Appendix — Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle
Supreme Court brief2000
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Opinion below, Hope Clinic v. Ryan,
BD Te Bee PUN, SOG vsiscnsinsncnsscroscsecoscssintvores A-2
District Court opinion denying permanent
injunction, Planned Parenthood v. Doyle,
44 F. Supp 2d 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999)...........cccceeeeees A-63
Seventh Circuit opinion reversing denial of
preliminary injunction, Planned Parenthood
v. Doyle, 162 F. 3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998)..............00 A-85
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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 98-1726
The Hope Clinic, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, and Richard K.
Devine, State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 97 C 8702--Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
Nos. 99-2528 & 99-2533
Dennis D. Christensen, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vv.
James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Diane
M. Nicks, District Attorney for Dane County, Wisconsin,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
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No. 98-C-0305-S--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.
Argued September 22, 1999--Decided October 26, 1999
Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and COFFEY, FLAUM,
EASTERBROOK, MANION, KANNE, ROVNER, DIANE
P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges."
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. We must decide whether
state laws’ prohibiting partial-birth abortions are
unconstitutionally vague or unduly burden women’s rights.
Acting without an evidentiary hearing, a district court held
the Illinois statute unconstitutional and entered a permanent
injunction. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. -
1998). But after a trial, another district court concluded that
the Wisconsin statute is valid. Planned Parenthood of
Wisconsin v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
A panel of this court earlier had ordered preliminary relief
against Wisconsin’s law, see Planned Parenthood of
Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998), and
plaintiffs say that this decision, applying Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), justifies permanent injunctions against both
states’ rules. To ensure consistency, we heard the appeals en
banc. We conclude that both laws can be applied in a
constitutional manner. Whether that will occur depends on
State coufig which alone can settle questions about the
construction of the statutes. To ensure that physicians are not
deterred from performing other medical procedures while
issues wend their way through state tribunals, we hold that
both sets of plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will
limit the statutes’ application to the medical procedure that
each state insists is its sole concern.
* Circuit Judge Ripple did not participate in the consideration or decision
of these cases.
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I
Induction, suction curettage, and dilation and evacuation
(D&E) are the principal methods of performing abortions in
the United States. Prohibiting any one_of these would
conflict with the right of abortion recognized by cases such
as Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion) (adopting
“undue burden” as the constitutional standard), and Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri-v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
75-79 (1976) (holding that a state may not forbid saline
amniocentesis, at the time the principal means of induction).
Our cases involve an uncommon procedure known to the
medical community as “intact dilation and extraction” or just
“dilation and extraction (D&X),” and to the public as
“partial-birth abortion.”
Some medical background is essential to understanding the
issues. Induction means inducing preterm labor, which
causes the expulsion of the conceptus. Methotrexate or
mifepristone (RU-486, now in clinical trials), in combination
with misoprostol, can be used for this purpose early in
pregnancy; saline amniocentesis and injected prostaglandins
serve the same function in the second trimester. Suction
curettage (vacuum aspiration), the most common surgical
method of abortion early in pregnancy, refers to evacuation
of the uterine cavity; the embryo or fetus is separated from
the placenta either by scraping or vacuum pressure, then is
removed by suction. When these methods are inappropriate,
or do not work, physicians employ the D&E procedure. To
perform a D&E, the physician dilates the cervix and
dismembers the fetus inside the uterus using forceps. Fetal
parts are removed with forceps or by suction.
A D&X is a variant of a D&E in which the fetus is
removed without dismemberment. The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) defines D&X as
follows: “1. deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a
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sequence of days; 2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a
footling breech; 3. breech extraction of the body excepting
the head; and 4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents
of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but
otherwise intact fetus.” Martin Haskell, the physician who
developed the D&X procedure, see Dilation and Extraction
for Late Second Trimester Abortion (1992), reprinted in 139
Cong. Rec. E1092 (Apr. 29, 1993), believes that how the
head is diminished in size so that it can pass through the
cervix is not important: mechanically crushing the skull
serves the same end as evacuating its contents, which causes
its collapse. It is this combination of coming so close to
delivering a live child with the death of the fetus by reducing
the size of the skull that not only distinguishes D&X from
D&E medically but also causes the adverse public (and
legislative) reaction. Opponents deem the D&X procedure
needlessly cruel and bordering on infanticide, and all three
states in this circuit have enacted statutory restrictions.
The statute in Illinois has three sections with legal
significance: ;
720 ILCS § 513/5. Definitions
In this Act: “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion
in which the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living human fetus or infant
before killing the fetus or infant and completing the
delivery. The terms “fetus” and “infant” are used
interchangeably to refer to the biological offspring of
human. parents.
720 ILCS § 513/10. Partial-birth abortions prohibited
Any person who knowingly performs a partial-birth
abortion and thereby kills a human fetus or infant is
guilty of a Class 4 felony. This Section does not
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apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to
save the life of a mother because her life is
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or
physical injury, including a_ !ife-endangering
condition caused Fy or arising from the pregnancy
itself, provided that no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.
720 ILCS § 513/15. Civil action
The maternal grandparents of the fetus or infant, if the
mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the time
of the abortion, may in a civil action obtain
appropriate relief unless the pregnancy resulted from
the plaintiffs criminal conduct or the plaintiff
cgnsented to the abortion. The relief shall include
money damages for all injuries, psychological and
physical, occasioned by the violation of this Act and
statutory damages equal to 3 times the cost of the
partial-birth abortion.
The Indiana statute defines “partial-birth abortion” in
identical terms. Ind. Code § 16-18-2-267.5. Like Illinois it
forbids partial-birth abortions unless that procedure is
necessary to save the mother’s life, and no other procedure
would suffice. Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1(b). The Indiana
statute has never been challenged and has been in effect since
July 1, 1997.
Wisconsin has taken a slightly different approach. Its
statutes provide:
Wis. Stat. § 895.038 Partial-birth abortions; liability.
(1) In this section:
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(a) “Child” has the meaning stn in § 940.16 (1)
(a).
(b) “Partial-birth abortion” has the meaning given
in § 940.16 (1) (b).
(2) (a) Except as provided in par. (b), any of the
following persons has a claim for appropriate relief
against a person who performs a_ partial-birth
abortion:
1. If the person on whom a partial-birth
abortion was performed was a minor, the
parent of the minor.
2. The father of the child aborted by the
partial-birth abortion.
(b) A person specified in par. (a) 1. or 2. does not
have a claim under par. (a) if any of the following
apply:
1. The person consented to performance of the
partial-birth abortion.
2. The pregnancy of the woman on whom the
partial-birth abortion was performed was the
result of a sexual assault in violation of §
940.225, 944.06, 948.02, 948.025, 948.06 or
948.09 that was committed by the person.
(3) The relief available under sub. (2) shall include all
of the following:
(a) If the abortion was performed in violation of §
940.16, damages arising out of the performance of
the partial birth abortion, including damages for
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personal injury and emotional and psychological
distress.
(b) Exemplary damages equal to 3 times the cost
of the partial-birth abortion.
(4) Subsection (2) applies even if the mother of the
child aborted by the partial-birth abortion consented
to the performance of the partial-birth abortion.
Wis. Stat. § 940.16 Partial-birth abortion.
(1) In this section:
(a) “Child” means a human being from the time of
fertilization until it is completely delivered from a
pregnant woman.
(b) “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in
which a person partially vaginally delivers a
living child, causes the death of the partially
delivered child with the intent to kill the child,
and then completes the delivery of the child.
(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever
intentionally performs a partial birth abortion is guilty
of a Class A felony.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the partial-birth
abortion is necessary to save the life of a woman
whose life is endangered by a physical disorder,
physical illness or physical injury, including a life-
endangering physical disorder, physical illness or
physical injury caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself, and if no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.
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Wisconsin’s definition of partial-birth abortion is
substantially the same as Illinois’, but the mental-state
elements differ, as do the maximum penalties: Illinois makes
unjustified partial-birth abortion a Class 4 felony, with a
maximum penalty of three years; in Wisconsin the offense is
a Class A felony, for which Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a)
provides a penalty of life imprisonment.
Because Wisconsin and Illinois use similar language to
define partial-birth abortions, we _ illustrate plaintiffs’
concerns with the latter’s statute:
“Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which
the person performing the abortion partially vaginally
delivers a living human fetus or infant before killing
the fetus or infant and completing the delivery. The
terms “fetus” and “infant” are used interchangeably to
refer to the bioiogical offspring of human parents.
This legal definition is an imperfect match for the medical
definition of D&X. It is easy to see why a legislature would
be chary of the ACOG’s specification: then any small
variation (such as a change in the method of reducing the
head size, or snipping off a toe to defeat the “otherwise
intact” specification) would take’ the abortion outside the
prohibition, even though the reasons why the technique has
been deemed objectionable would be unaffected. But, as is
common with legislation, the price of avoiding loopholes is
generality. Section 513/5 captures the idea, central to the
D&X procedure, that an intact fetus moves from uterus to
vagina before death occurs. But it also uses the words
“delivers” and “delivery,” which many physicians understand
to refer to any removal of fetal material from the uterus. The
law might be read to prohibit the extraction of dismembered
parts following a D&E, or to prohibit abortion by induction if
by chance the fetus survives until it reaches the birth canal.
Moreover, physicians performing a D&E sometimes do not
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complete the dismemberment inside the uterus, and some
fear that this could lead the procedure to be characterized as a
partial delivery under the statute.
The possibility that § 513/10 might discourage risk-averse
physicians from performing the D&E procedure led the
district court in Illinois to declare that it is too vague to be
enforced, and a similar concern animated our panel’s
decision to require preliminary relief against Wisconsin’s
law. Moreover, if these lawsneedlessly raise the effective -
costs of induction, suction curettage, or D&E, then they
would unduly burden the right of abortion, another concern
expressed not only by the district court in the Illinois case but
also by the panel in the Wisconsin case. But after a trial on
remand, the district court in Wisconsin concluded that
physicians who perform abortions recognize that the
statutory formula, however vague or broad these words
appear to lay eyes, refers to the D&X procedure alone. The
court held ‘that, as so limited, the statute does not
substantially burden any woman’s right to an abortion,
because D&X is never the only safe procedure.
Litigation elsewhere has produced results mirroring the
divergence between the outcomes in Jllinois and Wisconsin.
The sixth circuit held that Ohio’s ban on partial-birth
abortions is unconstitutional, Women’s Medical Professional
Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), but the
fourth circuit issued a stay preventing interference with
Virginia’s statute. Richmond Medical Center for Women v.
Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), motion to vacate stay
denied, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18547. Both of those
decisions were rendered over dissents. A single panel of the
eighth circuit recently held three states’ partial-birth-abortion
laws unconstitutional, but only after first concluding that all
three statutes forbid the D&E procedure. Carhart v.
Stenberg, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23162 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,
1999) (Nebraska); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A.
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v. Jegley, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23165 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,
1999) (Arkansas); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc.
v. Miller, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23166 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,
1999) (Iowa).
Il
Plaintiffs would like us to employ the approach of our
panel’s opinion in the Wisconsin case and declare both
States’ laws unconstitutional without ado. But different
statutes have different language, which may be important.
Litigants also have made distinctive arguments--for example,
Illinois relies on United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987), for the proposition that, except in first amendment
cases, a law may be held unconstitutional only when “no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”
Moreover, two events since the panel wrote call for fresh
analysis. First, that opinion dealt with preliminary relief and
observed that “the full trial may cast the facts in a different
light”. 162 F.3d at 466. That trial has been held in
Wisconsin, and its results must be considered. Second, both
the panel’s decision in the Wisconsin case and the district
court’s opinion in the Illinois case conclude that the statute as
written is vagué. A more recent decision of the Supreme
Court, Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), stresses
that state courts are entitled to construe state laws to reduce
their ambiguity, and that federal courts should evaluate state
laws as they have been construed, not just as they appear in
the statute books. See also, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974); Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973). This implies that Illinois and Wisconsin are
entitled to interpret their own laws--that federal courts should
not enjoin all application before enforcement and thus
prevent the state courts from having a chance to save their
Statutes.
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Salerno offers a potential ground for giving the states that
chance. It would be hard to say that every possible instance
of the D&X procedure is protected by the Constitution.
Along similar lines are the many cases saying that outside the
domain of the first amendment, vagueness challenges must
be assessed “as applied.” See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 1853 (1988); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hofjiman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982). But we
are reluctant to rely too heavily on this approach, because
Morales shows that three Justices believe that this language
is too sweeping, see 119 S. Ct. at 1858-59 & n.22 (Stevens,
J., joined by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.), and the Supreme Court
has on occasion resolved constitutional challenges to statutes
that do not involve speech without asking whether every
conceivable application would be unconstitutional. E.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 358-59 n.8 (1983); Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373 (1913). Only one Justice offered any support for
Salerno’s approach in Morales, and he did so in a dissenting
opinion. 119 S. Ct. at 1867-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia identified many cases that articulate Salerno’s
requirement, and many others that bypass the inquiry. Courts
of appeals are divided on the question whether Salerno
applies to abortion legislation. Compare Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996), with
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (Sth Cir. 1992). The
safest course for a court of appeals, when confronted with
inconsistent lines of precedent, is to decide on other grounds
if at all possible. Here it is possible, for we think that the
Supreme Courts of Illinois and Wisconsin could read their
laws in ways that comport with the Constitution.
1. One means of doing this would be to assimilate the
statutory definitions to the medical definition of D&X, with
allowance for different ways of reducing the head size and
other immaterial variations. Both states are concerned about
the D&X procedure and did not set out to forbid any other.
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The Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin, the
principal defendants, tell us that their statutes are concerned
only with the D&X procedure and will be enforced only
against its use. That assurance might be enough by itself, in
the absence of any contrary indication from the state
judiciary, to resolve immediate vagueness concerns. See
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988); cf. Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-80 (1997).
Although local prosecutors (States’ Attorneys in Illinois,
District Attorneys in Wisconsin) initiate criminal
prosecutions, representatives of these prosecutors have been
named as parties in each case, and they agree with the
Attorneys General. Plaintiffs object that this approach would
rewrite rather than interpret the law, but we doubt this. Both
medical and popular literature equate “partial-birth abortion”
(the statutory term) with the D&X procedure. See Janet E.
Gans Epner, Harry S. Jonas & Daniel L. Seckinger, Late-
term Abortion, 280 J. Am. Medical Ass’n 724 (Aug. 26,
1998); M. LeRoy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhof, Rationale for
Banning Abortions Late in Pregnancy, 280 J. Am. Medical
Ass’n 744 (Aug. 26, 1998). The district court in Wisconsin
found that this is the statute’s aim. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 984
(relying on the Attorney General’s concession). Using a
medical definition to supplement a vague lay definition does
not strike us as revisionism or an exercise in deconstruction.
But if this approach would nonetheless be an example of
brute force used to save a statute-- well, courts do it all the
time. Florida had a law forbidding “the abominable and
detestable crime against nature”. Placement in the code
showed that this crime had something to do with sex, but
what? Did it forbid incest? Necrophilia? Bestiality? A
legal historian might give an answer, but to lay readers of the
Statute, and even to most lawyers, the words are Delphic.
