Brief for the United States — Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. Bestfoods

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/ ® NOV 12 1997

No. 97-296 and 97-464 ERIK

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

PETITIONER

v.

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., CROSS-PETITIONER

v.

AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION AND CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a parent corporation can be held di-

rectly liable under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2), as an operator of its

wholly-owned subsidiary’s facility, based on the

parent corporation’s own actions in directing the

operation of the facility at the time of disposal of

hazardous substances (Question Presented in No.

97-296).

2. Whether, if the Court grants the petition for a

writ of certiorari in No. 97-296, it should also review

the Sixth Circuit’s holding that Aerojet-General is

not liable as an “operator” (Question Presented in No.

97-464).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Cordova Chemical Co. v. MDNR, 536 N.W.2d 860

(Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 554 N.W.2d

PO bon piuaeednavedienin 7-8

Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ........... 5

United States v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 83 F.3d510

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United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 113

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United States v. CPC, Int'l, Inc., petition for cert.

pending, No. 97-454 (filed Sept. 10, 1997) ............. 2, 3,8

United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796 (8th

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Statutes, regulations and rule:

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.:

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§ 104(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. 9604(C)(6) ........ceeeccceseeeeeeees

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$ 113(fX(2), 42 U.S.C. SGIS(E)(2) ............ecceecesseeees

§ 122(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9622(d)(2)(B) ............6+

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IV

Statutes, regulations and rule—Continued: Page

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104(i), 100 Stat.

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Miscellaneous:

H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ....... 5, 10

OES

Jn the Supreme Court of the Giited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-296

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

PETITIONER

Vv.

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

No. 97-464

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., CROSS-PETITIONER

v.

AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION AND CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

STATEMENT

The Michigan Department of Environmental Qual-

ity (MDEQ) seeks review of a decision of the United

| States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in

(1)

Dn eran Ee a

2

United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 113 F.3d 572

(1997) (en banc). See 97-296 Pet. App. la-42a. The de-

cision holds, among other things, that two corpora-

tions, CPC International, Inc. (CPC), and Aerojet-

General Corporation (Aerojet), are not liable to the

United States and the MDEQ, under Section 107(a) of

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42

U.S.C. 9607(a), for the governments’ expenses in

responding to releases of hazardous substances from

a facility located near Muskegon, Michigan. The

United States has also filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari seeking review of that decision. United

States v. CPC, Int'l, Inc., petition for cert. pending,

No. 97-454 (filed Sept. 10, 1997). The United States’

petition sets forth the facts and procedural history of

the case in the lower courts. See 97-454 Pet. 3-14.

The United States and the MDEQ have raised the

same issue in their respective petitions for a writ of

certiorari. Each urges that the court of appeals erred

in ruling that a parent corporation that actively par-

ticipates in, and exercises control over, a wholly-

owned subsidiary’s facility does not qualify as an

“operator” of the facility. Compare 97-454 Pet. I, 15-

21, with 97-296 Pet. i, 8-19. The petitions differ, how-

ever, in that the United States seeks relief against

both CPC and Aerojet, while the MDEQ seeks relief

only against CPC. Compare 97-454 Pet. II, 20-21, with

97-296 Pet. ii, 4. The MDEQ’s decision to seek relief

against only one of the companies has prompted CPC

to file a conditional cross-petition urging that, if the

Court grants the MDEQ’s petition, it should review

Aerojet’s liability as well. See 97-464 Pet. i, 4-7.

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ARGUMENT

The United States submits this brief to explain

our understanding of the relationship between the

United States’ petition for a writ of certiorari, the

MDEQ’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and CPC’s

conditional cross-petition. As described below, the

United States and the MDEQ each have impor-

tant and complementary interests in the issue pre-

sented by their petitions, but, as a consequence of

CERCLA’s statutory provisions and the facts of this

particular case, their interests are not entirely con-

gruent. The United States and the MDEQ agree on

the question of law at issue here. The United States

suggests, however, as a matter of sound procedure,

that the Court should hold the MDEQ’s petition and

CPC’s conditional cross-petition pending the Court’s

disposition of the United States’ petition in No.

