes forbid the partial vaginal delivery of a living fetus,

and this describes many instances of the D & E method of

abortion--which the court acknowledges cannot

constitutionally be banned, see also Carhart v. Stenberg,

Nos. 98-3245 NE, 1999 WL 753919 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,

1999); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v. Jegley,

No. 99-1004 EA, 1999 WL 753928 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999);

Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, No. 99-

1372 SI, 1999 WL 753770 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999)--as well

as it does the D & X. Judge Shabaz himself acknowledged

that “often” in the course of a D & E there is a fetal heartbeat

after portions of the fetus have been delivered into the

vagina, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 977, making the D & E

definitionally a “partial birth” abortion under both statutes.

The court’s response, as I noted at the outset of this dissent,

is not to hold that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague,

but instead to hold that they can’t be enforced against any

procedure except the D & X until the Wisconsin and Illinois

state courts have had a chance (the chance that is unlikely

ever to come) to “interpret” their statutes to permit the

standard D & E method even when it results, as it frequently

does, in the partial vaginal delivery of a living fetus.

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Putting to one side my objections to the court’s procedure,

which | discussed at the outset of this dissent, I note that the

court seems to have bought into the legal-realist view that a

statute means whatever the courts say it means, despite the

Supreme Court’s admonition that a court “may impose a

limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily

susceptible’ to such a construction.” Reno v. American Civil

Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997), and cases cited

_ there. If the realists are right, and the contrary intimations of

cases such as Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union can be

brushed aside, I wish the court would, as I suggested earlier,

hold that these statutes can be further narrowed by

“precautionary” injunction to make an exception for cases in

which the D & X procedure is necessary to protect the

woman’s health. The interpolation of such an exception

would be no greater act of judicial hubris than narrowing the

statute to the D & X when the draftsmen of the statutes

decided not to use that term, preferring a vaguer term

intended to be broader.

The constitutional law of vagueness is-obviously in turmoil

and so I shall suggest a lowest common-denominator

approach with which I think few judges will disagree,

however much they may disagree about its application to

particular cases. If a criminal statute is so worded that it is

highly likely to condemn a constitutionally privileged act,

and if the constitutionally privileged actor could not as a

practical matter avoid being punished for engaging in such an

act by raising a defense in a criminal proceeding, then the

statute is enjoinable, in advance of any prosecutions, as

unconstitutionally vague. For the very existence of such a

statute “deters constitutionally protected activity.” Coe v.

County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 496 (7th Cir. 1998), and cases

cited there. When vague statutes prescribe heavy penalties

for their violation, rational people avoid any conduct that

might be thought to fall within the statute’s scope, even if in

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an error-free litigation the conduct would be sure to be found

constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman

Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., supra, 455

U.S. at 494 n. 6; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979);

Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1984).

When the demanding conditions that I have outlined are

satisfied, the statute is invalid, and the legislature has to go

back to the drawing board. The court cannot rewrite the

Statute, or teil the state courts how to rewrite it, and, in

advance of any further interpretation, uphold the rewritten

statute. That procedure, the procedure followed by the court

today, in effect nullifies the doctrine of unconstitutional

vagueness.

These statutes are either absurdly (and unlawfully)

overbroad or remarkably vague, and the court’s direction to

issue “precautionary” injunctions is a tacit acknowledgement

of its inability to give the statutes a plausible narrowing

interpretation; the confused concessions of the states’

lawyers at the oral argument were no help in the endeavor.

Although the statutes are addressed to physicians--it is their

conduct alone that is regulated--the language employed is not

medical language. Instead of denoting the victim of illegal

abortion as a live fetus, a fetus with a heartbeat, or a viable

fetus (a fetus, remember, that can survive outside the

mother’s body), the Illinois statutes refers to “a living human

fetus or infant,” terms that the statute explains are “used

interchangeably to refer to the biological offspring of human

parents,” 720 II CS 513/5, while the Wisconsin statute refers

to “a living chila’ or “partially delivered child,” with “child”

defined, as I noted earlier, as “a human being from the time

of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a

pregnant woman.” Wis. Stat. §§ 940.16(1)(a), (6). The use

of such language makes the statutes incurably ambiguous.

Neither “biological offspring” nor “living” is defined. At

argument the Solicitor General of Illinois was emphatic that

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“biological offspring” is a synonym for “intact fetus,” that is,

a fetus (however deformed) before the physician performing

the abortion begins to work on it. But he retreated from this

position when faced with the hypothetical case of a physician

who, intending to perform a D & X, removes a limb or other

part of the fetus before beginning the procedure. His

retraction was consistent with his statement that the Illinois

legislature had tried to make the statute “as broad as

possible.” More extensive dismemberment than merely

removing a limb or two, Wisconsin’s lawyer assured us,

would inevitably kill the fetus before any part of it emerged

from the uterus. She offered no basis for this hopeful bit of

medical advice, and it is wrong. Carhart v. Stenberg, supra,

at *4; Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore,

supra, at *10. By “killing” the fetus, she evidently meant

doing something to cause its heart to stop beating, although a

fetus is living before it develops a heart. Obviously a one-

day old embryo, like the cells that compose a living human

body, is alive, not “dead.”

In a standard D & E, part or all of the fetus often will still

have a heartbeat, and so be “living,” in the sense of the word

apparently intended by the legislatures, when it emerges from

the uterus. Therefore it is “partially vaginally delivered,” just

as inaD & X. “During the D & E procedure, the fetus may

be removed from the uterus and brought through the cervix

and vagina either intact or disarticulated. . . . It may happen

that part of the intact fetus will be in the vagina and part in

the uterus or a disarticulated part of the fetus will be in the

vagina while the remainder of the fetus is ia the uterus. In

either of these situations, that part of the fetus which remains

in the uterus may still have a heartbeat.” Planned

Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, supra, 41 F.

