Appendix — Illinois State University v. Varner

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No. OFFICE OF THE GLeRK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1998

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Petitioners,

v

Dr. Iris I. VARNER, et al.,

Respondents,

AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAROL HANSEN POSEGATE JOHN P. LYNCH

Davip A. HERMAN Counsel of Record

GIFFIN, WINNING, COHEN & MARK S. MESTER

BopDEwEs, P.C. MATTHEW RAWLINSON

1 West Old State Capitol LATHAM & WATKINS

Plaza, Suite 600 233 South Wacker Drive,

Springfield, Illinois 62701 Suite 5800

(217) 525-1571 Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 876-7700

MAUREEN E. MAHONEY

LATHAM & WATKINS

1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.,

Suite 1300

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-2200

Counsel for Petitioners,

Dated: January 11, 1999 Illinois State University, et al.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc, filed October 13, 1998 ...........

Opinion of Court of Appeals, Filed July 21, 1998........

Order Granting In Part and Denying in Part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

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Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ Motion

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

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Relevant Portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,

Including the Eque! Pay Act ............00.c0eeeees

Constitution of the State of Illinois,

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Illinois Human Rights Act,

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Chicago, Illinois 60604

October 13 , 1998

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge

Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

Dr. IRIS I. VARNER, et al., ) Appeal from the

Plaintiffs-Appellees, United States District,

Court for the Central

No. 97-3253 v. | District of Illinois.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, No. 95 C 1355

et al., Michael J. Mihm

Defendants-Appellants. } Judge.

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing en banc filed in the above-entitled case on Septem-

ber 4, 1998, by defendants-appellants, no judge in active service

has requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the original

panel have voted to deny a rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing

be, and the same is hereby DENIED.

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No. 97-3253

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

IRIS I. VARNER, et al,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-A ppellee,

Vv.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeal from the United States Disirict Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 95 C 1355—Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 1998

DECIDED JULY 21, 1998

Before BAUER, HARLINGTON Woop, Jr., and FLAUM,

Circuit Judges.

FLAuM, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns the confluence

of two recent, significant Supreme Court decisions, City of Boerne

v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44 (1996). The plaintiffs represent a class comprised of

all tenured or tenure-track female faculty at Illinois State Univer-

sity (“ISU”) from the 1982-83 academic year to the present. In

1995, they filed a complaint against ISU, four of its officials, its

Board of Regents, and ten members of the Board (collectively,

en ee ee ee, ee Prt “he

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No. 97-3253

“the University”). The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Equal Pay

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and

sought injunctive and monetary relief, including compensatory dam-

ages for intentional violations of Title VII under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

The University, which is concededly a state entity, moved to dismiss

the Equal Pay Act claim, as well as that part of the Title VII claim

seeking compensatory damages. The University argued that its

Eleventh Amendment immunity served as a bar to federal jurisdic-

tion with respect to these claims. The district court denied the

University’s motion to dismiss. See 972 F. Supp. 458 (C.D. IIL.

1997), and 986 F. Supp. 1107 (C.D. Ill. 1996).

The University appealed the district court’s denial of its

Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. We granted the United

States’ motion to intervene to defend the constitutionality of this

application of federal law to the States. We ‘ave jurisdiction over

this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 under the

collateral order doctrine. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer

Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993). We

affirm the district court’s decision in all respects.

I.

The Eleventh Amendment provides, “The Judicial power of

the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in

law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. While

the amendment by its terms appears to limit only the federal

courts’ Article III diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has

long “understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much

for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”

Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779

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No. 97-3253

(1991). The text of the amendment, narrowly written to overrule

the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 US.

(2 Dall.) 419 (1793), see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 67-70,

stands for the larger proposition, inherent in our federal system,

that each state remains a sovereign entity. See id. at 54 (“For over

a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits

against unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated by the Consti-

tution when establishing the judicial power of the United

States.’”’) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).

Accordingly, the States enjoy an immunity from suit in federal

court by all private parties for all causes of action, including suits

arising under federal statutes. See, e.g., Doe v. University of IIL.,

138 F.3d 653, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1998). State sovereign immunity,

however, is not absolute: A state may consent to suit in federal

court! and, under certain circumstances, Congress may abrogate a

state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Congress may constitutionally abrogate the States’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity under a particular statute if it both un-

equivocally expresses its intent to do so and acts pursuant to a

valid exercise of power. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55. With

respect to the latter inquiry, Seminole Tribe rejected the notion

that the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S ConsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,

confers upon Congress the power to abrogate the States’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See id. at 71-73 (“The Eleventh Amend-

ment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I

cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed

upon federal jurisdiction.”). In so holding, the Court also explic-

itly overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),

in which a plurality of the Court held that the Interstate Commerce

Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, gave Congress the power to

abrogate state sovereign immunity. See 517 U.S. at 63-66.

' No party contends that Illinois has consented to suit in the instant case.

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No. 97-3253

The Court in Seminole Tribe reaffirmed, however, that valid

legislation pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could

serve as a basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity.’ See id.

at 59-60, 63-66 (discussing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445

(1976) ) (“Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplica-

ble to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth

Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh

Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to

alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power

achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.”). Thus,

“Cejven after Seminole Tribe, ‘the Eleventh Amendment does not

insulate the states from suits in federal courts to enforce federal

Statutes enacted under the authority of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.’” Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.,

141 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Crawford v. Indiana

Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997)).

The University raises a number of arguments contending that

Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity when it passed the Equal Pay Act. First, the University

asserts that the Equal Pay Act does not contain a clear and

unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate the States’

immunity. Second, the University posits that Congress passed the

Equal Pay Act pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause

and not pursuant to its power under § 5. The University argues that,

following Seminole Tribe, Commerce Clause legislation cannot

validly abrogate the States’ immunity from suit in federal court.

Third, the University asserts that the Equal Pay Act does not

? Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “The Congress shall

have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”

This section enables Congress “‘to enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment’s

guarantees that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law” or deny any person “the equal protection of the

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

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No. 97-3253

constitute valid legislation under Congress’s § 5 power in any event.

In this context, the University relies on the Supreme Court’s

interpretation of § 5 in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157

(1997), in conjunction with the fact that the Equal Pay Act does not

require proof of intentional discrimination to support a valid claim

for relief. The University’s Title VII argument is more narrow. It

concedes that Title VII itself contains a clear statement of legislative

intent to abrogate the States’ immunity. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S.

at 456. However, the University argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a,

which made available a compensatory damages remedy to Title VII

plaintiffs, is a distinct statute from Title VII that does not contain its

own statement of congressional intent to abrogate the States’ Elev-

enth Amendment immunity. We address these arguments in turn.

II. The Equal Pay Act

A. Intent to Abrogate

In deciding whether Congress unequivocally expressed its

intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity

under the Equal Pay Acct, it is helpful to consider the context and

history of the statute. Congress passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963,

Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)),

as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 to § 219. The Equal Pay Act, which

prohibits wage disparities on the basis of sex,’ therefore employs

the same definitional and enforcement provisions as do the

> The Equal Pay Act provides in relevant part:

No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section

shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are

employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to

employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he

pays wages to employees cf the opposite sex in such establishinent for

equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,

and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working

conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a

seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures

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No. 97-3253

overtime and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA. See

29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206-07, 216; see also Timmer v. Michigan

Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 838 n.6 (6th Cir. 1997). In

1966, Congress amended the FLSA’s definition of “employer” to

include state government workers employed in hospitals, institu-

tions, or schools. See Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 102(b), 80 Stat. 831

(amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)). The Supreme Court subse-

quently held, however, that the 1966 amendment to the FLSA

did not abrogate the States’ immunity from suit in federal court.

See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,

411 U.S. 279, 284-86 (1973). As we have noted, see Mueller v.

Thompson, 133 F.3d 1063, 1065 (7th Cir. 1998), Congress

responded to Employees by amending certain provisions of the

FLSA in the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.

No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, including its definitions of “employer,”

29 U.S.C. § 203(d) & (x), and “employee,” id. § 203(e)(2)(c),

as well as its enforcement provision, id. § 216(b).*

Following the 1974 amendments to the FLSA, the term

“employer” is defined to “include[ ] a public agency.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 203(d). The statute in turn defines “public agency” to include

“the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any

agency of .. . a State, or a political subdivision of a State.” Jd.

earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based

on any other factor other than sex....

29 US.C. § 206(d) (1).

“While our recitation of the history of the Equal Pay Act is helpful in

understanding the context of the statutory provisions at issue, this history in itself

has no bearing upon our inquiry into whether Congress unequivocally expressed

its intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Rather, that

intent must be made “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”

Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989); see also, e.g., Hilton v. South

Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204 (1991) (“Congressional intent

to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity must be expressed in the text of the

statute; the Court will not look to legislative history in making its inquiry.”).

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§ 203(x). The FLSA defines “employee” to include “any individ-

ual employed by a State, political subdivision of a State, or an

interstate governmental agency.” Jd. § 203(e)(2)(C). Finally,

the Act’s private enforcement provision provides in pertinent part,

“An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the

preceding sentences [including violations of § 206] may be

maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in

any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or

more employees.” Jd. § 216(b) (emphasis added).

In light of the plain statutory language, which authorizes

“employees” to sue “public agencies” in federal court for violations

of the Equal Pay Act, we have little difficulty holding that Congress

clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amend-

ment immunity when it amended § 216(b) in 1974. We have

previously hinted at this holding in both Mueller, 133 F.3d at 1065,

and Ende v. Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 176, 177 n.3 (7th Cir.

1985), and we make it explicit today. In so doing, we join the other

circuits that have examined this issue in the context of both the

Equal Pay Act and the FLSA. See Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31,

36 (2d Cir. 1997) (FLSA); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 41-42

(1st Cir. 1997) (FLSA); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 814-15

(10th Cir. 1997) (FLSA); Timmer, 104 F.3d at 837-38 (Equal Pay

Act); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir.) (en banc)

(FLSA), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 946 (1993).

While the University concedes that the Equal Pay Act creates

a private cause of action for state employees, it argues that the

statute does no more than permit those employees to sue the States

in their own courts. Compare, eg. Welch v. Texas Dep't of

Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (holding that the

Jones Act does not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity), with Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502

U.S. 197 (1991) (holding that the Federal Employers’ Liability

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Act, which provides the statutory remedial scheme for the Jones

Act, creates a cause of action against state employers in their own

courts). In this context, the University emphasizes that the statutory

provisions discussed above do not contain any explicit references to

the “Eleventh Amendment,” or to “abrogation of state sovereign

immunity.” See, eg. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473

U.S. 234, 246. (1985) (“A general authorization for suit in federal

court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to

abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.”). We previously have con-

cluded, however, that such “magic words” are unnecessary, because

“that degree of explicitness is not required.” Davidsen v. Board of

Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. Seminole Tribe,

517 U.S. at 56-57 (holding that, even though the statute at issue did

not refer explicitly to the Eleventh Amendment, “the numerous

references to the ‘State’ in the text of [the statute] make it

indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the

States’ sovereign immunity from suit”). Rather, as we stressed in

Davidson, all that is necessary is that Congress make “its desire to

override the states’ sovereign immunity clear[ ]” from the language

of the statute. 920 F.2d at 443.

We recently addressed a similar assertion of Eleventh Amend-

ment immunity by the State of Illinois under the Age Discrimina-

tion in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, in

Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 141 F.3d

761, 765-66 (7th Cir. 1998). Goshiasby explicitly reaffirmed David-

son's rationale on this point. See id. Moreover, Goshtasby rejected

the notion that Seminole Tribe altered in any way the traditional

inquiry to determine whether Congress unequivocally expressed its

intent to abrogate. We concluded that “Seminole Tribe simply

recycled [the] well-established verbiage in stating that Congress

must be ‘unmistakably clear.’ The analysis was the same one federal

courts have used for years.” Jd. at 766 (citations omitted). Thus, we

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conclude that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate the States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity when it arnended the Equal Pay

Act in 1974.

B. Power to Abrogate

But for the Supreme Court’s holding in Seminole Tribe, our

Eleventh Amendment inquiry into the Equal Pay Act would be

complete, as the Equal Pay Act (along with the rest of the FLSA)

Clearly is within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. See, e.g.,

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);

Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1978).

However, as we have discussed, see supra at 3-4, Seminole Tribe

established that Congress may only abrogate the States’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity through legislation validly enacted pursuant

to its § 5 enforcement powers.’ Because we must determine whether

* Accordingly, all of the circuits to have addressed the issue following

Seminole Tribe have held that the minimum wage and overtime provisions of

the FLSA do not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Those circuits have rejected, either explicitly or implicitly, the argument that the

wage and overtime provisions serve a valid Fourteenth Amendment purpose. See

Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 66 US.L.W. 3780

(U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1667); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136, 1137

(9th Cir. 1997); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1997); Mills v.

Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 48-49 (Ist Cir. 1997); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 816-

18 (10th Cir. 1997); Raper v. lowa, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Wilson-

Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 208-11 (6th Cir. 1996). In a case remanded to

this Court by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Seminole Tribe,

we implicitly reached the same holding. See Mueller v. Thompson, 133 F.3d

1063, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that, in light of Seminole Tribe, “(t]he only

issue is whether Wisconsin has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from

suit in federal court under the FLSA” and citing Mills, Raper, and Wilson-

Jones). Three of these courts, though, expressly reserved the question of whether ~

the Equal Pay Act validly serves a Fourteenth Amendment purpose. See Mills,

118 F.3d at 48; Aaron, 115 F.3d at 817; Raper, 115 F.3d at 624. Moreover, the

Sixth Circuit, in holdin» that the Equal Pay Act validly abrogates the States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity, noted that its holding was not in tension with

its contrary holding in Wilson-Jones. See Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Com-

merce, 104 F.3d 833, 842 (6th Cir. 1997).

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No. 97-3253

“the Act in question [was] passed pursuant to a constitutional

provision granting Congress the power to abrogate,” Seminole Tribe,

517 U.S. at 59, we therefore are required to consider two questions:

(1) whether Congress, in applying the Equal Pay Act to the States,

did so pursuant to its § 5 powers and, if so, (2) whether the Equal

Pay Act is within Congress’s § 5 powers, as interpreted by the

Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).

1. Whether Congress Exercised its § 5 Powers in Making the

Equal Pay Act Applicable to the States

In EEOC y. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 604-09 (7th Cir. 1982), we

considered whether Congress had employed its § 5 enforcement

powers when it amended the ADEA in 1974 to cover state

employees.® Although we recognized that the 1974 amendments

to the ADEA did not explicitly refer to Congress’s § 5 powers, id.

at 607-08, we did not believe that this fact was dispositive of our

inquiry. Instead, we concluded that “the test of whether legisla-

tion is enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

requires no talismanic intoning of the amendment. Rather, the

inquiry is whether the objectives of the legislation are within

Congress’ power under the amendment.” /d. at 608 (citation

omitted). Because we concluded that the objectives of the 1974

amendments to the ADEA were “clearly tied to the guarantee of

the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” we

held that Congress acted pursuant to its § 5 enforcement powers

when it extended the ADEA’s coverage to state and local govern-

ment employees. See id. at 608-09.

We recently have had two opportunities to consider Elrod’s

rule, in Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 657-60 (7th

* These amendments to the ADEA, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74, were

in fact included in the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974—the same

legislation that amended the FLSA. See Elrod, 604 F.2d at 605.

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Cir. 1998), and in Gaoshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univer-

sity of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 766-68 (7th Cir. 1998). In Doe,

which considered the State of Illinois’s Eleventh Amendment

challenge to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20

U.S.C. § 1681, we explicitly reaffirmed F/rod’s analysis, stating

that “[t]he appropriate question is, were ‘the objectives of [Ti-

tle IX] . . . within Congress’ power’”’ under the Fourteenth

Amendment. 138 F.3d at 660 (alterations in original) (quoting

Elrod, 674 F.2d at 608). Similarly, Goshtasby, which like Elrod

addressed the ADEA, reaffirmed our holding in E/rod, concluding

that “the rule remains that Congress need not use magic words to

exercise its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” 141 F.3d at 768. See also Doe, 138 F.3d at 678

(Easterbrook, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (“Sex

discrimination by public schools is a subject within the legislative

power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, and Congress need

not catalog the grants of power under which it legislates; courts do

not remand statutes for better statements of reasons.’’).

Both Goshtasby and Doe also rejected the argument, which

the University raises in the instant case, that E/rod’s rule contra-

venes the Supreme Court’s cautionary language that “we should

not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under

its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.” Gregory v.

Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) (quoting Pennhurst State

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981)). We

recognized in Doe that the inquiries involved in both Gregory and

Pennhurst were not similar to our inquiry into whether Congress

acted pursuant to § 5 in enacting legislation, the substantive reach

of which was clear. Rather, we concluded, those cases concerned

the substantive reach of statutory provisions and whether

Congress intended to subject the States to mandatory obligations

by enacting legislation pursuant to its § 5 powers. See Doe, 138

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F.3d at 658 & n.6; see also Goshtasby, 141 F.3d at 767-68. “In the

present inquiry, by Contrast, the intended result (of subjecting

States to suit for violations of [the Equal Pay Act’s] substantive

provisions) is clear, and the grant of power under which Congress

acted is at issue.”” Doe, 138 F.3d at 658. We therefore continue to

adhere to the method of analysis set forth in Elrod, which is

consistent with the long-recognized rule that “the constitution-

ality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of

the power which it undertakes to exercise.” Woods v. Cloyd W.

Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); see also EEOC v. Wyo-

ming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (recognizing that “Congress

need [not] anywhere recite the words ‘section 5’ or ‘Fourteenth

Amendment’ or ‘Equal Protection’”’ in order to exercise its § 5

powers).

The Equal Pay Act, however, presents an additional wrinkle

that prevents us from proceeding immediately to consider

whether the objectives of the Act are within Congress’s § 5

powers. The FLSA as originally enacted explicitly stated that the

statute constitutes an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause

powers. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(b); see also United States v. Darby,

312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the constitutionality of the

FLSA as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause pow-

ers). Moreover, when Congress amended the FLSA in 1963 by

passing the Equal Pay Act, it explicitly stated that it was relying

on its authority to regulate interstate commerce. See Pub. L.

No. 88-38, § 2(b), 77 Stat. 56, 56. This history would be

unexceptional by itself, as it is consistent with Congress’s pattern

of enacting civil rights statutes under the Commerce Clause to

regulate private conduct, as mandated by the holding of the Civil

Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and later amending those

statutes pursuant to its § 5 authority to encompass government

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conduct as well. See, e.g., Elrod, 674 F.2d at 606-08 (discussing

this pattern with respect to Title VII and the ADEA).

The University contends, however, that Congress made a

similarly express statement thet it was exercising its powers under

the Commerce Clause when it extended the FLSA to the States

through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. According

to the University’s argument, the Equal Pay Act is unlike the

ADEA, in which Congress left the source of its power unstated

when it extended the statute’s coverage to the States. See Goshtasby,

141 F.3d at 767. Therefore, the University argues, the inquiry

mandated by E/rod—whether the objectives of the statute are within

Congress’s § 5 powers—is simply inapplicable to this case. Rather,

the University believes that we should take Congress at its word and

definitively conclude that the 1974 amendments to the Equal Pay

Act were enacted solely pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.

As an initial matter, we note that another court of appeals

has rejected the premise that Congress explicitly relied upon its

Commerce Clause powers when it extended the Equal Pay Act’s

protections to the States. The Sixth Circuit, in addressing the

identical question that is before us today, extensively analyzed the

legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of

1974’ and reaffirmed its prior holding that “Congress did not

expressly state the constitutional basis of its extension of the

” As our analysis in Elrod made clear, we must focus upon the particular

legislation that extended a statute’s coverage to the States, as opposed to the

original statute itself, when determining the source of Congress’s power. See

Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604-08 (considering the 1974 amendments to the ADEA, as

opposed to the orginal legislation enacted in 1967). Accord, e.g., Mills v. Maine,

118 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1997) (considering the 1974 amendments to the FLSA

as opposed to the original legislation); Timmer v. Michigan Dep’t of Commerce,

104 F.3d 833, 838 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he court properly focused on the

1974 amendments as opposed to the 1963 version of the Equal Pay Act.

Although the 1974 legislation was an amendment to an already existing act, it

was nevertheless a separate act of Congress.”).

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No. 97-3253

FLSA to the States in 1974.” Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of

Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 838 (6th Cir. 1997). The court in

Timmer noted that the report of the Senate Committee on Labor

and Public Welfare, S. REP. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24

(1974), merely indicated the Committee’s belief that “it had the

power to extend the FLSA to the States under the Commerce

Clause.” * Timmer, 104 F.3d at 838-39 n.7.

The Equal Pay Act, which Congress designated as severable

from the other protections of the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. § 219, is

mentioned only once in the Senate Committee’s 116-page report,

in a discussion of the FLSA’s historical background. See S. REP.

No. 93-690, supra, at 6. Indeed, the relevant legislative history

indicates that Congress concentrated primarily upon extending

the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions when it

passed the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. See id.;

see also Timmer, 104 F.3d at 846 n.2 (Boggs, J., dissenting)

(“The items debated were primarily the minimum wage and

overtime provisions.”); cf. Elrod, 674 F.2d at 605 (noting that

{little legislative history exists on the ADEA amendment, .. .

because the breadth and significance of the amendments to the

FLSA overshadowed the ADEA amendment”). Thus, we do not

accept the University’s contention, which is solely based upon a

murky legislative history, that Congress expressly relied upon its

® The report states, in part:

The Committee believes that there is no doubt that the activities of

public sector employers affect interstate commerce and therefore that

the Congress may regulate them pursuant to its power to regulate

interstate commerce. Without question, the activities of government at

all levels affect commerce.

S. Rep. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974). See also H.R. REp.

No. 93-913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) (“It is hereby declared to be the

policy of this Act, through the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate

commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, to correct and as

rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to... .”).

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No. 97-3253

Commerce Clause powers in extending the Equal Pay Act to the

States. Accord Mills, 118 F.3d at 44 (“[O]ne cannot read

Congress’ statement regarding the Act’s validity under the Com-

merce Clause to indicate that Congress intended to exclude other

applicable constitutional bases for the Act.”) (quotations and

alteration omitted); Timmer, 104 F.3d at 838-39 n.7 (“We

believe that this legislative history falls far short of an ‘express

statement’ of congressional intent.”’).

Because we are unconvinced that Congress expressly declared

its intention to proceed solely pursuant to its Commerce Clause

powers, we conclude that Elrod’s analysis controls the present

inquiry. Pursuant to this analysis, we have little difficulty in conclud-

ing that the objectives of the Equal Pay Act were within Congress’s

powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.” As we have discussed,

see supra at 5-6 & n.3, the purpose of the Equal Pay Act is to

prohibit arbitrary sex-based wage disparities. Prohibiting “arbitrary,

discriminatory government conduct. . . is the very essence of the

guarantee of ‘equal protection of the laws’ of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604. Thus, we conclude that the

Equal Pay Act constitutes an exercise of Congress’s § 5 enforcement

powers.”

* We note that this conclusion is not dispositive of the issue of whether the

extension of the Equal Pay Act to the States is constitutionally-valid legislation,

which we consider infra at 16-22.

'© Two other courts of appeals, in addition to the Sixth Circuit in Timmer, have

arrived at the same conclusion. See Usery v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d

1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155

(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977). Those courts both rejected Tenth

Amendment challenges to the Equal Pay Act under the then-prevailing rule of

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), by holding that the Equal

Pay Act was enacted pursuant to Congress’s § 5 powers. We applied a different

rationale to reject a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Equal Pay Act in

Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978), but we expressly

reserved the question of whether the statute was also a proper exercise of Congress’s

§ 5 powers. See id. at 6 n.19.

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No. 97-3253

2. Whether The Equal Pay Act is Within Congress’s § 5

Enforcement Powers

The University argues that Congress exceeded its power to

enforce the Fourteenth Amendment when it extended the protec-

tions of the Equal Pay Act to the States. In this context, the

University relies on the fact that the Equal Pay Act does not

require proof of an employer’s discriminatory purpose. See Fal-

lon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing

that “the Equal Pay Act creates a type of strict liability in that no

intent to discriminate need be shown’’) (quotation omitted); see

also Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 118 (2d

Cir. 1997). Because claims of discrimination under the Four-

teenth Amendment require proof of purposeful discrimination,

see, e.g., Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979),

the University contends that the Equal Pay Act is not within

Congress’s power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the

provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 5. We previously have addressed similar challenges to

Title VII’s imposition of disparate impact liability. See Liber-

ales v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1983);

United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 422-24 (7th Cir.

1978). We rejected those challenges, holding that the prohibition

of policies that had a discriminatory impact was “plainly adapted”

to the end of “enforc[ing] the anti-discrimination provisions of

the Equal Protection Clause.” Jd. at 423. The University argues,

however, that the Supreme Court’s holding in City of Boerne vy.

Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), altered our prior understanding of

Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers and war-

rants a different result in the instant case.

In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court addressed the consti-

tutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4. RFRA was a legislative response

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No. 97-3253

to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division vy.

Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the Court had held that the

First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause did not require the

States to provide exceptions from neutral, generally applicable

laws that significantly burden religious practices. See id. at 887.

Congress enacted RFRA, through its § 5 power to enforce the

Due Process Clause, to overcome Smith’s holding. Accordingly,

RFRA provided that laws that substantially burdened the exercise

of religion must be justified as the least restrictive means of

furthering a compelling state interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.

The Court in City of Boerne considered whether legislative

resurrection of the “compelling interest” test—“the most de-

manding test known to constitutional law,” 117 S. Ct. at

2171—constituted a permissible exercise of Congress’s § 5 power.

The Court examined the legislative record and found that Con-

gress did not enact this test in response to a history of unconstitu-

tional conduct: “RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of

modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of

religious bigotry.” /d. at 2169. The Court concluded that RFRA

was “so out of proportion” to the burdens on religion that

Congress identified and attempted to prevent that the statute

could not be understood as an effort to respond to, or prevent,

unconstitutional behavior. See id. at 2170. Rather, the Court

determined that RFRA “attempt[s] a substantive change in

constitutional protections,” id., such that the statute went beyond

attempting *» “enforce” an established constitutional right. Be-

cause “Congiess’s power under § 5 . . . extends only to ‘en-

forc[ing]’ the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,” id. at

2164 (alteration in original), the Court struck down RFRA as

unconstitutional. See id. at 2172.

This analysis clarified what had been an unsettled question in

regard to Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth

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No. 97-3253

Amendment. The Court rejected the substantive, or “ratchet”

theory, expressed most forcefully in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384

U.S. 641, 653-56 (1966), which maintained that Congress could

expand the substantive rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth

Amendment even when the courts had explicitly refused to

recognize the existence of such rights.'' In rejecting this theory,

the Court explained, “Congress does not enforce a constitutional

right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to

enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitu-

tional violation.” City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.

Accordingly, in order to determine whether legislation is

appropriate under Congress’s enforcement power, we must con-

sider whether it deters or remedies unconstitutional conduct. See

id. at 2163. However, legislatior that satisfies this consideration

may be appropriate “even if in the process it prohibits conduct

which is not itself unconstitutional.” See id. For an act to be

appropriate remedial legislation, “[t]here must be a congruence

and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or reme-

died and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connec-

tion, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.”

Id. at 2164.

The University posits that the Equal Pay Act, by not requir-

ing proof of discriminatory intent, necessarily proscribes some

state action that is constitutional. Because of this feature, the

"The Court in City of Boerne asserted that “[a)ny suggestion that

Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment is not supported by our case law.” 117 S. Ct. at 2167. It did recognize that

Morgan “‘could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact

legislation that expands the nights contained in § | of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.” Jd. at 2168. However, the Court believed that this was “not a necessary

interpretation, . . . or even the best one.” Rather, the Court asserted that the

legislation at issue in Morgan could be justified as a reasonable attempt by

Congress to combat unconstitutional discrimination. See id.

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No. 97-3253

University argues that the Equal Pay Act constitutes “substan-

tive” legislation. This contention is not without some appeal.’

The Supreme Court’s recognition that Congress’s “remedial”

power “extends only to enforc[ing] the provisions of the Four-

teenth Amendment” is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s

statement that remedial legislation may be appropriate “even if in

the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitu-

tional.” City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163-64. The Supreme

Court recognized this difficulty, stating that “the line between

measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and

measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is

not easy to discern.”’ Jd. at 2164. Nonetheless, “the distinction

exists and must be observed.” Jd. Therefore, we reject the

University’s contention that the Equal Pay Act automatically

constitutes inappropriate legislation merely because it proscribes

some constitutional conduct.

Instead, we consider whether the Equal Pay Act satisfies

City of Boerne’s “proportionality and congruence”’ test. See id. In

'? The Supreme Court’s distinction between substantive and remedial

legislation has not been applied uniformly in the courts of appeals. In the context

of Eleventh Amendment challenges to antidiscrimination statutes, the distinc-

tion has resulted in disarray. Compare Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d

1426, 1433, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding, in a splintered opinion, that the

ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity),

with Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 772

(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the ADEA is a proper exercise of Congress’s

enforcement power); compare also Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d

802, 805 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In passing the [Amefieans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) ], Congress was not atiempting to make a substantive constitutional

change.”), with Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 440 (Sth Cir. 1998)

(Smith, J., dissenting) (“Both RFRA and the ADA purport to establish greater

rights for individuals against the states by increasing the measure of judicial

scrutiny for conflicting state actions to a level higher than the Supreme Court

has found appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment.”), petition for cert.

filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. May 28, 1998) (No. 97-1941).

No. 97-3253

this context, it is significant that Congress inquired into the extent

of sex-based wage discrimination in the workplace prior to enact-

ing the Equal Pay Act.”’ See, e.g., S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong.,

Ist Sess., 1 (1963). The Supreme Court has recognized that

Congress’ purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to

remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic

problem of employment discrimination in private industry—

the fact that the wage structure of “many segments of

American industry has been based on an ancient but outmo-

ded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should

be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the

same.”

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)

(quoting S. Rep. No. 176, supra). Congress accordingly had

substantial justification to conclude that pervasive discrimination

existed whereby women were paid less tham men for equal work.

We accord these findings substantial deference, given that “Con-

gress must have wide latitude,” City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164,

to determine where the line lies between substantive and remedial

measures. These legislative findings stand in contrast to RFRA, in

which the legislative record was devoid of any reference to

modern examples of the kind of unconstitutional conduct purport-

edly targeted by the legislation. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at

2169-70.

Moreover, in examining the provisions of the Equal Pay Act,

we do not believe that their scope is out of proportion to the

'? Legislative findings in this context may be helpful to our inquiry. As the

Supreme Court has recognized, however, they are not required. See City of

Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169-70 (“Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not

on the state of the legislative record Congress compiles but ‘on due regard for

the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide.’”) (quoting

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, J.)).

22a

No. 97-3253

harms that Congress sought to redress. See Goshtasby, 141 F.3d

at 772. In order to establish a claim under the Equal Pay Act, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer pays different wages

to employees of the opposite sex “for equal work on jobs the

performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibil-

ity, and which are performed under similar working conditions.”

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). This, however, does not automatically

establish liability. Rather, employers enjoy three specific affirma-

tive defenses: that the wage differentials are due to either (i) a

seniority system, (ii) a merit system, or (iii) a system that

measures wages by quantity or quality of production. Jd. In

addition, employers may avoid liability under a catch-all provision

that affords a defense when the differential is “based on any other

factor other than sex.” Jd. § 206(d)(1)(iv); see also Fallon v.

Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989). The broad scope of

these defenses protects employers from liability when the em-

ployer has sound reasons for wage disparities (“any other factor

other than sex’’), but they allow for liability when no such reasons

exist. We believe that these siatutory provisions are reasonably

tailored to remedy intentional gender-based wage discrimination.

Cf. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir.

1978) (holding that Congress’s extension of Title VII’s protet-

tions to government employees was “clearly rationally related to

and consistent with the ‘letter and spirit’ of the Fourteenth

Amendment’). As we recognized in Goshtasby, the fact that the

Statute’s sweep includes some constitutional conduct is not fatal.

See 141 F.3d at 423 (quoting City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163).

The Equal Pay Act, unlike RFRA, does not redefine the substan-

tive nghts of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor are its provisions

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No. 97-3253

out of proportion to the harms that Congress intended to remedy

and deter.'*

Thus, in light of the above, we conclude that Congress

validly abrogated the University’s Eleventh Amendment immu-

nity from suit under the Equal Pay Act.

Ill. The Civil Rights Act of 1991

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e,

was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of

1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 78 Stat. 253, to expressly abrogate the

States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,

427 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1976). Title VII's definition of “person”

was amended to include “governments, governmental agencies,

[and] political subdivisions,”’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), and the term

“employer” is defined as a “person’”’ who also satisfies other

statutory conditions not relevant here. Jd. § 2000e(b). The statute

also defines the term “respondent” to include an employer. /d.

§ 2000e(n). Finally, the 1972 amendments included within the

statute’s definition of “employee” those individuals “subject to

the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency

or political subdivision.” Jd. § 2000e(f). Title VII’s enforcement

provisions state that “a civil action may be brought against the

respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be

'* In a footnote to its Equal Pay Act argument, the University’s Brief states:

“To the extent that plaintiffs assert disparate impact claims under Title VII,

those claims raise identical Fourteenth Amendment concerns.” If the University

is attempting to argue that, in light of City of Boerne, we should overrule City of

Chicago and Liberales, it has waived this argument. See, e.g., United States v.

Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (“We repeatedly have made

clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments . . . are waived (even where

those arguments raise constitutional issues).”). At any rate, in light of the

foregoing discussion, we see no reason to revisit those cases without the benefit

of full briefing.

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No. 97-3253

aggrieved,” id. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and that “each United States

district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under

this subchapter.” Jd. § 2000e-5(f) (3). These provisions make it

unmistakably clear, as the Supreme Court recognized in Fitzpat-

rick, that Congress intended to abrogate the States’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity under Title VII. The University argues,

however, that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA)—which for

the first time provided a compensatory damages remedy for

Title VII plaintiffs who proved intentional discrimination, see

42 U.S.C. § 198la—does not contain a similar expression of

legislative intent to abrogate.

The plain language of § 1981a shows that Congress intended

to create an additional remedy for Title VII violations, as opposed

to a separate cause of action. The statute provides:

In an action brought by a complaining party under

section 706 ... of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

[42 U.S.C. 2000e-5] against a respondent who engaged

in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . prohibited

under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C.

2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16], and provided that the

complaining party cannot recover under [42 U.S.C.

1981], the complaining party may recover compensa-

tory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b)

of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by

section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

[42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)], from the respondent.

42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(1). As the University concedes, Congress

incorporated Title VII's definitional provisions into § 198la.

These definitional provisions establish that the States, as potential

“respondents,” see supra at 22, are within the class of employers

from which a “complaining party” under § 198la may recover

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- No. 97-3253

compensatory damages, and they are not elsewhere expressly

excluded from that class. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(1) &

(b)(2). Section 1981a defines the term “complaining party”’ to

include “a person who may bring an action or proceeding under

title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Jd. § 198la(d) (1) (A).

Thus, a “complaining party” in an “action brought” under Ti-

tle VII may be entitled to compensatory damages by showing that

a “respondent” (which includes State governments) engaged in

unlawful intentional discrimination. Further, as we have indi-

cated, Title VII confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts for

“actions brought” under its provisions. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f)(3). Therefore, we conclude that the Civil Rights

Act of 1991 mercly creates an additional remedy for actions

brought under Title VII. See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,

553 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Congress amended Title VII in the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 to permit victims of unlawful intentional

discrimination to collect compensatory and punitive dam-

ages. .. .”). It does not, as the University contends, create a

distinct cause of action that would require its own statement of

abrogation. When Congress authorized compensatory damages

claims against Title VII respondents (who may be sued in federal

court), it expressed its intent to authorize such claims against the

States.

Our conclusion is further buttressed by Congress’s explicit

exclusion of the States as respondents that may be subject to

punitive damages claims under Title VII. See 42 US.C.

§ 1981a(b)(1) (“A complaining party may recover punitive

damages under this section against a respondent (other than a

government, government agency or political subdivision)... .’’).

) No similar exclusion exists with respect to claims for compensa-

tory damages. See id § 1981a(b) (2). Congress would have had no

; need to provide this explicit exception to the CRA’s expanded

|

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No. 97-3253

remedies unless it understood the remainder of those remedies—

including compensatory damages claims—to apply to the States.

Indeed, “a limitation of liability is nonsensical unless liability

existed in the first place.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,

491 U.S. 1, 13 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Seminole

Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Thus, we believe that

the language of § 198la makes clear Congress’s desire to add

remedies to Title VII (including a compensatory damages rem-

edy against the States), rather than a separate cause of action.

Under Title VII, the abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amend-

ment immunity is settled. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49.

For the foregoing reasons, we reject the University’s asser-

tion of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to both the

Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. We therefore

affirm the decision of the district court.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

27a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dr. IRIS VARNER, et al., ,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 95-1355

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, et al,

Defendants. )

FILED

JUL 30 1997

JOHN M. WATERS, Clerk

U.S. District Court

Central District of Illinois

ORDER

This matter is now before the Court on Magistrate Judge

Robert J. Kauffman’s Report & Recommendation and two

Motions to Dismiss by Defendants. For the reasons set forth

herein, the Report & Recommendation [ #128] is adopted in part

and rejected in part, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#71] is

granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss [ #18] is granted in part and denied in part as moot.

