Opposition Brief — Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services

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Supreme Court, U.S

@ rILCe®D

No. 97-1113 FEB 5 1998

In the CLERK

Sapreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997

GRANVILLE AMOS, e/ al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR.

Attorney General of Maryland

CARMEN M. SHEPARD*

Deputy Attorney General

STEPHANIE LANE-WEBER

JOHN B. HOWARD, JR.

Assistant Attorneys General

200 St. Paul Place, 20th Floor

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

(410) 576-7055

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did Congress make unmistakably clear in § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act an intent to alter the constitutional balance

so that these federal acts apply to the core state function of

operating state prisons?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CUES TION PRECaGeeROM 656 be koro oso ee er ee i

STATE AGICe Se See Gn Woo es coh skeen l

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........... 3

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY

DECIDED THE CENTRAL ISSUES IN

THIS CASE BY ADHERING TO THIS

CRP we Pe OEE S ce el ce thee kk 3

CEE ec a Gh te a ee cae donee eee ks 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Amos v. Md. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr.

Services, 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997) ... passim

Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997) .. . 2

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,

GE BEE See eevee hbase 84s 4

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) ............... 4

Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections,

bee 0 OTe fe oe”, 7) ele 2

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) ......... 4,5

Lewis v. Casey, 116 §.Ct. 2174 (1996) ............. 4

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,

We Sie EN ee Savas crear si as ces 4

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) ........ 4.5

e WF et 6 ee ee

ili

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) ....

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) ......

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

Ee WA WOW CET OEE 5 a0 hv onc eee nbd ee

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) ....

Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 772 (1996) ......

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) ..........

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) .....

White v. Colorado, 82 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1996)

Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,

FG Al CEPT Ci ok Shee cick eos

Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections,

118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted,

pf} PE |. |.

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS:

42 U.S.C.

ES Re | Se epee ons wipe rere

29 U.S.C.A.

§630(b)(2) (West 1985) ..............

42 US.C.A,

se oe Oe ee ee OW ee ee oe OY ot ee a ae Se

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

ee ae ok ko er wR ea

vy. fa

‘a

ee ee

ors

No. 97-1113

In the

Supreme Court of the Huited States

October Term, 1997

GRANVILLE AMOS, ef al.,

Petitioners,

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners, thirteen disabled inmates at the Roxbury

Correctional Institution (“RCI”) in Hagerstown, Maryland,

filed this action against the Maryland Department of Public

Safety and Correctional Services, RCI, Division of

Correction Commissioner Richard Lanham, and RCI

Warden Jon P. Galley, seeking injunctive relief and

damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §

794 et seq.)(the “Rehabilitation Act”) and Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. §§ 12131 to 12165. The plaintiffs alleged that RCI

was not handicap-accessible in a number of respects,

thereby limiting their ability to participate in various prison

programs and to access or use certain prison facilities. In

addition, the prisoners alleged that they were denied needed

medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

On January 26, 1996, the district court granted the

State’s motion for summary judgment on the claims for

injunctive relief in light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in

Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996), which granted state prison

officials qualified immunity from ADA and Rehabilitation

Act claims, and strongly intimated that those statutes do not

apply to the operation of state prisons. The district court

also subsequently dismissed the medical claims.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that

the operation of state prisons could not “be subjected to the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act unless there has been a

clear and plain statement from Congress permitting federal

intrusion into this area of historic state control” and “that

Congress has made no such clear statement regarding the

application of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to state

prisons.” Amos v. Md. Dept. of Public Safety & Corr.

Services, 126 F.3d 589, 600-601 (4th Cir. 1997). The

Fourth Circuit’s decision accorded with the Tenth Circuit’s

decision in White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364 (10th Cir. 1996)

(holding that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not apply

to state prisons), but was at odds with decisions from the

Third and Seventh Circuits, see Yeskey v. Pennsylvania

Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir.1997), cert.

granted, _U.S. ___ (1998)(holding that the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act apply to state prisons); Crawford v.

Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481 (7th

Cir.1997)(same). The Ninth Circuit subsequently followed

the Third and Seventh Circuits in holding that the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act apply to state prisons. Armstrong v.

Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DECIDED

THE CENTRAL ISSUES IN THIS CASE BY

ADHERING TO THIS COURT’S PRECEDENTS

The Court should deny the petition for writ of certiorari —

because the Fourth Circuit correctly decided this issue, in a

thorough and meticulously reasoned opinion. Reviewing

and reaffirming its strong wicta from Torcasio, the court of

appeals held that “Congress must make its intention to alter

the constitutional balance between the States and the

Federal Government unmistakably clear” in its statutory

language. Amos, 126 F.3d at 594. Management of state

prisons, the court reasoned, is an area traditionally reserved

to the states, and “Congress failed to speak with

unmistakable clarity on the issue of whether the

Rehabilitation Act and the ADA apply to state prisons.”

Amos, 126 F.3d at 595-596. The court considered and

rejected contentions that the operations of state or local

correctional facilities are the types of “programs” or

“activities” contemplated by the statutory language of the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Amos, 126 F.3d at 601.

Although this Court has recently granted certiorari in

Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168

(3d Cir.1997), to decide the applicability of the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act to state prisons, if would be proper to

deny certiorari in this case because the Fourth Circuit’s

decision persuasively and faithfully followed this Court’s

“clear statement” precedents.’

The appeals court, reaffirming its 7orcasio rationale,

looked to the well-established rule of statutory construction

' In the alternative, this Court should hold the petition in

abeyance pending decision in Yeskey.

that, to alter the constitutional balance between the States

and the Federal Government, Congress must make that

intent unmistakably clear in the statute's language. Amos,

126 F.3d at 595. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); Pennhurst State School and

Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The

requirement that Congress leave no doubt about its intent,

the Fourth Circuit noted, has unique force “‘[iJn

traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the

federal balance’” to ensure that the legislature has in fact

faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters

involved in the judicial decision.” Amos, 126 F.3d at 604,

quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).

See also Gregory v. Ashcrofi, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991);

Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65

(1989).

Turning to a different line of this Court’s cases, the

Fourth Circuit observed that the management of state

prisons is, beyond dispute, a core state function. Amos, 126

F.3d at 595 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,

412 (1974) (holding that "[o}ne of the primary functions of

government is the preservation of societal order through

enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of

penal institutions is an essential part of that task"),

overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490

U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989)); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 491-92 (1973) ("It is difficult to imagine an activity in

which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more

intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and

procedures, than the administration of its prisons."); see

also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987); Rhodes

v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174,

2197 (1996)(Thomas, J., concurring)(stating that the federal

judiciary has no authority “to take control of core state

institutions like prisons, schools, and hospitals, and assume

the responsibility for making the difficult policy judgments

that state officials are both constitutionally entitled and

uniquely qualified to make.”)

The high degree of deference to state prerogatives in

prison management, the appeais court reasoned, “‘is in

significant measure motivated by the realization that

principles of comity and federalism apply with special force

in the context of correctional facilities.’"" Amos, 126 F.3d at

596 (quoting 7orcasio, 57 F.3d at 1346 (citing Procunier,

416 U.S. at 405) ("where state penal institutions are

involved, federal courts have ... reason for deference to the

appropriate prison authorities") and Preiser, 411 U.S. at

492, (the "internal problems of state prisons involve issues

[that are] peculiarly within state authority and expertise")).

Scrutinizing the language of the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act, the appeals court properly determined that this Court’s

“closely analogous” decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501

U.S. 452 (1991), controlled. In Gregory, this Court held

that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),

despite its express abrogation of the States' Eleventh

Amendment immunity, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(b)(2) (West

1985), did not apply to state judges because the statute did

not unmistakably state its intent to intrude on the core

function of state court judicial management.

Similarly, although the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity, see 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000d-7(a)(1); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12202, those acts

did not address an intent to intrude into the core state

function of state prison management. Just as this Court

found that the ADEA did not clearly apply to state judges,

see Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467 (statute "is sufficiently broad

that we cannot conclude that the statute plainly covers

appointed state judges"), here the broad coverage of state

“programs” and “activities” leaves considerable doubt about

Congress’s intent to micromanage state prisons.

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit was absolutely correct in

“declin[ing] to attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on

a core state function in the face of statutory ambiguity.”

Amos, 126 F.3d at 605.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,