Supp. 2d at 484. If the physician then kills the fetus, he

would, one would think, be guilty of having violated these

statutes, which punish the killing of a fetus that has been

partially vaginally delivered.

A-57

Against this interpretation, the Illinois Solicitor General,

discarding settled principles of criminal law for the sake of a

short-term victory, declared that the statute would not be

violated unless the physician had planned before beginning

the abortion to wait until a part of the fetus had emerged from

the uterus and kill the fetus then; the mere fact that the

physician knew it was likely that a part of the fetus would be

outside the uterus at the moment of death would not show the

requisite intent. By this logic--which the state’s Solicitor

General actually embraced at argument--if you fire a machine

gun into a lighted college dormitory at night, reckoning that

you have only a 10 percent chance of actually killing anyone,

and you do kill one or more of the residents, you are not

guilty of murder, provided you didn’t want to kill anyone but

just wanted to see whether your machine gun was in working

order. The law is otherwise. First-degree murder in Illinois

requires only that “in performing the acts which cause the

death” the defendant “knows that such acts create a strong

probability of death or great bodily harm.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1;

People v. Daniels, 702 N.E.2d 324, 330-31 (Ill. App. 1998);

People v. Mitchell, 601 N.E.2d 916, 919 (III. App. 1992);

Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 333-334 (7th Cir. 1997). A

physician who performs a standard D & E knowing, as he

must, before he begins, that part of the fetus is quite likely to

be outside the uterus when he kills the fetus, and then kills it

after a part has emerged from the uterus, is guilty of the

crime of partially vaginally delivering a living fetus and then

killing it.

The Illinois statute itself, moreover, requires only that the

partial-birth abortion have been performed “knowingly.” 720

ILCS 513/10. Under the law of Illinois, a defendant is

deemed to know “the result of his conduct, described by the

statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware

that such result is practically certain to be caused by his

conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b). -

A-58

Wisconsin authorizes life imprisonment for performing a

“partial birth” abortion. That is the state’s heaviest penalty,

the penalty for murder. Wisconsin deems its statute--as both

the penalty and the use of the term “child” to denote the fetus

reflect--a law against infanticide. (So does Illinois, by using

the term “infant,” but it is not serious, because the miaximum

punishment for killing the “infant” is only three years.) No

one would suppose, in the example of shooting into a

dormitory, that if only a one-day-old baby were killed the

killer would be innocent of murder. If Wisconsin is serious

in regarding a fetus that has begun to emerge from the uterus

as “a living child” who should be protected to the full extent

of the law against murder, it cannot rationally interpret the

statute to permit the physician to escape punishment by the

plea that when he began the abortion he thought there was

only a 50 percent chance that he would be killing “a living

child.” It would be like arguing that if a nurse hit a newborn

over the head with a baseball bat, with all her might, not to

kill it but merely to make it stop crying, and the newborn

died, the nurse could defend against a charge of first-degree

murder by proving that while she thought it quite possible

that the newborn would die, she didn’t want it to die and

thought it had a S50 percent chance of surviving.

Any doubts on this score are stilied by Wisconsin’s

statutory definition of intentional. The statute punishes

“intentionally” performing a partial birth abortion, Wis. Stat.

§ 940.16(2), and the term means either acting purposely to

accomplish the forbidden end or being “aware that [one’s]

conduct is practically certain to cause that result.” Wis. Stat.

§ 939.23(3). .As glossed by the case law, the alternative

definition is satisfied by conduct carrying a known high risk

of the forbidden result even if that result is not desired. See

State v. Gould, 202 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis. 1973); State v.

McCarter, 153 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Wis. 1967); State v.

Webster, 538 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. App. 1995). In Webster,

A-59

where the defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree

murder, it was deemed irrelevant that the jury might have

accepted his testimony “that he precisely aimed the shotgun

at Hood’s armpit, and that the gun was loaded only with

shotshells filled with bird shot.” 538 N.W.2d at 815.

So the state-of-mind requirements of the two statutes turn

out to be the same. They are, moreover, the standard state of

mind requirements for liability for serious crimes. A

criminal defendant acts intentionally, and, even more clearly,

knowingly, “when he knows that that result [here, a “partial

birth” abortion] is practically certain to follow from his

conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.” |

Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive

Criminal Law § 3.5, p. 304 (1986); see, e.g., United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-46 (1978);

Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1995); United

States v. McAnally, 666 F.2d 1116, 1119 (7th Cir. 1981).

I have discussed the state of mind requirements of these

Statutes at such length in order to make clear how little

mileage the court can get from the cases that it cites, such as

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), that save vague

Statutes by narrow interpretations. Put aside the fact that

these were federal statutes given nalrowing interpretations by

federal courts, rather than state statutes given narrowing

interpretations by federal courts, and that the Supreme Court

in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976), a decision

that is still good law on this point, held that the proper way to

obtain a narrowing interpretation of a vague state abortion

Statute is to abstain in favor of the state courts. The point |

wish to stress is that the device used in Screws and many

similar cases to save the statute, that of interpolating a

scienter requirement, is unavailable here. And this for two

reasons. The first is that the Wisconsin and Illinois statutes

make clear what the state of mind requirement for guilt under

each statute is, leaving no room for interpolating such a

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requirement in the guise of interpretation; and the second is

that the problem with knowing what these statutes require of

a physician is not ignorance of legal obligation, but ignorance

of the factual premises of liability. The statute challenged in

Screws made it a crime to deprive a person of a constitutional

right. The Court held that the statute could be saved by

requiring that the defendant be shown to have known that he

was violating a constitutional right. It was a realistic

requirement because the set of constitutional righis at any

moment is more or less knov'n and it is a straightforward

(though not always easily answerable) factual question

whether the defendant knew that his conduct infringed

something in that set. No one knows what procedures

constitute “partial birth” abortion, and specifically whether

many, perhaps most, D & E’s do, given that the fetus often

has a heartbeat after part of the fetus has emerged from the

uterus. Screws, when he beat his victim to death, knew that

he was committing the assault; the question was whether he

knew that the assault (because he was a sheriff and his victim

an arrestee) violated the Constitution. Physicians performing

late-term abortions in Illinois and Wisconsin do not know

whether they are performing “partial birth” abortions and

thus committing crimes.