The state’s highest court filled in the blank by saying that the
object was sodomy--and the Supreme Court of the United
States rebuffed a charge of unconstitutional vagueness, given
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the state court’s prestidigitation. Wainwright v. Stone, 414
U.S. 21 (1973). Only if vagueness remains after judicial
interpretation is there a constitutional problem, the Court
held. See also, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259
(1997); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455-57 (1939); Kolender, 461 U.S. at
355-57. Federal courts have performed equally dramatic
feats. As written, the Federal Election Campaign Act is
hopelessly vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976), saved the bulk of the statute by adding details. In
two recent cases we predicted that state courts would follow
suit with comparable state laws. See Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1998); Brownsburg
Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503
(7th Cir. 1998). In the latter case, because we were not
completely confident that the state judiciary would follow
Buckley’s path of freewheeling interpretation, we certified
the issue to the Supreme Court of Indiana--which responded
that it indeed possesses, and is inclined to use, that power.
Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714
N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 1999).
Relying on Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), the
sixth circuit concluded in Women’s Medical Professional
Corp. v. Voinovich that any statute concerning abortion is
unconstitutionally vague, no matter how precise an
interpretation state courts eventually develop, unless it
requires proof that the physician knows that a given act has
been forbidden. If this were so, then the approach to
avoiding vagueness that we have just sketched would be
untenable. But it is not so; never has the Supreme Court held
that all criminal laws (or even just all criminal laws affecting
abortion) depend on scienter. Cases we have mentioned
already (and more that we cite later) hold that a statute may
be sustained against a charge of vagueness if, as construed, it
gives reasonable notice of the forbidden conduct. That the
notice does not sink in--that some people close their eyes (or
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minds) and thus do not learn of the law’s contents or
appreciate its application to their conduct--does not prevent a
state from enforcing its rules. See United States v: Wilson,
159 F.3d 280, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1998). This subject received
sustained attention in Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 460-64
(7th Cir. 1999). For the reasons laid out in Karlin we
respectfully disagree with the sixth circuit’s understanding of
this question. See also Note, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 731 (1999)
(criticizing Women’s Medical Professional Corp.).
2. Although the Constitution does not compel states to
ameliorate vagueness problems by using a mental-state
requirement to limit prosecutions to situations in which the
defendant knows that his acts are forbidden, they are free to
do so. This is the path the Supreme Court took in Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), and United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), to save 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
and 242. These companion statutes, the poster children for a
vagueness campaign, make it a crime to deprive anyone of
any constitutional right (or conspire to do so). These statutes
are written entirely in terms that have been difficult to pin
down, such as “under color of any law” and “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution . . . of the United States”. Section 242 contains
the word “willfully”, and in Screws the Court read this to
mean that a person commits the offense only if he knows that
his acts deprive someone of a constitutional right. A person
who actually recognizes his legal obligation can’t complain
that he lacked notice. Many cases since Screws use a
knowledge requirement to prevent unfair surprise when the
statute is vague or complex. E.g., Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192 (1991) (tax laws); Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600 (1994) (gun-control laws).
Both Illinois and Wisconsin put mental-state elements in
their statutes. Attorneys General of both states contend that
under their laws a procedure may be deemed a “partial-birth
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abortion” only if at the outset of the procedure the physician
intends to perform all of the steps that mark the D&X. We
think that the Supreme Courts of both states could go even
farther and read the statutes to require knowledge of the legal
rules, and thus to follow the trail blazed in Screws.
The critical language in Illinois reads: “Any person who
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills
a human fetus or infant is guilty of a Class 4 felony.” 720
ILCS § 513/10 (emphasis added). If the Supreme Court of
Illinois reads “knowingly” in § 513/10 the same way the
Supreme Court of the United States read “willfully” in § 242,
then there is no vagueness problem with § 513/10. And we
can’t see any impediment to giving “knowingly” such a
reading. In context, the word sounds distinctly like a
requirement that the physician know that the medical
procedure being performed is a “partial-birth abortion” and
not simply that the physician know that he is performing
particular physical acts. The most natural reading is one that
requires knowledge of the law’s application to the medical
procedure being performed. Federal courts have been
creative with knowledge requirements as a means of saving
Statutes against constitutional infirmity. E.g., United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). Section
513/10 readily supports a construction that eliminates all
concern about vagueness, which makes it inappropriate for a
federal court to enjoin its application. (In Morales, the
Supreme Court’s most recent vagueness opinion, the lead
opinion stressed that the statute lacked any mental-state
requirement.)
Wisconsin uses the word “intentionally” rather than the
word “knowingly.” Its statute has two intent elements: a -
partial-birth abortion is defined as one in which the physician
acts with “the intent to kill the child”, Wis. Stat. §
940.16(1)(b), and the section defining the offense reads:
“Whoever intentionally performs a partial-birth abortion is
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guilty of a Class A felony.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(2). The
reference to “intent” in § 940.16(1)(b) must mean “that the
actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically
certain to cause that result.” Wis. Stat. § 939.23(4) (defining
“with intent to”). The reference to “intentionally” in §
940.16(2) has at least potentially a broader scope. Although
§ 939.23(3) defines “intentionally” as “a purpose to do the
thing or cause the result specified”, a “partial-birth abortion”
is neither a thing nor a result; it is a defined legal term. It is
therefore a distinct possibility that the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin will read this reference as equivalent to “wilfully”
or “knowingly” notwithstanding the caution in § 939.23(5)
that criminal intent “does not require proof of knowledge of
the . . . scope or meaning of the terms used in” a statute. The
question here is not whether a physician understands the
terms of § 940.16(1)(b) in the abstract, but whether the
physician intends that the plan of action add up to a “partial-
birth abortion.” In cases such as X-Citement Video, Cheek,
and Staples, the Supreme Court of the United States was
exceptionally creative with statutory allusions to mental
states; plaintiffs have not established that the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin would be unwilling to save its statutes the way
the Supreme Court of the United States saved 18 U.S.C. §
242.
3. Still a third interpretive approach is open to the state
courts. They may elect to apply the statute to its central core
of meaning, the D&X, while working out in common law
fashion its outer boundaries. See United States v. Pitt-Des
Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 986-90 (7th Cir. 1999). This is
how the Supreme Court has chosen to proceed with respect to
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, a statute much
less: precise than the partial-birth-abortion laws. Long before
the development of a body of antitrust rules, or even of a
clear distinction between the domains of the per se rule and
the rule of reason, the Court rebuffed a vagueness challenge,
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remarking that “law is full of instances where a man’s fate
depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.” Nash, 229
U.S. at 377 (Holmes, J.). The Court took the same approach
in Parker v. Levy for Article 133 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which makes it a crime for a commissioned
officer to engage in “conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman.” That statute, compared to which § 513/5 and §
940.16(1)(b) are paragons of specificity, was sustained
against a vagueness challenge because the military courts had
added details over many years, and the Supreme Court
anticipated that they would continue to do so as new
situations arose. Letter Carriers applies the same approach
to vague provisions of the Hatch Act. Parker cannot be
passed off as a sport of military law; it is just’one illustration
of the proposition that vagueness may be overcome
incrementally, as well as by an all-at-once construction.
Consider United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975), a
civilian case dealing with 18 U.S.C. § 1715, which makes it a
crime to mail a firearm capable of being concealed on the
person. A Derringer unquestionably qualifies, and although
larger guns pose tough questions, the combination of a core
meaning plus size as a metric for adjudication enabled the
Court to hold that borderline cases could be decided later, as
they arose.
Notice the difference between this approach and Salerno.
In cases such as Nash, Parker, and Powell, the Court did not
ask simply whether there was one constitutional application.
It asked whether there was a core of meaning that people
could grasp. In Nash the common law of restraint of trade
supplied that core; in Parker the accumulated body of
military precedents did so; in Powell the core comprised
handguns. Occasionally the Court fortifies this approach by
combining it with a scienter requirement, as United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), did for the
Sherman Act. Illinois and Wisconsin can follow the same
A-19
path. For their statutes, the medical definition of the D&X
procedure supplies the core of understandable application.
Indeed, the district court in Wisconsin found as a matter of
fact that physicians who are likely to perform an abortion
already understand that this is the point of partial-birth-
abortion statutes. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 978. That finding cannot
be set aside as clearly erroneous.
Plaintiffs respond to this core-plus-common-law approach
by contending that a statute is unconstitutionally vague until
the interstices have been filled in. But then all of the cases
we have cited were wrongly decided, for the interstices of
antitrust law were not filled in by 1913, nor were all of the
gun-mailing issues worked out before 1975: Powell involved
a sawed-off shotgun, not a pistol. To say that the law cannot
be applied to anyone, even a person who commits a violation
within the core of the statute, until all issues about its reach
have been resolved would prevent those issi es from coming
before the court to be resolved. How, precisely, are the
interpretive wrinkles to be smoothed if the law can’t be
invoked? By advisory opinions? Anyway, there is always a
periphery, no matter how many situations judges have
evaluated. Resolving each new question moves the area of
uncertainty but can’t abolish it. “Whenever the law draws a
line there will be cases very near each other on opposite
sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no
one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he
thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to
make him take the risk.” United States v. Wurzbach, 280
U.S. 396, 399 (1930) (Holmes, J.).
Protection for events outside the core is provided by the
principle that surprising and unanticipated applications of a
criminal statute violate the due process clause. See, e.g.,
Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964); Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977); Lanier, 520 U.S. at
266. Given the assurances made in this litigation by the
A-20
Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin, application of
these states’ partial-birth-abortion statutes to a normal D&E
or induction (including one that began as a D&E but turned
out to have elements of a D&X because of inadvertence or
developments during- surgery) would be surprising and
constitutionally impermissible. Plaintiffs therefore can
practice medicine without undue concern on the legal front.
The Constitution provides the assurance they crave--but
without the need to prevent application of the state law to the
D&X procedure itself. States have a powerful interest in
working out the details of their criminal laws in their own
courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.-37 (1971); Nelson v.
Murphy, 44 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1995). On remand the district
judges should enter precautionary injunctions, limited to
implementing the conclusion of this paragraph that the state
laws may not be applied to a normal D&E or induction until
after the state has provided additional specificity, by statutory
amendment, regulations, or judicial interpretation (which
could arise either from civil litigation, see Part IV below, or
from criminal prosecutions in which the parties disagree
about whether the medical procedure properly may be
labeled a D&X). With that assurance in hand, plaintiffs
would not face any substantial threat of prosecution.
A skeptic might respond: what’s the basis for an injunction
without a finding of actual constitutional violation? The
basis is the risk that plaintiffs face. See Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). Whenever suit is brought against a statute
that has yet to be enforced, there is a chance that what the
federal court does will be unnecessary or even advisory--for
in the absence of relief the statute might never be enforced in
a way that plaintiffs fear, or that would violate their rights.
Everything depends on probabilities. Plaintiffs believe that
the probability of improper prosecution is so high that the
statutes must be enjoined root and branch. We think that the
probability of improper prosecution is low, but non-zero; and
a prosecution for performing a D&E not only raises
—
A-21
vagueness concerns but also could unduly burden women’s
rights (see Part III below). That risk can be reduced to a
constitutionally acceptable level with a simple injunction
based on Bouie.
Persons who believe that the risk of improper prosecution
is so high that all prosecution under the statute should be
enjoined are poorly situated to contend that the risk also is so
low that the plaintiffs lack standing under Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660
(1983). When this case began the plaintiffs faced a real risk
and therefore had standing; and no one thinks that
defendants’ representations about their projected course of
enforcement have made the controversy moot. If as plaintiffs
believe the Constitution requires an injunction against
everything Illinois and Wisconsin have enacted, despite these
assurances, then the Constitution can’t simultaneously forbid
an injunction against potential misuses of state power in the
enforcement of these laws. Article III does not limit a federal
court’s choice to enjoining nothing, or enjoining everything.
The path we choose allows the states to interpret their laws
and supply more concrete rules, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976); the path the plaintiffs (and our
dissenting colleagues) prefer would foreclose now and
forever all interpretation by the state judiciary. By filing suit
against a novel and ambiguous law in federal court, litigants
can’t preclude interpretation by the state judiciary. Our
precautionary approach preserves the state judiciary’s role
while protecting plaintiffs’ (and their patients’) legitimate
interests in the interim.
4. In the Wisconsin case our panel expressed concern that
even if the probability of unanticipated application is low, the
penalty is so high (life imprisonment) that physicians would
avoid performing the D&E procedure. 162 F.3d at 469. This
cannot be said of Illinois, where the maximum penalty is
three years’ imprisonment. Although the threat of life in
A-22
prison has a greater potential to induce caution than does the
threat of three years in prison, the precautionary injunction
discussed above should reduce the risk of improper or
unanticipated application to a trivial level. The right
constitutional objection to a Draconian penalty is not
vagueness (a statute’s scope is equally clear or uncertain
whether the penalty is a $10 fine or 20 years in prison) but a
contention that severe criminal punishment for a medical
misunderstanding would inflict cruel and _ unusual
punishment. Plaintiffs themselves do not make such an
argument, however; they object to the substance of the state
laws, not to the punishment available on conviction. The
penalty is an afterthought, scarcely mentioned in their briefs.
If Wisconsin should some day impose a lengthy prison term
for a violation of § 940.16(2), then it will be time to consider
arguments based on the eighth amendment.
5. For the last two years, a natural experiment has been
conducted in the United States. Thirty states enacted laws
forbidding most partial-birth abortions. Judges prohibited
the application of these laws in two-thirds of these states; in
the other third the statutes have been in force. One way to
perform a reality check on the district court’s conclusion in
the Wisconsin case that physicians know that these statutes
cover only the D&X is to see what has happened in the states
where the laws have been permitted to take effect.
Vagueness could affect physicians in either or both of two
ways. First, they might send women seeking second-
trimester abortions to other states that do not regulate partial-
birth abortions. The result would be a decrease in second-
trimester abortions as a percentage of all abortions in the
state. Second, physicians might select a different procedure--
principally substituting induction for a D&E--even though
the replacement was medically infevior. This would produce
a change in the ratio of inductions to D&E procedures in the
affected state.
A-23
Indiana supplies a nice test, because its law took effect on
July 1, 1997, so it is easy to compare the first six months of
1997 to the second six. Moreover, Indiana is surrounded by
states that lack an effective prohibition on partial-birth
abortions (because of the Illinois injunction and the sixth
circuit’s ruling in Women’s Medical Professional Corp.), so
it was relatively easy for physicians to send their patients
elsewhere. Although the maximum penalty in Indiana is not
steep (an unjustified partial-birth abortion there is a Class C
felony, Ind. Code § 16-34-2-7(a), for which the punishment
is four years’ imprisonment, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a)), no
state or federal court has construed the statutory term, so
whatever uncertainty the raw text of the statute engenders is
unabated.
During 1997 a total of 13,208 abortions were performed in
Indiana. (These data come from tables prepared by Indiana’s
State Epidemiologist.) During the first six months, 74 late-
second-trimester abortions were performed: 72 by D&E and
2 by intra-uterine prostaglandin injection. During the second
six months (that is, after the partial-birth-abortion law took
effect), 87 late-second-trimester abortions were performed,
all by D&E. Thus physicians did not substitute induction for
D&E in order to reduce risk to themselves. Nor did they
avoid the D&E procedure by sending women to other states.