Background

The relevant facts of this case have been sufficiently set forth

in the Report & Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as

well as the prior Orders of this Court, and need not be restated

here. Suffice it to say that this matter is brought on behalf of a

a

28a

class including any female teaching faculty at Illinois State

University who was an Assistant Professor, Associate Professor,

or ful! Professor anytime during the period beginning with the

1982-1983 academic year up to and including the present. Plain-

tiffs allege that the class of women has been paid less than their

male counterparts, given considerations of teaching experience,

the number of classes and class size they taught, academic papers

published, service to the University, and other matters to go to the

quality of their services. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants

engaged in retaliation against female professors who complained

of their alleged employment practices.

On September, 24, 1996, the Court ruled on-a motion to

dismiss filed with respect to the original Complaint (“Motion to

Dismiss 1”). Motion to Dismiss | was premised upon the argu-

ment that Plaintiffs cannot proceed in federal court on any claims

based on the Equal Pay Act because the State of Illinois has not

consented to suit. Upon the filing of Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Complaint, Defendants revived this motion to dismiss, as well as a

second motion to dismiss that had been filed prior to the case

being transferred to this district (“Motion to Dismiss 2”). Motion

to Dismiss 2 challenged Plaintiffs’ ability to hold Defendants

liable in their individual capacities under Title VI] and the Equal

Pay Act. This matter then was referred to the Magistrate Judge

under Local Rule 72.1 for a report and recommendation.

On May 22, 1997, Magistrate Judge Robert J. Kauffman

entered a Report & Recommendation which recommended that

the motions be granted in part and denied in part. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b) (1), the parties had ten (10) working days after service

of the Report & Recommendation to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s decision. Objections were timely filed on

behalf of both parties. Additionally, the United States sought and

was granted leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae with respect to

the issue of sovereign immunity. This Order follows.

29a

Discussion

In resolving a motion to dismiss, this Court must consider all

well-pled facts as true and must draw all inferences in favor of the

non-moving party. Bontkowski v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, 998

F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 602 (1993).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts consider whether relief is

possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent

with the allegations in the Complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957). This Court will dismiss a claim only if it is

beyond doubt that no set of facts would entitle the Plaintiffs to

relief. Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp.,

987 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1993).

I. Motion to Dismiss 1—Sovereign Immunity

A. Equal Pay Act Claims

In their renewed Motion to Dismiss [#71], Defendants first

allege that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Pay Act should be

dismissed because the State of Illinois has not consented to be

sued in federal court under this statute and such a suit is therefore

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants rely on the

‘Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

US. , 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123 (1996), which found:

In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated

the States’ sovereign immunity, we ask two questions:

first, whether Congress has “unequivocally expresse[d]

its intent to abrogate the immunity,” Green v. Mansour,

474 US. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 426, 88 L.Ed.2u 371

(1985); and second, whether Congress has acted “pur-

suant to a valid exercise of power.”

Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1123.

When last confronted with this issue in September 1996, the

Court engaged in substantial analysis of the effect of Seminole

30a

Tribe on suits brought pursuant to the Equal Pay Act. Ultimately,

the Court determined that the portion of the Fair Labor Stan-

dards Act (“FLSA”) constituting the Equal Pay Act was enacted

to prohibit discrimination in pay based on sex in furtherance of

the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which

is a valid exercise of Congressional power.' After careful consider-

ation of the briefs submitted in connection with this issue, as well

as subsequent case authority,’ the Court remains confident that

the prior decision is correct and constitutes the law of the case. To

the extent that Defendants seek reconsideration of this Court’s

prior finding that the Equal Pay Act was properly enacted in

furtherance of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, such a request is denied.

However, Defendants now argue for the first time that

Congress did not clearly express its intent to abrogate the

Eleventh Amendment in enacting the Equal Pay Act. As this

Court’s September 24, 1996 Order did not contain an in-depth

discussion of this aspect of the Seminole Tribe test, the Court

will elaborate now in the interest of making a complete record.

The intent to abrogate “must be obvious from ‘a clear

legislative statement.’ ” Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1123, quot-

ing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 111

S.Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991). Here, the Equal Pay Act itself contains

neither definitions nor enforcement provisions. Rather, such

Cf. Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487

(7th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act, “like other

antidiscrimination statutes,” was an exercise of Congressional power under the

Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Commerce Clause).

> In Timmer v. Michigan Department of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir.

1997), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the holding of Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess

County Hospital, 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978), cited in this Court’s Septem-

ber 24, 1996 Order. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit found that, although not

expressly stated, Congress clearly and properly acted in furtherance of § 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment in_extending the Equal Pay Act to state employces.

Timmer, 104 F.3d at 838-39.

3la

interpretative terms and mechanisms must be drawn from the

context of the remainder of the FLSA.

The term “employer: is defined in the FLSA to “include[] a

public agency,” which in turn is defined as “the government of

a State or political subdivision thereof” and any agency of a

State. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (x). The term “employee” is

defined to include “any individual employed by a State, politi-

cal subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency.

Id. § 203(e) (2)(C). Finally, the private enforcement provision

provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability prescribed . . .

may be maintained against any employer (including a public

agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction

by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or

themselves and other employees similarly situated.”

Timmer, 104 F.3d at 837-38. Such language makes it abundantly

clear that Congress intended to permit actions against states and

State agencies under the Equal Pay Act, thereby purposely abro-

gating sovereign immunity from suit.

Thus, the Court concurs with the other courts which have

confronted this question with respect to the FLSA and reached

the conclusion that the FLSA’s current definitional and enforce-

ment provisions, which are fully applicable to the Equal Pay Act,

as well as the accompanying legislative history, provide an unmis-

takably clear statement of Congress’ intent to abrogate the states’

sovereign immunity.’ Accordingly, the Court finds that Congress

>See also Brinkman yv. Department of Corrections, 21 F.3d 370, 372

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 315 (1994); Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590-

91 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1187 (1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d

1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 386 (1993). Further-

more, the Court notes that the FLSA definition of “employer” and enforcement

provisions at issue are substantially similar to those set forth in the Age Discrimina-

tion in Employment Act, in which context the Seventh Circuit held such provisions

to evidence Congress’ clear “desire to override the states’ sovereign immunity.”

Davidson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 920 F.2d 441, 443

(7th Cir. 1990).

32a

clearly intended to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from

suit through the Equal Pay Act, and the portion of Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss which requests dismissal of all claims based on

the Equal Pay Act must be denied.

B. Claims for Monetary Damages

In their Objections to the Report & Recommendation,

Defendants also raise the new argument that Plaintiffs’ claims for

monetary damages under § 198la are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. Defendants contend that § 1981a contains no indi-

cation of any intent to abrogate sovereign immunity with respect

to claims for compensatory and punitive damages, failing to

satisfy the Seminole Tribe standard for abrogation of Eleventh

Amendment immunity.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages, the

Court agrees with Defendants’ position. Under § 1981la, govern-

ments, governmental agencies or political subdivisions are ex-

pressly excluded from liability for punitive damages. 42 U.S.C.

§ 198la(b)(1). This interpretation is further supported by the

relevant legislative history, which reveals that the purpose of the

language in § 1981la was to establish that punitive damages are

not available against state and local government defendants. See

137 Cong. Rec. S15445-02, S15460, S15472-01, S15484,

H950501, H9527 (1991). Thus, the Court finds that Congress

made no unequivocal expression of intent to abrogate the states’

sovereign immunity with respect to punitive damages in enacting

§ 1981la, and the standard set forth in Seminole Tribe for a valid

abrogation of sovereign immunity has not been satisfied. Accord-

ingly, the portion of Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts IIT and IV of the

First Amended Complaint seeking punitive damages pursuant to

§ 198la are barred, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be

granted in this respect.

33a

Defendants also urge the Court to adopt their myopic view

with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages and

find no indication of Congressional intent in § 198la itself.

However, in considering the availability of compensatory dam-

ages, the Court finds that the appropriate analysis must reach

further. It is clear that Title VII permits recovery of front pay, 7

back pay, and other equitable relief against employers who violate

its provisions but does not, as enacted, provide an avenue of relief

with respect to monetary damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢e ef seq.

However, in 1991, Congress passed § 198la to expand the

remedies available to successful Title VII plaintiffs to include

compensatory damages. Blankenship v. Warren County, Virginia,

931 F.Supp. 447, 450 (W.D.Va. 1996), citing H.R.Rep.

No. 40(1), 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 65, 71 (1991), 1991

U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. While § 1981a does not technically amend

Title VII but, rather, stands alone as a separate statutory provi-

sion, this is not dispositive. To the contrary, the Court concurs

with the district court in Blankenship that an examination of

§ 198la necessarily involves reference to the definitional and

enforcement provisions of Title VII.

Section 1981a provides:

In an action brought by a complaining party under sec-

tion 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... against a

respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimina-

tion . . . prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the

Act ... and provided that the complaining party cannot

recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining

party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as

allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in additional to any

relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 ... from the respondent.

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1). Although a complaining party includes

“a person who may bring an action or proceeding under Title VII

34a

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. § 198la(d)(1)(A),

the term “respondent” is not defined by § 1981a. However, by its

own terms, § 1981a looks to § 2000e to give meaning to its

provisions. Sattar v. Unocal Corp., 829 F.Supp. 331, 333 n.3

(N.D.Cal. 1993).

To determine who qualifies as a respondent, one has no

recourse but to look to § 2000e-5(b), which defines “respon-

dent” as, inter alia, an “employer.” .. . [I]t is beyond cavil

that employers under Title VII include state employers.

Therefore, § 1981a, which permits suits against respondents,

allows suits against state employers as well.

Blankenship, 931 F.2d at 450. In other words, the term

“*[r]Jespondent’ can only be interpreted by reference to § 2000e

and, thus, to the use of the word ‘employer’.” Sattar, 829 F.Supp.

at 333 n.3. i

Thus, the Court finds that by including the references to

Title VII in the text of § 198la and failing to provide an

alternative definition, Congress expressed its intent that Title VII

supply the definition of “respondent” for purposes of assessing

liability under § 1981a. This, in combination with the other overt

references to Title VII’s enforcement and definitional provisions

in the text of § 198la, evidences Congress’ intent in enacting

§ 1981a to supplement the remedies available under Title VII and

expand its prior abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity.

Furthermore, the legislative history of § 198la evidences Con-

gress’ understanding that the provisions concerning compensatory

damages would apply to the states. See 137 Cong. Rec.

H9505-01, H9527 (1991) (“By reference to sections 703, 704

and 706 of Title VII, the statutory language of section [1981a] is

explicit that compensatory damages are available against state

and local governmental defendants . . . .”); 137 Cong. Rec.

S$15472-01, S15484 (1991) (“[C]ompensatory damages may be

awarded against federal, state and local government

35a

agencies ....”). Accordingly, in applying the first step of the two-

part analysis set forth in Seminole Tribe, the Court concludes that

Congress has provided a ciear statement of its intent to subject

states to claims for compensatory damages pursuant to § 1981a in

federal court.

The second part of the Seminole Tribe analysis requires that

Congress act “pursuant to a valid exercise of power” in attempt-

ing to abrogate sovereign immunity. 116 S.Ct. at 1123. In

enacting § 1981a, Congress sought to expand the remedies availa-

ble to plaintiffs in Title VII actions. The Supreme Court has held

that Title VII constitutes a valid abrogation of the states’ Elev-

enth Amendment immunity because Congress acted in further-

ance of the Fourteenth Amendment, “which operated to alter the

pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by

Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.” Seminole Tribe, 116

S.Ct. at 1128; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666

(1976). Like Title VII, § 198la provides additional remedies

against discrimination in the workplace on account of sex, and

Defendants cannot reasonably argue that Congress lacks power to

provide remedies for discrimination under § 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. As such, the Court finds that § 198la is an anti-

discrimination measure that may be viewed as an exercise of

Congress’ power to adopt legislation enforcing the Fourteenth

Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law. Therefore,

under Seminole Tribe, sovereign immunity would not insulate the

State of Illinois from suit for compensatory damages pursuant to

§ 198la, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss | must be denied

with respect to Plaintiffs’ claums for compensatory damages in

Counts III and IV.

36a

II. Motion to Dismiss 2—Individual Liability

A. Equal Pay Act Claims

Defendants assert that the Equal Pay Act does not permit

suits against defendants in their individual capacities. Although

the Seventh Circuit has found that an individual employee may

be named in lieu of the employer in an Equal Pay Act claim,

- Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987), the

Court of Appeals did not decide the precise issue of whether an

individual employee may be named in addition to the employing

entity in this context. However, this issue has been addressed by

Other district courts in this circuit. In Pommier v. James L.