The incurable vagueness of these statutes might seem to be

of little moment if a physician prosecuted for infanticide or

feticide had a sure defense should the prosecution stray

beyond the narrow path to which the court today attempts to

confine the statute. He could not avoid prosecution but at

least he would know he would be acquitted, and if he were

lucky he would be let out on bail pending trial and maybe

Planned Parenthood would pay his legal fees. But let us be

realistic, and not only about the possibility of legal error.

The physician is not the real target of the statute; the

pregnant woman is. It is not the physician’s pregnancy that

is to be terminated. He has no incentive to undergo the

agony of a criminal prosecution merely in order to perform

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an abortion in a particular way. Better for him either to

abandon late-term abortions altogether, or to be sure to give

the fetus a lethal injection in utero, and wait for it to take

effect, before performing the abortion. The in terrorem

effect of these statutes, especially the Wisconsin statute with

its maximum penalty of life imprisonment, is likely to induce

physicians in these states to steer well clear of the forbidden

zone. What physician would be fool enough, or hero enough,

to risk a criminal prosecution in order to explore the precise

meaning and outer bounds of the precautionary injunctions

that this court has ordered the district courts in these two

Cases to enter, even if the risk is small?

And now we can see more clearly one of the fallacies in the

“precautionary” injunction gimmick. It is the existence of

these statutes, because of their extraordinary breadth and the

limited incentive of a physician to test their scope, not the

risk of prosecution, which may indeed be slight, that burdens

those abortion rights that are conceded to be constitutionally

protected. A peculiarity of abortion rights is that they require

the assistance of a third party, the physician, who has a lesser

interest in them than his patient. Because his interest is less,

he is more easily deterred, and this should increase our

concern with the deterrent effects of these vague statutes.

It remains only to make clear that in finding these statutes

pernicious and unconstitutional I do not mean to criticize

anyone who believes, whether because of religious

conviction, nonsectarian moral conviction, or simply a

prudential belief that upholding the sacredness of human life

whatever the circumstances is necessary to prevent us from

Sliding into barbarism, that abortion is always wrong and

perhaps particularly so in late pregnancy, since al/ methods

of late-term abortion are gruesome. If a woman told by her

physician that her fetus will be a Down’s baby or a Tay-

Sachs baby or will be born without arms or legs, or that her

own health or even life will be endangered if she carries the

A-62

fetus to term, decides nevertheless against abortion, | would

be the last to criticize her decision. I might consider her a

heroine or a saint. But what is at stake in these cases is

whether the people who feel that way are entitled to coerce a

woman who feels differently to behave as they would in her

situation. The Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme

Court in decisions that we are not free to palter with answers

this question “no.” We should therefore affirm the district

court’s decision in Hope and reverse the district court’s

decision in Doyle.

B E>)

*

\

A-63

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF WISCONSIN,

GARY T. PROHSKA, M.D., FREDRIK F.

BROEKHUIZEN, M.D., GAVIN JACOBSON, M.D.,

NEVILLE SENDER, M.D., DENNIS D.

CHRISTENSEN, M.D. and BERNARD SMITH,

M.D., on behalf of themselves and their patients

seeking abortions,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JAMES E. DOYLE, in his official Capacity as the

Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin and

DIANE M. NICKS, in her official Capacity as District

Attorney for Dane County and as representative of a

class of all District Attorneys in Wisconsin,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

98-C-305-S

At issue in this matter is the constitutionality of 1997

Wisconsin Act 219, codified at Wis. Stat. §§ 895.038 and

940.16 (the “Act”.

The Act forbids any person from intentionally performing a

“partial-birth abortion.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(2). It defines

“partial-birth abortion” as “an. abortion in which a person

Partially vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of

the partially delivered child with the intent to kill the child,

and then completes delivery of the child.” Wis. Stat. §

940.16(1)(b). “Child” is defined as a “human being from the

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time of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a

pregnant woman.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(1)(a). The Act

provides an exception to its criminal sanction where a partial-

birth abortion “is necessary to save the life of a woman

whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical

illness, or physical injury . . . if no other medical procedure

would suffice for that purpose.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(3).

Violation of the Act is a class “A” felony under Wisconsin

law, subjecting violators to life imprisonment.

The Act also creates civil liability for its violation. It

authorizes the father of the child aborted by the partial-birth

abortion and, if the woman on whom the abortion was

performed is a minor, either of her parents, to sue for

damages. Wis. Stat. § 895.038(2)(a). Either may sue

regardless of whether the woman consented to the partial-

birth abortion. However, neither may sue if he or she

consented to the partial-birth abortion. Wis. Stat. § 895.038.

In its enactment the Wisconsin legislature rejected

proposed amendments, Exhibits 1 - 15.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs previously sought a preliminary injunction

against enforcement of the Act which this Court denied.

Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D.

Wis. 1998). On the basis of undisputed facts, the Court

found that (1) the Act could be narrowly construed to apply

only to the dilation and extraction (“D&X”) method of

abortion, (2) the scienter requirements in the law helped save

it from a vagueness challenge, and (3) the Act did not place

an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.

Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiffs had failed to

establish a likelihood of success on the merits.

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The Court of Appeals disagreed. Planned Parenthood v.

Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998). It found that plaintiffs

might succeed in proving the Act unconstitutional for any of

three reasons. First, the Act makes no exception for cases in

which the fetus is not yet viable at the time of the abortion.

Id. at 466. Second, the Act contains no exception for cases in

which a D&X procedure is necessary for the preservation of

the mother’s health. /d. at 467. Third, the Act is vague. Id.

at 469.

The Court of Appeals specifically noted that its opinion

was based on the record compiled at the time and that “the

full trial may cast the facts in a different light.” Jd. at 466.

Accordingly, a trial was held in this matter to determine

whether the evidence presented by the parties would continue

to justify the Court of Appeals’ concerns regarding the

constitutionality of the Act.

Findings of Fact

Based on the evidence presented at trial and those facts to

which the parties have Stipulated, the Court makes the

following findings of fact. These findings may be divided

into three parts according to the issue they primarily address.

In the first group is evidence relating to the vagueness of the

Act -- whether the Act can be construed to apply to any

procedure other than the D&X procedure. In the second

group is evidence relating to the impact of the Act -- whether

its purpose or effect is to place an undue burden on a

woman’s right to an abortion. In the third group is evidence

relating to the state interests served by the Act.

The Court will present its factual findings according to this

division of the relevant evidence. The facts to which the

parties have stipulated are accepted as true except to the

extent they conflict with the following findings.

A-66

\

Vagueness -- The following facts are relevant to the issue

of whether the Act is unconstitutionally vague.

The most commonly used methods of abortion are suction

curettage, dilation and evacuation (“D&E”) and induction.

Some physicians also use the dilation and extraction

(“D&X”’) method of abortion.

In a suction curettage procedure, the physician generally

dilates the cervix, inserts a tube (cannula) through the vagina

and the cervix into the uterus, and removes the embryo or

fetus and other products of conception through the cannula

while it is inside the vagina, cervix, and uterus.

Abortion by induction involves inducing preterm labor.

The physician uses laminaria to dilate the cervix and

introduces medications into the patient that will both

continue the dilation and induce labor. As a result of the

labor, the fetus is expelled from the woman’s uterus.

In a D&E procedure, the physician generally dilates the

cervix by inserting laminaria. When sufficient dilation is

achieved, the physician removes the laminaria and ruptures

the amniotic sac. Depending on the gestational age and the

size of the fetus and the amount of dilation achieved, the

physician may use suction to remove the parts of the fetus

and products of conception that are removable by suction.

The physician will then insert forceps into the woman’s

uterus in order to grasp and remove the remaining parts of

the fetus from the uterus through the cervix into the vagina

and then from the woman’s body. This process involves

dismemberment of the fetus and repeated insertions of the

forceps into the woman’s uterus to grasp and remove

remaining fetal parts. During an abortion performed in this

manner, there often is fetal cardiac activity and other signs of

life after a fetal part has been delivered into the vagina while

the remainder of the fetus is in utero.

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Plaintiffs Christensen and Smith define the D&X procedure

as follows:

In the intact D&E procedure (which is also known as

“dilation and extraction,” “D&X”’ or “intact D&X’’),

the physician dilates the cervix and then removes the

fetus from the uterus through the vaginal canal intact.

The physician extracts the fetal body intact, usually

feet first, until the cervix is obstructed by the after

coming head, which is too large to pass through the

cervix. Then the physician creates a small opening at

the base of the skull and evacuates the contents, —

allowing the calvarium to pass through the cervical

opening. The intentional removal of the fetus intact is

what distinguishes an intact D&E procedure from a

D&E procedure.

Similarly, the American College of Obstetricians and

Gynecologists (“ACOG”) defines the D&X procedure to

include the following steps:

1. deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a

sequence of days;

2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling

breech;

3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head;

and

4. partial evacuation of the intzacranial contents of a

living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but

otherwise intact fetus.

Dr. Broekhuizen agrees with this definition but would

define D&X more broadly to include other variations on the

technique, including crushing the skull to allow it to pass

through the cervix. Haskell agrees that how the skull is

reduced in size is not an important distinction. He stated that

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“the medical distinction between a D&E and a D&X is the

extent to which the surgeon attempts to extract portions of

the fetus intact.”” Ex. 227 at 8.

Haskell also testified that in perhaps 75% of the D&X

procedures he performs, he cuts the umbilical cord before

removing the fetus from the uterus. However, sometimes the

child is partially delivered before he cuts the umbilical cord.

Haskell stated that the child is likely to die within minutes

after Haskell cuts its cord.

As evidenced by the policy statements of the American

Medical Association (Ex. 17) and the American College of

Obstetricians and Gynecologists (Ex. 16) as well as articles

published in prominent medical journals (Exs. 205, 206, 207

_and 240), the medical community understands the phrase

“partial birth abortion” to refer to the dilation and extraction

or “D&X” procedure. See also Ex. 239 at 35 (“The breech

extraction variation of intact D & E, described in the lay

press as ‘partial birth abortion’ has been made illegal in

several states.”) Nevertheless, the plaintiff physicians state

that they find the definition of partial birth abortion in the

Act to be vague because the definition could be construed to

cover the three most common methods of abortion including

suction curettage, induction, and dilation and evacuation

(“D&E”). See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24.

They expressed concern over the following situations:

Suction Curettage -- Occasionally, in some suction

curettage procedures, it is necessary for the physician

to use forceps to remove the fetus from the uterus.

Sometimes the physician removes the fetus in parts

and other times it is intact. When the fetus is intact,

there may be a point in the procedure when part of the

fetus is outside of the uterus while the rest of the fetus

remains in the uterus.