97-454, which places before the Court all of the rele-

vant parties and all of the relevant claims.

1. As noted in the United States’ petition (97-454

Pet. 3-6), Congress enacted CERCLA to create a

comprehensive federal program for addressing the

national problem posed by decades of improper dis-

posal of hazardous substances. CERCLA authorizes

the United States to undertake direct response ac-

tions to protect the public from the release and

threatened release of hazardous substances. See

CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. 9604. CERCLA also

grants the United States authority to issue orders

and to seek injunctive relief to compel persons to

respond to releases, or threats of release of those

substances. See CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. 9606.

CERCLA provides a mechanism for financing

government-initiated cleanups of hazardous waste

sites and recovering those costs from the responsible

parties. Upon satisfying statutory conditions, the

United States may use the “Hazardous Substance

Superfund” as the initial source of funding for federal

response actions. See CERCLA §§ 101(11), 104, 42

U.S.C. 9601(11), 9604; 26 U.S.C. 9507. The United

States may then bring judicial actions against re-

sponsible parties under Section 107 of CERCLA to

recover the government’s response costs and replen-

ish the Superfund. 42 U.S.C. 9607.

The individual States have a significant role in

federally-financed cleanups. Of particular relevance

here, Section 104(c)(3) of CERCLA requires each

State to provide cost-sharing and other assurances

before any Superfund-financed remedial action may

take place. Section 104(c)(3) provides in relevant part:

The President shall not provide any remedial ac-

tions pursuant to this section unless the State in

which the release occurs first enters into a con-

tract or cooperative agreement with the President

providing assurances deemed adequate by the

President that (A) the State will assure all future

vintenance of the removal and remedial actions

provided for the expected life of such actions as

determined by the President * * * and (C) the

State will pay or assure payment of (i) 10 per

centum of the costs of the remedial action, includ-

ing all future maintenance [or (ii) 50 percent or

more in circumstances where the State operated

the facility at which the release occurred].

42 U.S.C. 9604(c)(3). In other words, the State is

responsible for (1) paying 10 percent of the costs of a

Superfund-financed “remedial action” at a facility

that has not been operated by the State, and (2) fully

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funding the costs of “maintenance” of the remedial

action under CERCLA. See 40 C.F.R. 300.435(f),

300.510; see also Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1543-1545

(D.C. Cir. 1998).

Section 104(c)(6) of CERCLA provides that, for pur-

poses of subsection (c)(3) cost share and maintenance

responsibilities, treatment measures necessary to

restore ground or surface water quality shall be

considered “remedial action,” rather than “operation

and maintenance,” for a period of up to ten years after

commencement of operations, or until the ground

or surface water quality is restored to a level that

ensures protection of human health and the en-

vironment.! 42 U.S.C. 9604(c)(6); see 40 C.F.R.

300.435(f)(3). Consequently, for groundwater treat-

ment remedies (such as the one being implemented at

the “Muskegon” site), the United States contributes

90 percent of the funding for the operation and main-

tenance of the groundwater treatment remedy, and

the State contributes the remaining 10 percent of the

funding, for up to ten years after the remedy becomes

operational. Thereafter, the State pays the full main-

tenance costs for the groundwater treatment mea-

sure.

2. The United States has incurred the bulk of the

response costs to date for cleaning up the hazardous

conditions at the Muskegon site. Nevertheless, the

MDEQ (which was formerly known as the Michigan

Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)), has also

1 The Section 104(c)(6) provisions were added to CERCLA

through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104(i), 100 Stat. 1620; see

also H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1, at 60, 70

(1985); Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d at 1544.

incurred significant response costs at the site. See,

e.g., 97-296 Pet. App. 82a-83a (stipulation and order en-

tered in April 1992 by the district court indicating

that the MDNR had incurred $1.65 million in past

response costs); see also 97-296 Pet. App. 80a. Both

the United States and the MDEQ will also incur

future response costs at the Muskegon site.

Most significantly, the MDEQ will be obligated

to pay its statutory cost-share of implementing the

groundwater treatment measure at the site. The

EPA has not yet declared the groundwater treatment

remedy “operational and functional.” See 40 C.F.R.