Abortion by D&E during the first six months represented
1.03% of all abortions performed in Indiana (72 of 6,950).
Abortion by D&E during the second six months represented
1.39% of all abortions in the state (87 of 6,258). These data
are incompatible with plaintiffs’ a priori belief that the
partial-birth-abortion statutes will discourage the
performance of the D&E procedure or cause the physician to
substitute an inferior procedure. Perhaps things have turned
out differently in other states, or perhaps physicians behaved
differently in 1998 or 1999. We do not mean to preclude
plaintiffs from submitting the data in Indiana and other states
to rigorous analysis. A few procedures were classified in the
A-24
tables as “unknown,” which may mask some effects--though
the number of “unknown” procedures did not change much
from the first to the second half of 1997. Our point is only
that a simple inquiry reinforces the findings of fact made in
the Wisconsin case and implies that partial-birth-abortion
statutes need not have the baleful effects that plaintiffs
foresee.
Plaintiffs in both cases contend that, even if the statutes are
precise enough to be enforced, they create an undue (and
therefore unconstitutional) burden on abortion. The eighth
circuit reached this conclusion in Carhart and its two
companion cases, but only after first holding that the state
laws effectively prohibit the D&E procedure. If we thought
that the Illinois or Wisconsin laws forbade D&E, then
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth would
require us to agree with the eighth circuit. For reasons we
have already given, however, we believe that state courts are
entitled to accept the view of both states’ Attorneys General
that their laws do not forbid, or even affect, the D&E
procedure. The question we must address, then, is whether a
statute limited to D&X unduly burdens abortion.
One reason why this might be so is that neither state’s law
contains an exception for situations in which the D&X
procedure is necessary to protect the woman’s health. A
second argument is that any prohibition of any medical
procedure unduly burdens a woman’s right to abortion. The
first line of argument finds some support in Casey, which
held that any regulation of abortion must make an exception
for procedures that protect “the woman’s life or health”, 505
U.S. at 846 (emphasis added), as well as our panel’s decision
_ in the Wisconsin case, 162 F.3d at 467-68, 470-71. But we
do not think that the plurality in Casey meant this as a
universal rule, one applicable even when the procedure in
A-25
question lacks demonstrable health benefits. The point that
the plurality made was that a statute that lacks a “health
exception” may unduly burden the woman’s right to obtain
an abortion before the fetus has reached viability; when state
law offers many safe options to that end, the regulation of an
additional option does not produce an undue burden.
Section 513/10 of the Illinois statute contains an exception
for “‘a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life
of a mother because her life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-
endangering condition caused by or arising from fhe -
pregnancy itself, provided that no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.” It does not contain a
comparable exception for a partial-birth abortion that
promotes the woman’s health. Wisconsin’s law has a similar
structure. Both sets of plaintiffs contend that the lack of an
exception for a woman’s health dooms the statute. Coming
from the Illinois plaintiffs, this is a weak argument indeed,
for none of the plaintiff physicians or clinics in Illinois uses
the D&X, and none asserts any desire to start. Whether the
D&X procedure sometimes would protect a woman’s health
is therefore immaterial to these physicians and the women in
their care. But several of the plaintiff physicians in the
Wisconsin case do employ the D&X procedure on occasion,
sO we must consider the merits of the argument.
After a trial, the district court in the Wisconsin case
concluded that the D&X procedure is never necessary from
the perspective of the patient’s health. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 979-
82. This conclusion cannot be called clearly erroneous; as
things transpired, it was not a seriously contested issue.
None of the plaintiff physicians in that case testified to the
contrary. The district court summed up:
None of the physicians would state unequivocally that
the D&X procedure is safer than the D&E procedure.
A-26
Broekhuizen conceded that further study of the
procedures is required. Smith admitted that he had
never encountered a situation where D&X would
have been the best procedure to use. Haskell, who
invented the procedure, admitted that the D&X
procedure is never medically necessary to save the
life or preserve the health of a woman. Giles agreed.
Id. at 980. The judge added that, although the D&X
procedure has been used for more than a decade, no
published study compares the risks of D&X to those of D&E.
Id. at 979. Some authors believe that the D&X procedure is
more hazardous. See Sprang & Neerhof, supra, 280 J. Am.
Medical Ass’n at 746 (“Intact D&X (partial-birth abortion)
should not be performed because it is needlessly risky,
inhumane, and ethically unacceptable.”); Nancy G. Romer,
The Medical Facts of Partial-Birth Abortions, 3 Nexus 57
(1998).
_ Plaintiffs have not identified any data that undercut the
district court’s finding of fact. Their principal medical
reference is the ACOG’s 1997 statement and technical
bulletin on the D&X procedure, which concluded that,
although D&X is never the only medically appropriate
option, choice still should be reserved to the physician.
Although the statement asserts that D&X sometimes may be
the best option, the ACOG did not identify any concrete
circumstance under which this would be so or provide
support for the assertion. Several of the plaintiff physicians
testified to like effect, again without specifics or data. No
published medical study fills the gap. Cf. Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1177-79 (1999). Unelaborated
avowals do not demonstrate that a finding of fact reached
after a trial is clearly erroneous. When there is a conflict in
the testimony--and that is the description most favorable to
the plaintiffs--the finder of fact is entitled to choose. See
A-27
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). We
proceed on the assumption, which appears to be shared by
the American Medical Association, that the D&X is not the
best or safest option in any articulable category of situations.
The AMA’s Policy H-5.982 concludes, among other things,
that “there does not appear to be any identified situation in
which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to
induce abortion.” The district court in Illinois did not make
contrary findings, or indeed any finding; acting without a
trial or even an evidentiary hearing, it could not properly
have rendered “findings” about disputed issues. District
courts in other circuits have disagreed with the conclusions
the district judge reached in the Wisconsin case, but this does
more to show that the issue is debatable among reasonable
persons than to show that a particular view is in error.
The question in the end is not what one or another judge
found on a given record; it is whether the state legislatures
exceeded their constitutional powers. Factual premises
underlying legislation normally are not subject to review by
trial courts. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 315 (1993); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
111 (1979); National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. Chicago, 45
F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court’s
findings, the statements of medical groups, and the inferences
to be drawn from what has happened in states that have
implemented partial-birth-abortion statutes, are informative
rather than conclusive on the question whether the
underpinnings of the legislation are tenable. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
229 (1985). Although “undue burden” analysis does not map
neatly to the standard classifications (“rational basis,” “strict
scrutiny,” and the like), making it hard to know the extent to
which courts must respect legislative decisions about
contestable factual matters, it is significant that none of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in abortion cases suggests that the
A-28
same law would be constitutional in one state, and
unconstitutional in another, depending on a district judge’s
resolution of factual disputes. Thus we treat the findings in
the Wisconsin case, like the view of the AMA, not as
replacements for legislative conclusions, but as establishing
that there is real, and not just hypothetical, support for a
belief that the partial-birth-abortion laws do not pose hazards
to maternal health. (This is the approach to evaluation of
facts when the constitutional standard prescribes an
intermediate level of analysis. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 199-204 (1976).)
Only if every regulation related to abortions must contain a
case-by-case “health exception” is there a problem with these
laws. Yet Casey did not say that health effects must be
evaluated case by case, rather than procedure by procedure.
Abortions are not havens for-junk science--so that, for
example, the state must let any chiropractor perform an
abortion, if the chiropractor believes that manipulation of the
spine is safest for the woman. Cases such as Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), which held that states may
limit performance of abortions to physicians, permit laws that
regulate by class of procedures (or of medical providers). Cf.
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (FDA may
ban a generally ineffective drug, even though for a few
people it may be the only cure). Doubtless some nurses are
better than some physicians at performing abortions, so
patients’ health would be improved by allowing these nurses
to perform abortions; yet the Court held that states may
provide otherwise. Similarly, Illinois and Wisconsin
concluded that the D&X procedure is not essential to protect
the health of any woman, given the availability of other
procedures. Compilation of additional information by the
medical profession could call this conclusion into question.
As things stand, however, interference with the operation of
the siate laws cannot be justified on the ground that the D&X
procedure is necessary to protect women’s health.
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A requirement of a case-by-case “health exception” to
every statute concerning abortion would amount to a rule that
no state may regulate any abortion procedure. For a
physician will use a particular procedure only if in the
physician’s judgment the procedure is superior in some way--
faster, safer, more likely to work (and thus indirectly safer
because an abortion can be achieved with one procedure
rather than two, with cumulative risks), or perhaps less
expensive (and thus again indirectly safer, because the lower
cost brings it within the reach of- additional patients). Can
plaintiffs, who object to the vagueness of the states’ laws,
really welcome a ruling under which every abortion creates
the possibility of a prosecution in which the state invites a
jury to disagree with the physician’s assessment of the
procedure’s safety? A health exception, where jurors rather
than physicians assessed health, would be an order of
magnitude worse than the ambiguity plaintiffs perceive in the
partial-birth-abortion laws. Perhaps plaintiffs believe that a
“health exception” should make the physician’s assessment
of health consequences incontestable. That would avoid
vagueness at the price of vitiating the laws. Some physicians
are bound to think that a given procedure is safer or
otherwise superior, even if the medical profession as a whole
disagrees. A constitutionally based health exception for
every procedure, coupled with a prohibition against review of
physicians’ beliefs about which procedures are safest, would
amount to a rule that arvyything goes. And plaintiffs make this
argument explicitly: they contend that any regulation of any
medical procedure that pertains to abortion is an “undue
burden” on women’s rights.
To the observation that D&X is not an important
procedure--indeed, that it is such a marginal procedure that
few physicians anywhere in the nation (and none in Illinois)
express any interest in performing it--plaintiffs rejoin that the
question is not whether a law creates an undue burden for
A-30
women as a group, but only whether it does so for those
women it affects. The affected set here is women for whom
a physician will think that D&X is the procedure most likely
to succeed, or to entail the least cost. For these women,
plaintiffs contend, the burden is substantial and therefore
“undue.” Moreover, the argument continues, if the states are
right--if D&X really is a procedure that the medical
profession abjures--then the law must be political
grandstanding. A restriction imposed for no better reason
than to make a point has no benefits and therefore must be
“undue,” the argument concludes. On plaintiffs’ approach, if
the statutes actually accomplish something, then the burden
is “undue” because the laws have effects; and if the laws
accomplish nothing, then the burden is “undue” because any
cost is excessive when the benefit is zero. Plaintiffs have the
states both coming and going.
But this cannot be a sound understanding of Casey, or
Mazurek would have come out the other way. By plaintiffs’
lights, Montana’s statute restricting the performance of
abortions to licensed physicians would have had an “undue
burden” on those women it affected--that is, the set of
women for whom the extra cost of a physician’s fees made
obtaining an abortion impractical or burdensome. Yet the
Court held that a physician-only rule is not an “undue
burden,” as the plurality in Casey used that phrase. What
plaintiffs in our case really argue is not that limiting the
D&X procedure to situations (if there are any) in which it is
necessary to save the woman’s life is an undue burden, when
compared with other burdens (such as waiting periods,
information requirements, parental approval or consultation
requirements, and physician-only rules) that the Court has
sustained; it is, rather, that a// “burdens” are “undue” because
women should have unfettered choice among medical
procedures. But then the phrase “undue burden” is simply
redundant; the word “undue” does no work.
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A-31
It is always difficult for a court of appeals to predict how
Justices of the Supreme Court will apply a phrase with as
much plasticity as “undue burden.” But our best estimate is
that “undue” rather than “burden” is the key word, and that
“undue” means not only “substantial” (a small cost or
inconvenience is not “undue”’) but also that the burden must
be undue in relation to the woman’s interests, rather than
undue in relation to the court’s assessment of society’s
interests. Plaintiffs’ (implicit) argument that every regulation
of a medical procedure is “undue” fails because many
regulations create small burdens. The physician-only rule
was one; a prohibition of D&X is another. Even for the class
of wemen who seek late-second-trimester abortions, there is
always one or more other safe methods of abortion in
addition to D&X. Let us return to the natural experiment
now under way. Plaintiffs do not contend that in any of the
states where a partial-birth-abortion law is in effect, even one
woman has been injured or denied an abortion because of the
law.
As for the second branch of plaintiffs’ argument--that
because the partial-birth-abortion laws do not diminish the
number of abortions, they must be condemned as moralizing
rather than utilitarian laws--this calls on judges to
recapitulate Lochner’s methodology. This line of argument
amounts to the contention that Casey so restricts the states’
power that states are limited to symbolic gestures; and then
the states’ very attempt to comply with Casey by refraining
from substantially impeding women’s access to abortion
dooms their laws. We do not read Casey as condemning
states to this self-defeating legislative menu. So long as the
law does not harm women’s legitimate interests, the fact that
the law’s effects are small and justified by moral rather than
utilitarian considerations does not spell unconstitutionality.
A-32
IV
One final issue requires attention. The district court in
Illinois read 720 ILCS § 513/15 to establish a parental-
consent requirement, which the court enjoined because it
lacks a judicial bypass procedure. 995 F. Supp. at 861,
relying on a portion of Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900, that
reaffirmed Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). But
what § 513/15 actually provides is different. It reads:
The maternal grandparents of the fetus or infant, if the
mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the time
of the abortion, may in a civil action obtain
appropriate relief unless the pregnancy resulted from
the plaintiff's criminal conduct or the plaintiff
consented to the abortion. The relief shall include
money damages for all injuries, psychological and
physical, occasioned by the violation of this Act and
statutory damages equal to 3 times the cost of the
partial-birth abortion.
Nothing here requires parental consent to a partial-birth
abortion. Section 513/10 forbids most partial-birth abortions;
no one can authorize that procedure in Illinois unless it is
necessary to protect the woman’s life, and then no parent’s
consent is necessary.
Section 513/15 provides civil damages for conduct that
violates § 513/10, and it assigns the right to pursue these
damages to parents if the person who undergoes the
procedure is a minor. A parent who gave consent to the
procedure naturally can’t recover damages, even though a
criminal prosecution remains possible under § 513/10 if the
mother’s life was not in jeopardy. The possibility that a
parent may consent to an unlawful procedure (and thus
insulate the physician from civil damages), or consent to a
life-saving procedure for which no consent was necessary in
A-33
the first place, hardly implies that a judge also must be
empowered to authorize a violation of § 513/10.
Wisconsin’s civil-liability provision, Wis. Stat. § 895.038
(2), is entirely derivative from its criminal-liability provision,
and the district court held it valid because the criminal
provision is valid. Plaintiffs in the Wisconsin case do not
take issue with this approach: they argue only that §
895.038(2) is unconstitutional because -§ 940.16 is
unconstitutional. We therefore do not discuss § 895.038(2)
further.
Actually, we have said too much already about the civil-
liability provisions. They are enforced in private litigation;
the states’ Attorneys General and local prosecutors have
nothing to do with civil suits. Relief against the public
officials therefore would be pointless even if the civil-
liability provisions were problematic. See Summit Medical
Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).