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Induction -- Sometimes during an induction the

physician must assist in the removal of the fetus; and

sometimes the physician collapses or compresses the

skull or some part of the fetal abdomen to allow it to

pass through the cervix.

D&E -- In some D&E procedures, a physician draws

part of the intact fetus partially through the cervix and

into the vaginal canal. After the grasped part has

come through the cervix the physician disjoins the

part from the rest of the fetus, which remains in the

uterus. Physicians who perform abortions know that

disarticulating a fetal limb from a pre-viable fetus will

cause the fetus to die within a few minutes.

Trial testimony and the stipulated facts establish that

physicians cannot control when a child’s death occurs in

either the suction curettage or induction methods of abortion.

While death of the pre-viable fetus is the ultimate outcome of

these procedures, there is no particular step taken in either of

these procedures that is practically certain to kill the fetus at

an identifiable point in time. Fetal demise occurs at different

times and from different causes.

Similarly, when beginning a D&E abortion, a physician

cannot predict when the child will die and generally it is not

known when a child does die. If the child is alive when

dismemberment begins, the physician may be practically

certain that dismembering substantial portions of the child

will kill the child before delivery of all parts of the fetus is

completed. In those circumstances, however, the physician

does not complete delivery of a “child.” Rather, the

physician delivers dismembered body parts.

By contrast, physicians who perform D&X abortions know

that crushing the fetal skull or piercing the skull and

suctioning the contents will cause the fetus to die

immediately or within a few minutes. They take this step

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after partially vaginally delivering the child. Accordingly,

they are practically certain to kill a child in the birth canal on

most occasions. Except for beginning the abortion with an

injection that is lethal to the fetus, the piercing or crushing of

the skull in a D&X procedure and cutting the umbilica! cord,

a physician does not intentionally kill the child at any

specific point during the procedure.

Accordingly, based on this evidence, the Court concludes

that only in the D&X procedure is the physician aware that

his conduct is practically certain to kill a living child in the

birth canal before completing delivery of the child.

Undue Burden -- In addition to the facts already stated,

the following facts are relevant to whether the Act imposes

an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.

There are both advantages and disadvantages of the D&X

procedure as compared to the D&E procedure. One of the

advantages of the D&X procedure is that it is quicker and

easier to perform than the D&E procedure after 18 weeks

Imp. The shorter procedure time reduces the amount of

bleeding and reduces the amount of time that the patient has

to be subject to anesthesia. Another advantage is that the

physician in the D&X procedure does not have to make

multiple insertions of the forceps into the uterus. Reducing

the use of instruments in the uterus reduces the risk of uterine

perforation.

The D&X also has certain disadvantages in that it creates

risks not found in the D&E procedure. The D&X procedure

requires greater dilation of the cervix through an additional

24 hours of laminaria. The testifying physicians agreed that

delaying an abortion creates additional risks. With regard to

the D&X procedure these risks include a risk that the

woman’s membranes might rupture or that she may develop

an infection. The greater dilation used in D&X also poses

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the risk of cervical incompetence, which may lead to

premature births in future pregnancies.

Also, the D&E procedure has a proven track record that the

D&X procedure does not have. D&E is the most common

method of second-trimester abortion, accounting for

hundreds of abortions in Wisconsin each year. D&X, by

contrast, is rarely used. Among the plaintiff physicians, only

Christensen regularly performs the D&X procedure and he

performs just 2-3 such procedures each year.

There are no published, medically-recognized studies

comparing the risks of D&E to D&X. Haskell testified to an

informal comparison. He stated that in 10 years of

performing abortions he does not recall any complications in

the D&X procedures he has performed and recalls perhaps 2-

3 complications in the D&E procedures he has_performed.

His experience conflicts with that of his mentor, Dr.

McMahon, as reported in Exhibit 228. McMahon

encountered major complications in 4 out of 1362 patients

using the D&X procedure. This success rate was no better

than for D&E’s. The Court places little reliance on any of

this anecdotal evidence because there has been no suggestion

that the women receiving D&E abortions were similarly

Situated to the women receiving D&X abortions, or that the

complication rates experienced by Haskell and McMahon

were statistically significant.

More telling evidence concerning the relative safety of the

D&X procedure may be found in the opinions of the

testifying physicians, None of the physicians would state

unequivocally that the D&X procedure is safer than the D&E

procedure. Broekhuizen conceded that further study of the

procedures is required. Smith admitted that he had never

encountered a situation where D&X would have been the

best procedure to use. Haskell, who invented the procedure,

admitted that the D&x procedure is never medically

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necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a woman.

Giles agreed.

Major medical associations are equally reluctant to endorse

the D&X procedure. ACOG reviewed the D&X procedure

and “could identify no circumstances under which [the D&X

procedure] would be the only option to save the life or

preserve the health of the woman.” Ex. 16 at 2. ACOG did

state that there “may” be circumstances in which the D&X

procedure is the best or most appropriate procedure, but it did

not identify what those circumstances might be. Jd.

Similarly, the American Medical Association concluded

that “there does not appear to be any identified situation in

which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to

induce abortion, and ethical concerns have been raised about

intact D&X. The AMA recommends that the procedure not

be used unless alternative procedures pose materially greater

risk to the woman.” Ex. 17 at 15. Again, however, the AMA

did not identify any particular circumstances in which

“alternative procedures pose materially greater risk to the

woman.” /d.

The plaintiff physicians’ reluctance to endorse the safety of

the D&X procedure is evidenced by their conduct. Actions

often speak louder than words, and in this case plaintiffs’

conduct indicates that the D&X procedure offers no material

advantage in terms of safety. As noted, none of the plaintiff

physicians routinely performs the D&X procedure. Nor do

they train their staff or medical students to perform the

procedure. They also do not routinely inform their patients

as to the procedure’s availability or its supposed advantages.