Edelstein Enterprises, the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen held that

the definition of the term “employer” as used in both the Equal

Pay Act and Title VII is “identical,” and case law in the Title VII

area directs that an individual supervisor cannot be held person-

ally liable for Equal Pay Act violations made as agent of the

employer. 816 F.Supp. 476, 481 (N.D.III. 1993), citing Weiss v.

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 772 F.Supp. 407, 412

(N.D.III. 1991). The district judge in Weiss likewise concluded

that allegations against an individual regarding actions that were

taken as an agent of the employer cannot result in individual

liability. 772 F.Supp. at 412. See also Jaskowski v. Rodman &

Renshaw, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 1094, 1098 (N.D.III. 1994) (recog-

nizing that neither Title VII nor the Equal Pay Act permits suits

against individuals. )*

“The Court also notes that although the decisions in Witham v. Regency

Savings Bank, 1995 WL 723888 (N.D.III. December 5, 1995), and Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Home by Hemphill. Inc., 1995 WL

683502 (N.D.III, November 16, 1995), technically allow allegations of individ-

ual liability under the Equal Pay Act to survive a motion to dismiss, the Court

finds these opinions unpersuasive. In Witham, the Honorable Milton I. Shadur

expressly stated that the court would be willing to entertain a motion for

dismissal of the individual claim that was “properly supported by persuasive

authority.” 1995 WL 723888 at *1. Similarly, although leave to replead was

37a

Whereas the Equal Pay Act derives its definition of “em-

ployer” from the Fair Labor Standards Act and “includes any

person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer

in relation to an employee and includes a public agency,” 29

U.S.C. § 203(d) (emphasis added), “a person engaged in an

industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees

for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in

the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a

person” is an employer under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)

(emphasis added). Although this Court does not agree that the

definitions of “employer” in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are

identical, the definitions may be functionally equivalent as ap-

plied. Furthermore, the remedies available under the applicable

sections of the Equal Pay Act include unpaid minimum wages or

unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, reinstate-

ment, and promotion. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Like the remedies

available under Title VII, these are remedies which are more

likely provided by an employer rather than an individual, and the

language of the Equal Pay Act uses the term “employer” in the

context of the entity paying the disparate wages. 29 U.S.C.

§§ 216(b), 206(d) (1).

Additionally, the Court’s review of the First Amended Com-

plaint reveals that Plaintiffs’ allegations against the named De-

fendants are directed toward actions purportedly taken by these

persons in their capacities as agents for Illinois State University.

Plaintiffs do not allege that any of these persons was acting

outside the scope of their official capacities at the time they

engaged in violations of the Equal Pay Act. Thus, there does not

appear to be a basis for imposing personal liability against these

individuals. Accordingly, this aspect of the Report & Recommen-

dation is rejected, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in

their individual capacities are dismissed from Counts I and II.

granted, the decision in Hemphill actually dismissed the claim of individual

liability as insufficient. 1995 WL 683502 at *3.

38a

B. Title VII Claims

In the Motion to Dismiss 2, Defendants also contend that

they cannot be sued in their individual capacities for violations of

Title VII and ask that Plaintiffs’ claims in this regard be dis-

missed. In the Report & Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge

concurs and recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the

Title VII claims against the individuals in Counts III and IV, be

granted. However, this Court’s review of the Amended Complaint

reveals that Counts III and IV, as amended, do not state any

claim against Defendants in their individual capacities. Accord-

ingly, the Court rejects this portion of the Report & Recommen-

dation. This aspect of Motion to Dismiss 2 will be denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Report & Recommenda-

tion is ADOPTED in part and REJECTED in part. Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss [#71] is GRANTED IN PART and DE-

NIED IN PART, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#18] is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT.

The previously imposed stay is now lifted, and this matter is

referred to Magistrate Judge Kauffman for further proceedings.

ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1997.

MICHAEL M. MIHM

Chief United States District Judge

39a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dr. IRIS VARNER, ef al

Plaintiff

VS. > ~—s-s Case No. 95-1355

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, ef al

Defendants }

FILED

MAY 22 1997

JOHN M. WATERS, Clerk

U.S. District Court

Central District of Illinois

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Now before the court are the defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

(#18 and #71), which were revived by motion following the

filing of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The motions are

fully briefed, and oral arguments were heard on February 27.

Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, the district judge has referred the

matter to me for a report and recommendation. After carefully

considering all of the submissions of the parties, and pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the motions be

granted in part and denied in part.

40a

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Iris Varner, Teresa Palmer, and Paula Pomerenke,

on behalf of themselves and a certified class, allege that defend-

ants have violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§1981),

and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§1983).

Plaintiffs are all tenure track faculty at Illinois State Univer-

sity. Defendants are Illinois State University, four officials of the

University, and members of the Board of Regents and its succes-

sor Board of Trustees in their official capacities. (The caption of

the complaint indicates that these individuals are sued in both

individual and official capacities. However, the body of the

complaint reveals that relief is sought against the individuals in

their official capacities only.)

~The complaint was originally filed in the Northern District of

Illinois. Upon a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer, Judge Zagel

granted the motion to transfer and denied the motion to dismiss.

A second motion to dismiss, filed after transfer to this court, was

granted in part and denied in part by Judge Mihm, after which

plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint.

The First Amended Complaint consists of five counts.

Counts I and II, against the University and the board members in

their official capacities, allege sex discrimination and retaliation in

violation of the Equal Pay Act. Counts III and IV are also against

the University and members of the board in their official capaci-

ties; these Counts claim violations of Title VII and §1981.

Count V alleges a violation of §1983 against the individual

defendants in their official capacity. After the amended complaint

was filed, Defendants moved to revive the previous motions as

they related to the amended complaint, a motion that was

allowed.

4la

Because one of the issues raised in the second motion to

dismiss was the constitutionality of the two statutes at issue, the

United States Attorney General was notified. Although the

United States subsequently declined to intervene, the Attorney

General requested that the court consider briefs on the same issue

that had been filed in another case currently pending in this court.

The constitutional issue raised is whether Congress properly

abrogated State immunity from Equal Pay Act liability under the

Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

US., 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). In an Order

dated September 24, 1996, resolving the second motion to dis-

miss, Judge Mihm ruled that Congress had properly abrogated

Illinois’ sovereign immunity and that the State was not insulated

from suit under the Equal Pay Act. Because this issue has been

resolved in this case by the District Judge, I decline to reconsider

the issue, believing the Order to constitute law of the case. To the

extent the defendants had wished to revive this portion of the

earlier motions, they may take up the Eleventh Amendment

issues in objections to this Report and Recommendation.

The other issue raised is whether suit against the individual

defendants is proper. That issue will be addressed in this Report

and Recommendation.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears from

the pleadings that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544,

548 (7th Cir. 1993). Rather, it should be construed broadly and

liberally in conformity with the mandate in Rule 8(f).

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; its well-pleaded factual

42a

allegations are taken as true, and all reasonably-drawn inferences

are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Hishon v. King, 467 U.S. 69 (1984);

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); MCM Partners y.

Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 1995);

Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1992);

Yeksigean v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1990). In addition, a

complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recov-

ery under some viable legal theory. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos.,

727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984). If the plaintiffs claim as plead is

“without legal consequence,” dismissal is proper; Grzan v.

Charter Hospital, 104 F.3d 116, 119 (7th Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION

A. Individual liability under the Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (EPA), is part of

the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The latter statute defines

“employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the

interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a

public agency .. .” 29 U.S.C. §203(d). “Public agency” means

“the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any

agency of . . . a State, or a political subdivisions of a State.”

29 U.S.C. §203(x). “Person’’ includes “an individual.” 29 U.S.C.

§203(a).

There are cases discussing individual liability under the EPA

but this is an issue not yet addressed by the Supreme Court. The

Seventh Circuit has mentioned it in dicta, Riordan v. Kempiners,

831 F.2d 690, 694-5 (7th Cir. 1987), but that reference scems to

cut against defendants’ position:

For reasons unclear to us, [plaintiffs] lawyer decided to

name .. . the director of the Department [] as the only

43a

defendant to her suit under the Equal Pay Act. The word

“employer” is defined broadly enough in the Fair Labor

Standards Act (of which the Equal Pay Act is an amend-

ment) to permit naming another employee rather than the

employer as defendant, provided the defendant had supervi-

sory authority over the complaining employee and was re-

sponsible in whole or part for the alleged violation.

Id. at 694.

The Northern District of Illinois has ruled on the issue

directly several times with inconsistent results. See, Jaskowski v.

Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 1094, 1098 (N.D.IIL.

1994) (finding individual liability under EPA); Pommier v.

James L. Edelstein Enter, 816 F.Supp. 476 (N.D.III.

1993) (same); and Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F.Supp.

407 (N.D.IIl. 1991) (same); but see, EEOC v. Home by Hemp-

hill, Inc., No. 95 C1138, 1995 WL 683502 (N.D.IIl. Nov. 16,

1995) (rejecting individual liability under EPA); and Witham v.

Regency Savings Bank, 1995 WL 680313 (N.D.IIl. Nov. 13,

1995) (same). See also, Bergstrom v. Univ. of New Hampshire,

943 F.Supp. 130 (D.N.H.1996) (rejecting individual liability and

criticizing Pommier as “thinly reasoned” and based in part on the

erroneous conclusion that “employer”’ is defined identically in the

EPA and Title VII). Cf, Freemon v. Foley, 911 F.Supp. 326

(N.D.IIl. 1995) (finding individual liability under Family and

Medical Leave Act, which adopts definition of “employer” from

FLSA).

In my opinion, the definition of “employer” in the FLSA

clearly and unambiguously includes individuals. The cases cited

above that have concluded differently have, as the New

Hampshire court pointed out, simply assumed that the statutory

definition is the same as is contained in Title VII and other

employment statutes. It is not. Under the EPA, an individual may

be held liable.

44a

However, that conclusion does not mean that all individual

co-employees, supervisors, officers and board members are ac-

countable under the EPA. To determine if any “person” is an

employer, courts look to such factors as the powers to hire and

fire, to supervise and control work schedules or conditions of

employment, to set rate and method of payment, and to maintain

employment records. See, Keenan v. Allan, 889 F.Supp. 1320

(E.D.Wash. 1995), affd. 91 F.3d 1275. Accord, Brock v. Hamad,

867 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1989) (power to hire and direct employ-

ees); U.S. Dept of Labor v. Cole Enter., Inc., 62 F.3d 775

(6th Cir. 1995) (CEO with significant ownership interest, signifi-

cant control of business operation, power to determine salaries

and to make hiring decisions is employer). These powers need not

be exclusively exercised by the “person” who has been sued.

Freemon, 911 F.Supp. 326; Reich v. Cole Enter., Inc., 901

F.Supp. 255 (S.D.Ohio 1993) aff'd, 62 F.3d 775. If a director or

officer has sufficient control over the entity that his decisions

determine if a violation of the FLSA occurred, then the FLSA

considers that “person” to be the “employer.” Dole v. Simpson,

784 F.Supp. 538 (N.D.Ind.1991).

I believe the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint contains

sufficient allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss. It may or

may not be possible for plaintiff to develop evidence as to each of

these individuals sufficient to withstand summary judgment, but

that is an issue for another day. I recommend that the motion to

dismiss the EPA claims against the individual defendants be

denied.

B. Individual Liability under Ti*le VII as amended

In Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995), the

Seventh Circuit clearly held that there is no Title VII liability for

individuals, unless the individual meets the statutory definition of

“employer” independently of the entity. Otherwise, under

Title VII, only the entity that is the employer is subject to suit.

45a

Accord, Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 1996) (su-

pervisor does not fall within Title VII definition of employer);

Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1996) (in

sexual harassment Title VII suit in which supervisor was sued in

official capacity, proper defendant was University not supervisor;

summary judgment for supervisor affirmed).

The individuals named as defendants in this suit are not

“employers.” See, Feltner v. Partyka, 945 F.Supp.1188

(N.D.II1.1996) (owners of company not “employers”); Fernandez

v. Wolff, 919 F.Supp. 1120 (N.D.III. 1996) (university president

and dean not “employers”); Vakharia v. Little Company of Mary

Hosp., 917 F.Supp. 1282 (N.D.IIl. 1996) (hospital officers not

“employers”); Whitechurch v. Apache Products Co., 916 F.Supp.

809 (N.D.Ill. 1996)(CEO not “employer”); Briggs v. North

Shore Sanitary Dist., 914 F.Supp.245 (N.D.IIl. 1996) (board of

trustees member not “employer”). They are therefore not subject

to suit under Title VII.

For this reason, I recommend that defendants’ motion to

dismiss the Title VII claims against the individuals in Counts III

and IV be granted.

C. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, I recommend that defendants’

motion be granted as to the Title VII claims asserted in

Counts III and IV and denied as to all other issues. Plaintiff

should be directed to file an amended complaint. The parties are

advised that any objection to this Report and Recommendation

must be filed in writing with the Clerk within ten (10) working

days after service of this Report and Recommendation.

Fed.R.Civ.P.72(b); 29 U.S.C.636(b) (1). Failure to object will

constitute a waiver of objections on appeal. Video Views Inc. V.

Studio 21, Lid., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).

46a

ENTER this 22nd day of May, 1997.

Ce

ROBERT J. KAUFFMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

47a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dr. IRIs I. VARNER, DR. TERESA M.

PALMER, and Dr. PAULA J.

POMERENKE, on their own behalf and

on behalf of all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY;

ROBERT W. JEFFERSON, Dean;

DAVID STRAND, Provost; JOHN K.

URICE, Vice President and Provost;

THOMAS P. WALLACE, President; the

Board of Regents; including Davip T.

Murpuy; CAROL K. BURNS;

JOSEPH B. EBBESEN; CARL E. Kas-

TEN; NANCY J. MASTERSON;

PATRICIA A. MCKENZIE; JAMES W.

MYLES; BARBARA SCHEIBLING;

NIRANJAN SHAH; and WILLIAM

SULASKI, individually and in their

capacity as members of the Board of

Regents,

Defendants.

FILED

SEP 24 1996

d

> Case No. 95-1355

JOHN M. WATERS, Clerk

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

48a

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss [#71] and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Prior Order and

for Extension of Time [#81]. For the reasons set forth below, the

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,

and Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.

Background

On March 13, 1995, three female professors employed at

Illinois State University (“the University’), Dr. Iris I. Varner,

Dr. Teresa M. Palmer, and Dr. Paula J. Pomerenke, filed a

Complaint against Illinois State University, four officials of Illi-

nois State University, the Board of Regents, and the ten members

of the board. The Complaint has been certified, as a class action

on behalf of any female teaching faculty at Illinois State Univer-

sity who was an Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, or full

Professor anytime during the period beginning with the 1982-

1983 academic year up to and including the present.

The named Plaintiffs have been employed by the University

as teaching faculty (in the case of one Plaintiff simce 1969).

Drs. Varner, Palmer, and Pomerenke allege that from the dates of

their respective employment, they have been paid less than their

male counterparts, given considerations of teaching experience,

the number of classes and class size they taught, academic papers

published, service to the University, and other matters to go to the

quality of their services. The Complaint further alleges that the

Defendants engaged in retaliation against female professors who

complained of the Defendants’ alleged employment practices.

49a

Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs brought this suit pursuant to the Equal Pay Act, 29

U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000, ef seq.; and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, et seq. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000,

et seq.; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; and

the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq.

Discussion

In resolving a motion to dismiss, this Court must consider all

well-pled facts as true and must draw all inferences in favor of the

non-moving ‘party. Bontkowski v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, 998

F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 602 (1993). In

ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts consider whether relief is

possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent

with the allegations in the Complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957). This Court will dismiss a claim only if it is

beyond doubt that no set of facts would entitle the Plaintiffs to

relief. Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp.,

987 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1993).

On August 14, 1996, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss,

to which Plaintiffs filed a Response instanter on September 10,

1996. In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants make the

following arguments: (1) By adding a Defendant, Plaintiffs have

amended the pleadings and should file an amended complaint;

and (2) Plaintiffs cannot proceed in federal court on any claims

based on the Equal Pay Act because the State of Illinois has not

consented to suit. Each of these arguments will be addressed in

turn.

John Urice (“Urice’”’) was initially named as a Defendant in

this case. However, Judge James B. Zagel of the Northern

50a

District of Illinois dismissed Urice in an Order dated August 18,

1995 because Urice was not alleged to have participated in the

basic claims of gender discrimination and had been sued in his

individual capacity. Plaintiffs then filed a related suit making

similar allegations against Urice, Case No. 96-1355. On July 15,

1996, Plaintiffs filed a Motion before this Court to add Urice as a

Defendant once again. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion on

July 26, 1996, stating that Urice was to be added as a named

Defendant in this case, and Plaintiffs were to submit a voluntary

dismissal regarding the related case against Urice. To date,

Plaintiffs have taken no steps to implement this Court’s Order.

Plaintiffs have not only failed to file an amended complaint

adding Urice to the present case, but they have also failed to

dismiss the related action. Rather, Plaintiffs state that they are

exercising “an abundance of caution” and have moved to vacate

the order they requested adding Urice as a Defendant in order “to

keep the Title VII and § 1981 claims presented in 96-1355

separate from the issues raised by Defendants under the Equal

Pay Act.” (Plaintiffs’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Plaintiffs

have presented no logical or practical reason why two separate

suits should be conducted based on the same set of facts and

similar issues. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Prior

order is denied.

Defendants argue that adding a party generally requires an

amendment to the Complaint. In the present case, they claim that

the addition of Urice as a Defendant requires Plaintiffs to file an

amended complaint because there are no allegations currently

pending against him as a result of Judge Zagel’s previous Order

dismissing Urice from the case. Thus, without an amended

complaint, Defendants claim that it is not currently possible to

determine what allegations are pending against Urice.

5la

While notice pleading may not require a plaintiff to plead in

great detail, Rule 8 does require sufficient clarity to determine

that “‘the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2).

The primary purpose of these provisions is rooted in fair

notice: Under Rule 8, a complaint “must be presented

with intelligibility sufficient for a court or opposing party

to understand whether a valid claim is alleged and if so

what it is.”

Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d, 771,

775 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Court also noted

that a properly pled complaint allows the defendant to formulate

an answer. Jd. at 776. Additionally, “[w]here an amendment of

pleadings is necessary for purposes of clarity or otherwise, after

parties have been added, the complaint should be amended.” Fair

Housing Development Fund Corp. v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414, 415

(D.C.N.Y. 1972) (quoting Bartels v. Sperti, Inc., 73 F.Supp. 751

(S.D.N.Y. 1947)).

The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to add Urice as a

Defendant with the understanding that the claims raised in the

related case were similar to those raised in the present case and

involved the same set of basic facts. In doing so, the Court sought

to eliminate unnecessary duplication and maximize judicial effi-

ciency. However, Plaintiffs have not amended their Complaint to

add Urice. Based on Judge Zagel’s previous dismissal of Urice

from this case, principles of res judicata prevent Urice from being

called upon once again to answer the same Complaint. To the

extent that Defendants’ Motion requests that the entire suit be

dismissed on these grounds, that portion of the Motion to Dismiss

is denied. Nevertheless, the portion of Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss requesting that Urice be dismissed for failure to file an

amended complaint stating any allegations against Urice is

granted. Plaintiffs have 21 days to file an Amended Complaint in

this case including allegations against Urice and to voluntarily

52a

dismiss the related suit, Case No. 96-1355, in compliance with

this Court’s July 26, 1996 Order.

Defendants ask the Court to confirm that Urice, like the

other Defendants in the case, may only be sued in his official

capacity. Judge Zagel’s August 18, 1995 Order held that Title

VII did not permit suits against supervisory employees and

dismissed all claims against Defendants in their individual capaci-

ties. However, Judge Zagel refused to dismiss claims against

Defendants in their individual capacities with respect to the Equal

Pay Act claims, with the exception of Urice. Thus, with respect to

Title VII claims, Urice, like the other Defendants, may only be

sued in his official capacity, but no such restriction would apply

with respect to Equal Pay Act claims or other claims that may be

made against Urice in the Amended Complaint.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants also allege that any

claims based on the Equal Pay Act or other parts of the Fair

Labor Standards Act should be dismissed because the State of

Illinois has not consented to suit in federal court and such a suit

therefore is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants

cite Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, US. ,

116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996), for the proposition that this Court lacks

jurisdiction over these claims because Congress did not expressly

waive the sovereign immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution.

In Seminole Tribe, the Court examined a provision of the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“the Act’), 25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(3)(A), which requires that States negotiate in good

faith with Indian tribes. The Act authorizes an Indian tribe to sue

a State for breaching the duty to negotiate in good faith. 25

U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7). The Court found that Congress did not

have the authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity

under the Indian Commerce Clause and, therefore, federal courts

do not have jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Act

53a

because the State had not consented to suit. Seminole Tribe, 116

S.Ct. at 1132-33.

Prior to the expansive view of sovereign immunity expressed

in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court had recognized congres-

sional authority to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity when

legislation was enacted pursuant to either § 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment or the Interstate Commerce Clause, based on Fitz-

patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666 (1976), and

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273

(1989), respectively. Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1125. The

Court overruled its prior holding in Union Gas, stating that “both

the result in Union Gas and the plurality’s rationale depart from

our established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and

undermine the accepted function of Article III.” Jd. The Court

found that Congress could not overcome the jurisdictional bar of

the Eleventh Amendment when legislating pursuant to the Inter-

state Commerce Clause because “Article I cannot be used to

circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal

jurisdiction” by Article III. Jd. at 1132. However, the Court did

not disturb its prior decisions with respect to legislation enacted

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, “which operated to alter

the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved

by Article III] and the Eleventh Amendment.” Jd. at 1128. Thus,

in the wake of Seminole Tribe, the only source of congressional

authority capable of abrogating sovereign immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment that has been recognized by the Supreme

Court is legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

As noted by the Defendants, the Equal Pay Act is part of the

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”). Congress expressly

54a

stated that it was enacting the FLSA pursuant to its power under

the Commerce Clause:

It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through

the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate com-

merce among the several States and with foreign na-

tions, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to

eliminate the conditions above referred to in such indus-

ties [sic] without substantially curtailing employment

or earning power.

29 U.S.C. § 202(b); see also Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577

F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding that the Equal Pay Act is a

valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause).

Plaintiffs admit that the FLSA was enacted pursuant to

Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause but argue that the

portion of the FLSA constituting the Equal Pay Act was enacted

in furtherance of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment and therefore should be undisturbed by Seminole

Tribe, citing Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital,

581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978), in support of this position. In

Marshall, the Sixth Circuit found that the Equal Pay Act amend-

ments to the FLSA were authorized by § 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Jd. at 119 (quoting Usery v. Allegheny County

Institution Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430

U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1582 (1977), and Usery v. Charleston County

School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977).

In Allegheny County, the Third Circuit rejected the proposi-

tion that because the Equal Pay Act is housed within the FLSA

and uses its administrative and enforcement mechanisms, it is

necessarily a Commerce Clause enactment. 544 F.2d at 155.

Rather, “the Equal Pay Act is a separate law, enacted at a

different time, and aimed at a separate problem—discrimination

on account of sex in the payment of wages” and “Congress has

§ 5 fourteenth amendment power to prohibit sex discrimination.”

55a

Id. The Fourth Circuit adopted this view in Charleston County

adding that, unlike the other provisions of the FLSA:

[T]he Equal Pay Act is an anti-discrimination measure;

and, as such, may be viewed as an exercise of Congress’

power to adopt legislation enforcing the Fourteenth

Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law.

558 F.2d at 1170.

The Seventh Circuit has adopted analogous reasoning with

respect to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“ADEA”), which was also amended to authorize suits against

state, and local governments. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982). In Elrod, the

Seventh Circuit set forth the test for determining whether legisla-

tion is enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as

“whether the objectives of the legislation are ‘within Congress’

power under the amendment.” 674 F.2d at 608 (emphasis in

Original ).

The Seventh Circuit found that despite the fact that the

ADEA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, it was

also a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Jd. at 603; see also, Davidson v. Board of Governors

of State Colleges, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). Prohibiting

arbitrary or discriminatory government conduct is the “very

essence” of the guarantee of equal protection under the Four-

teenth Amendment. Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604. This reasoning is also

consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court with regard to

Title VII in Fitzpatrick, which was affirmed in Seminole Tribe.

116 S.Ct. at 1125, 1128.

In light of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in connection with

the ADEA cases, this Court agrees with the position taken by the

Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits that the portion of the FLSA

constituting the Equal Pay Act was enacted to prohibit

56a

discrimination in pay based on sex in furtherance of the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, sov-

ereign immunity would not insulate the State of Illinois from suit

under Seminole Tribe. Accordingly, the portion of Defendants’

Motion requesting dismissal of all claims based on the Equal Pay

Act is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the portion of Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss [#71] requesting dismissal with leave to file

an amended complaint adding Urice as a defendant is

GRANTED and the portion requesting dismissal of the Equal

Pay Act claims is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Prior

Order and for Extension of Time [#81] is DENIED. Plaintiffs

have 21 days to file an Amended Compiaint in this case including

allegations against Urice and to voluntarily dismiss the related

suit, Case No. 96-1355. This case is referred to Magistrate Judge

Robert J. Kauffman.