There is no controversy between the parties to this case that
can be resolved by a declaration concerning the civil-liability
rules. But see Okpalobi v. Foster, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
22785 (Sth Cir. Sept. 17, 1999) (purporting to enjoin a
private-civil-damages provision in a suit to which only state
officers were defendants, without mentioning the eleventh
circuit’s conclusion in Summit Medical).
The judgments in both cases are vacated. The cases are
remanded with instructions to enter the precautionary
injunctions discussed in Part II.3 of this opinion, to dismiss
the challenges to the civil-liability provisions for want of a
case or controversy, and otherwise to enter judgment for the
defendants.
VACATED AND REMANDED
A-34
POSNER, Chief Judge, with whom ROVNER, DIANE P.
WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
Compromise holds seductive allure for a court faced with a
hot issue, and there is none hotter than the issue of abortion
rights. The Illinois and Wisconsin statutes criminalizing
“partial birth” abortion are challenged here both as being
unconstitutionally vague and as unconstitutionally burdening
the right of abortion. (These are independent grounds; if
either is valid, the statutes are invalid.) The court rejects
both challenges yet orders the district courts to enjoin
enforcement of the statutes against any method of abortion
other than the one the medical community refers to as “intact
D & E” (that is, intact dilation and evacuation) or, more
commonly, “D & X” (dilation and extraction). This is the
form of “partial birth” abortion that gave rise to these
statutes, although they are not limited to it.
The court’s decision is not a real compromise. It leaves
intact the core of the statutory prohibitions, which unlawfully
burden the right of abortion by outlawing the D & X™
procedure. The court does toss a bone to the plaintiffs, but at
the cost of expanding federal judicial power over the states
by a method that the Supreme Court has never countenanced
and that violates Article III of the Constitution. It is a bone,
incidentally, that the plaintiffs didn’t ask for; neither side, in
either case, requested this novel form of relief or commented
on it in their briefs. We are taking a leap into the unknown
without any inpw* from the parties.
The “precautionary” injunctions that the court is directing
the district courts to enter will forbid the enforcement of the
statutes outside their core prohibition, thus placing the
federal contempt power behind this court’s interpretation of
state statutes. The court does this while accepting the
enforcers’ assurances that they will not enforce the statutes
outside the core, and concludes, therefore, “that the
probability of improper prosecution is low.” The states are
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nevertheless to be enjoined because the probability, though
low, is greater than zero. The probability of improper
prosecution under every criminal statute ever written is
greater than zero; and so the court’s decision, should it be
followed outside the abortion context--and nothing in the
decision suggests a principled limitation to that context--
implies a radical expansion of the power of the federal courts
to superintend the enforcement of state statutes. State
Officials will be subject to federal contempt sanctions for
failing to abide by a federal court’s interpretation of the
statutes that these officials, not federal judges, are charged
with administering.
The court adds that while the probability of improper
enforcement now is low, given the assurances that the state
law enforcement authorities have male in their briefs in this
court and at oral argument, the probability was high enough
when these cases were brought to confront the plaintiffs with
“a real risk” of being prosecuted for performing
constitutionally privileged abortions. But if that is so, it
means the statutes are unconstitutionally vague. If the law
enforcers’ present assurances are not enough to moot the
case, how can they be enough to moot the central issue to
which those assurances are addressed, the issue the court
ducks of whether the statutes are in fact unconstitutionally
vague? And if the present probability of improper
enforcement is slight, as the court believes, what equity do
the plaintiffs have to obtain an injunction?
The court is directing that state statutes be enjoined that it
has not found either violate federal law or create a significant
danger of such violation. This is unprecedented, and (on the
court’s view of the facts) violates Article III. If the court is
right--I do not think it is, but it is the premise of the decision-
-that there is only a “non-zero” probability that either state
statute will be enforced against any abortion procedure other
than the D & X, the threatened injury is too slight to activate
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the curative powers of federal courts. A nonzero probability
could be a probability of one in a thousand, or one in a
million. A probabilistic injury can support standing, e.g.,
Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2100-01
(1998); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998);
North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir.
1991), but the probability must be nontrivial, not merely
nonzero. E.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1982)
(per curiam); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-
07 and n. 8 (1983); Walters v. Edgar, supra, 163 F.3d at 434-
35. Otherwise the federal courts will be flooded with cases,
since few statutes are altogether free of vagueness; statutes
that are too precise allow loopholes.
Lyons, the choke-hold case, makes the basic point. The
probability that the plaintiff would again be arrested and
subjected to a choke hold was held to be too slight to support
standing-—But it was no less than the implicit probability that
this court today assigns to the threat of prosecution for
performing abortions that the state law enforcement
authorities concede are constitutionally privileged.
Although the injunctions that the court is ordering
ostensibly are temporary, to remain in force only until the
state courts have a chance to clarify the statutes, those courts
are unlikely ever to get that chance, since the enforcement of
the statutes beyond their core prohibition, which in the
court’s view needs no clarification, will be enjoined. Private
civil suits are unaffected, but the provisions for civil
enforcement of these statutes are limited and cases are
unlikely. The Illinois statute authorizes civil suits only by
the parents of a minor who has a “partial birth” abortion, and
the Wisconsin statute by either the minor’s parent or the
fetus’s father. Should a prosecutor indict a physician for
performing a D & X, and the physician contend that it was
really a D & E, the dispute will be-resolved by the district
court’s interpreting its injunction in contempt proceedings.
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As a practical matter, the courts of Illinois and Wisconsin
will never have an opportunity to explore the outer bounds of
these statutes.
The court cites no case that authorizes such injunctions. It
relies on cases such as City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct.
1849, 1861 (1999), and Village of Hoffman Estates v. The
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n. 5
(1982), which hold that if a state statute has been interpreted
by the state’s highest court, the interpretation binds any
federal court asked to decide the meaning of the statute. No
case holds, however, that until the statute is construed by the
state courts, a claim that it is unconstitutionally vague is
premature. No case denies the authority of the federal courts
to interpret state statutes, which is something we do all the
time. No case holds that until a state statute is construed by
the state courts its operation may be enjoined without a
determination that the statute is unconstitutional. All the
cases on which the majority relies involve federal courts
either narrowing federal statutes that are fairly susceptible of
being narrowed or accepting as authoritative a narrowing
interpretation of a state statute by a state court. In no case
cited by the majority did a federal court impose its own
narrowing interpretation on a state statute by injunction, let
alone a state statute the language of which defies a saving
interpretation.
Although grounded in a concern with preserving the
prerogative of state courts to interpret state statutes, today’s
decision curtails that prerogative by forbidding the states to
enforce state statutes that the court has not found to be
invalid. The decision is thus internally inconsistent (the
court both rejects the charge that the statutes are
unconstitutionally vague and, by enjoining their application
outside their small clear core until they are clarified by the
state courts, holds that they are too vague to provide fair
warning--which means they are unconstitutionally vague,
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e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964)),
as well as being an evasion of judicial duty, a violation of
Article III, and an affront to federalism. The content of the
injunctions that the court orders entered, moreover, is not
specified; disputes over it will undoubtedly give rise to
further litigation. And there will be a nice question of
whether the plaintiffs can obtain attorneys’ fees on the
ground that they have won something, with the defendants
arguing that it is they who have won the case because the
court has both held the challenged statutes to be valid and
accepted the defendants’ assurances that the statutes will not
be enforced beyond their valid scope.
On the merits, the most important issue raised by the
appeals is that of undue burden. (I'll come back later to the
substantive issue of vagueness, as distinct from the problems
raised by the court’s effort to evade the issue by means of the
“precautionary” injunctions.) To understand this issue
requires understanding the peculiar and questionable
character of these statutes. They do not protect the lives of
fetuses either directly or by seeking to persuade a woman to
reconsider her decision to seek an abortion. For the statutes
do not forbid the destruction of any class of fetuses, but
merely criminalize a method of abortion--they thus have Jess
to recommend them than the antiabortion statutes invalidated
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). If any fetal lives are
saved by these statutes, it will only be by scaring physicians
away from performing any late-term abortions, an effect
particularly likely in Wisconsin, whose statute imposes a
punishment of life imprisonment for its violation. In tacit
acknowledgment of that statute’s especially questionable
character, the majority opinion invites an Eighth Amendment
challenge should a lengthy prison sentence ever be imposed
on a violator of the statute.
The statutes do not seek to protect the lives or health of
pregnant women, or of anybody else, as by confining the
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performance of abortions to licensed physicians, as in
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam), or
to facilities equipped to deal with emergencies that may arise
in the course of an abortion, particularly a late-term one. A
legislature can ban quacks from practicing medicine without
making an exception for those quacks (and no doubt there are
some) who are abler than the worst physicians. Any general
health regulation is likely to hurt a few people. But as
banning “partial birth” abortions is not intended to improve
the health of women (or anyone, for that matter), it cannot be
defended as a health regulation.
The statutes make no exception for cases in which
pregnancy results from rape or incest, or in which the fetus is
profoundly deformed, nonviable, or unlikely to live more
than a few hours after birth, or indeed, as I shall show, in
which the woman’s life would be endangered if she carried
the fetus to term. The absence of any such exceptions is
particularly surprising because late-term abortions are much
less likely than the much more common first-trimester
abortions to be motivated by considerations merely of
convenience rather than of urgency. A woman who finds
herself five months pregnant is unlikely to decide to have an
abortion unless advised by her physician either that the fetus
is profoundly deformed or that her own health requires that
the pregnancy be terminated. Indeed, if the fetus has become
viable, she cannot lawfully obtain an abortion unless her life
or health is in danger. Wis. Stat. § 940.15(3); 720 ILCS
510/5(1). These are constitutionally permissible protections
of fetal life. | Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). It is
incomprehensible to me why these states, if acting in good
faith, were unwilling to write the same health exception into
statutes that criminalize the abortion of nonviable as well as
viable fetuses. The “partial birth” statutes do not distinguish
between fetuses that are viable, in the sense of being
sufficiently developed to be able to survive outside the
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mother’s body, and those that are not. Some fetuses don’t
become viable until 27 weeks or even later, but the “partial
birth” abortion, even defined so narrowly as to cover only the
D & X procedure, is performed from 20 weeks on. A
physician might be convicted of a felony violation of these
statutes even though the Supreme Court has held that a state
may not prevent the abortion of a nonviable fetus. /d. at 846,
877. -
The statutes do not outlaw a particularly cruel or painful or
horrifying mode of abortion. This can be shown with the aid
of a simple example. Suppose that the fetus is hydrocephalic,
so that its head is too large to pass through the cervix. If the
physician performing the abortion crushes the fetus’s skull in
the uterus, killing the fetus while the fetus is still entirely
within the uterus, he is not guilty of violating either of the
statutes before us. But if before crushing the fetus’s skull the
physician turns the fetus around so that its feet are protruding
into the vagina, he has committed a felony. In both cases, the
fetus is killed by the crushing of its head in the uterus. (The
crushing is necessary to enable the fetus to be removed
through the birth canal without making the woman go into
labor.) From the standpoint of the fetus, and, | should think,
of any rational person, it makes no difference whether, when
the skull is crushed, the fetus is entirely within the uterus or
its feet are outside the uterus. Yet the position of the feet is
the only difference between committing a -felony and
performing an act that the states concede is constitutionally
privileged.
The tortured efforts of the states’ lawyers to provide
guidance to physicians engaged in performing abortions--
physicians who already are frequent subjects of picketing and
other harassment and occasionally of physical assaults, see,
e.g., United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996),
and who are now to be threatened with criminal prosecution
and professional defrocking-- make one thing clear: it is
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extremely difficult, indeed probably impossible, to
distinguish a “partial birth” abortion from the methods of
abortion that are conceded to be privileged. (This is the key
to the statutes’ vagueness, and so a point to which I’11 return.)
The principal reason for the difficulty is that, as my example
of the hydrocephalic fetus suggests, there is no meaningful
difference between the forbidden and the privileged practice.
No reason of policy or morality that would allow the one
would forbid the other. We should consider therefore why
any state would pass such a law. An important part of the
answer is found in Judge Manion’s opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir.
1998). The states want to dramatize the ugliness of abortion.
“All methods [of abortion] are gruesome. But this is the one
method that has been at least partially exposed to the light of
day. . . . The exposure of this procedure has cast a bright light
on the alternative procedures that are equally gruesome. .. .
No doubt when this statute is properly construed--[so] that it
bans only the rarely-used D & X procedure--it does not
appear to accomplish much in the way of saving babies. But
these laws have certainly elevated the public’s concern over
the fate of the ‘potential human lives’ that are exposed to
abortion.” Jd. at 477, 479 (dissenting opinion). From this
standpoint, the more a “partial birth” abortion is like an
abortion that is conceded to be constitutionally _——-
the better.
The wave of “partial birth” abortion statutes that broke over
the nation after a description of the D & X procedure was
publicized--see Martin Haskell, “Dilation and Extraction for
Late Second Trimester Abortion” (1992), reprinted in 139
Cong. Rec. E1092, 1993 WL 135664 (Apr. 28, 1993), and in
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, Hearing before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 5
(Nov. 17, 1995)--does not exhibit the legislative process at its
best, whatever one thinks of abortion rights. Whipped up by
activists who wanted to dramatize the ugliness of abortions
a ee eee ee ee ee ee ee
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and deter physicians from performing them, the public
support for the laws was also based--as is implicit in Judge
Manion’s defense of the laws--on sheer ignorance of the
medical realities of late-term abortion. The uninformed
thought the D & X procedure gratuitously cruel, akin to
infanticide; they didn’t realize that the only difference
between it and the methods of late-term abortion that are
conceded all round to be constitutionally privileged is which
way the fetus’s feet are pointing. Opposition to the bills that
became these laws was at first muted not only by ignorance
of the character of a late-term abortion but also by the fact
that few women are likely to be affected by the laws.
Circumstances conspired, as it were, to produce a set of laws
that can fairly be described as irrational.
This is a harsh verdict, but doubt about its soundness is laid
to rest by the absence of any exception for situations in
which a “partial birth” abortion is necessary to protect the
pregnant woman’s health. The right of abortion is unduly
burdened by any law that endangers the woman’s health.
Even a law that limits only the right to abort viable fetuses--a
limitation not found in the statutes challenged in this case--
must, to pass co..stitutional muster, make an exception “for
pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health.”
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
supra, 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added). Immediately the
question arises why the Wisconsin and Illinois legislatures
didn’t try to come within reach of the cases that permit states
to limit the right of abortion by making an exception for
pregnancies that endanger the woman’s health, the same
exception they have written into their other abortion statutes.
When pressed at argument, the lawyers for the two states
could answer only that the exception is unnecessary. The
lawyers were confident that such an abortion is never
required to preserve a woman’s health. They may be right,
though I think not (more on this below). But if so, they are
right only for today. Tomorrow, studies may show that, yes,
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there indeed are cases where a “partial birth” abortion is
necessary to protect the mother’s health, as many physicians
believe. Tomorrow, then, these two statutes may be
unconstitutional even by the lights of the majority opinion.
Why would a state risk the early obsolescence of its statute
by making it wholly dependent on ever-changing medical
opinion, when to avoid this risk it need only have excepted
those “partial birth” abortions, if any, that are necessary to
protect the woman’s health? If there are few such cases, the
exception will rarely be invoked; if none, never.