All of the physicians use the same consent form regardless of

the method of abortion used.

The conduct of the other physician witnesses offered by

plaintiffs suggests the same conclusion. Haskell invented the

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D&X procedure and has demonstrated an unusual fondness

for it. Nevertheless, he sometimes chooses to perform a

D&E abortion -- despite his alleged concerns regarding its

safety -- because the additional delay involved in a D&X

procedure would be inconvenient for the woman. Similarly,

Stubblefield and his colleagues perform induction abortions

at 17 - 20 weeks Imp and do not offer D&X abortions

because the added time necessary to dilate the cervix is not

worth the benefits of the D&X procedure.

Similarly, plaintiffs’ conduct during the two weeks that the

Act was in effect provides further evidence concerning the

alleged burdens imposed by the Act. Broekhizen conceded

that during this period he continued to perform abortions

without altering his procedures. Smith effectively conceded

the same when he declined to answer a question on this point

and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights against self-

incrimination. Christensen also continued to perform

abortions during this period. He issued a press release stating

that he could comply with the Act as he interpreted it only by

altering his procedures in a way that would impose greater

health risks on women. Nevertheless, Christensen’s rate of

complications from abortions did not go up in a “statistically

significant fashion” while Wis. Stat. § 940.16 was in effect.

Regardless of the general safety of the D&X procedure,

plaintiffs argue the procedure is safer in Certain

circumstances. They contend that in some induction

procedures the fetal skull is too large to pass through the

cervix and must be crushed in order to complete delivery.

Several of the plaintiff physicians admitted that they could

wait for the skull to pass the cervix naturally, but they stated

that there would be no medical reason for doing so and the

delay may lead to excessive bleeding.

Plaintiffs also contend there are certain maternal conditions

or fetal anomalies in which the D&X procedure is the best

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procedure to use in order to accomplish an abortion. In

support of this position they offered the testimony of Dr.

Broekhuizen who described three circumstances in which he

intended to perform D&X abortions. In the first case,

Broekhuizen aborted a pregnancy in a woman with

schleroderma. He dilated the cervix through serial

application of laminaria and the fetus was completely

expelled intact. He did not crush the skull or puncture the

skull and suction out the contents.

In the second case, Broekhuizen intended to perform a

D&X abortion to terminate the pregnancy of a woman with

skeletal dysplasia. He chose the D&X procedure because the

woman opposed dismemberment of the fetus through the

D&E procedure and had an “inerdinate” fear of labor pains

so that she did not want an induction. Broekhuizen also

wanted to deliver an intact fetus in order to obtain a more

definite diagnosis of dysplasia. Despite Broekhuizen’s intent

to perform a D&X abortion, serial dilation of the cervix led

to a spontaneous onset of labor and an intact fetus was

delivered.

In the third case, Broekhuizen performed the D&X

procedure to abort a fetus 28 weeks Imp with hydrocephalus.

Due to this fetal anomaly the head was larger than that of a

child carried to term. Broekhuizen performed a combination

of dilation and induction, and then decompressed the head

with scissors and needles and completed delivery.

Dr. Giles disagreed that the D&X procedure was the best

procedure to use in any of these circumstances. Indeed, with

25 years of experience in high risk pregnancies, Giles has

never seen a situation where D&X would be the best

procedure to use. He deemed induction the safest method in

all late-term (20 or more weeks Imp) pregnancies because it

does not require instrumentation in the uterus. Accordingly,

in his view, induction is safer even than D&E. Moreover, -

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like D&X, the induction procedure yields an intact fetus

which could be studied by physicians and grieved over by

mothers.

Giles disputed the need to crush the fetal skull in induction

procedures. He routinely uses cervical relaxants and other

drugs to allow the fetal head to pass quickly without

complications. He also noted that a physician could assist an

induction procedure by gently compressing the fetal head

without either the intent to kill the fetus or the practical

certainty that death of the fetus would be the result.

Giles also stated that D&X is not the best method of

abortion where a child has hydrocephalus. He stated that a

needle could be inserted through the mother’s abdomen to

safely reduce the size of the child’s head in order to allow the

physician to perform an abortion through induction.

The Court finds Giles’ testimony more credible. Giles

spoke from substantial experience in high risk pregnancies,

having performed over 1,000 abortions through induction

without any major complications. His view that induction

could be used in the situations Broekhuizen described is

Supported by Broekhuizen’s experience. Although

Broekhuizen intended to perform the D&X procedure in the

first two circumstances he described, he did not actually

perform the procedure. In each case the pregnancy was

aborted through what was essentially an induction procedure.

Moreover, Giles expressed his opinion that the D&X

procedure is never necessary to save the live or preserve the

health of a woman despite the fact that Giles regularly

provides abortions and otherwise supports a woman’s right to

an elective abortion. Giles’ willingness to state what must be

an unpopular view in the circles in which he travels bolsters

his credibility.

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Haskell and Broekhuizen criticized Giles’ use of cervical

relaxants and other drugs, but there was no showing that

these doctors had the expertise or experience to offer this

criticism. Moreover, Giles’ substantial success in performing

abortions through inductions is more credible evidence than

the unsupported opinions of these physicians.

In light of this substantial evidence, the Court concludes

that partial birth abortion is never medically necessary to

preserve the health or life of a woman and abolition of the

procedure does not subject women to materially greater

health risks. D&E is nearly always an option and there has

been no credible showing that D&E is riskier that D&X.

Moreover, induction is safer than even D&E and can be used

in those rare pregnancies, if any, where D&E would be

problematic.