ENTERED this 24th day of September, 1996.

MICHAEL M. MIHM

Chief United States District Judge

57a

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seg.

§ 203. Definitions

As used in this chapter—

+++ ¢ €

(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and

(4) the term “employee” means any individual employed by an

employer.

(2) In the case of an individual employed by a public

agency, such term means—

(A) any individual employed by the Government of the

United States—

(i) as a civilian in the military departments (as

defined in section 102 of Title 5),

(ii) in any executive agency (as defined in

section 105 of such title),

(iii) in any unit of the judicial branch of the

Government which has positions in the competitive

service,

(iv) in a nonappropriated fund instrumentality

under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces,

(v) in the Library of Congress, or

(vi) the Government Printing Office;

(B) any individual employed by the United States

Postal Service or the Postal Rate Commission; and

58a

(C) any individual employed by a State, political subdi-

vision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency, other

than such an individual—

(i) who is not subject to the civil service laws of

the State, political subdivision, or agency which em-

ploys him; and

(11) who—

(1) holds a public elective office of that

State, political subdivision, or agency,

(II) is selected by the holder of such an

office to be a member of his personal staff,

(III) is appointed by such an officeholder to

serve on a policymaking level,

(IV) is an immediate advisor to such an of-

ficeholder with respect to the constitutional or legal

powers of his office, or

(V) is an employee in the legislative branch

or legislative body of that State, political subdivi-

sion, or agency and is not employed by the legisla-

tive library of such State, political subdivision, or

agency.

s+ ¢ 2

(x) “Public agency” means the Government of the United

States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof;

any agency of the United States (including the United States

Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a State, or a

political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental

agency.

59a

§ 206. Minimum Wage

*+t & £

Prohibition of sex discrimination

(d)(1) No employer having employees subject to any provi-

sions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment

in which such employees are employed, between employees on

~ the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establish-

ment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to

employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal

work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,

and responsibility, and which are performed under similar work-

ing conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to

(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (ili) a system which

measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a

differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided,

That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in

violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the

provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any

employee.

§ 216. Penalties

*e¢2t

(b) Damages; right of action; attorney’s fees and costs;

termination of right of action

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or

section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or

employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum

wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may

be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any

employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a) (3) of this

title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be

appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of

60a

this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement,

promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal

amount as liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability

prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained

against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal

or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more

employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other

employees similarly situated. No employee shall be 2 party

plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing

to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in

which such action is brought. The court in such action shall, in

addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,

allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and

costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring

an action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any

employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, shall

terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor

in an action under section 217 of this title in which (1) restraint is

sought of any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum

wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensation, as the

case may be, owing to such employee under section 206 or

section 207 of this title by an employer liable therefor under the

provisions of this subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is

sought as a result of alleged violations of section 215(a) (3) of

this title.

6la

CONSTITUTION

OF THE

STATE OF ILLINOIS

Date Effective

Adopted at Special Election on December 15, 1970

General Effective July 1, 1971

ARTICLE I. BILL OF RIGHTS

§ 18. No Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or

abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local

government and school districts.

62a

CHAPTER 775

HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT 5. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

ARTICLE 1. TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITIONS

775 ILCS 5/1-101

5/1-101. Short title

§ 1-101. Short Title. This Act shall be known and may be

cited as the Illinois Human Rights Act.

775 ILCS 5/1-102

5/1-102. Declaration of policy

§ 1-102. Declaration of Policy. It is the public policy of this

State:

(A) Freedom from Unlawful Discrimination. To secure for

all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination

because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age,

marital status, physical or mental handicap, or unfavorable dis-

charge from military service in connection with employment, real

estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability

_ of public accommodations.

(B) Freedom from Sexual Harassment-Employment and

Higher Education. To prevent sexual harassment in employment

and sexual harassment in higher education.

(C) Freedom from Discrimination Based on Citizenship

Status-Employment. To prevent discrimination based on citizen-

ship status in employment.

63a

(D) Freedom from Discrimination Based on Familial Sta-

tus-Real Estate Transactions. To prevent discrimination based

on familial status in real estate transactions.

(E) Public Health, Welfare and Safety. To promote the

public health, welfare and safety by protecting the interest of all

people in Illinois in maintaining personal dignity, in realizing their

full productive capacities, and in furthering their interests, rights

and privileges as citizens of this State.

(F) Implementation of Constitutional Guarantees. To se-

cure and guarantee the rights established by Sections 17, 18 and

19 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(G) Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action. To establish

Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action as the policies of this

State in all of its decisions, programs and activities, and to assure

that all State departments, boards, commissions and instrumen-

talities rigorously take affirmative action to provide equality of

opportunity and eliminate the effects of past discrimination in the

internal affairs of State government and in their relations with the

public.

(H) Unfounded Charges. To protect citizens of this State

against unfounded charges of unlawful discrimination, sexual

harassment in employment and sexual harassment in higher

education, and discrimination based on citizenship status in

employment.

TTS ILCS 5/1-103

5/1-103. General definitions

§ 1-103. General Definitions. When used in this Act, unless

the context requires otherwise, the term:

(A) Age. “Age” means the chronological age of a person

who is at least 40 years old, except with regard to any practice

64a

described in Section 2-102, insofar as that practice concerns

training or apprenticeship programs. In the case of training or

apprenticeship programs, for the purposes of Section 2-102, “age”’

means the chronological age of a person who is 18 but not yet

40 years old.

(B) Aggrieved Party. “Aggrieved party” means a person

who is alleged or proved to have been injured by a civil rights

violation or believes he or she will be injured by a civil rights

violation under Article 3 that is about to occur.

(C) Charge. “Charge” means an allegation filed with the

Department by an aggrieved party or initiated by the Department

under its authority.

(D) Civil Rights Violation. “Civil rights violation” in-

cludes and shall be limited to only those specific acts set forth in

Sections 2-102, 2-103, 2-105, 3-102, 3-103, 3-104, 3-104.1, 3-105,

4-102, 4-103, 5-102, SA-102 and 6-101 of this Act.

(E) Commission. “Commission” means the Human Rights

Commission created by this Act.

(F) Complaint. “Complaint” means the formal pleading

filed by the Department with the Commission following an

investigation and finding of substantial evidence of a civil rights

violation.

(G) Complainant. “Complainant” means a person includ-

ing the Department who files a charge of civil rights violation with

the Department or the Commission.

(H) Department. “Department” means the Department of

Human Rights created by this Act.

(1) Handicap. “Handicap” means a determinable physical

or mental characteristic of a person, including, but not limited to,

a determinable physical characteristic which necessitates the

person’s use of a guide, hearing or support dog, the history of such

65a

characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the

person complained against, which may result from disease, injury,

congenital condition of birth or functional disorder and which

characteristic:

(1) For purposes of Article 2 is unrelated to the person’s

ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position;

(2) For purposes of Article 3, is unrelated to the person’s

ability to acquire, rent or maintain a housing accommodation;

(3) For purposes of Article 4, is unrelated to a person’s

ability to repay;

(4) For purposes of Article 5, is unrelated to a person’s

ability to utilize and benefit from a place of public

accommodation.

(J) Marital Status. “Marital status” means the legal status

of being married, single, separated, divorced or widowed.

(K) National Origin. “National origin” means the place in

which a person or one of his or her ancestors was born.

(L) Person. “Person” includes one or more individuals,

partnerships, associations or organizations, labor organizations,

labor unions, joint apprenticeship committees, or union labor

associations, corporations, the State of Illinois and its im tcumen-

talities, political subdivisions, units of local government, legal

representatives, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers.

(M) Public Contract. “Public contract’ includes every

contract to which the State, any of its political subdivisions or any

municipal corporation is a party. .

(N) Religion. “Religion” includes all aspects of religious

observance and practice, as well as belief, except that with respect

to employers, for the purposes of Article 2, “religion” has the

meaning ascribed to it in paragraph (F) of Section 2-101.

66a

(O) Sex. “Sex” means the status of being male or female.

(P) Unfavorable Military Discharge. “Unfavorable mili-

tary discharge” includes discharges from the Armed Forces of the

United States, their Reserve components or any National Guard

or Naval Militia which are classified as RE-3 or the equivalent

thereof, but does not include those characterized as RE-4 or

“Dishonorable”.

(Q) Unlawful Discrimination. “Unlawful discrimination”

means discrimination against a person because of his or her race,

color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status,

handicap or unfavorable discharge from military service as those

terms are defined in this Section.

ARTICLE 2. EMPLOYMENT

775 ILCS 5/2-101

5/2-101. Definitions

§ 2-101. Definitions. The following definitions are applica-

ble strictly in the context of this Article.

(A) Employee.

(1) “Employee”’ includes:

(a) Any individual performing services for remu-

neration within this State for an employer,

(b) An apprentice;

(c) An applicant for any apprenticeship.

(2) “Employee” does not include:

(a) Domestic servants in private homes;

(b) Individuals employed by persons who are not

“employers” as defined by this Act;

67a

(c) Elected public officials or the members of

their immediate personal staffs;

(d) Principal administrative officers of the State or

of any political subdivision, municipal corporation or

other governmental unit or agency;

(e) A person in a vocational rehabilitation facility

certified under federal law who has been designated an

evaluee, trainee, or work activity client.

(B) Employer.

(1) “Employer” includes:

(a) Any person employing 15 or more employees

within Illinois during 20 or more calendar weeks within

the calendar year of or preceding the alleged violation;

(b) Any person employing one or more employees

when a complainant alleges civil rights violation due to

unlawful discrimination based upon his or her physical

or mental handicap unrelated to ability or sexual

harassment;

(c) The State and any political subdivision, munic-

ipal corporation or other government unit or agency,

without regard to the number of employees;

(d) Any party to a public contract. without regard

to the number of employees;

(e) A joint apprenticeship or training committee

without regard to the number of employees.

(2) “Employer” does not include any religious corpora-

tion, association, educational institution, society, or non-

profit nursing institution conducted by and for those who rely

upon treatment by prayer through spiritual means in accor-

dance with the tenets of a recognized church or religious

68a

denomination with respect to the employment of individuals

of a particular religion to perform work connected with the

carrying on by such corporation, association, educational

institution, society or non-profit nursing institution of its

activities.

(C) Employment Agency. “Employment Agency” includes

both public and private employment agencies and any person,

labor organization, or labor union having a hiring hall or hiring

office regularly undertaking, with or without compensation, to

procure opportunities to work, or to procure, recruit, refer or place

employees.

(D) Labor Organization. “Labor Organization” includes

any organization, labor union, craft union, or any voluntary

unincorporated association designed to further the cause of the

rights of union labor which is constituted for the purpose, in whole

or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers

concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or

apprenticeships or applications for apprenticeships, or of other

mutual aid or protection in connection with employment, includ-

ing apprenticeships or applications for apprenticeships.

(E) Sexual Harassment. “Sexual harassment” means any

unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any

conduct of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such conduct

is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an

individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such

conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment

decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the

purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s

work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive

working environment.

(F) Religion. “Religion” with respect to employers in-

cludes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as

belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to

69a

reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective em-

ployee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship

on the conduct of the employer’s business.

(G) Public Employer. “Public employer” means the State,

an agency or department thereof, unit of local government, school

district, instrumentality or political subdivision.

(H) Public Employee. “Public employee” means an em-

ployee of the State, agency or department thereof, unit of local

government, school district, instrumentality or political subdivi-

sion. “Public employee” does not include public officers or

employees of the General Assembly or agencies thereof.

(1) Public Officer. “Public officer” means a person who is

elected to office pursuant to the Constitution or a statute or

ordinance, or who is appointed to an office which is established,

and the qualifications and duties of which are prescribed, by the

Constitution or a statute or ordinance, to discharge a public duty

for the State, agency or department thereof, unit of local govern-

ment, school district, instrumentality or political subdivision.

(J) Eligible Bidder. “Eligible bidder” means a person who,

prior to a bid opening, has filed with the Department a properly

completed, sworn and currently valid employer report form,

pursuant to the Department’s regulations. The provisions of this

Article relating to eligible bidders apply only to bids on contracts

with the State and its departments, agencies, boards, and com-

missions, and the provisions do not apply to bids on contracts with

units of local government or school districts.