The answer is that opponents of abortion do not think there
should be an exception for abortions that endanger a
woman’s health. Life, yes, but not health. These statutes,
remember, are not concerned with saving fetuses, with
protecting fetuses from a particularly cruel death, with
protecting the health of women, with protecting viable
fetuses, or with increasing the Wisconsin population (as
intimated, surely not seriously, by Wisconsin’s counsel).
They are concerned with making a statement in an ongoing
war for public opinion, though an incidental effect may be to
discourage some late-term abortions. The statement is that
fetal life is more valuable than women’s health.
I do not deny the right of legislatures to enact statutes that
are mainly or for that matter entirely designed as a statement
of the legislators’ values. Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 814
(7th Cir. 1998). Nothing in the Constitution forbids
legislation so designed. Many statutes are passed or, more
commonly, retained merely for their symbolic or aspirational
effect. But if_a statute burdens constitutional rights and all
that can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that
legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those
rights, the burden is undue. The statutes before us endanger
pregnant women--and not only pregnant women who want to
have an abortion. There is no exception for women whose
physicians tell them you must have an abortion or die. It is
A-44
true that if a “partial birth” abortion is necessary to save the -
woman’s life, the statutes permit this. But if her life could be
saved by another type of abortion, even one that threatened |
her health--that threatened to sterilize her or to paralyze her--
then the physician would be committing a felony if he
performed a “partial birth” abortion. I cannot believe that my
colleagues would think the physician could be punished in
such a case, and I wonder therefore why the “precautionary”
injunctions do not extend to it. The statutes allow a “partial
birth” abortion to be performed if “no other medical
procedure would suffice for that purpose” (that is, saving the
mother’s life). Wis. Stat. § 940.16(3); 720 ILCS 513/10.
Could not “would suffice” be interpreted to mean “would be
as good as from the standpoint of the woman’s health’?
Such an interpretation, no more audacious than the
interpretive leaps that underlie the order to enter
“precautionary” injunctions, would seem compelled by the
court’s own reasoning, but goes unremarked. If the
interpretation is rejected, it would imply that a D & X would
be forbidden even if the only alternative were a
hysterectomy. That can’t be right.
The court points out that it is unclear how many women are
endangered by these statutes. The forbidden procedure is
performed only (or almost only) in late-term abortions, which
fortunately are rare; and only in some unknown fraction of
them is a “partial birth” abortion the medically preferable
procedure. But government cannot without a reason forbid a
person to obtain medical treatment and if challenged defend
by pointing out that most people don’t need that treatment.
In the context of abortion this principle is implicit in the
statement in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 878, that “purpose
or effect” (emphasis added)--and thus purpose alone--“‘to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability” condemns an
antiabortion statute. E.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, No. 98-30228,
A-45
1999 WL 728396, at *16-20 (Sth Cir. Sept. 17, 1999); Jane
L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116-18 (10th Cir. 1996).
That is no constitutional novelty; statutes that burden other
constitutional rights besides the right of abortion have been
invalidated on the basis of improper purpose. E.g., Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The Casey opinion speaks
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of “ta woman,”
not “many women.” Imagine a married woman, pregnant,
told by her physician that her life depends on her obtaining
an abortion. He tells her it would be better from the
standpoint of minimizing the risk to her of medical
complications from the abortion for her to have a D & X.
But, he adds, unfortunately the law prohibits the procedure.
It does so not because the procedure kills the fetus, not
because it risks worse complications for the woman than
alternative procedures would do, not because it is a crueler or
more painful or more disgusting method of terminating a
pregnancy, but because the state wishes to make a statement
of opposition to constitutional doctrine. A legislature may be
taken to intend any consequences of its handiwork that are at
once natural, highly probable, and wholly foreseeable (and
foreseen). Here the intent is to block a woman from seeking
an abortion when her doctor advises her that the best
procedure for her is criminal.
The statutes’ improper purpose is further shown by the
terminology they employ. The Wisconsin statute defines a
fetus from the moment of conception to the moment of birth
as a “child” (thus absurdly implying that when we are born
we are no longer children). The Illinois statute defines the
fetus, also from the moment of conception, as an “infant.” If
these definitions are sound, a// abortion is infanticide, which
is not the Supreme Court’s view. A state cannot be permitted
to abrogate federal constitutional rights by definition. Line
drawing is inescapable but the line between feticide and
infanticide is birth, Once the baby emerges from the
mother’s body, no possible concern for the mother’s life or
A-46
health justifies killing the baby. But as long as the baby
remains within the mother’s body, it poses a potential threat
to her life or health and this threat presents a compelling case
(or so at least the Supreme Court believes) for a right of
abortion. The Wisconsin statute, whose provision for life
imprisonment already marks it as the crazier one, also allows
either of the fetus’s grandparents to sue in respect of a
“partial birth” abortion. One can imagine a father who cares
more for having a grandchild than he cares for the health of
his daughter threatening to sue in order to block a “partial
birth” abortion, while the mother (who may be divorced from
the father), valuing the situation differently, sits on the
sideline, helpless to protect her daughter.
In concluding that the challenged statutes do not pose any
threat. to women’s health, the court relies heavily on
tendentious factfindings by the district judge in the
Wisconsin case. He fastened on the fact that a Dr. Harlan
Giles believes that the D & X procedure is rarely, maybe
never, necessary for the protection of the pregnant woman’s
health. The judge brushed aside the contrary testimony of
reputable physicians--more reputable, perhaps, as we’re
about to see, than Dr. Giles. Giles’s testimony is essentially
the only basis of the judge’s finding, and the judge’s finding
is the principal basis on which this court, disregarding the
contrary findings in the Illinois case, dismisses concerns
about the absence of a health exception. Yet apart from
everything else, Judge Shabaz’s opinion is_ internally
contradictory. He acknowledged that the D & X procedure,
being quicker and easier to perform on fetuses that are more
than 18 weeks old, has advantages for the woman’s health in
reducing the amount of bleeding, the risk of uterine
perforations, and the amount of time that she has to be under
anesthesia. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d
975, 979 (W.D. Wis. 1999). Yet without retracting these
findings, he concluded that the procedure is never necessary
to protect the woman’s health.
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I daresay reputable physicians can be found who believe
that surgery is never necessary in a case of prostate cancer, or
that all vitamins are worthless, or that no efforts should be
made to resuscitate a person over 80 years old who
experiences cardiac arrest, since he is quite likely to be -
“revived” to a vegetative state. Dr. Giles may not even be
wholly reputable. Another district judge rejected his
testimony in opposition to the D & X procedure because,
among other reasons, Giles was “more focused on the
political aspects of the abortion debate than on the medical
questions essential to resolution of the issues presented in
this action. And, Dr. Giles was evasive when responding to
questions directed at crucial issues in the case. Hence the
testimony of Dr. Giles was neither credible, reliable nor
helpful.” Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore,
55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 1999 WL 507453, at *7 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(footnote omitted). Another district judge criticized Giles--
who appears to be a member of that much-criticized
fraternity, the professional expert witness--for pronouncing
on an abortion statute with which he was unfamiliar. Evans
v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1309-10 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
Another rejected his testimony that the D & X is “a
resurrection of an obstetric method discarded in the 1960s,
which was used to deliver dead fetuses, and known as
craniotomy,” and concluded that Giles’s criticisms of the D
& X procedure were “not persuasive.” Women's Medical
Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070
(S.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).
Judge Shabaz, his only support the dubious Dr. Giles,
stands alone among district judges who have made
factfindings concerning the potential benefits of the D & X
procedure for women’s health. See Rhode Island Medical
Society v. Whitehouse, No. C.A. 97-416 L, 1999 WL 683846,
at *22 (D.R.I. Aug. 30, 1999) (contrary testimony is
“unbelievable”); Richmond Medical Center for Women v.
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Gilmore, supra, at *44-45; Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp.
2d 1099, 1124-26 (D. Neb. 1998), aff'd, 1999 WL 753919
(8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999); A Choice For Women vy.
Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153, 1156-57 (S.D. Fla.
1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 852 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (the decision reversed today without regard for the
district judge’s findings); Evans v. Kelley, supra, 977 F.
Supp. at 1296; Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v.
Voinovich, supra, 911 F. Supp. at 1070; see also Causeway
Medical Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 608, 613-14
(E.D. La. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey
v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484-85 (D.N.J. 1998). If
this court is to give weight to district judges’ assessment of
the credibility of the physicians who have testified pro or con
the D & X procedure, it ought at least to acknowledge that
Judge Shabaz is in a minority of one.
In refusing to give any weight to the findings of fact made
by Judge Kocoras in the Hope case, the court seems to have
forgotten that we are reviewing his judgment too. It is not
some unrelated case that we are free to ignore on the ground
that it is based on a different record from any before us. His
findings, made in a proceeding that resulted in the issuance
of a permanent injunction against the Illinois statute, are
entitled to as much weight as Judge Shabaz’s, Knapp v.
Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996);
Durasys, Inc. v. Leyba, 992 F.2d 1465, 1471 (7th Cir. 1993)--
more, really, because they are not infected by the internal
contradiction that weakens Judge Shabaz’s findings. If those
findings justify our upholding the Wisconsin statute, Judge
Kocoras’s should lead us to invalidate the Illinois statute.
The court denies that Judge Kocoras made findings. I don’t
understand this. It is true that he based his findings on
affidavits rather than on live testimony, but the state did not
challenge the facts contained in the affidavits, including the
facts about the medical advantages of the D & X procedure.
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Findings do not lose weight by being based on uncontested
facts; admissions are not weaker evidence than facts found
after vigorous contest. And if it were true that there were no
findings in the Illinois case, this would call for a remand; it
would not entitle us to plug Judge Shabaz’s findings into a
separate litigation with no common parties. (What kind of
transplant is that?)
Consistent deference to district court factfindings in this
pair of cases would lead to an inconsistent result--the
upholding of one statute and the condemnation of its sister.
This demonstrates that the constitutional right of abortion
cannot be made to depend on whether a particular district
judge finds a particular physician who disagrees with the
consensus of medical opinion to be more credible than the
spokesmen for the consensus. The consensus here is found
in the statement by the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) that the D & X procedure “may ~
be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular
circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a
woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with the patient,
based upon the woman’s particular circumstances can make
this decision.” As Judge Shabaz himself acknowledged, the
procedure reduces the risk of lacerating the uterus and the
cervix with the sharp instruments used in the standard D & E.
Such lacerations cause trauma and loss of blood. The D & X
also reduces the risk that fetal tissue will remain in the
woman’s body, where it can cause infection. It reduces the
length of time that the woman is under anesthesia. And it
facilitates testing for genetic abnormalities, which is
particularly important to the woman’s decision whether to
become pregnant again. (So much for the suggestion of
Wisconsin’s lawyer that banning the D & X will lead to more
births.) Not all physicians agree with these points; and
ACOG hedged its opinion by noting that a select panel of
physicians had been unable to identify specific circumstances
in which there is no satisfactory alternative to aD & X. But
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the team of Dr. Giles and Judge Shabaz are, with all due
respect, not competent to resolve this medical controversy.
How often the circumstances sketched in the previous
paragraph that led ACOG to recommend retention of the D &
X as a treatment option in late-term abortions will be present
is not critical. It is slight consolation to be told that while the
state has forbidden the optimal treatment of your medical
problem, that problem happily is rare. Although we haven’t
been told of cases in states that have enacted laws forbidding
“partial birth” abortion that were not promptly enjoined in
which the consequence has been to endanger women, for all
we know women in those states go out of state if they are
candidates fora D & X. Cf. Jane L. v. Bangerter, supra, 102
F.3d at 1117. That would be the prudent course. My
colleagues in the majority perform their own statistical
analysis, outside the record, in an effort to refute this
possibility. I have no objection to a court’s relying on extra-
record evidence to determine the health effects of “partial
birth” abortion. Those effects should indeed be treated as a
legislative fact rather than an adjudicative fact, in order to
avoid inconsistent results arising from the reactions of
different district judges, sheltered by -the deferential “clear
error” standard of appellate review of factfindings, to
different records--the inconsistency illustrated by the
different findings of Judges Shabaz and Kocoras in the two
cases before us. Even so, we should hesitate to play
statistician. It is incongruous for this court to brush aside the
findings of district judges in other cases- while bolstering
Judge Shabaz’s inadequate findings with extra-record
evidence of its own.
The court tries to shore up Judge Shabaz’s findings with
two medical papers. One of these, however, Nancy G.
Romer, “The Medical Facts of Partial-Birth Abortion,” 3
Nexus: A Journal of Opinion 57 (1998), is not a medical
paper at all. Although the author is an M.D., she is also a
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pro-life activist, and the burden of her paper is that viable
fetuses should be saved rather than aborted. This is a
respectable ethical stance but it has nothing to do with the
medical pros and cons of a D & X. The other paper, M.
LeRoy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhoff, “Rationale fur Banning
Abortions Late in Pregnancy,” 280 JAMA (Journal of the
American Medical Association) 744 (1998), appears in a
section of JAMA captioned “controversies,” and though it
does point out possible dangers to the woman from the
procedure, the authors are heavy on the ethical issues
involved in abortion. Like Dr. Romer, they come out in
opposition to late-term abortion by any method, and opine
very unscientifically that “partial birth” abortion is “closer to
infanticide than it is to abortion.” /d. at 746. Another
medical article in the same issue of JAMA concludes that the
D & X procedure should, as ACOG concluded, be an option
for the physician. See David A. Grimes, “The Continuing
Need for Late Abortions,” 280 JAMA (Journal of the
American Medical Association) 747 (1998). The court does
not cite that article.
No hypothesis has been proposed by either of the states, or
by the amici curiae who have submitted briefs in support of
the Wisconsin statute, as to why physicians would perform,
or the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
support, a method of abortion that benefits no patient. There
has been no suggestion of any pecuniary incentive that might
cause them to engage in a controversial procedure of this
kind.
Apart from performing its own statistical analysis and
bringing to bear so-called medical papers, the court evinces
its queasiness about resting entirely on Judge Shabaz’s
findings by saying that “the question in the end is not what
one or another judge found on a given record” (the question
the court had spent so much time discussing). “It is enough
that there is real, and not just hypothetical, support for a
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belief that the partial-birth-abortion laws do not pose hazards
for maternal health.” This sounds suspiciously like the test
for whether a statute has a rational basis, see, e.g., FCC v.
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993), and
so may explain the court’s one-sided treatment of the facts
(the failure to cite Dr. Grimes’s paper, for example).
Rational basis is not the issue here. The issue is whether the
Wisconsin and Illinois “partial birth” statutes impose an
undue burden, and specifically whether they are a threat to
maternal health. That is rightly an issue of legislative fact,
meaning that its resolution is not to be cabined by facts
determined in an adjudicative hearing; still it must be
resolved in accordance with the weight of the evidence,
including such extra-record evidence as the consensus of the
relevant expert community, in this case the medical
community. It is not enough to note that there is some
evidence in support of one side of the issue, when there is
more evidence on the other side. In the case the court cites as
illustrating the appropriate scope of review, Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976), the Supreme Court critically
reviewed statistical evidence underlying the claimed
constitutionality of the challenged statute--and found it
wanting. When one critically reviews the testimony of Dr.