Moreover, having reviewed the proposed amendments to

the Act as well as the amicus brief filed by state legislators,

the Court finds that the Legislature did not adopt the Act for

the purpose of placing an obstacle in the path of women

seeking an abortion. As the Court has previously stated, the

proposed amendments were reasonably rejected to avoid

creating loopholes in the law that would have allowed

physicians to easily avoid the restrictions the law imposes.

Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.

The State Interest Served by the Act -- In addition to the

facts already stated, the following facts are relevant to

whether the Act serves a compelling state interest.

As Giles testified, partial birth abortion raises several

concerns including pain to the child, denying the child any

possibility of survival, and risks to maternal health. These

concerns have been noted by the AMA and have been

discussed in prominent medical journals. See Exs. 17, 205,

206, 207 and 240. In an article in the Journal of the

EE

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American Medical Association, Drs. Sprang and Neerhof

concluded that “intact D&X partial-birth abortion should not

be performed because it is needlessly risky, inhumane and

ethically unacceptable.” Ex. 206 at 746. They observed that

when the physician kills a child in a partial birth abortion, the

child “is merely inches from being delivered and obtaining

full legal rights of personhood under the US Constitution.”

Id. at 746. Accordingly, the doctors concluded that partial

birth abortion is “closer to infanticide than it is to abortion.”

Id. The legislators who filed an amicus brief make similar

arguments.

The Court concludes that these facts demonstrate that the

Act serves compelling state interests.

Conclusions of Law

The Court now turns to its conclusions of law with a view

toward determining whether the Court of Appeals’ concerns

regarding the constitutionality of the Act remain valid.

In undertaking this task, the Court must begin its review of

the Act with the strong presumption that it is constitutional.

State v. Cissell, 378 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1985); Andree v.

Ashland County, 818 F.2d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the Act is

unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Wisconsin v.

Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Wis. 1995). In assessing

whether a party has carried its burden of proof, “every

presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all

possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative

enactment’s constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of

constitutionality.” Jd. In light of these considerations and

the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Act is

constitutional. The fully developed record demonstrates that

the Court of Appeals’ concerns have not been borne out by

the evidence.

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First, the evidence establishes that the Act need not make

an exception for cases in which the fetus is not yet viable at

the time of the abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505

U.S. 833, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), plainly

establishes that states may regulate abortions pre-viability.

They may do so in order to “further the interest in potential

life or some other valid state interest” so long as their

regulation does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of

a woman seeking an abortion. Casey 505 U.S. at 877

(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Act is not

unconstitutional per se merely because it does not make an

exception pre-viability. Rather, the Court of Appeals found

the Act unconstitutional based on its finding that the Act did

not serve the state’s interest in maternal health or potential

life or any other compelling state interest. See Planned

Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d at 466-67.

As noted, the fully developed record establishes that the

Act serves several compelling state interests, including

interests in maternal health, potential life and morality.

Maternal Health -- The Act serves Wisconsin’s interest in

maternal health insofar as use of the D&X procedure places

women at higher risk of infection, rupture of the amniotic

sac, and cervical incompetence. Wisconsin could rationally

prohibit use of what is clearly an unnecessary procedure in

order to protect women from these dangers.

Potential Life -- The Act also serves Wisconsin’s interest

in potential life insofar as use of the D&X procedure creates

risks for subsequent pregnancies due to cervical

incompetence.

Morality -- It has long been recognized that states have a

legitimate interest in prohibiting conduct deemed immoral.

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)

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(upholding constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy law in part

because it was rationally related to “the presumed belief of a

majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual

sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”). Although abortion

laws are typically justified according to the state’s interest in

maternal health or potential life, the Casey court specifically

recognized that “other valid state interest[s]” could justify a

pre-viability abortion restriction. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.

As the Court of Appeals observed, the Act is not likely to

save the life of any child because other safe alternative

methods of abortion are available. Planned Parenthood vy.

Doyle, 162 F.3d at 470. Nevertheless, even if the state’s

interest in a child previability is not sufficient to allow the

State to protect it from destruction, in the D&X procedure the

child is just inches from being born. Surely at that point the

State has a sufficient interest in the child to allow the state to

regulate the manner of the child’s death, regardless of

whether the State is able to keep the child alive. Wisconsin

has declared that such children are not to endure -- and

Wisconsin physicians are not to inflict -- the gruesome death

imposed in the D&X procedure. It is well-within the

province of the state to legislate against the immorality of

partial birth abortion.

Perhaps, as plaintiffs argue, the child will endure a

gruesome death through some other method of abortion.

This does not detract from the legitimacy of Wisconsin’s

partial birth abortion law, however, because it is apparently

beyond Wisconsin’s power to eliminate those other methods

of abortion. Wisconsin can eliminate this one method.

Given the national groundswell of Opposition to partial birth

abortion and the ethical concerns raised within the medical

community concerning the procedure, the State cannot be

faulted for acting where it can to outlaw an unnecessary

procedure that in most cases in which it is used is literally

inches away from being infanticide.

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Any and all of these state interests justify Wisconsin’s

partial birth abortion law so that the Act need not make an

exception for cases in which the fetus is not yet viable at the

time of the abortion.

Second, the Act need not contain an exception for cases in

which a D&X procedure is necessary for the preservation of

the mother’s health. As noted, a pre-viability restriction on

the right to an abortion is unconstitutional if it places an

undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. As the Court of Appeals found, a

law which prohibits women from obtaining an abortion

through a method that is necessary for the preservation of the

mother’s health places an undue burden on the woman’s

right to an abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d

at 468.