300.435(f)(3). Once it does so, Section 104(c) of

CERCLA will require the MDEQ to pay 10 percent of

the operation costs for up to ten years and to pay the

full costs of operation and maintenance in the ensuing

years. 42 U.S.C. 9604(c). The EPA currently esti-

mates that the long-term operation of that remedy

will last approximately 30 years and, therefore, that

the present value of the MDEQ’s financial commit-

ment at this site is likely to be substantial.

3. Section 107 of CERCLA provides that the

United States, as well as a State, may recover re-

sponse costs from the parties that Congress has

deemed liable under the statute. See CERCLA § 107,

42 U.S.C. 9607. In the instant case, the United States

filed a cost recovery action under Section 107 of

CERCLA to recover its response costs at the Muske-

gon site against CPC, Aerojet, Aerojet’s subsidiaries,

Cordova Chemical Company (Cordova/California) and

Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan (Cordova/

Michigan), and Arnold Ott. See 97-296 Pet. 5. The

MDEQ initially was drawn into this dispute be-

cause CPC and Aerojet filed contribution actions

against the MDNR. The MDNR later filed a counter-

7

claim against CPC and a cross-claim against Aerojet

and the Cordova subsidiaries for cost recovery and

contribution. Ibid.’

The MDEQ also has an unusual financial interest

in the instant cost-recovery action against CPC and

Aerojet that arises from the pre-litigation history_of

the Muskegon site. In 1977, Aerojet’s subsidiary,

Cordova/California, purchased the site and also en-

tered into an agreement with the MDNR under which

Cordova/California agreed to undertake certain clean-

up actions, the MDNR agreed to share in the funding

of those actions, and the MDNR agreed to indemnify

Cordova/California for other expenses. 97-296 Pet.

App. 105a-112a. The Michigan state courts have held

that because of that agreement, the MDNR must in-

demnify Aerojet and its Cordova subsidiaries against

any CERCLA liability that they may incur at

the Muskegon site. See Cordova Chemical Co. v.

2 CPC actually initiated the legal actions by filing contribu-

tion actions in anticipation of the United States’ suit. See

97-296 Pet. 4-5. CPC sued not only the MDNR, but also

Aerojet, the Cordova subsidiaries and ultimately CPC’s insurer,

while Aerojet and the Cordova subsidiaries filed claims against

CPC. 97-296 Pet. 5. The district court, which consolidated the

actions for resolution in three phases (liability, remedy, and in-

surance coverage, 97-296 Pet. App. 139a-140a), has not resolved

any of the contribution claims brought by the companies

against each other. Jbid.; see id. at 8la. The district court dis-

missed contribution claims brought by CPC and Aerojet against

the MDNR under CERCLA, holding that the MDNR was not

liable as an operator under Section 107(a)(2) or as an arranger

for disposal of hazardous waste under Section 107(a)(3). See

97-296 Pet. App. 127a-131a, 138a. The court of appeals affirmed

the district court’s decision regarding arranger liability, the

only claim against the MDNR that was appealed. See id. at

13a-14a.

8

MDNR, 536 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal

denied, 554 N.W.2d 319 (Mich. 1996) (Table).

The MDEQ’s petition indicates that the MDEQ

does not seek relief against Aerojet, but seeks review

of only that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment

pertaining to the liability of CPC as an operator of

the Muskegon site under Section 107(a)(2) of

CERCLA. See 97-296 Pet. ii, 4. As CPC’s conditional

cross-petition suggests, the MDEQ appears to have

limited its requested relief in that way to avoid sub-

jecting itself to potential liability as Aerojet’s indem-

nitor. See 97-464 Pet. 5 & n.4. The United States, by

contrast, has sought relief against both CPC and

Aerojet because, in the United States’ view, they are

both directly liable as “operators” under CERCLA.’

See 97-454 Pet. 20-21.