Giles, and the court’s own statistical analysis, and the so-
called medical papers, and weighs them against the evidence
that establishes the medical consensus, it becomes apparent
that the court does not take the standard of Craig seriously.
Let me suggest an analogy. Suppose that a legislature in
the South in the 1950s had listened to several “reputable”
cognitive psychologists testify that blacks as a group are slow
learners, and hence that they should be educated in separate
schools. No one would argue that this legislative finding,
because supported by some evidence from the relevant expert
community, would have to be accepted in deciding the
constitutionality of segregated education. The court, if it
thought the issue relevant, would have to decide whether the
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finding was correct before relying on it. Similarly, the
Wisconsin and Illinois legislatures are not entitled to ban an
abortion procedure that the medical community believes may
be preferable from a medical standpoint for some women,
simply because a marginally reputable expert (Dr. Giles)
thinks that the set of women for whom the procedure is
preferable is actually zero. That might bear on the
legislatures’ good faith (though there is contrary evidence on
that too, as I have pointed out), but it would not decide the
issue of the statutes’ effects on the right of abortion.
Enough said: banning the D & X, the core prohibition in
these statutes, imposes an undue burden on women who seek
to have an abortion, and is therefore unconstitutional. Let me
turn now to the alternative ground of vagueness. Both
statutes forbid the partial vaginal delivery of a living fetus,
and this describes many instances of the D & E method of
abortion--which the court acknowledges cannot
constitutionally be banned, see also Carhart v. Stenberg,
Nos. 98-3245 NE, 1999 WL 753919 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,
1999); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v. Jegley,
No. 99-1004 EA, 1999 WL 753928 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999);
Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, No. 99-
1372 SI, 1999 WL 753770 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999)--as well
as it does the D & X. Judge Shabaz himself acknowledged
that “often” in the course of a D & E there is a fetal heartbeat
after portions of the fetus have been delivered into the
vagina, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 977, making the D & E
definitionally a “partial birth” abortion under both statutes.
The court’s response, as I noted at the outset of this dissent,
is not to hold that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague,
but instead to hold that they can’t be enforced against any
procedure except the D & X until the Wisconsin and Illinois
state courts have had a chance (the chance that is unlikely
ever to come) to “interpret” their statutes to permit the
standard D & E method even when it results, as it frequently
does, in the partial vaginal delivery of a living fetus.
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Putting to one side my objections to the court’s procedure,
which | discussed at the outset of this dissent, I note that the
court seems to have bought into the legal-realist view that a
statute means whatever the courts say it means, despite the
Supreme Court’s admonition that a court “may impose a
limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily
susceptible’ to such a construction.” Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997), and cases cited
_ there. If the realists are right, and the contrary intimations of
cases such as Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union can be
brushed aside, I wish the court would, as I suggested earlier,
hold that these statutes can be further narrowed by
“precautionary” injunction to make an exception for cases in
which the D & X procedure is necessary to protect the
woman’s health. The interpolation of such an exception
would be no greater act of judicial hubris than narrowing the
statute to the D & X when the draftsmen of the statutes
decided not to use that term, preferring a vaguer term
intended to be broader.
The constitutional law of vagueness is-obviously in turmoil
and so I shall suggest a lowest common-denominator
approach with which I think few judges will disagree,
however much they may disagree about its application to
particular cases. If a criminal statute is so worded that it is
highly likely to condemn a constitutionally privileged act,
and if the constitutionally privileged actor could not as a
practical matter avoid being punished for engaging in such an
act by raising a defense in a criminal proceeding, then the
statute is enjoinable, in advance of any prosecutions, as
unconstitutionally vague. For the very existence of such a
statute “deters constitutionally protected activity.” Coe v.
County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 496 (7th Cir. 1998), and cases
cited there. When vague statutes prescribe heavy penalties
for their violation, rational people avoid any conduct that
might be thought to fall within the statute’s scope, even if in
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an error-free litigation the conduct would be sure to be found
constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., supra, 455
U.S. at 494 n. 6; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979);
Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1984).
When the demanding conditions that I have outlined are
satisfied, the statute is invalid, and the legislature has to go
back to the drawing board. The court cannot rewrite the
Statute, or teil the state courts how to rewrite it, and, in
advance of any further interpretation, uphold the rewritten
statute. That procedure, the procedure followed by the court
today, in effect nullifies the doctrine of unconstitutional
vagueness.
These statutes are either absurdly (and unlawfully)
overbroad or remarkably vague, and the court’s direction to
issue “precautionary” injunctions is a tacit acknowledgement
of its inability to give the statutes a plausible narrowing
interpretation; the confused concessions of the states’
lawyers at the oral argument were no help in the endeavor.
Although the statutes are addressed to physicians--it is their
conduct alone that is regulated--the language employed is not
medical language. Instead of denoting the victim of illegal
abortion as a live fetus, a fetus with a heartbeat, or a viable
fetus (a fetus, remember, that can survive outside the
mother’s body), the Illinois statutes refers to “a living human
fetus or infant,” terms that the statute explains are “used
interchangeably to refer to the biological offspring of human
parents,” 720 II CS 513/5, while the Wisconsin statute refers
to “a living chila’ or “partially delivered child,” with “child”
defined, as I noted earlier, as “a human being from the time
of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a
pregnant woman.” Wis. Stat. §§ 940.16(1)(a), (6). The use
of such language makes the statutes incurably ambiguous.
Neither “biological offspring” nor “living” is defined. At
argument the Solicitor General of Illinois was emphatic that
A-56
“biological offspring” is a synonym for “intact fetus,” that is,
a fetus (however deformed) before the physician performing
the abortion begins to work on it. But he retreated from this
position when faced with the hypothetical case of a physician
who, intending to perform a D & X, removes a limb or other
part of the fetus before beginning the procedure. His
retraction was consistent with his statement that the Illinois
legislature had tried to make the statute “as broad as
possible.” More extensive dismemberment than merely
removing a limb or two, Wisconsin’s lawyer assured us,
would inevitably kill the fetus before any part of it emerged
from the uterus. She offered no basis for this hopeful bit of
medical advice, and it is wrong. Carhart v. Stenberg, supra,
at *4; Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore,
supra, at *10. By “killing” the fetus, she evidently meant
doing something to cause its heart to stop beating, although a
fetus is living before it develops a heart. Obviously a one-
day old embryo, like the cells that compose a living human
body, is alive, not “dead.”
In a standard D & E, part or all of the fetus often will still
have a heartbeat, and so be “living,” in the sense of the word
apparently intended by the legislatures, when it emerges from
the uterus. Therefore it is “partially vaginally delivered,” just
as inaD & X. “During the D & E procedure, the fetus may
be removed from the uterus and brought through the cervix
and vagina either intact or disarticulated. . . . It may happen
that part of the intact fetus will be in the vagina and part in
the uterus or a disarticulated part of the fetus will be in the
vagina while the remainder of the fetus is ia the uterus. In
either of these situations, that part of the fetus which remains
in the uterus may still have a heartbeat.” Planned
Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, supra, 41 F.
Supp. 2d at 484. If the physician then kills the fetus, he
would, one would think, be guilty of having violated these
statutes, which punish the killing of a fetus that has been
partially vaginally delivered.
A-57
Against this interpretation, the Illinois Solicitor General,
discarding settled principles of criminal law for the sake of a
short-term victory, declared that the statute would not be
violated unless the physician had planned before beginning
the abortion to wait until a part of the fetus had emerged from
the uterus and kill the fetus then; the mere fact that the
physician knew it was likely that a part of the fetus would be
outside the uterus at the moment of death would not show the
requisite intent. By this logic--which the state’s Solicitor
General actually embraced at argument--if you fire a machine
gun into a lighted college dormitory at night, reckoning that
you have only a 10 percent chance of actually killing anyone,
and you do kill one or more of the residents, you are not
guilty of murder, provided you didn’t want to kill anyone but
just wanted to see whether your machine gun was in working
order. The law is otherwise. First-degree murder in Illinois
requires only that “in performing the acts which cause the
death” the defendant “knows that such acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1;
People v. Daniels, 702 N.E.2d 324, 330-31 (Ill. App. 1998);
People v. Mitchell, 601 N.E.2d 916, 919 (III. App. 1992);
Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 333-334 (7th Cir. 1997). A
physician who performs a standard D & E knowing, as he
must, before he begins, that part of the fetus is quite likely to
be outside the uterus when he kills the fetus, and then kills it
after a part has emerged from the uterus, is guilty of the
crime of partially vaginally delivering a living fetus and then
killing it.
The Illinois statute itself, moreover, requires only that the
partial-birth abortion have been performed “knowingly.” 720
ILCS 513/10. Under the law of Illinois, a defendant is
deemed to know “the result of his conduct, described by the
statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware
that such result is practically certain to be caused by his
conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b). -
A-58
Wisconsin authorizes life imprisonment for performing a
“partial birth” abortion. That is the state’s heaviest penalty,
the penalty for murder. Wisconsin deems its statute--as both
the penalty and the use of the term “child” to denote the fetus
reflect--a law against infanticide. (So does Illinois, by using
the term “infant,” but it is not serious, because the miaximum
punishment for killing the “infant” is only three years.) No
one would suppose, in the example of shooting into a
dormitory, that if only a one-day-old baby were killed the
killer would be innocent of murder. If Wisconsin is serious
in regarding a fetus that has begun to emerge from the uterus
as “a living child” who should be protected to the full extent
of the law against murder, it cannot rationally interpret the
statute to permit the physician to escape punishment by the
plea that when he began the abortion he thought there was
only a 50 percent chance that he would be killing “a living
child.” It would be like arguing that if a nurse hit a newborn
over the head with a baseball bat, with all her might, not to
kill it but merely to make it stop crying, and the newborn
died, the nurse could defend against a charge of first-degree
murder by proving that while she thought it quite possible
that the newborn would die, she didn’t want it to die and
thought it had a S50 percent chance of surviving.
Any doubts on this score are stilied by Wisconsin’s
statutory definition of intentional. The statute punishes
“intentionally” performing a partial birth abortion, Wis. Stat.
§ 940.16(2), and the term means either acting purposely to
accomplish the forbidden end or being “aware that [one’s]
conduct is practically certain to cause that result.” Wis. Stat.
§ 939.23(3). .As glossed by the case law, the alternative
definition is satisfied by conduct carrying a known high risk
of the forbidden result even if that result is not desired. See
State v. Gould, 202 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis. 1973); State v.
McCarter, 153 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Wis. 1967); State v.
Webster, 538 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. App. 1995). In Webster,
A-59
where the defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree
murder, it was deemed irrelevant that the jury might have
accepted his testimony “that he precisely aimed the shotgun
at Hood’s armpit, and that the gun was loaded only with
shotshells filled with bird shot.” 538 N.W.2d at 815.
So the state-of-mind requirements of the two statutes turn
out to be the same. They are, moreover, the standard state of
mind requirements for liability for serious crimes. A
criminal defendant acts intentionally, and, even more clearly,
knowingly, “when he knows that that result [here, a “partial
birth” abortion] is practically certain to follow from his
conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.” |
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive
Criminal Law § 3.5, p. 304 (1986); see, e.g., United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-46 (1978);
Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. McAnally, 666 F.2d 1116, 1119 (7th Cir. 1981).
I have discussed the state of mind requirements of these
Statutes at such length in order to make clear how little
mileage the court can get from the cases that it cites, such as
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), that save vague
Statutes by narrow interpretations. Put aside the fact that
these were federal statutes given nalrowing interpretations by
federal courts, rather than state statutes given narrowing
interpretations by federal courts, and that the Supreme Court
in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976), a decision
that is still good law on this point, held that the proper way to
obtain a narrowing interpretation of a vague state abortion
Statute is to abstain in favor of the state courts. The point |
wish to stress is that the device used in Screws and many
similar cases to save the statute, that of interpolating a
scienter requirement, is unavailable here. And this for two
reasons. The first is that the Wisconsin and Illinois statutes
make clear what the state of mind requirement for guilt under
each statute is, leaving no room for interpolating such a
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requirement in the guise of interpretation; and the second is
that the problem with knowing what these statutes require of
a physician is not ignorance of legal obligation, but ignorance
of the factual premises of liability. The statute challenged in
Screws made it a crime to deprive a person of a constitutional
right. The Court held that the statute could be saved by
requiring that the defendant be shown to have known that he
was violating a constitutional right. It was a realistic
requirement because the set of constitutional righis at any
moment is more or less knov'n and it is a straightforward
(though not always easily answerable) factual question
whether the defendant knew that his conduct infringed
something in that set. No one knows what procedures
constitute “partial birth” abortion, and specifically whether
many, perhaps most, D & E’s do, given that the fetus often
has a heartbeat after part of the fetus has emerged from the
uterus. Screws, when he beat his victim to death, knew that
he was committing the assault; the question was whether he
knew that the assault (because he was a sheriff and his victim
an arrestee) violated the Constitution. Physicians performing
late-term abortions in Illinois and Wisconsin do not know
whether they are performing “partial birth” abortions and
thus committing crimes.
The incurable vagueness of these statutes might seem to be
of little moment if a physician prosecuted for infanticide or
feticide had a sure defense should the prosecution stray
beyond the narrow path to which the court today attempts to
confine the statute. He could not avoid prosecution but at
least he would know he would be acquitted, and if he were
lucky he would be let out on bail pending trial and maybe
Planned Parenthood would pay his legal fees. But let us be
realistic, and not only about the possibility of legal error.
The physician is not the real target of the statute; the
pregnant woman is. It is not the physician’s pregnancy that
is to be terminated. He has no incentive to undergo the
agony of a criminal prosecution merely in order to perform
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an abortion in a particular way. Better for him either to
abandon late-term abortions altogether, or to be sure to give
the fetus a lethal injection in utero, and wait for it to take
effect, before performing the abortion. The in terrorem
effect of these statutes, especially the Wisconsin statute with
its maximum penalty of life imprisonment, is likely to induce
physicians in these states to steer well clear of the forbidden
zone. What physician would be fool enough, or hero enough,
to risk a criminal prosecution in order to explore the precise
meaning and outer bounds of the precautionary injunctions
that this court has ordered the district courts in these two
Cases to enter, even if the risk is small?
And now we can see more clearly one of the fallacies in the
“precautionary” injunction gimmick. It is the existence of
these statutes, because of their extraordinary breadth and the
limited incentive of a physician to test their scope, not the
risk of prosecution, which may indeed be slight, that burdens
those abortion rights that are conceded to be constitutionally
protected. A peculiarity of abortion rights is that they require
the assistance of a third party, the physician, who has a lesser
interest in them than his patient. Because his interest is less,
he is more easily deterred, and this should increase our
concern with the deterrent effects of these vague statutes.