(K) Citizen Status. “Citizenship status” means the status

of being:

(1) a born US. citizen;

(2) a naturalized U.S. citizen;

(3) a US. national; or

70a

(4) a person born outside the United States and not a

U.S. citizen who is not an unauthorized alien and who is

protected from discrimination under the provisions of Sec-

tion 1324b of Title 8 of the United States Code, as now or

hereafter amended.

775 ILCS 5/2-102

5/2-102. Civil rights violations—Employment

§ 2-102. Civil Rights Violations—Employment. It is a civil

rights violation:

(A) Employers. For any employer to refuse to hire, to

segregate, or to act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion,

renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship,

discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of

employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination or citizenship

status.

(B) Employment Agency. For any employment agency to

fail or refuse to classify properly, accept applications and register

for employment referral or apprenticeship referral, refer for em-

ployment, or refer for apprenticeship on the basis of unlawful

discrimination or citizenship status or to accept from any person

any job order, requisition or request for referral of applicants for

employment or apprenticeship which makes or has the effect of

making unlawful discrimination or discrimination on the basis of

citizenship status a condition of referral.

(C) Labor Organization. For any labor organization to

limit, segregate or classify its membership, or to limit employ-

ment opportunities, selection and training for apprenticeship in

any trade or craft, or otherwise to take, or fail to take, any action

which affects adversely any person’s status as an employee or as an

applicant for employment or as an apprentice, or as an applicant for

apprenticeships, or wages, tenure, hours of employment or

Tla

apprenticeship conditions on the basis of unlawful discrimination or

citizenship status.

(D) Sexual Harassment. For any employer, employee,

agent of any employer, employment agency or labor organization

to engage in sexual harassment; provided, that an employer shall

be responsible for sexual harassment of the employer’s employees

by nonemployees or nonmanagerial and nonsupervisory employ-

ees only if the employer becomes aware of the conduct and fails

to take reasonable corrective measures.

(E) Public Employers. For any public employer to refuse to

permit a public employee under its jurisdiction who takes time off

from work in order to practice his or her religious beliefs to

engage in work, during hours other than such employee’s regular

working hours, consistent with the operational needs of the

employer and in order to compensate for work time lost for such

religious reasons. Any employee who elects such deferred work

shall be compensated at the wage rate which he or she would have

earned during the originally scheduled work period. The employer.

may require that an employee who plans to take time off from

work in order to practice his or her religious beliefs provide the

employer with a notice of his or her intention to be absent from

work not exceeding 5 days prior to the date of absence.

(F) Training and Apprenticeship Programs. For any em-

ployer, employment agency or labor organization to discriminate

against a person on the basis of age in the selection, referral for or

conduct of apprenticeship or training programs.

(G) Immigration-Related Practices. For an employer to

request for purposes of satisfying the requirements of Sec-

tion 1324a(b) of Title 8 of the United States Code, as now or

hereafter amended, more or different documents than are re-

quired under such Section or to refuse to honor documents

tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine.

72a

It is not a civil rights violation for an employer to take any

action that is required by Section 1324a of Title 8 of the United

States Code, as now or hereafter amended.

775 ILCS 5/2-103

5/2-103. Arrest record

§ 2-103. Arrest Record. Unless otherwise authorized by

law, it is a civil mghts violation for any employer, employment

agency or labor organization to inquire into or to use arrest

information or criminal history record information ordered ex-

punged, sealed or impounded under Section 5 of the Criminal

Identification Act’ as a basis to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to

act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of

employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge,

discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employ-

ment. This Section does not prohibit a State agency, unit of local

government or school district, or private organization from utiliz-

ing conviction information obtained from the Department of State

Police under the provisions of Section 3 of the Criminal Identifi-

cation Act’ in evaluating the qualifications and character of an

employee or a prospective employee.

775 ILCS 5/2-104

5/2-104. Exemptions

§ 2-104. Exemptions.

(A) Nothing containea in this Act shall prohibit an em-

ployer, employment agency or labor organization from:

(1) Bona Fide Qualification. Hiring or selecting

between persons for bona fide occupational qualifications or

73a

any reason except those civil-rights violations specifically

identified in this Article.

(2) Veterans. Giving preferential treatment to veterans

and their relatives as required by the laws or regulations of

the United States or this State or a unit of local government.

(3) Unfavorable Discharge From Military Ser-

vice. Using unfavorable discharge from military service as a

valid employment criterion when authorized by federal law

or regulation or when a position of employment involves the

exercise of fiduciary responsibilities as defined by rules and

regulations which the Department shall adopt.

(4) Ability Tests. Giving or acting upon the results of

any professionally developed ability test provided that such

test, its administration, or action upon the results, is not used

as a subterfuge for or does not have the effect of unlawful

discrimination.

(5) Merit and Retirement Systems.

(a) Applying different standards of compensation,

or different terms, conditions or privileges of employ-

ment pursuant to a merit or retirement system provided

that such system or its administration is not used as a

subterfuge for or does not have the effect of unlawful

discrimination.

(b) Effecting compulsory retirement of any em-

ployee who has attained 65 years of age and who, for the

2-year period immediately preceding retirement, is em-

ployed in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking

position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate

nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension,

profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation plan,

or any combination of such plans of the employer of

such employee, which equals, in the aggregate, at least

74a

$44,000. If any such retirement benefit is in a form

other than a straight life annuity (with no ancillary

benefits) or if the employees contribute to any such plan

or make rollover contributions, the retirement benefit

shall be adjusted in accordance with regulations pre-

scribed by the Department, so that the benefit is the

equivalent of a straight life annuity (with no ancillary

benefits) under a plan to which employees do not

contribute and under which no rollover contributions are

made.

(c) Under January 1, 1994, effecting compulsory

retirement of any employee who has attained 70 years of

age, and who is serving under a contract of unlimited

tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited

tenure) at an institution of higher education as defined

by Section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of

1965.'

(6) Training and Apprenticeship Programs. Establish-

, ing an educational requirement as a prerequisite to selection

for a training or apprenticeship program, provided such

requirement does not operate to discriminate on the basis of

any prohibited classification except age.

(7) Police and Firefighter Retirement. Imposing a

mandatory retirement age for firefighters or law enforcement

officers if prior to December 31, 1993, the law enforcement

officer or firefighter has attained the age of retirement in

effect under applicable state or local law on March 3, 1983

and if such retirement action is taken pursuant to a bona fide

retirement plan. This paragraph (7) shall not apply with

respect to any cause of action arising under the Illinois

Human Rights Act as in effect prior to December 3, 1987

(the effective date of Public Act 85-949).

75a

(8) Police and Firefighter/Paramedic Appointment.

Failing or refusing to hire or to discharge any individual

because of such individual’s age if such action is taken with

respect to the employment of an individual as a firefighter/

paramedic or as a law enforcement officer and the individual

has attained the age of hiring or retirement in effect under

applicable State or local law, which provides a maximum age

hiring limitation or for mandatory retirement, in effect on or

before March 3, 1983.

As used in this paragraph (8):

(a) “Firefighter/paramedic” means an employee,

the duties of whose position are primarily to perform

work directly connected with the control and extinguish-

ment of fires or the maintenance and use of firefighting

apparatus and equipment, or to provide emergency

medical services, including an employee engaged in this

activity who is transferred to a supervisory or adminis-

trative position.

(b) “Law enforcement officer” means an em-

ployee, the duties of whose position are primarily the

investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals

suspected or convicted of criminal offenses, including an

employee engaged in this activity who is transferred to a

supervisory or administrative position.

The provisions of this paragraph (8) shall remain in

effect until December 31, 1993 or until similar provisions in

Section 4 of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (29 U.S. Code 623) are deleted or repealed,

whichever is later.

(9) Citizenship Status. Making legitimate distinctions

based on citizenship status if specifically authorized or re-

quired by State or federal law.

76a

(B) With respect to any employee who is subject to a

collective bargaining agreement:

(a) which is in effect on June 30, 1986,

(b) which terminates after January 1, 1987,

(c) any provision of which was entered into by a labor

organization as defined by Section 6(d) (4) of the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(4)), and

(d) which contains any provision that would be super-

seded by this amendatory Act of 1987 (Public Act 85-748),

such amendatory Act of 1987 shall not apply until the termination

of such collective bargaining agreement or January 1, 1990,

whichever occurs first.

775 ILCS 5/2-105

5/2-105. Equal employment opportunities—Affirmative action

§ 2-105. Equal Employment Opportunities, Affirmative

Action.

(A) Public Contracts. Every party to a public contract and

every eligible bidder shall:

(1) Refrain from unlawful discrimination and discrimi-

nation based on citizenship status in employment and under-

take affirmative action to assure equality of employment

opportunity and eliminate the effects of past discrimination;

(2) Comply with the procedures and requirements of

the Department’s regulations concerning equal employment

Opportunities and affirmative action;

(3) Provide such information, with respect to its em-

ployees and applicants for employment, and assistance as the

Department may reasonably request.

T7a

(B) State Agencies. Every State executive department,

State agency, board, commission, and instrumentality shall:

(1) Comply with the procedures and requirements of

the Department’s regulations concerning equal employment

opportunities and affirmative action;

(2) Provide such information and assistance as the

Department may request.

(3) Establish, maintain, and carry out a continuing

affirmative action plan consistent with this Act and the

regulations of the Department designed to promote equal

opportunity for all State residents in every aspect of agency

personnel policy and practice. For purposes of these affirma-

tive action plans, the race and national origin categories to be

included in the plans are: African American, Hispanic or

Latino, Native American, Asian, and any other category as

required by Department rule. This plan shall include a

current detailed status report:

(a) indicating, by each position in State service,

the number, percentage, and average salary of individu-

als employed by race, national origin, sex and disability,

and any other category that the Department may re-

quire by rule;

(b) identifying all positions in which the percent-

age of the people employed by race, national origin, sex

and disability, and any other category that the Depart-

ment may require by rule, is less than four-fifths of the

percentage of each of those components in the State

work force;

(c) specifying the goals and methods for increas-

ing the percentage by race, national origin, sex and

disability, and any other category that the Department

may require by rule, in State positions,

78a

(d) indicating progress and problems toward

meeting equal employment opportunity goals, including,

if applicable, but not limited to, Department of Central

Management Services recruitment efforts, publicity,

promotions, and use of options designating positions by

linguistic abilities;

(e) establishing a numerical hiring goal for the

employment of qualified persons with disabilities in the

agency as a whole, to be based on the proportion of

people with work disabilities in the Illinois labor force as

reflected in the most recent decennial Census.

(4) If the agency has 1000 or more employees, appoint

a full-time Equal Employment Opportunity officer, subject

to the Department’s approval, whose duties shall include:

(a) Advising the head of the particular State

agency with respect to the preparation of equal employ-

ment opportunity programs, procedures, regulations, re-

ports, and the agency’s affirmative action plan.

(b) Evaluating in writing each fiscal year the suffi-

ciency of the total agency program for equal employ-

ment opportunity and reporting thereon to the head of —

the agency with recommendations as to any improve-

ment or correction in recruiting, hiring or promotion

needed, including remedial or disciplinary action with

respect to managerial or supervisory employees who

have failed to cooperate fully or who are in violation of

the program.

(c) Making changes in recruitment, training and

promotion programs and in hiring and promotion proce-

dures designed to eliminate discriminatory practices

when authorized.

79a

(d) Evaluating tests, employment policies, prac-

tices and qualifications and reporting to the head of the

agency and to the Department any policies, practices

and qualifications that have unequal impact by race,

national origin as required by Department rule, sex or

disability or any other category that the Department

may require by rule, and to assist in the recruitment of

people in underrepresented classifications. This function

shall be performed in cooperation with the State

Department of Central Management Services.

(e¢) Making any aggrieved employee or applicant

for employment aware of his or her remedies under this

Act.

(5) As used in this subsection (B), “disability” shall be

defined in rules promulgated under the Illinois Administra-

~ tive Procedure Act.'

(C) Civil Rights Violations. It is a civil rights violation for

any public contractor or eligible bidder to:

(1) fail to comply with the public contractor’s or eligi-

ble bidder’s duty to refrain from unlawful discrimination and

discrimination based on citizenship status in employment

under subsection (A)(1) of this Section; or

(2) fail to comply with the public contractor’s or eligi-

ble bidder’s duties or affirmative action under sub-

section (A)(1) of this Section and subsection (A)(2) and

(A) (3) of this Section, provided however, that the Depart-

ment has notified the public contractor or eligible bidder in

writing by certified mail that the public contractor or eligible

bidder may not be in compliance with affirmative action

requirements of subsection (A)(1) and with sub-

sections (A)(2) and (A) (3) of this Section, and is given a

minimum of 60 days to comply with the requirements.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Appendix — Illinois State University v. Varner · 528 U.S. 1110 | Frix