4. As the foregoing discussion indicates, the

United States has the predominant interest in the

outcome of this case under the CERCLA framework,

but the MDEQ also has substantial interests under

CERCLA. The MDEQ’s position in this case appears

to be affected, however, by its potential financial

obligations under an indemnity agreement with one of

the respondents, which has prompted CPC to file its

conditional cross-petition. The United States sub-

3 This does not mean, of course, that they ultimately would

be subject to the same monetary assessment for the conditions

at the Muskegon site. Under CERCLA’s statutory contribu-

tion provisions, if CPC and Aerojet are found to be jointly and

severally liable, they would be entitled as a matter of con-

tribution to obtain an equitable allocation of their respective

shares of the response costs. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42

U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court

may allocate response costs among liable parties using such

equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”).

mits that, if (as we urge) the Court decides to grant

review in this case, it can most effectively accommo-

date the various interests of the parties by holding

the MDEQ’s petition and CPC’s cross-petition until

the Court resolves the issue set out in the United

States’ petition for writ of certiorari. That procedure

would place all of the relevant parties and claims

before the Court.

The United States’ petition and the MDEQ’s peti-

tion present an identical legal question for the

Court’s review. They differ only ir that the United

States seeks reversal of the court of appeals’ judg-

ment with respect to both CPC and Aerojet, while the

MDEQ seeks reversal solely with respect to CPC.

Hence, the MDEQ could pursue its specific claim

against CPC as a respondent supporting the United

_ States’ position under Rule 12.6 of the Rules of this

Court, while the MDEQ’s own petition remains pend-

ing for appropriate relief should that position prevail.

At the same time, the United States’ request for

relief against both CPC and Aerojet would also

satisfy CPC’s concern that the Court also consider

the potential liability of Aerojet. Because the United

States’ petition effectively places all of the relevant

parties and issues before the Court, there is no

need to follow the procedurally cumbersome course

of granting two petitions and a conditional cross-

petition to achieve the same result.*

* In light of CPC’s concerns about its liability vis-a-vis

Aerojet, we note that the United States had settlement dis-

cussions with the MDEQ and Aerojet before filing its petition

in this caSe, and those discussions are likely to continue. The

United States is, of course, receptive to resolving the liability

of potentially responsible parties through settlement on rea-

sonable terms and in accordance with the provisions of

10

CERCLA. Under CERCLA’s provisions, such settlements af-

fect the rights of other parties to contribution from the settling

parties. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(2). In the

event that the United States, the MDEQ, and Aerojet should

ultimately reach agreement respecting Aerojet’s liability, the

proposed settlement agreement would be formalized in a

proposed consent decree that would be subject to public notice

and comment before receiving final approval. See CERCLA

§ 122(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9622(d)(2)(B); 28 C.F.R. 50.7.

Under the United States’ standard practice in CERCLA

cases, a proposed consent decree is lodged in the district court

in which the action is pending, and the United States publishes

a notice of the proposed consent decree in the Federal

Register. Persons who are not parties to the proposed consent

decree are given at least 30 days before its entry as a final

judgment to provide comments. The United States considers,

and files with the court, all such comments, and the United

States may withhold its consent to the proposed decree if the

comments “disclose facts or considerations which indicate that

the proposed judgment is inappropriate, improper, or in-

adequate.” CERCLA § 122(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9622(d)(2)(B);

see 28 C.F.R. 50.7. Furthermore, in approving a consent de-

cree, a district court must determine that the settlement is rea-

sonable, fair, and consistent with the purposes that CERCLA is

intended to serve. See, e.g., United States v. Charter Int'l Oil

Co., 83 F.3d 510, 515 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Hercules,

Inc., 961 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1992); see also H.R. Rep. No.

253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 3, at 19 (1985).

Hence, in the event that settlement discussions resume while

this case is pending before the Court and an agreement is

reached, CPC would have a full opportunity to comment on the

proposed terms and raise objections before the agreement is

entered as a final consent decree.

11

5 CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 97-296

and the conditional cross-petition in No. 97-464 should

be held and disposed of in accordance with this

Court’s disposition of the United States’ petition for a

writ of certiorari in No. 97-454.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

NOVEMBER 1997

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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