It remains only to make clear that in finding these statutes
pernicious and unconstitutional I do not mean to criticize
anyone who believes, whether because of religious
conviction, nonsectarian moral conviction, or simply a
prudential belief that upholding the sacredness of human life
whatever the circumstances is necessary to prevent us from
Sliding into barbarism, that abortion is always wrong and
perhaps particularly so in late pregnancy, since al/ methods
of late-term abortion are gruesome. If a woman told by her
physician that her fetus will be a Down’s baby or a Tay-
Sachs baby or will be born without arms or legs, or that her
own health or even life will be endangered if she carries the
A-62
fetus to term, decides nevertheless against abortion, | would
be the last to criticize her decision. I might consider her a
heroine or a saint. But what is at stake in these cases is
whether the people who feel that way are entitled to coerce a
woman who feels differently to behave as they would in her
situation. The Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in decisions that we are not free to palter with answers
this question “no.” We should therefore affirm the district
court’s decision in Hope and reverse the district court’s
decision in Doyle.
B E>)
*
\
A-63
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF WISCONSIN,
GARY T. PROHSKA, M.D., FREDRIK F.
BROEKHUIZEN, M.D., GAVIN JACOBSON, M.D.,
NEVILLE SENDER, M.D., DENNIS D.
CHRISTENSEN, M.D. and BERNARD SMITH,
M.D., on behalf of themselves and their patients
seeking abortions,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JAMES E. DOYLE, in his official Capacity as the
Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin and
DIANE M. NICKS, in her official Capacity as District
Attorney for Dane County and as representative of a
class of all District Attorneys in Wisconsin,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
98-C-305-S
At issue in this matter is the constitutionality of 1997
Wisconsin Act 219, codified at Wis. Stat. §§ 895.038 and
940.16 (the “Act”.
The Act forbids any person from intentionally performing a
“partial-birth abortion.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(2). It defines
“partial-birth abortion” as “an. abortion in which a person
Partially vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of
the partially delivered child with the intent to kill the child,
and then completes delivery of the child.” Wis. Stat. §
940.16(1)(b). “Child” is defined as a “human being from the
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time of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a
pregnant woman.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(1)(a). The Act
provides an exception to its criminal sanction where a partial-
birth abortion “is necessary to save the life of a woman
whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical
illness, or physical injury . . . if no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(3).
Violation of the Act is a class “A” felony under Wisconsin
law, subjecting violators to life imprisonment.
The Act also creates civil liability for its violation. It
authorizes the father of the child aborted by the partial-birth
abortion and, if the woman on whom the abortion was
performed is a minor, either of her parents, to sue for
damages. Wis. Stat. § 895.038(2)(a). Either may sue
regardless of whether the woman consented to the partial-
birth abortion. However, neither may sue if he or she
consented to the partial-birth abortion. Wis. Stat. § 895.038.
In its enactment the Wisconsin legislature rejected
proposed amendments, Exhibits 1 - 15.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs previously sought a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the Act which this Court denied.
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D.
Wis. 1998). On the basis of undisputed facts, the Court
found that (1) the Act could be narrowly construed to apply
only to the dilation and extraction (“D&X”) method of
abortion, (2) the scienter requirements in the law helped save
it from a vagueness challenge, and (3) the Act did not place
an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.
Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiffs had failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
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The Court of Appeals disagreed. Planned Parenthood v.
Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998). It found that plaintiffs
might succeed in proving the Act unconstitutional for any of
three reasons. First, the Act makes no exception for cases in
which the fetus is not yet viable at the time of the abortion.
Id. at 466. Second, the Act contains no exception for cases in
which a D&X procedure is necessary for the preservation of
the mother’s health. /d. at 467. Third, the Act is vague. Id.
at 469.
The Court of Appeals specifically noted that its opinion
was based on the record compiled at the time and that “the
full trial may cast the facts in a different light.” Jd. at 466.
Accordingly, a trial was held in this matter to determine
whether the evidence presented by the parties would continue
to justify the Court of Appeals’ concerns regarding the
constitutionality of the Act.
Findings of Fact
Based on the evidence presented at trial and those facts to
which the parties have Stipulated, the Court makes the
following findings of fact. These findings may be divided
into three parts according to the issue they primarily address.
In the first group is evidence relating to the vagueness of the
Act -- whether the Act can be construed to apply to any
procedure other than the D&X procedure. In the second
group is evidence relating to the impact of the Act -- whether
its purpose or effect is to place an undue burden on a
woman’s right to an abortion. In the third group is evidence
relating to the state interests served by the Act.
The Court will present its factual findings according to this
division of the relevant evidence. The facts to which the
parties have stipulated are accepted as true except to the
extent they conflict with the following findings.
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\
Vagueness -- The following facts are relevant to the issue
of whether the Act is unconstitutionally vague.
The most commonly used methods of abortion are suction
curettage, dilation and evacuation (“D&E”) and induction.
Some physicians also use the dilation and extraction
(“D&X”’) method of abortion.
In a suction curettage procedure, the physician generally
dilates the cervix, inserts a tube (cannula) through the vagina
and the cervix into the uterus, and removes the embryo or
fetus and other products of conception through the cannula
while it is inside the vagina, cervix, and uterus.
Abortion by induction involves inducing preterm labor.
The physician uses laminaria to dilate the cervix and
introduces medications into the patient that will both
continue the dilation and induce labor. As a result of the
labor, the fetus is expelled from the woman’s uterus.
In a D&E procedure, the physician generally dilates the
cervix by inserting laminaria. When sufficient dilation is
achieved, the physician removes the laminaria and ruptures
the amniotic sac. Depending on the gestational age and the
size of the fetus and the amount of dilation achieved, the
physician may use suction to remove the parts of the fetus
and products of conception that are removable by suction.
The physician will then insert forceps into the woman’s
uterus in order to grasp and remove the remaining parts of
the fetus from the uterus through the cervix into the vagina
and then from the woman’s body. This process involves
dismemberment of the fetus and repeated insertions of the
forceps into the woman’s uterus to grasp and remove
remaining fetal parts. During an abortion performed in this
manner, there often is fetal cardiac activity and other signs of
life after a fetal part has been delivered into the vagina while
the remainder of the fetus is in utero.
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Plaintiffs Christensen and Smith define the D&X procedure
as follows:
In the intact D&E procedure (which is also known as
“dilation and extraction,” “D&X”’ or “intact D&X’’),
the physician dilates the cervix and then removes the
fetus from the uterus through the vaginal canal intact.
The physician extracts the fetal body intact, usually
feet first, until the cervix is obstructed by the after
coming head, which is too large to pass through the
cervix. Then the physician creates a small opening at
the base of the skull and evacuates the contents, —
allowing the calvarium to pass through the cervical
opening. The intentional removal of the fetus intact is
what distinguishes an intact D&E procedure from a
D&E procedure.
Similarly, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (“ACOG”) defines the D&X procedure to
include the following steps:
1. deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a
sequence of days;
2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling
breech;
3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head;
and
4. partial evacuation of the intzacranial contents of a
living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but
otherwise intact fetus.
Dr. Broekhuizen agrees with this definition but would
define D&X more broadly to include other variations on the
technique, including crushing the skull to allow it to pass
through the cervix. Haskell agrees that how the skull is
reduced in size is not an important distinction. He stated that
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“the medical distinction between a D&E and a D&X is the
extent to which the surgeon attempts to extract portions of
the fetus intact.”” Ex. 227 at 8.
Haskell also testified that in perhaps 75% of the D&X
procedures he performs, he cuts the umbilical cord before
removing the fetus from the uterus. However, sometimes the
child is partially delivered before he cuts the umbilical cord.
Haskell stated that the child is likely to die within minutes
after Haskell cuts its cord.
As evidenced by the policy statements of the American
Medical Association (Ex. 17) and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (Ex. 16) as well as articles
published in prominent medical journals (Exs. 205, 206, 207
_and 240), the medical community understands the phrase
“partial birth abortion” to refer to the dilation and extraction
or “D&X” procedure. See also Ex. 239 at 35 (“The breech
extraction variation of intact D & E, described in the lay
press as ‘partial birth abortion’ has been made illegal in
several states.”) Nevertheless, the plaintiff physicians state
that they find the definition of partial birth abortion in the
Act to be vague because the definition could be construed to
cover the three most common methods of abortion including
suction curettage, induction, and dilation and evacuation
(“D&E”). See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24.
They expressed concern over the following situations:
Suction Curettage -- Occasionally, in some suction
curettage procedures, it is necessary for the physician
to use forceps to remove the fetus from the uterus.
Sometimes the physician removes the fetus in parts
and other times it is intact. When the fetus is intact,
there may be a point in the procedure when part of the
fetus is outside of the uterus while the rest of the fetus
remains in the uterus.
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Induction -- Sometimes during an induction the
physician must assist in the removal of the fetus; and
sometimes the physician collapses or compresses the
skull or some part of the fetal abdomen to allow it to
pass through the cervix.
D&E -- In some D&E procedures, a physician draws
part of the intact fetus partially through the cervix and
into the vaginal canal. After the grasped part has
come through the cervix the physician disjoins the
part from the rest of the fetus, which remains in the
uterus. Physicians who perform abortions know that
disarticulating a fetal limb from a pre-viable fetus will
cause the fetus to die within a few minutes.
Trial testimony and the stipulated facts establish that
physicians cannot control when a child’s death occurs in
either the suction curettage or induction methods of abortion.
While death of the pre-viable fetus is the ultimate outcome of
these procedures, there is no particular step taken in either of
these procedures that is practically certain to kill the fetus at
an identifiable point in time. Fetal demise occurs at different
times and from different causes.
Similarly, when beginning a D&E abortion, a physician
cannot predict when the child will die and generally it is not
known when a child does die. If the child is alive when
dismemberment begins, the physician may be practically
certain that dismembering substantial portions of the child
will kill the child before delivery of all parts of the fetus is
completed. In those circumstances, however, the physician
does not complete delivery of a “child.” Rather, the
physician delivers dismembered body parts.
By contrast, physicians who perform D&X abortions know
that crushing the fetal skull or piercing the skull and
suctioning the contents will cause the fetus to die
immediately or within a few minutes. They take this step
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after partially vaginally delivering the child. Accordingly,
they are practically certain to kill a child in the birth canal on
most occasions. Except for beginning the abortion with an
injection that is lethal to the fetus, the piercing or crushing of
the skull in a D&X procedure and cutting the umbilica! cord,
a physician does not intentionally kill the child at any
specific point during the procedure.
Accordingly, based on this evidence, the Court concludes
that only in the D&X procedure is the physician aware that
his conduct is practically certain to kill a living child in the
birth canal before completing delivery of the child.
Undue Burden -- In addition to the facts already stated,
the following facts are relevant to whether the Act imposes
an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.
There are both advantages and disadvantages of the D&X
procedure as compared to the D&E procedure. One of the
advantages of the D&X procedure is that it is quicker and
easier to perform than the D&E procedure after 18 weeks
Imp. The shorter procedure time reduces the amount of
bleeding and reduces the amount of time that the patient has
to be subject to anesthesia. Another advantage is that the
physician in the D&X procedure does not have to make
multiple insertions of the forceps into the uterus. Reducing
the use of instruments in the uterus reduces the risk of uterine
perforation.
The D&X also has certain disadvantages in that it creates
risks not found in the D&E procedure. The D&X procedure
requires greater dilation of the cervix through an additional
24 hours of laminaria. The testifying physicians agreed that
delaying an abortion creates additional risks. With regard to
the D&X procedure these risks include a risk that the
woman’s membranes might rupture or that she may develop
an infection. The greater dilation used in D&X also poses
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the risk of cervical incompetence, which may lead to
premature births in future pregnancies.
Also, the D&E procedure has a proven track record that the
D&X procedure does not have. D&E is the most common
method of second-trimester abortion, accounting for
hundreds of abortions in Wisconsin each year. D&X, by
contrast, is rarely used. Among the plaintiff physicians, only
Christensen regularly performs the D&X procedure and he
performs just 2-3 such procedures each year.
There are no published, medically-recognized studies
comparing the risks of D&E to D&X. Haskell testified to an
informal comparison. He stated that in 10 years of
performing abortions he does not recall any complications in
the D&X procedures he has performed and recalls perhaps 2-
3 complications in the D&E procedures he has_performed.
His experience conflicts with that of his mentor, Dr.
McMahon, as reported in Exhibit 228. McMahon
encountered major complications in 4 out of 1362 patients
using the D&X procedure. This success rate was no better
than for D&E’s. The Court places little reliance on any of
this anecdotal evidence because there has been no suggestion
that the women receiving D&E abortions were similarly
Situated to the women receiving D&X abortions, or that the
complication rates experienced by Haskell and McMahon
were statistically significant.
More telling evidence concerning the relative safety of the
D&X procedure may be found in the opinions of the
testifying physicians, None of the physicians would state
unequivocally that the D&X procedure is safer than the D&E
procedure. Broekhuizen conceded that further study of the
procedures is required. Smith admitted that he had never
encountered a situation where D&X would have been the
best procedure to use. Haskell, who invented the procedure,
admitted that the D&x procedure is never medically
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necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a woman.
Giles agreed.
Major medical associations are equally reluctant to endorse
the D&X procedure. ACOG reviewed the D&X procedure
and “could identify no circumstances under which [the D&X
procedure] would be the only option to save the life or
preserve the health of the woman.” Ex. 16 at 2. ACOG did
state that there “may” be circumstances in which the D&X
procedure is the best or most appropriate procedure, but it did
not identify what those circumstances might be. Jd.
Similarly, the American Medical Association concluded
that “there does not appear to be any identified situation in
which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to
induce abortion, and ethical concerns have been raised about
intact D&X. The AMA recommends that the procedure not
be used unless alternative procedures pose materially greater
risk to the woman.” Ex. 17 at 15. Again, however, the AMA
did not identify any particular circumstances in which
“alternative procedures pose materially greater risk to the
woman.” /d.
The plaintiff physicians’ reluctance to endorse the safety of
the D&X procedure is evidenced by their conduct. Actions
often speak louder than words, and in this case plaintiffs’
conduct indicates that the D&X procedure offers no material
advantage in terms of safety. As noted, none of the plaintiff
physicians routinely performs the D&X procedure. Nor do
they train their staff or medical students to perform the
procedure. They also do not routinely inform their patients
as to the procedure’s availability or its supposed advantages.
All of the physicians use the same consent form regardless of
the method of abortion used.
The conduct of the other physician witnesses offered by
plaintiffs suggests the same conclusion. Haskell invented the
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D&X procedure and has demonstrated an unusual fondness
for it. Nevertheless, he sometimes chooses to perform a
D&E abortion -- despite his alleged concerns regarding its
safety -- because the additional delay involved in a D&X
procedure would be inconvenient for the woman. Similarly,
Stubblefield and his colleagues perform induction abortions
at 17 - 20 weeks Imp and do not offer D&X abortions
because the added time necessary to dilate the cervix is not
worth the benefits of the D&X procedure.
Similarly, plaintiffs’ conduct during the two weeks that the
Act was in effect provides further evidence concerning the
alleged burdens imposed by the Act. Broekhizen conceded
that during this period he continued to perform abortions
without altering his procedures. Smith effectively conceded
the same when he declined to answer a question on this point
and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination. Christensen also continued to perform
abortions during this period. He issued a press release stating
that he could comply with the Act as he interpreted it only by
altering his procedures in a way that would impose greater
health risks on women. Nevertheless, Christensen’s rate of
complications from abortions did not go up in a “statistically
significant fashion” while Wis. Stat. § 940.16 was in effect.