But as the fully developed record reveals, Wisconsin’s

partial birth abortion law is not such a law. Partial birth

abortion is never medically necessary to preserve the health

or save the life of a woman and abolition of the procedure

does not subject women to materially greater health risks.

Accordingly, the trial has “cast the facts in a different light.”

While the Court of Appeals assumed that the D&X procedure

would be the best medical procedure for obtaining an

abortion in at least some circumstances, the evidence

demonstrates that it is not. Because the Act leaves women

with safe, alternative methods of abortion, it does not impose

an undue burden on their abortion rights.

Third, the Act is not vague. The Court remains convinced

that plaintiffs’ alleged confusion concerning the meaning of

the Act is a demon of their own creation. Everyone

understands what partial birth abortion is and what it is not.

It is the D&X procedure. It is not the suction curettage

procedure, the induction procedure or the D&E procedure.

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Defendants have stipulated to this reading of the law, which

supports the Court’s interpretation. See Wolman v. Walter,

433 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (Blackmun, J.) (relying in part on

the defendants’ stipulation as to the meaning of a law in

rejecting the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute at issue was

“so vague as to fail to insure against sectarian abuse.”’)

In rejecting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,

this Court found that only in the D&X method of abortion

does a physician act with the purpose of performing a

procedure in the steps described by the statute -- first

partially vaginally delivering a living child and then causing

the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to kill

the child and then completing delivery of the child. Planned

Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-44. The Court of

Appeals did not take issue with this conclusion.

Nevertheless, it observed that the Act “must be read in light

of the definition of ‘intentionally’ elsewhere in Wisconsin *

criminal-law statutes as either acting purposely to accomplish

the forbidden end or being ‘aware that [one’s] conduct is

practically certain to cause that result.’” Planned

Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d at 469, citing Wis. Stat. §

939.23(3). The Court of Appeals observed that in some

methods of abortion other than D&X a physician might be

aware that he or she is “practically certain” to kill an intact

living child in the birth canal before delivery is completed.

Plaintiffs took the same position at trial. See Plaintiffs’

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24.

The fully developed record has not justified this concern.

As noted, physicians cannot control when death occurs in

induction and suction curettage abortions and cannot be

“practically certain” that any step they take will kill a fetus in

the birth canal. Accordingly, even if their conduct in

performing these abortions is construed as_ partially

delivering a living child, they do not thereafter take any

second step for the purpose of killing the child or that is

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practically certain to kill the child before completing

delivery. Moreover, a physician who sets out to perform an

abortion through suction curettage or induction does not

purposely perform the three steps proscribed by the act in the

order proscribed, nor is he or she practically certain to do so.

The D&E procedure also is not covered by the Act. The

physician in the D&E procedure removes the fetus in parts.

As this Court has already held, the Act refers to delivery of a

“child” which cannot be equated to delivery of

“dismembered body parts.” Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9

F. Supp. 2d at 1041. Accordingly, the /ega/ interpretation of

the Act excludes delivery of a dismembered fetus, regardless

of the /ay interpretation which the testifying physicians --

including Giles, defendants’ expert -- sought to impose upon

the Act. The Act does not apply to the D&E procedure.

For similar reasons, the Act does apply to the D&X

procedure. The D&X procedure is distinct from the D&E

procedure in that the goal of the D&X is to extract an intact

fetus -- a “child” -- rather than a dismembered fetus. Haskell,

Christensen and Smith agreed with this distinction.

Moreover, the D&X procedure is the only procedure in

which the physician purposely follows the sequence of steps

proscribed by the Act. Accordingly, D&X is the only

abortion procedure abolished by the Act.

Plaintiffs also complain that there is disagreement

concerning what a D&X is, thereby making the law vague.

But the evidence demonstrated substantial agreement

concerning the meaning of D&X. All of the medical

authorities offer substantially the same definition of D&X.

To the extent they disagree in any relevant way, it is a

disagreement concerning how physicians kill the child --

whether through suctioning the cranial contents, crushing the

skull or cutting the umbilical cord. But there is no

disagreement that if a physician takes one of these steps after

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partially vaginally delivering a living child and then

completes delivery of the child, he or she has performed a

partial birth abortion. Accordingly, the law gives physicians

reasonable notice of the conduct proscribed.

As noted, the Act is constitutional if it prohibits only the

D&X procedure. In reviewing the language of the Act, it is -

difficult to discern how the Legislature could have signaled

any more clearly its intent to adopt this limited prohibition --

without creating enormous loopholes in the law. The Act

specifically uses the term “partial birth abortion” which

physicians understand to mean D&X abortions. Moreover,

the steps it describes as constituting a “partial birth abortion”

apply most naturally and easily to the D&X procedure. Dr.

Broekhuizen conceded that it is only by bending the language

of the Act beyond its most obvious meaning that it can be

construed to apply to the suction curettage method of

abortion. The same is true with regard to all other methods

of abortion except D&X. The contortions the plaintiffs invite

this Court to impose on the law run contrary to the command

that every presumption in favor of constitutionality be

indulged. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the law is

not vague.

Consent

One issue remains that was not addressed by the Court of

Appeals. Plaintiffs argue that the civil liability provisions in

the Act amount to an unconstitutional tacit consent

requirement. However, as this Court held in response to

plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, if the law

criminalizing partial-birth abortions is constitutionally sound,

then a law imposing civil sanctions for the same activity

must withstand a constitutional challenge as well. See United

States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991).

Having found the criminal sanctions in the Act constitutional,

the Court finds the civil sanctions constitutional as well.

: A-84

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of

defendants against plaintiffs dismissing their complaint and

all claims contained therein with prejudice and costs except

as to Section 895.038(3)(b) of the Act which is severed and

declared unconstitutional.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that enforcement of the

judgment is stayed pending appeal.

Entered this 4th day of Jun

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