Regardless of the general safety of the D&X procedure,
plaintiffs argue the procedure is safer in Certain
circumstances. They contend that in some induction
procedures the fetal skull is too large to pass through the
cervix and must be crushed in order to complete delivery.
Several of the plaintiff physicians admitted that they could
wait for the skull to pass the cervix naturally, but they stated
that there would be no medical reason for doing so and the
delay may lead to excessive bleeding.
Plaintiffs also contend there are certain maternal conditions
or fetal anomalies in which the D&X procedure is the best
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procedure to use in order to accomplish an abortion. In
support of this position they offered the testimony of Dr.
Broekhuizen who described three circumstances in which he
intended to perform D&X abortions. In the first case,
Broekhuizen aborted a pregnancy in a woman with
schleroderma. He dilated the cervix through serial
application of laminaria and the fetus was completely
expelled intact. He did not crush the skull or puncture the
skull and suction out the contents.
In the second case, Broekhuizen intended to perform a
D&X abortion to terminate the pregnancy of a woman with
skeletal dysplasia. He chose the D&X procedure because the
woman opposed dismemberment of the fetus through the
D&E procedure and had an “inerdinate” fear of labor pains
so that she did not want an induction. Broekhuizen also
wanted to deliver an intact fetus in order to obtain a more
definite diagnosis of dysplasia. Despite Broekhuizen’s intent
to perform a D&X abortion, serial dilation of the cervix led
to a spontaneous onset of labor and an intact fetus was
delivered.
In the third case, Broekhuizen performed the D&X
procedure to abort a fetus 28 weeks Imp with hydrocephalus.
Due to this fetal anomaly the head was larger than that of a
child carried to term. Broekhuizen performed a combination
of dilation and induction, and then decompressed the head
with scissors and needles and completed delivery.
Dr. Giles disagreed that the D&X procedure was the best
procedure to use in any of these circumstances. Indeed, with
25 years of experience in high risk pregnancies, Giles has
never seen a situation where D&X would be the best
procedure to use. He deemed induction the safest method in
all late-term (20 or more weeks Imp) pregnancies because it
does not require instrumentation in the uterus. Accordingly,
in his view, induction is safer even than D&E. Moreover, -
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like D&X, the induction procedure yields an intact fetus
which could be studied by physicians and grieved over by
mothers.
Giles disputed the need to crush the fetal skull in induction
procedures. He routinely uses cervical relaxants and other
drugs to allow the fetal head to pass quickly without
complications. He also noted that a physician could assist an
induction procedure by gently compressing the fetal head
without either the intent to kill the fetus or the practical
certainty that death of the fetus would be the result.
Giles also stated that D&X is not the best method of
abortion where a child has hydrocephalus. He stated that a
needle could be inserted through the mother’s abdomen to
safely reduce the size of the child’s head in order to allow the
physician to perform an abortion through induction.
The Court finds Giles’ testimony more credible. Giles
spoke from substantial experience in high risk pregnancies,
having performed over 1,000 abortions through induction
without any major complications. His view that induction
could be used in the situations Broekhuizen described is
Supported by Broekhuizen’s experience. Although
Broekhuizen intended to perform the D&X procedure in the
first two circumstances he described, he did not actually
perform the procedure. In each case the pregnancy was
aborted through what was essentially an induction procedure.
Moreover, Giles expressed his opinion that the D&X
procedure is never necessary to save the live or preserve the
health of a woman despite the fact that Giles regularly
provides abortions and otherwise supports a woman’s right to
an elective abortion. Giles’ willingness to state what must be
an unpopular view in the circles in which he travels bolsters
his credibility.
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Haskell and Broekhuizen criticized Giles’ use of cervical
relaxants and other drugs, but there was no showing that
these doctors had the expertise or experience to offer this
criticism. Moreover, Giles’ substantial success in performing
abortions through inductions is more credible evidence than
the unsupported opinions of these physicians.
In light of this substantial evidence, the Court concludes
that partial birth abortion is never medically necessary to
preserve the health or life of a woman and abolition of the
procedure does not subject women to materially greater
health risks. D&E is nearly always an option and there has
been no credible showing that D&E is riskier that D&X.
Moreover, induction is safer than even D&E and can be used
in those rare pregnancies, if any, where D&E would be
problematic.
Moreover, having reviewed the proposed amendments to
the Act as well as the amicus brief filed by state legislators,
the Court finds that the Legislature did not adopt the Act for
the purpose of placing an obstacle in the path of women
seeking an abortion. As the Court has previously stated, the
proposed amendments were reasonably rejected to avoid
creating loopholes in the law that would have allowed
physicians to easily avoid the restrictions the law imposes.
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.
The State Interest Served by the Act -- In addition to the
facts already stated, the following facts are relevant to
whether the Act serves a compelling state interest.
As Giles testified, partial birth abortion raises several
concerns including pain to the child, denying the child any
possibility of survival, and risks to maternal health. These
concerns have been noted by the AMA and have been
discussed in prominent medical journals. See Exs. 17, 205,
206, 207 and 240. In an article in the Journal of the
EE
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American Medical Association, Drs. Sprang and Neerhof
concluded that “intact D&X partial-birth abortion should not
be performed because it is needlessly risky, inhumane and
ethically unacceptable.” Ex. 206 at 746. They observed that
when the physician kills a child in a partial birth abortion, the
child “is merely inches from being delivered and obtaining
full legal rights of personhood under the US Constitution.”
Id. at 746. Accordingly, the doctors concluded that partial
birth abortion is “closer to infanticide than it is to abortion.”
Id. The legislators who filed an amicus brief make similar
arguments.
The Court concludes that these facts demonstrate that the
Act serves compelling state interests.
Conclusions of Law
The Court now turns to its conclusions of law with a view
toward determining whether the Court of Appeals’ concerns
regarding the constitutionality of the Act remain valid.
In undertaking this task, the Court must begin its review of
the Act with the strong presumption that it is constitutional.
State v. Cissell, 378 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1985); Andree v.
Ashland County, 818 F.2d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the Act is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Wisconsin v.
Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Wis. 1995). In assessing
whether a party has carried its burden of proof, “every
presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all
possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative
enactment’s constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of
constitutionality.” Jd. In light of these considerations and
the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Act is
constitutional. The fully developed record demonstrates that
the Court of Appeals’ concerns have not been borne out by
the evidence.
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First, the evidence establishes that the Act need not make
an exception for cases in which the fetus is not yet viable at
the time of the abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), plainly
establishes that states may regulate abortions pre-viability.
They may do so in order to “further the interest in potential
life or some other valid state interest” so long as their
regulation does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion. Casey 505 U.S. at 877
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Act is not
unconstitutional per se merely because it does not make an
exception pre-viability. Rather, the Court of Appeals found
the Act unconstitutional based on its finding that the Act did
not serve the state’s interest in maternal health or potential
life or any other compelling state interest. See Planned
Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d at 466-67.
As noted, the fully developed record establishes that the
Act serves several compelling state interests, including
interests in maternal health, potential life and morality.
Maternal Health -- The Act serves Wisconsin’s interest in
maternal health insofar as use of the D&X procedure places
women at higher risk of infection, rupture of the amniotic
sac, and cervical incompetence. Wisconsin could rationally
prohibit use of what is clearly an unnecessary procedure in
order to protect women from these dangers.
Potential Life -- The Act also serves Wisconsin’s interest
in potential life insofar as use of the D&X procedure creates
risks for subsequent pregnancies due to cervical
incompetence.
Morality -- It has long been recognized that states have a
legitimate interest in prohibiting conduct deemed immoral.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
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(upholding constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy law in part
because it was rationally related to “the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”). Although abortion
laws are typically justified according to the state’s interest in
maternal health or potential life, the Casey court specifically
recognized that “other valid state interest[s]” could justify a
pre-viability abortion restriction. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
As the Court of Appeals observed, the Act is not likely to
save the life of any child because other safe alternative
methods of abortion are available. Planned Parenthood vy.
Doyle, 162 F.3d at 470. Nevertheless, even if the state’s
interest in a child previability is not sufficient to allow the
State to protect it from destruction, in the D&X procedure the
child is just inches from being born. Surely at that point the
State has a sufficient interest in the child to allow the state to
regulate the manner of the child’s death, regardless of
whether the State is able to keep the child alive. Wisconsin
has declared that such children are not to endure -- and
Wisconsin physicians are not to inflict -- the gruesome death
imposed in the D&X procedure. It is well-within the
province of the state to legislate against the immorality of
partial birth abortion.
Perhaps, as plaintiffs argue, the child will endure a
gruesome death through some other method of abortion.
This does not detract from the legitimacy of Wisconsin’s
partial birth abortion law, however, because it is apparently
beyond Wisconsin’s power to eliminate those other methods
of abortion. Wisconsin can eliminate this one method.
Given the national groundswell of Opposition to partial birth
abortion and the ethical concerns raised within the medical
community concerning the procedure, the State cannot be
faulted for acting where it can to outlaw an unnecessary
procedure that in most cases in which it is used is literally
inches away from being infanticide.
A-80
Any and all of these state interests justify Wisconsin’s
partial birth abortion law so that the Act need not make an
exception for cases in which the fetus is not yet viable at the
time of the abortion.
Second, the Act need not contain an exception for cases in
which a D&X procedure is necessary for the preservation of
the mother’s health. As noted, a pre-viability restriction on
the right to an abortion is unconstitutional if it places an
undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. As the Court of Appeals found, a
law which prohibits women from obtaining an abortion
through a method that is necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s health places an undue burden on the woman’s
right to an abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d
at 468.
But as the fully developed record reveals, Wisconsin’s
partial birth abortion law is not such a law. Partial birth
abortion is never medically necessary to preserve the health
or save the life of a woman and abolition of the procedure
does not subject women to materially greater health risks.
Accordingly, the trial has “cast the facts in a different light.”
While the Court of Appeals assumed that the D&X procedure
would be the best medical procedure for obtaining an
abortion in at least some circumstances, the evidence
demonstrates that it is not. Because the Act leaves women
with safe, alternative methods of abortion, it does not impose
an undue burden on their abortion rights.
Third, the Act is not vague. The Court remains convinced
that plaintiffs’ alleged confusion concerning the meaning of
the Act is a demon of their own creation. Everyone
understands what partial birth abortion is and what it is not.
It is the D&X procedure. It is not the suction curettage
procedure, the induction procedure or the D&E procedure.
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Defendants have stipulated to this reading of the law, which
supports the Court’s interpretation. See Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (Blackmun, J.) (relying in part on
the defendants’ stipulation as to the meaning of a law in
rejecting the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute at issue was
“so vague as to fail to insure against sectarian abuse.”’)
In rejecting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
this Court found that only in the D&X method of abortion
does a physician act with the purpose of performing a
procedure in the steps described by the statute -- first
partially vaginally delivering a living child and then causing
the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to kill
the child and then completing delivery of the child. Planned
Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-44. The Court of
Appeals did not take issue with this conclusion.
Nevertheless, it observed that the Act “must be read in light
of the definition of ‘intentionally’ elsewhere in Wisconsin *
criminal-law statutes as either acting purposely to accomplish
the forbidden end or being ‘aware that [one’s] conduct is
practically certain to cause that result.’” Planned
Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d at 469, citing Wis. Stat. §
939.23(3). The Court of Appeals observed that in some
methods of abortion other than D&X a physician might be
aware that he or she is “practically certain” to kill an intact
living child in the birth canal before delivery is completed.
Plaintiffs took the same position at trial. See Plaintiffs’
Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24.
The fully developed record has not justified this concern.
As noted, physicians cannot control when death occurs in
induction and suction curettage abortions and cannot be
“practically certain” that any step they take will kill a fetus in
the birth canal. Accordingly, even if their conduct in
performing these abortions is construed as_ partially
delivering a living child, they do not thereafter take any
second step for the purpose of killing the child or that is
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practically certain to kill the child before completing
delivery. Moreover, a physician who sets out to perform an
abortion through suction curettage or induction does not
purposely perform the three steps proscribed by the act in the
order proscribed, nor is he or she practically certain to do so.
The D&E procedure also is not covered by the Act. The
physician in the D&E procedure removes the fetus in parts.
As this Court has already held, the Act refers to delivery of a
“child” which cannot be equated to delivery of
“dismembered body parts.” Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9
F. Supp. 2d at 1041. Accordingly, the /ega/ interpretation of
the Act excludes delivery of a dismembered fetus, regardless
of the /ay interpretation which the testifying physicians --
including Giles, defendants’ expert -- sought to impose upon
the Act. The Act does not apply to the D&E procedure.
For similar reasons, the Act does apply to the D&X
procedure. The D&X procedure is distinct from the D&E
procedure in that the goal of the D&X is to extract an intact
fetus -- a “child” -- rather than a dismembered fetus. Haskell,
Christensen and Smith agreed with this distinction.
Moreover, the D&X procedure is the only procedure in
which the physician purposely follows the sequence of steps
proscribed by the Act. Accordingly, D&X is the only
abortion procedure abolished by the Act.
Plaintiffs also complain that there is disagreement
concerning what a D&X is, thereby making the law vague.
But the evidence demonstrated substantial agreement
concerning the meaning of D&X. All of the medical
authorities offer substantially the same definition of D&X.
To the extent they disagree in any relevant way, it is a
disagreement concerning how physicians kill the child --
whether through suctioning the cranial contents, crushing the
skull or cutting the umbilical cord. But there is no
disagreement that if a physician takes one of these steps after
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partially vaginally delivering a living child and then
completes delivery of the child, he or she has performed a
partial birth abortion. Accordingly, the law gives physicians
reasonable notice of the conduct proscribed.
As noted, the Act is constitutional if it prohibits only the
D&X procedure. In reviewing the language of the Act, it is -
difficult to discern how the Legislature could have signaled
any more clearly its intent to adopt this limited prohibition --
without creating enormous loopholes in the law. The Act
specifically uses the term “partial birth abortion” which
physicians understand to mean D&X abortions. Moreover,
the steps it describes as constituting a “partial birth abortion”
apply most naturally and easily to the D&X procedure. Dr.
Broekhuizen conceded that it is only by bending the language
of the Act beyond its most obvious meaning that it can be
construed to apply to the suction curettage method of
abortion. The same is true with regard to all other methods
of abortion except D&X. The contortions the plaintiffs invite
this Court to impose on the law run contrary to the command
that every presumption in favor of constitutionality be
indulged. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the law is
not vague.
Consent
One issue remains that was not addressed by the Court of
Appeals. Plaintiffs argue that the civil liability provisions in
the Act amount to an unconstitutional tacit consent
requirement. However, as this Court held in response to
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, if the law
criminalizing partial-birth abortions is constitutionally sound,
then a law imposing civil sanctions for the same activity
must withstand a constitutional challenge as well. See United
States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991).
Having found the criminal sanctions in the Act constitutional,
the Court finds the civil sanctions constitutional as well.
: A-84
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of
defendants against plaintiffs dismissing their complaint and
all claims contained therein with prejudice and costs except
as to Section 895.038(3)(b) of the Act which is severed and
declared unconstitutional.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that enforcement of the
judgment is stayed pending appeal.
Entered this 4th day of Jun
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